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India-U.S. Relations

Summary

Long considered a “strategic backwater” from Washington’s perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region’s dominant actor with more than one billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent major power and “natural partner” of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China’s growing clout. Washington and New Delhi have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation,” are underway. This latter initiative, launched by President Bush in July 2005 and provisionally endorsed by the 109th Congress in 2006 (P.L. 109-401, the “Hyde Act”), would reverse three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. It requires, among other steps, a Joint Resolution of Approval by Congress. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement that calls for expanding bilateral security cooperation. Since 2002, the two countries have engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises. Major U.S. arms sales to India are planned. The influence of a growing and relatively wealthy Indian-American community of more than two million is reflected in Congress’s largest country-specific caucus.

Further U.S. interest in South Asia focuses on ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan rooted in unfinished business from the 1947 Partition, competing claims to the Kashmir region, and, in more recent years, “cross-border terrorism” in both Kashmir and major Indian cities. In the interests of regional stability, the United States strongly encourages an ongoing India-Pakistan peace initiative and remains concerned about the potential for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. The United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have resisted external pressure to sign the major nonproliferation treaties. In 1998, the two countries conducted nuclear tests that evoked international condemnation. Proliferation-related restrictions on U.S. aid were triggered, then later lifted through congressional-executive cooperation from 1998 to 2000. Remaining sanctions on India (and Pakistan) were removed in late 2001.

India is in the midst of major and rapid economic expansion. Many U.S. business interests view India as a lucrative market and candidate for foreign investment. The United States supports India’s efforts to transform its once quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening. Since 1991, India has taken major steps in this direction and coalition governments have kept the country on a general path of reform, yet there is U.S. concern that such movement is slow and inconsistent. India is the world’s fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Congress also continues to have concerns about abuses of human rights, including caste- and gender-based discrimination, and religious freedoms in India. Moreover, the spread of HIV/AIDS in India has been identified as a serious development. See also CRS Report RL34161, India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations. This report will be updated regularly.
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India-U.S. Relations

Introduction

Long considered a “strategic backwater” from Washington’s perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region’s dominant actor with more than one billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent major power and “natural partner” of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China’s growing clout. Washington and New Delhi have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation,” are underway. This latter initiative, launched by President Bush in July 2005 and provisionally endorsed by the 109th Congress in 2006 (P.L. 109-401, the “Hyde Act”), would reverse three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. It requires, among other steps, a Joint Resolution of Approval by Congress. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement that calls for expanding bilateral security cooperation. Since 2002, the two countries have engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises. Major U.S. arms sales to India are planned. The influence of a growing and relatively wealthy Indian-American community of more than two million is reflected in Congress’s largest country-specific caucus.

Both leading U.S. presidential candidates express full-throated support for a deepened and expanded U.S.-India partnership. Senator Barak Obama would like to see U.S.-India ties strengthened “across the board,” with a particular focus on energy issues. Senator John McCain claims the

India in Brief

Population: 1.15 billion; growth rate: 1.6% (2008 est.)
Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (slightly more than one-third the size of the United States)
Capital: New Delhi
Head of Government: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (Congress Party)
Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan 72%; Dravidian 25%; other 3%
Languages: 22 official, 13 of which are the primary tongue of at least 10 million people; Hindi is the primary tongue of about 30%; English widely used
Religions: Hindu 81%; Muslim 13%; Christian 2%; Sikh 2%, other 2% (2001 census)
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 72 years; male 67 years (2008 est.)
Literacy: female 48%; male 73% (2001 census)
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $3.03 trillion; per capita: $2,784; growth rate 9% (2007)
Currency: Rupee (100 = $2.37)
Inflation: 6.4% (2007)
Defense Budget: $28.5 billion (2.4% of GDP; 2007)
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $24.0 billion; imports from U.S. $17.6 billion (2007)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; U.S. Department of Commerce; Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; Military Balance
United States has a “vested interest in India’s success” and he calls for improved military and counterterrorism cooperation, along with mutual efforts to strengthen democracy and energy security. Both Senators are explicit supporters of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation as proposed by the Bush Administration.1

Key Current Issues and Developments

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation2

Plans to initiate U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation were long hampered by domestic political resistance in India, but are again underway in mid-2008. In a major policy shift by the United States, a July 2005 U.S.-India Joint Statement notably asserted that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states,” and President Bush vowed to work on achieving “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India.” As a reversal of three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, such proposed cooperation stirred controversy and required changes in both U.S. law and in international guidelines. Enabling U.S. legislation became public law in December 2006 (P.L. 109-401 or “the Hyde Act”).

For nearly one year from mid-2007 to mid-2008, however, India’s United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, led by the Congress Party of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was unable to overcome persistent and unrelenting resistance to the pact from communist party leaders who provide the ruling coalition with crucial parliamentary support. By threatening to withdraw such support if the UPA went forward with the initiative, the Left Front obstructed its potential consummation, leading many analysts to conclude that planned cooperation would not take place in the foreseeable future. A July 2008 political realignment in New Delhi, however, freed the UPA to continue its pursuit of the deal. On August 1, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors approved the safeguards accord with India. On August 21, the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is set to meet to discuss adjusting its guidelines to permit nuclear trade with India. If this step is taken, U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation can commence only after Congress approves a Joint Resolution of Approval. The text of the 123 Agreement must be submitted for 30 days of continuous congressional session before any vote can take place. Thus, by nearly all accounts, the U.S. congressional calendar presents a major obstacle to the deal’s consummation in 2008.3

1 “‘I Am Reluctant To Seek Changes In The N-Deal’” (interview), Outlook (Delhi), July 21, 2008; John McCain, “America Has A Vested Interest in India’s Success” (op-ed), Indian Express (Mumbai), August 8, 2008.

2 See also CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India, and “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” section below.

3 “Congress May Not Pass U.S.-India Nuclear Pact,” Washington Post, July 9, 2008. According to Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act, the President is to submit the text to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The (continued...)
Recent Background. In July 2007, the United States and India announced having concluded negotiations on a peaceful nuclear cooperation (or “123”) agreement. Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, the lead U.S. negotiator, called the deal “perhaps the single most important initiative that India and the United States have agreed to in the 60 years of our relationship” and “the symbolic centerpiece of a growing global partnership between our two countries.”4 U.S. officials urged New Delhi to move rapidly toward completing remaining steps to consummation of the pact. These included finalizing arrangements for IAEA inspections of India’s civilian nuclear facilities and winning the endorsement of the NSG for nuclear trade. Following these steps, the 123 Agreement can become operative only through a Joint Resolution of Approval from Congress. There have been significant apparent contradictions between the expectations of and public statements by U.S. and Indian officials on this issue.5

Many independent Indian commentators approved of the pact, seeing in it an end to “nuclear apartheid” that likely will “go down as one of the finest achievements of Indian diplomacy.”6 There also is evidence that the Indian business community supports the deal as a means of contributing to India’s rise as a major power and of bolstering the country’s energy security. In November 2007, 23 former Indian military chiefs, senior bureaucrats, and scientists signed an open letter to Parliament urging approval of the pact so as to remove the “crippling constraints” India suffers due to international regimes that deny it high-technology goods.7 With multiple admonitions from senior U.S. government officials in 2008 that the time needed to consummate the deal was growing short, many Indian commentators joined in pressing their government to avoid an uncertain future by moving quickly to finalize the pact. Some see India’s nuclear power industry in dire need of uranium supplies that can only come from the international market. Uranium shortages appear to be hampering India nuclear power sector, which is running at or below half capacity.8

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3 (...continued)
President is then to consult with the committees for a period of not less than thirty days of continuous session.” According to Section 123d, the two committees shall, after that time, “each hold hearings on the proposed agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be approved or disapproved.” Therefore, the minimum amount of time that must elapse before Congress can vote on a joint resolution of approval is 30 days of continuous session, in addition to the amount of time Congress would take to hold hearings.


5 A useful table is at [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/123agreementchart.pdf].


7 See [http://www.indianexpress.com/story/239308.html].

8 G. Parthasarathy, “We Won’t Get a Better Deal” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi); “Don’t Wait for Obama’(editorial), Indian Express (Mumbai), both February 22, 2008; M.R. Srinivasan, “Nuclear Ground Realities” (op-ed), Indian Express (Mumbai), March 29, 2008; K. Subramanyam, “Why the Nuke Deal is Crucial” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), April 7, 2008; “Govt Admits Lack of Fuel Delayed Start-Up of Two N-Power Plants,” Indian (continued...
In New Delhi, where the executive can enter international agreements without parliamentary approval, Prime Minister Singh’s Congress Party-dominated cabinet endorsed the agreement text immediately upon its finalization. His UPA coalition government then set about assuring domestic skeptics that the autonomy of the country’s nuclear weapons program would be maintained and that all key commitments previously made to parliament were being adhered to, including those related to plutonium reprocessing and nuclear weapons testing rights, as well as assured and uninterrupted supplies of nuclear fuel even if the agreement is terminated.\(^9\) Later, in response to continued controversy over whether or not India’s freedom to conduct future nuclear weapons tests is restricted by the agreement, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told Parliament, “There is nothing in the bilateral agreement that would tie the hands of a future government or legally constrain its options.”\(^10\)

Despite such assurances, ensuing debate over the deal divided the New Delhi establishment as much as any issue in the country’s history. Prime Minister Singh may have underestimated the degree of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism held by his coalition’s communist Left Front allies, who provided his ruling coalition with crucial parliamentary support. In August 2007, senior leaders of the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) reiterated their party’s “reservations” about the nuclear deal and its potentially negative impact on India’s nuclear weapons program. Yet India’s communist parties went much further in their criticisms, issuing a joint statement which called the 123 Agreement “flawed” and claiming that it “must be seen as a crucial step to lock India into the U.S. global strategic designs.” Their view is not limited to those with communist sentiments: One former Indian national security advisor asserted that while a vast majority of the country’s rising urban middle class firmly favors closer India-U.S. ties, it “will not tolerate a subservient relationship” and retains significant differences in approaches to third parties such as Iran and Pakistan.\(^11\)

The political squabbling in New Delhi put the nuclear deal on lengthy hold. In October 2007, Prime Minister Singh informed President Bush that “certain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalization” of the deal.\(^12\) Hopes for consummation were revived in November when the Left Front allowed the Indian government to begin talks with the IAEA. Yet, by year’s end, the communist leadership was again threatening to withdraw support for the ruling coalition unless talks were halted. December negotiations with the IAEA reportedly were hampered by “technical glitches” related to India’s demand for “unconditional” guarantees of fuel supplies in perpetuity. External Affairs Minister Mukherjee insisted in the first

\(^8\) (...continued)
Express (Mumbai), May 8, 2008.


days of 2008 that New Delhi had not given up on the deal and was continuing with its efforts to resolve the face-off with the Left Front.13

Nonproliferation experts have been consistent in their opposition to the nuclear deal, believing it will significantly damage the global nonproliferation regime and facilitate an Asian nuclear arms race. Some have asserted that the text of the 123 Agreement disregards the legislative intent of the Hyde Act, especially in the area of continued supplies of nuclear fuel to India even if that country tests a nuclear weapons and the agreement is terminated. Others warn that NSG endorsement of an exception for India will “virtually ensure the demise of global nuclear export restraints.”14 A January 2008 letter to NSG officials endorsed by more than 130 nonproliferation experts and nongovernmental organizations argued that India’s commitments thus far did not justify making “far-reaching” exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms. The document asked that NSG members consider the potential costs of granting to India any special safeguards exceptions and urged the body to make clear that all nuclear trade with India would cease upon that country’s resumption of nuclear testing for any reason.15 Opponents warn that the already weakened international nonproliferation regime may be mortally damaged by the proposed alteration of international norms. Particular criticism arises in the area of future nuclear testing, which nonproliferation advocates say is likely to be facilitated by the deal.16

At least one nonproliferation advocate in Congress concluded that the 123 Agreement “is not consistent with [congressional] requirements and restrictions” and would “deeply damage” the global nonproliferation regime. He identified the issues of nuclear testing, assurances of fuel supply, and the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material three core concerns.17 During a February 2008 hearing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice assured the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) that the U.S. government will support India in the NSG only if any resulting exemptions are fully consistent with the provisions of the Hyde Act. Nonproliferation advocates say Secretary Rice’s pledge will require a shift in U.S. policy, in particular by placing conditions on India’s ability to engage in global nuclear trade.18 Representative Howard Berman, the HFAC Chairman and a

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14 See, for example, William Potter and Jayantha Dhanapala, “The Perils of Non-Proliferation Amnesia,” Hindu (Chennai), September 1, 2007.
18 Transcript: House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on the Fiscal 2009 International Relations Budget, February 13, 2008; Arms Control Association press release (continued...)
supporter of the initiative, finds it “incomprehensible” that the Administration would seek or accept an NSG exemption that omits many of the conditions contained in the Hyde Act. He says such an exemption would be inconsistent with U.S. law, be harmful to U.S. business interests, and undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives. In line with previous Administration assurances to Congress, he expects U.S. negotiators to reject any NSG exemption “that does not faithfully reflect all of the Hyde Act conditions.”

**Current Status.** Left Front leaders maintained their adamant opposition to any “operationalization” of the nuclear deal, which for them meant the government should not seek IAEA Board of Governors approval for the draft agreement on safeguarding India’s nuclear facilities. They saw Prime Minister Singh following a timeline set by the Bush Administration at the expense of India’s national interests, and they threatened to withdraw support for the UPA coalition. There were signs in May that the U.S. government had wound down its efforts to persuade NSG members to provide an exemption for India. In mid-May, U.S. officials were saying the window for completing the necessary steps had become “very narrow” and, by June, reports of the deal’s outright failure were appearing.

On July 8, the communist parties formally withdrew their support for the Congress-led ruling coalition, saying they opposed a “strategic embrace with the most aggressive power in the world today.” Days later, with his domestic political standing bolstered by a regional party that could partially compensate for the loss of Left Front support (see “Domestic Political Realignment” section below), Prime Minister Singh was able to attend a G8 summit meeting in Japan with renewed optimism about the nuclear deal’s prospects. New Delhi moved quickly to obtain IAEA approval by submitting a draft safeguards accord and, in mid-July, Foreign Secretary Menon was joined in Vienna by Under Secretary of State William Burns for consultations with IAEA Secretary-General Mohammed ElBaradei, an avid proponent of the deal. Indian officials were then dispatched to numerous foreign capitals to lobby IAEA and NSG member governments for support. President Bush agrees with Prime Minister Singh that the pact should be finalized “as expeditiously

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18 (...continued)
at [http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2008/20080214_Rice_India.asp].
19 See [http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3240].
as possible.” Some observers, already viewing the deal overly favoring of India, see little reason for the U.S. government to move precipitously to finalize it.\(^\text{24}\)

On August 1, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards accord with India. The IAEA Secretary-General insisted that the accord met all of the body’s legal requirements and was of “indefinite duration.”\(^\text{25}\) The next major step toward consummation is obtaining an adjustment of NSG guidelines so as to allow India to purchase nuclear fuel and technologies on the international market. Representatives from all 45 NSG member states are scheduled to gather in Vienna on August 21. New Delhi has been firm in demanding a “clean and unconditional exemption” from the NSG, one that would waive all guidelines normally applied to non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT.\(^\text{26}\) Yet unconditional NSG approval may not be a given, as some member states may be hesitant to endorse nuclear trade with a country that is not signatory to the NPT and that has tested nuclear weapons. Japan, for example, recently has expressed such concerns. Some reports indicate that smaller member states may seek to add amendments (conditions) such as requests that India join the NPT and/or CTBT, or that safeguards be made permanent regardless of the status of fuel supply.\(^\text{27}\)

The text of a draft U.S. proposal for the NSG, circulated on August 6, has come under fire from nonproliferation advocates for its alleged weakening of NSG credibility and its failure to include clear statements that would end all cooperation in the event of a future Indian nuclear weapons test; prohibit the transfer to India of sensitive processing, enrichment, or heavy water technologies; and call upon India to stop producing fissile materials. According to one analysis, the U.S. draft contains language contrary to the 2006 Hyde Act.\(^\text{28}\)

While top U.S. officials withheld comment on India’s internal political processes, there remains a sense of urgency in Washington, with the Bush Administration (and many in Congress) eager to see the deal consummated during its remaining term in office. Some analysts warned that a failure to submit the 123 Agreement to Congress by mid-summer would require starting the difficult negotiation process anew in 2009, perhaps involving a Democratic U.S. Administration and/or Congress that might be more favorable to arguments made by nonproliferation advocates. Former Under Secretary of State Burns has himself opined that a future U.S. presidential administration is highly unlikely to replicate the

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\(^{25}\) “India Inspections Deal Meets IAEA Standards: ElBaradei,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, August 1, 2008.


\(^{28}\) See [http://armscontrol.org/node/3274].
deal in its present form, meaning that “the only opportunity to realize the potential of this deal is with the administration of President Bush.”

### Domestic Political Realignment

Domestic debate in India on the pending U.S.-India nuclear deal triggered the most serious crisis faced by the UPA government since it came to power in May 2004. In fact, the turmoil nearly led to a collapse of the ruling coalition and early elections as both Prime Minister Singh and the Left Front parties maintained staunch and mutually incompatible positions on the deal. The August 2007 release of the 123 Agreement text brought an uproar in the Indian Parliament — effectively shutting the body down at times — with numerous lawmakers complaining that the deal would restrict India’s ability to test nuclear weapons in the future and threaten its foreign policy independence. An urgent meeting between Singh and communist leader Prakash Karat ended without reconciliation, and the Left Front warned the central government of “serious consequences” if it moved forward with the plan.

To facilitate what could only be an interim truce between the Congress party and the Left Front, the government created a panel of government officials, politicians, and scientists to “study” the nuclear deal. Communist leaders agreed to join the 15-member panel, which met for the first time in September 2007. Ten rounds of talks were held over ensuing months, but neither side budged from its strident position. With Prime Minister Singh and Congress Party chief Gandhi seeming to veer from strident support for the deal to an acceptance of its potentially permanent hibernation in only a matter of days during October, the New Delhi government’s credibility came into question. By March 2008, communist leaders again were openly threatening to withdraw support for the UPA coalition and so bring an early end to the government’s term, which is scheduled to terminate in May 2009.

Indications arose in June that Prime Minister Singh would push for approval of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation despite Left Front opposition. Talk of early elections again increased. Yet, on July 8, the same day India’s communist parties formally withdrew their support for the Congress-led ruling coalition, the regional powerhouse Samajwadi Party (SP) formally announced that its 39 parliamentarians would support — but not join — the UPA. It brushed off criticism by the Bahujan

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29 “Post-Bush, India May Have to Start From Scratch,” *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), October 23, 2007; [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2008/101628.htm].

30 In September, India’s leading communist party issued an open letter to Parliament expressing the Left Front’s strong opposition to the proposed nuclear deal, calling the alleged creation of a “strategic alliance with America” an unacceptable departure from the Common Minimum Program and rejecting a perceived “military alliance with America” (see [http://www.cpim.org/statement/statements_2007.htm]).


32 According to a U.S.-based analyst, “The abrupt halt ... casts a serious doubt about the willingness and ability of any government in New Delhi to act in a responsible, predictable, and reliable fashion” (Sumit Ganguly, “Save the Nuclear Deal,” *Times of India* (Delhi), October 26, 2007).
Samaj Party (BSP), its Uttar Pradesh political rivals, that the nuclear deal was “anti-Muslim.”33 (The SP and BSP are both reliant on the state’s large Muslim electorate; Muslims account for about one-fifth of Uttar Pradesh’s population.) As conveyed by SP leader Amar Singh, “For us, communalism is a bigger danger than imperialism. Advani is a bigger danger than Bush.”34 Some analysts view the Congress Party’s embrace of the SP as evidence of a rightward shift in national politics.35

With a partial replacement for the Left Front secured, the government set a July 22 date for a confidence vote, which requires the 543-member Lok Sabha (lower house) to vote yes or no on a motion expressing confidence in the ruling coalition. The opposition-leading BJP mobilized for the perceived opportunity to topple the UPA government and trigger early elections in which it might prevail. As the date neared and the anticipated outcome remained unclear, the Congress Party used the advantages of incumbency to entice wavering parliamentarians. Such efforts reportedly included offering ministerships and other perquisites to gain the support of smaller regional parties, some of them comprised of but one Lok Sabha.36 On July 22, after two days of raucous parliamentary debate, the Singh government survived the vote by a wider-than-expected margin of 275-256, with 11 abstentions, thus averting early elections. Yet the victory may have come at some cost: bribery charges were immediate and included claims by BJP legislators that they had been offered huge sums of cash to abstain from voting. Moreover, the UPA may be haunted by deal-making with smaller parties of questionable reliability.37

**Economic Woes**

India’s economy has in recent months been rocked by soaring inflation, and power shortages have sparked public outrage and protests. In June, the New Delhi government took a political risk in announcing a ten percent hike in fuel prices. The move triggered street protests in several states, including strikes that virtually shut down the Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Investor concerns about soaring gasoline costs likely contributed to a 3.3% one-day drop in the value of the Sensex index of the Bombay Stock Exchange. Indeed, a sharp increase in food and fuel costs

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33 SP chief Mulayam Singh is viewed as a secular and liberal figure, but he has faced corruption probes and accusations of incompetence as three-time past chief minister of India’s most populous state. His key rival is BSP leader and current state Chief Minister Mayawati, whose party won an outright majority in May 2007 state assembly elections. Mayawati, the most important low-caste politician in India’s history, has aspirations to become the country’s Prime Minister, but also suffers from accusations of corruption (“As Communists Fade, India’s New Kingmaker Emerges,” Reuters, July 12, 2008; “Mayawati Plans to Seek India’s Premier Post,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2008).

