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USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DoD Mission-Based Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP)

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 (Reference (a)) and the guidelines and responsibilities as assigned in DoDD 3020.40 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.45 (References (b) and (c)):

a. This Manual provides uniform procedures for the execution of DCIP activities.

b. This Volume:

(1) Provides comprehensive procedures for implementation of a defense critical infrastructure (DCI) identification process across all the DoD Components and defense infrastructure sectors using a mission-focused process that includes all DoD functions as described in DoDD 5100.1 (Reference (d)). All DCI assets will be designated as task critical assets (TCAs), with a subset of this list being designated as defense critical assets (DCAs).

(2) Incorporates and cancels the Criticality Process Guidance Document (Reference (e)).

2. APPLICABILITY. This Volume applies to:

a. OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

b. Each Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent (DISLA) identified in Reference (b).

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

5. PROCEDURES

a. This Volume provides direction to support a process that commanders and civilian equivalents within the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and the defense infrastructure sectors will use to identify mission-based (function-based for DISLAs) TCAs, including those formerly referred to as supporting infrastructure critical assets (SICAs). The term "SICA" is no longer used within the DCIP.

b. Detailed identification procedures are contained in Enclosure 3.

c. An example of this process is provided in Enclosure 4.

7. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. The information requirements contained in Enclosure 5 are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.2. of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (f)).

8. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Volume is approved for public release. Copies may be obtained through the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

9. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Volume is effective immediately.



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ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)),
December 8, 1999
- (b) DoD Directive 3020.40, "Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),"
August 19, 2005
- (c) DoD Instruction 3020.45, "Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management,"
April 21, 2008
- (d) DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major
Components," August 1, 2002
- (e) Criticality Process Guidance Document (CPGD), December 17, 2006 (hereby canceled)
- (f) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information
Requirements," June 30, 1998
- (g) DoD Directive 1000.25, "DoD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program," July 19, 2004
- (h) DoD Directive 8320.03, "Unique Identification (UID) Standards for a Net-Centric
Department of Defense," March 23, 2007
- (i) DoD Directive 8320.02, "Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense,"
December 2, 2004
- (j) DoD Instruction 4165.14, "Real Property Inventory and Forecasting," March 31, 2006
- (k) DoD Instruction 8320.04, "Item Unique Identification (IUID) Standards for Tangible
Personal Property," June 16, 2008
- (l) DoD Instruction, 8260.03, "Organizational and Force Structure Construct (OFSC) for
Global Force Management (GFM)," August 23, 2006
- (m) DCIP Security Classification Guide, May 2007¹

¹<http://polportal-ext.osd.mil/sites/Policy/dcip/default.aspx>

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide to the ASD(HD&ASA), Heads of the DoD Components, and DISLAs a list of recommended DCAs, submitted annually and when changes occur, based on the TCA lists provided by the Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, Military Departments, and the DISLAs.

2. COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall, within their respective regional or functional area of responsibility:

a. Conduct analyses of command missions and mission essential tasks (METs) with their associated conditions and standards, and provide results to appropriate DoD Component and DISLA DCIP offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) to support TCA identification in accordance with this Volume.

b. Coordinate and assist with additional DoD Component and DISLA analyses of command missions and related capabilities to identify TCAs necessary to execute these missions.

c. Validate TCAs submitted by the DoD Components as critical to the fulfillment of their assigned missions and submit a compiled, validated list of TCAs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually and when changes occur.

3. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS; COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM); CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and in consultation with the National Guard Adjutants General); AND DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES. The Secretaries of the Military Departments; Commander, USSOCOM; Chief, National Guard Bureau (in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and in consultation with the National Guard Adjutants General of the States); and Directors of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities having control of DCI assets within their respective areas of responsibility, shall:

a. Identify TCAs in support of assigned missions, METs, and/or core functions and provide analysis results to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff DCIP OPR. Coordinate with other DoD Component Heads and DISLAs as necessary to determine scope and parameters of their missions, METs, and core functions assigned to the organization for execution to identify TCAs.

b. For DCI, provide and maintain DoD Component baseline element of information (BEI) data on this asset and make this data accessible in accordance with architectural views that address DCIP requirements, Reference (b), and DCIP security classification requirements.

c. Ensure BEI data conforms to DoD policy in accordance with DoDDs 1000.25, 8320.03, and 8320.02 and DoDIs 4165.14, 8320.04, and 8260.03 (References (g) through (l)).

