BUILDING A NEW STORYLINE FOR FLORIDA'S DOMESTIC SECURITY TO PROVIDE FUTURE RESILIENCY FOR THE STATE

by

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September 2008

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BUILDING A NEW STORYLINE FOR FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY TO PROVIDE FUTURE RESILIENCY FOR THE STATE

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ABSTRACT

Quickly after the 9/11 event, the state of Florida drafted one of the Nation’s first comprehensive counterterrorism strategies to aid in the protection of the state’s visitors and citizens. This strategy was drafted early in the new paradigm of Homeland Security. The strategy had several modifications over the years but has not had a comprehensive review since its inception. Many things have changed in the arena of Homeland Security since that first step after the 9/11 event. The analysis of interviews from Florida Homeland Security Leaders, and other states’ homeland security strategies in combination with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) six desirable characteristics demonstrates the need for Florida to develop the next iteration of its domestic security strategy. This thesis recommends using the strengths of Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Force, the Department of Homeland Security Target Capability List, and the GAO desirable characteristics combined with traditional elements of strategic planning to be the pillars of this new iteration of the strategy. A new vision and mission statement based on a traditional strategic planning tool will be the first step in building a new storyline for Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Sun Tzu wrote, if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

(Clavell, 1983, p.18)

Prior to the 9/11 event, Florida did not have a Homeland Security or Domestic Security Strategy for the state. Quickly after September 11, 2001, Florida’s top leadership joined together to draft the “Nation’s first comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy” (Florida Division of Emergency Management [FDEM], 2008, p. 3). The document entitled Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy commenced as terrorism centric and moved towards an all hazards approach with the most recent version being adopted on August 8, 2007 by the leadership of Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Committee (DSOC). The present document has been modified slightly over the past seven (7) years and consists of only five (5) pages. The underlining argument of this thesis is for the state of Florida to rewrite its states Domestic Security Strategy. The paradigm of Homeland Security has changed since the 9/11 event and Florida must change its strategy to better protect its citizens and visitors for the future. This thesis will explore methods of developing a strategic strategy and review other states’ homeland security strategies for best practices to be utilized by Florida and other states in the future.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

1. Should a Seven-Year-Old Strategic Plan Consisting of Five Pages Really be the Storyline for Florida’s Domestic Security?

Does a strategic strategy drafted in 2001 still have the same relevance today to guide Florida’s Leadership in its decision making in the realm of homeland security? The idea of strategic planning can be capsulated as, “My own view is that both leadership and management involve both doing the right things and doing them well, but if we stick with this rather simplistic distinction for a moment, strategic planning is first and foremost
about clarifying mission, mandates, vision, goals, and the nature of the common good and public value to be created-doing the right things-whereas management is about making sure those things are done well through strategies and operations at reasonable costs” (Bryson, 2004, p. 15).

A second thought process on strategic thinking has changed from a “road map” to a “compass” model because we are in a wilderness – the stream, the environment, is so unpredictable that road maps are worthless (Covey, 1991, p. 166). An argument can be made that Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy misses the mark on clarifying mission, mandates, vision, and goals, which is at the heart of strategic planning.

2. **What Method Should Florida’s Leadership Utilize to Enhance its Domestic Security Strategy?**

A second question concerning the development of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy pertains to what variables were considered at the time of its development and are these variables still a driving force today. The process of creating a strategic strategy can have an impact on the effectiveness of the final product. The 9/11 event created chaos for governmental agencies charged with protecting its citizens. Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy was born out of this chaos as the first step into this new paradigm of homeland security. An interview of a Homeland Security Leader involved in the original development of Florida’s Strategy identified three overarching themes impacting the process: (1) Four Focus Groups were used to provide feedback, (2) Florida was the first state to construct a strategy for this new discipline of Homeland Security with no prior available context, and (3) the emergent need for a strategy overshadowed taking the time to address all the possible steps of a strategic process (Interview of Anonymous Homeland Security Leader, 2008). Seven years later, Florida still has the same strategy with no defined process or methodology for change. Once the initial strategy was developed, Florida chose to wait on applicable federal guidance from the Department of Homeland Security before changing its official strategy. Should Florida commence down the path of developing a new homeland security strategy and if so how?
Florida’s 2007 Domestic Security Strategy consists of five pages with a vision statement, mission statement, five goals, and thirty-seven objectives. The Strategy, however, misses the mark. It fails to include many of the critical, desirable characteristics of strategic plans, and as a result, does not provide a sufficient framework to guide the state’s program initiatives and budgetary priorities.

Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy’s mission has remained constant through the different iterations since its inception in October 2001. Florida’s mission statement is to “Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards through interdisciplinary and interagency consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong Regional Collaboration” (Florida Domestic Security Strategy [FDSS], 2007, p. 1). Florida’s strategy also contains a vision statement articulated as, “Florida: working together for a safe and secure future” (FDSS, 2007, p. 1). A mission statement gives meaning to an organization. Developing a mission statement will take time but it is the essence of an organization, the battle cry, for the organization. Several different methods can be used to develop a mission statement. One perspective has a philosophical base by which the organization answers a series of questions. The questions the organization needs to answer to create the Socratic dialogue are:

1. Who are we?
2. What are the basic social and political needs we exist to meet, or what are the basic social or political problems we exist to address?
3. In general, what do we do to recognize, anticipate, and respond to these needs or problems?
4. How should we respond to our key stakeholders?
5. What are our philosophy, values, and culture?

The questions ask the organization to find its identity and unique purpose. The strategic path leads from the mission statement and reflects its vision and values and also reflects the environment realities, the stream, so that obsolete products or services are not being produced (Covey, 1991, p. 167). Globalization has caused increased competition amongst organizations, which forces them to adapt or lose their competitive edge.

The who are we question is never really addressed in Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy. It mentions interdisciplinary, interagency, and regional collaboration but never really puts a face with this effort. Before the other questions can be adequately answered, the organization needs to be identified which then can bring clarity to some of the other questions.

The second question of what are the basic social or political problems we exist to address has meaning to a homeland security strategy. This question is partially answered within Florida’s mission statement by the phrase, “capability to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards.” The argument could be made that the term all hazards could be further defined to provide more clarity to the problems the strategy is trying to address or the public value the strategy tries to provide.

The third question of, what do we do to recognize, anticipate, and respond to these needs, or problems are partially answered by the words of interdisciplinary, interagency consensus and regional collaboration. Further efforts or discussions need to occur to better answer the question within the strategy.

The fourth question pertains to key stakeholders, how should we respond to our key stakeholders? Florida’s strategy does not address the identification of any key stakeholders. The strategy does mention strong regional collaboration but does not go the extra step to identify who at the regional level are key stakeholders.

The fifth question focuses on the inner culture of an organization. This question will be a little more difficult for a state homeland security strategy to address, since it takes numerous agencies working together to produce public value. The question asks organizations to identify its philosophy, values, and culture. Florida’s strategy partially addresses this question by inserting the words consensus, strong and commitment. The key stakeholders will need to wade in on this question for political considerations.
especially pertaining to the public. The philosophy and culture could influence the success level of the organization. Failure is not an option for a state’s homeland security strategy.

The final question pertains to an organization’s longevity in this ever changing global environmental. Organizations should ask the question what makes us distinctive or unique. This question could influence the state’s competitiveness for federal funding. The federal grant funding process every year is becoming more and more competitive in nature. One state’s uniqueness could add to the overall score of its application. Florida’s strategy partially addresses uniqueness by using the words regional collaboration but needs to take the next step to set Florida above the rest.

The Florida Strategy lists five goals for the strategy, which are compatible to past National Strategies on Homeland Security:

1. PREPARE for terrorism response missions
2. PREVENT, preempt and deter acts of terrorism
3. PROTECT Florida’s citizens, visitors, and critical infrastructure
4. RESPOND in an immediate, effective, and coordinated manner, focused on the victims of the attack.