34 “SP Says It Will Back Congress in Trust Vote;” Economic Times (Delhi), July 6, 2008.

35 Praful Bidwai, “Rightward Turn” (op-ed), Frontline (Chennai), August 1, 2008.

36 “Cong Ready to Open Bag of Bounties,” Telegraph (Kolkata), July 18, 2008.

may counterbalance recent growth in the Indian economy. In mid-June, inflation rates reached a 13-year high of more than 11% and prices for basic foodstuffs reportedly rose by as much as 50% in some smaller Indian cities in less than six months. The Reserve Bank of India responded by raising its benchmark lending rate to the highest level in six years. Inflationary pressures continued throughout July and, in early August, breached 12%, due mainly to soaring food prices. The central government’s deteriorating public finances, due mainly to rising subsidies, are threatening India’s investment grade credit ratings. Power shortages have forced some key state governments, including Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka, to strictly ration commercial electricity supplies.

Some observers have expressed optimism that, with the Left Front no longer a central factor for the central government’s decision making, stalled economic reform efforts could move forward with the help of the pro-business Samajwadi Party, potentially boosting rates of foreign investment. In late July, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram pledged to revive reforms, especially in the banking and insurance sectors. Yet it is considered likely that more urgent economic problems and impending national elections will combine to keep such efforts on the back burner. Despite serious difficulties, some more optimistic commentators offer that, because the shocks are largely external, and high investment rates persist, India’s economy can be expected to continue to perform strongly.

### Terrorism and Deteriorating Relations With Pakistan

Among the top goals of Indian officials in 2008 has been gauging the new Pakistani government’s commitment to the bilateral peace process. Within this modest context, the outcome of Pakistan’s February national election was viewed as generally positive. However, ensuing months have seen a deterioration of India-Pakistan relations, and some in New Delhi express frustration that the new civilian leaders in Islamabad have little influence over Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence agencies. In August, the Indian national security advisor expressed worry at the possibly imminent removal from office of Pakistani President Pervez

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42 “Quietly Forward,” Frontline (Chennai), June 20, 2008.

Musharraf, saying such a development would “leave radical extremist outfits with freedom to do what they like” in the region.44

In May, India accused Pakistan of committing multiple cease-fire and territorial violations along the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC); one incident left an Indian soldier dead. June visits to Islamabad by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, and later by Pakistan’s foreign minister to New Delhi, were cordial and appeared to get the peace process back on track, but produced no new initiatives. Then, on July 7, a suicide car bomb killed 58 people, including four Indian nationals, at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Afghan and Indian officials later claimed to have evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence agency was complicit in the attack, a charge reportedly echoed by the U.S. government. Late July serial bomb attacks in the cities of Bangalore and Ahmedabad killed scores of people and triggered heightened suspicions of foreign involvement in terrorist acts inside India.45 Indian security officials also claim that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is poised to send 800 religious militants into India.46

On July 21, Foreign Secretary Menon met with his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi to launch the fifth round of the bilateral Composite Dialogue. Following the meeting, the Menon warned that recent events — culminating in embassy bombing — had brought the peace process “under stress.” Blunt language again followed a high-level meeting in Sri Lanka, where Menon suggested that India-Pakistan relations were at a four-year low ebb.47 Along with the Kabul bombing, Indians widely suspect Pakistani complicity in recent terrorist attacks inside India. At the same time, further lethal shooting incidents along the LOC in July exacerbated bilateral tensions. When the Pakistani Senate passed a resolution on the situation in India’s Jammu and Kashmir state (see below), an Indian official called the move “gross interference” in India’s internal affairs. The exchange was soon repeated when the Pakistani foreign minister decried “excessive and unwarranted use of force” in Kashmir by the Indian government, a charge rejected as unhelpful by New Delhi. Moreover, New Delhi’s progress in an initiative that would allow India to purchase
nuclear materials and technologies on the international market spurred Islamabad to warn of a potential new nuclear arms race on the Asian subcontinent.48

Renewed Conflict in Kashmir

In late June, a state government decision to grant 99 acres of land to a trust for the popular Amarnath Hindu shrine in the Jammu and Kashmir state sparked violent protests by Muslims who say the move seeks to change the demographic balance in their Muslim-majority state. Public expressions of anger included a withdrawal from the state’s coalition government by the influential regional People’s Democratic Party and the subsequent resignation of Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, which placed the state under federal rule. Azad had responded to resistance by revoking the land grant decision, but protests did not subside and later spread to the Hindu-majority Jammu region. Dozens of people have been killed and hundreds wounded in clashes with police over more than one month of unrest.

Many of the state’s Hindus were upset by the government’s reversal; their efforts to block the sole road connecting the Kashmir Valley from the rest of India have left the capital of Srinagar short of food, fuel, and medical supplies. A high-level federal government meeting convened by Prime Minister Singh in early August concluded that a dialogue process was needed and would benefit from the active support of the opposition BJP, whose Hindu nationalist leanings may help to fuel the resentments the state’s Hindu minority. Yet worsening strife, with at least 19 protesters killed and up to 300 security troops injured on August 11-12 alone, has led some to warn that the state could fall into “communal meltdown,” squandering years of improvement.49

A July 2008 public opinion survey conducted in both India and Pakistan found a majority of respondents expressing an openness to a range of possible outcomes for Kashmir, including outright independence. While such an outcome was described as “unacceptable” by half of the Indians surveyed, the pollsters concluded that, “If a majority of all Kashmiris were to choose independence, a majority of Indians and Pakistanis would find such independence at least tolerable.”50

Other Recent Developments

- On August 12, at least 19 protesters were killed and up to 300 security troops injured in two days of clashes in Kashmir.


50 See [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul08/Kashmir_Jul08_rpt.pdf].
On July 26, some 53 people were killed and more than 120 wounded by 16 small bomb explosions in Ahmedabad, Gujarat.

On July 25, two people were killed by 7 small bomb explosions in Bangalore, Karnataka.

On July 24, suspected separatist militants killed nine people, including a woman and her four children, in Indian Kashmir.

On July 21, Foreign Secretary Menon met with his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi to launch the fifth round of the bilateral Composite Dialogue.

On July 19, at least nine soldiers were killed by a landmine explosion near Srinagar, Kashmir.

On July 18, the India-Pakistan Working Group on confidence-building measures for Kashmir met in Islamabad.

On July 16, least 20 special commando police officers were killed when their vehicle struck a landmine planted by suspected Maoist militants in Orissa.

On July 9, President Bush met with Prime Minister Singh on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in Japan.

On July 7, a suicide car bomb killed 58 people, including four Indian nationals, at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

On July 2, 11 separatist militants and an army officer were killed in a gunbattle in Indian Kashmir.

On July 1, National Security Advisor Narayanan paid a visit to Tehran for talks with top Iranian leaders.

Also on July 1, at least six people were killed after suspected separatist militants exploded a bomb in a crowded Assam market.

On June 30, the New Delhi government unveiled India’s first-ever national action plan to address climate change.

On June 29, at least 39 elite Indian anti-insurgency troops were feared drowned after their boat capsized following an attack by Maoist militants in Orissa.

On June 27, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee met with his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi, where the two leaders agreed to launch the fifth round of the Composite Dialogue in July.

On June 24, Indian and Pakistan officials held a third meeting of their Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism in Islamabad.

On June 16, a Singaporean national was sentenced to three years in U.S. federal prison for conspiring with Indian government officials to illegally ship controlled U.S. computer technology to India for use in military missile systems.

**Context of the U.S.-India Relationship**

**Background**

U.S. and congressional interests in India cover a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from the militarized dispute with Pakistan and weapons proliferation to concerns about regional security, terrorism, human rights, health, energy, and trade
and investment opportunities. In the 1990s, India-U.S. relations were particularly affected by the demise of the Soviet Union — India’s main trading partner and most reliable source of economic and military assistance for most of the Cold War — and New Delhi’s resulting need to diversify its international relationships. Also significant were India’s adoption of significant economic policy reforms beginning in 1991, a deepening bitterness between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and signs of a growing Indian preoccupation with China as a potential long-term strategic rival. With the fading of Cold War constraints, the United States and India began exploring the possibilities for a more normalized relationship between the world’s two largest democracies. Throughout the 1990s, however, regional rivalries, separatist tendencies, and sectarian tensions continued to divert India’s attention and resources from economic and social development. Fallout from these unresolved problems — particularly nuclear proliferation and human rights issues — presented major irritants in bilateral relations.

India’s May 1998 nuclear tests were an unwelcome surprise and seen to be a policy failure in Washington, and they spurred then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to launch a series of meetings with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in an effort to bring New Delhi more in line with U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals. While this proximate purpose went unfulfilled, the two officials soon engaged a broader agenda on the entire scope of U.S.-India relations, eventually meeting fourteen times in seven different countries over a two-year period. The Talbott-Singh talks were considered the most extensive U.S.-India engagement up to that time and likely enabled circumstances in which the United States could play a key role in defusing the 1999 Kargil crisis, as well as laying the groundwork for a landmark U.S. presidential visit in 2000.

President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 visit to South Asia seemed a major U.S. initiative to improve relations with India. One outcome was a Joint Statement in which the two countries pledged to “deepen the India-American partnership in tangible ways.” A U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was established that year and continues to meet regularly. During his subsequent visit to the United States later in 2000, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee addressed a joint session of Congress and issued a second Joint Statement with President Clinton agreeing to cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS.

In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation and the use of India’s bases for counterterrorism operations. Engagement was accelerated after a November 2001 meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee, when the two leaders agreed to greatly expand U.S.-India cooperation on a wide range of issues, including regional security, space and scientific collaboration, civilian nuclear safety, and broadened economic ties. Notable progress has come in the area of security cooperation, with an increasing

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51 See [http://www.usindiafriendship.net/archives/usindiavision/delhideclaration.htm].
53 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/6057.htm].
focus on counterterrorism, joint military exercises, and arms sales. In late 2001, the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group met in New Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership based on regular and high-level policy dialogue.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid a landmark July 2005 visit to Washington, where what may be the most significant joint U.S.-India statement to date was issued. In March 2006, President Bush spent three days in India, discussed further strengthening a bilateral “global partnership,” and issued another Joint Statement. The Bush Administration has vowed to “help India become a major world power in the 21st century,” and U.S.-India relations are today conducted under the rubric of three major “dialogue” areas: strategic (including global issues and defense), economic (including trade, finance, commerce, and environment), and energy. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that “U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India.” The 2006 version claims that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.” In the course of an annual assessment of global threats, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said,

We expect India’s growing confidence on the world stage as a result of its sustained high rates of economic growth will make New Delhi a more effective partner of the United States but also a more formidable interlocutor in areas of disagreement, particularly in the WTO.

In late 2007, Under Secretary of State Burns, who traveled to New Delhi at least eight times over a two-year period, penned an article lauding stronger U.S.-India relations while also identifying “considerable hurdles” to achieving an effective “global partnership.” Foremost among these are terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and nuclear proliferation, which he avers must be dealt with through stronger bilateral security ties that will include defense sales. At a 2007 U.S.-India business conference in Washington, Secretary of State Rice laid out the perspective that,

We in America look to the rise of India as an opportunity, a chance to work with a great fellow democracy to share not only the benefits of the international system, but indeed, the burdens and the responsibilities of maintaining it, of strengthening it, and defending it. We are eager to continue charting a global partnership with India, one that addresses the global challenges upon which the safety and success of every nation now depends: stemming nuclear proliferation, fighting terrorism, combating disease, protecting the environment, supporting

education and upward mobility, expanding economic development, and promoting freedom under the rule of law.\footnote{59}

Some analysts, however, see great potential but little likelihood of India becoming a major global power in the foreseeable future. Despite possession of a large, youthful, entrepreneurial population, a booming national economy, and growing power projection capabilities in the military realm, there remains much doubt about the capacity of India’s leaders to engage in effective long-term strategic thinking and policy making. One senior Washington-based India-watcher has opined that, “The Indian strategic community is hopelessly unstrategic,” and that its political community is “too domestically focused,” thus precluding India’s emergence as a substantive major power. Some Indian analysts agree that their national leaders lack a “coherent national grand strategy.”\footnote{60}

Recognition of India’s increasing stature and importance — and of the growing political influence some 2.3 million Indian-Americans — is found in the U.S. Congress, where the India and Indian-American Caucus is now the largest of all country-specific caucuses. Over the past seven years, legal Indian immigrants have come to the United States at a more rapid rate than any other group. In 2005 and 2006, the Indian-American community, relatively wealthy, geographically dispersed, and well-entrenched in several U.S. business sectors, conducted a major (and apparently successful) lobbying effort to encourage congressional passage of legislation to enable U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation.\footnote{61}

\section*{India’s Regional Relations}

India is geographically dominant in both South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. While all of South Asia’s smaller continental states (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan) share borders with India, none share borders with each other. The country possesses the region’s largest economy and, with more than one billion inhabitants, is by far the most populous on the Asian Subcontinent. The United States has a keen interest in South Asian stability, perhaps especially with regard to the India-Pakistan conflict nexus and nuclear weapons dyad, and so closely monitors India’s regional relationships.

\textbf{Pakistan.} Decades of militarized tensions and territorial disputes between India and Pakistan arguably have hamstrung economic and social development in both countries while also precluding establishment of effective regional economic or security institutions. Seemingly incompatible national identities contributed to both

\footnote{59} See \url{http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/06/87487.htm}.

\footnote{60} Stephen Cohen cited in “Look Before You Hop” (interview); Harsh Pant, “‘Adamant for Drift, Solid for Fluidity,’” both in \textit{Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review}, June 2008 and July 2008, respectively.


\footnote{62} See also CRS Report RL33498, \textit{Pakistan-U.S. Relations}. 
wars and to the nuclearization of the Asian Subcontinent, with the nuclear weapons capabilities of both countries becoming overt in 1998. Since that time, a central aspect of U.S. policy in South Asia has been prevention of interstate conflict that could destabilize the region and lead to nuclear war. In 2004, New Delhi and Islamabad launched their most recent comprehensive effort to reduce tensions and resolve outstanding disputes, an effort that has to date resulted in modest, but still meaningful successes. New Delhi acknowledges that a stable Pakistan is in India’s interests. At the same time, however, many top Indian leaders are convinced that Pakistan has long been and remains the main source India’s significant domestic terrorism problems. They continue to blame Islamabad for maintaining an “infrastructure of terror” and for actively supporting terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskar-e-Taiba that are held responsible for attacks inside India.63

Current Status. The halting India-Pakistan peace initiative was revived in mid-2008 after becoming moribund in the final months of 2007, when domestic political and security crises diverted the Pakistani government’s attention away from its relations with India. New Delhi has watched the domestic turmoil of its neighbor and long-time rival with great interest, but little public comment. India takes pains to avoid even the perception of meddling in Pakistan’s domestic political problems and so has been reticent and extremely cautious in its relevant public statements. A destabilized Pakistan represents a major security concern for New Delhi, but at the same time history shows that as Pakistan’s internal difficulties grow, Pakistani interference in Indian affairs tends to decrease. Some view India’s relatively muted response as strong evidence that the two countries have finally become “de-hyphenated.” Others call on New Delhi to reach out to the new Islamabad government with conciliatory gestures that could facilitate the consolidation of democratization in Pakistan.64

In 2006, India and Pakistan agreed to open a second Kashmiri bus route and to allow new truck service to facilitate trade in Kashmir (the new bus service began in June of that year). Subsequent “Composite Dialogue” talks were held to discuss

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63 While levels of violence in Kashmir declined significantly in 2007 as compared to the previous year, some Indian analysts see signs that Islamist militants will seek to reverse this trend, perhaps with the urging and even support of Pakistani government elements. According to Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, a former chief of the country’s domestic intelligence agency, very few Indian Muslims have played major roles in domestic terrorism. He has asserted that, “Mostly, the [terrorist] activity has been generated from outside” and “the overwhelming majority” of India’s terrorism problems emanates from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. Internal Indian government documents reportedly conclude that Pakistan’s main intelligence agency has not changed its central objectives, which, according to these sources, include supporting anti-Indian militancy in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, and along the India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh borders (“Negotiating War,” *Outlook* (Delhi), May 28, 2008; “MK Narayanan” (interview), *India Abroad*, September 21, 2007; “ISI Still Helping Terror Groups Against India: Narayanan,” *Times of India* (Delhi), March 26, 2008; “No Let Up in ISI Operations: Report,” *Times of India* (Delhi), June 9, 2008).

militarized territorial disputes, terrorism and narcotics, and cultural exchanges, but high hopes for a settlement of differences over the Siachen Glacier have been dashed with repeated sessions ending without progress. Multiple sessions on the Tubal navigation project/Wullar barrage water dispute similarly have ended without forward movement.

The serial bombing of Bombay commuter trains in July 2006 killed nearly 200 people and injured many hundreds more. With suspicions regarding the involvement of Pakistan-based groups, New Delhi suspended talks with Islamabad pending an investigation. However, at a September meeting on the sidelines of a Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba, Prime Minister Singh and Pakistani President Musharraf announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations and also decided to implement a new Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism. Soon after, however, Bombay’s top police official said the 7/11 train bombings were planned by Pakistan’s intelligence services and, in October 2006, Prime Minister Singh himself said India had “credible evidence” of Pakistani involvement. (To date, India is not known to have gone public with or shared with Pakistan any incriminating evidence of Pakistani government involvement in the Bombay bombings.)

The Composite Dialogue resumed with a third round of foreign secretary-level talks when Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon hosted a New Delhi visit by his Pakistani counterpart in late 2006. No progress came on outstanding territorial disputes, but the two officials did give shape to the new anti-terrorism mechanism. Such a mechanism is controversial in India, where some analysts are skeptical about the efficacy of institutional engagement with Pakistan in this issue-area even as Islamabad is suspected of complicity in anti-India terrorism.

Indian External Affairs Minister Mukherjee met with his Pakistani counterpart in Islamabad in early 2007 for the first such visit in more than a year. The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a new round of talks. In February of that year, two bombs exploded on an Indian segment of the Samjhauta [Friendship] Express train linking Lahore, Pakistan, with Delhi. Resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days later, Mukherjee hosted Kasuri in New Delhi, where the two men reaffirmed a bilateral commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack, the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

The new India-Pakistan anti-terrorism mechanism met for the first time in March 2007 and produced a joint statement in which both governments agreed to use the forum for exchanging information about investigations of and/or efforts to prevent terrorist acts on either side of the shared border, and to meet quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information. Hopes that the Samjhauta train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed, however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under this framework. Still, the continuing engagement even after a major terrorist attack was widely viewed as evidence that the bilateral peace process had gained a sturdy momentum.
A fourth round of the Composite Dialogue also was launched in March 2007, when the two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad. No new agreements were reached, but both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.65 A fourth round of bilateral talks on economic and commercial cooperation held in August 2007 ended with agreements to facilitate importation of cement from Pakistan and tea from India, among others. Indian and Pakistani officials also held technical-level talks on the modalities of cross-border movement.

In September 2007, Pakistan issued a formal protest and expressed “deep concern” in response to the Indian government’s announced intention to open the disputed territory of the Siachen Glacier to tourism, saying the region was “illegally occupied” by Indian troops in 1984 and its final status has yet to be determined due to an “inflexible Indian attitude.”66 October saw a second meeting of the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism in New Delhi, where the two sides shared new information on terrorism and agreed to continue mutual investigatory cooperation.

Following a November 2007 imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan, political crisis in Islamabad is widely seen as having put what are at least temporary brakes on the bilateral peace process, and has also brought into question the efficacy of India’s seeking to strike agreements with a Pakistani leader (Musharraf) whose political legitimacy and longevity in office are in doubt. New Delhi lauded Pakistan’s February 2008 electoral processes and expressed preparedness to resume the Composite Dialogue once a new government is in place in Islamabad. The leader of Pakistan’s leading political party, Asif Zardari, expressed hope that India-Pakistan economic ties should be strengthened even without a settlement of the Kashmir issue, saying Kashmir is a situation upon which Pakistan and India “can agree to disagree.” Prime Minister Singh has invited Pakistan’s new civilian leaders to put the past behind them and build a new cooperative relationship with India.67

In May 2008, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee met with his Pakistani counterpart in Islamabad for a review of the fourth round of the Composite Dialogue. The two leaders reaffirmed their determination to not let terrorism impede the bilateral peace process. A month later, the new Pakistani Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, made his first official trip to New Delhi, where it was agreed that the fifth round of the Composite Dialogue would take place in July. June 2008 also saw the bilateral anti-terrorism mechanism meet for only the third time in nearly two years. Among the top goals of Indian officials has been gauging the new Pakistani
government’s commitment to the bilateral peace process. Within this modest context, the outcomes have been viewed as positive.68

**Background.** Three wars — in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of the border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan. The bloody and acrimonious nature of the 1947 partition of British India and continuing violence in Kashmir remain major sources of interstate tensions. Despite the existence of widespread poverty across South Asia, both India and Pakistan have built large defense establishments — including nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missile programs — at the cost of economic and social development. The two countries reportedly continue to stockpile a combined 11 million landmines and up to 2,000 square kilometers of India’s Jammu and Kashmir state may remain mined.69 The nuclear weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan became overt in May 1998, magnifying greatly the potential dangers of a fourth war. Although a bilateral peace process has been underway for more than four years, little substantive progress has been made toward resolving the Kashmir issue, and New Delhi continues to be rankled by what it calls Islamabad’s insufficient effort to end Islamic militancy that affects India.

