



## **NEWPORT PAPERS**

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A Series of Point Papers  
from the Naval War College and the  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
For Senior Leadership  
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

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United States Naval War College  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
Newport, Rhode Island

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**Newport Paper: 22****HOMELAND SECURITY  
MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL**

**Issue.** The maritime Command and Control (C2) Structure for Homeland Security

**Background.** Prior to 11 September 2001, U.S. maritime forces had planned on the Cold War structure of the U.S. Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) Atlantic and Pacific Commands to provide for U.S. coastal and harbor defense (NWP 3-10 *Naval Coastal Warfare*). When activated, these commands were to coordinate defense operations using Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) forces composed of active duty and reserve Navy and Coast Guard personnel in cooperation with other commands and agencies. Coast Guard District Commanders were to serve as NCW Commanders and local Coast Guard Captains of the Port were to serve as designated Harbor Defense Commanders within the activated MDZ Structure. In order for this structure to be implemented, USCG assets were to be shifted from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Defense, specifically under command and control of the U.S. Navy. Due to numerous factors arising from the 11 September 2001 attack, many of which are tied directly to the diffuse nature of the terrorist threat, many USN and USCG leaders believe that the MDZ structure is not suitable for today's maritime defense mission. Therefore, a new C2 structure should be developed and considered that focuses all affected federal, state, and local authorities on the maritime security mission and clearly establishes who is the lead agency.

**Discussion.**

- a. **Threat.** The maritime HLS organization must be organized to deter and defeat a new type of enemy – one which can asymmetrically attack targets within the maritime area of operations from within and beyond the continent, by air, land, and sea. The threat will be long-term, and to defeat it, the maritime C2 organization requires access to national C4ISR with a fused and responsive all-source intelligence structure. This structure must be designed to detect the danger with sufficient standoff in both time and space to allow for neutralization of the threat.
- b. **Joint and Interagency Requirements.** Though much of the maritime HLS force structure will be built upon some combination of naval and Coast Guard assets, the organization will also require the support of other DoD Services, as well as many Federal, State, and local agencies, in order to accomplish its mission. Such an organization must be configured to assimilate these dissimilar forces and to address their unique requirements. The organization must resolve a myriad of force interoperability challenges, not the least of which will include: communications, intelligence dissemination, differing views of ROE and use of force, and varying legal authorities.

c. **Nature of the C2 Problem in HLS.** Existing C2 structures are insufficient to address the many C4ISR and operational facets of the HLS problem: the number of CINCs owning a significant portion of the problem (JFCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, NORAD, TRANSCOM); the extensive USN/USCG cooperation required; the desirability of melding LANT/PAC efforts; and the necessary participation by other government agencies and departments (DOT, DOJ, TREASURY, STATE, COMMERCE, DOE, HLS). It also includes state and local authorities and international alliance/coalition military and law enforcement agencies. All these make a clearly defined command and control structure imperative. Attempts to combine multiple existing C2 structures into a single entity (or organize commands, agencies, or departments into a single existing command structure) may prove less capable of action or decision-making than creating a specialized C2 organization which is responsive to the specific mission of HLS.

d. **Common Assumptions.**

Due to the size of the US coastline and traditional maritime working relationships, two concurrently operating structures may be required: one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific.

USCG retains statutory authorities regardless of C2 structure.

CINCJFCOM retains no less than OPCON for all potential models.

e. **Potential Command and Control Options.**

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC): USCG lead

?? Pros: a solid structure for unity of command/effort; USCG more familiar with the capabilities and requirements of other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and the coordination issues involved with working with them.

?? Cons: the JFMCC concept is not designed to support interagency operations; the USCG is currently unfamiliar with JFMCC organizational structure and developing doctrine; no existing USCG C2/C4ISR structure is available to provide such command; and, this construct requires the USCG operational commanders to report to (and be tasked directly by) JFCOM, which may not be acceptable to the Coast Guard.

JFMCC: USN lead

?? Pros: a solid structure for unity of command/effort; the USN is more familiar with this organizational structure and is developing a JFMCC doctrine (Preliminary Coordination Draft NWP 3-32 *Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Handbook*); Navy C4ISR is extant; this construct provides good linkage with JFCOM.

?? Cons: the JFMCC structure is not designed to support interagency operations; the USN is not organized, trained and equipped for such a large coastal protection role; present legal restrictions would hamper

USN effectiveness in law enforcement activities; and, the USN tasking authority over USCG assets is not defined.

~~✍~~ ~~✍~~ MARDEZ

?? Pros: unity of command/effort; doctrine established; C2 structure and staff augments identified; previously gamed; least manpower intensive

?? Cons: theory only; not interagency; places USN in the “lead” for HLS as the MARDEZ is a USN echelon three command

~~✍~~ ~~✍~~ New organizational structure under HLS Cabinet Post: TBD

?? Issues: undefined structure with yet to be identified legal and budgetary authority.

~~✍~~ ~~✍~~ Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs)/Joint Task Forces (JTFs) -

?? Pros: strongest USCG lead command authority for HLS; solid structure for unity of command/effort; provides for a clear link to JFCOM; currently exists as an established C2 relationship; provides best available structure for interagency coordination; two standing models (JIATF East and West) provide examples - the missions of JIATF East and West could even be expanded to include HLS.

?? Cons: the JTF/JIATF structure is the most manpower intensive option.

**Conclusion.** It should be recognized that HLS will be an enduring mission of the DoD - likely lasting for decades. Time should be taken at the outset to construct the C2 framework which will be most responsive to mission requirements. Presidential and/or congressional actions and/or legislation may be required to properly implement any of the above structures. In any event, a decision must be made so that coordination and planning can go forward.

**Recommendation.** The JTF/JIATF model offers the best combination of structure, function, and ease of implementation to solve the current C2 issue surrounding maritime HLS. It provides the Area Coast Guard Commanders with operational control of forces from CINCJFCOM while retaining all USCG missions and statutory authorities. This/these organization(s) should be built on existing headquarters structures (existing JIATFs, MARDEZ, Naval Numbered Fleet Commands, Area/District Coast Guard commands) to avoid piecing together an ad hoc organization. Further, Fleet Forces Command should be designated as the single naval component for CINCJFCOM’s execution of the maritime HLS mission.



**Recommended Command and Control Structure**

