



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

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**NAVY DECISION MAKING
IN THE TERROR WAR:
"HOME GAMES" vs. "AWAY GAMES"**

Purpose: Examine the relationship between overseas operations (away games) and close defense of the homeland (home games) in the context of the Navy's role in the terror war.

Background: There may be an intrinsic tension in the way the Navy approaches its decision making with respect to the "away game" portion of the war on terror and its "home game" responsibilities. For example, the 21st Century Navy stipulates the following set of strategic themes as the drivers for the Navy's operations and its investment strategy:

- Power and Influence from Command of the Seas;
- Sustaining Sovereign Power Overseas through Forward Naval Presence;
- Assured Access, the 21st Century Challenge for the Joint Force; and,
- Enabling the Transformation of the Joint Force to Fight and Win

These themes reflect the Navy's strategic tradition and clearly underscore the strengths that the Service brings to the overseas away game part of the war on terror. One could logically assume that these tenets will shape the Navy's mental map of its role in this war. However, the events of 11 September have confirmed that the context of this conflict has a domestic protection or home game venue as well as one that is carried out overseas.

In fact, given America's recent fixation (perhaps properly so) on the homeland aspect of security, the Navy may be forced to respond and reshape toward the home game's unique requirements, even though its own assessment might be to play the away game differently or better (specific to the new threat). This suggests that the Navy may have to strike a balance in its strategic posture and force structure -- how it thinks and acts -- with respect to the away game and the home game.

Discussion: How will the Navy balance the two roles as we proceed into the opening period of the Terror War? Though the C2 scheme for the home game is unclear as this paper is being written, one thing is certain: someone will be tapped to lead this effort and that someone will ultimately establish requirements for forces to conduct the coordinated operations that will characterize the home game. How will the Navy approach such complex issues as the requirement for MPA and surface combatants to conduct

surveillance during the IDTC? Will the Navy be prepared to provide surface ships to augment the Coast Guard's requirement to protect our maritime frontiers? Is the Office of Naval Intelligence well resourced to support the operational intelligence requirements of the home game? What are the requirements that might emerge from Domestic Support Operations? What are the GNFPP/OPTempo/ITEMPO implications of these requirements? Each of these represents true opportunity costs -- tradeoffs that potentially take away from the Navy's historical role in taking the fight overseas.

Newport Paper 01 (Strategy and Policy Considerations: The Terror War) stated that the "Navy must understand the fundamentals of war as well as the context in which it will fight." This Newport Paper contends that the essential element of this task, whether it is in the framework of the away game or the home game, is the requirement for a clear understanding of the operational meaning of security to the nation and its citizens.

There is no question that the Navy has a clear and compelling concept of what its traditional role has been in support of the prevent/deter mission that forms the core of the away game. Have the attacks on September 11 changed this fundamental view toward balancing capabilities and resources to address the protect and respond missions that will probably form the essence of the home game? In this regard, it is useful to recall that QDR 2001 states that:

✍️ "The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders..."

This begs a simple question with complex answers: Should the Navy view its primary role, comparative advantages, and primary strengths any different today than before September 11? In other words, can the Navy, in fact, respond to both the home and away game by planning to play the away game better/differently?

In any case, the Navy must be confident of a compelling story to underscore the near-term decisions for both the away game and the home game; and its rationale for them must be convincing enough for Congress and the American people to believe that the Navy will continue to make a vital contribution to the security of our nation and its citizens.

Analysis: Oftentimes, the Navy only views the 'operational' meaning of security. This means that routinely, planners assess security on a linear scale of threat and capability to counter threat (i.e., we have more ships than they do hence a greater degree of security). However, careful understanding of the nature of true security is essential to informed decision making. Without it, further rigorous assessment is at risk, deliberate strategic and operational planning based on that assessment is flawed, rational resource allocation is ineffective, and making a coherent and compelling case for force structure decisions to the American people and their elected legislative body is much harder.