The Kashmir problem is itself rooted in claims by both countries to the former princely state, now divided by a military Line of Control (LOC) into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir (see “The Kashmir Issue,” below). Normal relations between New Delhi and Islamabad were severed in December 2001 after a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament was blamed on Pakistan-supported Islamic militants. Other lethal attacks on Indian civilians spurred Indian leaders to call for a “decisive war,” but intense international diplomatic engagement, including multiple trips to the region by high-level U.S. officials, apparently persuaded India to refrain from attacking.70 In October 2002, the two countries ended a tense, ten-month military standoff at their shared border, but there remained no high-level diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan (a July 2001 summit meeting in the Indian city of Agra had failed to produce any movement toward a settlement of the bilateral dispute).

In April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee extended a symbolic “hand of friendship” to Pakistan. The initiative resulted in slow, but perceptible progress in confidence-building, and within months full diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored. Islamabad responded positively and, in November, took its own initiatives, most significantly the offer of a cease-fire along the Kashmir LOC. A major breakthrough in bilateral relations came at the close of a January 2004 summit session of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad. After a meeting between Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraf — their first since July 2001 — the two leaders agreed to re-engage a “composite

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dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” A May 2004 change of governments in New Delhi had no effect on the expressed commitment of both sides to carry on the process of mid- and high-level discussions. Some analysts believe that increased people-to-people contacts have significantly altered public perceptions in both countries and may have acquired permanent momentum. Others are less optimistic about the respective governments’ long-term commitment to dispute resolution. Moreover, an apparent new U.S. embrace of India has fueled Pakistan’s anxieties about the regional balance of power.

**China.** India and China together account for one-third of the world’s population, and are seen to be rising 21st century powers and potential strategic rivals. The two countries fought a brief but intense border war in 1962 that left China in control of large swaths of territory still claimed by India. Today, India accuses China of illegitimately occupying nearly 15,000 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir, while China lays claim to 35,000 square miles in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The 1962 clash ended a previously friendly relationship between the two leaders of the Cold War “nonaligned movement” and left many Indians feeling shocked and betrayed. While Sino-Indian relations have warmed considerably in recent years, the two countries have yet to reach a final boundary agreement. Adding to New Delhi’s sense of insecurity have been suspicions regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia. A strategic orientation focused on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, and other power projection programs.71

Beijing’s military and economic support for Pakistan — support that is widely understood to have included nuclear weapons- and missile-related transfers — is a major and ongoing source of friction; past Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir position has added to the discomfort of Indian leaders. New Delhi takes note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction of military and port facilities on the Indian Ocean.72 The two countries also have competed for trade partners and energy resources to feed their rapidly growing economies; India’s relative poverty puts New Delhi at a significant disadvantage in such competition.73

Analysts taking a realist political theory perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad


72 For example, China is developing a billion dollar commercial port on the southern tip of Sri Lanka. Some Indian analysts fear the port could be used to support Chinese naval activity in the India Ocean (“India, China Jostle for Influence in Indian Ocean,” Associated Press, June 7, 2008).

73 An example is found in relations with Africa, where India’s historical advantage has been eroded by Beijing’s deeper pockets. The value of China’s two-way trade with African countries is now more than double that of India’s (“On China’s Heels, India Vies for Its Old Edge in Africa,” Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 2008).
allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India. More wary observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement,” or constraint, of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-wide influence.

Despite historic and strategic differences, high-level exchanges between India and China regularly include statements that there exists no fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries. During a landmark 1993 visit to Beijing, then-Prime Minister Narasimha Rao signed an agreement to reduce troops and maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control that divides the two countries’ forces at the disputed border. Numerous rounds of border talks and joint working group meetings aimed at reaching a final settlement have been held since 1981 — a dozen of these since both countries appointed special representatives in 2003 — with New Delhi and Beijing agreeing to move forward in other issue-areas even as territorial claims remain unresolved. Some skeptical Indian analysts believe China is using the so far unavailing border dialogue as “diplomatic cover to be intractable and revanchist.”

A 2003 visit to Beijing by then-Prime Minister Vajpayee was viewed as marking a period of much improved relations. In 2004, India’s army chief visited Beijing to discuss deepening bilateral defense cooperation and a first-ever India-China strategic dialogue was later held in New Delhi. Military-to-military contacts have included modest but unprecedented combined naval and army exercises. During Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s 2005 visit to New Delhi, India and China inked 11 new agreements and vowed to launch a “strategic partnership” to include broadened defense links and efforts to expand economic relations. In a move that eased border tensions, China formally recognized Indian sovereignty over the former kingdom of Sikkim, and India reiterated its view that Tibet is a part of China. Moreover, in 2006, dubbed the “Year of India-China Friendship,” the two countries formally

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74 Brahma Chellaney, “Don’t Get Cowed Down” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), October 2, 2007.
76 March 2008 saw growing violence and instability in the disputed Tibet region when pro-independence protesters there took to the streets of Lhasa and Chinese government forces were deployed to suppress the agitators. While India recognizes Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, for 50 years the Indian city of Dharamsala has been home to the exiled Dalai Lama — a Tibetan spiritual leader and focus of the pro-independence movement — as well as to some 180,000 other Tibetan exiles who are given refuge but who are not allowed to engage in political activities on Indian soil. Discord in Tibet creates a dilemma for New Delhi, where officials seek to balance human rights concerns with a desire to maintain warm relations with Beijing. Many large Indian rivers originate in Tibet. Both India and the United States support Chinese dialogue with the Dalai Lama, even as New Delhi warns that figure to refrain from political activity. Some analysts criticize New Delhi’s perceived timidity on the issue and assert that India’s aspired great power status requires standing up to China on human rights issues. During her March visit to India, Speaker of the House Rep. Nancy Pelosi met with and expressed support for the Dalai Lama, and called on the Chinese government to end its violent crackdown in Lhasa (see [http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/March08/dalai-lama.html]).
agreed to cooperate in securing overseas oil resources. In July of that year, India and China reopened the Nathu La border crossing for local trade (the Himalayan pass had been closed since the 1962 war). Sino-India trade relations are soaring — bilateral commerce was worth nearly $39 billion in 2007, a 15-fold increase over the 1999 value. In fact, China may soon supplant the United States as India’s largest trading partner. Still, Indian leaders are concerned that trade with China is woefully unbalanced, with China enjoying a large surplus.

Indo-Chinese relations further warmed in late 2006, when Chinese President Hu Jintao made a trip to India, the first such visit by a Chinese president in a decade. There India and China issued a Joint Declaration outlining a “ten-pronged strategy” to boost bilateral socio-economic ties and defense cooperation, and to “reinforce their strategic partnership.” The two countries, which declared themselves “partners for mutual benefit” rather than rivals or competitors, also signed 13 new pacts on a variety of bilateral initiatives. The Joint Declaration notably contained an agreement to “promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy,” although no details have been provided on what form such cooperation might take. India’s army chief spent a week in China in mid-2007, providing fresh impetus to bilateral defense cooperation. A late 2007 visit to Beijing by Congress Party chief Sonia Gandhi may have been part of an effort to balance New Delhi’s increasingly close relations with the United States, Japan, and other regional countries, relations that may be straining Indo-Chinese ties.

Prime Minister Singh’s January 2008 visit to Beijing, his first as Prime Minister, saw India and China agreed to further strengthen trade and defense relations. Singh called on Beijing to expand market access for Indian goods so as to correct his country’s growing trade imbalance with China. A number of significant unresolved bilateral issues, not least the conflicting territorial claims, had analysts foreseeing no major new initiatives growing from the summit. The resulting document, “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century,” resolved to promote global peace and prosperity through an India-China relationship built on trust and based on equality. It included an unprecedented expression of Chinese support for a greater Indian in the U.N. Security Council, as well as calls for further regional economic integration and resolution of outstanding territorial disputes through peaceful negotiations. External Affairs Minister Mukherjee met with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing in June 2008; the two leaders pledged to maintain peace on the India-China border but offered no new approaches to resolving outstanding territorial disputes.

Militarized bilateral frictions persist. Ahead of Prime Minister Singh’s China trip, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee conceded that Chinese troops had sometimes intruded on Indian territory and that infrastructure development on the Chinese side of the border was “much superior” to that on the Indian side. Just two weeks after returning from China, Singh was in India’s remote Arunachal Pradesh state for the first such prime ministerial trip in nearly a decade. The visit ostensibly

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was meant to assure the region’s citizens that New Delhi remained mindful of their development needs. Indian officials have been clear in conveying to Beijing that they consider the state to be “an integral part of India.” Some Indian analysts, wary of China’s territorial claims and military presence in the region, lauded what they saw as Singh’s symbolic demonstration of Indian resolve in the face of Chinese provocations. In apparent response to China’s rapid development of infrastructure on its side of the disputed border, the Indian army plans to deploy two new mountain divisions to the region within eight years. In May 2008, reports that China was basing a nuclear submarine on Hainan Island in the South China Sea triggered alarm in New Delhi. Hainan is 1,200 miles from the strategically vital Malacca Straits. Indian concern was compounded by reports of apparent missile launch sites from which Chinese nuclear forces may target northern India. Moreover, India’s pursuit of a military space program to defend its satellites may portend a regional arms race and exacerbate existing India-China tensions.

Burma. India continues to pursue closer relations with the repressive regime in neighboring Burma, with an interest in energy cooperation and to counterbalance China’s influence there. Such engagement seeks to achieve economic integration of India’s northeast region and western Burma, as well as to bolster energy security. The Bush Administration urges India to be more active in pressing for democracy in Burma: in October 2007, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte said, “Now is the time for Beijing and New Delhi to forgo any energy deals that put money in the pockets of the junta and to suspend weapons sales to this regime.” However, New Delhi calls democracy and human rights internal Burmese issues.

During September 2007, major pro-democracy street protests in Burma grew in scale and the Rangoon military regime launched a violent crackdown to suppress the movement being led by Buddhist monks. In response, the United States announced new sanctions on Burma and urged other countries to follow suit. Following Rangoon’s crackdown, New Delhi has continued to favor dialogue and is opposed to imposing sanctions on Rangoon. India is, in fact, moving ahead with plans to assist Rangoon in building a port in northwestern Burma as part of an effort develop that country’s natural gas industry. This approach, justified by Indian leaders as being a pragmatic pursuit of their national interest, has elicited accusations of Indian complicity in Burmese repression.

83 “India to Push On With Myanmar Port Despite Unrest,” Reuters, October 10, 2007; “India Silent on Myanmar Crackdown,” Associated Press, October 23, 2007. One observer called (continued...
On October 1, 2007, S.Res. 339, expressing the sense of the Senate on the situation in Burma, was passed by the full Senate. The resolution includes a call for the United States and the United Nations to “strongly encourage China, India, and Russia to modify their position on Burma and use their influence to convince the Government of Burma to engage in dialogue with opposition leaders and ethnic minorities towards national reconciliation.” On the same day, New Delhi reiterated its calls for political reform in Burma and urged Rangoon to launch a formal inquiry into recent use of force against pro-democracy protestors there, but New Delhi was not seen to be adjusting its Burma policy in any meaningful way.84 In a justification of New Delhi’s relatively uncritical approach to the Rangoon regime, some commentators call past and continued cooperation by the Burmese military vital in New Delhi’s efforts to battle separatist militants in India’s northeast.85

Press reports in late 2007 indicated that New Delhi was halting arms sales to Rangoon; however it appears that India’s supply of military equipment to Burma has only been “slowed.”86 International human rights groups and some in Congress have criticized New Delhi’s military interactions with Rangoon.87 Burma’s foreign affairs minister visited New Delhi in the first week of 2008 for wide-ranging discussions with his Indian counterpart. Prime Minister Singh expressed satisfaction with positive India-Burma relations while also stressing “the need for greater urgency in bringing about political reforms and national reconciliation” through a “broad-based”

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83 (...continued)

New Delhi’s policy a “reprehensively passive and callous posture” toward Burma’s pro-democracy forces (Praful Bidwai, “Failing the Foreign Policy Test” (op-ed), Frontline (Chennai), October 19, 2007).


85 See, for example, Shishir Gupta, “Rangoon Isn’t Kathmandu” (op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi), October 2, 2007.


87 Since 1988, the United States has imposed a wide range of sanctions against Burma, including passage of the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) banning imports from Burma (renewed by Congress in 2007). In a 2007 floor statement, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee criticized India (and China) for propping up the Rangoon government “through shockingly direct, blatant deals, including arms trading with this cruel junta in Burma.” New York-based Human Rights Watch has lambasted India (among other countries) for “supplying Burma with weapons that the military uses to commit human rights abuses and to bolster its ability to maintain power” (see [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/10/burma17066.html]).
process. When Burma’s second-highest ranking military ruler visited New Delhi in April 2008, the two countries reached agreement on a $120 million-project that will see India upgrade numerous waterways and highways in Burma. An early May cyclone devastated Burma’s coastal areas and left at least 78,000 people dead. The New Delhi government sought to keep with “India’s close and good neighborly ties with the friendly people” of Burma by quickly rushing food, water, and medical supplies to its devastated neighbor.

India-Iran relations may complicate progress in New Delhi’s nascent “strategic partnership” with Washington. India’s relations with Iran traditionally have been positive and, in 2003, the two countries launched a bilateral “strategic partnership” of their own. The Indian government and firms have invested a reported total of nearly $10 billion in Iran since 2000, placing India 10th on the list of international investors worldwide. Some in the U.S. Congress voiced past concerns that New Delhi’s policies toward Tehran’s controversial nuclear program were not congruent with those of Washington, although these concerns were eased when India voted with the United States (and the majority) at the IAEA sessions of September 2005 and February 2006. India urges the United States to refrain from unilaterally taking on the task of preventing Iran’s potential development of nuclear weapons and leave the job to the IAEA. New Delhi believes there is no military solution to the issue and warns that any military strike on Iran “would have disastrous consequences for the entire region.”

During the period from 2004 to 2006, the United States sanctioned Indian scientists and chemical companies for transferring to Iran WMD-related equipment and/or technology (most sanctions were chemical-related, but one scientist was alleged to have aided Iran’s nuclear program). New Delhi called the moves unjustified. Included in legislation to enable U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation (P.L. 109-141, the “Hyde Act”) was a non-binding assertion that U.S. policy should “secure India’s full and active participation” in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. New Delhi firmly opposes the emergence of any new nuclear weapons powers in the region.

91 See text of the January 2003 “New Delhi Declaration” at [http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2003/01/25jd1.htm]. In December 2007, Indian Foreign Secretary Menon visited Iran, where he held several high-level meetings and reiterated New Delhi’s interest in establishing a strategic partnership with Tehran.
93 Although President Bush indicated he has not adopted the law’s statements of policy as U.S. foreign policy, this provision rankled many in New Delhi who view it as an “extraneous” constraint on India’s foreign policy independence. In their explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 109-401, congressional conferees repeatedly emphasized their belief that securing India’s assistance on this matter was “critical” (H.Rept. 109-721).
Many in Congress have voiced concern about India’s relations with Iran and their relevance to U.S. interests. Some worry especially about New Delhi’s defense ties with Tehran and have sought to link the issue with congressional approval of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. Expressions of these congressional concerns became more pointed in 2007. New Delhi has offered assurances that all of India’s dealings with Iran are permitted under U.N. Security Council Resolutions; one official expressed being “quite amazed” at reports of closer India-Iran military ties. In September 2007, Assistant Secretary of State Boucher conceded that some concerns about India-Iran military relations are “exaggerated,” but that the onus is on New Delhi to “explain” its relations with Tehran.

In April 2008, President Ahmadinejad arrived in New Delhi for a five-hour visit and met with top Indian leaders. It was the first such visit by an Iranian president since 2003. India’s foreign secretary took the opportunity to express satisfaction with the course of the bilateral relationship and stressed his government’s view that building a physically secure, economically and commercially viable natural gas pipeline from Iran to India would be in both countries’ interests. When asked if India’s relations with Iran could jeopardize warm relations with the Untied States, the foreign secretary said he did not think so, offering that deeper engagement with Iran would facilitate regional stability and that, “Everything we do with Iran is open, above-board, and quite clear to everybody.” In the run-up to the Iranian leader’s visit, a State Department spokesman had expressed hope that New Delhi would call on Ahmadinejad to meet U.N. Security Council requirements that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities. The comment sparked outrage and indignation in New Delhi, where the External Affairs Ministry responded by saying India and Iran

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95 In April, eight U.S. Senators sent a letter to Prime Minister Singh requesting that New Delhi “suspend its military cooperation” with Iran, asserting that “India’s own interests are damaged by its support for the Iranian military” and that “India’s principles are also poorly served by deepening its military relationship with Iran.” In May, eight U.S. Representatives — including the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee — sent Singh a letter expressing “grave concern” at India’s “increasing cooperation” with Iran. In July, a letter to President Bush by 23 House Members expressed concern with “India’s deepening military-to-military relationship with Iran ... [which] places congressional approval of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation in jeopardy.” In September, two Senators wrote to Secretary of State Rice to express their concern about India-Iran military-to-military relations, saying that, as supporters of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, they are “apprehensive that the [123] agreement could be sidetracked by what appears to be a growing relationship between Iran and India.”


97 “Briefing by Foreign Secretary Shri Shivshankar Menon on Visit of President Ahmadinejad of Iran to India,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, April 29, 2008.
were “perfectly capable” of managing their own bilateral relations and needed no external guidance in this regard.\(^\text{98}\)

There are further U.S. concerns that India will seek energy resources from Iran, thus benefitting financially a country the United States is seeking to isolate. Indian firms have in recent years taken long-term contracts for purchase of Iranian gas and oil. Natural gas purchases could be worth many billions of dollars, but thus far differences over pricing and transport have precluded sales. Building upon growing energy ties is the proposed construction of a pipeline to deliver Iranian natural gas to India through Pakistan. The Bush Administration repeatedly expresses strong opposition to any gas pipeline projects involving Iran, but top Indian officials insist the project is in India’s national interest and they remain “fully committed” to the multi-billion-dollar venture. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24) required the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The 109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). To date, no firms have been sanctioned under these Acts.

The “IPI” Pipeline Project.\(^\text{99}\) New Delhi insists it is going ahead with a proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and on to India. Despite positive signaling, New Delhi had in the latter months of 2007 maintained only low-profile participation in relevant negotiations, perhaps in part due to sensitivities surrounding the as-yet unconsummated U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Earlier in 2007, officials from the three countries resolved a long-running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for a fourth meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Working Group on the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) Pipeline in Islamabad, where the two countries agreed to split equally expected gas supplies. Indian leaders consistently describe the pipeline project as being in the nation’s interest for greater energy security. As Iran and Pakistan move to finalize the pipeline project, India in April 2008 confirmed that it would rejoin talks. Beijing has expressed interest in Pakistani proposals that China participate in the IPI project, possibly spurring more energetic Indian participation.\(^\text{100}\) Ever-optimistic Iranian leaders anticipate a trilateral agreement to launch the project will be inked by mid-summer 2008. Such a development could be considered a significant failure of U.S. policy that could convey a sobering message about America’s allegedly declining international and regional clout.\(^\text{101}\)

Some independent analysts and Members of Congress assert that completion of an IPI pipeline would represent a major confidence-building measure in the region.

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\(^{99}\) See also CRS Report RS22486, India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA).

\(^{100}\) “China Shows Interest in Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, April 26, 2008.