4. DISLAs. The DISLAs shall, in accordance with this Volume, identify sector-related TCAs and inter- and intra-dependencies for sector functions and in support of mission and asset owners' analyses and submit a compiled, validated list of TCAs related to sector functions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually and when changes occur.

ENCLOSURE 3

PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL

a. Common Framework. The process described in this enclosure provides a common analytical framework that is consistent and repeatable for use in identifying TCAs and DCAs through analysis and appropriate collaboration. This analysis will consider the effect of a temporary or permanent loss of an asset on the mission(s) it supports, using the BEI attributes Mission/MET Owner, Mission Type, Mission Impact Statement, Time to Restore, and Time to Impact Mission. Where appropriate, the process provides additional clarification based on whether the mission under analysis is a Combatant Command or Defense Agency MET; a Military Department responsibility to train, equip, provide, or sustain forces; or a Defense infrastructure sector function.

b. CAIP Results. The CAIP results will be:

(1) Identified TCAs and DCAs based on assigned missions (METs, Military Department responsibilities, or sector functions).

(2) Documented critical asset BEI data along with its assigned asset identifier per References (g) through (l).

2. KEY CONSIDERATIONS

a. BEIs. BEIs represent only the minimum data required on those assets identified as TCAs or DCAs. They do not relieve organizations of other assigned DCIP data exchange responsibilities such as support of sector characterization or vulnerability assessment results. This enclosure is subject to change as additional DCIP BEI requirements are identified and will be updated as required.

(1) DoD asset owners shall document TCAs in accordance with the DCIP TCA BEIs matrix in Enclosure 5 and References (f) through (k), and submit compiled TCAs with their BEI data to the Joint Staff in accordance with their direction on format (e.g., Microsoft Excel, Strategic Mission Assurance Data System update) and Tier levels.

(2) The Joint Staff J-34 shall evaluate the submitted TCAs and nominate those that meet the definition for consideration as DCAs.

(3) The ASD(HD&ASA) shall evaluate the DCA nominations and approve the final DCAs. Once the DCAs are approved, the ASD(HD&ASA) shall notify the appropriate stakeholders, through the Joint Staff J-34, of the asset's DCA status.

b. Classification. All nominated and/or validated TCAs and DCAs are classified in accordance with the DCIP Security Classification Guide (Reference (m)), and must be protected accordingly.

c. Mission Impact. When compiling the BEIs on a TCA, DoD asset owners must ensure the mission impact statement fully and accurately describes the effect of the TCA's loss to all appropriate mission owners. This data will be used first by the mission owner to evaluate if the TCA is truly vital to mission accomplishment, then by the Joint Staff J-34 to determine if the TCA should be nominated as a DCA, and finally by ASD(HD&ASA) to determine if the TCA's nomination is accepted as a DCA. Non-uniform application of the methodology will result in inaccurate or incomplete data that may cause improper designation of the asset and diminish the effectiveness of DoD risk management efforts.

d. Proper Asset Identification. Although a number of systems, sub-systems, capabilities, and functions can be easily identified as critical to the Department of Defense (e.g., the Global Positioning System), analysis that stops at this level does not meet the needs or intent of DCIP. Rarely is an entire system necessary to the success of a specific mission. Instead, the mission owner shall define the mission and the parameters of the mission to be executed. The resource provider and/or the subordinate organization charged to execute the mission shall determine which assets and systems are available to meet the parameters or requirements of the mission. From this pool of assets, further analysis is conducted to determine if any of those assets are critical. The importance of well-defined mission requirements cannot be overstated, as this will prevent unnecessary and wasteful analysis beyond the needs of the mission owner. Close coordination between mission and asset owners to define mission requirements, standards, and conditions accurately is required to complete this process successfully. A TCA whose disruption or destruction disrupts an entire critical system, sub-system, or function shall be identified through the Defense Infrastructure Sector TCA identification portion of this process (described in Paragraph 3) and submitted to the Joint Staff J-34.

e. TCA Location or Ownership. There are numerous potential TCAs, and it is important not to exclude some because they are not physically located on a DoD installation or owned by the Department of Defense. A commercially owned asset such as an electric power substation should be identified as a TCA if it is determined that the loss of this asset would prevent execution of a mission or function. Analysis also may determine that TCAs on DoD installations, such as those owned by tenant units, may be critical to missions beyond those of the installation itself.

f. Key Players. Implementation of this process requires close coordination between two primary groups within the Department of Defense; mission owners and resource providers.

