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## NEWPORT PAPERS

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A Series of Point Papers  
from the Naval War College and the  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
For Senior Leadership  
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

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United States Naval War College  
Navy Warfare Development Command  
Newport, Rhode Island

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**Newport Paper 64****U.S. NAVAL RESERVE:  
THE NAVY'S TEAM FOR "HOME GAMES"**

**Purpose:** Examine the advantages and disadvantages of enabling the U.S. Naval Reserve to act as the Navy's Executive Agent in all maritime aspects of Homeland Defense.

**Background:** Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has tried to define what it wants from its Reserve Force. Legally, the purpose of a reserve component is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty...in time of war or national emergency..." (10 USC Chapter 13). This has been traditionally interpreted to mean the development of the ability to surge and sustain the Navy's response to protracted conflict. That is, upon mobilization, Naval Reservists are expected to do what active forces do, wherever active forces do it. In times of peace, they lighten the load of conducting forward presence.

Today's Naval Reserve is largely a microcosm of the Navy. Following the Cold War, it shrank in the same proportion as the active force. Its composition mirrors and complements that of the active force because it is designed to back-up the forward-deployed operational fleet. The Reserve's most salutary effect is relieving OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO deficiencies by providing replacement sailors or entire units to the deployed fleet.

**Discussion:** The advent of the Terror War, however, presents a distinct challenge to this traditional notion because a critical Area of Operations has become the Continental U.S. The U.S. Navy is neither *organized, equipped, nor disposed* to address the naval dimensions of the domestic Terror War. The active Navy can provide some elements of this protection (combat air patrol, maritime interdiction), but only at a significant financial and opportunity cost. Thus, the Navy faces a choice. It can pay these opportunity costs or it can relinquish this crucial Area of Operations at a time when the American public is focused on it. See the discussion of this intrinsic tension in Newport Paper 61.

The U.S. Navy has shown a predilection toward fighting and winning the Terror War as far forward as possible. Indeed, it is sized and shaped to do so. There is little reason to suspect that this preference will (or should) wither, especially in light of recent events in which the Navy's power projection capacity played the central role in the dismemberment of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, this leaves the equally important requirement of defensive naval security at home without an enthusiastic sponsor. This mission area could become the exclusive focus of the Naval Reserve. They could fight

the Navy's portion of the "home game". The Naval Reserve is already contributing to the domestic Terror War. Press reports suggest that the number of Naval Reservists called to active duty will reach 14,400 by the end of November. This activation of the reserves is based on matching individual skills with emerging terror war requirements, particularly in security, law enforcement, health care and intelligence. That is, many Naval Reservists have the skills to fight the Terror War, however, the Naval Reserve is not organized or chartered to do likewise, particularly in support of commercial interests.

The United States will need to take defensive measures along our coastlines as long as we face a terrorist threat. That there is a military element to this threat which may be generated "from the sea" is clear.

**Analysis:** Many of today's Naval Reserve functions are already ideally suited to continue their support of the domestic terror war:

- ?? **Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW).** The reserve Mine and Undersea Warfare (MIUW) units are the perfect building block around which to build coastal defenses against military threats including, mines, torpedoes, cruise missiles, small boats, clandestine swimmers. In conjunction with the Coast Guard (and assuming some easing of *posse comitatus* restrictions), they could protect all American ports against terror threats from the sea. Reserve mine countermeasures ships could be integrated under the NCW command. Maritime patrol aircraft could integrate into the Coastal Vessel Traffic Service. NCW Commanders could integrate their sea borne forces with landside security. This is already the principal contribution made by the Reserves and could be expanded to cover additional American ports, not only those with military assets present.
- ?? **Cargo Handling.** These units have expertise in loading and unloading containerized cargo. They could work with the Coast Guard to vastly expand the inspection of containerized shipping in American seaports.
- ?? **Field Hospitals and Medical Support.** Rapidly mobilizable medical units trained in mass casualty scenarios could be the first large medical units on the scene, particularly if used in conjunction with Hospital ships such as USNS Comfort. A hospital ship could be manned by medical reservists on each coast on 48-hour notice to sail.
- ?? **Reserve Air assets.** In particular, cargo and Medevac planes could be used in any mass casualty scenario. The Reserves could relinquish the reserve carrier air wing and shift completely to cargo and reconnaissance and patrol aircraft.
- ?? **Construction Battalions.** Reserve Seabees will remain a useful asset in almost any scenario. Certainly, their construction abilities would be a welcome addition to the Office of Homeland Security.
- ?? **Maritime Patrol Air.** Surface surveillance of the approaches to all major ports can be covered by high-endurance airborne assets such as the Reserve P3 and E2 fleet. This also allows for a C2 interface with NORAD assets.