The strategy addresses strategic goals but never lists any performance measures, milestones, or organizational roles of accomplishing the goals or its assigned objectives.

The State’s Domestic Security Strategy can be compared to the U.S. General Accountability Office’s (GAO) set of desirable characteristics for implementing domestic security strategies. GAO’s approach focuses on a plan’s scope, methodology, problem definition, risk assessment, activities, performance measures, resources, investments, risk management, organizational roles, responsibilities, coordination, integration, and implementation (GAO, 2004, p. 4). Since Florida’s strategy lacks the identification of any organization or agency, Florida’s plan strikingly falters on its attention to organizational responsibilities. The document lacks numerous characteristics to include the lack of one agency by name or its responsibilities to enhance the implementation of the document.
The strategy was formed to tackle the strategic issue of protecting a state’s homeland security. Does the present strategy create public value? It could be argued the document lacks clarity, which hinders the usefulness in providing domestic security to the citizens and visitors of Florida. A concern for Florida’s Leadership developed over expanding the strategy or wait for further guidance from the federal government to have a cohesive plan that tied into the federal overarching national plan. Florida Leadership decided to wait instead of developing enhancements and then having to spend the time and effort to redraw to comply with the federal guidance.

An interview of a Florida Homeland Security Leader revealed “the reason Florida did not expand its domestic security strategy was due to the ever changing grant guidance from the Department of Homeland Security” (Interview of Anonymous Homeland Security Leader, 2008). This thought is supported in the Department of Homeland Security document issued in 2005 entitled, “State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy” (DHS, 2005). The document provided the following guidance, “In the future, States and Urban Areas will be asked to develop enterprise-wide homeland security strategies for 2007, 2008, and 2009 that reflect the necessary integration and collaboration across all mission areas and support the establishment of the National Preparedness System and realization of the Goal” (DHS, 2005, p. 8). The 2005 federal guidance further advised states, “In the future, States and Urban Areas will be asked to more completely revise their strategies to address their goals, objectives, mission statements and preparedness vision for 2007-2009” (DHS, 2005, p. 21). Florida believes it to be prudent to wait for complete guidance from the federal government before overhauling its existing state strategy.

4. **What Steps Should Florida Leadership Use to Enhance the Effectiveness of its Strategy?**

Several different models of strategy development exist from the military and the business world. One such model is the *Strategy Change Cycle*. The cycle has ten steps, which an organization will progress through to reach a final strategy. Parts of this formula will be leveraged to aid Florida to enhance its homeland security strategy.
B. ANALYSIS

The blending of the GAO desirable characteristics, strategy change cycle, and best practices of other states’ homeland security strategies will provide a foundation for Florida to build upon in developing the next iteration of its domestic security strategy. Utilizing the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security will ensure Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy will be aligned with the national goals for our nation’s homeland security. The Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan has many of the GAO desirable characteristics contained within its strategy. The Texas Plan could be used as a reference point for Florida.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the best practices drawn from a wide array of states’ strategic plans and a well-defined planning cycle to begin to reformulate Florida’s statewide Strategic Plan. Characteristics from existing plans and using a defined method in the progression of developing the plan will create synergy and lessen the possibility of gaps in the strategic plan. A strong strategic plan with desirable characteristics and an end date will provide the needed compass to protect the citizens and visitors to any state in the nation.

C. METHODOLOGY

A triangulation approach will be taken by using interviews of Florida Homeland Security Leaders and review of Homeland Security Strategies drafted by other states and Florida Urban Area Security Initiatives. The analysis will focus on taking strengths and opportunities, which will work to neutralize weaknesses and threats facing Florida’s Domestic Security Program.

A review of strategic planning tools, concepts, and methods will be the starting point for this thesis. A tool or concept will be chosen which has application to the arena of homeland security. Several state and national strategies will be researched to find commonalities that make sense to be part of a state’s homeland security strategic plan. Florida at this time has five Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI), which are mandated to have a Homeland Security Strategy. The five strategies will be reviewed and compared...
to the GAO desirable characteristics so that a template can be designed to ensure all UASI’s and the state plan are aligned with and connected to provide a seamless message to all stakeholders.

Interviews of several Florida Homeland Security Leaders will be conducted to identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) facing Florida and its Domestic Security Program. Focusing on the positives will be injected into the process to see what is going right and incorporate those ideas in redrafting the Mission, Vision, and Objectives of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy.

The final piece will consist of recommendations or ideas of what a homeland security strategy should address to provide guidance and accountability to organizations involved in the new discipline of homeland security. The suggestions could have relevance for any public or private organization that has a mission of homeland security.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

Since the 9/11 event, numerous Homeland Security Strategies (HSS) have been developed throughout the United States. Many states’ and governmental organizations have established Homeland Security strategies to guide their jurisdictional philosophy. This review focuses on literature that deals with traditional characteristics of strategy development that has been used by the military and businesses. Several selected state Homeland Security strategies will also be researched for this thesis.

2. Literature on Characteristics of Strategy

Strategy formulation methods or schools have been around for centuries. Many of the schools began to take shape in the 1960’s. Several different ways and different schools of thought can define strategy. Author Henry Mintzberg and others have defined ten different schools, which have a different view on strategy development:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Strategy Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Design       As a process on conception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Planning     As a formal process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Positioning  As an analytical process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial As a visionary process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Cognitive    As a mental process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Learning     As an emergent process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Power        As a process of negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Cultural     As a collective process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Environmental As a reactive process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Configuration As a process of transformation (Mintzberg et al., 2005, p. 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the ideas can be applied to states’ homeland security strategies.

The U.S. Army War College identifies a different set of terms or characteristics for developing strategies. “Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art and science, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends, ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodology for articulating strategies” (Yarger, 2006 p. ix). This strategy model is further defined as, ends (where we are going), ways (how we are going to get there), and means (how we organize the resource) (Covey, 1991, p. 166).

Another approach to strategic planning is the *Strategy Change Cycle*, which is typically fluid, iterative, and dynamic in practice but nonetheless allows for a reasonably orderly, participative and effective approach to determining how best to achieve what is best for an organization and create real public value (Bryson, 2004, p. 2). The process has ten steps to guide an organization through the process seen in Table 1 (Bryson, 2004, p. 33).
Table 1. Strategy Change Cycle

The Cycle does more than just create a strategic document. The Cycle is intended to move the organization to think and act strategically and be able to implement the actions needed to receive the desired results. The new paradigm of Homeland Security will demand leaders find new, technically workable, and intelligent ways to protect our communities.

A final approach researched was identified by The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) with its six desirable characteristics for implementing strategies: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation (GAO, GAO-04-408T, 2004, p. 11). The GAO applied these characteristics to seven existing national strategies. The report identified strengths and weaknesses of each of the federal strategies. The key
weaknesses were in the following areas: (1) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (2) resources, investments, and risk management; and (3) integration and implementation.

The GAO characteristics has a weakness due to the lack of the concepts of a mission and vision statement. The Strategy Change Cycle places emphasis early on in the cycle for the organization to determine its mission and vision. These two elements are traditionally addressed early in an organization’s strategy.

3. Emerging Strategy in Homeland Security

An emerging strategy in homeland security is Capabilities-Based Planning, which identifies many of the characteristics identified by the GAO. Capabilities-Based Planning speaks to needs, priorities, resources, critical tasks, and capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security has developed the Target Capability List (TCL) as a guide to local governments to aid in drafting homeland security doctrine. The Department of Homeland Security Target Capabilities List was issued in 2007 consisting of 37 target capabilities. The TCL is a national document for all states to use in developing their individual homeland security strategy plans. Besides building a strong state capability, the use of the TCL can also build a national framework to strengthen our nation.