(1) Mission Owners. Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, Military Departments, and Defense infrastructure sectors. Defense infrastructure sectors, as virtual organizations, have not been assigned missions. For the purpose of this Volume and in support of DCIP, DISLAs identify TCAs related to sector functions (similar to DoD Components' identification of TCAs related to their assigned missions), and shall be considered mission owners for this function-based analysis only.

(a) Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and Military Departments have been assigned missions by law or by the President and/or Secretary of Defense.

(b) Defense infrastructure sectors are led by a DISLA and they serve as mission owners solely to accomplish their assigned responsibility under Reference (b) to characterize their sector functions (Enclosure 6) and systems and, ultimately, identify TCAs vital to these functions.

(2) Resource Providers. Resource providers include:

(a) The asset owners (Military Departments, Services, DoD Field Activities, Defense Agencies, the National Guard Bureau, and USSOCOM) that furnish the forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities to execute a mission.

(b) DISLAs who, although not asset owners, shall identify to mission owners alternative capabilities related to their sector functions. Through their characterization efforts, sectors shall identify to mission owners alternative sector-related capabilities that would not have been identified within a single asset owner's internal analysis. This additional analysis provides data from across the entire Department of Defense to allow a mission owner to assess the criticality of an asset accurately.

g. Coordination. Although similar in nature, there are differences in the coordination process followed by the Combatant Commands, Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and Defense infrastructure sectors.

(1) Combatant Command and Defense Agency Missions. The coordination process used to identify TCAs based on Combatant Command or Defense Agency METs is outlined in Figure 1.

(2) Military Department Missions. The coordination process used to identify TCAs based on Military Department responsibilities is outlined in Figure 2.

(3) Defense Infrastructure Sector Functions. The coordination process used to identify TCAs based on sector function (Enclosure 6) is outlined in Figure 3.

Figure 1. Combatant Command and Defense Agency (METs) Coordination Process for TCA Identification






Figure 2. Military Department Responsibility Coordination Process for TCA Identification



**Figure 3. Defense Infrastructure Sector (Function)
Coordination Process for TCA Identification**



3. PROCESS. The CAIP consists of nine steps:

a. STEP 1: Mission Decomposition and Required Capability Identification. Mission owners decompose their assigned missions to the point of identifying the capabilities required to implement each mission. Each identified capability should include the minimum performance standards and conditions necessary to achieve mission success. Mission owners shall provide this mission decomposition information (including capabilities, standards, and conditions) to resource providers and DISLAs for analysis to begin the CAIP. These standards and conditions serve to focus the analysis performed by the resource providers. For example, a surveillance requirement might be described as "continuous, near-real-time monitoring of the airspace over the battlefield transmitted back to the Combatant Command operation center for the duration of the operation." This example provides what is needed, when it is needed, the duration for which it is needed, and the starting and ending points for this data. From these specific requirements, appropriate resource providers can identify those assets capable of meeting this need.

(1) Mission owners at the Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies shall decompose their METs into the appropriate subordinate METs, if any, down to basic capabilities with standards and conditions. A subordinate MET may be assigned to another supporting organization, such as when a Combatant Commander assigns METs to appropriate components. Any organization identified to execute all or part of the MET under analysis also must identify DISLA functions with appropriate standards and conditions they deem necessary to accomplish the MET.

(2) Military Departments shall decompose their responsibilities, to include assigned METs, by defining the capabilities required to meet these responsibilities along with the standards and conditions. These capabilities may be assigned to subordinate organizations such as the Services or major commands.

(3) DISLAs shall decompose sector functions to identify the systems and networks the Department of Defense relies on to accomplish the function. System identification and its unique item identifier (UII), along with its system-unique identifier, at this point may also uncover interdependencies with functions or systems from other defense infrastructure sectors. The DISLA shall notify other DISLAs and the mission owner of any interdependencies discovered during the process along with their standards and conditions, as defined by the mission owner.

b. STEP 2: Task Asset (TA) Identification. The appropriate resource providers identify TAs that meet the mission owner's required capability standards and conditions. Continuing the example from paragraph 3.a. of this enclosure, the Air Force may identify that it can provide aircraft to support the near-real-time air picture over the battlefield. Other appropriate resource providers likewise identify TAs that meet the needs of the mission owner.

