THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING MASS GATHERINGS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 9, 2008
Serial No. 110–124
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-652 PDF
WASHINGTON : 2008
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Wednesday, July 9, 2008

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Lowey, Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Green, Perlmutter, Pascrell, King, Shays, Lungren and Dent.

Chairman THOMPSON. We are going to call the hearing to order. We will ask Mr. Shays to sit in for Ranking Member King who is—well, speak of the angel. He is here.

The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on the challenge of protecting mass gatherings in a post-9/11 world.

Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today.

When Americans think of mass gathering events, the Super Bowl, the national conventions and the Pope’s recent visit come to mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and coordinates these high-profile national security events is certainly worthy of discussion, but that is a discussion for another day. Today, we will turn our attention to the challenges of securing mass gatherings that are not considered national special security events, that do not have the Federal Government coming in to run security and are held in communities that do not have huge amounts of resources for security.

Think of State fairs, collegiate sporting events and even large shopping complexes during the holiday season. Mass gatherings, whether they have national security event rating or not, could be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with the goal of killing or injuring the most people, destroying the most infrastructure and having the greatest impact possible with the least amount of effort.

As you all know, I made it a priority to look at mass gatherings of all types. In fact, last year I directed committee staff to explore a variety of venues to see how mass gatherings are being handled. At these venues, committee staff observed members of the public and private sectors working to ensure the health, safety and security of all involved. They found that support personnel at these
venues are doing the best they can with what they have, especially when they do not have the benefit of substantial Federal support.

This exploration culminated in a report that the majority staff of the committee released in May entitled, “Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings.” The report concluded that while local and State official efforts are laudable, the Federal Government needs to partner with them in three particular areas: countering biological threats, collaborating and planning, and partnering across sectors.

Among the report’s recommendations were that the Department of Homeland Security help these localities in hosting these mass gatherings now by strengthening public health and other critical infrastructures, establishing comprehensive biological surveillance systems and ensuring that intelligence about biological threats is made actionable for decisionmakers on the scene.

It is remarkable how State and local and private sector partners have worked together to develop solutions on their own, given the absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting a common fight, they have established trusted relationships with other very different entities and that trust serves as the basis for sharing information and resources that would not otherwise occur. The Department of Homeland Security could stand to learn a lesson about information sharing here.

The Department of Homeland Security should also take note that the districts that the Members of this committee represent are diverse. Some, like mine, are largely rural, while others, like the one represented by the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, are decidedly urban. However, when it comes to mass gatherings, we all share the same goal, ensuring that our communities are prepared for and can respond to the challenges of protecting mass gatherings. To that end, I look forward to this morning’s testimony.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Good morning. I’d like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today.

When Americans think of “mass gatherings”—events like the Super Bowl, the National Conventions, and the Pope’s recent visit come to mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and coordinates these high-profile National Security Events is certainly worthy of discussion but that is a discussion for another day. Today, we turn our attention to the challenges of securing mass gatherings that: are not considered “National Special Security Events”; do not have the Federal Government coming in to run security; and are held in communities that do not have huge amounts of resources for security.

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Mass gatherings, whether they have National Security event rating or not, could be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with the goals of: killing and injuring the most people; destroying the most infrastructure; and having the greatest impact possible with the least amount of effort.

As you all know, I have made it a priority to look at mass gatherings of all types. In fact, last year, I directed committee staff to explore a variety of venues to see how mass gatherings are being handled. At these venues, committee staff observed members of the public and private sectors working to ensure the health, safety, and security of all involved. They found that support personnel at these venues are doing the best they can with what they have, especially when they do not have the benefit of substantial Federal support. This exploration culminated in a report that the majority staff of the committee released in May entitled “Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings.” The report concluded that while local and State officials’ efforts are laudable, the Federal Government needs to partner with them
in three particular areas: Countering biological threats; collaborative planning; and partnering across sectors.

Among the report’s recommendations were that the Department of Homeland Security help the localities hosting these mass gatherings now by: Strengthening public health and other critical infrastructures; establishing comprehensive biological surveillance systems; and ensuring that intelligence about biological threats is made actionable for decisionmakers on the scene. It is remarkable how State, local, and private sector partners have worked together to develop solutions on their own, given the absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting a common fight, they have established trusted relationships with other very different entities and that trust serves as the basis for sharing information and resources that would not otherwise occur.

