

**Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
For Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council**

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**2008 INSA Analytic Transformation Conference
Orlando, Florida**

September 4, 2008

Morning & Evening Keynote Speeches

Morning Keynote Address

MR. JOHN BRENNAN (Chairman, Intelligence and National Security Alliance): It is a great honor and privilege to have somebody who has been so instrumental in seeing through and standing up the task of orchestrating the analytic community within the intelligence community. And Tom Fingar, who has had a long and distinguished career and was most recently at INR before he came over to the Office of the DNI. Tom has done a superb job from a substance standpoint as well as from interacting with the analytic workforce throughout the community. And so, without further ado, I'd like to introduce Tom Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis.

(Applause.)

DR. THOMAS FINGAR (Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis & Chairman of the National Intelligence Council): I trust you can see me because I can't see you. The lights are really quite, quite bright. I know I've got many friends out in this audience and I thank you for coming. I thank John Brennan and INSA for convening you and for giving us the opportunity to build upon the foundation we laid in Chicago and the subsequent meetings in Washington, to give reality to the term alliance, and the partnership between the intelligence community, and between those of you who serve and support from outside of the government.

The opportunity, indeed the necessity, to combine what each of us know separately to form a larger body of more relevant and more timely information to keep our nation safe is one that we must not squander. My task this morning is to talk about customer relations on the eve of an administration change. I'm delighted for that even though I had no idea what the title meant when it was assigned to me because it provided an opportunity to think about three messages that I'd like to lay on you this morning and begin a dialogue. And I mean that sincerely. As we talk about the transition, the change of an administration, what are the things that we need to do that we may not have yet initiated? Or that we may not have told you about? What are the problems you think we need to be aware of as we go into a transition?

One of the bottom-line realities is that the Officer of the Director of National Intelligence has never before been through a transition. And simple questions like how many and which

members of the senior staff are expected to hand in letters of resignation or expected to stay on into the next administration or to be around for just a period of transition? In parts of the government, certain positions, this is spelled out very clearly in law. It doesn't affect very many people in the ODNI. In others, there are precedents and traditions and patterns and the hardcore civil service component that is there, the career service. We're staffed, roughly 50 percent, by detailees, who by pure coincidence, are on terms of rotation that would normally expire at about the same time as we will change administrations. So there's a lot of, sort of, housekeeping detail that involves making it up as we go along. That means there is both wide latitude for mistakes, but also great opportunity to take advantage of insights, suggestions that you and other friends of the community may have.

What I'd like to do this morning is to present a brief overview of the state of play, with respect to the ODNI and the transformation agenda. I will be speaking from the perspective of analysis. That's the one I know best. I'd like to provide a sense of what we are doing as we go into the ODNI's first change of administration. And then I'm going to rather shamelessly seek your support and they go to the bottom line of my presentation and my pitch, if you will, that though I am certain that we have not done everything perfectly, that there are still some pretty ragged edges around the transformation, around the stand up of an organization and the integration of the community, I think we've done more well than we've done badly and I think that one of the worst things we could do to our community over the next six months to a year, was to suggest that we ought to start all over again. It's neither necessary nor desirable to upend the grain board, make intelligence, the intelligence community, the centerpiece of partisan politics or reinvention. I'll come back to that point, but that's where I'm headed in this presentation this morning.

First, where are we, with respect to customer support? What's our relationship with our customers? When I accepted this job three and a half years ago, one of my highest priorities was to restore confidence, customer confidence, congressional confidence, the self-confidence of the analysts in our community. We've been pretty badly battered, not just by the experiences of 9/11 and the Iraq WMD estimate, but by the way in which the tar brush was so liberally applied to tens of thousands of people who had not been involved in the production of the estimate or involved directly in 9/11-related activities. Morale was pretty low. The gang that can't shoot straight, the keystone cops, couldn't connect the dots. You remember the imagery and verbiage that was used. We didn't have to sort of win confidence of people who didn't know about us. We had to restore confidence among people who had been dealing with us for some period of time.

We had to do this, in part, by restoring confidence in the quality of the work. Quite simply, we had to make it better. Many of you heard me say before, the overall quality of work was much better than it was depicted in the caricatures of the incompetent, bumbling community. But it was nowhere nearly as good as it could be, as it needed to be, to meet the much more complex array of issues of which we were asked to provide information and insight. We seriously had to tackle the trade craft issues, the collaboration issues, the sharing issues, in order to produce better support, better analytic support, more timely support from the collectors to military forces in the field in a very different kind of support for the intelligence community to our first responders, the law enforcement community, fire departments, and so forth inside our own country.

The term better doesn't simply refer to the quality of tradecraft in the product, however. The support that we provide had to be noticeably more useful. It had to be timely. It had to be on target. It did very little good to restore confidence, indeed, very little good for the security of our nation to, at annual evaluation time, critique, in a rather boastful fashion, how many products we had produced, how significant that product had been to this or that customer. We had to be truly useful. We had to be there at the right time, in the right place, with the right information, with important insights. We had to be able to move these across IT boundaries and across institutional boundaries. We had to know exactly what our customers need and when they needed it and in what form they needed, at what level of classification they could use it, and a whole array of related questions.

We tackled this with a multi-pronged approach. Beginning with the, what our customers need, starting point, we decided to take advantage of the existing structure of the community, a structure that is widely caricatured, ridiculed, why do you need 16 intelligence agencies? Sixteen is actually a number that is too small when you consider that there are major players like the National Counterterrorism Center or the National Intelligence Council that aren't counted in that number. But they exist.

And they exist for one fundamentally important reason. Each of the customer sets, each of the missions that they support is in some ways unique, requires tailored support, customized support, the right kind of expertise. So as a collective, we've got a wide array of customers and issues. But you also have a wide array of experts and organizations designed to support them.

Wanting to take advantage of the up-close-and-personal relationship between an individual briefer and the people they support, the folks who are down the hall in the same building, the weekly or other interactions that occurred to know what people needed, to vacuum up those tasks so that we could translate them into more useful products. To take advantage of the difference in expertise, the difference in missions to capture synergies – synergies that in the past were too often lost because we didn't know about work being done at another component of the community. We didn't know who was working on the same or related activities. If we did know who they were and where they were, we didn't know how to contact them. If we knew how to contact them, the wires or the firewalls or the other technical impediments were in the way.

And if we'd solve that – there would be some, but that database is not open to people of this agency – kind of impediment. And even if you overcame all of that, there was very little knowledge of the quality of work being done by colleagues who were not known personally. Very difficult to take advantage of divisions of labor, to capture synergies without fundamental confidence in the competence of prospective colleagues. So the confidence in our work is in part a confidence in one another to reinforce the self-confidence that we had to build.

We can talk, if you wish, in the questions, about some of the specific ways in which we improved the tradecraft, the adoption of standards for products, for sourcing of materials, the training programs, the way in which an increasing number of products – beginning with the President's Daily Brief – through single agency products are being done with input from colleagues in other agencies. This is mostly a bottom-up phenomenon. It's not senior managers

going around and saying Fingar told me I have to make you do this. It's analysts who now that they have a vehicle through the ARK (sp) and the Yellow Pages, through interconnected e-mails to find one another, have realized that they produce better products with input from colleagues.

So this bottom-up phenomenon has resulted in a steady increase in the number of products. And where I count them is in the President's Daily Brief because it's in my job jar. The analysts get it. They're now discovering new ways and feeling more comfortable about producing better product and understand what's necessary to produce that better product. All of that is still in the nice to do category. The real issue is do those we support think we're doing better. Do they have greater confidence in our work?

And here, I think the answer is overwhelmingly yes. If anyone out there or several of you have picked up a different view, I would love to hear it, because that would mean it's a specific problem that needs attention. But the general situation, I think, is really quite good.

And let me cite some illustrative examples, which I recognize – as a 40-odd-year-long analyst do not constitute definitive proof of my proposition. Let me begin with the first customer. The President spends between 30 minutes and an hour with us six days a week. He's a very busy man. He's a very demanding senior executive. If he thought we were wasting his time, we would get short shrift. The views directly and indirectly from him, from Steve Hadley, from the cabinet members who now attend at least one day a week sessions built around the intelligence presentations, the introduction of what we call deep dives. Read-ahead papers provided to the principals, analysts going into the Oval Office to present and defend and respond to questions sort of demonstrating who we are, what we know, to be able to say directly what we don't know, what assumptions we are making, to talk about the collection capabilities. We've done almost 100 of these deep dives. We've had more than 200 analysts who have been participants in this.

I confess to a high degree of trepidation when we began this. I knew we could start off with a bang. I wasn't sure how deep our bench was. John Kringen and I, when John was the DDI, sort of can't believe that the balloon is still up there. I keep waiting for the air to come out of it. But after 100 of these, we are still going strong. And we have them scheduled out for weeks, and in some cases months in advance, because they have proven useful. That is an important vote of confidence.

Second is our oversight folks, both congressional committees, and the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. The PIAB did its own evaluation of analytic performance and has pronounced it much better on several dimensions. Congress and oversight is a little more mixed. That we have restored confidence in the product is tempered or obscured by the highly partisan character of an awful lot of exchanges.

Something that has produced a situation that is a little bit uncomfortable for us, for me personally, that as we have restored confidence in the product we have increased the incentives to use the intelligence community and intelligence products as a club with which to bludgeon opponents on issues. And the desire to have unclassified products, the need to appear in sessions that are clearly structured with among the objectives embarrassing folks in the other party, that it's very gratifying when members come up to me in person and compliment the product. And

when I have sought to gain dispensation from producing certain products or appearing in certain sessions, it is no, we trust you. The you is not Fingar. It's the analytic community and the intelligence community, because we have confidence in you that we think it important that your insights be presented as a part of the public debate. That's more gratifying than comforting.

