

**LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY
REFORM:
THE NEXT PRESIDENT'S AGENDA**

Colloquium Report

Editors

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FOREWORD


On March 20, 2008, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and the European Union Center of Excellence of Texas A&M University teamed with the LBJ School of the University of Texas at Austin and with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute for a program to examine the choices facing the American voter in foreign and defense policy in the November 2008 elections. This colloquium examined the conditions existing in the contemporary threat environment and how they may shape American security policy for the next presidential administration. Integral to this objective is articulating how U.S. threats, policies, and strategies have changed since 2001, and how the national security system has been slow in adjusting to changing operating requirements. The colloquium highlighted differing notions of national security and the difficulty of aligning and synchronizing competing visions and missions represented by various government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, military services, and Congress.

Participants considered the various obstacles impeding dramatic security reform ranging from political pressures to bureaucratic inertia. Currently, every stakeholder in the process maintains a different opinion on what requires change and how this should be achieved. Thus, the reform agenda is sophisticated and complicated yet represents the critical first step for positive restructuring. Participants also received insight into a number of ongoing governmental and political initiatives to raise awareness of this issue and spark action.

The colloquium was held on the campus of Texas A&M University, which possesses a rich military tradition and is supported by a community very interested in national security affairs. The program included one panel, one keynote speaker, and a debate featuring prominent scholars and policymakers.

Most debates in the 2008 presidential primary campaign addressed a wide range of political issues. This colloquium focused specifically on international affairs and national security policy. The opening panel included international experts to discuss the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) security environment and “new” foreign and defense policy issues, including human and homeland security, nation building and conflict, and political development and terrorism. The keynote speaker was The Honorable James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

In sum, the goal for the participants was to develop a deeper understanding of the post-9/11 national security agenda and the choices facing the next administration. This report provides a record of conference activities.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: THE NEXT PRESIDENT'S AGENDA

INTRODUCTION

This colloquium examined the contemporary international environment and American national security policy for the next presidential administration. Participants examined how threats, policies, and strategies have changed since 2001 and how the U.S., European, and other international security systems have responded to changing requirements.

The participants' comments centered on three themes:

- In the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) world, what threats and challenges face the next presidential administration?
- What reforms are needed to the current national, European, and international security systems in terms of policy, institutions, and leadership?
- How can the next presidential administration effect change to improve U.S. and international security?

The answers to these questions are addressed more deeply throughout this report, but some key results of the colloquium are included here. First, the close relationship between development and security was identified as a key component of effective policymaking. Second, failed states present a challenge to policymakers and the U.S. Government requires institutional restructuring, including significant reform to the national security system as a whole, to face future threats. Third, the United States and the European

Union (EU) will be more effective working together against similar threats to homeland security, but significant differences in the method of handling these threats exist that must be considered if joint actions are to be taken. Finally, the candidates for the presidency in 2008 will be faced with a choice between balancing domestic economic concerns and international security issues. In a debate on these issues, those representing the Republican Party focused on Barack Obama's lack of experience in national security matters as a major drawback. Those representing the Democratic Party argued that the Republican dominance on national security is no longer unequivocal; the election will be centered more on economics than on national security issues.

**Panel: The Post-911 Security Challenges:
Humanitarian, Homeland Security, and State-
Building Issues – New Tricks and Old Dogs?**

Topics:

1. Learning from Failed States
2. Building Failed States
3. European Views on Homeland Security
4. Terrorism and Peacekeeping

Chair: Dr. Robin Dorff, U.S. Army War College

Panel Members:

Mr. Richard McCall, Creative Associates,
International, Inc.

Mr. John Wilson, EU Center Fellow, Texas A & M
University

Dr. Volker C. Franke, Bonn International
Center-BICC

“Learning from Failed States,” by Dr. Robin Dorff.

In 1992, I began work on a project sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) on “Global Ungovernability.” The “Challenges of Global Ungovernability Project” was largely completed by 1994 and reported in 1995. In 1996 Dr. Roy Godson and I presented the project’s findings to the U.S. Secretary of State’s Open Forum Speakers Program. Among other things, this presentation highlighted some of the earliest work done on what would eventually become known as the “failed states problem” and the security challenges posed by this phenomenon. In the summer of 1996, *Parameters* published an article I wrote based in part on that study entitled “Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability.”¹

I say this as background to point out that the failed states phenomenon and its linkages to terrorism, transnational organized crime, insurgencies, and a host of other national security “maladies” are hardly new, and most certainly not limited to the post-9/11 world as some would have us believe. I made this argument in another article published in 2005, nearly 13 years after I had begun work directing the project for the NSIC.² Today the use of terms like failed, failing, and fragile states is nearly ubiquitous in discussions of national and international security. So much so, in fact, that some would argue the very terms have become so all-encompassing as to mean almost nothing. But it is clear that for the topic we are addressing with this panel today—“The Post-9/11 Security Challenges: Humanitarian, Homeland Security and State-Building Issues—New Tricks and Old Dogs?”—there are certainly some things that we have learned and some things that we have not learned at all, or have not

learned very well, from the study of and experience with these failed states. I will share some of those as brief observations.

Some Observations.

1. Many of the threats, challenges, and even opportunities in the strategic security environment emanate from such states and/or the conditions we associate with them. We need only think immediately of Afghanistan and Iraq, but there are many others, of course.

2. It is not simply that we are presented with insurgency and counterinsurgency, or terrorism and counterterrorism. We have learned from failed states that the absence or weakness of effective, legitimate governance helps spawn the very forces that we have to counteract. And even when we think about humanitarian crises, we must recognize that this same “good governance deficit” exacerbates those crises (whether manmade or natural in their origins). The inability of governance to function effectively breeds and empowers insurgents, terrorists, and criminals, and it helps foster the kind of incompetence and corruption that make relatively simple disasters horrific in their human consequences.

3. We have learned from failing states that security and development go hand in hand. We cannot have one without the other. Perhaps arguably, security must come first. But it cannot be sustained without the prospect (both real and perceived) of meaningful economic development and all that it entails.

4. We have also learned from failed states about the convergence of defense, diplomacy, and development (the so-called 3-Ds), and the corollary need to bridge

the gap between military and civilian capabilities in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.³

5. And all of these preceding “lessons” have helped us understand (albeit slowly perhaps) that a “whole of government” (even a “whole of international community”) approach is needed, even while recognizing that that we do not really know how to do that yet. And that perhaps we are both poorly equipped and poorly organized to do it (the latter being in particular an argument that we will hear more about later today from The Honorable James Locher). To play off the title of this panel: We need to figure out what the “new tricks” are and do our best not to be the “old dogs” trying to address new national security challenges using “old tricks” and outmoded organizations.

6. To address the challenges and threats we face and to take advantage of opportunities that arise to shape the environment require that we bring all that we have learned from failed states to bear on the problems. To do that effectively, and to make a difference, will require extraordinary presidential leadership—and together those things comprise a daunting agenda for the next president.

ENDNOTES - Dr. Dorff

1. Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability,” *Parameters*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 17-31.

2. Robert H. Dorff, “Failed States After 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?” *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, February 2005, pp. 20-34.

3. These SSTR operations, and the issues surrounding our ability to conduct them, were a central focus of the workshop held last year at this time at the Bush School. Much of the content of that conference can be found in Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, eds., *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2007.

