



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

Contents

Newport Papers

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Points of Contact</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>Strategy and Policy</u>				
<u>01</u>	Strategy and Policy Considerations: The Terror War	Prof. George Baer Prof. Andrew Ross CAPT Robert McCabe, USN	24 Sept 01	1
<u>02</u>	U.S. War Objectives	Prof. Tom Mahnken	24 Oct 01	4
<u>03</u>	U.S. War Objectives: How Narrow or Broad?	Prof. Andrew Ross	25 Oct 01	7
<u>04</u>	U.S. War Objectives: Near, Medium, and Long Term	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	12 Nov 01	10
<u>05</u>	Terror War: Is a Formal "Declaration of War" Needed?	Prof. Nick Rostow COL Fred Borch, USA	12 Oct 01	14
<u>06</u>	What Is The Kind Of War Upon Which We Are Embarking?	Prof. Bill Fuller Prof. Mac Owens	22 Oct 01	16
<u>07</u>	The Terror War: Perspectives on Coalition Issues	CDR Stephen Kenny, RN Prof. Christopher Bell Prof. Bruce Elleman	28 Nov 01	20
<u>08</u>	Enemy Objectives	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	11 Dec 01	23
<u>09</u>	The Strategy of Usama bin Laden and <i>Al Qaeda</i> Annex A: The Worldview and Motivations of Usama bin Laden	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	19 Dec 01	26 31
<u>10</u>	Potential Adversaries in the Terror War: Individuals, Groups, and States	Prof. Ahmed Hashim Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	1 Feb 02	36
<u>11</u>	Russia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	11 Dec 01	42

<u>12</u>	China and the Terror War	Prof. Jonathan Pollack Prof. Bruce Elleman Prof. Lyle Goldstein	4 Jan 02	46
<u>13</u>	Japan and the Terror War	Prof. Bruce Elleman	4 Jan 02	50
<u>14</u>	The Terror War: Alternative Futures	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	14 Feb 02	54
<u>15</u>	Pakistani Militant Groups: Policy Challenges and Solutions	Mr. Owen Sirrs	20 Feb 02	58
<u>16</u>	The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Terror War	Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	14 Mar 02	62
<u>17</u>	Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Symposium Executive Summary	Prof. Lawrence Modisett	2 Apr 02	66
<u>18</u>	Central Asia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	1 May 02	75
<u>19</u>	NATO and the Global War on Terror	Prof. Catherine McArdle Kelleher	21 May 02	79
<u>20</u>	Grand Strategy for the Terror War	Prof. Mac Owens	22 May 02	84
<u>Operational Concepts</u>				
<u>21</u>	Maritime Homeland Security: Concept of Operations	CAPT Michael Critz, USN	25 Oct 01	88
<u>22</u>	Homeland Security: Maritime Command and Control	Prof. John Ballard, USN CAPT Michael Critz, USN	23 Oct 01	92
<u>23</u>	Maritime Homeland Command and Control: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks	LCDR D. Scott Bauby, USCG	23 May 02	96
<u>24</u>	Employing Aerial Coercion to Combat Terrorism: Recommendations for the Theater CINC	MAJ Mark T. Damiano, USAF	23 May 02	102
<u>25</u>	Terrorist Application of Operational Art	LCDR Marc E. Tranchemontagne, USN	23 May 02	111

National Security Decisions

<u>61</u>	Navy Decision Making in the Terror War: "Home Games" vs. "Away Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	26 Oct 01	124
<u>62</u>	Justice as a U.S. War Aim: The Legal Implications	COL Fred Borch, USA	14 Nov 01	131
<u>63</u>	The Use of Force in the War on Terror: A Legal Perspective	COL Fred Borch, USA	05 Dec 01	134
<u>64</u>	U.S. Naval Reserve: The Navy's Team for "Home Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	16 Dec 01	136
<u>65</u>	How Are We Doing? Assessing Progress in the War on Terrorism.	Prof. Tom Mahnken	16 Dec 01	140
<u>66</u>	Military Support to Civil Authorities: "Navy Roles and Responsibilities in Domestic Support Operations"	CAPT Steve Morris, SC, USN	18 Dec 01	144
<u>67</u>	Carrier Deployments: One Option (Classified paper, view on: www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil)	Prof. Jim Giblin	17 Dec 01	NA
<u>68</u>	Economic Dimensions of the Terror War	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	1 May 02	152
<u>69</u>	Technological Mobilization for the Terror War	Prof. William Martel	21 May 02	157
<u>70</u>	Pakistani Madrassahs and the Spread of Militant Radicalism	Mr. Owen Sirrs	22 May 02	162
<u>71</u>	How Now Shall We Fight? The Relevance of the Law of Armed Conflict to the United States and Its Coalition Members in Light of the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001	LCDR Tony F. DeAlicante, JAGC, USN	23 May 02	165



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

Newport Paper: 70

PAKISTANI MADRASSAHS AND THE SPREAD OF MILITANT RADICALISM

Objective: To examine the links between Pakistani madrassahs and Islamic militants and to explore how those links can be severed.