Third measure of quality and factual basis for confidence because we share it are the evaluations that we perform. We established under the IRTPA legislation an analytic integrity and standards group. With an action group comprised of representatives of all the agencies developed the standards. Those standards are applied by evaluation teams of some ODNI staff and many contractors. We are now standing up in agencies that did not have them evaluation programs of their own. But the end of the year, all agencies will have them. They will apply a common set of standards to their own product.

The vote of confidence – more than a dozen agencies have come to us and asked for special evaluations of product lines. This is kind of cool, right? When the kid comes to the teacher and asks for extra homework and then to have it graded. Agencies are using these evaluations of strong points and weak points to adjust their training programs, to provide extra help to managers that have some weakness and so forth. And it's clear, because we've now got data on thousands of products that in aggregate, we're getting better. Probably agency by agency, we're getting better. I say probably because we have gone out of our way, again, to build confidence in the process by doing everything we can to preclude invidious comparison.

When we share results outside of an individual agency, they're always aggregated – the community as a whole. We give the results to the agency that requested them. They can do with them as they wish. But they own that. And you can use it for diagnostic or pedagogic reasons. But we're not trying to introduce an element of unhealthy competition that would get in the way of confidence and collaboration. And it's working.

And finally, a point that I alluded to a moment ago with the bottom-up, agencies and analysts have more confidence in what we're doing. It's sort of you know – it's like pornography. You know it when you see it. If you've been around the intelligence community, you know what good and what is not as good. You know when the reaction to your product is one that elicits a, I can use this. Or even more frequently the case, when the ideas and the insights are stolen without attribution. It's not stolen. We are a support organization. We provide the input. I've been around policy-makers long enough to know if there's a good idea in there, and it becomes their idea, that's a big win for us. They take ownership of it. They've accepted it. They've accepted the quality of the work that underlies it. And it shouldn't bother us that we don't get credit.

Some of the transformational tools, techniques that you've heard about from others and will hear about – intellipedia, A-Space, and so forth – have crossed a threshold or tipping point here. To be not something that is sort of novelty – for many not something that is viewed as zero-sum. I could do my real work or I can play in that particular sandbox. But becoming tools that they have found useful. And the numbers of users, the requests to be pilots in A-Space, from the beginning when this stands up to have some of the issues – enigmatic facilities, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas in Pakistan and so forth, to be a part. They see value in this.

So we've restored confidence in who we are and what we do and how we do the work. Confidence is always, in my view, a fragile commodity. Hard to build; easy to lose. As my friend Ron Burgess has put it, one "oh shit" wipes out 100 "atta-boys." Just as in so many other endeavors, we have to be good every day in all respects or it undermines the confidence in everything we're doing in all areas.

As we go into the transition, we've got some challenges associated with simultaneous support of multiple customers, with quite different needs. And we've been thinking about this actually for several months. Again, having been around through a number of transitions, there is a natural and normal process in the latter years of an administration, particularly a two-term administration. They know a great deal about the issues being worked. The agenda narrows to that smaller number of issues that are really important to wrap up, if possible, before the end. And it's not simply a legacy issue. It's a desire to take advantage for the nation of the work, the effort that has gone into working hard problems, to try and push them over the line before a handoff in our nation gives potential advantage to the folks we are working with or against on a problem, where they have continuity and we have learning curve.

So as we approach the end – and it's been certainly over the past year – the bar for us with this administration is very high. To come in with things that are very useful on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, Arab-Israeli issues, and a dozen or so other. It's very high that the work that we do, the importance of the issues, the magnitude of the effort, the support to war-fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, the magnitude of the effort in the global war on terror has resulted in the reallocation of effort within the community. Analysts, collection, resources, technical capabilities focused on these high-priority items. No matter who wins, we know for sure that the next administration will not be as high on the particular learning curves that I've just described, that the agenda will be different. It's likely to be much broader. It will include all of the high-priority issues that will be there for the handover. But there will be many more.

So we started many months ago to wrestle with the how do we need to be using our rotational assignments, our recruitment practices across the community to rebuild capability that we have diminished in order to support higher priorities? We have to be ready to go on January 20th. We can't take that as the starting gun for rebuilding capability in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, in Africa and some of the other areas where we have reduced effort. So that has been (inaudible).

In addition the normal rather heavy load of support that we provide analytic products, we've generated dozens of community level NIEs and NIAs, ICBs, and ICAs, and other array of products so that they'll be ready to go. Again, experience indicates that people will want a fresh look at the issues. Sort of dusting off something with a 2006 or 2007 date on it, and saying things haven't changed very much with respect to this issues is not going to instill confidence.

We need to do the updating. We need to do the rethinking. Some of what passed for conventional wisdom or analytic insight before we had instituted the new procedures for tradecraft and quality and collaboration were simply not up to the current expectations and have to be reworked.

And we will have a rather full shelf of materials ready to go. We will have groups of briefers ready to go on essentially any topic. Some of these will be done out of the NIC-coordinated community level. Most of them will be within agencies. Most of the products prepared for the customer supported by a particular agency will be from that agency. But again, we've got enough confidence in the quality of work done by one another that they will be leavened and enriched by products produced elsewhere in the community.

So part of what we need to convey from day one is that we are an integrated enterprise, that when you touch whatever your particular contact or normal or integrated intelligence unit, you've touched the community writ large. And we will worry the problem through. If we need to go to the Marine Corps, to the Air Force, to Treasury to get specific expertise and insight on a problem, we'll do that for you. We're not going to say go to Treasury for that question. And we're not all the way there but we're a long way toward where we need to be.

We know what we have to prepare for, for the next almost five months. We don't know with any precision what comes next. We've begun to engage with the campaigns. The President authorized us to reach out to the campaigns to offer substantive briefings at a time and place of their choosing. We've now done one. The Obama campaign, indeed Senator Obama, received a briefing on Tuesday. Our approach in this is complete transparency. If one campaign asks for something or receives something, we notify the other. We don't want to be an issue. We don't want to appear to be or enable anybody to construe us as being partisan in this. We've provided an array of topics that we think sort of collectively in the community are ones that might want to know about early on. But we'll of course receive any request.

It's a little different this year than it has been in any previous year or many previous elections. It's different because we don't have an incumbent running for an office. But it's also different because we've got three sitting Senators who can call up any one of us in the community at any time from their Senate capacity and ask for things. Is the request from the Senator as a Senator or is the request from a Senator as a Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate? As a Senator, we wouldn't tell anybody else what was asked. Within the guidelines that we've laid out for the campaign, we want transparency here.

We're preparing – and the agencies are preparing – materials on their specific missions and so forth. We're also preparing a guide for customers of intelligence that will be common in many respects: how to read intelligence, what confidence levels mean, how to interpret sourcing information and the like, and specific to the agency in question and the customer sets that they support.

We will be more useful if we have better informed customers. And come January and February and March, again, no matter who wins the election, we anticipate having a large number of new customers who do not know the intelligence community. They know about us from infamy, from reputation, from caricature, from open congressional testimony, from scurrilous press, from good repute, through trusted interlocutors. But we will have to again build an understanding of what we can do and confidence in it.

I'm quite certain that we will be able to do this, not just because we've thought about it, because we have plans and procedures that are more or less in place, but because we do have a good product. We have good people. And we have confidence in ourselves.

Now, the pitch for support. I mentioned the partnership, the alliance, that the community is able to do all that it does, not just because it has a large workforce and a large budget but because we day in and day out work with people like you. You develop technologies. You have ideas. You have suggestions. You prod us. You taunt us. You talk us up or talk us down in the circles in which you move.

And though I certainly would never, never ask professional colleagues and friends to say anything about analytic transformation or the efforts of the ODNI or the intelligence community that you believe to be untrue or inaccurate, to the extent that you've caught the wave, share the excitement. Sense that we're on the right track. See the potential in what has been built over the last few years. We ask that you share that with the friends and colleagues that you know. Your opinions carry weight.

And if we do all that we can in order to increase the likelihood that we start off at zero, if not in the positive side of the ledger, if we minimize the goddamn intelligence community kind of stereotypical starting point, the better for us, the better for the nation, the more quickly we will be able to move forward and focus on the real issues. And I will argue strenuously in any arena that the intelligence community should not be anywhere near the top of the next administration's agenda. We are not broken. We are not the problem.

The nation has a long list of serious problems and challenges, and momentous if not historical opportunities that deserve and require the attention of senior people. On some of them, we can make contributions. On others, they're just outside of our realm. But the focus should not be on us. We should not have another Monty Python moment of, "and now, for something completely different." Let's upend the game board, knock the pieces over, and rearrange them. We don't need that. And I believe it would be very, very undesirable if not dangerous to do so.

I'll return to that. But let me sort of prepare the way again by repeating the confession that we are not yet all that we aspire to be, that we haven't done everything right, that there has been certain elements – maybe a high number of elements – of what the Chinese call crossing the stream by feeling for the stones with your feet. See what's going to work. See which pilots are going to be successful and are worthy of further development and which should be abandoned. Since our approach at the beginning was not we know exactly what needs to be done and decreeing that – I've been around Washington, as have my colleagues, too long to know that and to attempt that.

Building confidence in a new organization, going from a white blackboard with no people to an organization charged with overseeing a budget that is larger than the gross domestic product of most nations, running a hugely complex operation is not something that one should willy-nilly make changes or not willy-nilly discard what is in place. We've done things more slowly than anybody would like. Everybody would like to get from current situation to a more desirable one as rapidly as possible.