“Building Failed States,” by Mr. Richard McCall.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its international partners have struggled to deal with a complex set of foreign policy challenges, most notably global terrorism and the failed state phenomenon. Failed states have often served as the breeding grounds for terrorist movements. Classic examples include Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and the federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan.

The U.S. ability to manage these challenges more effectively will require institutional restructuring of our national security apparatus, particularly the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State/ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and our intelligence agencies; significant changes in bureaucratic cultures; and an entirely new strategy of engagement.

An excellent starting point for serious reform would be the recommendations contained in Dr. Jeffrey McCausland’s recent publication entitled *Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century*.¹ McCausland, a retired Army colonel, is former Dean of the U.S. Army War College. His study is very comprehensive, and I won’t go into great detail here. But I would like to cite the following:

. . . it is crucial that we develop a system that places the *right* people in the *right* places in government at the *right* moment. The nation critically needs civilian policymakers who can manage the change and deal with the here and now. It is essential that we develop career civilian leaders for strategic decisionmaking in the national security process. Such development must include the recruitment of quality personnel, experiential learning through a series of positions of increasing responsibility,

training for specific tasks or missions, and continuous education that considers both policy and process. . . . [I]t requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding policy issues, but also possess the leadership abilities to direct large complex organizations.²

The bottom line is that we do not have knowledge-based skills or sufficient quantity and quality of leadership that can manage change. Nor do we have bureaucratic agility and flexibility in our current national security system to adjust to realities on the ground or to changing dynamics. Just as institutions were created to manage the global economy and prevent a repeat of the 1920s and 1930s; just as political and military institutions were created and restructured to manage the Cold War; we are now compelled to restructure our mechanisms and tools to manage the real world as it is today. We also need to reevaluate many of our assumptions and develop different analytical tools and frameworks and to recognize that these are essential components to a new national security strategy.

Yet, since the end to the Cold War, the United States and the international community continue to struggle with the failed state phenomenon. The logic of democratization and market economics has driven the notion that many societies are in transition—that there is somewhat of a linear progression from centrally controlled political and economic systems to democratic and free market-driven systems. Yet, in these so-called transitions, failed states included, it is apparent that a difficult and patient societal transformation is the more appropriate description of the processes required for peace, stability, and political pluralism to be established and sustained over the long term.

In too many areas of the world, countries have not undergone the processes fundamental to the creation of a modern nation-state. Many of these states are comprised of diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities. In the absence of functioning institutions that reflect a working consensus within these societies, state coercion is relied upon to maintain the grip on power by the group in control. Even when there is voluntary cooperation among and between diverse elements within a state, this cooperation is vulnerable to stress, no matter what the source (such as competition for limited resources, environmental degradation, corruption, and impunity), and can be the spark that sets off violent conflict. In both instances, coercive state institutions or voluntary cooperation, the status quo is vulnerable to complete breakdown.

I am going to briefly touch upon a concept that has largely been ignored by the international community's preference for top-down approaches to nation-building. I am referring to constituting processes (those processes which create institutions) at all levels of society. This institution building is fundamental to the maintenance of coherence and order during times of stress. In the case of voluntary cooperation, it can only be sustained by encapsulating such cooperation within institutions that reflect not only a common set of values, but also a strong sense of national community. These processes, in turn, can transcend the divisive nature of localism or communalism, such as ethnic and/or religious issues.

While most modern nation-states have gone through these constituting processes, the citizens of most countries have not been engaged in processes whereby common values are agreed upon and institutions created that reflect this fundamental societal consensus. The problems of disease, illiteracy,

hunger, poverty, corruption, and terrorism cannot be adequately addressed in a world community where too many countries fail to attain the status of the “capable” nation-state. They remain vacuums that terrorists, narco-traffickers, demagogues, and dictators are more than willing and capable to fill and exploit for their own ends.

I could go on at length and in greater detail as to the types of programmatic interventions we should consider as essential elements to a new national security strategy. Time does not allow me to do so now. However, I do want to make some final observations.

While there has been some progress on the margins, the U.S. Government still tends to look at world problems as a discrete and differentiated set of security, political, economic, and assistance issues and sectors. We tend to develop segmented policy and programmatic responses based on narrow, short-term, parochial interests. As a result, we have failed to understand the reality and internal dynamics of problems on the ground which prevents us from devising appropriate strategies to fit the situation and address the root causes of conflict.

There is a multiplicity of U.S. Government departments, agencies, and offices involved in articulating and implementing U.S. policy abroad. Oftentimes this promotes confusion and even contradictory policy priorities. Just as the problems of the countries in which USAID operates cannot be solved effectively by a set of isolated activities, neither can the United States project a coherent policy abroad through a series of discrete and differentiated tools with oftentimes differing priorities. We need a strategic vision that recognizes how each of these sets of problems relates to each other. Unfortunately, we continue to be

bogged down by a process that is preoccupied with individual boxes and the competition for resources among these boxes.

Finally, I want to make the point that any international engagement in dealing with a failed state has to focus first on peace building and not nation-building. Peace building is bottom-up process that engages all segments of society in defining not only a common set of values around which there can be a working consensus, but also fundamental agreement on the systems and nature of the institutions which would be serve them.

Nation-building, as we have approached it, has focused too much on a top-down approach, writing constitutions that have little, if no meaning for most in these societies, holding elections quickly, and focusing almost exclusively on constituting a central government. The end result all too often exacerbates existing tensions and conflict in society, leading to more violence. Such an approach denies a broad-based ownership of the processes and does not give the vast majority of the population a stake in the outcome.

In my estimation, this is a short synopsis of the challenges facing the next administration, be it Republican or Democrat.

ENDNOTES - Mr. McCall

1. Jeffrey D. McCausland, *Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2008.

2. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

**“European Views on Homeland Security,” by
Mr. John Wilson.**

As my contribution to the discussion, I would like sketch out the EU’s security strategy as it raises issues of wider interest, including how the EU tries to ensure that states in its region are stable and well-governed.

The Common Security and Defense Policy started slowly but has come a long way in less than 10 years. The EU has adopted a strategy, set up an institutional framework, started building capabilities, and reached certain compromises on relations between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Central to the EU’s strategy is the paper unanimously agreed upon by the Council in 2003¹ by coincidence at a moment when member states disagreed sharply about Iraq. The strategy paper sets out five key threats to be tackled: (1) terrorism, (2) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), (3) regional conflicts, as in the Middle East and Central Africa, (4) state failure, and (5) organized crime. And it recognizes that these could combine to constitute a truly radical threat.

These threats are familiar, but it is interesting that the strategy mentions state failure rather than rogue states as sources of instability, terrorism, and crime. And there may also be a difference in threat perception. Let me quote the opening sentence: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, or so free.” (Different threats are discussed but not mentioned here.) This is different from “America is at war.”

Now for two basic principles of the EU’s strategy. First, a commitment to upholding and developing international rules and institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN), as it has the primary responsibility for international peace; in other words, a policy

of effective multilateralism. And here proliferation of WMD is a high priority; multilateral rules must be implemented properly.

Second, emphasis is on using the full range of instruments available to tackle the threats, civil instruments in particular, such as political pressure, economic incentives, development aid, law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and military intervention if necessary. The EU has such civil instruments—for example, it is the world's largest donor of development aid—and is developing a certain military capability.