The additional capabilities below should also be expanded by the creation of Reserve units in the following specialties designed exclusively for use in the domestic terror war:

- ?? **Cryptologic support**
- ?? **Interpreters**
- ?? **Intelligence**
- ?? **Risk Assessment** (to enable resource prioritization)
- ?? **Information Technology**

There are obvious complementarities between the war on domestic terror and the war on drugs. Not only are they considered parts of overall homeland security, the joint and interagency organizations designed to fight the war on drugs may be the models used to combat domestic terror. In similar fashion, the Naval Reserve could assume the Navy lead in this important area employing the assets below:

- ?? **Reserve Frigates.** Along with their embarked helicopters, these frigates could provide a considerable deterrent to the sea borne movement of drugs to the American coast. They would continue to work for JIATFs and help develop the Navy's expertise in Joint and Interagency Operations.

This would entail organizational changes for the Naval Reserve. Training and administration would be affected because of the requirement for new and different skill sets. The principal change, however, would require that the Naval Reserve would act as supporting forces for the military commander supporting the Office of Homeland Security as the new organization emerges. The Naval Reserve would have little difficulty supporting either CINCNORAD or CINCJFCOM.

Designating the Naval Reserve as the Navy's Executive Agent in the conduct of defensive security operations would result in a number of benefits:

1. The American public would feel more secure if "naval professionals" specializing in domestic terror are protecting their coasts. They would appreciate the Navy more. . This change would be deemed responsive to public and political pressure.
2. The Navy would rapidly develop an expertise in *interagency operations*. It is premature and problematic to predict the nation's ultimate organization for Homeland Security. It is safe, however, to note that it will be a complex *interagency network*. While the Office of Homeland security will (minimally) coordinate efforts, numerous other government agencies will contribute assets and expertise to its operations. The Naval Reserve could act as the Navy's Executive Agent on all such matters, developing cutting-edge expertise in *interagency operations*, which could be shared with the active forces.
3. The Navy would develop true expertise and specialization in defensive anti-terror operations. If the Terror War is indeed long-term, these talents will be invaluable to the nation.
4. Pressures on reserve deployments will be eased. To perform these operations, reservists would not be required to leave CONUS and would be less likely to be activated for excessively long periods.



5. The active forces would have a repository for hardware and platforms no longer useful in battle group operations. This equipment (frigates, maritime patrol aircraft) would be extremely valuable in the domestic terror war.
6. This mission area could be funded commensurate with its importance. The Coast Guard is short of resources and spread too thinly.

The principal shortcoming is that forward-deployed forces could no longer look to the reserves for support and back up in "away-game" crises. In addition, the skill sets required by the Naval Reserve would change appreciably, necessitating some personnel upheaval and augmentation.

**Recommendations/Actions:** Should the U.S. Navy opt to continue to emphasize its traditional role in the "away game" of counter-terrorist operations, the Navy should:

1. Re-examine the roles and missions of the U.S. Naval Reserve to determine its capacity to become the lead Navy agent in "defensive" homeland defense.
2. Get a legal opinion as to whether *posse comitatus* restrictions could be eased to allow the Reserves to play a more vigorous role in harbor security.
3. Develop a draft organization plan to allow the Naval reserve forces to chop to the CINC designated to control DoD assets in the defense of the homeland.
4. Conduct an analysis of the skill sets required to perform all (expanded) aspects of naval homeland defense.
5. Consider appropriate funding augmentations (and reductions) for the Reserves in the development of POM 04, starting with the ISPP.