\(^{101}\) “Iran Sees Pipeline Deal With India, Pakistan by Mid-Year: Report,” Agence France Presse, May 28, 2008; “India’s Iran Pipeline Deal,” Forbes, July 1, 2008.
and could bolster regional energy security while facilitating friendlier Pakistan-India
ties (see, for example H.Res. 353 in the 109th Congress). Some Indian strategic
analysts contend that New Delhi would risk alienating the Pakistani leadership if it
were to withdraw from the project. 102  As part of its efforts to isolate Iran
economically, the Bush Administration actively seeks to dissuade New Delhi from
participation in this project, and a State Department official has suggested that
current U.S. law dictates American opposition. Some independent analysts concur
with this view and urge Washington to assist the Indian and Pakistani governments
in developing alternative energy sources, including liquified natural gas and pursuit
of a proposed pipeline that would deliver Turkmen natural gas to South Asia through
Afghanistan. 103  In May 2007, Indian Oil Minister Murli Deora assured concerned
Left Front parties that India “will not be cowed down by any threat” regarding its
relations with Iran, saying that India’s participation in the IPI pipeline project “is not
the business of the United States.”104

Other Countries.  India takes an active role in assisting reconstruction efforts
in Afghanistan, having committed some $1.2 billion to this cause, as well as
contributing some 4,000 workers and opening numerous consulates there (much to
the dismay of Pakistan, which fears strategic encirclement and takes note of India’s
past support for Afghan Tajik and Uzbek militias). Among Indian assistance to
Afghanistan are funding for a new $111 million power station, an $84 million road-
building project, a $77 million dam project, and construction of Kabul’s new $67
Parliament building, to be completed in 2010. There are reported to be several
hundred Indian commandos stationed in Afghanistan to provide protection for Indian
reconstruction workers. The United States has welcomed India’s role in Afghanistan.
A July 2008 suicide bombing at India’s Kabul Embassy was taken as a stark message
to Indian leaders that Taliban militants and their allies want New Delhi to withdraw
from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Singh instead responded by vowing $450 million
in new Indian aid for Afghan reconstruction.105

Looking to the north, New Delhi supports consolidation of Nepal’s democratic
and conflict resolution processes, in particular through continued political
assimilation of the Maoists. India remains concerned by political instability in
Kathmandu and by the cross-border infiltration of Maoist militants into India. In
April 2008, Nepali Maoists won a surprise electoral victory in taking more than one-
third of Kathmandu’s Constituent Assembly seats to oversee a new coalition
government. The new Kathmandu government has since threatened to abrogate the
1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty, which allows for unrestricted travel
and residency across the shared border. While Indian officials are fairly sanguine

102 See, for example, K. Subrahmanyam, “Pipeline Dreams” (op-ed), Indian Express
(Mumbai), July 3, 2008.

103 Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham, “The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas
Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

104 “India Won’t Be Cowed Down: Deora” Hindu (Chennai), May 9, 2007.

105 “Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India,” New York Times, July 9, 2008; “India
Announces $450 Million Aid to Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 4, 2008.
about the development and vow openness to working with the new Nepali government, they are likely to have concerns about the potential for instability in Nepal to exacerbate India’s own internal insecurities.\(^{106}\)

To the east, and despite India’s key role in the 1971 creation of neighboring Bangladesh, New Delhi’s relations with Dhaka have been fraught with tensions related mainly to the cross-border infiltration of Islamic and separatist militants, and tens of millions of illegal migrants into India. New Delhi is undertaking a $1.2 billion project to fence India’s entire 2,000-mile shared border with Bangladesh. The two countries’ border forces engage in periodic gun battles. Still, New Delhi and Dhaka have cooperated on counterterrorism efforts and talks on energy cooperation continue. The Bangladeshi faction of the Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami — an Islamist militant outfit that was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law in March 2008 and that has links to Pakistan-based terrorist groups — has been implicated in several terrorist attacks inside India, including May 2008 terrorist bombings that killed at least 63 people in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Bangladesh’s military-backed interim government, which took power in 2007, may benefit India by reducing anti-India rhetoric and by addressing the apparently growing influence of Islamist forces that are seen as a threat to Indian interests.

In the island nation of Sri Lanka off India’s southeastern coast, a Tamil Hindu minority has been fighting a separatist war against the Sinhalese Buddhist majority since 1983. A Norwegian-brokered cease-fire unraveled in 2006 and, after a series of military successes in 2007, the Colombo government abrogated the cease-fire in January 2008. More than 60 million Indian Tamils live in southern India and tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees have fled to India in recent months and years. India’s armed 1987 intervention to assist in enforcing a peace accord resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 Indian troops and led to the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil militants. Since that time, New Delhi has maintained friendly relations with Colombo while refraining from any deep engagement in third-party peace efforts. New Delhi resists Colombo’s push for more direct Indian involvement and insists there can be “no military solution” to the island’s ethnic troubles. The Indian Navy played a key role in providing disaster relief to Sri Lanka following the catastrophic December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Moscow was New Delhi’s main foreign benefactor for the first four decades of Indian independence. Russia continues to be “indispensable to India’s foreign policy interests,” according to Prime Minister Singh, who calls energy cooperation the core of the two countries’ “strategic partnership.”\(^{107}\) India’s single largest foreign investment is a $1 billion stake in a joint oil and gas venture on Russia’s Sakhalin Island. Moreover, and despite some post-Cold War diversification of its defense suppliers, India continues to obtain the bulk of its imported military hardware from Russian firms. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a visit to New Delhi,


where he met with top Indian officials; signed several bilateral agreements on energy, science, and space cooperation; and offered to sell four new 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors to India. In November, Prime Minister Singh visited Moscow, where he and Putin discussed economic, energy, and defense ties. Agreement for the construction of four new nuclear reactors was deferred due to “technical hitches.” Some commentators believe the U.S. government pressured New Delhi to avoid the deal. Russia’s status as a main supplier of Indian defense equipment currently is threatened by several disputes, including over the refitting of an aircraft carrier (which has seen major delays and cost overruns), a spat over Russia’s allegedly substandard upgradation of an Indian attack submarine, and other irritants.  

India’s relations with Japan only began to blossom in the current decade after being significantly undermined by India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests. Today, leaders from both countries acknowledge numerous common values and interests. They are engaging a “strategic dialogue” formally launched with a 2007 visit to Tokyo by Foreign Minister Mukherjee, who spoke of Japan as a “natural partner in the quest to create an arc of advantage and prosperity” in Asia. Mukherjee emphasized India’s desire for economic integration in Asia and cooperative efforts to secure vital sea lanes, especially in the Indian Ocean. Japan’s support for the latter initiative has included plans for unprecedented joint naval exercises. New Delhi and Tokyo also share an interest in seeing membership of the U.N. Security Council expanded; both governments aspire to permanent seats. India seeks Japan’s endorsement for proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation, which has not been forthcoming to date. A mid-2007 visit to New Delhi by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was effusive in his praise of India as a “partner and friend,” was seen by many as part of a long-term Japanese effort to hedge against China’s growing regional influence. Abe and Prime Minister Singh issued a “Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership” outlining plans for security cooperation and comprehensive economic engagement. Singh met with the new Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, in Singapore in November and reiterated a commitment to the India-Japan “strategic and global partnership.”

The U.S. and Japanese governments have sought India’s participation in a prospective quadrilateral “axis of democracy” that would include Australia and could conceivably have a security alliance dimension (Australian officials reportedly are skeptical of such a pact for fear of alienating China). In 2007, U.S., Indian, and Japanese naval vessels conducted unprecedented combined exercises off Japan’s east coast. In September of that year, India hosted unprecedented five-country naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal (with Australian and Singaporean vessels also participating). Officials stressed that the exercises — which involved a total of 27 ships and submarines, among them two U.S. aircraft carriers — were not prompted by China’s growing military strength. New Delhi favors greater trilateral India-U.S.-Japan cooperation, especially in the areas of trade and energy security, but shies from anything that could be construed as a multilateral security alliance.

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Political Setting

India is the world’s most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative government and rule of law. As a nation-state, India presents a vast mosaic of hundreds of different ethnic groups, religious sects, and social castes. U.S. policymakers commonly identify in the Indian political system shared core values, and this has facilitated increasingly friendly relations between the U.S. and Indian governments. In 2008, the often-cited Freedom House again rated India as “free” in the areas of political rights and civil liberties.

**National Elections.** With a robust and working democratic system, India is a federal republic where the bulk of executive power rests with the prime minister and his or her cabinet (the Indian president is a ceremonial chief of state with limited executive powers). Most of India’s prime ministers have come from the country’s Hindi-speaking northern regions and all but two have been upper-caste Hindus. The 543-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is the locus of national power, with directly elected representatives from each of the country’s 28 states and 7 union territories. A smaller upper house, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), may review, but not veto, most legislation, and has no power over the prime minister or the cabinet. National and state legislators are elected to five-year terms. The most recent parliamentary elections were held in the spring of 2004.

National elections in October 1999 had secured ruling power for a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Vajpayee. That outcome decisively ended the historic dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress Party, which was relegated to sitting in opposition at the national level (its members continued to lead many state governments). However, a surprise Congress resurgence under Sonia Gandhi in the 2004 elections brought to power a new left-leaning coalition government led by former finance minister and Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, a Sikh and India’s first-ever non-Hindu prime minister. Many analysts attributed Congress’s 2004 resurgence to the resentment of rural and poverty-stricken urban voters who felt left out of the “India shining” campaign of a BJP more associated with urban, middle-class interests. Others saw in the results a rejection of the Hindu nationalism associated with the BJP.

The current Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) ruling coalition has marked nearly four years in power, exceeding the expectations of some observers. Opinion surveys suggest that both Prime Minister Singh and party chief Gandhi have remained fairly popular national figures. However, February 2007 state elections in Punjab and Uttaranchal saw Congress candidates decisively defeated by the BJP and its allies, causing some pundits to suggest that national economic policies and rising inflation may have damaged the ruling coalition’s standing. Such arguments were forwarded when the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) won an outright majority in May 2007 state assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. During its four years overseeing a national ruling coalition, the Congress Party has lost 12 assembly elections and was dislodged by the main opposition BJP in four states, including Karnataka and Punjab. Meanwhile, under

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110 See also CRS Report RL32465, *India’s 2004 National Elections.*
the party presidency of Rajnath Singh, the BJP has enjoyed seven consecutive election victories. Congress’s surprise May 2008 loss in Karnataka set the party on its heels in the run-up to national polls expected in early 2009, with many analysts concluding that national political momentum has shifted away from the party. Some observers saw in the Karnataka election dynamics signs that urban voters are exercising new-found muscle in ways that could weaken the country’s traditionally pro-rural politicians.

Prime Minister Singh, though widely admired as an honest and intelligent figure, has been unable to succeed in pushing through most of the UPA agenda, and his party’s state-level electoral setbacks have most analysts predicting no bold policy initiatives before the next national election expected in 2009. This is especially so in the wake of the New Delhi government’s inability to consummate a civil nuclear cooperation deal with the United States, an issue upon which the UPA leadership has staked considerable political capital. By most accounts, 2007 was a particularly unsuccessful year for the incumbent national government.

The Congress Party. Congress’s electoral strength reached a nadir in 1999, when the party won only 110 Lok Sabha seats. Observers attributed the poor showing to a number of factors, including the failure of Congress to make strong pre-election alliances (as had the BJP) and perceptions that party leader Sonia Gandhi lacked the experience to lead the country. Support for the Congress, which dominated Indian politics for decades, had been in fairly steady decline following the 1984 assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 1991 assassination of her son, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv’s Italian-born, Catholic widow, refrained from active politics until the 1998 elections. She later made efforts to revitalize the party by phasing out older leaders and attracting more women and lower castes — efforts that appear to have paid off in 2004. Today, Congress again occupies more parliamentary seats (145) than any other party and, through unprecedented alliances with powerful regional parties, it again leads India’s government under the UPA coalition. As party chief and UPA chair, Gandhi is seen to wield considerable influence over the coalition’s policy making process. Her foreign origins have presented an obstacle and likely were a major factor in her May 2004 decision to decline the prime ministership. As key Congress party figures express support for the future leadership

111 “BJP on a Roll, Congress on the Ropes,” India Today (Delhi), June 9, 2008.
114 See the Indian National Congress at [http://www.congress.org.in].
of her son and new parliamentarian, Rahul Gandhi, Manmohan Singh’s political authority is correspondingly undermined.115

**The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).**116 With the rise of Hindu nationalism, the BJP rapidly increased its parliamentary strength during the 1980s. In 1993, the party’s image was tarnished among some, burnished for others, by its alleged complicity in serious communal violence in Bombay and elsewhere. Some hold elements of the BJP, as the political arm of extremist Hindu groups, responsible for the incidents (the party has advocated “Hindutva,” or an India based on Hindu culture, and views this as key to nation-building).

While leading a national coalition from 1998-2004, the BJP worked — with only limited success — to change its image from right-wing Hindu fundamentalist to conservative and secular, although 2002 communal rioting in Gujarat again damaged the party’s credentials as a moderate organization. The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was overseen by party notable Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, whose widespread personal popularity helped to keep the BJP in power. After 2004, the BJP was weakened by leadership disputes, criticism from Hindu nationalists, and controversy involving party president Lal Advani (in 2005, Advani ceded his leadership post and Vajpayee announced his retirement from politics). The party did, however, take control of the Karnataka state government in November 2007, the first time the BJP has held power in southern India. In preparing for a new round of national elections, the party may adhere to its core Hindutva philosophy; it has nominated hardliner Advani to be its next prime ministerial candidate and may continue efforts to demonize India’s Muslim minority as part of a long-standing electoral strategy.117 Some observers, however, believe the party is looking beyond its traditional vote bank to appeal to urban, middle-class concerns such as governance and commerce, especially in the wake of party notable Narendra Modi’s reelection as Chief Minister of the western Gujarat state in December 2007.118

**Regional Parties.** The influence of regional and caste-based parties has become an increasingly important variable in Indian politics; the 2004 national elections saw such parties receiving nearly half of all votes cast. Never before 2004 had the Congress Party entered into pre-poll alliances at the national level, and numerous analysts attributed Congress’s success to precisely this new tack, especially thorough arrangements with the Bihar-based Rashtriya Janata Dal and Tamil Nadu’s

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116 See the Bharatiya Janata Party at [http://www.bjp.org].

117 See, for example, A.G. Noorani, “Merchants of Hate” (op-ed), Frontline (Chennai), June 21, 2008.

118 “BJP Goes Back to Hindutva,” Telegraph (Kolkata), September 2, 2007; “Finally Number One,” India Today (Delhi), February 11, 2008. In mid-2008, a fanatic Hindu nationalist party and regional ally of the BJP appeared to issue a call for “Hindu suicide squads” as a response to Islamist terrorism, spurring widespread public outrage and embarrassment for the NDA alliance (“Call for Hindu Suicide Squads Sparks Anger in India,” Reuters, June 1, 2008).
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. The newfound power of both large and smaller regional parties, alike, is seen to be reflected in the UPA’s ministerial appointments, and in the Congress-led coalition’s professed attention to rural issues and to relations between state governments and New Delhi.

Two significant regional parties currently independent of both the ruling coalition and the BJP-led opposition are the Samajwadi Party, a largely Muslim- and lower caste-based organization highly influential in Uttar Pradesh, and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) of Bihar, which also represents mainly lower-caste constituents. State assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh — home to more than 170 million Indians and one of only four states where the Congress Party is not in power — concluded in May 2007 and saw a major victory for the BSP and its lower-caste, female leader Mayawati, who reached out to upper-caste and other groups to secure an outright majority, the first time in 14 years that a single party secured such status. Mayawati is believed to have national political aspirations and her party’s success with caste-based politics may erode support for the Congress party in expected 2009 national elections.119 The outcome may have been an important indicator of national political trends, especially in gauging satisfaction with the current center coalition. In June 2007, eight regional parties formally launched a new “Third Front” that might emerge as a national alternative to the UPA and NDA. Well-known Tamil Nadu politician Jayalalithaa is a notable leader.120

The Left Front.121 Although the Communist Party of India (Marxist) seated the third largest number of parliamentarians in 2004, its vote bank is almost wholly limited to West Bengal and Kerala (the Left Front coalition holds about 11% of all Lok Sabha seats). Communist parties have in the past been bitter rivals of the Congress in these states, but a mutual commitment to secularism appears to have motivated their cooperation against the BJP in 2004.122 Early alarm was sounded that the new influence of communists in New Delhi might derail India’s economic reform efforts; Indian industrial leaders sought to assure foreign investors that Left Front members are not “Cuba-style communists,” but could be expected to support the UPA reform agenda. The communist Chief Minister of West Bengal, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, has himself actively sought corporate investment in his state. However, since coming to power, the Congress-led coalition has slowed most aspects of its economic reform program, including suspending major government disinvestment and special economic zone initiatives. These moves are widely viewed

119 See, for example, “India’s ‘Untouchables Queen’ Gains Power, Enemies,” Reuters, January 21, 2008.

120 The new front includes such regional powerhouses as the Telugu Desam of Andhra Pradesh, the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, and the Samajwadi of Uttar Pradesh.

121 See the Communist Party of India (Marxist) at [http://www.cpim.org].

122 In 2008, Congress Party officials have warned Left Front leaders that any effort by communists to forge a “third front” could leave the electoral field open to Hindu nationalist forces found mainly in the BJP and its allies (“India’s Ruling Congress Slams Left Ally’s ‘Third Front,’” Reuters, January 21, 2008).
as gestures to the strongly opposed communists. The Left Front also has been vocal in criticisms of closer India-U.S. relations, taking particular aim at proposed civil nuclear cooperation and any signs that the United States seeks to make India a “junior partner” in efforts to counter China.

Bilateral Issues

“Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” and Beyond

The now-concluded Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative encompassed several major issues in U.S.-India relations. New Delhi has long pressed Washington to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use high-technology goods (those with military applications), as well as to increase civilian nuclear and civilian space cooperation. These three key issues came to be known as the “trinity,” and top Indian officials insisted that progress in these areas was necessary to provide tangible evidence of a changed U.S.-India relationship. There were later references to a “quartet” when the issue of missile defense was included. In January 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee issued a joint statement declaring that the U.S.-India “strategic partnership” included expanding cooperation in the “trinity” areas, as well as expanding dialogue on missile defense. This initiative was dubbed as the NSSP and involved a series of reciprocal steps.

In July 2005, the State Department announced successful completion of the NSSP, allowing for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation, and removal/revision of some U.S. export license requirements for certain dual-use and civil nuclear items. Taken together, the July 2005 U.S.-India Joint Statement and a June 2005 U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement include provisions for moving forward in all four NSSP issue-areas. Many observers saw in the NSSP evidence of a major and positive shift in the U.S. strategic orientation toward India, a shift later illuminated more starkly with the Bush Administration’s intention to initiate full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

Civil Nuclear Cooperation. India’s status as a non-signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has kept it from accessing most nuclear-related materials and fuels on the international market for more than three decades. New Delhi’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” spurred the U.S.-led creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) — an international export control regime for nuclear-related trade — and Washington further tightened its own export laws with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). New Delhi has long railed

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126 See also CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India.
at a “nuclear apartheid” created by an apparent double standard inherent in the NPT, which, they maintain, allows certain states to legitimately employ nuclear deterrents while other states cannot. Senior Indian officials reiterate the widely-held Indian perspective that reaching a civil nuclear deal with the United States remains crucial to the process of removing constraints placed on India by “an increasingly selective, rigorous, and continually expanding regime of technology denial,” claiming that only by “turning the nuclear key” will India be able to open the door to global trade in dual use and other sophisticated technologies.127

Under U.S. and international law, civil nuclear cooperation with India cannot commence until Washington and New Delhi finalize a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (and Congress endorses such an agreement), until New Delhi concludes its own safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and until the NSG allows for such cooperation. At present, nuclear power accounts for less than 3% of India’s total electricity generation, and an Indian government official has estimated that, even under optimistic scenarios, this percentage would likely no more than double over the next 25 years.128

**The Bush Administration Policy Shift.** Differences over nuclear policy bedeviled U.S.-India ties for decades and — given New Delhi’s lingering resentments — have presented a serious psychological obstacle to more expansive bilateral relations. In a major policy shift, the July 2005 U.S.-India Joint Statement notably asserted that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states,” and President Bush vowed to work on achieving “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India.” As a reversal of three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, such proposed cooperation stirred controversy and required changes in both U.S. law and in NSG guidelines. India reciprocally agreed to take its own steps, including identifying and separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner and placing the former under international safeguards. Some in Congress express concern that civil nuclear cooperation with India might allow that country to advance its military nuclear projects and be harmful to broader U.S. nonproliferation efforts. While the Bush Administration previously had insisted that such cooperation would take place only within the limits set by multilateral nonproliferation regimes, it later actively sought adjustments to U.S. laws and policies, and has approached the NSG in an effort to adjust that regime’s guidelines, which are set by member consensus.

In March 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh issued a Joint Statement that included an announcement of “successful completion of India’s [nuclear facility] separation plan.”129 After months of complex and difficult negotiations, the Indian government had presented a plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities as per the July 2005 Joint Statement. The separation plan would require India to move 14 of its 22 reactors into permanent international

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127 See, for example, a February 2008 speech by Indian Special Envoy and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran [http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/popups/shyamsaran.pdf].


129 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-5.html].
oversight by the year 2014 and place all future civilian reactors under permanent safeguards. Shortly thereafter, legislation to waive the application of certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to India was, at the President’s request, introduced in the U.S. Congress.

**Potential Benefits and Costs.** Secretary of State Rice appeared before key Senate and House committees in April 2006 to press the Bush Administration’s case for civil nuclear cooperation with India. The Administration offered five main justifications for making changes in U.S. law to allow for such cooperation, contending that doing so would

- benefit U.S. security by bringing India “into the nonproliferation mainstream;”
- benefit U.S. consumers by reducing pressures on global energy markets, especially carbon-based fuels;
- benefit the environment by reducing carbon emissions/greenhouse gases;
- benefit U.S. business interests through sales to India of nuclear reactors, fuel, and support services; and
- benefit progress of the broader U.S.-India “global partnership.”