(1) For MET-driven analysis, Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies shall assist their resource providers by providing further clarification on capabilities, standards, and conditions, as required. When Combatant Commands seek input through their Service components, they also should ensure that the component coordinates with its parent Service and Military Department so that all means of providing the capability, not just those owned by the Service component, are considered. This action lays the framework for identifying what is truly critical to MET execution.

(2) For analysis of its responsibilities, a Military Department shall assist or actively manage the analysis of its resource providers.

(3) For sector functions, DISLAs should work through the members of their defense infrastructure sector working group and the DoD Component's DCIP office to analyze and characterize those systems and assets owned by supporting DoD Components and any interdependencies identified to other DISLAs. DISLAs also may seek analysis assistance from or refer problems to the DoD Component's DCIP office.

c. STEP 3: TCA Nomination and Submission. Once TA identification and analysis has been completed, resource providers seek to identify potential TCAs as described in subparagraphs 2.c.(1) through 2.c.(5) of this enclosure. The DoD asset owner shall document nominated TCAs in accordance with the DCIP critical asset BEIs (Enclosure 5) and submit them to the mission owner. If the potential TCA is identified by a DISLA, the DISLA must also notify the DoD asset owner that is responsible for submitting the TCA nomination BEI data to the mission owner. DISLAs shall submit TCA data to the mission owner for non DoD-owned TCAs. To be nominated as a TCA, a TA should meet one of the following criteria:

(1) No other TAs are available to meet the minimum performance standards of the required capability of the mission or function.

(2) Multiple TAs exist that, if combined, function as a system, but the loss of any of these assets may cause the system itself to fail or significantly degrade (e.g., an electronic system may require three electronic clocks for synchronization, so the loss of any one of these three clocks causes the system to fail even though the other two are still functioning).

(3) A group of TAs combined is required to meet minimum performance standards (four locomotives are necessary to meet throughput levels of cargo; loss of any one causes degradation or mission failure).

(4) An alternate TA that supports another required capability of the same mission is available, but using this particular TA would cause failure or significant degradation to that mission or function.

(5) In some situations an alternative, workaround, or mitigation to the TA that could potentially provide this capability exists, but has not been operationally tested or validated to do so. Until such time as the alternative is certified to provide the same capability as the original, the TA would still be considered a TCA.

d. STEP 4: TCA Validation. Mission owners shall review and validate nominated TCAs and shall notify the asset owner if the nomination is accepted or rejected so the asset owner can ensure that only the status of critical assets is tracked. During the validation process, the mission owner shall seek redundant capabilities that meet their stated capability standards and conditions from other resource providers for the TCAs that have been identified to them. Additionally mission owners must remove from the list those assets that are not necessary to accomplish the mission. To validate a TCA, the mission owner must determine that the capability the nominated TCA provides cannot be duplicated from another resource provider and that, without this capability, the mission will fail or be severely degraded. Only assets meeting BOTH of these criteria are validated as TCAs to the mission they support.

(1) Combatant Command and Defense Agency mission owners shall review each nominated TCA submitted in support of their METs as outlined above. Mission owners shall notify the asset owners and the DISLA who nominated the TCA of the validation results. Nominated TCAs not validated will not be maintained as a TCA unless they are determined to be critical to some other mission.

(2) Military Department mission owners review nominated TCAs submitted by their subordinate organizations and provided by other resource providers. Military Departments shall receive nominated TCAs from their subordinate commands, make TCA validation decisions based solely upon inherent capabilities within the Military Departments, and then make appropriate notifications. Any validated TCA nominations from outside the Military Department's inherent capabilities will follow the same notification procedures as described under paragraph 3.d.(1) of this enclosure.

(3) For sector functions, DISLAs shall validate nominated TCAs following the same process outlined in paragraph 3.d. of this enclosure and the same notification procedures as described for Combatant Commands.

e. STEP 5: Validated DoD Component and DISLA TCA Lists Submitted to the Joint Staff

(1) The following shall be submitted to the Joint Staff DCIP OPR:

(a) Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies. List of validated TCAs for all assigned METs.

(b) Military Departments. List of validated TCAs for all assigned responsibilities.

(c) DISLAs. List of validated TCAs for sector functions.

(2) All TCAs will be assigned a Tier level in accordance with the TCA Tier definitions in the Glossary.