It is useful to organize a problem in constituent elements so that the Navy can correctly construct its roadmap in response to the Terror War. The following working hypotheses is proposed:

☞☞ First -- *Security* is the independent variable in this calculus; everything else is a dependent variable.

☞☞ Second -- *Security* is the absence of *fear*. In pure terms, security is the absence of physical harm (being killed). However, fear may be a more useful measure of relative security given the newly realized terror threat to the nation. Life/death gives an analytic output of zero or one, whereas fear can be scaled. Fear has also proven to be highly effective in changing the behavior of people, leading many to comment that the terrorist wins when we are coerced into certain behavioral change. The presence of fear indicates the absence of some measure of security; the absence of fear indicates the presence of some measure of security. This concept is equally as applicable to the nation's citizens (the individual) as it is to the nation (in aggregate).

☞☞ Third -- When all is said and done, *risk* is the exposure to possible loss or injury. Therefore, risk requires an assessment of the amount of fear or danger that a nation and its people assess that they are willing to accept.

☞☞ Fourth -- *Risk* is a function of *threat*, *vulnerability*, and *forseeability*. $r = f(T,v,F)$

If this working hypothesis is accepted, Navy decision making as well as its strategic posture in the war against terrorism must take due regard of:

☞☞ An objective assessment of the threats (T) and vulnerabilities (v) that will confront the nation.

☞☞ The *risk* that the nation and its people are willing to assume.

☞☞ Actions that the Navy can take to reduce to the maximum extent possible the *fear* associated with the *risk* in both the home game and the away game.

First Order Challenge. The first-order challenge for the Navy is to determine who and/or what causes fear (perceived) and danger (actual) in the security calculus of the United States and its citizens. Traditionally, the Navy has defined the nation's security as an inverse function of the level of the threat in the external security environment. The lower the threat level, the more secure the nation and its citizens are. Because of this, the Navy's estimate of the threat in the external security environment has driven both its decision

making and its risk assessment. This has affected, in part, the Navy's choice of a strategy and the forces to support it. Hence, the focus on away games.

However, if risk is a function of both threat and vulnerability, then it seems only prudent for the Navy to examine its role in that area of the security environment where the vulnerabilities are located -- the home game. The attack on September 11 confirms that it is equally important for the Navy to assess the nation's susceptibility to serious degradation of its vital elements of national power (or at least that portion of it that could emanate from the sea) and then determine what is the optimum role of the U.S. Navy in mitigating/eliminating a threat targeted at these vulnerabilities.

In short, the Navy should understand the relationship of the nation's weaknesses at home related to the nation's threats from and based overseas. This approach, if understood, might lessen the natural tension between the Navy's preference to play away games and the potential requirement to support the home game.

Second Order Challenge. The second order challenge is to determine just what it is the Navy can do to mitigate that fear (perception) and danger (actual). What should the Navy do with its more than \$300B in ships, planes and submarines to enhance the security of the nation and its citizens?

For example, Tab (A) is the Navy's portion of the recent supplemental appropriation to the terrorist attack. The emphasis is focused on capabilities and enhancements to support the away game. Some of the capabilities, situational awareness and force protection, probably address both the away and home game requirements. At this point, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these desired enhancements indicate that the away game constitutes the Navy's preferred strategic posture for the Terror War.

While this feeds the precept that says 'do what you have always done best,' a thorough analysis done in response to the first order challenge posed above might lead to a different list for follow-on appropriations. The Navy needs to begin this effort in earnest.

Influences that will skew the home versus away game analysis/assessment.

Influences leading to bias for the away game. The assessment of what to do given an understanding of the new calculus of fear and danger as it effects home versus away games has some other long standing issues and potential constraints attached. First, the fundamental home game mission is and has been legitimately a Coast Guard responsibility. This may limit the range of options for Navy contributions. Secondly, departures from tradition and traditional roles (for the Navy, the away game) are unusual, often temporary, and almost always executed with a sense of uneasiness. This provides a coefficient of inelasticity to change which leads to moderate vice radical decision. Furthermore, it also is a fundamental reason why assessment -- the foreseeability part of the relationship that is contained in the component of risk -- is so vital to the strategy and

operational business of our Navy. Traditions and norms help the leadership gauge their way of doing business against the objective conditions or trends that only a rigorous assessment can highlight. It may be a 'new' world, but it may not lead to a 'new' Navy.