Many leading American experts on South Asian affairs joined the Administration in urging Congress to support the new policy, placing particular emphasis on the “necessary” role it would play in promoting a U.S.-India global partnership.131

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce — which, along with the U.S.-India Business Council, lobbied vigorously in favor of President Bush’s initiative — speculated that civil nuclear cooperation with India could generate contracts for American businesses worth up to $100 billion, as well as generate up to 27,000 new American jobs each year for a decade. A more modest estimate foresees the deal generating as much as $40 billion in new foreign investment into India.132 However, foreign companies such as Russia’s Atomstroyexport and France’s Areva may be better poised to take advantage of the Indian market. Moreover, U.S. nuclear suppliers will likely balk at entering the Indian market in the absence of nuclear liability protection, which New Delhi does not offer at present.

Further hearings in the Senate and House during mid-2006 saw a total of fifteen independent analysts weigh in on the potential benefits and/or problems that might accrue from such cooperation. Numerous nonproliferation experts, scientists, and former U.S. government officials warned that the Bush Administration’s initiative

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131 See, for example, an open letter Congress at [http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Mar/30.asp].

was ill-considered, arguing that it would facilitate an increase in the size of India’s nuclear arsenal, potentially leading to a nuclear arms race in Asia, and would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and cause significant damage to key U.S. security interests. Some experts opined that the Administration’s optimism, perhaps especially as related to the potential effects on global energy markets and carbon emissions, could not be supported through realistic projections.\(^{133}\)

Geopolitical Motives. In the realm of geopolitics, much of the Administration’s argument for moving forward with the U.S.-India nuclear initiative appears rooted in an anticipation/expectation that New Delhi will in coming years and decades make policy choices that are more congruent with U.S. regional and global interests (a desire for such congruence is, in fact, written into the enabling legislation, P.L. 109-401). Proponents suggest that this U.S. “gesture” will have significant and lasting psychological and symbolic effects in addition to the material ones, and that Indian leaders require such a gesture in order to feel confident in the United States as a reliable partner on the world stage. Skeptics aver that the potential strategic benefits of the nuclear initiative are being over-sold. Indeed, centuries of Indian anti-colonial sentiments and oftentimes prickly, independent foreign policy choices are unlikely to be set aside in the short run, meaning that the anticipated geopolitical benefits of civil nuclear cooperation with India remain speculative and at least somewhat dependent upon unknowable global political developments.

Congressional Action. After months of consideration, key House and Senate committees took action on relevant legislation in June 2006, passing modified versions of the Administration’s proposals by wide margins. The new bills (H.R. 5682 and S. 3709) made significant procedural changes to the Administration’s original proposal, changes that sought to retain congressional oversight of the negotiation process, in part by requiring the Administration to gain future congressional approval of a completed peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India (this is often referred to as a “123 Agreement,” as it is negotiated under the conditions set forth in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act). During the final months of its tenure, the 109th Congress passed enabling legislation with broad bipartisan support.\(^{134}\) So-called “killer amendments” were rejected by both chambers (Indian government and Bush Administration officials had warned that certain proposed new provisions, such as those requiring that India halt its fissile material production or end its military relations with Iran, would trigger New Delhi’s withdrawal from the entire negotiation).

In a December 2006 “lame duck” session, congressional conferees reconciled the House and Senate versions of the legislation and provided an explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-721). President Bush then signed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-401 or the “Hyde Act”) into law, calling it a “historic agreement” that would help the United

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\(^{133}\) See, for example, open letters to Congress at [http://fas.org/intl2006/X3e_FDC01218.pdf]; [http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060912_India_Ltr_Congress.pdf]; and [http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20051118_India_Ltr_Congress.pdf].

\(^{134}\) In July 2006, the House passed H.R. 5682 by a vote of 359-68. In November, the Senate passed an amended version of the same bill by a vote of 85-12.
States and India meet the energy and security challenges of the 21st century. The President also issued a signing statement asserting that his approval of the act “does not constitute [his] adoption of the statements of policy as U.S. foreign policy” and that he will construe such policy statements as “advisory.” Some in Congress expressed concern that President Bush would seek to disregard Congress’s will.\(^{135}\)

In mid-2007, as negotiations on a 123 Agreement were underway, 16 experts, scholars, and former U.S. government officials signed a letter urging Senators to hold the Bush Administration to the “set of core conditions and limitations” of the Hyde Act, including termination of assistance upon an Indian nuclear test, permanent and unconditional safeguards on civilian Indian facilities, and prohibitions on reprocessing and enrichment technologies.\(^{136}\) A July letter to President Bush signed by 23 Members of the House stressed the need for any civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India to conform to “the legal boundaries set by Congress.” The letter noted that the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the sole authority to regulate foreign commerce, and it expressed ongoing concerns about “India’s deepening military-to-military relationship with Iran ... [which] places congressional approval of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation in jeopardy.”\(^{137}\)

**Indian Concerns.** Almost immediately upon the release of the July 2005 Joint Statement, key Indian political figures and members of the country’s insular nuclear scientific community issued strong criticisms of the bilateral civil nuclear initiative; some such criticisms continue to this day. Former Prime Minister Vajpayee, along with many leading figures in his opposition BJP party, insisted that the deal as envisioned would place unreasonable and unduly expensive demands on India, particularly with regard to the separation of nuclear facilities. In reaction to the U.S. Congress’s passage of enabling legislation in late 2006, the BJP listed numerous continuing objections, and went so far as to call the deal “unacceptable” and aimed at “capping, rolling back, and eventually eliminating India’s nuclear weapons capability.”\(^{138}\) Many analysts view the BJP’s opposition as political rather than substantive, especially in light of the fact that the 2004 NSSP initiative was launched during the BJP’s tenure.\(^{139}\)


\(^{136}\) See [http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20070515letteronUSIndia123House.pdf]. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reportedly has said it would be unlikely that Congress would be willing to further amend U.S. law on nuclear testing and reprocessing (“Biden Cool to US Compromise on India Deal,” *Reuters*, May 2, 2007).


\(^{139}\) See, for example, “Politics of BJP’s Nuclear Tantrum,” *Telegraph* (Kolkata), August 7, 2007. Strobe Talbott, a Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration and a key interlocutor with India, has opined that the BJP government of the 1990s “would have been (continued...)
Some Indian analysts, wary of U.S. intentions in pursuing bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, believe the initiative may be cover for a broader effort to cement India’s cooperation in a number of non-energy-related areas, such as defense trade and New Delhi’s relations with Iran. From this perspective, the U.S. government repeatedly “shifted the goalposts” to forward its own (veiled) nonproliferation goals.\textsuperscript{140} India’s influential communist parties, whose Left Front provides crucial support to the Congress-led ruling coalition in New Delhi, have focused their ire on geopolitical aspects of the civil nuclear initiative. In late 2006, the leader of India’s main communist party declared the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal “not acceptable” as it would “seriously undermine India’s independent foreign policy.” Previously, the Left Front had called India’s two IAEA votes on Iran a “capitulation” to U.S. pressure.\textsuperscript{141} Indian leftists thus have been at the forefront of political resistance to India’s becoming a “junior partner” of the United States.

Equally stinging and perhaps more substantive criticism came from several key Indian scientists, whose perspectives on the technical details of the civil nuclear initiative are considered highly credible. India’s nuclear scientific community, mostly barred from collaboration with international civil nuclear enterprises as well as direct access to key technologies, has worked for decades in relative isolation, making its members both proud of their singular accomplishments and sensitive to any signs of foreign “interference.” Many viewed the enabling legislation passed by the U.S. Congress as being more about nonproliferation and less about energy cooperation. They considered it both intrusive on and preclusive of their activities.

The major criticisms of existing plans for U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation made by Indian commentators (and at times by the Indian government) are summarized as follows:

- India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was being codified into a bilateral obligation through a clause that would allow the United States to reclaim any supplied nuclear equipment if India were to test a nuclear device;
- India was being denied nuclear reprocessing technologies warranted under “full cooperation;”
- India was not being given prior authorization to reprocess spent fuel;
- India was not being given assurances that it will receive uninterrupted fuel supplies in perpetuity; and

\textsuperscript{139}(...continued)\textsuperscript{astonished” at and eager to accept a similar deal, had it been offered then (“Buzz of the Week,” \textit{India Today} (Delhi), March 17, 2008).\textsuperscript{140} Siddharth Varadarajan, “This Has Nothing To Do With Energy” (op-ed), \textit{Hindu} (Chennai), May 2, 2007; Brahma Chellaney, “Nuclear Non-Starter” (op-ed), \textit{Wall Street Journal}, May 9, 2007.\textsuperscript{141} In February 2007, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense reportedly said that India’s two IAEA votes on Iran had been “coerced” and paved the way for congressional approval of proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford later called the attributed statement “inaccurate” (“Rademaker is Not a U.S. Official,” \textit{Hindu} (Chennai), February 17, 2007).
• language on securing India’s assistance with U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction would limit New Delhi’s foreign policy independence.142

Prime Minister Singh stood firm against such wide-ranging and high-profile criticisms, repeatedly assuring his Parliament that relevant negotiations with the United States have not altered basic Indian policies or affected New Delhi’s independence on matters of national interest. Within this context, however, Singh expressed concern about some of the points listed above.143 Regardless of the legally binding or non-binding nature of certain controversial sections of the U.S. legislation, New Delhi found many of them to be either “prescriptive” in ways incompatible with the provisions of the July 2005 and March 2006 Joint Statements, or “extraneous” and “inappropriate to engagements among friends.”144

**Bilateral Negotiations Completed.** In July 2007, the United States and India announced having concluded negotiations on a peaceful nuclear cooperation (“123”) agreement, calling it a “historic milestone” in the bilateral strategic partnership. The announcement came one week after a fifth round of formal bilateral negotiations had ended in Washington, where a high-level Indian delegation led by National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan had met with numerous top U.S. officials, including Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Rice. Under Secretary of State Burns, the lead U.S. negotiator, called the deal “perhaps the single most important initiative that India and the United States have agreed to in the 60 years of our relationship” and “the symbolic centerpiece of a growing global partnership between our two countries.”145 U.S. officials urged New Delhi to move rapidly toward completing remaining steps to consummation of the pact.

Among the text’s more salient provisions are the following:

• India is granted authorization to reprocess spent fuel at a national reprocessing facility that New Delhi plans to establish under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

• In the event of a future nuclear test by India, the two countries would launch immediate bilateral consultations to “consider carefully the circumstances” and take into account whether the circumstances resulted from “serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other states which could impact national security.” While the U.S. President would have a right to demand the return of all U.S.-supplied nuclear

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142 “Major Obstacles Persist in Nuclear Deal,” Hindu (Chennai), April 25, 2007; A. Gopalakrishnan, “Hyde-Bound N-Deal Cannot Be Accepted” (op-ed), Asian Age (Mumbai), May 15, 2007.


144 Author interview with Indian government official, New Delhi, September 2006.

equipment and material in such a circumstance, the text recognizes that “exercising the right of return would have profound implications” for bilateral relations and calls for both parties to “take into account the potential negative consequences” of any termination of ongoing cooperation.

- India is given assurances that supplies of fuel for its civilian reactors will not be interrupted — even if the United States terminates the 123 Agreement — through U.S. commitments to “work with friends and allies ... to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market,” and to “support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel.”

Press reports had indicated that U.S. granting of unambiguous reprocessing rights, along with an Indian insistence on U.S. guarantees of an uninterrupted fuel supply for all imported reactors, had become a central obstacle in the lead-up to the talks, and that Indian negotiators had taken uncompromising positions in both areas. Subsequent reports suggested that U.S. negotiators made considerable concessions to Indian demands and that the agreement could face resistance in Congress if its legal stipulations are seen to deviate from those found in the Hyde Act. In early 2008, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee reassured the Indian Parliament of his government’s view that the Hyde Act is relevant only to interaction between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, and that only the provisions of the 123 Agreement will be binding upon New Delhi. This distinction was echoed by Assistant Secretary of State Boucher during his contemporaneous visit to New Delhi.

**Civil Space Cooperation.** India has long sought access to American space technology; such access has since the 1980s been limited by U.S. and international “red lines” meant to prevent assistance that could benefit India’s military missile programs. India’s space-launch vehicle technology was obtained largely from foreign sources, including the United States, and forms the basis of its intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile booster, as well as its suspected Surya intercontinental ballistic

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148 See [http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2008/Mar/1.asp]; “We Can Move Forward With Hyde Act and 123 Agreement: Boucher,” *Hindu* (Chennai), March 4, 2008. In a move that angered many nonproliferation advocates who oppose the deal, the State Department requested that congressional staff adhere to unusually strict confidentiality restrictions and not share the answers to congressional inquiries with the general public. Some observers called this “virtual gag order” a strong indication that the answers contained information harmful to the deal’s prospects (“State Department Asks Congress to Keep Quiet About Details of Deal,” *Washington Post*, May 9, 2008).
missile program. India is today seen to maintain one of the world’s most advanced space programs.\textsuperscript{149}

The NSSP called for enhanced U.S.-India cooperation on the peaceful uses of space technology, and the July 2005 Joint Statement anticipated closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena. Major conferences on India-U.S. space science and commerce were held in Bangalore (headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organization) in both 2004 and 2005. During President Bush’s 2006 visit to India, the two countries committed to move forward with agreements that will permit the launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles and they later agreed to include two U.S. scientific instruments on India’s planned Chandrayaan lunar mission. In 2007, a meeting of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation was held in Washington, where officials expressed satisfaction with growing bilateral ties in the aerospace field.

**High-Technology Trade.**\textsuperscript{150} U.S. Commerce Department officials have sought to dispel “trade-deterring myths” about limits on dual-use trade by noting that less than 0.5\% of total U.S. trade value with India is now subject to licensing requirements and that the great majority of dual-use licensing applications for India are approved (about 95\% in 2007). July 2003 saw the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), where officials discussed a wide range of issues relevant to creating the conditions for more robust bilateral high technology commerce; the sixth HTCG meeting was held in New Delhi in February 2008 (at the 2007 session, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez had unveiled a new “Trusted Customer” program designed to facilitate greater high-tech trade with India). In 2005, the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Defense Working Group was held under HTCG auspices.\textsuperscript{151} Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security formally designated India as an eligible country under its “Validated End-User” program in October 2007. This designation will allow certain trusted Indian buyers to purchase high-technology goods without an individual license.\textsuperscript{152}

Since 1998, a number of Indian entities have been subjected to case-by-case licensing requirements and appear on the U.S. export control “Entity List” of foreign end users involved in weapons proliferation activities. In 2004, as part of NSSP implementation, the United States modified some export licensing policies and removed the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) headquarters from the Entity List. Further adjustments came in 2005 when six more subordinate entities

\textsuperscript{149} In April 2008, India’s space agency set a world record by successfully launching ten satellites at one time in what was viewed as an impressive achievement and further sign that Indian scientists had made great and largely indigenous strides in mastering complex aerospace technologies (“India’s Growing Strides in Space,” \textit{BBC News}, April 30, 2008).

\textsuperscript{150} See also CRS Report RL34161, \textit{India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations}.


were removed. Indian entities remaining on the Entity List are four subordinates of the ISRO, four subordinates of the Defense Research and Development Organization, three Department of Atomic Energy entities, and Bharat Dynamics Limited, a missile production agency.153

Security Issues

The Indian Military.154 With more than 1.3 million active personnel, India’s is the world’s third-largest military (after China and the United States). The country’s defense budget grew by 11% to about $28 billion in 2007 and is up more than 30% since 2000 (adjusted for inflation). The army — more than one million strong and accounting for nearly half of the budget — has traditionally dominated, but the navy and air force are becoming more important as India seeks to project its power and protect an Exclusive Economic Zone of more than two million square kilometers. For 2007, the air force procurement budget of $3.75 billion was nearly 44% of the service-specific total, with the navy receiving another $2.56 billion.

The Indian army possesses more than 4,000 main battle tanks and some 4,500 towed artillery tubes. The navy has grown rapidly in recent years, currently operating 48 principal surface combatants (including one aircraft carrier) and 16 submarines. There also is a significant amphibious capacity: 17 landing ships (including one recently acquired from the United States) can carry nearly 5,000 troops or 100 tanks. The navy is developing an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine to be armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and also plans to lease a Russian Akula-class submarine as part of its “sea-based strategic deterrence.” The air force flies 565 combat-capable aircraft, the majority of them Russian-built MiGs, along with some late-model Sukhoi-30, as well as French-built Mirage and Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft. It also possesses modest airborne early warning and in-flight refueling capabilities provided by Russian-made platforms. A Strategic Forces Command oversees as many as 170 intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and has plans to field a new Agni-IV missile with a range that would give it inter-continental capabilities.

New Delhi increasingly seeks to shift advanced military imports from finished platforms to co-production with foreign suppliers. A 2005 deal with France provides for technology transfers and Indian construction of six Scorpene submarines to be delivered in 2012-2017. In seeking to replace its aging arsenal of MiG-21 fighters, India may purchase up to 186 new jets (126 for the air force and 60 for the navy) and has signaled a desire for technology sharing and co-production in this effort: only 18 of the new air force jets are to be manufactured abroad. In addition to the Scorpene submarines, other notable recent purchases for the Indian military include hundreds of the latest Russian T-90 tanks and upgrades on 600 existing T-72s; 3 new Russian-built missile frigates; 24 new MiG-29K naval jets for deployment on the INS Vitramaditya (formerly the Russian Gorshkov); 40 upgraded Su-30 MKI ground

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attack aircraft, major upgrades on existing MiG and Jaguar combat aircraft; and 66 jet trainers from Britain.

Russia continues to provide the bulk of India’s imported defense wares. In recent years, however, Israel has roughly equaled Russia in the value of defense exports to India, with each country providing about $1.5 billion worth of defense supplies in 2006. Moreover, India and Israel are engaging in new joint development projects involving missile technology.\(^{155}\) India was the leading developing world arms purchaser from 1999-2006, making arms transfer agreements totaling $22.4 billion during that period.\(^ {156}\) As India seeks to expand its power projection capabilities, it has come under fire from some for continuing to prepare for a conventional interstate war that may be unlikely to occur. According to one report, of the country’s nearly two million persons in uniform, only about 5,000 have meaningful counterterrorism training.\(^ {157}\)

**U.S.-India Security Cooperation.** Defense cooperation between the United States and India is in the early stages of development (unlike U.S.-Pakistan military ties, which date back to the 1950s). Since September 2001, and despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement with Pakistan, U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished; U.S. diplomats rate military cooperation among the most important aspects of transformed bilateral relations. The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group (DPG) — moribund since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions — was revived in late 2001 and meets annually.

In June 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration related to missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group. The agreement may be the most ambitious such security pact ever engaged by New Delhi. A Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement, inked in 2006, commits both countries to “comprehensive cooperation” in protecting the free flow of commerce and addressing a wide array of threats to maritime security, including piracy and the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. In April 2007, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Tim Keating, told a Senate panel that the Pentagon intends to “aggressively” pursue expanding military-to-military relations with India. During his August 2007 visit to New Delhi, Adm. Keating lauded U.S.-India defense relations

\(^{155}\) India’s January 2008 space launch of an Israeli military satellite elicited a formal complaint from Tehran, especially due to Iranian concerns that the satellite’s sophisticated imaging systems will be used to monitor Iran’s controversial nuclear program (“Iran Angered Over India’s Launch of Israeli Spy Satellite,” *Agence France Presse*, February 5, 2008).


The sentiment was echoed by Secretary of Defense Gates during his February 2008 visit to the Indian capital.

The United States views defense cooperation with India in the context of “common principles and shared national interests” such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. Many analysts view increased U.S.-India security ties as providing an alleged “hedge” against or “counterbalance” to growing Chinese influence in Asia, though both Washington and New Delhi repeatedly downplay such probable motives. Still, while a congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is unlikely in the foreseeable future, convergences are being identified in areas such as shared values, the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region, and on distinct challenges such as WMD proliferation, Islamist extremism, and energy security. There also remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners are divergent on several key issues, including the role of Pakistan, approaches to conflict resolution in Iraq and in Palestine, and Indian’s relations with Iran, as well as with repressive governments in places such as Burma and Sudan.159

Combined Military Exercises. Since early 2002, the United States and India have held a series of unprecedented and increasingly substantive combined exercises involving all military services. “Cope India” air exercises have provided the U.S. military with its first look at advanced Russian-built Su-30MKIs; in 2004, mock air combat saw Indian pilots in late-model Russian-built fighters hold off American pilots flying older F-15Cs, and Indian successes were repeated versus U.S. F-16s in 2005. Indian pilots joined military aviators from South Korea and France to participate in August 2008 U.S. Air Force training exercises over Nevada. U.S. and Indian special forces soldiers have held at least five “Vajra Prahar” joint exercises, and at least 133 U.S. Special Forces soldiers have attended India’s Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School. Moreover, major annual “Malabar” joint naval exercises are held off the Indian coast. The seventh and most recent of these came in September 2007, when India hosted a total of 27 warships from five countries — including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Singapore — for maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal. It was the first time such exercises were conducted off India’s east coast. U.S. and Indian officials tout ongoing joint maneuvers as improving interoperability and as evidence of an overall deepening of the bilateral defense relationship.160

Arms Sales.161 Along with increasing military-to-military ties, the issue of U.S. arms sales to India has taken a higher profile, with some analysts anticipating

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159 See also Vibhuti Hate and Teresita Schaffer, “U.S.-India Defense Relations: Strategic Perspectives,” CSIS South Asia Monitor, April 4, 2007.