To make this more concrete, let me mention two specific policies. First is the policy towards the EU neighborhood, the countries of the Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Caucasus and Ukraine, which are not candidates for membership. EU has a vital interest in neighbors that are stable, prosperous, and well-governed. So it has launched a policy to build close relations with each of them, through agreements and action plans suited to the needs of the partner country.

Second is counterterrorism. In addition to what is done at national level, the EU has acted, in particular, in two areas:

1. Cooperation on law enforcement in order to help national police forces and judiciaries to work together effectively. The EU adopted several laws, for example, one on the definition and punishment of terrorist acts as serious criminal offenses; and one making extradition automatic for terrorist offenses. Also, it has established two agencies to improve cooperation: Europol (police) and Eurojust (prosecutors).

2. EU standards for protection of civil aviation and of maritime ports. The EU has laid down legally binding standards that apply at all airports and ports

except the smallest. And the Commission recently made a proposal on the protection of infrastructure that is critical at the European level.

The EU strategy provides for military intervention when called for, and has defined three possible missions: (1) humanitarian and rescue, (2) peacekeeping, and (3) crisis management, including peacemaking and stabilization after crises.

Long-term missions could widen, as capabilities develop. To carry out such missions, nearly 10 years ago the EU agreed to establish a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men deployable for 1 year. This capability gradually is being formed but, as defense expenditure is a small part of gross domestic product (GDP) in the EU, a major effort is being made to combine national resources and to use them to improve capabilities more effectively, which will take time.

Nevertheless, with the capabilities available, the EU has carried out a number of peacekeeping and policing operations, mainly in the Balkans and Africa, but also in Palestine, both within and outside NATO. This, then, is a rough outline of the EU's security strategy, in particular as it concerns maintaining the stability of states and managing crises. It allows for autonomous action by the EU, but also advocates a balanced and active partnership with the United States. Together the EU and the United States can achieve much more acting together than alone.

ENDNOTES - Mr. Wilson

1. European Council, March 20-21, 2003, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, Belgium, May 5, 2003, available at ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/75136.pdf, accessed on September 18, 2008.

“Terrorism and Peacekeeping,” by Dr. Volker C. Franke.

The next president’s agenda is full, and the challenges are plenty and daunting. To take stock briefly: Since 9/11, American leadership has started wars in two countries and threatened to use force against several others, withdrawn from international treaties and violated international laws, bullied adversaries and alienated allies, pressured friends, and angered public opinion worldwide. In many ways, the Bush administration’s foreign policy choices have not only undermined America’s position as a global leader, but may have also contributed to a general decline in peace and security around the world.

Key on the next president’s agenda will be to counter an increasing array of threats effectively, while at the same time improving America’s global image. This will require a paradigm shift in U.S. national security strategy that entails multilateral engagement, civilian crisis prevention and conflict resolution capabilities, and sensible public diplomacy. The purpose of these remarks is to briefly examine America’s global image problems and present Germany’s strategic commitment to nonmilitary conflict resolution as an alternative framework for devising foreign policy. While the German approach cannot be a blueprint for U.S. security policy, much might be learned from its strategic premises and its intended execution.

America’s Global Image.

Washington’s strategic failures in its global war on terrorism and its “go-it-alone” approach to international affairs has hurt America’s image abroad.

Between 2000 and 2006, America's global reputation has been slipping consistently and support for the war on terrorism has been steadily declining, even among close allies.¹ America's image is particularly tarnished in the Muslim world. For instance, only 30 percent of people in Indonesia and 27 percent in Pakistan now have a favorable impression of the United States, with still lower figures for Jordan (15 percent) and Turkey (12 percent).² Even more telling: A poll conducted among young South Koreans following the Iraq invasion revealed that, in the event of a war between the United States and North Korea, two-thirds (65.9 percent) would side with their neighbors to the North.³ While only 1 percent of Iraqis approve of terrorism, polls show that more than 50 percent approve of attacks on U.S. troops.⁴

These figures indicate that among the top priorities of the next president's foreign policy agenda will be to restore America's tarnished image. To do so effectively will require a thorough analysis of the root causes and a series of strategic steps to remedy them. Among the root causes of global anti-American sentiment are:

- Widespread disagreement with current U.S. foreign policy;
- A perception that U.S.-led global expansion has been unilateral, exploitative, and exclusionary;
- A feeling that U.S. (pop) culture has become all-pervasive, thereby threatening local culture, mores, and social norms;
- An impression of the "American collective personality" as loud, arrogant, insensitive, and ignorant.⁵

Remedying America's image problem and addressing emerging security problems are two sides of the same coin: Washington needs the cooperation of

governments around the world, and especially in the Muslim world. And Washington needs to secure the trust and support of local populations in those countries for its policies. America, so suggests the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power, must revitalize its ability to inspire and persuade instead of relying merely on military might.⁶

More specifically, the report recommends: The United States must become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good—providing things people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership. By complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges.⁷

This, the authors suggest, can be accomplished by: (1) reinvigorating alliances, partnerships, and institutions that serve U.S. interests; (2) elevating the role of development in U.S. foreign policy to help align American interests with the aspirations of people around the world; and (3) improving public diplomacy to “win the hearts and minds” of foreign publics. In other words, improving America’s performance abroad will serve to boost its global image. But America’s foreign policy must be based on a coherent comprehensive strategy that is also supported by the American public. What should such an approach entail? The German example may provide some valuable insights.

Civil Crisis Prevention – the German Approach.

In response to the critics of Germany’s military involvement in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, the Federal Government in May 2004

passed its Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” which calls for a “coordinated, multilateral, civilian-military, preventive approach by state and nonstate actors using all available instruments as the response to new threat scenarios.”⁸ Implementation of the Action Plan requires the coordinated effort of *all* federal ministries in a coherent fashion based on an extended conception of security (based roughly on the concept of “human security”) and a broad interpretation of crisis prevention as policy before, during, and after armed conflict.

The Action Plan reflects Germany’s multilateral approach to conflict management: it follows the logic of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 as well as the European Consensus on Development of 2005, and explicitly promotes the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security. Operationally, the Action Plan details 161 specific actions to be undertaken over a period of 5-10 years, aiming to strengthen crisis prevention through a preventive and integrative security and development policy which aims at overcoming poverty and developing functioning, democratic governments, expanding existing international conventions so that conflicts can be subjected to legal adjudication, and promoting effective multilateralism by strengthening the UN and regional organizations.⁹

In its assessment of the initial 2-year period (2004-06), the government concluded that:

The Action Plan has played a substantial part in bringing about the improved orientation of Germany’s crisis prevention engagement and in visibly enhancing the status of this policy field. In the past, it was hard to

establish crisis prevention as a comprehensive policy field comparable to the traditional policy fields. It is thanks not least to the Action Plan that crisis prevention has increasingly also become established as an element of security policy.¹⁰

Among the most tangible effects of the Action Plan has been a significant recent budget increase for the Foreign Office for civilian crisis prevention from some 12 million euros in FY 2007 to more than 90 million euros in 2008. This money is (in nearly equal parts) to be used to finance projects in three areas: peacebuilding (ca. €37 million), crisis prevention (ca. €25 million), and peace and security for Africa (ca. €30 million). In addition to the increase in appropriations for direct measures of crisis prevention, German Chancellor Angela Merkel also pledged to increase German development assistance by 750 million euros annually between 2008-11 in order for Germany to reach the nearly 4-decade old goal of allocating 0.7 percent of the gross national product (GNP) to development assistance.¹¹

Implementing the Agenda – What the Next President Can Do.