But it's important to remember the context. It's a context that shaped us and will sound defensive and making excuses. But it's a context that by and large will persist into the next administration. It includes such things as the sheer size and complexity of the community. It's like trying to turn an aircraft carrier. It's not going to turn on a dime.

Doing it in the midst of two wars – Iraq, Afghanistan – global terrorist threats, the long, growing list of complex challenges, nuclear proliferation, the rise of extremism, energy dependence, energy diplomacy, and the like – these ought to give anyone pause as they consider making the changes, that the challenge we've had and will continue to have is akin to what my friend Peter Clement described as swapping the wings on an airliner full of people at 30,000 feet. We've got to make fundamental change and have been making fundamental change without breaking anything. We don't have the luxury to sweep that aside, do away with that activity. It has to be incremental if it's going to avoid immediate and serious deterioration of the support we provide to a wide array of customers.

We've been through the challenges of a start-up organization. When I think back on things producing three budgets over a period of eight months – Caryn Wagner I think is here someplace – recruiting and bringing on board people – remember the first performance evaluations. We had people from 22 organizations of the U.S. government for more than those in the intelligence community being evaluated by people from 18 agencies using – used to, accustomed to 14 different evaluation systems. We've moved well beyond that. But that illustrates sort of the magnitude of what we worked our way through.

And now that we are mostly through that, the transformation agenda has taken root, is picking up speed, and as importantly has momentum. It has momentum so as it picks up speed it will be more self-sustaining. I think it's terribly important that we not lose that momentum, that we not expend a lot of time and effort in another series of studies to determine whether round really is the best shape for a wheel. We just need to accept that we've got it more right than wrong and move ahead.

If my gray hair doesn't convey it effectively, I've been in the intelligence community 38 years, 15 of them in senior positions. And I have never seen the community perform more effectively than it does today. That's not simply because of ODNI. It's because of the commitment, the dedication, the capabilities of individuals and agencies throughout the community. We are not broken. We are working arguably better than we ever have. And mostly, we know and agree on where we need to be. Getting there is always a challenge. The devil is in the details. Turf issues arise. Mythology is not yet dead about individual components. But we're getting there.

It's not necessary to revolutionize the community. And it's also dangerous. The intelligence community, as you know as well as I, is fundamentally about people. We have great gadgets and gizmos and capabilities and creativity. But they came from the mind of some individuals. They're usually individuals working collaboratively. And morale matters. And sense of achievement matters. And confidence matters.

And I worry a lot – and this worry is reinforced – I do monthly brown bags with analysts that we pull out of the analytic resources catalog. So they're thematic; but other than that, they're randomly generated. And as I look at our graying baby boomer contingent that's been through a lot. From the halcyon days of the Cold War through the uncertainties of downsizing and rightsizing, to the excitement of rebuilding and transformation, I'm afraid that sort of let's go back and start again, back to a blank piece of paper, back to square one, our most senior people will take advantage of the opportunities for retirement that they now have.

The other end of the spectrum are the 55 or 60 percent of the workforce that joined since 9/11. Exceedingly talented, committed, patriotic, professional, whose initial experience in the community, by and large, has been in the new dispensation, within the era of transformation, within the ability to work through, in, build expectations, career expectations in an environment they expect to be predictable. If we remove that predictability and they see the loss of the seniors at the top, I'm afraid that we will drive more of them in the direction that is predicted for the generation of short excursion tours in a variety of jobs and industries and activities.

And we don't have to lose very many at either the high end or the youthful end of our spectrum before we are in a world of hurt as the expertise, the experience, the understanding of customer requirements that they have is absolutely critical. With that rather shameless pitch for your help, your support, let me shift to invitation for questions and comments. What did I miss? What should we be thinking about as we gear up to support a new administration? What should we be thinking about in terms of outreach to the Hill, to the media, influentials around the campaign? Preparing now for the arrival of people who may have no experience or indeed may have experience with the intelligence community from a different era?

With that, let me thank you for your attention and invite your questions and comments. (Applause.) I'll come out here and get in front of the lights so I can see you. Do I just field questions? I will invite them. I hope I haven't intimidated this crowd. Anybody?

Q: (Inaudible) – yesterday we heard colleagues getting up and say two things that were interesting. One was that it's possible that we have too much information sharing going on in the community and that there will never be a change in the way we handle the department – (inaudible) – I don't want to mischaracterize what you were saying. But I think the sentiment was that there is a lot of data to go through. Not everyone needs to know everything. I wanted to know – I wanted to hear your reaction to that.

DR. FINGAR: Yeah, that's the point Mike Wertheimer has been making for three years. The conflict between the flood of information – that we take in enormous volumes of information – and we want to confound that problem by telling people to share it with one another. Let me just – several points of that – one is, through the physical sharing, sharing of the digits for the information, we facilitate not just collaboration but we facilitate divisions of labor. Trusted colleagues who I'll follow this stream of reporting; you follow that stream of reporting. We'll share our notes and observations.

We'll do this when we get to A-Space sort of on a board where the senior comments are available to anybody, the juniors questions and comments are available to anybody. So that not

everybody has to go through the same pile of data, that we have moved well down the road to making it accessible, making it sharable, making it interactive in facilitating the division of labor. We have to continue to push in that direction or people will simply never move away from their electronic inbox. It'd be constant constipation.

Can you have too much information sharing? The short answer is no, my short answer. There are materials that need to be protected that do not need to be, should not be shared with everybody. I thin of this as concentric circles. Most information in the community, the vast majority, should be available theoretically and actually to, say, everybody in the intelligence community with the right tickets. We're clearing people in the different agencies to the same level. If they've got the same clearance, they should have the same access to the information, provided that the systems have been certified to the same level. And they now have been.

The innovation of a single community CIO responsible for the accreditation of systems, we've now moved to the point where – again, in theory – essentially any information can move across the electronic pipes between all of the components. I forced this one a little bit using my PDB responsibilities. As that became a community product, we had to be able to share drafts across the community. We had to get them off the dedicated LAN that they were – onto a larger one. And we did it. It wasn't immediate, took a matter of several weeks.

Then, my argument became, if I can move the PDB containing the most sensitive information we've got across this system securely and it's been certified, why the hell can't I move garden variety secret vanilla materials across this same system? So most stuff should be available so that we can have the divisions of labor.

Everything should be discoverable. Everything will be discoverable in the Library of National Intelligence. That does not meant that everybody gets access to everything, that there do need to be compartments, and SAPs and so forth. But if you're working on a subject as an analyst, you're entitled to now – indeed, I'd argue you must know – if there's a body of reporting, a body of analysis on your subject that you haven't seen.

So discovery – and it could be really quite generic – Chinese submarines. Now, that we actually collect on and worry about Chinese submarines is not going to surprise anybody. There is no counterintelligence that we would do that. So you know that it exists. You need to be able to go to somebody in your own organization who has got access to that and say, I think I need that, to at least begin the dialogue that may result in, no you don't. I'm in there. I review a product. I will ensure that you're not saying anything that is inconsistent with that material but you don't need it.

Or, yeah, I think you do need it. And a process to request and gain access to a specific piece, a specific document, or perhaps the entire compartment. So we need to have that kind of control on it to protect truly sensitive materials. But we have to be able to discover their existence. We have to have procedures that are not arbitrary and that begin from judgments about I need this to do my work as opposed to I decide on whom I will bestow the privilege of looking at this information that I've put into my compartment.

I hope that got to your question. Anybody else?

Q: As I was listening to Mike Wertheimer yesterday, I was struck by the implications for what he was saying about the analytic community. And you know, I applaud all of the standards that are being written and all of the other things that you are doing to normalize analysis across the community. The concern I have though is that once those documents are written and once they're distributed, agencies are just by their natural inclination either going to move and put them into practice or say, okay, they've done their work. I know best, and ignore them. It goes on all the time in government.

So my question to you is, if you're going to normalize the analytic workforce, are you thinking about the implications for what Mike has said? Should we be thinking about the implications for what Mike has said? For example, are we thinking about whether we ought to hire analysts into the community along the lines of the military services? So you hire them in as a batch of people; you put them through common training, common understanding. And then, from that pool of people, they go out into the individual agencies. Have you gotten to that point in your thinking or should we be thinking along those lines?

DR. FINGAR: This one is – there is a gap between my thinking, which would be my vision, and reality, and the what is possible. Let me preface the rest of the answer with saying, sort of my approach is that it's a lot easier to argue from demonstrated success than it is to sell an abstract vision, which is a kind of a step at a time and prove its worth and keep moving. Don't settle for anything that is good enough if you know there is something better.

I like the ideal. I share the ideal of being a member of the intelligence community. Where one happens to work within that community – CIA, INR, MCIA – sort of ought to be a function of interest, expertise, opportunities to build and use that expertise, not the basis of mythology about who is best and who is worst. It ought to be governed a little bit by proximity to residence. But building that sense of we are one community and analysts everywhere are as good as, as professional as those in any other part is a building process.

Pat's catching my eye – the joint duty in the military that took a decade. You know, good idea – it took a decade to put into place. We are going to compress that – we are going to attempt to compress that. Some of the reciprocity, the access to data, but you can't have joint duty requirement and rotate people around who you expect to be your senior officers, and have them go from one agency to another agency and say, well, when you are here, you no longer have access to what you had access to in your other organization, but you can have this stuff, which you won't have access when you go back. So we have got to tackle that kind of problem.

There are serious differences of view among the leadership across the community as to whether having purple analysts here, bringing them into the community, giving them a sense of a community, and then specialized training, acculturation into an agency is the way to go. Or it is community agency; understand the values, the mission, the practices of this agency before you go out into the larger sea of people because then you can contribute to understanding. If you don't know anything about your agency of assignment, you can't sort of bring much to the table.