161 See also CRS Report RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia.
that New Delhi will spend as much as $40 billion on weapons procurement over the
next five years.\footnote{162} The first-ever major U.S. arms sale to India came in 2002, when
the Pentagon negotiated delivery of 12 counter-battery radar sets (or “Firefinder”
radars) worth a total of $190 million. India also purchased $29 million worth of
counterterrorism equipment for its special forces and has received sophisticated U.S.-
made electronic ground sensors to help stem the tide of militant infiltration in the
Kashmir region. In 2004, Congress was notified of a sale to India involving up to
$40 million worth of aircraft self-protection systems for mounting on the Boeing
737s that carry India’s head of government. Moreover, the State Department has
authorized Israel to sell to India the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Phalcon airborne
early warning system, an expensive asset that some analysts believe may tilt the
regional strategic balance even further in India’s favor.

In 2006, Congress authorized and New Delhi approved the $44 million purchase
of the \textit{USS Trenton}, a decommissioned American amphibious transport dock. The
ship, which became the second largest in the Indian navy when it was commissioned
as the \textit{INS Jalashwa} in June 2007, set sail for India carrying six surplus Sikorsky
UH-3H Sea King helicopters purchased for another $39 million.\footnote{163} In May 2007, the
Pentagon notified Congress of a possible sale to India of six C-130J Hercules military
transport aircraft (along with related equipment, training, and services) in a deal that
could be worth more than $1 billion to the manufacturer, Maryland-based Lockheed
Martin. In January 2008, Washington and New Delhi signed an agreement to finalize
the deal, which represents the largest-ever U.S. defense sale to India.

The Indian government reportedly possesses an extensive list of desired U.S.-
made weapons, including PAC-3 anti-missile systems, electronic warfare systems,
and possibly even combat aircraft. The March 2005 unveiling of the Bush
Administration’s “new strategy for South Asia” included assertions that the United
States welcomed Indian requests for information on the possible purchase of F-16 or
F/A-18 fighters, and indicated that Washington is “ready to discuss the sale of
transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and
missile defense.”\footnote{164} India in August 2007 invited foreign tenders for the sale of 126
new multi-role combat aircraft in a deal that could be worth more than $10 billion.
Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and Illinois-based Boeing’s F/A-18 are competing with
aircraft built in Russia, France, Sweden, and by a European consortium. Lockheed’s
pitch reportedly includes offering a “super-cruise” version of the F-16 that saves
large amounts of fuel by achieving supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners.

\footnote{162}“Building a Modern Arsenal in India,” \textit{New York Times}, August 31, 2007; US Aims to
Edge Out Russia in big Arms Sales to India,” \textit{Reuters}, December 26, 2007. In December
2007, Boeing agreed in principle to send up to $1 billion in aerospace manufacturing work
to India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics over the next decade. In January 2008,
Lockheed Martin announced the opening of a subsidiary in New Delhi.

\footnote{163} India’s comptroller later issued a report critical of the government for purchasing an
“ageing ship” in a “hasty manner” without proper assessment of the ship’s sea-worthiness,
prompting communists in Parliament to demand an investigation. Indian navy officials
reject the criticism and say the inexpensive ship will provide significant sea-lift capabilities

\footnote{164} See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43853.htm].
Boeing, for its part, has sought to establish multiple joint ventures that could better position the company to become India’s preferred aerospace and defense partner.165

Some top Indian officials express concern that the United States is a “fickle” partner that may not always be relied upon to provide the reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by New Delhi.166 In 2006, the Indian Navy declined an offer to lease two U.S. P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, calling the arrangements too costly. Moreover, India’s offset policy states that any defense purchases worth more than $76 million must include offset clauses amounting to at least 30% of the deal’s total value. This policy, already described as “narrow” and “fairly restrictive” by the U.S. Ambassador to India, was altered to require that fully half of the value of any multi-role combat aircraft import be attached to offsets. U.S. laws requiring on-site verifications of exported defense equipment may represent a further irritant, as Indian officials reportedly have expressed discomfort with such physical inspections.167

Joint U.S.-India military exercises and arms sales negotiations can cause disquiet in Pakistan, where there is concern that induction of advanced weapons systems into the region could disrupt the “strategic balance” there. Islamabad worries that its already disadvantageous conventional military status vis-à-vis New Delhi will be further eroded by India’s acquisition of sophisticated “force multipliers.” In fact, numerous observers identify a pro-India drift in the U.S. government’s strategic orientation in South Asia. Yet Washington regularly lauds Islamabad’s role as a key ally in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition and assures Pakistan that it will take no actions to disrupt strategic balance on the subcontinent.

**U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation.** One facet of the emerging “strategic partnership” between the United States and India is greatly increased counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007* identified India as being “among the world’s most terror-afflicted countries” and counted more than 2,300 Indian deaths due to terrorism in 2007 alone. State finds numerous problems with New Delhi’s capacity to combat terrorism:

The Indian government’s counterterrorism efforts remained hampered by outdated and overburdened law enforcement and legal systems. The Indian court system was slow, laborious, and prone to corruption; terrorism trials can take years to complete. Many of India’s local police forces were poorly staffed, lacked training, and were ill-equipped to combat terrorism effectively.168

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Some Indian analysts complain that the intelligence gathering capabilities of India’s security forces remain woefully inadequate and preclude effective law enforcement and preventive action.\textsuperscript{169}

In November 2001, President Bush and then-Indian Prime Minster Vajpayee agreed that “terrorism threatens not only the security of the United States and India, but also our efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world.”\textsuperscript{170} In 2002, India and the United States launched the Indo-U.S. Cyber Security Forum to safeguard critical infrastructures from cyber attack. The June 2005 “New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship” lists “defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism” as one of four key shared security interests, and it calls for a bolstering of mutual defense capabilities required for such a goal.\textsuperscript{171} An April 2006 session of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism — the seventh such meeting since the group’s founding in January 2000 — ended with a statement of determination from both countries to further advance bilateral cooperation and information sharing on such areas of common concern as bioterrorism, aviation security, advances in biometrics, cyber-security and terrorism, WMD terrorism, and terrorist financing.\textsuperscript{172} Expanding military-to-military links have included company-level joint counterinsurgency training of army units.\textsuperscript{173}

In October 2005, the United States and India concluded a treaty on criminal matters that would institutionalize law enforcement cooperation and create a regularized channel for mutual assistance. Among the hoped-for benefits has been more effective counterterrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{174} It was reported in May 2006 that the United States had offered demining assistance, counterinsurgency training for police forces, and humanitarian relief for persons internally displaced by conflict related to the Maoist rebellion.\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, three months after the July 2006 Bombay terrorist bombings, senior CIA officials reportedly traveled to New Delhi to discuss improving counterterrorism cooperation with Indian leaders, and an FBI official later called for closer law enforcement and intelligence coordination with India in light of terrorist attacks in that country’s interior.\textsuperscript{176} There have been signs that U.S. government agencies have taken greater notice of links apparent between Pakistan-based terrorist groups and wanted Indian criminal boss Dawood Ibrahim, who is

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\textsuperscript{169} See, for example, Ajai Sahni, “Get to the Basics,” \textit{Outlook} (Delhi), May 21, 2008.


\textsuperscript{172} See [http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Apr/24-821244.html]. The most recent meeting of the Working Group was held in Washington in November 2007.


suspected of residing in Karachi, Pakistan. In 2003, the U.S. Department of the Treasury formally designated Ibrahim as a terrorist supporter and accused him of collaborating with Al Qaeda in South Asia.\textsuperscript{177}

**Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation.** Many policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998, India conducted five underground nuclear tests, breaking a self-imposed, 24-year moratorium on such testing. Despite international efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed. The tests created a global storm of criticism and represented a serious setback for two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Following the tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on non-humanitarian aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act. India currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly plutonium, for 55-115 nuclear weapons; Pakistan, with a program focused on enriched uranium, may be capable of building a similar number. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs. India’s military has inducted short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, while Pakistan itself possesses short- and medium-range missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea). All are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant distances.

Proliferation in South Asia is part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking to achieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a conventionally stronger India. In 1999, a quasi-governmental Indian body released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine for India calling for a “minimum credible deterrent” (MCD) based upon a triad of delivery systems and pledging that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. In 2003, New Delhi announced creation of a Nuclear Command Authority. After the body’s first session in September of that year, participants vowed to “consolidate India’s nuclear deterrent.” India thus appears to be taking the next steps toward operationalizing its nuclear weapons capability. According to the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a 2007 statement to a Senate panel, India is building its stockpile of fission weapons and is likely to continue work on advanced warhead and delivery systems.\textsuperscript{179}

**U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts and Congressional Action.** Soon after the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, Congress acted to ease aid sanctions through a series of legislative measures.\textsuperscript{180} In September 2001, President Bush

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\textsuperscript{177} “Hunting for India’s ‘Most Wanted,’” *Jane’s Intelligence Digest*, December 9, 2005; Treasury notification at [http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js909.htm].

\textsuperscript{178} See also CRS Report RL32115, *Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia*, and CRS Report RS21237, *Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons*.


\textsuperscript{180} The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (in P.L. 105-277) authorized a one-year sanctions waiver exercised by President Clinton in November 1998. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79) gave the President permanent authority after (continued...)}
waived remaining sanctions on India pursuant to P.L. 106-79. During the 1990s, the U.S. security focus in South Asia sought to minimize damage to the nonproliferation regime, prevent escalation of an arms race, and promote Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. In light of these goals, the Clinton Administration set out “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan based on the contents of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172, which condemned the two countries’ nuclear tests. These included signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halting all further production of fissile material and participating in Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations; limiting development and deployment of WMD delivery vehicles; and implementing strict export controls on sensitive WMD materials and technologies.

Progress in each of these areas has been limited, at best, and the Bush Administration quickly set aside the benchmark framework. Along with security concerns, the governments of both India and Pakistan face the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs and domestic resistance to relinquishing what are perceived to be potent symbols of national power. Neither has signed the CTBT, and both appear to be producing weapons-grade fissile materials. (India has consistently rejected the CTBT, as well as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as discriminatory, calling instead for a global nuclear disarmament regime. Although both India and Pakistan currently observe self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue to resist signing the CTBT — a position made more tenable by U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999.) The status of weaponization and deployment is unclear, though there are indications that this is occurring at a slow but steady pace. Section 1601 of P.L. 107-228 outlined U.S. nonproliferation objectives for South Asia. Some in Congress identify “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward South Asia, particularly as related to the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT and U.S. plans to build new nuclear weapons. In May 2006, the United States presented in Geneva a draft global treaty to ban future production of fissile material (a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) that it hopes will be supported by India. Some analysts speculated that the move was meant to bolster U.S. congressional support for proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation.

India’s Economy and U.S. Interests

Overview. India is in the midst of a major and rapid economic expansion, with an economy projected to soon be the world’s third largest. Although there is widespread and serious poverty in the country, observers believe long-term economic potential is tremendous, and recent strides in the technology sector have brought international attention to such new global high-tech centers as Bangalore and Hyderabad. However, many analysts and business leaders, along with U.S.

180 (...continued)
October 1999 to waive nuclear test-related sanctions applied against India and Pakistan. On October 27, 1999, President Clinton waived economic sanctions on India (Pakistan remained under sanctions as a result of an October 1999 military coup). (See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions.)

181 See also CRS Report RL34161, India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations. Most of the economic data in these sections come from the Economist Intelligence Unit and Global Insight, as well as from U.S. and Indian government sources.
government officials, point to excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures as a
hindrance to the realization of India’s full economic potential. The high cost of
capital (rooted in large government budget deficits) and an “abysmal” infrastructure
also draw negative appraisals as obstacles to growth. Constant comparisons with the
progress of the Chinese economy show India lagging in rates of growth and foreign
investment, and in the removal of trade barriers. Just prior to his March 2006 visit
to New Delhi, President Bush noted India’s “dramatic progress” in economic reform
while insisting “there’s more work to be done,” especially in lifting caps on foreign
investment, making regulations more transparent, and continuing to lower tariffs.182

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, India’s per capita GDP was only
about $824 in 2007. The highly-touted information technology and business
processing industries employ only about one-third of one percent of India’s work
force and, while optimists vaunt an Indian “middle class” of some 300 million
people, a larger number of Indians subsists on less than $1 per day.183 Yet, even with
the existence of ongoing problems, the current growth rate of India’s increasingly
service-driven economy is among the highest in the world and has brought the
benefits of development to many millions of citizens. The U.N. Development
Program ranked India 128th out of 177 countries on its 2007/2008 human
development index (between Morocco and Laos), down from 126th in 2006.184

After enjoying an average growth rate above 6% for the 1990s, India’s economy
cooled with the global economic downturn after 2000. Yet sluggish, Cold War-era
“Hindu rates of growth” had become a thing of the past. For the fiscal year ending
March 2006, real change in GDP was 8.5%, the second-fastest rate of growth among
the world’s 20 largest economies. During FY2006/2007, India’s economy expanded
by a blistering 9.2% and nearly matched this rate again in FY2007/2008 with a 9%
expansion. Robust growth in the services, manufacturing, and industry sectors
continues, but is moderated by a weak agricultural sector (low productivity levels in
this sector, which accounts for nearly one-fifth of the country’s GDP, are a drag on
overall growth).185 Short-term estimates are encouraging, predicting expansion well

183 India’s official poverty line for 2004-2005 was an income of 356 rupees (about $9) per
person per month. By this measure, the national poverty rate was about 28%. Yet estimates
indicate that some 400 million Indians subsist on less than 40 rupees per day. One British
medical study found that more than half of all Indian children under the age of five are
“stunted” by lack of proper nutrition. More than two million Indian children died in 2006
— more than in any other country — and studies indicate that better delivery of healthcare
for India’s poorest children is necessary for meeting international millennium development
goals (“Economic Boom Fails to Generate Optimism in India,” New York Times, August 16,
2007; “51% of Indian Children Stunted by Undernutrition,” Hindu (Chennai), May 15,
185 Despite a series of expensive programs meant to bring relief to India’s beleaguered
farmers, the government has failed to stem the incidence of farmer suicides, which are
estimated to number some 10,000 each year (“No Let Up in India Farm Suicides,” BBC
above 7% for the next two years. A major upswing in services is expected to lead; this sector now accounts for more than half of India’s GDP.

India’s central bank warned in early 2007 that rising inflation and surging stock and property markets were “signs of overheating” in the country’s economy. Some analysts criticize the bank for being too timid in reining in domestic demand.\textsuperscript{186} Consumer price inflation rose somewhat in mid-2007, then appeared to level off at a lower rate toward year’s end (with a year-on-year rate of 5.5% in January), but may rise again in 2008. The soaring Bombay Stock Exchange tripled in value from 2001-2006, then apparently overheated with the worst-ever daily decline of its benchmark Sensex index on May 22, 2006, when almost 11% of its total value was lost (related also to political developments). The market subsequently stabilized and then recovered mightily, reaching new highs in the closing months of 2006. More new record highs became even more frequent in the latter half of 2007 and the Sensex was up nearly 40% for the year. India now boasts more billionaires than any other Asian country and has the fourth most in the world, trailing only the United States, Germany, and Russia. The bounty of India’s newly-super-wealthy is traced largely to phenomenal gains in the country’s stock market, but, in a further indicator of serious income disparity, only about 2% of the country’s working-age population hold any stock at all.\textsuperscript{187}

A major U.S. concern with regard to India is the scope and pace of reforms in what has been that country’s quasi-socialist economy. Reforms begun in 1991, under the Congress-led government of Prime Minister Rao and his finance minister, current Prime Minister Singh, boosted growth and led to major new inbound foreign investment in the mid-1990s. Reform efforts stagnated, however, under weak coalition governments later in the decade, and combined with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and international sanctions on India (as a result of its 1998 nuclear tests) to further dampen the economic outlook. Following the 1999 parliamentary elections, the BJP-led government launched second-generation economic reforms, including major deregulation, privatization, and tariff-reducing measures.

Once seen as favoring domestic business and diffident about foreign involvement, New Delhi appears to gradually be embracing globalization and has sought to reassure foreign investors with promises of transparent and nondiscriminatory policies. A January 2007 report from global investment banking and securities firm Goldman Sachs called India’s recent high growth rates a result of structural rather than cyclical increases and projected a sustainable growth rate of about 8% through 2020. It identified political developments — including a rise in protectionism; supply-side restraints, including business climate, education, and labor market reforms; and environmental degradation — as representing major risks to future growth.\textsuperscript{188} An October 2007 country survey from the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) traced India’s economic successes to reforms that reduced the role of the state in economic affairs and

\textsuperscript{188} [http://www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/Indias_Rising_Growth_Potential.pdf].
claimed that New Delhi’s pursuit of further “ambitious and wide-ranging reforms” could push India’s growth rate to a sustainable 10% annually. Other analyses identify water shortages, urban woes, and pollution as further potential threats to Indian prosperity.

**Trade and Investment.** As India’s largest trade and investment partner, the United States strongly supports New Delhi’s continuing economic reform policies. A U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum was created in November 2005 to expand bilateral economic engagement and provide a venue for discussing multilateral trade issues. The United States currently accounts for about one-sixth of all Indian exports. India was the 16th largest export market for U.S. goods in 2007 (up from 21st the previous year). Levels of U.S.-India trade, while relatively low, are blossoming; the total value of bilateral trade has doubled since 2001 and the two governments intend to see it doubled again by 2009. U.S. imports from India in 2007 were valued at $24 billion (up 10% over 2006). Leading imports included cotton apparel; textiles; and pearls, gemstones, and jewelry. Exports to India in 2007 totaled $17.6 billion (up 75% over 2006), with civilian aircraft; telecommunications equipment; finished pearls, gemstones, and jewelry; and chemical fertilizers as leading categories. Bilateral trade in private commercial services was worth more than $13 billion more, split evenly between imports and exports.

Annual inward direct investment to India from all countries rose from a mere $74 million in 1991 to $5.5 billion in 2001 and $17.5 billion in 2006. Net portfolio investment added another $7.1 billion in FY2006/2007. According to Indian officials, about one-seventh of foreign direct investment in India since 1991 has come from U.S. firms; in recent years, the major U.S.-based companies Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, and IBM have made multi-billion-dollar investments in India (U.S. firms invested about $2 billion in India in 2006; Indian companies invested roughly the same amount in the United States). The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in India was just below $9 billion for 2006. India’s foreign exchange reserves were at a record $300 billion in August 2008. India has moved to raise limits on foreign investment in several key sectors, although U.S. officials prod New Delhi to make more rapid and more substantial changes to foreign investment ceilings, especially in the retail, financial services, and banking sectors. In March 2006, the U.S.-India CEO Forum — composed of ten chief executives from each country representing a cross-section of key industrial sectors — issued a report

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189 See [http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/India].