The discussion thus far has shown that the next president's agenda is characterized by the need to combat emerging threats effectively and to repair America's tarnished image. But Washington is already moving in a direction that promises, at a minimum, greater flexibility, sensitivity, and multilateral cooperation. The decisions to elevate stability operations and institutionalize civilian post-conflict reconstruction as core tasks of the U.S. foreign and security policy portfolio are first steps in this direction, and are finding

growing support among national security experts and the American public.

A survey conducted by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) in August 2007 shows widespread public support for a foreign policy agenda designed around nonmilitary conflict resolution strategies, multilateralism, and proactive engagement with other countries.¹² The PIPA polls show that between two-thirds and three-fourths of Americans support U.S. engagement in the world and reject calls for a more isolationist stance and the idea that the United States should play the role of hegemon or dominant world leader. Instead, *a very strong majority favors U.S. participation in multilateral efforts to deal with international problems and on a cooperative approach wherein the United States is attentive to the views of other countries. Consequently, very strong majorities favor the administration to support and work through international institutions and participate in collective security structures and multilateral approaches for preventing and combating terrorism, addressing international environmental issues, and providing aid for economic development.* These polls also show that Americans believe that U.S. foreign policy should be oriented to the global interest, and that serving the global interest ultimately also serves the national interest. Finally, large majorities of Americans are aware that the United States is viewed negatively in other countries and see this perception as a result of current U.S. foreign policy and not American values. What remains on the next president's agenda is a fundamental paradigm shift that conceives of security and development as intrinsically connected components of a coherent and comprehensive national security strategy. Concrete steps may include:

1. Developing a more comprehensive set of civilian crisis response mechanisms for which the German model may serve as a point of reference.

2. Prioritizing civilian and multilateral crisis response to the unilateral use of force.

3. Improving local civil capacity and the delivery and quality of government services. Not only will this be much more cost-effective than (sustained) military intervention, it will also enhance local ownership and the perception of the U.S. military as “liberators” as opposed to “occupiers.” Particularly important in this respect are the rapid demobilization of ex-combatants and their sustainable reintegration into civil society, the democratic transformation of the security sector, and the successful hand-over of security responsibilities to local security and government forces. This strategy will also facilitate the controlled and continued draw down of U.S. troops from the theater and aid implementation of a feasible exit strategy.

4. Expanding intelligence gathering capabilities (“early warning”) through establishing broad-based trust among local communities, thereby persistently improving local perceptions toward U.S. security and development assistance.

5. Improving the interagency process between the primary players (White House, DoD, State, National Security Council [NSC], Department of Homeland Security [DHS], and Congress) and involve all departments (Department of the Interior [DOI], Department of Energy [DOE], Department of Education, the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], and the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]) in the development and implementation of a comprehensive security strategy.

6. Including relevant civilian nongovernmental actors in the development of the new security

strategy and its implementation on the ground (e.g., humanitarian nongovernment organizations [NGOs], human rights watch organizations, think tanks, and the private sector).

Improved (measurable) performance in these areas will likely result in enhanced cooperation from international allies, a lowered risk of continued and escalating insurgency/violence, and broad-based popular support both at home and abroad. Improving performance will require the next president to change not just America's security strategy, but its entire security paradigm. Security and development cannot be separated. Therefore, the president's agenda must be based on an extended conception of security. Changing America's security paradigm may prove an uphill battle and will require the next incumbent to skillfully use his perhaps most important power: the power to persuade.¹³ To bring about such a paradigm shift, the next president will have to become an effective "Persuader-in-Chief" for "smart (power) politics" based on multilateral engagement and a comprehensive approach to civilian crisis prevention and peacebuilding. Indeed, the stakes are high—but the time is now, and the American (and foreign) people are ready!

ENDNOTES – Dr. Franke

1. For instance, a 2006 Pew study found that Washington's favorability ratings dropped between 2000 and 2006 from 83 percent to 56 percent in Great Britain, from 62 percent to 39 percent in France, from 78 percent to 37 percent in Germany, and from 76 percent to 63 percent in Japan. See pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252, last accessed on March 5, 2008.

2. *Ibid.*

3. F. William Smullen, "The Battle for World Opinion," *Security + Peace*, Vol. 3, forthcoming.

4. David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008, p. xxvi.

5. See Keith Reinhard, "Defending Ideals And Defining the Message," Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Hearing On The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy, August 23, 2004, available at www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/action/written_testimony.pdf, last accessed March 5, 2008.

6. Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, "A Smarter, More Secure America," Report of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007. For further information on the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, see www.csis.org/smartpower/, last accessed March 7, 2008.

7. Armitage and Nye, p. 8.

8. German Federal Government, "Working together to Strengthen Security and Stability through Crisis Prevention," 2006, p. 15, available at www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Krisenpraevention/Aktionsplan1Bericht0506-EN.pdf, last accessed March 12, 2008. The English text version of the Action Plan is available at cms.ifa.de/fileadmin/content/foerderprogramme/zivik/downloads/aktionsplan_volltext_en.pdf, last accessed on March 4, 2008.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

11. See www.socialwatch.org/es/informeImpreso/pdfs/lanzet-vandamme2007_ger.pdf, last accessed March 5, 2008.

12. For details, see www.americans-world.org/d/digest/overview/us_role/usrole_summary.cfm, last accessed March 5, 2008.

13. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, New York: Free Press, 1990.

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
"LEADERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY
REFORM AGENDA"**

The Honorable James R. Locher III

I am delighted to participate in this timely symposium focused on a critical issue: the leadership role the next president must play in achieving far-reaching national security reforms. Our national security posture is precarious. We are seriously overextended and have lost our strategic agility. David Abshire of the Center for the Study of the Presidency has written of the leadership challenges facing the next president:

A storm is gathering, threatening the celebrations that will surround the inauguration of the President-elect on January 20, 2009. Already, we have begun to see the erosion of America's strategic and financial freedom, the hollowing of its military, and the faltering of its ability to create and lead meaningful alliances. Worse may yet come. The President will inherit a polarized nation and a host of profound challenges at home and abroad.

High on the next president's agenda must be reform of the national security system, the cross-government mechanisms used to establish objectives, make policy, formulate plans, and execute missions. This system encompasses the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council and their subordinate committees. The national security system occupies that space between the departments and the president. Reform must be a priority because our current organizational arrangements are outmoded, suited to an earlier era. They are not capable of responding to

today's threats and challenges. Although the Homeland Security Council was created in 2001, it is modeled on the National Security Council which was established by the National Security Act of 1947. Of our antiquated arrangements, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has observed, ". . . we have tried to overcome post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War." Imagine the tremendous changes in all fields that have occurred over that 60-year period while our organizational arrangements have remained relatively unchanged.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States has suffered a number of painful setbacks: (a) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; (b) troubled stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (3) an inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. These setbacks are not coincidental; they are evidence of a system failure. Our national security system is not capable of handling the threats and challenges that confront us in today's complex, fast-paced world. This is not about the lack of talent or commitment by our national security professionals in all departments and agencies. They are working incredibly hard and with unsurpassed dedication. The problem is that much of their hard work is wasted by a dysfunctional system.

Problems.

