



---

## NEWPORT PAPERS

---

A Series of Point Papers  
from the Naval War College and the  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
For Senior Leadership  
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

---

United States Naval War College  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
Newport, Rhode Island

## Contents

### Newport Papers

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Points of Contact</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
<b><u>Strategy and Policy</u></b>				
<u>01</u>	Strategy and Policy Considerations: The Terror War	Prof. George Baer Prof. Andrew Ross CAPT Robert McCabe, USN	24 Sept 01	1
<u>02</u>	U.S. War Objectives	Prof. Tom Mahnken	24 Oct 01	4
<u>03</u>	U.S. War Objectives: How Narrow or Broad?	Prof. Andrew Ross	25 Oct 01	7
<u>04</u>	U.S. War Objectives: Near, Medium, and Long Term	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	12 Nov 01	10
<u>05</u>	Terror War: Is a Formal "Declaration of War" Needed?	Prof. Nick Rostow COL Fred Borch, USA	12 Oct 01	14
<u>06</u>	What Is The Kind Of War Upon Which We Are Embarking?	Prof. Bill Fuller Prof. Mac Owens	22 Oct 01	16
<u>07</u>	The Terror War: Perspectives on Coalition Issues	CDR Stephen Kenny, RN Prof. Christopher Bell Prof. Bruce Elleman	28 Nov 01	20
<u>08</u>	Enemy Objectives	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	11 Dec 01	23
<u>09</u>	The Strategy of Usama bin Laden and <i>Al Qaeda</i> Annex A: The Worldview and Motivations of Usama bin Laden	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	19 Dec 01	26 31
<u>10</u>	Potential Adversaries in the Terror War: Individuals, Groups, and States	Prof. Ahmed Hashim Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	1 Feb 02	36
<u>11</u>	Russia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	11 Dec 01	42

<a href="#"><u>12</u></a>	China and the Terror War	Prof. Jonathan Pollack Prof. Bruce Elleman Prof. Lyle Goldstein	4 Jan 02	46
<a href="#"><u>13</u></a>	Japan and the Terror War	Prof. Bruce Elleman	4 Jan 02	50
<a href="#"><u>14</u></a>	The Terror War: Alternative Futures	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	14 Feb 02	54
<a href="#"><u>15</u></a>	Pakistani Militant Groups: Policy Challenges and Solutions	Mr. Owen Sirrs	20 Feb 02	58
<a href="#"><u>16</u></a>	The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Terror War	Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	14 Mar 02	62
<a href="#"><u>17</u></a>	Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Symposium Executive Summary	Prof. Lawrence Modisett	2 Apr 02	66
<a href="#"><u>18</u></a>	Central Asia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	1 May 02	75
<a href="#"><u>19</u></a>	NATO and the Global War on Terror	Prof. Catherine McArdle Kelleher	21 May 02	79
<a href="#"><u>20</u></a>	Grand Strategy for the Terror War	Prof. Mac Owens	22 May 02	84
<b><u>Operational Concepts</u></b>				
<a href="#"><u>21</u></a>	Maritime Homeland Security: Concept of Operations	CAPT Michael Critz, USN	25 Oct 01	88
<a href="#"><u>22</u></a>	Homeland Security: Maritime Command and Control	Prof. John Ballard, USN CAPT Michael Critz, USN	23 Oct 01	92
<a href="#"><u>23</u></a>	Maritime Homeland Command and Control: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks	LCDR D. Scott Bauby, USCG	23 May 02	96
<a href="#"><u>24</u></a>	Employing Aerial Coercion to Combat Terrorism: Recommendations for the Theater CINC	MAJ Mark T. Damiano, USAF	23 May 02	102
<a href="#"><u>25</u></a>	Terrorist Application of Operational Art	LCDR Marc E. Tranchemontagne, USN	23 May 02	111