Background: Originally founded to teach the complexities of Islamic law to mature students, the religious schools (or *madrassah*) in Pakistan have evolved into a substitute for primary education. Much of the curriculum in these schools centers on rote memorization of the *Quran* and interpretation of religious texts; there is little or no emphasis on scientific or technical subjects that could benefit Pakistan's development. More importantly, a small minority of these schools (10-15 percent by most estimates) propagate an extreme, ascetic interpretation of Islam that is promoted by their Saudi and other Gulf Arab donors. Not surprisingly, these more radical schools are also notorious for their ties to extremist organizations like Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda or Afghanistan's Taliban. Indeed, these madrassahs are a prime source of recruits for Islamic insurgencies in Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Discussion: The rise of the new madrassahs in Pakistan coincided with a series of external events that reshaped the face of Pakistani Islam. In brief, those events included the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the reign of Pakistan's "Islamic Dictator" Zia ul-Haq from 1977-1988, and a dramatic increase in donor funding from the Arabian Gulf. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the number of Pakistani madrassahs multiplied exponentially—from a few hundred in 1977 to 45,000 by 1999. This increase paralleled the dramatic decline in the Pakistani public education system during this time.

Links to Extremist Organizations

Several madrassahs cultivated close links with Al Qaeda, various Kashmiri and Central Asia extremist groups, and the Taliban. In fact, a substantial number of senior Taliban leaders emerged from a single madrassah located in northwest Pakistan. In 1997, virtually the entire student population of this school was sent to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in its war against internal opponents. On the international terrorist front, at least one of the terrorists involved in the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya was educated in a Pakistani madrassah. In addition, there is evidence indicating that Richard Reid, the infamous "shoe bomber," attended a Pakistani madrassah. Finally, the "American Taliban" fighter John Walker Lindh attended a Pakistani madrassah before undergoing training at an Al Qaeda terrorist training camp inside Afghanistan.

Clearly then, the Pakistani madrassahs are a fundamental link in a militant training cycle that also included (until December 2001) attendance at terrorist camps in Afghanistan, and service on the front lines in the Afghan and Kashmiri wars. Many battle-hardened militants eventually returned to their home countries in Algeria, Egypt, the Philippines, Chechnya, or Uzbekistan to wage their own jihads. Given this role in indoctrinating future militants and providing recruits for terrorist organizations, the United States has a direct interest in curtailing, if not neutralizing, the activities of the extremist Pakistani madrassahs.

Some Modest Proposals

For the United States, the obstacles posed by the madrassahs are formidable. Kinetic weapons are, for the most part, useless. Furthermore, Pakistan's cultural sensitivities and obvious sovereignty concerns further inhibit the range of American policy responses. Indeed, even the sole remaining superpower cannot blatantly force an ally to reform its education system without arousing the grievances of outraged nationalism. Given these narrow parameters, U.S. options essentially boil down to generous financial assistance programs, discrete pressure on the government to shut down the more radical schools, and proposals for greater government control of the madrassahs.

Option #1: Fund Public Education and Vocational Training. The nature of Pakistan's security dilemmas has badly skewed its government spending programs and development priorities. Indeed, some thirty percent of Islamabad's budget is devoted to the military while less than two percent is earmarked for public education. Carefully targeted U.S. aid programs directed toward restoring public schools or providing vocational education could challenge the madrassahs' current monopoly on Pakistan's poorer students. Moreover, a greater focus on vocational training will meet Pakistan's development needs where a religious education clearly does not. Ultimately, of course, the onus is on Pakistan to effect these reforms: the United States does not want to find itself funding Pakistani schools even as Islamabad diverts ever greater resources to its military.

Option #2: Shut Down the Radical Schools. The United States has a vested interest in having the extremist madrassahs shut down, given their ties to Islamist extremists and their recruiting role for wars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and beyond. Only the Pakistani government can fundamentally reform or disband the more radical schools. Washington should therefore search for suitable inducements to ensure that such reforms or closures are carried out. Such inducements might include debt forgiveness, credits, loans, direct development assistance, and tariff reductions in specific sectors such as textiles.

Option #3: Government-Run Madrassahs. The United States should facilitate, albeit in a discrete manner, Pakistani efforts to exert greater control over the religious schools. One possible model that has worked in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan is the government-funded madrassah. At the present time, Pakistan's madrassahs are run by private organizations with generous infusions of Gulf Arab and émigré cash. A government-run system would afford Islamabad not only greater control over the schools' activities but also an

opportunity to enforce a standard curriculum that better meets Pakistan's development needs.

Recommendations/Actions: Policymakers must recognize the vital role that Pakistani madrassahs play in the ideological formation of militants in South, Central, and Southeast Asia. The links between these schools and known international terrorists are sufficient reason to craft policies that either reform the most extreme schools or effectively shut them down.