There are dozens of problems in our national security system, but three are key. First, we are not able to integrate the diverse expertise and capabilities of our departments and agencies. Our challenges require effective whole of government integration—but we remain in outmoded, bureaucratic, inward-looking,

competitive departmental stovepipes. Some have begun to sarcastically call these stovepipes “cylinders of excellence.” We need to be able to work horizontally across department and agency boundaries, but we are constrained by a vertical government that permits the placement of a premium on the parochial desires of the departments and agencies at the expense of genuine national requirements. In sum, our organizational arrangements are misaligned with our security challenges.

The second problem is that civilian departments and agencies are under-resourced and culturally and administratively unprepared for national security roles. We have heard a great deal about this issue, especially from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. He recently said, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.” Part of the problem of the inabilities of civilian departments and agencies stems from our outdated definition of national security. With World War II in mind, the National Security Council focused on military, diplomacy, and intelligence—we still have that focus. We know that national security today is much broader and includes finance and economics, law enforcement and legal information, energy, health, and the environment.

Third, Congress—which is also stovepiped in committees with narrow jurisdictions—reinforces divisions in the Executive Branch. Congress focuses on the parts and cannot address a whole-of-government approach to national security missions. Congress is worse off because it never had its own National Security Act of 1947. These problems and others in the national security system are not new. Our

system has almost never been capable of addressing national security missions with a whole of government approach. We have seldom been able to integrate all of the instruments of national power. We could not do it in Vietnam, or Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, or elsewhere. We have faced horizontal challenges with a vertical government for many decades.

Our shortcomings, however, have become more serious in recent years. Why? Two answers: complexity and rapidity of change. In an increasingly complex and rapidly paced world, our vertical stovepipes are less and less capable. The gap between our capacities and the demands being placed on the national security system is widening. This is a frightening conclusion. Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives and a member of the Project on National Security Reform, stated: "We have met the enemy, and it is our bureaucracy."

Reform Agenda.

What must be done? Sweeping reforms of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Marginal changes will not do. We need a 21st century government for 21st century challenges. Bringing our government from 1947 to today will take an enormous effort. We envision three sets of reforms.

(1) New presidential directives governing the operation of the national security system. The next president could make enormous changes on his or her own through these directives. Although he or she would lack some authorities and could not create a permanent system, they could start the transformation that is required.

(2) A new national security act, replacing many provisions of the 1947 Act. It will be the National

Security Act of 2009. One key provision may be to merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single council. The bifurcation of national security at the water's edge has proven to be a major organizational weakness.

(3) Amendments to Senate and House rules to bring about necessary congressional reforms. One key possibility is to create Select Committees on Interagency Affairs in the Senate and House of Representatives. These would be peopled by the chairman and ranking minority members of the committees with national security jurisdictions—seven in the Senate and eight in the House. Create a horizontal team on Capitol Hill that could take whole of government approaches to national security missions. This team would empower and oversee the national security system.

This reform agenda will be pursued with the same rigorous methodology that produced the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It would understand the history of how we arrive at our current organizations and processes; analyze the underlying assumptions; and identify the problems and their causes. This is 95 percent of the intellectual effort. Get beyond the symptoms. The patient has a 104 degree temperature, but what is the fundamental illness? Look at all of the elements of organizational effectiveness: vision and values, processes, structure, leadership and organizational culture, personnel incentives and preparation, and resources. See the importance of leaders with incredible skills of collaboration; develop an integrated set of solutions that directly relates to the problems and to an even greater extent causes; and give major attention to implementation—50 percent of achieving the desired outcome.

Challenges and the Role of Leadership.

Change is never easy. Transforming the world's most important, most complex organization will be incredibly challenging. The defenders of the status quo can be formidable opponents. The status quo preserves the interests of the departments and agencies over broader and genuine national requirements. It should be understood that when departmental representatives come together under National Security Council or Homeland Security Council auspices, they are there to defend the interests and prerogatives of their departments. Those are their instructions. They are rewarded by success in carrying out those instructions and punished if they fail to do so. This parochial orientation is the largest obstacle that must be overcome. The national need must become supreme.

Despite the obstacles, major reforms can be achieved. I have been a central figure in three major reform efforts—each an historic success: (1) the Goldwater-Nichols Act—which unified the Pentagon and created the world's premier joint warfighting force; (2) special operations and low-intensity conflict reforms—which created the Special Operations Command and the magnificent Special Operations Forces that played extraordinary roles in Afghanistan and Iraq; and (3) defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina—which took the three warring factions and put them into one military establishment and on the path to one army—which they have achieved. My experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina made my previous U.S. reform efforts pale by comparison. In each case, 95 percent of experts judged that reform was impossible. The many naysayers to these earlier reforms remind me of a quotation by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis:

“Most of the things worth doing in the world had been declared impossible before they were done.”

As in the case of these earlier reforms, national security reform will take visionary leadership and the skilled application of change management techniques. George Bernard Shaw said, “Reformers have the idea that change can be achieved by brute sanity.” It can’t. It must be skillfully managed, especially its political dimensions. We have some problems here because we don’t prepare civilian government officials for leadership roles, we promote the best specialists, we make the best brain surgeon the hospital administrator. We don’t study change management.

A little story in this regard: I was asked to give a lecture on leadership to government officials in a short course at Tufts University. These officials were the mid-career stars of their departments and agencies—the best and the brightest with promising futures. As I started my lecture, I ask how many of them aspired to be assistant secretary or higher. All of the hands shot up. I then asked how many of them had read any of the then top 10 leading books on leadership. Not a single person had read one. I then asked about how many had undertaken formal study of leadership. No one. I then asked if anyone had systematically observed the leadership of their bosses. Here many had observed bad leadership in action. Unfortunately, this anecdote is not an isolated incident.

To students in the audience who are about to start a career in public service, let me offer the following advice. First, you must build your expertise in your area of specialization. This is the bedrock of every career and will make you valuable. But what will make you an incredible asset to the government is to become a visionary leader. This will take some work and study. And to become a visionary leader, you

will need to be skilled at change management. The top priority for leaders in today's turbulent world is managing change. There is a whole field of study on change management. Become an ardent student of this powerful knowledge.

Project on National Security Reform.

I have devoted the last 2 years working to bring about such historic change in the national security system. I am leading the Project on National Security Reform sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Our goal is approval of a new system early in the next administration. I have a distinguished coalition of former officials guiding the Project on National Security Reform: Brent Scowcroft, Jim Steinberg, Newt Gingrich, Tom Pickering, Norm Augustine, General Jim Jones, and 15 others of great expertise and experience; 300 national security professionals on 14 working groups; the support of the Department of Defense (DoD), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, and Homeland Security Council staff; cooperative Agreement with DoD; and a caucus of 15 members in the House of Representatives, 30-35 House supporters and 10-12 senators. There is an interim report as of July 1, and a final report as of September 1.

The interim report analyzes problems, causes, and consequences; the final report provides alternative solutions, their evaluation, and an integrated set of recommendations; and, immediately after the election:

1. draft presidential directives,
2. draft national security act,
3. draft amendments to Senate and House rules,

and

4. implementation plans.

But the next president will have the most important leadership role to play. The opposition cannot be overcome without a strong commitment from and active involvement of the president. Working with the three remaining presidential campaigns: the John McCain, Barack Obama, and Hilary Clinton teams are aware of our agenda and are interested. On July 13, 2007, McCain stated:

To better coordinate our disparate efforts, I would ask Congress for a civilian follow-on to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which fostered a culture of joint operations within the separate military services. Today we need similar legislation to ensure that civil servants and soldiers train and work together in peacetime so that they can cooperate effectively in wartime and in postwar reconstruction.