(3) Individual Combatant Commands, Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and DISLAs must ensure that, if a TCA supports more than one of their assigned missions or functions, this data is reflected in the mission impact statement for that TCA by coordinating with DCI owner to update the BEIs.

(4) For TCAs that support a mission owner who, in turn, supports multiple other mission owners, the full impact of the TCAs loss must be reflected in the mission impact statement. For example, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sector that identifies a single TCA satellite capable of providing real-time monitoring of the battlefield that could be used by any of the Combatant Commands should identify its potential mission impact to all Combatant Commands. As shown in Figures 1 through 3, each mission owner must cross-reference TCAs to check for overlapping mission linkages.

f. STEP 6: Joint Staff Compilation and Release of the DoD-wide TCA List. The Joint Staff DCIP OPR shall compile all TCA list submissions from the Combatant Commands, Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and DISLAs. The DCIP OPR shall then consolidate duplicate TCAs (TCAs submitted by more than one of the above agencies) and coordinate the update of the mission impact statement for that asset to reflect its full mission impact upon all applicable DoD Components and DISLAs. The DCIP OPR shall classify this approved DoD-wide TCA list appropriately and release it to the community on an annual basis, at a minimum, or more frequently if warranted. This list will form the basis for the other DCIP-related activities for the coming year such as vulnerability assessment planning and remediation and mitigation prioritization submissions by the DoD Components and DISLAs.

g. STEP 7: Defense Infrastructure Sector Interdependency Analysis Support to TCAs. Once the DoD-wide TCA list has been released to the DCIP Community, the DISLAs shall conduct an interdependency analysis of sector-related support provided to TCAs to identify additional critical assets. Any additional critical assets identified will be reported to the applicable DoD

Components for formal submission. A DISLA may not be able to perform interdependency analysis on all identified TCAs on an annual basis. To promote the goals of the DCIP most effectively, it is recommended that the DISLAs survey members of the DCIP Community to determine where this interdependency analysis would be the most helpful to the overall DCIP, such as in support of the year's upcoming vulnerability assessment schedule, and focus their analysis at these points. For example, if the DoD-wide list identified a TCA, DISLA interdependency analysis on that asset might include:

(1) DIB Sector Analysis. Identify single source providers of key components of the TCA.

(2) Personnel Sector Analysis. Review the training and manning of key DoD-owned TCA operators and maintainers.

(3) Public Works Sector Analysis. Analyze commercial utility support (electric power, natural gas, etc., as appropriate) to the TCA.

h. STEP 8: Joint Staff Nomination of Potential DCAs to ASD(HD&ASA). The Joint Staff shall review the mission impact statement associated with each TCA and nominate to ASD(HD&ASA) those that meet the definition of a DCA.

i. STEP 9: ASD(HD&ASA) Review and Approval of Nominated DCAs. The ASD(HD&ASA) shall review the Joint Staff nominations, evaluate the asset's consequence of loss to the Department of Defense, and approve those that meet the definition of a DCA. Once approved, ASD(HD&ASA) shall provide this list of assets to the appropriate DoD Components and DISLAs.

ENCLOSURE 4

CAIP EXAMPLE

1. GENERAL. This example is provided to assist with process understanding only. It is not intended to be authoritative or accurate in the specifics of missions and required coordination to execute the analysis. Only one required resource provider is identified in each step to serve as an example. Actual decomposition often involves significantly more coordination.

2. SCENARIO. The mission owner, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), applies the critical asset identification process to identify TCAs in support of its strategic MET, Strategic National (SN) 3.4.1, "Provide Strategic Air Defense for North America."

a. STEP 1: Mission Decomposition and Required Capability Identification. USNORTHCOM posts the following required capabilities for MET SN 3.4.1:

(1) Continuous combat air patrols in 12 designated locations that must be maintained for the duration of the execution of this mission – potentially 30 days or more.

(2) The ability to monitor continuously, from the USNORTHCOM operations center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the air picture over North America out to 200 miles in near-real-time for the duration of the execution of this mission.

(3) The ability to interface directly with command and control of the combat air patrols in all 12 locations to respond to potential threats for the duration of the execution of this mission.

(4) The ability to provide continuously position, velocity, time, and navigation data to coordinate combat air patrols for the duration of mission execution.

b. STEP 2: TA Identification

(1) Air Forces North (AFNORTH), the Air Force component of USNORTHCOM, in collaboration with the resource provider (Air Force), determines that for 10 of the locations identified under the required capability in paragraph 2.a.(1) of this enclosure it has multiple means of meeting the requirement. As a result, no TCAs will be associated with these locations.