4. The Federal Homeland Security Strategy

The Office of Homeland Security released the first National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002. The strategy was drafted in response to the 9/11 event. The national strategy consisted of the following subject areas; (1) threat and vulnerability, (2) organizing for a secure homeland, (3) intelligence and warning, (4) border and transportation security, (5) domestic counterterrorism, (6) protecting critical infrastructures and key assets, (7) defending against catastrophic threats, (8) emergency preparedness and response, (9) law, (10) science and technology, (11) information sharing and systems, (12) international cooperation, (13) costs of homeland security, and (14) priorities for the future (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. v). This was the watershed event, which commenced the journey for states to develop a homeland security
strategy for their jurisdiction. Arguably, the national strategy was drafted during chaotic times with an ever-present need for a call to action to protect America. The strategy has several gaps in key desirable characteristics. The 2002 strategy had gaps in the characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, performance measures, resources, investments, risk management, intergradation, and implementation (GAO, 2004, p. 4). In October 2007, the United States Homeland Security Council released the second version of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

The new version of the national strategy continues to lack certain desirable characteristics to include organizational roles, responsibilities, resources, investments, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures. Furthermore, the new strategy lacks a timeframe for implementation and updating the strategy.

5. State Homeland Security Strategies

The literature review of the actual homeland security strategy for individual states was based on open source availability via their established websites. States may utilize other documents, which are exempt from public disclosure, that support their homeland security program, and consequently, not all of the material on state strategies exists in the public sphere. Several of the state strategies have many of the same gaps as the federal strategy such as, characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, performance measures, resources, investments, risk management, intergradation, and implementation.

The state of Florida’s homeland security strategy has some characteristics of vision, mission, and overarching goals. The goals are based on the national strategy of prevent, prepare, protect, respond and recover. Each goal has a series of subordinate objectives to bolster the overarching goal (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2007, pp. 1-5).

Florida’s homeland security strategy is anemic or nonexistent in the characteristics of scope, methodology, problem definition, risk assessment, activities, performance measures, resources, investments, risk management, organizational roles, responsibilities, coordination, integration, and implementation. Two major flaws in the strategy are organizational responsibilities and the operational timeframe of the strategy.
The strategy fails to answer the question of who is in charge during a major catastrophic event and is unclear with respect to how long the state will operate under its present strategy. The state of Texas has a very robust homeland security strategic plan (HSSP), which starts with the operational existence (five years) and identifies which agencies are responsible for implementation of the plan. The plan touches on numerous desirable characteristics such as purpose, scope, methodology, problem definition, risk assessment, goals, subordinate objectives, activities, resources, risk mitigation, organizational roles, responsibilities, implementation, coordination, and integration (Perry, 2005, pp. 1-49). However, the Texas HSSP does not address investments and performance measures. The HSSP identifies goals and activities but fails in costs and investments to accomplish the goals. The document lacks any type of performance measure methodology or milestones to measure the results of the HSSP.


The state of Iowa revised their Homeland Security and Emergency Management Strategy in December 2006 via the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division. The strategy addresses or partially addresses every one of the GAO’s desirable characteristics. Iowa, like Texas, has developed a comprehensive homeland security strategy to guide their state’s efforts. Iowa’s strategy links up with many of the attributes of the National Homeland Strategy. The final strength is the established timeline of the plan. This plan calls for bi-annual reports and a complete review after 2008, which is a three-year strategy (Miller, 2006, pp. 1-36).


6. Summary

The 2002 National Strategy identifies responsibilities for disaster as, “Ultimately, all manmade and natural disasters are local events-with local units being the first to respond and the last to leave” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 12). Clearly, this was true in 2002 and still resonates throughout this country. Since 2002, numerous things have changed in homeland security’ the Department of Homeland Security became operational, the Director of National Intelligence was created to change the federal Intelligence Community, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, fusion centers, and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) were developed and changed from terrorism centric to an all hazards approach. Billions of tax dollars have been spent to purchase things to enhance homeland security in furtherance of the national strategy. It is not clear, however, which activities and performance measures these expenditures succeeded in enhancing. The National Strategy and other states HSS lack this type of information.

Comparing Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy to other states and the national strategy has identified a resounding gap in several desirable characteristics consisting of: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation. The next step for Florida in enhancing its present strategy is to identify the present status of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that Florida faces for the future. Those factors then can create the foundation for which Florida can create a new storyline for its strategy.
II. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS FOR FLORIDA

Organizations must understand the environment they operate in every day. The information age makes this even more critical than past years due to the speed of change and the global information exchange. An important step in developing a strategic change process concerns analyzing the environment the organization competes in for relevance. The environment is comprised of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats which an organization must navigate through in this new global age. An organization by analyzing its internal and external environments can take its strengths and opportunities to influence the weaknesses and threats it faces.

A. SWOT ANALYSIS

The SWOT analysis method stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats the organization may face. Strengths and weaknesses pertain to the present status of the internal workings of the organization. An organization will have more control of its strengths and weaknesses versus its opportunities and threats. Opportunities and threats identify the outside forces influencing an organization. Organizations have less control over the opportunities and threats it faces. The underlining goal of the strategy for the organization is to maximize its strengths and opportunities and neutralize the weaknesses and threats it faces. The strategy needs to make sense and add value to the organization.

A useful tool for assessing the environment is the use of scenarios an organization may face during its normal course of business. The creativity of terrorists today spans from airplanes used as gasoline-filled bombs to Improved Explosive Devices (IED) will challenge homeland security leaders to explore the unknown to find the next possible catastrophic scenario.
B. SWOT OF FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY PROGRAM
PERSPECTIVE BASED ON LITERATURE REVIEW

The state of Florida has received hundreds of millions of federal grant dollars since 911 to enhance its capabilities to respond and prevent natural and man-made disasters. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats were developed from researching materials published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office, National Homeland Security Strategy, Department of Homeland Security Grant Guidance, Florida Division of Emergency Management State Preparedness Report, and knowledge gathered as part of the Florida Domestic Security Apparatus. This list is by no means exhaustive but a beginning for Florida homeland security professionals to explore.

The federal grant dollars have created or influenced the following strengths:

**Strengths**

1. Creation of various Specialty Teams to include Bomb, SWAT, Waterborne Response, Forensic Response, Urban Search & Rescue and Hazmat
2. Seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) which are multi disciplined and provide regional collaboration
3. National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant
4. Adoption of Incident Command System (ICS)
5. Expanded Florida Interoperability Network (FIN)
6. Past history of responding to major hurricanes and events

The above are some of the strengths which Florida’s leaders can utilize to prevent or respond to any disaster in the state.

Besides strengths, Florida’s Domestic Security Program has several weaknesses facing the program:

**Weaknesses**

1. Sustainment funding for Specialty Teams
2. No statewide data sharing system
3. Five Independent Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI)
4. Independent funding process for UASI’s and State Homeland Security grant funds

6. Strike Teams identified by Centralized Command not a Regional Response

7. Lack of Comprehensive State Strategy to give Florida a storyline for its Domestic Security Program

8. Lack of use of Target Capabilities List (TCL)

The above lists of strengths and weaknesses is not a complete list just a start.

The next phase looks at opportunities and threats, which are outside the organization’s control. The below list is not all-inclusive but just a start:

**Opportunities**

1. Florida is one of the fastest growing states in the nation
2. Change of Power in Cuba
3. Military Commands based in Florida
4. Technology Advancements
5. Regional Domestic Security Task Forces
6. Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Programs

Organizations need to be cognizant of outside threats, which they may face:

**Threats**

1. Fifteen (15) National Planning Scenarios
2. Budget Reductions and Cuts in State Revenue Funding
3. Budget Reductions in Federal Funding for Homeland Security
4. Price of Fuel and Crude Oil
5. Radicalization of US citizens to al-Qaeda
6. Foreign cargo from China landing in Florida Port
7. Low percentage of incoming cargo being screened by port authorities

C. SWOT OF FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY PROGRAM FROM THE EYES OF SEVERAL FLORIDA HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS

Eight interviews were conducted of Florida Homeland Security Leaders to add value to the above SWOT process. The Florida Leaders came from the North, Central, and South regions of the state. The leaders came from different backgrounds to include
Fire, Emergency Management, Health, Law Enforcement, and the Urban Area Security Initiatives. The leaders were given complete anonymity in the hopes of gathering candid information.