Influences leading to bias for the home game. Security (national defense) is a public good. Public goods are available for all to consume and nonexcludable; it is impractical to exclude those who do not pay for it. As a public good spread across the expanse of America, defense has traditionally received less interest/focus among the American people than other issues which have a narrower constituency (and hence a more organized voice). The perception of high security at home has allowed the Navy to conduct mission analysis heavily focused on playing the away game -- and subsequently shape force structure to optimize its effectiveness overseas. The new American calculus of fear and danger could marshal an American people demand for investment in home game specific capabilities and investment. This is reinforced if additional terrorist attacks occur. Any Navy decision that seems to suboptimize its role in the home game may be received poorly by both congress and a much more unified American voice.

Recommendations/Actions: As the Navy makes decisions concerning its investment strategy and its role in the terror war:

- (1) The Navy should take lead in the national effort to begin a rigorous analysis of new calculus of security after September 11.
- (2) Understand the institutional and national bias as they affect the assessment leading to decisions that will shape strategic roles and force structure. Recognize that home game requirements may require different away game capabilities if the new equation of security is a function of fear and danger (risk). One size fits all may be too expensive -- trade-offs will be complex and could lead to unacceptable losses to capabilities in traditional missions.
- (3) Conduct a deliberate and rigorous assessment of the balance among the prevent, protect, and respond missions in the MCP and throughout the POM 04 development process starting with the ISPP.

SUMMARY OF USN SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

~~??~~\$4.9B for " increased worldwide posture"

- ?? \$1.2B for the mobilization of 15,000 Naval Reserve personnel
- ?? \$1.13B for increased ship and aircraft maintenance
- ?? \$0.43B for increased flying hours
- ?? \$0.35 B for additional spare parts
- ?? \$0.157B for enhanced career sea pay
- ?? \$0.28B for expected increased OPTEMPO in the war against terrorism.
 - ~~??~~ 1 year of steaming days for 1 CVBG (\$0.166B)
 - ~~??~~ 1 year of steaming days for 1 ARG (\$0.043B)
 - ~~??~~ 1 year of steaming days for 7 NRF ships (\$0.072B).

~~??~~\$4.8B for "procurement"

- ?? \$2.3B to fund the conversion of 2 SSBNs to SSGN platforms in FY02
- ?? \$0.31B in FY-02 to preserve the option of converting a total of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs,
- ?? Purchase 27 C-40A aircraft, 18 Marine Corps KC-130J planes, three Marine Corps UC-135 aircraft and four Navy C-37s.
- ?? \$0.101B to modernize Coast Guard command, control and communications.

~~??~~\$4.0B for "enhanced force protection" including:

- ?? \$2.3B for improved command and control
- ?? \$1.0B (about) to procure several AT/FP missiles and ship self-protection suites, including more STANDARD missiles, upgrades to helicopter weapons systems and enhancements to Coast Guard weapons systems.
- ?? \$0.778B to pay for 1,500 additional personnel to meet additional A/T and FP security needs, provide FP at six private shipyards, and perimeter protection and building hardening at Navy installations.

~~??~~\$1.9B for "offensive counterterrorism" including

- ?? Increase the Navy's inventory of precision guided munitions:

- \$0.6B for TLAM conversions and upgrades
- \$0.531B for laser guided bomb kits
- \$0.142B for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program
- \$0.1B for JDAMs

~~??~~\$0.49B for "increased situational awareness"

~~??~~\$0.176B for initial crisis response

?? Covers some homeland defense efforts on ships and in ports, including funding the COMFORT (AH-20) operations to provide relief to rescue workers in NYC.

~~??~~\$0.05B for Pentagon repairs and upgrades.