We must make national security reform a campaign issue. You cannot be elected president unless you have a plan for fixing the nation's antiquated security system. Government's premier responsibility should be a commitment to act within first 100 days in office. If you don't hear about national security reform during the campaigns, you will know that the Project on National Security Reform is working feverishly on Plan B.

Conclusion.

National security reform must happen. The nation's security cannot be adequately preserved without 21st century organizations using 21st century leadership and management techniques. The nation will be best

served if bold reforms are initiated at the start of the next administration. Moving this large mountain, however, might take longer, but eventually it will happen. The need is that compelling.

An incredibly broad and powerful coalition will be needed to make this transformation happen. This includes presidential candidates and eventually a president, members of Congress, Executive Branch officials, think tanks, universities, businesses, and concerned citizens. As this symposium evidences, the Bush School is part of this grand coalition. My hat is off to Dean Chilcoat, Dr. Cerami, and their colleagues who were early champions of national security reform. We are looking to recruit others to their ranks. I began my speech by quoting David Abshire's description of the gathering storm the next president will face. He observes, "The clouds have been forming for many years; the rain has begun. But deluge is not inevitable. This is no natural storm; it is a creation of man—and man has the power to ward it off. The time for action is now." A determined effort is underway to produce that needed action. I solicit your support.

**DEBATE:
THE NEXT PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENDA**

Moderator: Dr. Joseph R. Cerami

Panelists:

The Republican Party and National Security, Dr. Michael C. Desch, The Bush School of Texas A&M University

The Democratic Party and National Security, Dr. James M. Lindsay, The LBJ School of the University of Texas at Austin

"The 2008 Election: The Republican Party and National Security," Remarks by Dr. Michael C. Desch (Summary by Mr. Sam Binkley).

Dr. Desch pointed out that Senator McCain has built a platform atop two columns of foreign and domestic policy. First, Senator McCain consistently advocates the Bush administration's approach to terrorism as an essential and effective national security policy. Second, he views free trade and economic liberalization as the preferred economic strategies for the United States.

Dr. Desch noted that national security has been a traditional Republican strength, and the Democratic candidates will continue help Senator McCain's command of the issue because they remain so divided on the subject. On one hand, Senator Clinton voted for the Iraq War in 2003, and she has—thus far—been unable to overcome her voting record with antiwar voters. Senator Obama, on the other hand, maintains a much clearer position on the war: he will "cut and run," which is desirable for some voters, but unacceptable for most national security voters.

Senator McCain holds the notion that the surge in Iraq is working, and cites three indicators of its success. First, violence in Iraq is down a significant amount, some 60 percent in recent months. Second, Iraqis are now rallying around the United States and the Iraqi government, indicating that nationalism is finally starting to take hold in the fragmented country. Third, General David Petraeus has served as a successful commander in Iraq and holds the strategy for success in the conflict.

Still, several dangers exist that threaten our operations in Iraq. First, the weakening of our resolve on the home front undermines the spirit and motivation of our service members fighting in the Middle East. Second, many of Iraq's current problems are caused by Syria and Iran. Curbing relations from Damascus and Tehran is necessary to limit this dangerous, unwanted influence. Third, with regard to the leadership of U.S. forces in Iraq, switching horses in midstream would be a mistake. For the sake of continuity of command and policy, Dr. Desch stressed that General Petraeus must remain in Iraq. (Note: Since these remarks in March, General Petraeus has been promoted to Central Command Commander and replaced by his Iraq deputy, General Odierno.)

Senator McCain cedes, however, that the Bush administration has not acted vigorously enough in taking the fight to the terrorists. He points to the enemy as Islamic extremists who embrace terror, and states that we need to take the fight to both terrorist entities and state sponsors of terror. The linchpin to this policy is the bolstering of regional allies, including Israel, to support our counterterrorism operations in the Middle East.

Despite an emphasis on terrorism, Senator McCain recognizes that the threat of conventional warfare with other states still exists. The United States, under a McCain presidency, will likely see an increase in the size of conventional forces by 100,000 troops, accompanied by the continued modernization of the U.S. military and development of new, innovative strategies and capabilities to wage war. On a larger scale, Senator McCain will likely continue to support the development of a ballistic missile defense program to protect the United States against rogue nations and future adversaries such as China.

The Republican Party will argue that Senator McCain will oversee this revolution of military affairs in an effective manner, limiting defense spending while still obtaining state-of-the-art materiel. In addition he will reform procurement methods, as indicated by his support of the Air Force's recent selection of a Lockheed/European consortium over Boeing to develop the next generation of in-flight refueling aircraft. Moreover, Senator McCain will seek to complete the defense budget within the annual budget process.

With regard to the economy, Dr. Desch pointed out that both Democratic candidates are ambivalent on free trade, though Senator McCain's position on North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will undoubtedly be a key feature of the Democratic argument. During the Democratic primary campaign both Senators Clinton and Obama have waffled on free trade and issues pertaining to NAFTA, but Senator McCain supports both free trade and reduced trade barriers. To legitimize free trade initiatives with Republican voters, Senator McCain will pursue domestic educational reform to increase the competitiveness of the American worker in the international

market. Moreover, Senator McCain is an advocate of energy independence and seeks to use market mechanisms to wean the United States off foreign oil.

Dr. Desch also highlighted that the least amount of daylight exists between the candidates' platforms on the issue of immigration. Illegal immigration is a both a cultural issue and a national security issue, though the existence of an uncontrolled border complicates matters. Senator McCain must rely on a credible policy to curb illegal immigration while, at the same time, develop a realistic policy to address reasons why migrants come to the United States.

In the end, Dr. Desch's emphasized that voters can garner four main points from Senator McCain's campaign and pursuit of the presidency: (1) Democrats want to lose in Iraq; (2) Democrats are weak on terrorism; (3) Democrats are not committed to national defense; and (4) Democrats will break the economy.

"The 2008 Election: The Democratic Party and National Security," Remarks by Dr. James M. Lindsay (Summary by Mr. Sam Binkley).

Dr. Lindsay introduced the Democratic Party platform by highlighting three main challenges that the next President would have to face once in office, and argued that a democratic nominee would be better equipped to meet these challenges.

1. *Leaders need followers.* The U.S. Government's policies are radioactive in many parts of the world. Dr. Lindsay suggested that President George W. Bush has helped propagate the image of a hegemonic America that is on the loose—an image that has caused other nations to distance themselves from us. American foreign policy must master the art of winning followers

through persuasion and not compellence if it is to be successful.

2. *The nature of power.* Dr. Lindsay argued that McCain's downfall is that he does not understand the true nature of power and is ill-suited for the challenges we face today. While America needs success in the proliferation of weapons and maintaining its hard power, there also needs to be a shift towards soft power. He calls for a return to diplomacy and the doctrine of give-and-take for effective conflict resolution rather than a flexing of muscles.

3. *Globalization and Economics.* Globalization is remaking the world as we know it. There is an increased focus on economic cooperation and trade – an area that, as Dr. Lindsay argued, McCain knows nothing about. McCain's free trade agenda is a policy that will not receive much support. The American public remains skeptical of the benefits of free trade if the benefits are not distributed equally.