### *National Security Decisions*

<a href="#"><u>61</u></a>	Navy Decision Making in the Terror War: "Home Games" vs. "Away Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	26 Oct 01	124
<a href="#"><u>62</u></a>	Justice as a U.S. War Aim: The Legal Implications	COL Fred Borch, USA	14 Nov 01	131
<a href="#"><u>63</u></a>	The Use of Force in the War on Terror: A Legal Perspective	COL Fred Borch, USA	05 Dec 01	134
<a href="#"><u>64</u></a>	U.S. Naval Reserve: The Navy's Team for "Home Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	16 Dec 01	136
<a href="#"><u>65</u></a>	How Are We Doing? Assessing Progress in the War on Terrorism.	Prof. Tom Mahnken	16 Dec 01	140
<a href="#"><u>66</u></a>	Military Support to Civil Authorities: "Navy Roles and Responsibilities in Domestic Support Operations"	CAPT Steve Morris, SC, USN	18 Dec 01	144
<a href="#"><u>67</u></a>	Carrier Deployments: One Option (Classified paper, view on: <a href="http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil">www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil</a> )	Prof. Jim Giblin	17 Dec 01	NA
<a href="#"><u>68</u></a>	Economic Dimensions of the Terror War	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	1 May 02	152
<a href="#"><u>69</u></a>	Technological Mobilization for the Terror War	Prof. William Martel	21 May 02	157
<a href="#"><u>70</u></a>	Pakistani Madrassahs and the Spread of Militant Radicalism	Mr. Owen Sirrs	22 May 02	162
<a href="#"><u>71</u></a>	How Now Shall We Fight? The Relevance of the Law of Armed Conflict to the United States and Its Coalition Members in Light of the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001	LCDR Tony F. DeAlicante, JAGC, USN	23 May 02	165



---

## NEWPORT PAPERS

---

A Series of Point Papers  
from the Naval War College and the  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
For Senior Leadership  
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

---

United States Naval War College  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
Newport, Rhode Island

## Newport Papers: 23

---

### MARITIME HOMELAND COMMAND AND CONTROL: TEACHING AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS

**Purpose:** to discuss how the United States should view and conduct command & control for maritime homeland defense.

**Discussion:** On the morning of 12 September 2001, the United States awoke to the sobering challenge of securing and defending the maritime homeland from the threat of terrorism. Navy ships sailed on short notice to deliver impromptu coastal air defense. Coast Guard cutters patrolled coastal waters and harbors. Customs Service Port Directors surveyed the staggering volume of commercial vessel and container traffic, pouring through major port facilities. There was no command and control of the maritime homeland. Instead, there was independent effort. The Navy tracked commercial aircraft, the Coast Guard escorted commercial vessels, and the Customs Service inspected commercial containers. Organizational schemes, some left over from the Cold War and some adapted from the Drug War, were cobbled together to converge on an undefined maritime terrorism threat. Maritime Action Groups, Port Security Units, and Inter-Agency Task Forces relied upon *ad hoc* measures of coordination and cooperation. Five months later, a tough question still lingers. How should the United States command & control the maritime homeland?

The short answer is one commander, presiding over a unified command and control structure. Military services and federal agencies should serve as resource and force providers – to a single commander. Canadian and Mexican maritime services should coordinate with one U.S. commander.

The long answer is a command and control structure limited to three echelons, with centralized direction by objectives and decentralized execution by zones. The homeland security mission is inherently defensive -- secure, protect, defend. The area of operations is vast and non-contiguous, including coastlines and island archipelagoes in two oceans. Organization by security objectives and geographic zones is a new trick for an old dog.

#### *The Old Dog*

Unity of effort in the maritime homeland is attainable only by closing the seams separating law enforcement security and military defense, and by filling the void between shore defense and naval offense. The lessons of the past can lead us toward the future.

The Ancient Greeks fortified the entire Port of Piraeus and the road to Athens inside the great Long Walls in order to establish a shore defense in the maritime homeland, while their fleet protected distant trade routes and fought distant naval battles.<sup>1</sup> The United States employed this ancient strategy as late as World War II, when Navy Admiral Adolphus Andrews took command of the Eastern Sea Frontier and counted only twenty obsolete barges, tugs, and Coast Guard cutters at his disposal for defending the entire U.S. Atlantic Coast.<sup>2</sup> Army artillery fortifications defended strategic ports and coastal territory from enemy naval attack, while the Navy pursued enemy fleets in distant waters. Later during the Cold War, a Maritime Defense Zone strategy was developed to defend the U.S. against a naval attack from the Soviet Union. In the late 20th Century, modern transnational threats from poachers, smugglers, and terrorists generated a host of new agencies and task forces to fight largely independent maritime interdiction Wars on Illegal Drugs and Migration. In every case, independent command and control structures were constructed to counter individual maritime homeland security threats – German U-Boats, Soviet naval forces, and narcotics smugglers.

A new government entity has emerged, while new command and control structures have been proposed -- all focused on one threat, terrorism. However, the security and defense of the maritime homeland is larger than one threat. The old habit of creating a new command and control structure, tailored to meet each new maritime threat, should be left behind in the Twentieth Century. The old dog needs to learn a new trick -- command and control by security objectives, not by emerging threats.