The Department of Homeland Security could stand to learn a lesson about information sharing here. The Department of Homeland Security should also take note that the districts that the Members of this committee represent are diverse. Some (like mine) are largely rural while others (like the one represented by the Gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke) are decidedly urban. However, when it comes to mass gatherings, we all share the same goal: ensuring that our communities are prepared for—and can respond to—the challenges of protecting mass gatherings. To that end, I look forward to the testimony this morning.

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening statement.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing.

Obviously, mass gatherings are a matter of great concern always but certainly since September 11; and I want to commend the Department for what it has done through the NIPP to try to address this, because this is primarily a local and State and private matter. But, on the other hand, it does need cooperation and assistance from the Department of Homeland Security; and I think that the NIPP goes a long way toward addressing that. But, again, this is a matter of great concern.

I know certainly in New York we have had—for instance, in 2004, we had the U.S. Tennis Open, we had the Republican National Convention, and we had the Yankees all playing in the same night. There is any number of events like that, such as New Year’s Eve, such as when the U.N. General Assembly is held. Often there is a Federal and local component. You may have the U.N. General Assembly and you have the Yankees or the Mets playing at the same time.

So this is something, obviously, that is of great importance in a post-9/11 era. It, to me, shows the absolute necessity of having cooperation at all levels, with a significant input from the Federal Government, with the concept being that the locals know better than anyone. Certainly the Federal Government can provide whatever intelligence or perhaps coordination is needed, but it is primarily a local responsibility.

Also the importance of layered defenses. Because there is no silver bullet that is going to provide the type of blanket coverage that we may like. For instance, a key component I know in New York has been the Securing the Cities program which has been pushed very much by the Department which basically is intended to protect the city from radioactive devices being brought in as a first line of defense.

So, all in all, Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing is vital. It is important. This whole issue is important.
I think the Department has taken very significant first steps. I commend them for what they have done. Obviously, more needs to be done. More needs to be done at all levels, and we have to continue to work toward that.

Mr. Chairman, no opening statement by me would be complete without my once again stating what I believe is an absolute necessity of us having an authorization bill this year and having hearings on it and going forward both for the purposes of the Department of Homeland Security, for the Committee on Homeland Security, and also so we can establish a benchmark that I think has to be set by this committee if we are going to be a successful committee.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman THOMPSON. Other Members of the committee are reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE
JULY 9, 2008

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening this important hearing that examines the challenge of protecting mass gatherings across the United States. Each year, millions of Americans attend sporting and theatrical events, visit resorts, and frequent shopping venues. In many ways, these places allow people to gather as they desire in order to participate in activities that bring them joy and entertainment.

Unfortunately, these locations are also a potential target for terrorists. On several occasions, Al Qaeda’s leadership has asserted that causing economic damage to our country is among its chief objectives. In November 2004, for example, Osama bin Laden asserted that, “[w]e are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” When the economic consequences of an attack on a mass gathering event are combined with the spectacle that video coverage of it worldwide would cause, it is clear that we need to ensure that these events are secure and that effective response measures are in place.

I am grateful, therefore, that Chairman Thompson has provided this necessary forum to speak on this vital issue and for us to discuss the best way forward to making sure that the American people can go about their way of life while knowing that their security is the top priority.

As Chairwoman of the Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, I am quite familiar with many of the issues that will be covered in today’s hearing. I believe that my subcommittee’s robust oversight over DHS’ infrastructure protection efforts has played a major role in helping to make the Department’s efforts more effective.

The DHS effort to secure mass gathering events is coordinated by the Commercial Facilities Sector (“CFS”), one of among 18 critical infrastructure sectors in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (“NIPP”). Under this regime, the Department coordinates security efforts for assets and stakeholders within each of the 18 sectors, many in the private sector. Each sector has a “Sector Specific Agency” (“SSA”) that is responsible for leading the sector’s efforts in NIPP compliance and, therefore, must liaise with the private sector, State and local governments, and the relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government. In the case of the CFS, the SSA is DHS. To be sure, this is a large task. Not only is DHS a new department with a well-documented track record of ineffective management, but the CFS, unlike most of the other 17 sectors, is not a traditionally regulated sector. In the case of the Energy Sector, for example, the SSA is the Department of Energy which has a long history of coordinating and regulating the sector’s various stakeholders. Although such coordination and regulation has not, hitherto, been based upon security, preexisting partnerships can be leveraged for security-related activities.

