



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

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Newport Paper: 21

**MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

Purpose: To examine the emerging Maritime Homeland Security mission and develop a preliminary concept of operations (CONOPS).

Background: Military commanders are charged with making operational decisions. Every day, they and their staffs resolve many simple, routine and/or complex problems. To help them think through their options, while applying their knowledge, experience and judgment, military commanders use a decision-making tool called the Commander's Estimate of the Situation.

The estimate of the situation is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting a military situation as to a course of action (COA) to be taken to accomplish a mission. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the CES process as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission."

In the CES, the commander evaluates all the elements of a situation that impact the employment of forces and assets. The decision to select a certain COA is the basis for the development of plans and the issuing of combat orders. The commander's estimate also transmits the decision to the next higher command echelon for approval.

The commander's estimate leads to the adoption of a COA that is:

- ?? Adequate (one that accomplishes the mission),
- ?? Feasible (one that allows for the accomplishment of the assigned mission with forces and assets available), and
- ?? Acceptable (one that is worth the estimated cost or risks).

Discussion: The detailed methodology for conducting a CES is contained in NWP 5-01 (Rev A), *Naval Operational Planning*. The generic commander's estimate consists of seven principal steps:

?? **Mission Analysis.** The superior's mission is dissected to identify the specified and implied tasks and to distill the essential tasks, those required to achieve the conditions which define success. Married with the purpose of the mission and coupled with a review of restraints and constraints, the commander states known facts and assumptions leading to a restated mission. With this review the Commander can now issue his initial planning guidance and intent to his staff.

?? **Analysis of Factors Affecting Possible Courses of Action.** Identify those factors that might influence the choice of a course of action and to draw conclusions about how these factors might favor or hinder own or enemy courses of actions. The aim is to identify and tabulate strengths and weaknesses for own and enemy forces and to make an initial determination of the *adequacy* of one's own forces. Traditionally, the principal factors affecting the possible courses of action of both sides in a conflict are factors space, forces, time, and their interactions.

?? **Enemy Courses of Action (ECOAs).** Identify enemy capabilities and then estimate how the enemy commander could combine those capabilities into enemy courses of action (ECOAs). The primary source of information on ECOAs is the intelligence estimate. Enemy capabilities are considered in the light of all known factors impacting military actions, including time, space, and forces.

?? **Own Courses of Action (COAs).** A COA is any course of action open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission. For each COA, the commander must envisage the employment of own forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed restrictions and limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions previously determined during earlier steps in the CES process.

?? **Analysis of Enemy Courses of Action and Own Courses of Action.** The heart of the commander's estimate process, this analysis is nothing more than war gaming - either manual or computer assisted. In the previous steps of the estimate, ECOAs and COAs were examined relative to their basic concepts. ECOAs were developed based on enemy capabilities and COAs developed based on own mission and capabilities. In this step a dynamic analysis is made of the probable impact each ECOA has on the chances of success of each COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs. Predicted outcomes may also show the need to consider additional modifications to the COAs that could mitigate risk or improve the likelihood of success.

?? **Comparison of Own Courses of Action.** Consider each COA's advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final assessments of feasibility and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each.

?? **The Decision.** Finally, the commander selects the single COA that, in his estimation, offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. A concept of operations (CONOPS) to support the COA is determined and the commander states his intent.

In practice these steps may not take place in the sequence listed, but might occur concurrently with each other.

Issues. During the course of conducting the CES for the Maritime Homeland Security mission, the following issues were identified:

- ?? What is the proper location and size of Joint Operating Area (JOA)? Is there a requirement for a 200 NM extension of the maritime JOA?
- ?? Who are the maritime forces? Navy, Coast Guard, USMC, Canada, Mexico, other coalition partners or allies?

- ?? Intelligence & Information collection and dissemination.
 - ?? Can we detect threats?
 - ?? Is JFCOM integrating the overall detection plan and what are the maritime tasks?
- ?? What are the civil authority support requests?
- ?? Does maritime actually have a NORAD support mission?
- ?? Who is the interagency lead for Homeland Security?
- ?? What are the size, composition, and tasks for the maritime portion of the reaction force?
- ?? What support will the Land Component (and other components) require from the maritime forces?

- ?? What is/are the measure(s) of effectiveness - no leakers?

- ?? What do we need to do to streamline our Command and Control arrangements? (LANT/PAC, USN/USCG, NORAD, JFCOM/PACOM/SOUTHCOM/TRANSCOM)

- ?? What additional international and/or domestic legal authorities or modifications does JFCOM need to accomplish the mission?
 - ?? New laws/regulations required for C2?
 - ?? New laws/regulations required to accomplish mission?
 - ?? Coordination and promulgation of Rules of Engagement/Use of Force policies in the HLS interagency environment.

- ?? What are "critical infrastructures?" What "critical infrastructures" are required to be protected by the maritime force?

- ?? Force Sustainment Issues.
 - ?? Mobilization level required?
 - ?? RRF activation?
 - ?? USN hull transfers to USCG?
 - ?? New construction (USN/USCG)?

?? Coalition contributions?

Recommendations/Actions: Recently, the CINLANTFLT and JFCOM staffs, together with the Naval War College Operational Planning staff, assisted by the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies, developed a Commander's Estimate of the situation and a preliminary CONOPS for Maritime Homeland Security.

The classified Maritime Homeland Security CONOPS may be viewed at the NWDC HLS web site:

<http://nwdc.navy.smil.mil> under the CONOPS menu,

or directly at:

[http://mbc.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/media/NewportPapers_Maritime_HLS_CONOPS\(Secret\).doc](http://mbc.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/media/NewportPapers_Maritime_HLS_CONOPS(Secret).doc)