### ***Objectives***

The first step toward designing a unified command and control organization is to define the security objectives. More specifically, the desired end state and the strategic objectives for Homeland Security must be converted into operational objectives. While various strategic documents outline specific threats and objectives, a desired state of homeland security has yet to be defined. In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission revealed the lack of coherent strategic guidance for homeland security and recommended an urgent effort to focus strategy and resources on the homeland.<sup>3</sup>

One year later, the newly established Office of Homeland Security still has not defined the desired strategic end state or the strategic objectives. However, in the absence of clear guidance, a desired state of maritime homeland security can be extrapolated from existing security strategy. The National Security Strategy defines an end state for international security, "A stable, peaceful international security environment is the desired end state -- one in which our nation, citizens, and interests are not threatened."<sup>4</sup> This desired security environment translates to the homeland through established strategic objectives.

The National Security Strategy also identifies seven objectives under the common goal of Protecting the Homeland: National Missile Defense, Countering Foreign Intelligence, Combating Terrorism, Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Critical Infrastructure Protection, National Security Emergency Preparedness, and Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other International Crime.<sup>5</sup> One might insert the words "maritime" and "homeland" into each objective and declare them operational objectives. However, this simple conversion would produce a traditional equation for command and control -- independent objectives focused on threats. Several of these objectives also represent the mission of existing military commands and federal agencies. Somehow, these established strategic objectives should translate into clear operational objectives for the maritime homeland.

In order to establish attainable and coherent operational objectives, a common denominator must underscore each objective and lead toward the desired state of maritime security. *Secure and defend* is the common denominator for the maritime homeland. What must be secured and defended? The National Security Strategy answers this question succinctly: citizens, territory, infrastructure, resources, and interests.<sup>6</sup> Critical infrastructure is expressed in terms of energy, transportation, water, finance, telecommunications, and emergency services. Resources include living and non-living marine resources claimed in the Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends two hundred miles seaward from the baseline.<sup>7</sup> Interests are clarified to represent desired conditions within the international community, and as a result, do not translate entirely to the maritime homeland. The defense of military capabilities and information vital to national security are international security objectives, which translate logically to the homeland. In summary, the strategic guidance for maritime homeland security already exists in clear and concise form. A desired security environment and clear operational objectives for the maritime homeland can be derived directly from this existing strategic guidance.

### ***Desired State of Maritime Homeland Security***

An environment in which our coastal population, sovereignty, infrastructure, and resources are secure against threats from the sea.

### ***Strategic Objective***

Prevent, Detect, and Defeat maritime threats against major coastal population centers, territorial integrity and sovereign waters, critical coastal infrastructure, and marine resources.

### ***Operational Objectives***

(1) Secure and defend coastal territory and major coastal population centers.

- (2) Secure and defend citizens and shipping in territorial and internal waters.
- (3) Secure and defend energy, telecommunications, transportation, emergency services, and military capabilities infrastructure in territorial and internal waters.
- (4) Secure and defend information deemed to be vital to national security, that is located or accessible in territorial and internal waters.
- (5) Secure and defend living and non-living marine resources in the exclusive economic zone.
- (6) Secure and defend waters adjacent to a coastal emergency and assist the consequence management effort from the sea.


The desired security environment, strategic objective, and operational objectives provide a coherent framework for building a command and control structure. This can unify efforts to secure and defend specific objectives in the maritime homeland against *all* maritime threats.

**Centralized Direction by Objectives**

Centralized direction is a fundamental tenet of command and control.<sup>8</sup> Concise guidance and decisions flowing downward in an organization are reciprocated by clear accountability flowing upward. The logic of this concept is an accepted norm within military and law enforcement cultures. The challenge lies in applying this concept to a unified command and control organization that combines both cultures. The answer is found in the common denominator of achieving objectives. The first echelon of maritime homeland command and control should be organized by security objectives.

It is necessary to unite efforts of the Coast Guard, Naval Service, and Customs Service, primarily responsible for maritime homeland security, under a common command and control structure, without diluting individual Service capabilities or controls. The disparate geographic areas of control used by each Service must be synchronized. Coast Guard District Commanders, Naval Force Commanders, and Customs Special Agents in Charge must preside over similar geographic spans of control. Military and law enforcement efforts must be synchronized

The complexity of existing spans of control provides sound support for organizing the first echelon of maritime homeland command and control according to operational objectives. Security and defense objectives can unite effort, centralize direction, and



clarify responsibility for achieving maritime security and defense objectives. The six proposed objectives could also represent the six functional components of maritime homeland security.