Dr. Lindsay then offered some criticism as well as recommendations on key policy issues. The first concerned Iraq. He argued that no one imagined that troops would still be fighting in Iraq in 2008. Yet, the costly war continues and places a tremendous strain on the U.S. military. In the end, the Iraqis are the only ones who can win or lose. Therefore, the sooner we get out of Iraq, the faster they can get to their business and the more support we will have for Afghanistan. The second issue Dr. Lindsay touched on, however briefly, was the issue of free trade. He argued that if McCain continues his policies on free trade, he will need to negotiate protections within the free trade agreements. Dr. Lindsay then argued that Republicans do not realize the dangers inherent in securing nuclear weapons.

Potential theft of nuclear weapons or materials should push the United States to rely less on them as well as push forward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. U.S. foreign policy will need a major shift in perspective if it is to steer away from the policies pursued in the recent past.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Dr. Joseph R. Cerami

Thanks to James Lindsay and Michael Desch for debating many of the important issues facing the next presidential administration.

For those of you who have been with us throughout the conference, I know that, like me, you have a better feel for the complex array of international challenges facing the next administration. I think that today national security must include discussions of homeland security, human security, and economic security (at the very least).

Thanks again to our panel: Robin Dorff, Richard McCall, Volker Franke, and John Wilson; and our keynote speaker, the Honorable James Locher, for sharing their experiences and insights.

It will be interesting to see how the positions of the candidates and parties continue to evolve between now and November.

For me, our debate (and colloquium) symbolizes the best in American politics. The nature of our competitive and adversarial political system always creates interest and, of course, tension. Every 4 years our citizens have the opportunity to pause, reflect, and then decide for themselves on the direction of the country and who they want to lead us for the next 4 years.

So, let me conclude by saying, in a nonpartisan way—may the party and candidates with the best ideas and leaders win in November.

ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS

SAM BINKLEY is a student in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is pursuing a Masters' degree in International Affairs with focuses on Defense Policy, Intelligence as an Instrument of Statecraft, and Regional Studies. He received a B.S. in Psychology, with a minor in History, from Texas A&M University.

JOSEPH R. CERAMI joined the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in August 2001, teaching National Security Studies in the Masters Program in International Affairs. Dr. Cerami was appointed as the founding Director of the Bush School's Public Service Leadership Program in 2002. His last assignment was as the Chairman of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA, from 1998-2001. He is a graduate of the USAWC. In 1995 Dr. Cerami was awarded a Certificate from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Program for Senior Officials in National Security. He completed his doctoral studies in the Penn State University's School of Public Affairs. He and James F. Holcomb, Jr., are the co-editors of the *Army War College Guide to Strategy* (2001). In 2007, Dr. Cerami and Mr. Jay W. Boggs co-edited the *Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare*, available on line at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=828.

RICHARD A. (DICK) CHILCOAT, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.) joined the Bush School in 2001 as Dean and holder of the Edward and Howard Kruse Endowed Chair. He holds an undergraduate degree from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY, and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. Chilcoat has directed and facilitated the Army Strategic Leadership Course for Army general officers, served as the 43d Commandant of the USAWC, and was appointed as the 9th President of the National Defense University by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving in this post until 2000. His military service included combat tours in Vietnam; staff and command tours of duty in the infantry, aviation, operations, and policy and strategy; and Executive Assistant to General Colin Powell during the First Gulf War. Throughout his long military career, he served as an educator and trainer, to include Assistant to the Dean of the USMA Academic Board, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, and member, USMA Athletic Board. During his cadet career, he was First Captain and Brigade Commander of the Corps of Cadets, President of the Class of 1964, and captain of the varsity basketball team. Retiring after 42 years of active military service, he provided professional consulting services to business and academic enterprises about education and training, executive professional development, and leadership prior to his arrival at the Bush School. He frequently lectures on the subjects of national security affairs, professional military education, strategic leadership, transformation, and change management and currently serves as a member of the Board of Visitors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) University, a Class Trustee of the Association of Graduates for the USMA, and a member of the Board of Directors for the National Defense University Foundation.

MICHAEL DESCH is the founding Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs (in 2004) and is the first holder of the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Prior to that, he was Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. From 1993 through 1998, he was Assistant Director and Senior Research Associate at the Olin Institute. He spent 2 years (1988-90) as a John M. Olin Post-doctoral Fellow in National Security at Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and a year (1990-91) as a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California before joining the faculty of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside (1991-93). He received his B.A. (with honors) in Political Science (1982) from Marquette University, and his A.M. in International Relations (1984) and Ph.D. in Political Science (1988) from the University of Chicago. He is the author of *When the Third World Matters: Latin American and U.S. Grand Strategy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); co-editor of *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment* (Albany: State University Press, 1998); editor of *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), and has published scholarly articles and reviews

in *Foreign Affairs*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *Survival*, and other leading journals.

ROBIN DORFF joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2007 as Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He previously served on the USAWC faculty as a Visiting Professor (1994-96) and as Professor of National Security Policy and Strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy (1997-2004), where he also held the General Maxwell D. Taylor Chair (1999-2002) and served as Department Chairman (2001-04). Dr. Dorff has been a Senior Advisor with Creative Associates International, Inc., in Washington, DC, and served as Executive Director of the Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC (2004-06). His research interests include these topics as well as failing and fragile states, interagency processes and policy formulation, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and U.S. grand strategy. He lectures frequently on these topics at institutions such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the George C. Marshall Center, the Marine Corps University, the Joint Special Operations School, the National Defense University of Taiwan, and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. He is the author or co-author of three books and numerous journal articles. Dr. Dorff is the recipient of the U.S. Army Superior Civilian Service Award and the U.S. Army Outstanding Civilian Service Medal, and seven USAWC Faculty Published Writing Awards (1996-2001, 2004). Professor Dorff holds a B.A. in Political Science from Colorado College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

VOLKER C. FRANKE joined the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), one of Germany's premier peace and conflict research and capacity building institutes, as Director of Research in 2006. He is also Associate Professor (on leave) of Political Science and International Studies at McDaniel College in Westminster, MD. Currently, Dr. Franke serves on the German Foreign Ministry's Advisory Council on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and the Scientific Advisory Board of the German Foundation of Peace Research. In addition, he served as Director and Managing Editor of the National Security Studies Case Studies Program at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (1998-2007). Dr. Franke holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, a Master of Public Administration degree from North Carolina State University, and an MA in political science and sociology from Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany. He is the author of *Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value-Orientations, and Professional Military Education* (Praeger, 1999) and numerous journal articles on social identity, peace and security studies, and military socialization. He is also the editor of *Terrorism and Peacekeeping: New Security Challenges* (Praeger, 2005) and *Security in a Changing World: Case Studies in U.S. National Security Management* (Praeger, 2002).

JAMES M. LINDSAY is Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin, where he holds the Tom Slick Chair for International Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. Before

coming to Austin, he was Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, Dr. Lindsay was Deputy Director and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and a professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa. In 1996-97, he was Director for Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. Dr. Lindsay has written extensively on various aspects of American government, foreign policy, and international relations. His book with Ivo H. Daalder, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, was awarded the 2003 Lionel Gelber Award and selected as a top book of 2003 by *The Economist*. Dr. Lindsay holds an A.B. in economics and political science (highest distinction, highest honors) from the University of Michigan and an M.A., M. Phil., and Ph.D. from Yale University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LOCHER III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, is a graduate of West Point and the Harvard Business School. He has worked in the White House, Pentagon, and Senate. He served as the senior staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee for the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and later for the Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created the U.S. Special Operations Command. In the first Bush and early Clinton administrations, Locher served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. In 2003-04, he chaired the Defense Reform Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that successfully merged the three warring factions

into a single military establishment and began the move toward a single army. Currently, Locher is the Executive Director of the nonpartisan Project on National Security Reform, which was established to assist the nation in reforming its national security system to meet the challenges of the 21st century. He is the author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, published by Texas A&M University Press.