The interviews reflected the following insight:

**Results of Eight Interviews (* Signifies duplicate response)**

**Strengths**
1. RDSTF Regional Approach****
2. Multi-Discipline Approach******
3. Robust Emergency Management Apparatus*
4. Strong Governor
5. Strong Communication among the Disciplines**
6. Most Planning in Florida is linked to gaps and the National Guidance
7. Most Regions in Florida look at doing the best for the most rather than just giving funding to those most politically affiliated
8. Use of Target Capabilities List (TCL)*
9. Comprehensive phases of threat & impact
10. Consensus Building on what is needed

**Weaknesses**
1. Minimized State Law Enforcement Involvement
2. Lack of Asset Typing for Teams and Equipment
3. Designation of Co-Chairs by State Statute (No room for change)
4. Non base Risk Assessment Statewide view *
5. Weak State Strategic Plan
6. Silos remain within each Discipline*
7. Competitive Funding should be based on need rather than population*
8. No Succession Planning
9. Some decisions are made by people on top of organizational chart and may not have the insight of the “boots on the ground”
10. Large Urban Areas receiving more representation
11. Lack of Target Capabilities (TCL) & Uniform Task Lists (UTL)
12. Vulnerable to changes in funding which potentially impact ability to accomplish mission
13. Domestic Security Program and Strategy is not fully integrated into day-to-day operations
14. Not enough people are familiar with it (Responders, Elected Officials)
15. Overlaps of FS 252 & FS 943 in state strategy which creates grey areas and reduces clarity
16. Heavily skewed towards Law Enforcement at highest levels of program
17. Out of the 67 counties, most are medium to small in size which creates a political voting block that resists risk and threat approaches
18. UASI since its inception has been resisted and the state has ignored its requirements and strategic elements as deliverables per federal requirement.
19. Struggle for dominance; power control of money
20. Unnecessary funding of Projects
21. Lack capability for sustainment
22. Lack of funding for personnel
23. Lack of regional coordinator for each discipline to help track and coordinate effort
24. Weak Regional Response Plans
25. Constant eminence due to size of membership

**Opportunities**

1. Better definition of Homeland Security
2. More defined spending practices due to reduced federal funding
3. Recognition of the RDSTF Structure as a best practice*
4. Funding linked to good performance
5. Use of HSEEP for exercises
6. State Strategy process can be a model for other states
7. Florida representatives with success in their discipline to consult with other states to align the National Strategy
8. Leverage no cost of training offered by DHS, FEMA and EMI
9. Once integrated strategy to include TCL’s & UTL’s effective gap analysis can be conducted
10. Integrate/link with other hazard-based programs for planning, response, recovery, prevention, mitigation
11. Create one all hazard, all discipline plan that has equity for all major disciplines
12. Reform and combine FS 252 & FS 943
13. Regionalization to stop duplications
14. Each region could have a level of expertise
15. Structure allows for private partners

**Threats**

1. Attacks on Transportation System (Rail, Bridges, Tunnels, Highways) *
2. Unprotected Tourism Industry*
3. Lack of Partnership with Tourism Industry
4. Overwhelming Florida Sheriffs Association power on program
5. Federal Funding being depleted**
6. Training and exercise fatigue
7. Apathy from not having an incident to keep preparedness in the forefront**
8. Loss of institutional knowledge due to loss of key personnel
9. Domestic as well as International Terrorists
10. Natural Disasters*
11. Changing of UASI footprint by federal government loss of funds
12. Local & Regional resistance to outcomes of gap analysis*
13. Mandating a redirection of funding
14. Issuing funding in uniform fashion regardless of risk
15. Hazardous Materials
16. Lack of security at small airports
17. Changing demographics in state
18. Lack of established minimal levels of response for rural and urban areas
19. Existing resistance to organizational change produces vulnerabilities
20. Poor coordination with major cities increases the threat of poor operational coordination with major municipalities
21. The State’s reliance on the 67 counties as the absolute method to deal with structure, operations, and resources needs to be revisited
22. Disenfranchisement of Florida’s major cities has deleterious effects
23. Resistance to participatory inclusion at the Domestic Security Oversight Counsel affects all aspects of State Domestic Security Operations
The leaders were also asked this final question, Should we change or modify our present state domestic security strategy? The following responses were recorded:

1. Yes. There are several options for this. Most change would be unpopular.
3. Yes. It is a living document and must be reviewed on a regular basis. Need to make adjustments to move forward.
4. Yes. Absolutely due to lack of TCL’s and UTL’s.
5. Yes. Mission Statement could be clarified – needs to be more clearly stated.
6. Yes. It excludes participatory equity on the part of the major disciplines. It prevents the application of risk-based approaches. It is clouded by duplicitous, old strategy that is due for updating, particularly to consolidate FS 252 and FS 943.
7. Yes. Prudent review of the State Domestic Security Strategy demonstrates the need to assess the inclusion of a goal relative to the need for multi-agency coordination.
8. Yes. Need to change based on change in culture and events.

D. OVERVIEW OF SWOT INTERVIEWS

The primary key strengths to Florida’s Domestic Security Program were identified as the Regional Domestic Security Task Force configuration, the Multi-Discipline Approach, robust Emergency Management Apparatus, and Strong Communication among Disciplines. These positive actions need to be reinforced in the development future iterations of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy. The second overarching point is the need for Florida to update its Domestic Security Strategy. The interviews produced an overwhelming support for Florida to update its strategy. Several of the weaknesses identified were lack of use of the Target Capability List (TCL), weak state strategic plan, weak regional response plans, and lack of clarity between state
statutes governing emergency response and resisting the UASI program. Key opportunities identified consisted of Regional Domestic Security Task Force structure as a best practice, regionalization to stop duplications, each region could have a level of expertise, create one all hazard and discipline plan with equity, and the TCL can impact present gaps in the program. Threats ran the gamut from terrorist groups to natural disasters and reduced federal funding for homeland security. Apathy from the lack of an incident and Florida’s reliance of 67 counties as the absolute method to deal with structure, operations, and response can be minimized by a strong strategic plan.

E. SUMMARY

The SWOT is more than just making lists and going through the motions. The process calls for analysis and to be completed on a regular basis by the organization. Florida’s Domestic Security Program would be well served to complete a SWOT analysis at least once a year. Several federal documents can help provide a framework for the analysis such as the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment, National Strategy for Homeland Security and the annual Department of Homeland Security Grant Guidance. These documents can provide a piece of the national picture of potential threats, which local homeland security professionals can dissect for applicability to their local jurisdiction. The arena of homeland security has changed since the 911 event. It is a safe bet that change will continue on a rapid pace for at least the near future. Organizations need to assess their environment at least once a year to attempt to stay current. A major change since 911 is the development the federal Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program that is administrated by the United States Department of Homeland Security. Florida has received millions of dollars via this program to enhance its homeland security. The designated UASI sites are stakeholders in Florida’s Domestic Security Program and need to be part of the process.
III. REVIEW OF FLORIDA’S URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE (UASI) HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES

A. URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVES (UASI) IN FLORIDA

The designated UASI sites in Florida as of May 2008 consist of Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale. Every year the federal government determines which cities and counties will be designated as UASI sites. The makeup of each UASI site has a different regional flavor due to its population and geographical composite. The local leadership was able to identify the core city and counties as part of the grant application. The Department of Homeland Security is in the process of developing nationwide guidance on the geographical standards for UASI sites. It is unknown at this time what affect if any the 2008 guidance will have on the existing Florida UASI sites.