**Subordination**

Once the command and control structure is oriented directly toward operational objectives, the challenge proceeds to the process of linking this organization into the national hierarchies of control. The National Command level must exercise ultimate control over the defense of the maritime homeland, while National Law Enforcement Authorities must exercise ultimate control over law and order in the maritime homeland.

The most effective structure to integrate these fundamental controls is a combination of the Cold War Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) structure, the current Defense Department Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) structure, and the Drug War Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) structure. The strong aspects of each organization can be used in synergy. The MDZ concept integrates Reserve forces and translates a common command and control structure between peacetime and wartime. The JFMCC concept integrates homeland maritime operations into the Unified Command Plan and the national chain of command. The JIATF concept produces fused intelligence and inter-agency synchronization, under the control of law enforcement authority. The answer to maritime homeland command and control is combining the best parts of all three models. The ideal organization should transition between wartime and peacetime, plug into the national intelligence network, and integrate defense and law enforcement efforts. However, the combination of these optimum contributions must first pass through a review of statutory constraints and options.

### ***Statutory Considerations***

The over-arching statutory constraint to synchronizing defense and law enforcement efforts is the *Posse Comitatus Act*.<sup>9</sup> The statute serves to protect civilian citizens from direct military police action. Direct police action is interpreted as the fundamental surveillance, arrest, search, and seize authorities to enforce federal laws. While the statute does not specifically prohibit Navy and Marine Corps forces from enforcing federal law, the intent and application of the law is clear. Title 10 and Defense Department policy support the clear separation of military and police activities.<sup>10</sup> However, the military can support law enforcement efforts indirectly and the Coast Guard can conduct law enforcement operations and military defense operations across the peace and war spectrum.<sup>11</sup>

Another statutory consideration involves Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). The Stafford Act, the Disaster Relief Act, and sections of Title 10 provide the legal guidance for military to support civil authorities. These provisions enable the military to support national emergencies with medical and infrastructure assistance. In terms of operational objectives in the maritime homeland, this authority synchronizes military and civilian efforts in the consequence management of coastal natural disasters and weapons attacks. However, these provisions are limited to support measures. The security and enforcement of a maritime disaster area remains the function of law enforcement authorities.

The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a final legal consideration. U.S. statutes and maritime law enforcement policy conform to the general provisions of the convention.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, the U.S. delineates specific maritime zones based upon a common line of demarcation, known as the baseline. Internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous waters, and exclusive economic waters all represent distinct forms of national sovereignty and legal jurisdiction. In addition, the line of demarcation and the boundaries extending twelve and two hundred miles seaward represent layers of security and defense. Federal authorities also exercise command and control over internal waters, navigable from the sea – major rivers, bays, and the Great Lakes. These distinct zones of national and legal jurisdiction must be considered as part of the standard challenge to distribute forces across space and time.

In summary, statutory constraints segregate military and law enforcement authorities and delineate areas of sovereign authority within the maritime homeland. Coast Guard forces offer the best means to bridge military and law enforcement gaps. The establishment of maritime zones, based upon international convention and U.S. law, is a logical way to organize a joint effort across the vast geographic area of operations. The second echelon of command and control must convert the centralized direction of operational objectives into decentralized execution.

### ***Decentralized Execution By Zone***

Decentralized execution is a hallmark of effective command and control, and a logical product of centralized direction. A clear understanding of strategic vision and operational objectives is critical to the execution. This understanding has been met through expression of a desired security environment and operational objectives. The challenge now becomes matching Service jurisdictions and capabilities to operational objectives in space and time. The Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs Service are the primary

forces charged with maritime homeland security. There are six operational objectives to secure and defend, across two oceans and four distinct maritime zones.

A logical way to decentralize execution begins with dividing security objectives between the Atlantic and Pacific Areas of Operation. Navy and Coast Guard organizational structures already make this distinction. At this second echelon level, traditional joint staff organizations are useful mechanisms to command and control resources. Area Commanders can build staffs to command operations, intelligence, and logistics functions. This staff organization is an effective tool for integrating law enforcement and military control. A joint staff structure also facilitates the translation of operational objectives into mission tasks.

International waters beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), greater than two hundred miles from the baseline, represent the outermost layer of a defense in depth and can be described as an Approach Zone (AZ). The lack of federal jurisdiction, and the distance from population centers and territory make this zone ideal for military surveillance and detection. Navy capabilities are best employed in obtaining surface, sub-surface, and air information in the AZ. Bona fide naval threats should be defeated in the AZ. In order to secure and defend other zones of the maritime homeland, early indications and warnings are needed from the AZ.