And the opposite is if everybody is blank at the same time, they build confidence in one another and a network of friends that goes –

We are going to move – unless what we are doing is a turn in a direction of bringing people into the community, into an agency, but building that integrated single enterprise early and rigorously. One small step in that direction – critically important step – is sort of sharing of information on vacancies.

First, at a collective – even though we are very big, that we shouldn't exacerbate or perpetuate gaps by simply replacing with a clone somebody who has left – in a single agency, bill it without regard to the larger community. If we have got three of those folks scattered around in other places, let's get some complementary expertise, so making that transparent. And when resumes come in, as they now do, we get far more well-qualified applicants for most positions than we are going to hire. In most cases, the agency is going to hire one. The rest of those resumes used to go into the burn bag. Now they are shared around the community. Here are some good people. We didn't pick them, but if you are moving toward a hiring opportunity for which this individual's skill set might be appropriate, here they are. Take advantage of it. Posting jobs together. We are moving there by steps.

It is going to take, I think, the playing through of the generational change that we are now witnessing before it becomes easy and natural to do. And guys like me have to get off the metaphorical stage to allow, again, the 60 percent that have come in, in a very different environment to move into the management positions and interact with their colleagues with the same disregard for lanyard and organizational boundaries that they have for barriers in the real world.

Q: You mentioned the generational kind of difference between those folks that are about to – are at the sunset of their career and those that are at the sunrise – to use a metaphor, and that the – I might argue that – and many have – that the attributes that the newer generation are bringing are exactly those attributes that we would like to embrace and encourage. However, almost all of our systems – the people policies, the business and mission processes are geared toward this generation that is about to move on. And what is your feeling about the need to shift these policies and processes to better map to that younger generation?

DR. FINGAR: The need is acute and it's palpable. The procedures and processes, the norms that we have in place that many of us have lived with – were not irrational. They were well-grounded, reasonable; they work – or worked. They work less well. And I think – you know, my experience, sort of seniors and that tiny little band of mid-level – sort of GS-14, 15 types – recognize that what worked well in the past is not working as well in the present, as it did in the past, and probably won't work in the – we are not going back to the future. We are going into a new era.

The people who are gray and experienced and have been with this process for decades – I think by and large sort of recognize the dwindling adequacy of what we did – don't have a clear idea of exactly what needs to replace it and are wary about transition, about running risk, about breaking something when you get from the known to the unknown. Natural. Social scientists

will tell it. But naturally, the younger people that you referenced here that come in with a different set of skills and expectations – I think it is not simply pandering to the way in which they like to work – the digital generation. It is recognizing that technology and learning, availability of information is just very, very different than it was a decade – let alone three decades ago. And instead of being – we shouldn't simply follow the whim of the youth in our workforce to make them feel happy about coming to work, so that they will stay on the job.

We need to be sensitive to that, but there is a – they have had more experience in a realm of capabilities that others of us have bumped up against after we were more set in our ways. For me, it is still kind of an unnatural, self-conscious act to do things with the computer that is totally intuitive to my kids. And as we link this back to the transition to the new administration, regardless of who wins – and this is not commentary on one or another candidate – regardless who wins, a greater percentage of those filling senior and mid-level positions are going to come out of that more digitally oriented generation, a no-limits generation, a no-barriers generation.

They are going to be used to receiving information in little bits moving across the computer screen, to multitasking. And we have to orient our mode of support to fit their mode of receipt. If they change the shape of the outlet, we had better change the shape of our plug. Otherwise, we are going to very quickly become unhelpful. If we become unhelpful, we become irrelevant. If we become irrelevant, we are obscenely expensive.

Yes, ma'am?

Q: Good morning, sir. One of the comments made a little earlier with the ICDs and all that are coming out, which, by the way, I think are great – good guidelines and all to work from and oversight, governance, performance measures coming up. My only concern is – not as an excuse or whining because I know the Army way is three bags full will do it no matter how many few people we have or how many are doing whatever. It is not that anyone chooses not to do something or elects not to, it is how many people you have. If you have three people and 10 tasks, it is doable. If you have three people and 20 tasks and oversight and reporting to do, something either has to drop or done later.

So the only thing – I guess what I am saying and not asking is that as all these ICDs keep coming out and provide a (inaudible) to do oversight on this and that. We are going to run out of people, especially when we have to start pulling from our analytic community to help do these things because the non-analytic community is small. Discussion yesterday came up about contractors, the percent versus government, converting to government, the percent of contractors to government. Certain things are government inherent in oversight. And we also have limitations on the growth to our government staff. So there is only so much we can do depending on how more and more ICDs and oversight requirements come out.

Just something to consider. I can't necessarily tell you even right now where is the line as far as – you know – we have no more bodies to tap.

DR. FINGAR: This will sound somewhat Pollyannaish – probably admit that. I'd juxtapose it – I probably wouldn't be where I had been over the last 20 years if I was just Pollyannaish. I think

most of what you have described is both a very real problem and a transitory one. Let me pick out a couple strands of that.

ICDs – most of the community will say, you know, another set of rules, have got to follow them, have got to change and do it. Most of the ones in the – again, the analytic realm – (inaudible) – have actually been welcome. There is not very much resistance to this. These make sense. This is good. This is a good practice. But at least as a transition, supervisors that need to assign resources to ensure that the good practices being mandated are actually being followed – to tutor, to mentor, to pair people up for mentoring, so that they can do it correctly. The goal is not to have standards police. It is to internalize the behaviors, to train people, evaluate, reward their performance, recognize managers on their performance, so that this becomes internalized and you don't need the same overlay of mentoring and monitoring that clearly is necessary in the short run.

We would be remiss, in my view, if we simply tossed it out there and said, here is the new rules. Get with the program or get out of town. It is, here is the rules. We are going to help you. We have trained – ODNI, by analytic integral standard – have trained people in each of the agencies. In some cases, we have made some money available to hire contractors to help get the programs off the ground. I will try to make a broader point here. It is not just the standards, but more broadly, it is not enough to decree new ways of doing things.

We have to involve people in their development and the system to understand and implement. But we will get there. And I think we will get there pretty quickly, where these become an accepted – because we have pretty quickly achieved that in the past at an agency-by-agency level, either with comprehensive, written-down, trained to procedures unique to that agency or had no training at all. And people on the job learned how to do it by watching others.

The numbers-versus-tasks problem that you point to is a tremendous motivator to get the training wheels off the bicycle of new people, whether they are new to the community or new to the account, as quickly as possible, so they can carry their load. So we are used to doing that. We will continue to do that, but in a – again, I think a relatively short period of time, we will have complementarity across the community, the ability to mentor across agencies because it is to the same standards.

The final point concerns the when do you take stuff off the list. This is hard. We are working at ODNI level – not just analytic – on a budget process that we went through a drill in April of folks in from – I think it was 50 different constituencies within the community, customer sets, non-title 50, non-title 10 agencies. I said, what do you need from the intelligence community? Part of the drill was what should we stop doing. What should we deemphasize? Where can we get some savings? It will surprise no one in this room that we had a list when we were done of 280 new requirements came out of this process.

And something on the order of two dozen – most weren't serious – suggestions as to what we could stop doing. It is natural. It is normal. We don't have a lot of unimportant things on our to-do list. And even the – in aggregate, least important is important to somebody. And we do pride ourselves on being able to provide customized support to niche activities. And in the

aggregates, certain kinds of mapping support the fighter pilots – may not stack up real high on the list of – but it sure is important to the fighter pilot. And it sure is important to the commander that is going to dispatch people.

So striking the right balance. I think in the near term, getting things off the list is going to be hard. And what we have to do is insist two managers. You have been running some of these activities for a decade or more. And every year you ask for more money to perform that activity. What the hell kind of manager isn't able to get efficiencies after a decade? So more and more – we want to try and identify areas that we can perform at an adequate level of service with fewer people, maybe fewer dollars, and have it tailored to get to exactly the people we want and not the broad brush – somebody might find this useful, and keep operating on it.

Sensitive to it because the community will step up and try to do everything it is asked. And if we get spread too thinly, again, we are not accurate. We are not useful. We are not relevant.

Yes, sir?

Q: Hi, Tom. Staying on the same theme of ICDs – in January of 2007, when John Negroponte was DNI, he signed Intelligence Community Directive 200, which essentially states the IC will not have the entire breadth and depth of expertise to cover all of its – and support its mission. It must reach out to academia, think tanks, NGOs, private business. How is, how should, how will the IC, whether it is ODNI or the entire community, reach out to those constituencies? Is it a one-way street via IC reaching out? Or does private business, academia, think tank knock on the door? Or is there a portal –

DR. FINGAR: It is a great question. And some of you think it is a setup question – those who know me and my passion for outreach. We finally got out – it is about a month, month-and-a-half ago – ICD 205, which is on outreach. It took two years to work through the system – a directive that basically said it is the responsibility of analysts to reach out to expertise. It is a responsibility of agencies to enable folks to reach out to the expertise.

CI concerns, notions of proprietary – who owns the experts that are outside of the intelligence community? We have collectors who think they own anybody that isn't wearing a badge inside the community. They had to work through that. We are now working through implementing guidelines on this. But the basic approach is individuals – analysts is my world, collectors, technologists, IT types – know that there are people outside of their organizations, outside of the IC, outside of the U.S. government, who are knowledgeable, who are working complementary or the same issues. They know or can know which one of those are good and which ones are not nearly as good.