191 See [http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/index.html].

identifying India’s poor infrastructure and dense bureaucracy as key impediments to increased bilateral trade and investment relations.193

In a May 2007 speech on U.S.-India relations, Under Secretary of State Burns captured all the major U.S. concerns (and advice) with regard to bilateral economic issues with India, saying New Delhi must insure that

new regulations or old red tape don’t impeded growth, and that foreign companies have a clear path to settling commercial disputes when they arise. The Indian government should also continue economic reforms and liberalizations that have been the basis of India’s economic boom so far. ... In order to achieve higher growth rates as well as broad rural development, India requires world-class airports, irrigation, and communications networks. It needs modern power grids, ports, and highways, and many other infrastructural improvements that could be vastly accelerated by greater investment, both public and private. ... Our focus is on facilitating and promoting foreign direct investment, enhancing bilateral consultations on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial goods, services, and agriculture, preventing the illicit use of the financial system, and strengthening India’s regime for intellectual property rights.194

In September 2007, U.S. Ambassador Mulford opined that, “Continued reform and liberalization will help further boost ... and spread the benefits of rapid economic growth to more recipients across India.”195 During his October 2007 visit to India, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson told a Mumbai audience,

In the long term, India can take a number of steps to become even more competitive, such as reducing requirements that financial institutions hold large amounts of government debt, reducing requirements for banks to provide credit to certain priority sectors, and removing various restrictions and caps on foreign investment. Limits on debt and equity financing, and asset allocation restrictions on financial institutions, are impediments to putting resources to their most productive use.196

**Barriers to Trade and Investment.** Despite significant tariff reductions and other measures taken by India to improve market access, according to the 2008 report of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), a number of foreign trade barriers remain, including high tariffs, especially in the agricultural sector. The USTR asserts that “continued reduction of the bilateral trade deficit will depend on

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195 See [http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr91907.html].

significant additional Indian liberalization of the trade and investment regime.”197 The Commerce Department likewise encourages New Delhi to continue lowering tariffs as a means of fostering trade and development. Indian Finance Minister Chidambaram agrees that high rates of investment must be maintained to sustain the country’s economic growth. In 2007, India regained full investment-grade status after a 15-year hiatus when Standard & Poor’s upgraded India’s sovereign rating, but the country’s public finances remain much weaker than comparable states: India has a public debt-to-GDP ratio (85%) more than three times higher than China’s, and interest consumes nearly one-third of total revenue.198

India’s extensive trade and investment barriers have been criticized by U.S. government officials and business leaders as an impediment to its own economic development, as well as to stronger U.S.-India ties. For example, in 2004, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State Alan Larson opined that “trade and investment flows between the U.S. and India are far below where they should and can be,” adding that “the picture for U.S. investment is also lackluster.” He identified the primary reason for the suboptimal situation as “the slow pace of economic reform in India.” In 2007, Under Secretary of the Treasury Tim Adams urged India to further reduce trade and investment barriers, liberalize its financial sector, and improve its business climate as key means to “compete effectively in the global economy.”199

Inadequate intellectual property rights protection is another long-standing issue between the United States and India. The USTR places India on its Special 301 Priority Watch List for “inadequate laws and ineffective enforcement” in this area. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition of U.S. copyright-based industries, estimated U.S. losses of $913 million due to copyright piracy in India in 2007, with some 95% of this in the categories of business and entertainment software (estimated loss amounts do not include motion picture piracy, which in 2004 was estimated to have cost some $80 million). The IIPA expresses frustration that “little significant progress” is being made in more effectively enforcing copyright protection in India.200 In December 2006, Under Secretary of Commerce and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jon Dudas told a New Delhi audience that “further modifications are necessary” in India’s intellectual property rights protection regime and that India’s copyright laws are “insufficient in many aspects.” He also warned that “piracy and counterfeiting rates will continue to rise without effective enforcement.”201

While the past two decades have seen a major transformation of the Indian economy, it remains relatively closed in many aspects. The Heritage Foundation’s

2008 Index of Economic Freedom — which some say may overemphasize the value of absolute growth and downplay broader quality-of-life measurements — rated India’s economy as being “54% free” and ranked it 115th out of 162 countries. The index highlights restrictive trade policies, heavy government involvement in the banking and finance sectors, rigorous investment caps, demanding regulatory structures, and a high incidence of corruption.202 Berlin-based Transparency International placed India 72nd out of 179 countries in its 2007 “corruption perceptions index.” The group’s 2006 “bribery index” found India to be the worst offender among the world’s top 30 exporting countries.203 The Vancouver-based Fraser Institute provides a more positive assessment of economic freedom in India, while also faulting excessive restrictions on capital markets.204

**Special Economic Zones (SEZs).** In 2005, New Delhi announced plans to allow Indian states to establish Chinese-style special economic zones that would encourage foreign investment and boost employment by bypassing the country’s strict labor and tax laws. Parliament soon approved implementation and, in early 2006, the SEZ Act went into effect. With well over 200 such zones approved and hundreds more planned, SEZs became a matter of significant controversy. Proponents view them as sensible means of growing the economy through greatly increased investment, as well as improving infrastructure. Yet the policy has elicited energetic opposition from interest groups representing the political left and right, alike. Some critics say building SEZs on fertile agricultural land will impoverish farmers without adequate compensation. Even Congress Party chief Sonia Gandhi openly opposed exposing farmers to “unscrupulous developers.” Other detractors, including India’s finance minister, warn that the government will be denied billions of dollars in tax revenues lost due to special concessions offered to participating firms. In early 2007, after Left Front parties demanded extensive curbs on the initiative, New Delhi suspended approval of 304 more SEZs pending decisions on issues including compensation for displaced farmers.205 In March of that year, police in Nandigram, West Bengal, opened fire on a group of protesters who were demonstrating against state land appropriations for a planned SEZ. At least 14 people were killed and the incident led to days of violent protests against the state government’s action. Soon after, the West Bengal government dropped its plans and the federal government vowed to “refine” its SEZ policy to make it more equitable.206

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202 See [http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=India].

203 See [http://www.transparency.org]. According to Transparency’s findings, one in three Indian families living below the poverty line paid a bribe in 2007 for basic public services.

204 See [http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/chapterfiles/3aEFW2006ch3A-K.pdf#].


206 SEZ-related troubles continued in late 2007 with an upsurge in political violence in West Bengal and reports that state officials may have been complicit in attacks on farmers.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. In 2006, the World Trade Organization’s “Doha Round” of multilateral trade negotiations were suspended due to disagreement among the WTO’s six core group members — which include the United States and India — over methods to reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies, eliminate export subsidies, and increase market access for agricultural products. The United States and other developed countries seek substantial tariff reductions in the developing world. India, like other members of the “G-20” group of developing states, has sought more market access for its goods and services in the developed countries, while claiming that developing countries should be given additional time to liberalize their own markets. In particular, India is resistant to opening its markets to subsidized agricultural products from developed countries, claiming this would be detrimental to tens of millions of Indian farmers and result in further depopulation of the countryside. According to Indian officials, the WTO’s narrow focus on economic issues excludes political and social variables which are equally sensitive for New Delhi and which constrain the options available to the Indian government. They seek greater U.S. understanding of this dynamic. The Indian economy could benefit significantly from lowered farm subsidies in developed countries and expanded trade in services, but indigenous industries could also be harmed if New Delhi were to reduce tariffs that currently protect India’s exporting sectors, especially in textiles and garments.

Indian Commerce Minister Nath has blamed U.S. intransigence for the Doha Round’s collapse. In mid-2007, Indian officials rejoined the negotiations, then claimed the talks had again “collapsed” due to lack of convergence among the major actors. U.S. Trade Representative Schwab later expressed surprise at how “rigid and inflexible” India (and Brazil) were during the negotiations, and she suggested that “some countries ... really don’t want a Doha round outcome.” In September, however, Nath again expressed optimism in identifying a new and “greater comprehension of India’s sensitivities” on the effects of U.S. farm subsidies.

Indian leaders were reported to be especially dissatisfied with draft documents they believe are too restrictive of their domestic policies meant to protect Indian farmers from a flood of foreign imports. The U.S. government, for its part, continues to insist that it can only cut its own domestic farm subsidies if advanced developing states such as India (and China and Brazil) do more to open their own markets to foreign goods. In June 2008, a Commerce Department official called India a “roadblock to success” in the negotiations by treating them as a “donor’s conference” and resisting all reasonable liberalization proposals, even those being offered by other

207 See also CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations, and CRS Report RL33144, WTO Doha Round.


When dialogue was rejoined in July, Commerce Minister Nath assumed the mantle of unofficial spokesman for the world’s developing economies, frustrating many Western negotiators by creating what seemed an intractable obstacle to progress. The potentially final collapse of talks came when U.S. negotiators could not agree with their Indian and Chinese counterparts on levels for a “safeguard clause” meant to protect developing states from unrestricted imports, which the Americans believed were being set too low. Some commentators said the Doha Round’s failure marked a conclusive end to an era in which free trade was organized around rules set in the West.

The Energy Sector and Climate Change. India’s continued economic growth and security are intimately linked to the supply of energy resources. Indeed, Indian leaders insist that energy security is an essential component of the country’s development agenda, calling for an integrated national energy policy, diversification of energy supplies, greater energy efficiency, and rationalization of pricing mechanisms. The country’s relatively poor natural energy resource endowment and poorly functioning energy market are widely viewed as major constraints on continued economic growth. Estimates indicate that maintaining recent rates of growth will require that India increase its commercial energy supplies by 4%-6% annually in coming years. The U.S. government has committed to assist India in promoting the development of stable and efficient energy markets there; a U.S.-India Energy Dialogue was launched in July 2005 to provide a forum for bolstering bilateral energy cooperation, meeting most recently in New Delhi in April 2008.

Increasing Energy Consumption. India is the world’s fifth largest energy consumer and may become third by the middle of this century. Overall power generation in the country more than doubled from 1991 to 2005. Coal is the country’s leading commercial energy source, accounting for more than half of national demand. India is the world’s third most productive coal producer, and domestic supplies satisfy most demand (however, most of India’s coal is an inefficient low-grade, high-ash variety). Oil consumption accounts for some one-third of India’s total energy consumption; about 70% of this oil is imported (at a rate of 1.7 million barrels per day in 2006), mostly from the West Asia/Middle East region. India’s domestic natural gas supply is not likely to keep pace with demand.

213 See U.S. Department of State fact sheet at [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49724.htm]. In May 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed S. 1950, to promote global energy security through increased cooperation between the United States and India on non-nuclear energy-related issues, but the full Senate took no action on the bill.
214 See a Ministry of Power report at [http://powermin.nic.in/reports/pdf/ar05_06.pdf].
and the country will have to import much of its natural gas, either via pipeline or as liquefied natural gas. Hydropower, especially abundant in the country’s northeast and near the border with Nepal, supplies about 5% of energy needs. Nuclear power, which Indian government officials and some experts say is a sector in dire need of expansion, currently accounts for only 1% of the country’s energy supplies and less than 3% of total electricity generation.\(^{215}\) Even optimistic projections suggest that nuclear power will provide less than 10% of India’s generation capacity in 25 years and there are doubts about New Delhi’s projected goal of generating 20 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2020.\(^{216}\)

Roughly one-fifth of the India’s power is consumed by farmers’ irrigation systems, making the farm lobby a powerful obstacle to curtailing subsidies provided by State Electricity Boards, which collectively lose billions of dollars annually. Moreover, from one-quarter to one-half of India’s electricity is said to disappear though “transmission losses,” i.e., theft. In the summer of 2007, worsening shortfalls were causing electrical outages of up to nine hours per day in the industrial and agricultural belts of Punjab, Gujarat, and Maharashtra; the capital of Delhi often has power for only 14 hours each day. A burgeoning electricity crisis may be severely hampering India’s continued economic security and growth.\(^{217}\)

During a March 2007 visit to New Delhi, U.S. Energy Secretary Sam Bodman held wide-ranging talks with numerous Indian officials and business leaders to discuss India’s energy needs and strategies for relevant bilateral cooperation. Secretary Bodman stressed “the absolute necessity of substantial and sustained investment in innovation on a global scale” and listed five major global goals for all countries, including the United States and India: 1) diversifying the available supply of conventional fuels and expanding their production; 2) diversifying energy portfolios through expanded use of alternative and renewable sources, including nuclear energy; 3) promoting increased energy efficiency and conservation; 4) reducing pollution and energy intensity in the global economy; and 5) protecting critical energy infrastructure.\(^{218}\)

**Climate Change Policies.** With emissions of more than 500 million tons of carbon dioxide per year, India is the world’s fourth-largest producer of greenhouse gases (GHGs) (after the United States, China, and Russia). Per capita emissions are, however, only about one-sixteenth those of the United States. The negative impact of climate change likely will be seen across India’s broad range of


\(^{218}\) See [http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr032007a.html].
ecosystems, with agriculture, infrastructure, and water resources most affected. Indian officials, who note that India accounts for 17% of the earth’s population but only 4% of its GHG emissions, thus far reject any policies or international agreements that would set limits on their own national emissions while calling it “imperative” that developed countries commit themselves to reducing their own emissions. New Delhi criticizes Washington for failing to take “historical responsibility for cumulative emissions” and for bringing “extraneous considerations of industrial competitiveness and employment” to bear on the debate. India asserts that its own continued economic development and poverty reduction efforts preclude capping its GHG emissions and claim there has been a “persistent attempt” by some developed countries to “avoid their legal obligations” under international treaties.219

In June 2008, the New Delhi government unveiled India’s first-ever “national action plan” to address climate change, with Prime Minister Singh acknowledging that the country faced a “dangerous problem” and vowing to devote greater attention to renewable energy, water conservation, and preserving natural resources. The plan sets forth eight “national missions” for sustainable development: (1) solar energy; (2) enhanced energy efficiency; (3) sustainable habitat; (4) conserving water; (5) sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem; (6) a “Green India;” (7) sustainable agriculture; and (8) a Strategic Knowledge Platform for Climate Change.”220

**Collaborative Efforts.** India is a party to both the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto protocol. According to the principles in both these treaties of “common but differentiated responsibility,” India is a developing country not required to set legally binding emissions limits under these agreements. In July 2005, the United States joined with India, China, Japan, Australia, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate, a U.S.-led effort to accelerate the development and deployment of clean energy technologies through a voluntary public-private partnership among six major Asia-Pacific nations. Sydney, Australia, hosted the inaugural meeting in January 2006 and the body’s second ministerial meeting was held in October 2007 in New Delhi, where the United States announced providing grant funds for 23 clean technology projects in India under the Partnership’s aegis.221 However, funding shortfalls have hampered the APP initiative since its inception. India also participates in the Major Economies Meeting (MEM) on Energy Security and Climate Change, initiated by President Bush in 2007. The process involves 16 nations (plus the EU) that are major greenhouse gas emitters. Its third session was held in Paris in April 2008.222

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219 “Talk by Special Envoy of Prime Minister, Shri Shyam Saran in Mumbai on Climate Change,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, April 21, 2008.


221 See remarks by James Connaughton, Chairman of President Bush’s Council on Environmental Quality, at [http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr101507a.html]. See also [http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org].

222 See [http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem] and [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/]
Some in Congress have sought to increase international cooperation on energy-related matters, including with India. The Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007 (S. 193) was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2007. The bill includes provisions for establishing energy crisis response mechanisms in cooperation with the governments of India and China. In February, H.R. 1186, to promote global energy security through increased U.S.-India cooperation, was introduced in the House. The International Climate Cooperation Re-engagement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2420) was reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in June. The bill contains provisions for expanding efforts to promote U.S. exports in clean and efficient energy technologies to India and China. The Clean Energy Partnership With India Act of 2008 (H.R. 5705), referred to House committee in April 2008, would establish a commission for improving and promoting bilateral renewable energy cooperation with India.

The Kashmir Issue

Although India suffers from several militant regional separatist movements, the Kashmir issue has proven the most lethal and intractable. Gunbattles and bomb blasts in India’s Jammu and Kashmir state reportedly killed an average of 5 or 6 people every day over the period 1989-2006. Conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty also has brought global attention to a potential “flashpoint” for interstate war between nuclear-armed powers. The problem is rooted in competing claims to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state and Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir. The dispute relates to the national identities of both countries: India has long sought to maintain its secular, multi-religious credentials, in part by successfully incorporating a Muslim-majority region, while Pakistan has since independence been conceived as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims. India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over Kashmir in 1947-1948 and 1965. Some Kashmiris seek independence from both countries. Spurred by a perception of rigged state elections in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between Islamic militants (and their supporters) and Indian security forces in Indian-held Kashmir is ongoing and has claimed tens of thousands of lives.

India blames Pakistan for supporting “cross-border terrorism” and for fueling a separatist rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with arms, training, and militants. Islamabad, for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls “freedom fighters” who resist Indian rule and suffer alleged human rights abuses in the region. New Delhi insists that the dispute should not be “internationalized” through involvement by third-party mediators and India is widely believed to be content with the territorial status quo. In 1999, a bloody, six-week-long battle in the mountains near the LOC at Kargil cost more than one thousand lives.

222 (...continued)
releases/2008/04/20080418-20.html].


224 Most estimates list from 41,000 to 66,000 related deaths. The Pakistan-based Kashmir Media Service claims that more than 92,000 Kashmiris have been “martyred” in the fighting.
lives and included Pakistani army troops crossing into Indian-controlled territory. Islamabad has sought to bring external major power persuasion to bear on India, especially from the United States. The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

During the early years of the Kashmir insurgency, hundreds of thousands of indigenous Hindu “Pandits” were driven from the region in what amounted to a form of “ethnic cleansing.” Up to half a million Kashmiri Pandits, accounting for the vast majority of Hindus then living in the area around Srinagar, fled their homes after coming under threat from Muslim militants. For many Indians, the Kashmir dispute cannot be resolved without arrangements for the return of these refugees, more than 100,000 of whom continue to live in camps with government support. Resolutions in the 110th Congress (H.Con.Res. 55 and S.Con.Res. 38) call for the safeguarding of the physical, political, and economic security of the Kashmiri pandits.

Some separatist groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), continue to seek an independent or autonomous Kashmir. Others, including the militant Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), seek union with Pakistan. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat [Freedom] Conference was formed as an umbrella organization for groups opposed to Indian rule in Kashmir. The Hurriyat membership of more than 20 political and religious groups has included the JKLF (originally a leading militant force, now a political group) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the political wing of the HuM). The Hurriyat Conference, which states that it is committed to seeking dialogue with the Indian government on a broad range of issues, calls for a tripartite conference on Kashmir, including Pakistan, India, and representatives of the Kashmiri people. Hurriyat leaders demand Kashmiri representation at any talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. The Hurriyat formally split in 2003 after a dispute between hardliners allied with Islamabad and moderates favoring negotiation with New Delhi. Subsequent efforts to reunify the group failed. In 2005, the Congress Party-led government renewed high-level contact with moderate Hurriyat leaders begun by the previous BJP-led coalition. Two years later, however, Hurriyat leader and noted Kashmiri cleric Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said talks between the Indian government and moderate Kashmiri separatists had suffered a “complete breakdown of communication,” and he accused New Delhi of lacking the will needed to find a political solution to the problem.

In December 2006, Pakistani President Musharraf issued a newly-modified version of his “out-of-the-box” thinking on resolution to the Kashmir problem, saying Pakistan is “against independence” for Kashmir, and offering instead a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-governance,” defined as “falling between autonomy and independence.” Many analysts saw the proposal as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Some Kashmiri separatist groups rejected

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225 An August 2007 opinion survey found nearly 90% of the residents of Srinagar, Kashmir’s most populous and Muslim-majority city, desiring Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan. In the largely Hindu city of Jammu, however, 95% of respondents said Kashmir should be part of India (see [http://www.indianexpress.com/story/210147.html]).

the proposal as an abandonment of Islamabad’s long-held policy, but Indian leaders welcomed Musharraf’s statements; in February 2007, Prime Minister Singh said the Pakistani government was “saying the right thing” in rejecting armed militancy as a solution to the Kashmir problem. Still, a lack of consensus among Kashmiri leaders and political parties has hampered progress. Even Kashmiri political figures who accept the principle of a solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution cannot agree on what such a solution may look like, and the Hurriyat Conference — which may have contributed to its own marginalization by boycotting the state’s 2002 elections — remains rife with its own divisions. Some analysts urge greater U.S. efforts to prod the New Delhi and Islamabad governments along in the ongoing search for a final resolution.  

At least 8,000 Kashmiris have “disappeared” during the conflict; some of these may occupy the nearly 1,000 unmarked graves discovered near the LOC in early 2008. When measured in terms of human deaths, levels of violence in Kashmir were high and steady through the mid- and late 1990s, peaked in 2001, and have been in decline since. Despite waning rates of infiltration and separatist-related violence, the issue continues to rankle leaders in New Delhi and remains a serious impediment to progress in the current India-Pakistan peace initiative. Even as the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward — and to some extent in reaction to their apparent marginalization in the face of this development — separatist militants continue their attacks on both civilians and Indian security forces, and many observers in both India and the United States believe that active support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani policy. The militants, seeing their relevance and goals threatened by movement toward peaceful resolution, regularly lash out with bloody attacks meant to derail the process.

**Figure 1** indicates that levels of violence in Kashmir were high and steady through the mid- and late 1990s, peaked in 2001, and have been in decline since. The long-term reduction in violence has allowed for a rebirth of the region’s major tourist industry. Yet, despite waning rates of infiltration and separatist-related violence, the issue continues to rankle leaders in New Delhi and remains a serious impediment to progress in the current India-Pakistan peace initiative. Even as the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward — and to some extent in reaction to their apparent marginalization in the face of this development — separatist militants continue their attacks on both civilians and Indian security forces, and many observers in both India and the United States believe that active support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani policy. The militants, seeing their relevance and goals threatened by movement toward peaceful resolution, regularly lash out with bloody attacks likely meant to derail the process.

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Despite some ongoing violence, many indicators point to positive long-term trends. The steadily reduced rates of infiltration may be attributed to the endurance of India-Pakistan dialogue and, with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges in late 2006, many analysts saw prospects for a meeting of minds between New Delhi and Islamabad as being better than ever before (determining and incorporating the desires of the Kashmiri people remain highly problematic). In 2006, India’s army chief credited much of a 20% drop in levels of violence in the region to the surrender of more and more “disillusioned” militants. At the same time, the state’s political leadership has lauded a major decline in reported human rights abuses by security forces, attributing the improvement to policies of restraint launched by the Peoples Democratic Party-Congress Party coalition which took power in 2002. New Delhi has more recently vowed to pull troops out of Kashmir if militant infiltrations and violence there cease, but to date only nominal troop withdrawals have come in response to a somewhat improved security situation in the region. In late 2007, India’s Home Ministry stated that the “overall stable security situation in the [Jammu and Kashmir] State is indicative of transition to normalcy.” There appears to be widespread public support among Kashmir Valley citizens for demilitarization of the region and a major reduction in the number of India troops stationed there.