Economic waters between the Territorial Sea (12-mile limit) and the EEZ (200 miles) represent the next layer of security. This area can be described as the Economic Zone (EZ) and can be secured with limited federal jurisdiction. Economic waters also represent the spatial overlap between military defense and law enforcement security objectives. Oil platforms and fishery stocks are sovereign resources located well offshore. Coast Guard capabilities are well suited to securing and defending resources in the EZ. In addition, these capabilities should provide another layer of early indications and warnings.

Territorial Waters between the baseline and the 12-mile limit constitute the final layer of defense and form the Territorial Zone (TZ). Federal jurisdiction is clear and broad within the TZ. Foreign vessels bound to or from U.S. ports are subject to boarding and search in the TZ. In these waters, Customs Service and Coast Guard capabilities can enforce federal laws.

Internal waters extend well inland from the baseline and offer navigable access to ports, cities, and infrastructure. This Internal Zone (IZ) should be considered a rear area in military terms because the zone is located well shoreward of the three security layers. At the same time, there are significant mechanisms of control within the IZ. Customs Port Directors and Coast Guard Captains of the Port exercise significant legal jurisdiction over vessels operating in internal waters. The Coast Guard can establish Security and Safety Zones to regulate access to maritime spaces in the IZ. The Captain of the Port can control port entries and departures. Access to the IZ from U.S. territory is the more difficult side of security and defense. Once a ship, container, or person has already passed through the four preceding zones and reached *terra firma*, there are few mechanisms to control or deny access to Internal Waters. For these reasons, the IZ is a reaction and consequence management zone.

Once the objectives and zones are integrated, the decentralized execution becomes apparent. A Navy led effort in the AZ will deliver first line defense and early indications and warnings. A Coast Guard led effort in the EZ and TZ will deliver maximum security and defense, across two maritime zones with different degrees of sovereign control. A Customs Service and Coast Guard led effort in the IZ will deliver port and waterway security. This decentralized execution aligns capabilities with authorities, and organizes objectives across the space of maritime zones. At the same time, effort is unified under Area Commanders. Three echelon levels command and control the maritime homeland, by centralizing control and decentralizing execution.

**Conclusions and Recommendations:** Any proposed command and control structure for the maritime homeland should focus on a desired maritime security environment and established operational objectives, under the direction of one commander. A Coast Guard Admiral, other than the Commandant, should serve as the Maritime Homeland Security Director and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.

The structure should adhere to the fundamental tenet of centralized direction and focus on operational objectives. The first echelon should comprise six components, corresponding directly to six operational objectives. Flag equivalent positions in the Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs Service should command these components. One component, a Maritime Homeland Intelligence Center, would correspond to the information security and intelligence production objective and resemble an expanded JIATF organization.

The command and control structure should decentralize execution. The second echelon should divide the organization between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, including two subordinate intelligence fusion centers, reconstituted from the existing JIATF organizations. The Coast Guard Area Commanders and staffs would comprise the core of a joint staff. Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs Service resources should be provided and integrated at this level.

Finally, the organization should synchronize resources across space and time, according to their capabilities and authorities. The third echelon should integrate Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs capabilities across the four maritime zones identified as the Approach Zone, Economic Zone, Territorial Zone, and Internal Zone. Two numbered Fleet Commanders should command all surface, sub-surface, and air assets assigned to the security and defense of the AZ, EZ, and TZ. District Commanders and Captains of the Port should command all shore and small surface resources assigned to the security and defense of the IZ.

The ancient strategy of naval offense and land defense should be left behind, along with the modern strategy of individual threats and independent effort. The defense and security of home waters is a compelling national security priority. Command and control models from the World War, the Cold War, and the Drug War are not the answer. The solution is a combination of these concepts -- a new trick for an old dog.

\*\*\*\*\*

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Robert B. Strassler, ed. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 57-58.

<sup>2</sup> Homer H. Hickam, Torpedo Junction U-Boat War off America's East Coast (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1989), 5.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/Twenty-first Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report (Washington DC: 15 February 2001), 11

<sup>4</sup> The White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2000), 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 20-26.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of State, Oceans Policy and the Law of the Sea, Fact Sheet, Department Web Site (28 May 1998), <<http://www.state.gov/oceans / policy/facts/htm>>.

<sup>8</sup> Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, Publication NWC 1004 (Newport, RI: Naval War College), 187.

<sup>9</sup> *Posse Comitatus* Act, U.S. Code, Title 18, sec. 1385.

<sup>10</sup> General Military Law, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 101-2801.

<sup>11</sup> The Coast Guard, U.S. Code, Title 14, sec.2.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, M16247.18 revised 2001.