Not only is DHS the SSA for the CFS, but it does not have a long history working and cooperating with the sector. Therefore, DHS must work harder. Accordingly, I know that my subcommittee will continue to provide DHS and the sector with the resources it needs to execute its vital mission.
I must state clearly, however, that I commend Assistant Secretary Robert B. Stephan’s leadership at DHS and the work he has done to develop the NIPP and to coordinate the relevant departments and agencies. I do believe his authority to coordinate NIPP-related functions must be legislatively strengthened to ensure better implementation of the NIPP—something that has been greatly lacking.

With regard to the CFS specifically, Chairman Thompson and I have directed committee staff to assist us in examining the activities of this very important—and visible—sector. I applaud the organizational work that DHS has done to enable it to do more security-related work in the sector. By forming eight subsectors and convening regular meetings, Assistant Secretary Stephan has taken important steps to solidify a sector that was not preexisting prior to September 11, 2001. With that said, several steps are necessary to move from organizational progress to robust implementation of security and response-related measures and I have many concerns.

First, my subcommittee held a hearing on March 12, addressing the security efforts currently underway in the United States in preparation for the Vancouver Olympics in 2010. During that hearing, several experts testified that Congress should consider creating a lead at DHS for non-National Special Security Events. Second, DHS needs to develop clear metrics for the implementation of security and response-related measures in the CFS as soon as possible. These metrics need to address exercises, resources allocation, and contingency planning efforts. I look forward to working with the Department to learn what it needs to make the metrics development process work as well as to help it acquire the necessary information from industry to feed those metrics. One response that I will not tolerate from the Department, however, is that the Paperwork Reduction Act prohibits the Department from acquiring information about security from the private sector. If the Department needs assistance to develop these surveys, then my subcommittee is eager and ready to assist.

Third, I also encourage the Department to utilize the authorities that Congress has already allocated. For example, Assistant Secretary Stephan has effectively begun to use the convening power provided by the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). I hope, however, that the CIPAC will seek to incorporate members that do not merely represent an association, but include individual asset owners and operators so that it is clear that these entities are acquiring the necessary knowledge to implement security and response-related procedures.

Fourth, I hope that the Department leverages its voluntary private sector preparedness certification program that was a part of the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.” This program can be used to encourage companies to meet voluntary standards using a market-based approach. I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Stephan about how this program has been introduced to the CFS.

Fifth, I am very interested in the exercises taking place in the CFS and how post-exercise reports are utilized: I would like a full description of these exercises, their participants, and their frequency.

On all of these topics, I am eager to hear from the Department about the tools and resources it needs to effectively secure the CFS.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing today. I look forward to continuing to work aggressively on these issues.

Chairman THOMPSON. I welcome our first panel of witnesses.

Our first witness is well-known to the committee. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stephan is Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland Security. He is responsible for the Department’s efforts to secure different aspects of the Nation’s infrastructure, including our commercial facilities where many mass gatherings occur and for which risk management assessment is a must.

Our second witness is Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, Director of Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security. His responsibilities include integrating component agency operations across the Department, coordinating with other Federal and non-Federal agencies and ensuring that the National Operations Center, which monitors many mass gatherings, functions efficiently and effectively.
We thank both witnesses for their service to the Nation and for being here today.
Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement in 5 minutes, beginning with Assistant Secretary Stephan.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STEPHAN, USAF (RET.), ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Colonel Stephan, Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King and distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today and address DHS’s efforts to enhance the security of mass gathering venues.

Places of mass gathering actually comprise a very diverse group of commercial facilities and assets, typically privately owned and operated, which may include sports venues, amusement parks, concert halls, retail malls, office buildings, residential apartment buildings, hotels or resorts, a very diverse landscape of things that we have to worry about as potential target sets. These facilities make up the Commercial Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, or the NIPP, and generally follow a model of open access to enable operations and hence represent an inherent security challenge.

Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a primary concern to both the Department and stakeholders at the State, local and private sector level within this sector. To address this complex dichotomy, DHS plays a key role in terms of information sharing, threat awareness, risk assessments, exercises and training, best practices, facilitating public-private sector interactions, sometimes at the local level, and incident management. These activities are frequently augmented by specific Federal support to select special events at commercial venues.

It is necessary to frame the context of this discussion around a central point: Mass gatherings are overwhelmingly and predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. Hence, the Department must leverage partnerships and relationships with the sector as well as State and local government officials to achieve success. This engagement supports a balanced approach that fairly addresses public and private sector concerns and, more importantly, ensures that risks are appropriately and reasonably mitigated.

Within this engagement, most security and emergency response planning across localized venues is principally the responsibility of the private sector and State and local officials at the venue level, with the role of the Federal Government to augment and facilitate this process in many significant ways as appropriate.