They should have as a part of the normal way in which we do work is spend taxpayer money to draw on as much expertise as we can – and efficiently. And I am talking here not about contracted activity – that might grow out of this. But the journalists, the professor, the corporate analyst or developer that is working a problem and is excited about that problem and publishes on that problem – to be reachable and willing to answer questions or share insights. This should

be as natural as the conversation you would have with the person in the carrel or office next to you. It has to be a two-way street. It won't work if it is all take and no give.

And here is why we have to be cautious here because we have to train people to compartmentalize – that, which they know because they are all source and they read the newspapers. They are exposed – and that, which they only know because of sensitive collection activity. And I recognize that it is quite different to talk about insights gained than it is to talk about the evidentiary base for those insights. And they can actually go quite far – but we have to actually make our folks comfortable. If we are not sharing insights and ideas with the people that we have reached to, what is in it for them?

Now, some get a thrill about, you know, group used to the intelligence community or components of the community. Some are just excited about the subject. But if this is going to be a meaningful exchange, there has got to be mutual benefit of this. We are developing a rolodex of experts, which I hope we are actually going to stand up pretty soon. These are outside experts, who have explicitly agreed to be receptive to approaches from analysts in the intelligence community.

We will try to work out rules to the road to make sure that the same individuals aren't deluged. But a lot of them are already on a list of individual agencies to make this possible. It will surprise nobody here that we are going to have to make the rolodex of unclassified experts a classified document. (Laughter.) And therefore, hard for the outside people to update – had to develop all of the cutouts and so forth to make that work for sound CI reasons. But we have to make it a part of the way we do our business because I would hazard to say it is a part of the way every person in this room does their job now. You are in contact with colleagues and competitors, foreign folk working a problem at all stages of the process. We have to do the same because when we need that expertise – I mean, really need it – it is too late to begin the search. You have to have developed the ties, the relationship, the evaluative criteria. And my vision on this is to have a chunk of the vetting located in the open source center.

So if somebody has developed sort of an understanding of what Susie X's field is, what she really knows – her talents, capabilities, how she has interacted – that that become (inaudible) to anybody in the community, so that they can start further up the learning curve or understand I don't need to bother Susie because she is a regular interlocutor of my colleague in the other agency and I just get it indirectly.

We are on the way there. But this is a change of culture for the community, where if it ain't secret, it ain't real. If somebody is not cleared, they are not worthy. That is yesterday's thinking. We have got to get to tomorrow, where not just our own people, but our customers live. I see John's up, so my time must have been expired. Thank you for all of the work you do for us.

(Applause.)

MR. BRENNAN: Thank you very much, Tom. We greatly appreciate your taking time out of your busy schedule to join us here. But I think more than that, we appreciate your many, many

years of selfless dedication and service to our country and to the national security mission of the intelligence community. And I think I speak on behalf of all the folks here that it is heartening to know that at this time of a critical transition in our country that career professionals like yourself are at the helm and are able to steer the ship straight. So we wish you luck in that endeavor. And again, thank you very much for the time that you have been here.

DR. FINGAR: Thank you, John.

Evening Keynote Address

MR. BRENNAN: Good evening, everyone. Can I have your attention, please? I hope you enjoyed the meal and the conversation. As I mentioned earlier, we are truly fortunate to have America's premier intelligence analyst with us, Tom Fingar, who has been able to spend time with us today speaking about analytic transformation and the business of intelligence. What we thought we would take advantage of is being here to address some of the substantive issues on our minds. And I passed along to Tom a couple of subjects and topics that people would like him to address.

But Tom is an exceptionally polished speaker, who has had to navigate the shoals of the political environment of Washington. But we very much appreciate his willingness to use this opportunity to address some of those issues confronting this administration and will confront the next. So Tom, please.

(Applause.)

DR. FINGAR: A laptop in front of me – I have no idea what to do with that. I am not a PowerPoint guy; I am an outline guy. And what I would like to do this evening is to have a kind of a Build-A-Bear approach to a briefing – what I am hinting toward is a question-and-answer session – one of the things that I actually enjoy most is responding to questions and drawing upon the insights that I have gained from the people that I work with and have worked with for a long time.

But let me begin by thanking two people, John Brennan, again, for the support. (Applause.)

It at times is lonely out there on the forward edge of bureaucracy in trying to change deeply instilled practices and procedures. And having had INSA as a source of support from the days that it was SASA [Security Affairs Support Association]. One of the first talks that I gave on taking this job was to this organization. The feedback, the support, the encouragement, the reinforcement are genuinely appreciated by me and by all of my staff that work with you.

And the other is to Mike Wertheimer. I told him after his presentation that if only he had a little more passion – (laughter) – for what he does, we would be absolutely assured of success. But the opportunity – (applause) – the opportunity to work with colleagues like Mike. He mentioned Andy, who is here somewhere, I assume – Andy Shepard – and many, many others. This is not a solitary journey. This is a group effort, and a group effort that depends on continuous infusion of

ideas and constructive criticism. And I am sure we will get both from you tonight and in the weeks and months that follow.

I also appreciate the opportunity to do substance for a change. In my Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis role, almost always I am speaking in the transformational mode, the standards mode, and so forth. But at heart, I am an analyst. And I enjoy thinking about, talking about, responding to questions about national security challenges. And what I would like to do tonight is to illustrate why it is important to smash barriers to collaboration by presenting two illustrations of what we face. One is subsumed under the rubric of 2025, the NIC [National Intelligence Council], now quadrennial look out into the future, which is done for new administrations.

We time this to be completed and released after the election, but before people are ensconced in their positions and are so busy with the daily grind that they don't have any time to think. This is sort of the strategic-level considerations. The second will be an example that I will begin with Iran, which is one of the topics that John said someone had expressed interest. Cutting into the complexity and interconnections of the world in a kind of a six degrees of separation or from this morning, 6.2 degrees of separation that are absolutely a fundamental part of the world we live in. The interconnection, the overlap, the interaction of many seemingly discrete developments. And I will work that, and then we will segue into whatever questions you might have.

Let me begin with a discussion of the 2025 project. This is an undertaking that was begun by John Gannon, who I know spoke to you yesterday when he was the chairman of the NIC. This is the fourth iteration. Every four years, we go out an additional five. I think this one may have as sort of the maximum. We are going to have 17 years of forecasting and scenario building. And that probably is the outer limit, and we will have to pull it back in. But the idea here is to identify some of the developments, the dynamics, the dimensions, the drivers that will shape the world over the next now 15 years or so. Some of these are absolutely inevitable, almost immutable. Others are susceptible to policy intervention – policy that if wise and effectively executed can make the situation better – or if badly conceived or badly implemented will make it worse.

I will illustrate that in a moment. It is also intended to shape the thinking of new administration. One of the canards in my view that sort of exists in the commentary about the intelligence community and what it ought to do – more strategic thinking, less current intelligence. When hears it, reads it all the time. I have no idea what that refers to. Strategic thinking must be a part of what every analyst does every day if they are going to do their job. They have to have some sense of the larger trends if they are to interpret current developments.

But by my experience, administration's notion of the strategic horizon begins in January, extends for four years, and gets shorted by seven days every week. If it is not going to happen in my tenure, it is beyond the realm of what I am going to worry about. There are exceptions to this, of course. But there is not a great market for strategic thinking. There is at the start of an administration. And the 2025 global trends series that we have produced is an attempt to sensitize folks to where we think developments are hidden – or more accurately, alternative

scenarios that manipulate some key and explicitly articulated drivers and say this is where it is headed.

Usually the scenario makes us – some are kind of positive, favorable to the United States, and some not so favorable. The 2020 report, for those of you who didn't read it or don't remember it, it included sort of a post-Davos world in which there was sort of globalization led to mainly, sort of, happy, positive developments. It probably won't surprise you that the President of the World Economic Forum thought this was a pretty terrific scenario. It also included the new caliphate – Islamic extremism triumphant in the Middle East. And much of the world that reads the 2025 global trends – 2025, as if it is the plan or the prediction or the aspiration of the United States government, and say, what part of the new caliphate did you think is in the interest of the United States? It is intended to highlight some good and bad outcomes.

To identify inflection points along those trajectories that may be susceptible to invention. If you like it, you may be able to reinforce it. If you don't like where it is going, you may be able to intervene and bring about a happier outcome. And at a minimum, you will know what the side posts are to tell you which direction events are hitting.

For 2025, which is a work in progress, the way in which we have built this, each one has been done a little differently – was to have – convene a number of seminars around, in this case, the United States – for 2020, we did six of them internationally – to do a Rorschach set of expectations. What were the principal drivers and trends and where were they headed? We pulled that together into a draft and we took that out to international audiences. I participated in a session in Beijing that had representatives from all continents, nine countries to critique it, tear it apart. We reworked that after a number of the international sessions. And it is now being worked around American think tanks.

He is not right or wrong. It is plausible, implausible, right indicators or the wrong indicators. Do the scenarios help us? I am not going to deal with the scenarios. I am going to deal with some of the key drivers and key assumptions. And I do this not to tell you about this project, or not exclusively tell you about the project, but also because this is what we would be telling the next administration. This is what we think will be not the full answer and explanation and determiner of events, but will be in the mix. This is not an exhaustive catalog.

One of the key assumptions or projections that we have used in sort of looking at the world going out 15, 17 years – the first assumption is that the process of globalization that we have witnessed over a couple of decades will both continue and continue to generate both greater wealth and greater inequality. So the overall sort of economic status of the world will improve. But the gap between rich and poor – internationally, regionally, and intranationally will grow – the elites and the disadvantaged. There are strengths and there are hazards associated with this.