(2) For the eleventh location, AFNORTH identifies only a single runway at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona, as capable of meeting this requirement.

(3) For the last location near Houston, Texas, AFNORTH identifies that it has the necessary TAs to perform the mission but their installations only have jet fuel reserves for 7 days of operations. AFNORTH coordinates with the logistics sector and identifies a DoD fuel depot in Amarillo, Texas, as the only source capable of providing jet fuel.

(4) Similarly, for capabilities in paragraphs 2.a.(2) and 2.a.(3) of this enclosure, the Global Information Grid (GIG) sector works with the Air Force and the space sector to meet these needs.

c. STEP 3: TCA Nomination and Submission. Based on the analysis conducted, resource providers and DISLAs nominate the following TCAs to USNORTHCOM:

(1) USNORTHCOM's command center visual display unit is the only means to display the air picture continually.

(2) The Peterson AFB satellite uplink/downlink is the only means for USNORTHCOM to communicate with the aircraft.

(3) The DoD fuel depot in Amarillo is identified as the only source capable of providing jet fuel to the aircraft in Texas.

(4) The runway at Davis-Monthan AFB is the only Air Force airfield capable of meeting the eleventh location requirement.

d. STEP 4: TCA Validation. USNORTHCOM validates the submitted TCAs as follows:

(1) Although it supports multiple strategic missions, the command center visual display unit is validated because its loss severely degrades the capability of USNORTHCOM to monitor the current air picture. Its loss can only be mitigated by radio communications and moving aircraft silhouettes on a map, similar to what was done during World War II, and this backup method is rated by the Combatant Commander as unacceptable.

(2) The Peterson AFB satellite uplink/downlink is validated because its loss results in mission failure.

(3) The DoD fuel depot in Amarillo is validated because its loss will cause mission failure.

(4) Another resource provider, the U.S. Marine Corps, identifies that it has the required resources at Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona, to fulfill the needs of the eleventh location requirement, so the Davis-Monthan AFB runway is not validated.

e. STEP 5: Validated TCA Lists Submitted to the Joint Staff. USNORTHCOM submits these three TCAs with their mission impact statement, along with all the TCAs identified in support of other USNORTHCOM missions, to the Joint Staff and the TCA owners.

f. STEP 6: Joint Staff Compilation and Release of the DoD-wide TCA List. The Joint Staff compiles all submitted TCA lists. It discovers that the DoD fuel depot in Amarillo, Texas, is also a TCA for U.S. Southern Command. Because of these multiple submissions, the TCAs are combined and the full impact on each Combatant Command is included in the mission impact

statement. The DoD-wide list is made available to appropriate members of the DCIP Community.

g. STEP 7: Defense Infrastructure Sector Interdependency Analysis Support to TCAs. Each DISLA reviews the TCAs to search for sector-related interdependencies. In this analysis, the DIB Sector identifies that a critical component of the satellite uplink/downlink has a single-source provider and, because of the cost, no spares are maintained on site or stocked by the company. The Transportation Sector identifies a bridge necessary to move jet fuel by truck from Amarillo to Houston, Texas. Loss of this bridge would add such a delay in rerouting these deliveries that mission failure is likely to occur. Both sectors report their results to USNORTHCOM (as mission owner), to the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency (as asset owners), and to the Joint Staff and ASD(HD&ASA).

h. STEP 8: Joint Staff Nomination of Potential DCAs to ASD(HD&ASA). The Joint Staff nominates each any of the three TCAs that appear to meet the definition of a DCA to ASD(HD&ASA).

i. STEP 9: ASD(HD&ASA) Review and Approval of Nominated DCAs. The ASD(HD&ASA) reviews those assets nominated by the Joint Staff and approves as DCAs those that meet that definition.