The Jacksonville UASI core city/county is the consolidated city of Jacksonville and Duval County. The city and county municipal services are combined under one governmental entity. The Jacksonville Leadership when applying for the UASI designation expanded the core city/county concept to incorporate the other twelve (12) counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The Jacksonville UASI was the first UASI to take this broad approach for its grant submission. The most recent Homeland Security Strategy for the Jacksonville UASI was adopted in October 2007 entitled Jacksonville Urban Area Security Initiative 2008 Homeland Security Strategy (Jacksonville UASI, 2007).

The Orlando UASI has a core city of Orlando with the core county of Orange. The Orlando UASI expanded to five (5) other counties but does not encompass the complete Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The additional counties consist of Seminole, Lake, Osceola, Volusia, and Brevard. The Orlando UASI operates under the most recent version of their homeland security strategy entitled Orlando/Orange Urban Area Security Initiative 2006 Strategy (Orlando UASI, 2006).
The Tampa UASI has a core city of Tampa with the core county of Hillsborough. The Tampa UASI expanded its geographical boundaries to include the cities of St. Petersburg and Clearwater, which included the county of Pinellas. Again, this UASI does not encompass all the counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The Tampa UASI operates under the most recent copy of the Tampa Bay Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy dated January 2006 (Tampa Bay UASI, 2006).

The Miami UASI has a core city of Miami with the core county of Miami-Dade. Additionally, the UASI included the city of Hialeah and the county of Monroe. The Miami UASI combined with the Fort Lauderdale UASI for administrative matters upon its designation by the federal government. The two UASIs joined for development and management of the Southeast Florida Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy. The most recent version was revised as of March 15, 2008 (Southeast Florida Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy, 2008).

The Fort Lauderdale UASI has a core city of Fort Lauderdale and core county of Broward. Fort Lauderdale UASI contains additional cities of Hollywood, Miami Gardens, Miramar, Sunrise, Pembroke Pines, Coral Springs, and the county of Palm Beach. The combination of the Miami and Fort Lauderdale UASI encompasses all the counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force.

B. COMPARING FLORIDA’S UASI HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES TO THE GAO DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS

The GAO Desirable Characteristics identified six overarching elements in which to compare the UASI strategies. Each parameter was rated as A (Addresses), PA (Partially Addresses) or DNA (Does Not Address) the characteristic. The analysis is depicted in Table 2.
Table 2. Florida UASI & GAO Desirable Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAO Identified Desired Characteristics in National Strategies</th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th>Miami/Ft. Lauderdale</th>
<th>Jacksonville</th>
<th>Tampa Bay</th>
<th>Orlando</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose, Scope, Methodology</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>PA – Need Methodology</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PA – Need Methodology</td>
<td>PA – Need Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Identification and Risk Assessment</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, Performance Measurements</td>
<td>A - Goals DNA – No mention of TCL</td>
<td>A – Mentions TCL</td>
<td>A – Mentions TCL</td>
<td>A – Mentions TCL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PA – Need to expand</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration and Implementation</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PA – Need to expand</td>
<td>A - Lists a person's name who is responsible</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Strengths of the Florida UASI Homeland Security strategies identify four areas. The strengths of USAI strategies compared to the GAO Desired Characteristics were identified as:

1. Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, Performance Measurements
2. Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination
3. Integration and Implementation
4. Alignment with the Target Capabilities List (TCL)

These desired characteristics would be valuable for Florida to incorporate in the next version of its domestic security strategy.
C. SUMMARY

Florida’s Urban Area Security Initiatives have been mandated to have a more robust homeland security strategy to impart through federal grant guidance. Florida leadership can build upon this experience to enhance its domestic security strategy and provide an all-encompassing strategy for the state.
IV. REVIEW OF THREE STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES

A. OVERVIEW OF STATES HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES

Several states’ homeland security strategies were reviewed in search of best practices. The final three states chosen to compare to Florida were Texas, Massachusetts, and California. These states were selected because of their size or location within the United States. Another factor was that these three states have an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) contained within the state. Each state was compared to the General Accounting Office Desirable Characteristics, which was developed in 2004 as a tool to compare National Strategies related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004, p. 4). The strategies all varied in size and depth of the document.

B. COMPARING FLORIDA, TEXAS, MASSACHUSETTS AND CALIFORNIA TO GAO DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS

The GAO Desirable Characteristics identified six overarching elements in which to compare the states strategies. Each parameter was rated as A (Addresses), PA (Partially Addresses) or DNA (Does Not Address) the characteristic. The analysis is depicted in Table 3.
Table 3. State Strategies & GAO Desirable Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAO Identified Desired Characteristics in National Strategies</th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th>Texas</th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose, Scope, Methodology</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A - Defines Homeland Security</td>
<td>PA - No Method</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Identification and Risk Assessment</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources, Investments, and Risk Management</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>PA - Need to Expand Investments</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A - Identifies UASI</td>
<td>A - Identifies UASI</td>
<td>A - Identifies UASI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration and Implementation</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Depth            | 4 pages  | 49 pages  | 30 pages | 100 pages |

The comparison depicts Florida as having several areas of improvement it should entertain when developing its next iteration of its domestic security strategy. Overall, the state of Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan meets many of the desirable characteristics. The plan contains some unique characteristics such as a definitive timeframe. The plan will provide guidance from 2005 to 2010, which gives the state a beginning and an end. The plan begins with answering the question, “What is Homeland Security?” something the other states did not list (Perry, 2005, p. 2). The Texas plan ties in the Urban Area Security Initiative cities as partners in the strategy (Perry, 2005, p. 6).
C. SUMMARY

Florida Leadership was one of the first states to draft a homeland security strategy. The strategy has served Florida well over the years. The picture of homeland security has changed since Florida’s first strategy was developed right after the 9/11 event. Florida would be well served to update and refresh its present strategy for the future.
V. BUILDING A NEW STORYLINE FOR FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY BY ENHANCING ITS VISION AND MISSION STATEMENT

A. PURPOSE OF A VISION STATEMENT

A vision statement has different elements but the primary purpose is to create value. Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy commences with a vision statement. The vision statement is, “Florida: working together for a safe and secure future” (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2007, p. 1). A vision statement for a strategy should paint a picture for the members and stakeholders it wishes to impact. A vision for an organization should be challenging, easy to understand, not just one person’s dream but indicative of a team’s commitment and not fixed or static but capable of evolving over time (Tichy, 1994, p. 416). Florida’s present vision statement has some of the above points but needs to be enhanced in the next iteration of the strategy.

B. NEXT ITERATION OF FLORIDA’S VISION STATEMENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

A possible vision statement that has some of the aforementioned attributes could be, “Florida will provide a Team effort to build Resiliency in every community to protect our citizens and visitors - One Team - One Fight.” Using the word team implies a multi-disciplined approach involving all possible partners from emergency responders to private entities. The team will need a plethora of expertise to build resiliency. Resiliency as applied to homeland security is defined as “Applying this notion of resiliency to our society at the national level involves two things: mobilizing the means to reduce our vulnerabilities and increasing our capacity to swiftly bounce back from major man-made or natural disasters” (Flynn, 2007, p. xxi). This notion goes right to the heart of what this new discipline of Homeland Security should entail for the future. The One Team – One Fight gives the vision statement a slogan or a battle cry to keep the operators inspired to continue their efforts to protect Florida. Utilizing the word community stresses the need for citizen involvement besides government action to create resiliency.
C. PURPOSE OF A MISSION STATEMENT

A mission statement goes hand in hand with the vision statement. A mission statement takes patience, a long-term perspective, and meaningful involvement—and few organizations rank high in those virtues (Covey, 1991, p. 165). The more stakeholders that are involved and impute, the better the chances are that the vision and mission will be accepted by the masses. Florida’s most recent Domestic Security Strategy adopted the following mission statement; “Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards through interdisciplinary and interagency consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong Regional Collaboration” (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2007, p. 1). Florida’s mission statement has stayed the same since its inception. The only major change was to include the “all hazards” focus to the mission. Interviews of Florida’s Homeland Security Leaders overwhelmingly believe Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy needs adjustment for the future.