A second is that the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished over this period of time. That the truly anomalous situation that has existed since World War II we vivified after the demise of the Soviet Union of the overwhelming dominance that the United States has enjoyed in the international system in military, political, economic, and arguably, cultural arenas is eroding and will erode at an accelerating pace with the

partial exception of military. But part of the argument here is that by 15 years from now, the military dimension will remain the most preeminent will be the least significant – or much less significant than it is now. Part of the – nobody is going to attack us with massive conventional force. Deterrence – nuclear deterrence will work. So the nature of international competition and challenges to cyber threat to cite one. It was just not susceptible to massive conventional military power. There was a sort of a – it poses a situation choices of how do we invest our national security dollars.

A third element here – this is partly an assumption, mainly an extrapolation of observable trends is that international institutions will be decreasingly – decreasingly capable of dealing with the new challenges of a more globalized world, a world in which the U.S. does not enjoy the preeminence that we did at the time the post-World War II system and institutions – the Dumbarton Oaks agreements and so forth were put in place. This is the United Nations. This is the World Trade Organizations. It is the successor to GAT, IMF, World Bank, the Alliance Structure; it is NATO first and foremost. These were terribly successful institutions. They worked extremely well. They achieved their objectives by and large of preserving peace and promoting prosperity. Their very success has rendered them increasingly OBE. And we need different or revived, revitalized institutions to deal with the challenges, the consequences of globalization. Globalization is a short-hand reference for all of the changes that are taking place in the international arena.

Put together the last two points. Diminished U.S. preeminence and decreased efficacy of the international institutions that preserve order that had been really essential to our own role in the world, peace of the world, the prosperity of billions of people. They need to be adjusted, but we don't have the capacity that we did almost 70 years ago to prescribe for the world what that replacement regime will look like. And indeed, at least for some period of time, international dissatisfaction with American actions or policy or attitude or behavior, triumphalism, or however we want to characterize this means that should we suggest perhaps a very, very good course of action, it is tainted, if not dead on arrival because it is our idea.

But look around the globe and you say who else could have an idea that isn't going to be encumbered by the same baggage. A Russian proposal, a Chinese proposal, an Indian proposal, an EU proposal, if you could get one out of the EU – that there is enough baggage, historical legacy here. There is nobody in a position or likely to be in a position over this period of time sort of to take the lead and institute the changes that almost certainly must be made in the international system.

A different kind of factor in the mix – the effects of climate change. Directed by the Congress to do a study – we did a National Intelligence Assessment of the geopolitical effects of climate change – a subject worthy of discussion in its own right, if you are interested. But looking – that looked out to 2030, which goes beyond our 2025. But a couple things are worth noting this evening. One is we did not do the science of climate change. We accepted the international panel on climate change – a governmental panel on climate change, median projections, which have been validated by the American counterpart and other folks. One of the points it makes is that there is absolutely nothing that can be done between now and 2030 that will change the projected impact on climate change. That die was cast years or decades ago. It doesn't mean we

shouldn't do things to affect the period of time thereafter. But at least the argument here is that the changes in sea level, the changes in temperature, the impact on agriculture, the impact on water availability, the impact that comes from melting in the Arctic and opening up resources and extending growing seasons in some places, and shortening them in others.

That is going to happen. Or we can begin to do now is prepare to mitigate those impacts. Now, what are those impacts? Water shortages. As far as I know, there is no disagreement about the projection of strains in water in particular regions. Regions that include the already unstable Middle East, that include China – that the projections of continued 10 percent growth for China and all that that means. Ignore the fact that it has severe water problems now. And they get much, much worse by 2015 or 2020. Why does it matter? Orders of magnitude in a North China plain that is running out of water because they are depleting the underground aquifers through millions of tube wells drilled in the 1960s, produces the food for 400 million people.

Think about the difficulty of scrounging up in the international system the food for 17 or 18 million North Koreans, for a few tens of millions on the Horn of Africa. Any number – any activity put down in the Chinese context, you have got one hell of a problem. And that is going to happen. This isn't in the maybe category. This is in the for-real category. Climate change, we concluded, is not by itself going to bring down any governments. It is not going to lead to wars.

But two things are pretty certain – that the already stressed and strained and flailing and flailing governments and states – this well could be the straw that breaks the camel's back. A little bit more severe water shortage, a little bit more severe food shortage, more people beginning to migrate, economic migrants looking within and across – within countries and across borders for better opportunities and better substance.

Tonight there are some 25 million people around the globe who are outside their home country – type of displaced or immigrant. That is going to go up. And they are going to go up from the poor, the disadvantaged, the ill – those will bad health, ill-educated, and they are going to be seeking opportunity in the more prosperous, richer countries. You know, I would be a genius, and I think that is a problem.

Another element of this that is in the damn near immutable is demography. And my colleagues who are demographers are really quite confident that the range of variation is very small. And what this tells us is over the next 15 years, the West, Europe, in particular, Russia, and the honorary West, Japan, and, oh, by the way, China, which isn't in the West, have very, very significant aging of their populations. It is happening in Europe and Japan, Spain, Italy, in particular very, very rapidly, way below replacement levels. China's decades of one-child policy begins to kick in. And by 2015, 2025, you are looking at a dependency ratio of young productive people to seniors. It begins to approach one to three. That is a pretty heavy burden on economic growth. How do the Europeans sustain the social safety net? Put people in the military if they don't have enough folks to go into the workplace to generate? Normal answer – migration, immigration. Where is it going to come from? Oh, yeah, the ill-educated, the sick, the poor, the benighted. And they are going to go into countries or try to go into countries like

most of Europe and Japan that are sort of, on a good day, highly chauvinistic. The doors are not open.

If you are not born Hungarian of Hungarian parents, you are not Hungarian. And to multiply that example, a tremendous cultural shift here to provide proper care for the senior citizens, maintain economic productivity and growth, provide troops, and preserve the homogeneity of the country. You can't get there from here. And that is going to happen over the next decade-and-a-half. The United States in this actually comes off pretty well – both climate change and demographics – because of our receptivity to immigration. We are just about alone in terms of the highly developed countries that will continue to have demographic growth sufficient to ensure continued economic growth.

And even with the climate change, it is not a good time to live in the Southwest because it runs out of water and looks like the Dust Bowl. It is not a good time to be along the Atlantic seaboard, particularly in the South because of the projected increase and intensity and severity and frequency of severe weather – more hurricanes, more serious storms, and so forth. And kind of practical problems – I think the number is 63 military installations that are in danger of being flooded by storm surges. The number of nuclear power plants that are so similarly vulnerable is almost as high.

How does this affect us? Insurance rates, building standards, inspection regimes that all will change. Urbanization – that the days when most people lived in the countryside are over, that the cushion of subsistence farming, even in Africa and South Asia, is rapidly disappearing as people move to the city because it is a better life – more amenities, better opportunities for education, better opportunities for the kids, and greater vulnerability to a breakdown anywhere in the global system. Energy shortages, water shortages, subsidence, all of these things.

And finally is energy security. As the world continues to prosper and grow, and we are projecting that it will, it is not just the big developing countries, India and China, which do require an awful lot of energy, even though per capita use is still pretty small. Any number times 2.4 billion – India plus China – is a big number, whether it is kilowatts or barrels of oil – with its impact on oil prices, on greenhouse gases, which, oh, yeah, reifies and ramifies, extends into climate change dimensions. But who benefits? The Mid-East authoritarian regimes that have the oil and gas? Russia, which already is beginning to exercise some energy diplomacy and leverage. That the instability of countries that will be affected by climate change and other effects like Nigeria, which on any given day is operating way, way below production capacity in oil because of instability or deteriorated infrastructure, and so forth. Why does that matter? We get about 9 percent of our oil from Nigeria, which, oh, by the way, is a higher percentage than we get from the Middle East. We have diversified out of one on stable region into others.

Let me shift to the six degrees of separation and building upon the 2020 – but now we are talking near – this is right now and next week, and when the next administration comes into office. Since there is an interconnected world – the flat world of recent metaphor, you can cut in anywhere and start pulling on strands and looking – and I would start with Iran because of the interest expressed in that. In looking at Iran, let me just sort of take off some of the dimensions that I think are important. One is location. Second is energy. And I'm glad you said about

energy security, oil and gas, and Iran's concern about access to electricity and its rationale for a nuclear power program.

The nuclear program, proliferation concerns, Islam – it is a theocratic state. And let me walk through some of the illustrative links here with you. And there are lots more. And we can talk about them in the question and answer. Location – if I had a map, you would see – your mental map will tell you – Iran is situated between Iraq and Afghanistan. The two shooting wars that we have are on the borders of Iran. Iran has the capacity, which is exercised, to meddle in those two conflict arenas. And they meddle in ways that are not to our benefit – IEDs to militias in Iran, support to the Taliban in some areas and to other insurgents in Afghanistan.

Roll back the clock six years or so. Who are the two biggest security threats to Iran? Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States took care of Iran's principal security threats – oh, yeah, except for us, which the Iranians consider a mortal threat to their nation. So they are there. It is a pivotal country of the kind of which there are about a dozen in the world by their location, by their population size, by their resource – you can't ignore it. This is not Malawi. This is a country that does affect its neighbors. It has an impact. It has a history. It has expectations. It has a different – a security requirement. We may not like the way they have defined their security requirement, but they consider it real and legitimate to respond to it.

It is also next to Turkey. And it is home to a portion of the Kurdish population, which also exists in Iraq and Syria and a large chunk of Turkey. It's a group of 25 million people with a guerilla group, a terrorist group, the KGK formerly known as the PKK – the Kurdish Workers' Party, which has a kind of uneasy, allowed to exist, allowed to harass the Turks or the Iraqis, but not to cause trouble in Iran, but a potential for the Turks to come in and go after the Kurds who are there.