ENCLOSURE 5CRITICAL ASSET BEIsTable 1. Critical Asset BEIs

ATTRIBUTE	DESCRIPTION
SystemID	Indicator of DCIP entity originating the data record
AssetID	Database-unique identifier for asset
AssetName	Name of asset (as determined by asset owner)
Associated UICs	Other associated unique identification codes (e.g., Real Property identification, etc.) used throughout the Department of Defense to refer to this asset. These UICs will be in accordance with References (g) through (l).
LastUpdate	Date Time Group (DTG) of last update to asset record (ZULU)
StreetAddress1	Street address of physical location of asset
StreetAddress2	Secondary physical address of asset (e.g., Bldg. #, Unit #, Suite #, Pier #)
City	City or DoD installation corresponding to physical address of asset
State	State abbreviation corresponding to physical address of asset, if in United States
ZIPCode	ZIP Code corresponding to physical address of asset, if in United States
CountryCode	International Standards Organization 3166 Country Code (3-character trigraph) indicating country in which the asset is physically located or home-based or home-ported
LocationType	Indicates whether asset is fixed, movable, or mobile.
Latitude	Latitude coordinates of asset in decimal degrees (minimum precision of 4 decimal places, e.g., 37.4008); negative for south of equator
Longitude	Longitude coordinates of asset in decimal degrees (minimum precision of 4 decimal places, e.g., -85.6302); negative for west of prime meridian
LatLong_Source	Method used to obtain lat-long coordinates (e.g., geocode/address match, global positioning system, map/imagery interpretation, feature extraction, ancillary authoritative data source, or other source)
AssetOwner	Agency, command, or commercial entity that owns the asset
AssetPOC	Asset point of contact (POC) name, as provided by asset owner
POC_TelNo	Commercial telephone number of asset POC (including country code, if outside United States)
POC_Email	Unclassified e-mail address of asset POC
Assessments	Type of assessment(s) performed on the asset, including latest date accomplished (e.g., DCIP, YYYYMMDD; Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA), YYYYMMDD). Includes, but not limited to DCIP, anti-terrorism, and JSIVA.
AssetStatus	Indicator of current functional nature of asset (e.g., Functioning Normally, Degraded – Maintenance, Degraded – Emergency, or Destroyed)
AssetDescription	Brief description of asset (classification determined by level of detail)
MissionMET_Owner	Describes either the ultimate mission owner (e.g., Combatant Command) or the organization that is assigned to execute the mission on behalf of the owner (e.g., a Combatant Command Component Command). The broad category of mission owners can include capture Combatant Commands, Military Departments, Services or components; and Defense agencies, but NOT sectors. This field also will have a primary and secondary mission owner attribute to accommodate distinctions in multiple owners.
Mission_Type	Describes the actual mission or MET with which a critical asset is associated. Mission type will be provided by authoritative source(s) and will utilize the source constructs, e.g., Universal Joint Task List, The Army Universal Task List (FM 7-15), Universal Navy Task List (UNTL), OPNAVINST 3500.38A.
Sector_Type	The 10 DoD Sectors. Supports capturing critical assets tied to sectors and sector functions as a result of the general characterization process
DISLA_Type	Defines the sector lead agent (DISLA) that will have the responsibility for reporting their sector or functional critical assets that were determined from

Table 1. Critical Asset BEIs (continued)

ATTRIBUTE	DESCRIPTION
	the sectors' general characterization efforts.
Sector Function_Type	Describes the high-level functions that are identified and supported by each sector in performing "sector characterization" through each sector lead agent. For each of the 10 sectors, there will be one or more high-level functions for each sector, which supports tying critical assets nominated by a sector to the specific function. The other BEIs related to asset identification, name, and description can be utilized, but they are connected to function type when sectors nominate critical assets based on function.
Risk Response_Type	Describes data that captures activities in three areas: remediation, mitigation, and/or acceptance of risk. Asset owners will generally capture whether or not they have undertaken remediation or mitigation in addressing identified vulnerabilities, or if they have accepted risk and done nothing to respond to an identified vulnerability for whatever reason. 1. Remediated, 2. Mitigated, 3. Risk Accepted. Actual remediation or mitigation data is not intended to be provided in this field, as it will support a sorting capability to get a quick snapshot on whether anything is being done in terms of a risk response.
Threat_Type	Describes specific threats that were identified in the assessment reports as capable of exploiting the vulnerability.
Hazard_Type	Describes specific hazards that were identified in the assessment reports as capable of exploiting the vulnerability.
Mission_Impact_Statement	Brief description of result of loss of asset
Vulnerabilities*	Any identified by the assessment(s) conducted, along with mitigation strategies or level of acceptance
Time_to_Restore	Time it would take to restore the critical asset or infrastructure node, or the capability it represents. (<24 hours, 1-3 days, 4-7 days, 8-30 days, >30 days)
Time_to_Impact_Mission	Estimated time for the loss of the asset to affect the mission supported (<2 hours, 2-24 hours, 1-7 days, 8-21 days, >21 days)
See Reference (m) for further information on the proper classification of DCIP BEI data.	