D. NEXT ITERATION OF FLORIDA’S MISSION STATEMENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Several strengths of Florida’s Domestic Security Program were identified from the interviews of Florida’s Homeland Security Leaders. Some of those attributes were the Regional Domestic Security Task Force Structure, Multi-Discipline Approach, Strong Communication, and Consensus Building. A possible new mission statement incorporating many of the past ideas would be: “Strengthen our coordinated capability via the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from man-made or natural disasters through interdisciplinary and interagency consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong regional collaboration.”

E. SUMMARY

The foundation of a strategy is the vision and mission statement. The vision and mission are the cornerstones for the rest of the process and strategy. If the foundation is weak, the potential for success lessens. Based on comparing other states’ vision and
mission statements plus the information gleamed from the Homeland Security Leaders interviews, Florida would be well served to enhance its present vision and mission statements of its Domestic Security Strategy. Identifying strengths of the past program successes should be the foundation for any changes in the statements. One example of a rewrite for Florida’s vision and mission statement was presented but by no means should be taken as the final answer. Florida’s State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG), which is comprised of subject matter experts from the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces should be charged to develop and enhance Florida’s vision and mission statement for the future. Many past and present organizations gain successes from a strong vision and mission statement examples such as the U.S. Marine Corps, NFL Football Teams, and top Fortune 500 companies.

Another reason Florida needs to update its mission and vision statement can be tied into the Issue-Attention Cycle as it relates to Homeland Security. Since the United States has not been attacked on its soil, America will continue in stage five of the cycle. During stage five the “issue moves behind the public scenes and becomes the grist for homeland security’s congressional, industrial, academic, and bureaucratic Complex which is populated by professionals to refine strategies, programs, and institutions” (Bellavita, 2005, p. 2). A cohesive, uplifting, and inspiring mission and vision statement could aid Florida Homeland Security Leadership to continue its fight to protect Florida.
VI. USING CAPABILITY-BASED PLANNING TO BOLSTER FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY

A. OVERVIEW

Once an organization has identified its mission, vision and environmental factors the next phase of the Strategy Change Cycle pertains to strategic issues and strategies. The strategic issues and strategies could be compared to the GAO desirable characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, activities, performance measures, resources, and investments to respond to a given strategic issue. Different schools of strategic thought have used different models over the years. The one that appears to be the most versatile for Homeland Security is the Capabilities-Based Framework. A working definition for Capabilities-Based Planning (CPB) developed by Paul K. Davis is as follows, “CPB is planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice” (Davis, 2002, p. xi).

Capabilities-Based Planning contains several key elements:

- A conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty by emphasizing flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness of capability.
- An analytical framework with three components:
  - understanding capability needs
  - assessing capability options at the level of mission or operation
  - choosing capability levels and choosing among capability options in an integrative portfolio framework that considers other factors (force management, different types of risk and economic limitations).
- A solution framework that emphasizes “building blocks” (Davis, 2002, p. 4).
Capabilities-Based Planning with its key elements and format may make sense of this new paradigm of Homeland Security. A state’s Homeland Security Apparatus needs to be flexible, robust, and adaptable for any possible scenario involving man-made or natural disasters. A model for Capabilities-Based Planning is depicted in Table 4 (Davis, 2002, p. 12).

Table 4. Process Model for Capabilities-Based Planning

The process begins by identifying plausible worries, which can be construed as threats or scenarios. The second step is the analytical framework, which looks at needs and assesses potential capabilities. The third step chooses goals, requirements, and metrics which looks at a mission level not the complete scenario. The final step is assessing options or reviewing building-block capabilities for the right option. The Department of Homeland Security based the National Preparedness Guidelines on a Capability-Based process, which is supported by three planning tools: the National Planning Scenarios, Target Capabilities List (TCL), and Universal Task List (UTL) (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. iii).
B. TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST (TCL)

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the Target Capabilities List (TCL) in September of 2007 as part of the National Vision of “A Nation Prepared” for all levels of government to include the private sector, non-government organizations, and citizens (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. iii). This version contained thirty-seven (37) core capabilities, which can be utilized to respond to a plethora of disasters. The TCL was not developed for every day type responses that cities and counties handle as a routine basis. Instead, the TCL addresses capabilities-based preparedness to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorism, very large-scale disasters, pandemic health emergencies, or other major incidents (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. 5).

The first step of the TCL process was to conduct a threat and mission analysis. DHS in this analysis developed 15 National Planning Scenarios as a starting point to build the capabilities to respond, prevent, and recover from these events. One of the National Planning Scenarios is a major hurricane. Florida’s history of response and recovery capabilities from hurricanes will be a strength of the state’s domestic security apparatus.

The second piece of the TCL pertains to identifying preparedness activities, critical tasks, measures, and metrics. These activities, measures, and metrics are applied to the four (4) mission areas of Prevent, Protect, Response, and Recover. The TCL identifies numerous activities and tasks for different mission areas. The performance measures and metrics for each capability define how quickly and how effectively critical tasks should be performed such as criticality (i.e., how quickly a specific capability is needed to prevent an incident, save lives, prevent suffering, or reduce major damage) is an important consideration in determining where a capability is needed (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. 12). Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy contains the overarching goals or mission areas but lacks the breadth in spelling out the activities, tasks, measures, and metrics to accomplish that mission.

A final focus of the TCL is to expand regional collaboration. Expanded Regional Collaboration is identified as the first priority in the National Preparedness Guidelines in
recognition that large-scale events may require a shared response across jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public/private sectors depending on the scale of the event (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. 11). The Department of Homeland Security by publishing the TCL is striving for standardization across the country. Standardization will result in states and regions being able to support each other in times of catastrophic disaster. Regional Collaboration will pool resources and spread costs across all levels of government. The state of Florida right after the 9/11 event developed the Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) concept throughout the state. Regional Collaboration has been a mainstay from the first iteration of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy to the present. Florida is divided into seven different regions. Each region is led by a local sheriff and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement Special in Agent in Charge. The RDSTF is mandated by state statute and is terrorism centric not all hazards. The below table illustrates Florida’s regional collaboration efforts in Table 5 (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2008):

Table 5. Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF)
The TCL and the National Preparedness Guidelines stress regional collaboration to contain multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary representation by all entities. Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy was built from the beginning on the need to have multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary partners at the table. Each Task Force has a series of committees encompassing a multi-disciplinary approach. The following table is an example of the makeup of a Regional Domestic Security Task Force (Pape, 2008):

Table 6. Regional Domestic Security Task Forces Committees

Several of the GAO Desirable Characteristics are addressed within the TCL. The Florida Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI)’s have adopted the TCL and mention its use in their Homeland Security Strategy. The TCL is a tool; a guide to help an entity involved in this new paradigm of Homeland Security. The TCL is a start for a countrywide approach. It is not the Holy Grail but has the potential to establish a baseline or help make sense on what a state may need to increase its preparedness.
C. APPLYING TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST TO FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY

The Target Capabilities List identifies an outcome of resilience. Resilience is key since it refers to our coping capacity to absorb events, adapt, respond to, and recover from the effects (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. vii). Each Regional Domestic Security Task Force with its delineated committees has the responsibility to determine the most effective distribution and sharing of capabilities to develop resilience for the region. The capabilities need to be best positioned within the region so all jurisdictions can have access when the need arises.