RICHARD MCCALL is the Senior Vice President for Programs, Creative Associates International, Inc. He leads and manages Creative Associate's Communities in Transition and Education Mobilization and Communications divisions. He is also in charge of a major Creative effort in Iraq, the Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education Project funded by USAID. Previously, he served as chief of staff to the USAID Administrator Brian Atwood and later a Senior Policy Advisor to two subsequent USAID administrators, Brady Anderson and Andrew Natsios. In more than a decade of service to USAID, he worked on conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. He also helped develop a broad conflict management and mitigation strategy for USAID. He also has vast experience in peace negotiations and has served as a senior foreign policy advisor in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government. He served on the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations where he was recognized for his contributions to the peace process in El Salvador. After he received a bachelor of arts from Hastings College, NE, he studied law at the University of Nebraska College of Law. He is a board member of the Falls Church Education Foundation which is raising a \$10 million endowment for the Falls Church City Public

Schools in Virginia that will provide supplemental funding for student programs and teacher leadership programs. He also is a board member of the Center for Multi-Cultural Human Services which provides social and counseling services to immigrant families in transition in northern Virginia.

LISA MOORMAN is originally from Houston, TX. Ms. Moorman received her bachelor's degree in Marketing from Texas A&M University in May 2006. Ms. Moorman has served as an intern to the Scowcroft Group in Washington, DC, an international business consulting firm. She is a student at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. Her studies have focused on international economic development. She graduated with a master's degree in May 2008, and moved to Washington, DC, to work for the International Food Policy Research Institute.

JOHN WILSON works for the European Commission in Brussels, whose main role is to propose policies for the European Union. For the last 3 years he has worked on aviation security, part of the EU's policy on domestic security, preparing proposals to revise and extend it. He is now a visiting fellow at the Bush School, working on transport security. After a spell as an economist in the British government in Edinburgh, he has spent his career in the European Commission, preparing and negotiating proposals in different fields: first in regional policy, when the first steps were taken to move from simple financial transfers to a policy; then in the external relations of the European Union, he worked successively on strengthening relations with Mediterranean countries before the accession of Spain and Portugal, on an agreement with Yugoslavia when

it was still a federal republic, and on trade and political relations with Japan at the height of the Japanese boom. He then moved to transport policy and helped initiate the measures to reform and liberalize the railway sector. He then worked on aviation policy, in particular the development of passengers' rights, before moving to aviation security. John Wilson is British, and pro-European, and studied economics and political science at Oxford and urban planning at Glasgow University.

ABOUT THE SPONSORS

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. Army's institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. It conducts strategic research and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College curricula, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community. SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided into three components: the Strategic Research and Analysis Department focuses on global, transregional, and functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation; the Regional Strategy and Planning Department focuses on regional strategic issues; and the Academic Engagement Program creates and sustains partnerships with the global strategic community. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field of security and military strategy. In most years, about half of SSI's publications are written by these external partners.

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is a research institute housed in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. The Institute is named in honor of Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), whose long and distinguished career in public service included serving as National Security Advisor for Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. The Institute's core mission is to foster and disseminate policy-oriented research on international affairs by supporting faculty

and student research, hosting international speakers and major scholarly conferences, and providing grants to outside researchers to use the holdings of the Bush Library.

The LBJ School of Public Affairs, a graduate component of The University of Texas at Austin, offers professional training in public policy analysis and administration for students interested in pursuing careers in government and public affairs-related areas of the private and nonprofit sectors. Degree programs include a Masters of Public Affairs (M.P.Aff), a mid-career M.P.Aff sequence, 10 M.P.Aff dual degree programs, a Master of Global Policy Studies (MGPS) and a Ph.D. in Public Policy. The School also sponsors a variety of nondegree professional development programs for public administrators and elected officials.

Creative Associates International, Inc., is a private for-profit international consulting firm headquartered in Washington, DC. Creative Associates addresses urgent challenges facing societies today. Whether they are shifts in demographics, the workplace, the classroom, technology, or the political arena at home and abroad, Creative Associates views change as an opportunity to improve. We help clients turn transitional environments into a positive force—an impetus for creating more empowered and effective systems and institutions. We approach change as an opportunity to transform and renew. Creative Associates employs in excess of 200 staff and operates 14 field offices around the world. Creative Associates is a minority, women-owned and managed firm, and a graduate of the SBA 8(a) Program. Creative Associates is an audited firm that complies with all Federal procurement requirements, and has

completed more than 400 contracts since its inception in 1979. Creative Associates also has security clearance to handle classified work and information.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the efficient and effective transformation of military-related structures, assets, functions, and processes. Having expanded its activities beyond the classical areas of conversion that focus on the reuse of military resources (such as the reallocation of military expenditures, restructuring of the defense industry, closure of military bases, and demobilization), BICC is now organizing its work around three main topics: arms, peacebuilding, and conflict. In doing this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept of national security, embodied above all in the armed forces, has been surpassed by that of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved without seriously reducing poverty, improving health care, and extending good governance throughout the world, in short: without human security in the broader sense.

The George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University educates principled leaders in public and international affairs, conducts research, and performs service. Both the Master of Public Service and Administration (MPSA) and Master of International Affairs (MPIA) are full-time graduate degree programs that provide a professional education for individuals seeking careers in the public or nonprofit sectors, or for activities in the private sector that have a governmental focus.

The MPSA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, combines 11 courses in public management, policy analysis, economics, and research methods with six electives. Students select an elective concentration in one of the following areas: nonprofit organizations; state and local policy and management; natural resources, environment, and technology policy and administration; security, energy, and technology policy; and health policy and management. A professional internship is completed in the first summer session.

The MPIA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, offers tracks in National Security Affairs and International Economics and Development. Students construct a program of study based on two or more concentrations or clusters of related courses such as economic development, diplomacy in world affairs, intelligence in statecraft, national security, or regional studies. Satisfactory completion of a foreign language examination is required to graduate. At the end of their first year of study, students will participate in either an internationally oriented internship or a foreign language immersion course.

The Certificate in Advanced International Affairs (CAIA) Program is a focused curriculum offered via distance education or through in-residence study. The Certificate in Homeland Security (CHS) Program is offered only via distance education and intended for people who need to understand the new security environment as part of their management and supervisory duties. This program requires students to take 15 credit hours of graduate course work centered upon homeland security issues and strategies at all levels of the government and private industry.

For more information on the Bush School please visit their website at *bush.tamu.edu*.

The European Union Center of Excellence (EUCE) at Texas A&M University is one of three regional centers within the International Programs Office (IPO) supporting international education as a university tradition. Designated in 2005 as a “Center of Excellence,” it is one of ten centers in the national network to receive funding from the European Commission to promote a better understanding of the European Union, and the policies and issues that influence the Transatlantic relationship. In partnership with colleges and professional schools on campus, the EUCE promotes the development and enhancement of the European curricula, research, and outreach activities at Texas A&M University.