The Persian Gulf – a huge percentage of oil moves through the Persian Gulf. The Iranians have developed a capability to disrupt the flow of oil. Again, it doesn't affect us very much directly. But it affects our partners, our trading partners, our allies, and it merits attention. Iran is a double outcast, maybe a triple outcast. It is a Shi'a nation in a Sunni sea. Shi'a is a small minority of global Islam. Its most numerous adherents are in Iran and Iraq. Given the tensions in the Islamic world, given the religious tensions – to equate them with the Thirty Years' War and the Protestant/Catholic in Europe is a stretch, but this is not harmony. It is a potential for disruption. It is compounded by being a Persian state in an Arab sea. There is a lot of nationalist friction here.

They are outsiders to the region. But they are bigger and they are more successful. And they are more democratic. And they have more money than a lot of their neighbors. And they are more scared of their neighbors than maybe they ought to be or the neighbors are of them. But there are reasons for them thinking they have a real problem – a problem that they have elected to deal with in part through two strategies. One is at the high end and one is at the low end. The poor man's deterrent is terrorism. Is it state-sponsored terrorism? It supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad scattered in camps, also in the West Bank. At the high end, it is pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. At the low end, sort of the message is clear.

Don't tread on me, don't threaten me. I know I can't defeat you or even match you, or even hope to in conventional military. But you can't protect all your people everywhere all the time.

It is very blatant. The aspirations for a nuclear weapon, which we judge in a recent estimate to work on the weaponization portion of the program was suspended. But on development of fizzle material, the critical ingredient – that continues. The sensitive Iranians say we are a – my word, “moral-less” law-abiding member of the non-proliferation treaty regime, the IAEA safeguards. I say moral-less because they keep lying, and they keep getting caught, and they fess up after they get caught. But we comply. We are allowed to have nuclear power, civilian nuclear power. There is no prescription on a fuel cycle. We can enrich fuel. And we live in this lousy neighborhood. The Russians don't like us much. The Americans don't like us much. The French don't like us much. If we are going to have energy security, we need to be able to produce our own enriched uranium.

It may be a disingenuous argument, but there are certain, actual plausible elements of this. They have gotten assistance at the Bushehr nuclear power plant from the Russians. But the Russians actually had been quite clear that they are very uncomfortable with the idea of a nuclear weapon program in Iran. And they have enforced constraints on what Iran might do – had been sometimes eager and sometimes reluctant participants in the P-5+1 response to Iran's nuclear program – P-5 – permanent members of the Security Council, which includes the Chinese, as well as the Russians, which have to be brought along by us and by the Europeans.

They have got mixed interests. The Chinese get a large and growing percentage of their oil from Iran. They say it is very well and good for you, Americans, to say clamp down and impose sanctions. You don't depend on that market. We do. The Russians are trying to manage the problem – most of the time – differently than we do because they are pretty close. Iran and its energy – oil, natural gas, major supplier. You can't – the world can't, even if we get orchestrated diplomatically, you can't cut off their exports of oil and gas. Too much of the world depends on them. Too much of our economy depends on the oil and gas going to our trading partners.

But that enriches the regime and it allows them to bribe its people. It enables them to have a little bit more performance-based legitimacy than they might otherwise have. So the turn-the-spigot-off kind of thing – even if we could do it, it would be counterproductive. The Russia-Iran had a nexus around energy. The Russians are making very effective use of their oil and gas exports. There are many Americans in Washington, who are more excited about European dependence on Russian gas than most Europeans seem to be. There are two alternatives for pipelines to bring oil and gas out of Central Asia. They either go through Russia and you reinforce its energy leverage, or it goes through Iran, and you reinforce the legitimacy and the capacity of the Iranian government.

Look at the map, guys. There aren't any other routes. So there's – either way there are political downsides, there are economic downsides, there are energy downsides, and much of the world is going to be making calculations around here that don't go through the same screen of concern about proliferation or concern about a theocracy, or concern about extension of influence.

I mentioned Hezbollah, which is in Lebanon. The Cedar Revolution, you remember, of a few years ago; the Lebanese reducing their dependence on Syria, Syria compelled to withdraw its overt presence from Lebanon. Hezbollah is an arm and extension of Iran, but it's also a political party with legitimacy, and Hezbollah's raison d'être is opposition to Israel, and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon – which is mostly over except for a little bit of territory by the Shebaa Farms, which we say is actually Syrian, not Lebanese. Why do we say that? Because it's on their currency. Their currency – the Syrian currency shows it as being in Syria. Opposition, hostility to Israel, which is an Iranian position, is furthered by Hezbollah activity, but Hezbollah is a part of the political process and we support democracy in Lebanon.

Manipulation – and I'll bring this to a close here – of controls over energy flows and energy transport mechanisms that many people fear from a resurgent Russia – Russia's economy is back on its feet. It's had several years of growth, impressive growth, much of which is associated with the high price of oil and gas. But they've actually rather wisely invested money in other portions of the economy.

The movement in Georgia, which I think has got more to do with it's their backyard, it's their Monroe Doctrine, without proclaiming it as such. Saakashvili has been a real thorn in their side. They did their “Dirty Harry” thing – go ahead and make my day; send troops into South Ossetia and we're going to squash you like a bug. Saakashvili sent the troops in and he got squashed like a bug. We stand up for the democratic government in Georgia. Most of our European allies are tying their shoes and not seeing things here at the moment. The Russians are right there, that these troops moved a few kilometers to get across the border that had to go through the tunnel. There's not much we can do about it.

And what is at stake? One of the things is an east-west pipeline and a rail line that carries oil. So, yeah, they want more ability to shut it down for political leverage, if that's the intent, or it's one more vulnerability of the Russians because they actually depend on the exports and being good commercial partners in order to sustain foreign investment in a range of other activities. I could go on with this, but I think the point becomes clear that there is almost no problem anywhere on the face of the Earth that isn't immediately, intrinsically, and importantly linked to many others, and if they don't directly come back to affect American interests, they do so indirectly because they affect the interests, the lives of our major friends and allies.

What does this all mean for this administration, the next administration, any administration? As we look out a few years, we're probably going to be playing with fewer cards. The face value of those cards will be diminished. There will be more players in the game. There will be more conflicting interests, interests that will be, end of the day if you looked at them objectively, legitimate interests that will be in conflict. There's no overwhelming enemy as Soviet-led international communism, an existential threat to our way of life. There's a whole bunch of – to borrow Jim Woolsey's – a lot of snakes out there, no more dragons.

The difficulty of marshalling a concerted response, or even the uncertainty about whether an orchestrated, coordinated response is appropriate; the inadequacy of existing institutions to deal with the problem – so what replaces them on a regional or sub-regional level? Will there be resorts to force, to asymmetric warfare? Maybe. Maybe. How should we be positioning

ourselves as an intelligence community to anticipate, to explain, to identify opportunities to ameliorate a course of action. How do we get across to those who will be moving into positions of authority and influence in Washington how complex the world is, how hazardous, off-the-shelf, knee-jerk, visceral kinds of fixes, solution, attitudes are, and that we just have to accept that we are viewed by the rest of the world differently that we were for most of the last six decades? It's going to be a whole lot harder to deal with a whole lot more problems that are going to be much more interconnected than ever in our past.

I bring this to closure before throwing it open to your questions by saying that's why we need to transform everything about our business: what we go after, how we go after it, how we use technology and smart people to sharpen the questions that we then ask of the data that we already have or ask the collectors to go get for us. These things are so bloody hard – again, my little examples. To deal with that nexus of problems you better have Russia specialists, and Caspian region specialists, and Iran specialists, and Iraq specialists, and military and energy and economic and demographic, and on and on and on. And if that array of experts isn't consulted, isn't sharing information, isn't talking with one another and talking beyond the confines of the community, we will fail.

On that rather unhappy note, let me invite you to play stump the band here and ask me whatever is on your mind and I'll make something up. Thanks, folks. (Applause.)

Yes, sir?

Q: Tom, you did make – (inaudible) – as you were talking through the demographics – (inaudible). The general assumption is that – (inaudible) – and the question becomes in my mind, what's the motivation for the Iranian bomb? It has nothing to do – an Iranian nuclear weapon has nothing to do with the West but it has everything to do with the Shi'ite bomb to counter the Sunni bomb – (inaudible).

DR. FINGAR: Yeah, did everybody hear the question? What if the Iranian quest for a bomb – which assumes that continues – or certainly its original motivation were triggered not by fear of the West but a fear of the Sunni in Pakistan who do have a bomb? That's probably an element of it is that both the Paks and the Iranians have accused one another in recent years of fomenting insurrection in Baluchistan, the area – the tribal groups that span the border, which are not terribly unstable in relative terms but have the potential to be a problem.

Iran, it has a lot of enemies, or a lot of adversaries, or a lot of potential enemies, most of whom happen to be connected to us, like the Saudis, the Egyptians –

Q: Who happen to be Sunni.

DR. FINGAR: – the Pakistanis – I'm sorry?

Q: Who happen to be Sunni.

DR. FINGAR: Happen to be Sunni – who happen to be Sunni. There’s a religious element to it, for sure. There is an approach to government – and this will sound strange but the Iranians actively have a better-functioning democracy than Pakistan does. We may not like who they elect. It may be a distorted process by the way in which people are vetted before they can run, but it’s actually pretty free and fair elections once they get to that point, and they have some authority afterwards.