Florida, since 2001, has coordinated the distribution of more than a billion dollars (primarily in federal funds) to state and local agencies to build an all hazards, scalable system of readiness that, through regional collaboration and mutual aid, ensures all local governments have the resources they need to protect citizens and visitors regardless of the type or magnitude of disaster (DEM, 2008, p. 3). A large portion of the funds have been spent for equipment, training and exercising the following Specialty Response Teams, Emergency Deployable Interoperable Communications, Fire/HazMat, Fire Urban Search & Rescue (USAR), Fire Light Technical Rescue, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Hazardous Device (HDT), Forensics Response, Waterborne Response, Aviation, Perimeter, and Incident Management Teams. The teams are positioned throughout the state, which spreads the capability amongst the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF). Many of these teams’ capabilities are listed in the TCL document. This gives Florida several strengths in which to build for the future.

The first step for Florida Leadership to integrate the TCL into the strategy is to build a strong partnership with the Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI). The UASI’s have been working with the TCL as part of the grant guidance issued by the Department of Homeland Security for the last funding cycles. The UASIs, like the state of Florida, has spent grant money on building capabilities for their assigned jurisdictions. A complete inventory of all teams and capabilities needs to occur to create a baseline of
capabilities for the state. Once the inventory is completed, each Regional Domestic Security Task Force would have a blueprint of the capabilities available to respond to any scenario.

Upon completion of the statewide inventory, the next sequence should be to determine the baseline capability each RDSTF should possess for any given scenario. Florida Homeland Security Leadership should select a major hurricane, which is one of the fifteen (15) National Planning Scenarios listed in the TCL. Florida has been subject to the most devastating terrorist of record, “Mother Nature.” Mother Nature by way of hurricanes has caused more destruction and death to Florida so far than any other national planning scenario or terrorist organization. Hurricanes have also touched in some form each of the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces of the state. Determining the capabilities needed to respond to and recover from a major hurricane will differ by region based on population and threat. Nevertheless, all regions will need a certain amount of capability to enhance its resilience. Once that framework and capability has been reached, the Florida Leadership should then move to another national planning scenario such as aerosol anthrax (which has occurred in Palm Beach County, FL) or an improvised explosive device (IED). This will create a building block foundation and many of the capabilities could be used for more than one scenario. Capabilities-Based Planning overarching theme is to build a system that is flexible, adaptable and can be built upon as new potential threats are discovered in the future. The system is designed to be a national network with one game plan.

Previous interviews of Florida Homeland Security Leaders identified the multi-discipline and RDSTF approach as a major strength of the program. A weakness identified from the interviews is the overlap or lack of clarity between Florida State Statute 252 entitled Emergency Management and State Statute 943 entitled Department of Law Enforcement. State Statute 943 identifies the Regional Domestic Security Task Force as terrorism centric not all hazards. The TCL is an all hazard Capabilities-Based approach. To fully engage the TCL, Florida should look to modify FSS 943 and FSS 252 to make the RDSTF the mechanism to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover
from any catastrophic event. The domestic security strategy could also identify the RDSTF as the regional organization to help counties and cities when more capabilities are needed to enhance a first response effort.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FLORIDA’S NEXT JOURNEY IN THE NEW PARADIGM OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Shortly after the 9/11 event, Florida Leadership drafted the state’s first Domestic Security Strategy. The strategy was one of the first in the nation. The strategy has aided the state in building its capabilities to respond and recover from major catastrophic disasters. After comparing other states’ Homeland Security Strategies and interviews of several Florida Homeland Security Leaders, it is recommended to draft the next generation of the strategy and make enhancements to the Domestic Security Program. The strategy has several strengths, which need to be carried forward to be the foundation for the next iteration of the strategy and program.

Building on the strengths and opportunities and being ever vigilant of the weaknesses and threats can build resilience for Florida. This thesis recommends Florida review the following recommendations for potential implementation as part of the Domestic Security Program:

1. Create a Strategic Planning Cell comprising key stakeholders, which reports to the Domestic Security Oversight Council.
2. Rewrite the State’s Domestic Security Strategy with special emphasis towards vision, mission, and the Target Capabilities List (Activities, Tasks, Measures, and Metrics).
3. Embrace Capabilities-Based Planning Model as the foundation of Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Force Program.
4. Establish the Regional Domestic Security Task Force as an all hazards model to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all catastrophic disasters.

A. INSTITUTE A STRATEGIC PLANNING CELL

The Cell should be comprised of key stakeholders from throughout the state. Each of the Seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces, Five Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI), and certain key agency leaders should comprise the team. The team should further have a multi-discipline flavor to engage as many stakeholders as possible. The primary responsibility of the Cell is to draft the next state domestic security strategy.
The state strategy being developed in this manner has a better chance of being accepted statewide. A secondary responsibility will be to implement any changes identified by the Department of Homeland Security via their annual federal homeland security grant guidance. A participative process with all appropriate stakeholders can build the next iteration of the state’s domestic security strategy that will meet many of the GAO desirable characteristics. Formulation of the Cell will then start the process of continuous strategic thinking for the state.

B. REWRITE FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY

Interviews of Florida Homeland Security Leaders overwhelmingly believe the present Florida Domestic Security Strategy needs to be updated to enhance Florida’s Domestic Security Program. The Strategic Planning Cell or another body of prominent stakeholders needs to be empanelled to complete a comprehensive review of the present strategy. The next iteration can build on Florida’s positive core, the multi-discipline Regional Domestic Security Task Force Model (RDSTF). Roles and responsibilities of the RDSTF need to be established via the next strategy. A new vision and mission statement could be the placeholder for defining the RDSTF. The vision statement needs a battle cry such as One Team – One Fight or something else that the numerous people involved in Homeland Security for the State of Florida can buy into which gives people the highest hopes for the future. A vision is inclusive of the constituents’ aspirations; it is an ideal and unique image of the future for the common good (Kouzes, 1997, p. 124).

The Department of Homeland Security has published the Target Capability List (TCL) for the nation. The goal is to better prepare the nation to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major disasters. The designated Florida Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) has adopted the TCL as part of their homeland security strategies based on the Department of Homeland Security grant guidance for the program. The TCL is a guide to help increase the nation’s preparedness.

Florida needs to incorporate the TCL into the next version of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy. Utilizing the TCL approach would create a common language or thought process for the state. The synergy or strength of selecting a unified approach
would then set the tone for other governmental entities and stakeholders throughout the state to adopt the same ideology. The TCL is divided into five different capability sections, which correspond to Florida’s present five overarching goals of the strategy. This commonality will eliminate the need of Florida from starting from ground zero.

The TCL identifies activities, tasks, measures, and metrics for each of the mission areas. Past iterations of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy have lacked this depth. The Strategic Planning Cell or empanelled body can review the hundreds of pages in the TCL and select those critical capabilities Florida should pursue over the next coming years.

Florida, by embracing the TCL, can put the document to the test. The TCL is a guide and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) realizes that by moving through this new paradigm of homeland security changes and capabilities will occur along this journey. Who better to challenge the document than Florida who developed one of the first homeland security strategies in the country? DHS, in fact, requests changes or recommendations on the TCL. Florida should seize the moment.

C. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING MODEL AS THE FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA’S REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE PROGRAM

Capabilities-Based Planning can be seen as a way to combine the strengths of the threat-based and scenario-based planning methods while maintaining the required level for flexibility given the evolving nature of the threat (Goss, 2005, p. 15) Once Florida accepts the TCL as a statewide protocol, the next phase to strengthen the state’s preparedness can take hold by completing a statewide region-by-region assessment of the available capabilities. The assessment will be used to establish the minimal baseline capabilities each region should possess and sustain. The next step will be to overlay the UASI’s capabilities that have been developed since the inception of the federal program.