Source: Adapted by CRS. Data from the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.

Figure 1. Deaths Related to Kashmiri Separatism, 1988-2006

Source: Adapted by CRS. Data from the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.


While those responsible for Kashmir’s security remain vigilant and convinced that the Islamabad government still “controls the tap” of cross-LOC infiltration, the people of the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley have been widely approving of the “flexibility” exhibited by Pakistan’s president and hopeful that such flexibility will be mirrored in New Delhi so as to create a resolution that works for all stakeholders.234

Other Regional Dissidence

The United States maintains an ongoing interest in India’s domestic stability and the respect for internationally recognized human rights there. The U.S. Congress has held hearings in which such issues are discussed. As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, India can be difficult to govern. Internal instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by colonial legacies such as international borders that separate members of the same ethnic groups, creating flashpoints for regional disidence and separatism. Beyond the Kashmir problem, separatist insurgents in remote and underdeveloped northeast regions confound New Delhi and create international tensions by operating out of neighboring Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal. New Delhi has at times blamed the governments of those countries for “sheltering” separatist groups beyond the reach of Indian security forces, and New Delhi has launched joint counter-insurgency operations with some of these neighbors. At the same time, Maoist rebels continue to operate in numerous states and represent a growing threat to internal sovereignty. India also has suffered outbreaks of serious communal violence between Hindus and Muslims, especially in the western Gujarat state.

The Northeast. Since the time of India’s foundation, numerous militant groups have fought for greater ethnic autonomy, tribal rights, or independence in the country’s northeast region. Some of the tribal struggles in the small states known as the Seven Sisters are centuries old. It is estimated that more than 50,000 people have been killed in such fighting since 1948, including about 20,000 killed in a 28-year-old Naga insurgency and another 10,000 deaths in 15 years of fighting in the Assam state. In the small state of Manipur alone there are said to be more than 20 separatists groups fighting the Indian army at a cost of more than 8,000 lives over two decades, and the writ of the central government there is tenuous, at best.235 As militant groups are seen to benefit from highly profitable criminal activities such as informal taxation, kidnaping, and smuggling, many observers conclude that only more effective economic development and integration of India’s northeast will allow for the resolution of myriad ethnic conflicts there.236

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234 Author interviews, Srinagar, Kashmir, September 2006.
235 In 2008, the Manipur government reportedly launched an initiative to arm and outfit villagers to facilitate the fight against separatist rebels there, a policy opposed by human rights groups (“India’s Manipur Arms Civilians to Fight Rebels,” Reuters, May 6, 2008).
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the United National Liberation Front (seeking an independent Manipur) are among the approximately 40 militant groups at war with the central government. These groups reportedly field a total of no more than 20,000 trained cadres. ULFA, like other groups, accuses New Delhi of exploiting their state’s resources while doing little to forward development and allowing thousands of non-indigenous people (often Hindi-speakers from Bihar) to flood the local job markets. In 2005, the U.S. State Department’s Counterterrorism Office listed ULFA among its “other groups of concern,” the first time an Indian separatist group outside Kashmir was so named.237 In June 2008, six ULFA field commanders abjured violence and vowed to seek peaceful resolution through negotiation.

**Maoist Insurgency.** Also operating in India are “Naxalites” — Maoist insurgents ostensibly engaged in violent struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribals. These groups, most active in inland areas of east-central India, claim to be battling oppression and exploitation in order to create a classless society. Their opponents call them terrorists and extortionists. The groups get their name from Naxalbari, a West Bengal village and site of a militant peasant uprising in 1967. In 2006, Prime Minister Singh identified a worsening Maoist insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge” ever faced by India, saying it threatened India’s democracy and “way of life.”238 Some of these groups may be growing poppy and extorting farmers and opium traders to fund their activities. Further reports indicate the rebels are placing new emphasis on recruiting child soldiers. Some analysts warn that, by blocking access to raw materials vital to India’s manufacturing sector, the Naxalite movement could deter investors and so thwart India’s long-term economic success.239 Naxalites now operate in about half of India’s 28 states; related violence has killed more than 6,000 people over the past two decades, including some 650 deaths in 2007. Indian government officials seek to downplay the threat by pointing out that only 2% of the country’s 650,000 villages are affected and only 2% of the country’s 14,000 police stations report Naxalite activity.240

The most notable of India’s Maoist militant outfits are the People’s War Group (PWG), mainly active in the southern Andhra Pradesh state, and the Maoist Communist Center of West Bengal and Bihar. In 2004, the two groups merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Both appear on the U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Office’s list of “groups of concern” and both are designated as terrorist groups by New Delhi, which claims there are nearly 10,000 Maoist militants active in the country. Other estimates see some 20,000 such fighters.

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240 See [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/fatalitiesnaxal.htm]; “Naxal Problem Should Not Be Exaggerated: Govt,” Indian Express (Mumbai), March 19, 2008. According to India’s Home Ministry, the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand account for two-thirds of the country’s Naxalite incidents and three-quarters of related casualties.
in India, including up to 5,000 in the central Chhattisgarh state alone. Such militants possess sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. PWG cadres were behind a 2003 landmine attack that nearly killed the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. In 2004, that state’s government lifted an 11-year-old ban on the PWG, but the Maoists soon withdrew from ensuing peace talks, accusing the state government of breaking a cease-fire agreement. Violent attacks on government forces then escalated in 2005 and have continued with even greater frequency since.

The Chhattisgarh state government has since 2005 sponsored a grassroots anti-Maoist effort. This “Salwa Judum” (“Campaign for Peace” or, literally, “collective hunt”) militia — comprised of about 5,000 lightly-armed tribal people who are paid about $1 per day — is viewed by some as an effective countervailing people’s movement. Others label it a vigilante group that has engaged in its own coercive and violent tactics against innocent tribals, one that only serves to accentuate the conflict as “a cure that is worse than the disease.”241 Following a March 2007 raid on a Chhattisgarh police camp by up to 600 armed rebels in which 55 people, including 19 policemen, were killed, Maoist leaders threatened further attacks if the Salwa Judum was not dismantled. A May 2008 report for India’s Planning Commission recommended that the Salwa Judum campaign represented “an abdication of the state itself” and should immediately be ended.242 New York-based Human Rights Watch later called on the New Delhi and Chhattisgarh governments to end all official support for the campaign, including provision of weapons, and to launch “serious and independent investigations” of related human rights abuses.243

Analysts warn that Naxalite activity — including swarming attacks on government facilities and coordinated, multi-state economic blockades — is spreading and becoming more audacious in the face of incoherent and insufficient Indian government policies to halt it. A shortage of police personnel appears to be a key problem. In late 2007, Prime Minister Singh asked India’s states to establish specialized, dedicated forces to address Maoist militancy. In mid-2008, the federal government announced plans to create a new 10,000-strong force trained specifically to fight the rebels. However, these efforts do not address the “intellectual appeal” of the Maoists, which India’s national security advisor says remains a key problem.244

**Hindu-Muslim Tensions.** Some elements of India’s Hindu majority have at times engaged in violent communal conflict with the country’s Muslim minority. In 1992, a huge mob of Hindu activists in the western city of Ayodhya demolished a 16th century Muslim mosque and set fire to an entire neighborhood. The_/Christian Science Monitor_ (May 1, 2007) editorialized: “India’s leaders must stop the violence and begin the work of reconciliation.”


243 See [http://hrw.org/reports/2008/india0708].

century mosque said to have been built at the birth site of the Hindu god Rama. Ensuing communal riots in cities across India left many hundreds dead. Bombay was especially hard hit and was the site of coordinated 1993 terrorist bombings believed to have been a retaliatory strike by Muslims. In 2002, another group of Hindu activists returning by train to the western state of Gujarat after a visit to the Ayodhya site of the now razed Babri Mosque (and a proposed Hindu temple) were attacked by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra; 58 were killed. Up to 2,000 people died in the fearsome communal rioting that followed, most of them Muslims. The BJP-led state and national governments came under fire for inaction; some observers saw evidence of state government complicity in anti-Muslim attacks.

The U.S. State Department and human rights groups have been critical of New Delhi’s largely ineffectual efforts to bring those responsible to justice; some of these criticisms were echoed by the Indian Supreme Court in 2003. In 2005, the State Department made a controversial decision to deny a U.S. visa to Gujarat Chief Minster Narendra Modi under a U.S. law barring entry for foreign government officials found to be complicit in severe violations of religious freedom. The decision was strongly criticized in India. More than five years after the Gujarat riots, international human rights groups express serious concerns about obstacles faced by victims seeking justice, the continuing internal displacement of thousands of families who lack basic necessities, and large numbers of uninvestigated related criminal cases (despite the Indian Supreme Court’s 2004 order to reopen nearly 1,600 such cases). A 2006 central government report found deep communal divisions continuing to haunt Gujarat, concretely expressed through ghettoization and religious segregation. In 2008, a U.N. envoy said such divisions combine with a culture of impunity to raise the risk of future violence. Sporadic communal violence continues to affect several Indian states.

**Human Rights Issues**

Many of India’s more than one billion citizens suffer from numerous and oftentimes serious human rights abuses. Some analysts are concerned that, as Washington pursues a new “strategic partnership” with New Delhi, U.S. government attention to such abuses has waned. According to the U.S. State Department’s *Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2007*, the Indian government “generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, numerous serious problems remained.” These included extensive societal violence against women; extrajudicial killings, including faked encounter killings; excessive use of force by security forces,

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arbitrary arrests, and incommunicado detentions in Kashmir and several northeastern states; torture and rape by agents of the government; “harsh, life-threatening” prison conditions and lengthy pretrial detentions without charge; “pervasive” police corruption; forced prostitution; child prostitution and female infanticide; forced child labor; human trafficking; and “ubiquitous” caste-based discrimination and violence, among others. Terrorist attacks and kidnapings also remained grievous problems, especially in Kashmir and the northeastern states. Indian law provides for extensive human rights protections, but enforcement is “lax” and convictions rare.247

The 2007 annual report from New York-based Human Rights Watch noted that India has a vibrant press and civil society, but also suffers from a number of chronic human rights problems. It called impunity a “critical issue” involving officials and members of the security services abusing their power and who are “rarely if ever brought to justice for torture, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings ....” Listed among other human rights concerns in India is the alleged “failure to implement policies that protect the rights of children, religious minorities, those living with HIV/AIDS or those belonging to vulnerable communities such as tribal groups, Dalits and other ‘backward’ castes.” London-based Amnesty International’s 2007 annual report also claims that perpetrators of human rights violations in India, in particular those related to 2002 communal rioting in Gujarat, continued to enjoy impunity, and it asserts that concerns over protection of economic, social, and cultural rights of already marginalized communities grew in 2006.248 The State Department itself recognizes impunity as a major human rights problem in India, asserting in an April 2007 report that “A widespread culture of impunity among police and security forces and pervasive corruption continued to be the principal obstacles to improving human rights” there.249

The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has claimed that India’s human right abuses “are generated by a traditionally hierarchical social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country’s many ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and the authorities’ attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods and training.”250 India’s 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives security forces wide leeway to act with impunity in conflict zones, has been called a facilitator of “grave human rights abuses” in several Indian states (in December 2006, Prime Minister Singh said he would seek to amend the controversial Act). In 2007, the problem of “staged encounters” in which police officers kill suspects in faked shootouts came to the fore.251 India generally denies international human rights groups official access to Kashmir and other sensitive areas.

247 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrprt/2007/100614.htm].
249 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2006/80590.htm].
**Human Trafficking.** The State Department’s latest annual report on trafficking in persons (issued June 2008) said, “India is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation.” It placed India on the “Tier 2 Watch List” for the fifth consecutive year for “failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons” and for “making no progress” in efforts to address the problem of bonded labor, which affects an estimated 20-65 million Indians. Moreover, State criticized the India’s federal and state governments for largely ignoring “the pervasive problem of government complicity in trafficking.” Upon the report’s release, the head of State’s trafficking office, Ambassador Mark Lagan, said “India still doesn’t recognize the degree to which bonded labor is a substantial human trafficking problem in its country. It has weak anti-corruption efforts and prosecutions are too few.”252

**Religious Freedom.** An officially secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with periodic lapses), which is protected under its constitution. The population includes a Hindu majority of 82% as well as a large Muslim minority of some 150 million (14%). Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others total less than 4%. Although freedom of religion is protected by the Indian government, human rights groups have noted that India’s religious tolerance is susceptible to attack by religious extremists. In its annual report on international religious freedom released in September 2007, the State Department found “no change in the status of respect for religious freedom” by India’s national government:

> [G]overnment policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion; however, problems remained in some areas. Some state governments enacted and amended “anti-conversion” laws and police and enforcement agencies often did not act swiftly enough to effectively counter societal attacks, including attacks against religious minorities. Despite Government efforts to foster communal harmony, some extremists continued to view ineffective investigation and prosecution of attacks on religious minorities, particularly at the state and local level, as a signal that they could commit such violence with impunity, although numerous cases were in the courts at the end of the reporting period. The National Government, led by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), continued to implement an inclusive and secular platform that included respect for the right to religious freedom.

The report added that a “Hindutva” — or Hindu nationalist — ideology continued to influence some government policies and actions at the state and local levels over the previous year.253

A May 2008 report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom noted continued improvements since the 2004 election of the Congress-led coalition, but warned that concerns about religious freedom in India remain. These include ongoing attacks against religious minorities, perpetrated mainly by Hindu activists and most often in states with BJP-led governments. The Commission also continued

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252 See [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/105388.htm] and [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/rm/2008/105572.htm].
253 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90228.htm].
to criticize allegedly insufficient state efforts to pursue justice in cases related to 2002 communal rioting in Gujarat. More than five years after those riots, the victims are said to still face serious challenges and obstacles in securing justice, and a large number of related criminal cases remain uninvestigated and unresolved.254

Caste-Based Discrimination. The millennia-old Hindu caste system reflects Indian occupational and socially-defined hierarchies. Sanskrit sources refer to four social categories: priests (Brahmin), warriors (Kshatriya), traders (Vayisha) and farmers (Shudra). Tribals and lower castes were long known as “untouchables” — a term now officially banned but still widely used — or Dalits.255 Although these categories are understood throughout India, they describe reality only in the most general terms. National-level legislation exists to protect India’s lower castes, yet, according to the U.S. State Department, “The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act lists offenses against disadvantaged persons and prescribes stiff penalties for offenders; however, this act had only a modest effect in curbing abuse and there were very few convictions.”256 In July 2007, H.Con.Res. 139, expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India, was passed by the full House.

Female Infanticide and Feticide. Given traditional societal discrimination against females, uneven female-to-male ratios are a matter of concern for India. The incidence of female infanticide and gender-selective abortions is identified as a growing human rights problem in India. The diffusion of enabling medical technology and the existence of unethical doctors have made sex-selective abortions more common there. Prime Minister Singh has called female feticide in India a “national shame” and said the government has a responsibility to curtail the widespread practice. The country’s most recent census (in 2001) found only 927 girls aged 0-6 for every 1,000 boys nationwide. Wealthier states, such as Delhi, Punjab, and Gujarat, have the lowest ratios (Punjab’s was the lowest at 798).257 A 2006 study in the British medical journal Lancet estimated that up to 10 million Indian females are “missing” due to sex-selective abortions and infanticide over the past two decades, and that some 500,000 girls are being “lost” annually.258 According to a June 2008 nongovernmental report, the incidence of female feticide is only increasing.259 The most recent U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights for India (released March 2008), claims that, in many Indian states,
Baby girls were either aborted or, after birth, left in the cold to contract pneumonia and perish. NGOs alleged that medical practitioners and government workers often were complicit in pushing or persuading women to abort their girl children. Sex determination tests are illegal under the 1994 Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act. However, NGOs reported that some family planning centers continued to reveal the sex of fetuses. According to the NGO IFES, feticide is a $116 million industry.

In 2007, the New Delhi announced the establishment of a series of orphanages to raise unwanted baby girls in an effort to reduce the incidence of female infanticide.

**HIV/AIDS**

The United Nations has estimated that 5.7 million Indians are infected with HIV/AIDS, giving India the largest such population worldwide (India overtook South Africa in this category in 2006). However, a July 2007 U.N.-backed study found that India’s infected population was about 2.5 million and the U.S. government estimate rises only to 3.1 million. Due to the country’s large population, prevalence rates among adults remain below 1%. India’s AIDS epidemic has become generalized in four states in the country’s south (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Maharashtra) and two in the northeast (Manipur and Nagaland). According to USAID, these six states account for 80% of the country’s reported AIDS cases. India first launched its AIDS control program in 1992; New Delhi boosted related funding to about $120 million in the most recent fiscal year and in July 2007 launched a new $2.8-billion National AIDS Control Program that will expand free treatment for HIV-positive persons, as well as boost the number of awareness and prevention campaigns. Stigma, gender inequalities, and discrimination present major obstacles to controlling India’s HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the country’s traditional society, open discussion of sexuality and risk of infection is rare, making education difficult: one Indian government survey found that nearly half of Indian women had not even heard of the disease. Analysts opine that substantially greater resources are needed to address HIV/AIDS in India than are currently available.

As part of its foreign assistance program in India, the U.S. government supports integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and support services in high prevalence states. India received nearly $30 million in direct U.S. assistance for such programs in FY2007 under the President’s Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), for a projected

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260 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrprt/2007/100614.htm].


total of some $136 million for FY2004-FY2008. In January 2007, H.R. 175, to provide assistance to combat HIV/AIDS in India, and for other purposes, was introduced in the House, but has not moved out of committee to date.

**U.S. Assistance**

A total of more than $15 billion in direct U.S. aid went to India from 1947 through 2007, nearly all of it in the form of economic grants and loans, more than half as food aid. In February 2007, in response to several years of rapid Indian economic expansion and New Delhi’s new status as a donor government, the State Department announced a 35% reduction in assistance programs for India. The bulk of the cuts are to come from development assistance and food aid programs. Another smaller decrease came in 2008 “in recognition of the continuing growth of the Indian economy and the ability of the government to fund more” development programs.

**Economic.** According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), India has more people living in abject poverty (some 385 million) than do Latin America and Africa combined. USAID programs in India, budgeted at about $69 million in FY2008, concentrate on six areas: (1) health (improved overall health with a greater integration of food assistance, reproductive services, and the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases); (2) environment (improved access to clean energy and water); (3) education (improved literacy and teacher capacity); (4) economic opportunity (agricultural reform and improved financial markets); (5) disaster response; and (6) tsunami recovery.

**Security.** The United States has provided about $169 million in military assistance to India since 1947, more than 90% of this distributed from 1962-1966. In recent years, modest security-related assistance has emphasized export control enhancements, counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs, and military training. Early Bush Administration requests for Foreign Military Financing were later withdrawn, with the two countries agreeing to pursue commercial sales programs. The Pentagon reports military sales agreements with India worth $429 million in FY2002-FY2007.

**Selected Relevant Legislation in the 110th Congress**

- The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (H.Res. 1341) was passed by the House in July 2008.
- The Clean Energy Partnership With India Act of 2008 (H.R. 5705), was referred to House committee in April 2008.
- H.Res 928, expressing the sense of the House that the United States should initiate negotiations to enter into a free trade agreement with India, was referred to House committee in January 2008.

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266 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/2008/104699.htm].

• **H.Res. 711**, expressing the sense of the House concerning the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, was referred to House committee in October 2007.

• **H.R. 3730**, to establish a U.S.-India interparliamentary exchange group, was referred to House committee in October 2007.

• **S.Res. 339**, expressing the sense of the Senate on the situation in Burma, was passed by the full Senate in October 2007.

• **H.Res. 638**, expressing the sense of the House that the U.N. Charter should be amended to establish India as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, was referred to House committee in September 2007.

• **H.Con.Res. 139**, expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India, was passed by the full House and referred to Senate committee in July 2007.

• **S.Con.Res. 38**, calling for the safeguarding of the physical, political, and economic security of the Kashmiri pandits, was referred to Senate committee in June 2007 (a House version, **H.Con.Res. 55**, was referred to House subcommittee in April).

• **H.R. 1186**, to promote global energy security through increased U.S.-India cooperation, was referred to House committee in February 2007.

• **H.R. 175**, to provide assistance to combat HIV/AIDS in India and for other purposes was referred to House committee in January 2007.
Table 1. Direct U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2009
(in millions of dollars)

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<td><strong>137.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>116.6</strong></td>
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</table>

**Sources:** U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. FY2008 amounts are estimates; FY2009 amounts are requested. Columns may not add up due to rounding.

**Abbreviations:**
- CSH: Child Survival and Health
- DA: Development Assistance
- ESF: Economic Support Fund
- IMET: International Military Education and Training
- INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (mainly export control assistance, but includes anti-terrorism assistance for FY2007)
- PEPFAR: President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

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<sup>a</sup> P.L. 480 Title II (grants), Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus donations), and Food for Progress. Food aid totals do not include freight costs.

<sup>b</sup> Country sub-allocations for PEPFAR are released later in the fiscal year.
Figure 2. Map of India

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (2/2007)