Let me reverse the question. See, if Iran were to get a nuclear weapon, would it make the region more or less stable? And part of the projection that we make is that the Saudis – the keeper of the Islamic heartland who happen to be Sunni, who have a Shi’a minority in their Far-Eastern portions, which, oh, by the way, is where the oil is – will feel compelled to have a weapon. They can’t make one, and whether they’ll rent one – maybe they’ve already rented it from the Pakistanis. It may sit in a silo or a warehouse in Pakistan with a Saudi flag painted on it – I’m being metaphorical – but we don’t know on that one. But the pressure to get one, the incentive to get – and, oh, it will expand up to the Turks as well, and the Egyptians, as they have made clear.

So the quest for security and stability has the very high prospect of making things less stable, and to contemplate a less-stable Pakistan is really quite frightening. There is a large Islamic movement. There is, of course, a large nuclear weapons capability. There is the unstable northern territories, the ungoverned territories that have never been governed by anybody effectively. And for those who haven’t been up there, if you’re readers of the comic strip of my youth, “Terry and the Pirates,” that’s it. I went up to meet the Taliban a little over a decade ago. It was my first TDY ever to the 14th century. It’s time travel. It’s strange. But it’s also dangerous, not just as a safe haven for terrorists who can spread back into Europe, to the United States, and training, but for destabilizing Afghanistan.

The instability fosters fear around the neighborhood, not just in India, but what might spill over? What if the beards got the bomb, is the way it is put – if these extremists got control of nuclear weapons? People who harbor terrorists – and these aren’t fissile – this is a bomb. And, you know, we feel reasonably confident that the Pakistani military maintains pretty good control of this. Well, what if the military sort of changes sides in this? Then we’ve got a problem, so we do worry about it and work on it.

Somebody else. Yes?

Q: Thanks for that very impressive tour of the – (inaudible). If the new administration comes in and – you know, just hypothetically, if they say – (inaudible) – an important element of soft power; we’re going to increase that soft power capability and we’ll triple the number of analysts in the intelligence community, if we could afford them. If they were to do that, would the analytic transformation and framework at its current state as of 2009, would that help to be able to – could we bring them in, in an entirely new role? What would the difference be?

DR. FINGAR: Yeah. I’m going to answer the question. Let me preface it by sort of a cautionary note. I realize that what I described can easily be heard as, oh, god, doom, gloom, pessimism. It should not. It’s attempted to describe the complexity of this. I actually remain

quite optimistic about our ability, of the intelligence community of the United States, us with our allies, to deal with this. The flip side of every one of these complexity-derived or exacerbated problems is an opportunity. They're in there. We have to be smart.

Now to the – there is a certain, oh, that's so last century to the way – as my kids would say – that if you've got a problem, throw more money and people at it. If I were to be asked that question, I would say, no, no, no, no, no. If the problem is defined as you did in the setup, the understanding of the world, I say take this money, take this effort, strengthen education. I was a beneficiary of the Eisenhower-era National Defense Education Act, know your enemy kind of funding, which produced a generation and a half-worth of experts who we've not replicated. Get people into the private sector who can do business, who can interact in NGOs, expand opportunities to bring foreign students to the United States. They understand us better. They don't necessarily love us but they at least understand us better, and they can go home to positions there.

So I think, in terms of bang for a buck, making the analytic community larger doesn't necessarily make it smarter. I think it might actually slow down the transformation if it's perceived as a band-aid that precludes the need for making the kind of hard, painful choices that Mike and I and others have described over the last two days.

That's a top-of-the-head response. I doubt that I'd change it much upon reflection, but that's where I start.

Anybody else?

Q: (Inaudible.)

DR. FINGAR: Ah, yes, in the Army we call that a spring button.

Q: (Inaudible) – you addressed earlier today in which we clearly got the message that you personally, and likely DNI – (inaudible) – believes that we shouldn't – (inaudible) – and that there is merit to having – (inaudible) – personally agree with that. I have a personal view that the terminology “community” – “intelligence community” is an oxymoron; that there has never been a community; that it's a series of tribes with more or less important sheiks at the top. So my question to you, Tom, is if the ODNI needs to be more successful than it has been – because my view, again, is that things are being done by consensus, necessarily so – what is the one thing, two things, three things that you, Tom, think needs to be done in order to accelerate into a – (inaudible) – dramatically lead in to turn the tribes into a real community?

DR. FINGAR: Did everybody hear the question?

AUDIENCE: No.

DR. FINGAR: Given the –

Q: Now I have to repeat it, Tom.

DR. FINGAR: No, no. Given the importance that I and other have ascribed to the role of the ODNI, it ought it be continued, not disbanded, what are the three things that I think need to be done in order to prevent reversion to the contending tribes? That is our history.

Let me preface it by going back a decade or so. I can't remember the precise time, but it may have been 1997 on the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act – which the National Archives produced a volume on the formative years of the intelligence establishment, and I went down with a couple of the veterans who were in INR when I joined the bureau in 1986, who had been there literally from the beginning. They had been in this part of OSS. Some of you NSAers will remember Dick Curl. Several of the speakers that day made the point that “intelligence community” not only was an oxymoron, that it was delusional, that the term “intelligence establishment” was chosen by these veterans who prepared this documentary history to reflect the fact that they were warring fiefdoms that didn't trust one another, that existed in parallel structures because no head of an agency would rely on intelligence from an organization they didn't control. And coming out of the State Department – the INR was created at the same time as the CIA because George Marshall, given his military experience, explicitly said his intelligence shop was going to work for him – Army intelligence, Navy intelligence.

That's the genesis of it. So we were born in an environment that put a patina of coordination and consolidation under the Director of Central Intelligence that from the beginning had no reality, as articulated by these sort of veterans of that time. Even I was very young at the time they were talking about in the '40s.

Where we are now is, I think, that organizations – the organizations that constitute the intelligence community have more or less gotten over the fear concern that there was going to be a homogenization, that we were going to create a central intelligence establishment in a kind of a replay of all of the concerns that existed in the '40s when that debate was first waged, and then that sort of led to the creation of additional agencies subsequently; that we would have, or strive for, something like a department of intelligence. And as my boss, Mike McConnell, has said on many occasions, he's less a Director of National Intelligence than a coordinator of national intelligence because he's not the secretary of national intelligence.

Of the 16 agencies, 15 report to another Cabinet member. So structurally, what I was referring to earlier in the day as a great asset for being close to our customers, it means that structurally there is a paucity of command authority – maybe put politely – and therefore a need to win grudging acceptance, if not consensus. That's what the law and the executive order are in the structure. And, actually, I don't have a problem with that. I think that there is healthy tension in the system, but I think we've gotten over the fear of homogenization, of loss of mission stature and capability, and an increasing ability to see the agency's future and the agency's mission as being attainable – best attainable within the context of a better-integrated enterprise. I said better-integrated, not integrated enterprise. I think for a while the antibodies and the resistance to a truly integrated corporate entity here, which has divisions and division of labor and so forth, I think we're headed in that direction and I think it's going to be hard to get there.

So what three things would I recommend, now that I vamped long enough to think in parallel processing mode? The budget authority that the DNI has – one of the few authorities that he really, unquestionably does have. We have to overcome the propensity of at least some within the ODNI staff to view this as an opportunity to micromanage the community. It has all of the silliness to me of a flea climbing up the tail of an elephant contemplating rape. (Laughter.) The budget is so huge, the range of activity so large, the complexity of activity such that a tiny staff has zero capability to micromanage the entire budget, and shouldn't try. We have agency heads, program managers. They have authority, they have mission, they have understanding, and the vast majority of the activity should be conducted by them, in my judgment.

But my metaphor here – and I've used it with McConnell – is that if we're an aircraft carrier that we want to turn, I don't care who runs the kitchen, I don't care who is in charge of refueling, who cleans up after the airplanes; I just want the rudder. And what the DNI and the ODNI I think needs to do is to identify those activities, those areas, those investments, those efforts that can best integrate the enterprise and get us moving forward so that the ability of each agency to achieve its objectives is enhanced by integration. Some of it is IT, some of it is common training, some of it is common tradecraft, some of it is complementarity in mission on this, that using that authority, a few percentage of the budget over the FYDP, each year monitoring, that produces big bang for the buck, visibly so in changing the community, I think it will be self-sustaining. So it's sort of focus the effort where you can have an impact – it might not succeed but you can have an impact rather than squander it in a showboating effort that is almost certain to fail.

The second is to hold agency heads and agencies accountable for adherence to those standards that have been adopted, implemented – everything from joint duty as a prerequisite for promotion into the senior service, the mobility dimensions of this, the compliance with sourcing standards. We need to have the cascade effect here: if agency heads are accountable, then those accountable to the agency heads, and we'll begin to have the kind of metrics and enforcement that was discussed earlier today in response to a question.

And the third is to sustain the quality of support that we provide, what I was alluding to in certain terms is confidence in the caliber, the quality of the support we provide, which most visibly to senior policy-makers are analytic products, which most visibly to the military services is the mixture of raw, tactical intelligence and information that is processed enough and analyzed enough to apply right now – operational information. And for law enforcement, first responders, it's much, much better distillation of what is a real threat and what isn't, so that they can make appropriate judgments.

I think if we focus on those areas, we will demonstrate the value of having an ODNI. As I mentioned to John at the table, it wasn't just the history, the structure, the authorities; it was the double – the dual character of DCIA from the beginning, running a big organization, arguably the preeminent, the major organization in the intelligence community, and attempting to herd the cats. Inevitably the cat herding took second place, and with few unsuccessful exceptions over the history, there was no effort, serious effort, to get the integrated enterprise – to change it from an establishment if not into a community – my mind's soft here – at least into an enterprise that could function together.

John is up, so I assume that means it's time to disperse you. Thank you for your time. John, I'm not cutting you off, your announcement. Thanks for your attention.

(Applause.)

(END)