The final phase will be to prioritize based on limited resources the next capability to be established in each region. The underlining premise is that not all regions are the same. Some regions will need more capabilities based on threat and population. Moreover, no region can stand-alone and hope to respond and recover to a major
catastrophic event by itself. The region will need help, Florida hurricane history proves the point that no region can recover by itself. The recovery may be accelerated if the impacted region understands that the remaining six have the same capabilities and protocols as them. Standardization can help make sense during a chaotic event.

D. STRENGTHEN THE REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE MODEL

The pinnacle of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy is the Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) concept. Interviews for this thesis of Florida Homeland Security Leaders bears testament to this fact. Presently, the RDSTF has been identified for terrorism related events, which makes the model terrorism centric. Capabilities that are built for terrorism can also be used for response to a litany of other disasters. The RDSTF needs to be an all-hazard approach. Modifications in Florida State Statute Chapters 943 and 252 would be the mechanism for this change. The state domestic security strategy is an all-hazard approach; by designating the RDSTF, an all-hazard model would bring clarity to its mission.

A final adjustment in hopes of strengthening the states’ domestic security program will be to identify a seat on the Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) for the Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI). The DSOC was established to provide executive oversight over the state’s domestic security efforts and approves the State Homeland Security Strategy. This seat will establish a strong partnership between the DSOC and the UASI. This partnership will help in determining the capabilities the region and the UASI will need to provide for the citizens in a designated area. A strong partnership will go a long way in identifying capabilities and leveraging available federal grant dollars for homeland security.
Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy

Vision Statement:

Florida: working together for a safe and secure future.

Mission Statement:

Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards through interdisciplinary and interagency consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong Regional Collaboration.

GOAL 1: PREPARE for terrorism response missions.

OBJECTIVE 1.1 PLANNING: Preparedness Plans incorporate an accurate hazard analysis and risk assessment and ensure that capabilities required to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and catastrophic natural disasters are available when and where they are needed.

OBJECTIVE 1.2 COMMUNICATIONS: A continuous flow of critical information is maintained as appropriate between multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, lead and support agencies, and the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS).

OBJECTIVE 1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT: State, regional, local, tribal and private sector entities, in coordination with Federal participation, identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions.
OBJECTIVE 1.4 COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION:
There is a structure and a process for on-going collaboration between government and non-governmental resources at all levels.

GOAL 2: PREVENT, preempt and deter acts of terrorism.

OBJECTIVE 2.1 INFORMATION GATHERING AND RECOGNITION OF INDICATORS AND WARNINGS: Threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-related information is identified, gathered, entered into an appropriate data/retrieval system, and provided to appropriate analysis centers.

OBJECTIVE 2.2 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION: Timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence/information products are produced in support of prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations.

OBJECTIVE 2.3 INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING AND DISSEMINATION: Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, regional, and private sector entities to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, and response to a threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency.

OBJECTIVE 2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION AND OPERATIONS: Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and apprehended.

OBJECTIVE 2.5 CBRNE DETECTION: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly detected and characterized at borders, critical locations, events, and incidents.

GOAL 3: PROTECT Florida’s citizens, visitors, and critical infrastructure.

OBJECTIVE 3.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: The risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure are reduced through the identification and protection of critical infrastructure.

OBJECTIVE 3.2 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SAFETY AND DEFENSE: Threats to food and agriculture safety are prevented, mitigated, and eradicated.

OBJECTIVE 3.3 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATION: Potential exposure and disease is rapidly identified to contain the spread of the event and reduce number of cases.
OBJECTIVE 3.4  PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY TESTING: Chemical, radiological, and biological agents causing, or having the potential to cause, widespread illness or death are rapidly detected and accurately identified by the public health laboratory within the jurisdiction or through network collaboration with other appropriate local, state, and federal laboratories.

GOAL 4: RESPOND in an immediate, effective, and coordinated manner, focused on the victims of the attack.

OBJECTIVE 4.1  ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: The incident is managed safely, effectively, and efficiently through the integration of facilities, resources (personnel, equipment, supplies, and communications), and procedures using a common organizational structure that is the Incident Command System (ICS), as defined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

OBJECTIVE 4.2  EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MANAGEMENT: The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-planned or no-notice event through the Emergency Operations Center Management.

OBJECTIVE 4.3  CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION: Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

OBJECTIVE 4.4  VOLUNTEER AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT: The coordination of volunteers and donations is maximized and does not hinder response and recovery activities.

OBJECTIVE 4.5  RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH: No illness or injury to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up.

OBJECTIVE 4.6  PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE: The incident scene is assessed and secured, while protecting first responders and mitigating any further effect to the public at risk.

OBJECTIVE 4.7  ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY SUPPORT: Foreign animal disease is prevented from entering Florida by protecting the related critical infrastructure and key assets; equipment, trained teams, and personnel surge plans are in place to proactively respond to suspected animal disease outbreaks.
OBJECTIVE 4.8  ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: After the primary event, disease and injury are prevented through the quick identification of associated environmental hazards to include exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary to the primary event and secondary transmission modes.

OBJECTIVE 4.9  EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS: Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards.

OBJECTIVE 4.10  FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS/SUPPORT: Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occurs within jurisdictional response time objectives.

OBJECTIVE 4.11  WMD/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE DECONTAMINATION: Hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and mitigated; victims exposed to the hazard are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; the impact of the release is limited; and responders and at risk populations are effectively protected.

OBJECTIVE 4.12  CITIZEN EVACUATION AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE: Affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated to safe refuge areas, and effectively and safely reentered into the affected area, if appropriate.

OBJECTIVE 4.13  ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE: Individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, basic necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza).

OBJECTIVE 4.14  URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE: The greatest numbers of victims (human and animal) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety.

OBJECTIVE 4.15  EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING: Government agencies and public and private sectors receive and transmit coordinated, prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their health, safety, and property, through clear, consistent information delivery systems.

OBJECTIVE 4.16  TRIAGE AND PRE-HOSPITAL TREATMENT: Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations.
OBJECTIVE 4.17  MEDICAL SURGE:  Injured or ill from the event are rapidly and appropriately cared for. Continuity of care is maintained for non-incident related illness or injury.

OBJECTIVE 4.18  MEDICAL SUPPLIES MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION:  Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately secured, managed, distributed, and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident.

OBJECTIVE 4.19  MASS PROPHYLAXIS:  Appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner upon the onset of an event to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends, and themselves.

OBJECTIVE 4.20  MASS CARE (SHELTERING, FEEDING, AND RELATED SERVICES):  Mass care services (sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution) are rapidly provided for the population and companion animals within the affected area.

OBJECTIVE 4.21  FATALITY MANAGEMENT:  Complete documentation and recovery of human remains, personal effects, and items of evidence are achieved (except in cases where the health risk posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains and personal effects).

GOAL 5:  **RECOVER** quickly and restore our way of life following a terrorist act.

OBJECTIVE 5.1  STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND MITIGATION ASSESSMENT:  Restore affected areas to pre-event conditions.

OBJECTIVE 5.2  RESTORATION OF LIFELINES:  Sufficient lifelines services are available to safely support ongoing recovery activities.

OBJECTIVE 5.3  ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY RECOVERY:  Economic impact is estimated, priorities are set for recovery activities, business disruption is minimized and returned to operation, and individuals and families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.

Approved by SWG Executive Board June 7, 2007
Approved by the DSOC on August 8, 2007

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LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Commissioner Gerald Bailey
   Florida Department of Law Enforcement
   Tallahassee, Florida