ENCLOSURE 6

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR FUNCTIONSTable 2. Defense Infrastructure Sector Functions

DIB Sector Functions		
Research and Development	Manufacturing	Depot Maintenance
Design	System Integration	Service
Financial Sector Functions		
Military Pay	Civilian Pay	Retired and Annuity Pay
Travel Pay	Contract/Vender Pay	Debt and Claims Management/Garnishments
Accounting	Disbursing	Budget, Finance, Personnel, and Miscellaneous
GIG Sector Functions		
Information Transport	Human-GIG Interaction	Information Dissemination Management
Information Processing	Network Operations and Management	Information Assurance
Information Storage		
Health Sector Functions		
Medical Treatment Facilities (Fixed)	Deployable Medical Units	Emergency Operation Centers
Blood Support	Medical Research Facilities	Preventive Medicine and Public Health
Medical Materiel Supply Chain	Healthcare Information Networks	Patient Movement and Evacuation
Critical Medical Materiel Items		
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Sector Functions		
Plan and Direct Intelligence Activities	Process, Exploit, Collate, and Correlate Intelligence Information and Data	Produce All-Source Products Based on Collected and Processed Intelligence Information and Data
Collect Intelligence Information and Data	Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence Products	Evaluate Intelligence Activities and Provide Feedback
Logistics Sector Functions		
Supply Management (Provide Procurement and Contracting, Inventory Control, Shipment Information, Receipt Processing, Status Reporting)	Weapon System Maintenance (Provide Depot-Level Maintenance, Intermediate-Level Maintenance)	Disposition and Demilitarization (DEMIL) (DEMIL, Hazardous Material Disposal, Recycle)
Personnel Sector Functions		
Accessing Personnel	Locating Personnel	Retiring Personnel
Training Personnel	Paying Personnel	Casualty Management
Mobilizing Personnel	Defining Manpower Requirements	Sustaining Personnel
Deploying Personnel	Separating Personnel	
Public Works Sector Functions		
Provide and Maintain Utilities	Provide and Maintain Real Property	Provide Emergency Services

Table 2. Defense Infrastructure Sector Functions (continued)

Space Sector Functions		
Space Control <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Space Surveillance ▪ Protection ▪ Prevention ▪ Negation 	Space Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Spacelift ▪ Satellite Operations ▪ Reconstitution of Space Forces 	Space Force Application <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ballistic Missiles ▪ Missile Defense
Space Force Enhancement. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ISR ▪ Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment ▪ Environmental Monitoring ▪ Communications ▪ Position, Velocity, Time, and Navigation 		
Transportation Sector Functions		
Move Cargo	Move Personnel	Move Patients
Provide Command, Control, Communications and Computers		

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFB	Air Force Base
AFNORTH	Air Forces North
ASD(HD&ASA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs
BEI	baseline elements of information
CAIP	critical asset identification process
DCA	defense critical asset
DCI	defense critical infrastructure
DCIP	Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
DIB	defense industrial base
DISLA	Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent
GIG	Global Information Grid
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JSIVA	Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
MET	mission essential task
OPR	office of primary responsibility
POC	point of contact
SICA	supporting infrastructure critical asset
SN	Strategic National
TA	task asset
TCA	task critical asset
UII	unique item identifier
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command

PART II. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this Volume only.

asset. Defined in Reference (b).

DCA. Defined in Reference (b).

defense infrastructure sectors. Defined in Reference (b).

MET. A mission task selected by a commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the universal joint task list in terms of task, condition, and standard. Differs from a joint mission essential task in that it may reflect missions task within a sole DoD Component's authority. In DCIP METs are linked to those higher level responsibilities of the DoD derived from NEFs, PMEfs, and MEFs.

severely degraded. In the context of DCIP, the point where the mission executing commander determines that the loss of a TCA makes the probability of mission failure unacceptable.

TA. Defined in Reference (c).

TCA. Defined in Reference (c).

Tier 1 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission (or function) failure at the DoD, Military Department, Combatant Command, sub-unified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.

Tier 2 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in severe mission (or function) degradation at the DoD, Military Department, Combatant Command, sub-unified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.

Tier 3 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission (or function) failure below the Military Department, Combatant Command, sub-unified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.