To facilitate and catalyze strong interaction among various private sector, local and State authorities, the Department has developed a series of initiatives that involve face-to-face venue-level engagements. These interactions serve a variety of purposes. Our protective security advisors are in place in communities throughout the Nation to assist with local to protect local efforts to protect as-
sets and provide a Federal resource to communities, businesses and State and local law enforcement and emergency managers.

Over the life of the program, our folks in the field have provided support to over 400 mass gatherings and special events. We have also supported selective security assessments and planning, as examples, for the papal visit to Washington, DC, New York City, the Super Bowl and Rose Bowl earlier this year.

DHS has also provided similar support to sporting organizations and events, including 30 outreach activities to NASCAR venues, supporting mass evacuation and emergency response planning, providing situational awareness, exercise planning, and observation and participation in various security summits.

DHS also sponsors the buffer zone protection plan program grant initiative. As of May, 2008, we have reviewed 863 buffer zone plans for the commercial facilities sector, awarding grant funds to State and local jurisdictions exceeding $50 million.

Sir, as an important and troubling side note, the House markup of the 2009 DHS budget includes effectively an elimination of this program. This is a very important error I think that needs to be corrected, because this is one of the most unique programs in our inventory that specifically drives me and my staff down to a local level of collaborative planning and focusing money on targeted capabilities, gaps within State and local law enforcement jurisdictions that surround these particular commercial venues. That money has effectively been zero-ized in our 2009 budget. We would like your support to correct that wrong as the bill moves through Congress.

To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts in coordination with our private sector partners we have created a suite of planning and informational resources that assist commercial facility owners and operators in enhancing their security posture. The various publications, vulnerability and risk assessment methodologies, reports that highlight common vulnerabilities within the commercial facility sectors, recommended approaches to reduce or manage risk and to effectively deal with various aspects of various threat vectors have all been provided in my written testimony. I will not elaborate on them there, other than to reemphasize the fact that we have done quite a bit of work across a wide range of activities, including information sharing exercises, vulnerability assessment, on-site collaborative security planning. The Department continues to move forward in this area.

In terms of concluding my opening remarks, I would like to take a moment to thank the committee for bringing this very important topic to the floor of discussion.

As many of you recall, 3 years ago the Department was severely chastised by our own Inspector General’s office and by the media for focusing on special events that happened to take place in local venues across the country. One that specifically comes to mind is the Mule Day Parade in Tennessee. We were specifically criticized for tracking and putting that event in our national asset database. That is unfortunate because, setting aside the importance of the mules temporarily, there are 150,000 to 200,000 people that gather in rural Tennessee one place, one time, 1 weekend every year. That
to me is 150,000 to 200,000 potential targets that involve the loss of human lives.

So I am glad to see that this committee considers and acknowledges the importance of these particular mass gatherings. Because they make up the fabric of America, and we are here to secure that piece of America that often goes overlooked.

Thank you, sir; and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Colonel Stephan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STEPHAN

JULY 9, 2008

Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and all of the distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to enhance the security of mass gathering venues. Today also serves as an opportunity to initiate a dialog to address the issues identified in the majority staff report, “Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings.”

“Places of mass gathering” actually comprise a very diverse group of commercial assets and facilities, typically privately owned and operated, which may include sports venues, amusement parks, concert halls, retail malls, office buildings, residential apartment buildings, and hotels and resorts. These facilities, which make up the Commercial Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework, may be generally characterized by one of four common traits: business activities, personal commercial transactions, recreational pastimes, and accommodations. The Commercial Facilities Sector’s requirement of open access, which is necessary to successfully conduct operations associated with these types of facilities, represents an inherent security challenge.

Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a primary concern to both the Department and the stakeholders of the Commercial Facilities Sector. As is consistent throughout the private sector, business activities are driven by profitability. Owners and operators strive to ensure that patrons enjoy easy access to facilities; however, there is also an increasingly clear understanding within the sector that today’s risk environment dictates a degree of security not previously seen in this very visible sector. To address this complex dichotomy between business operations and effective security solutions, DHS plays a key role in terms of information sharing, threat awareness, risk assessment processes and tools, exercises and training, best practices, facilitating public/private sector interactions, and national incident management activities. These activities are augmented by specific Federal support to select special events at commercial venues.

Reviewing the Department’s efforts in this Sector, I think it is necessary to frame the context of this discussion around a central point: Much like the bulk of the Nation’s CIKR, this sector is overwhelmingly and predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. Hence, the Department must leverage partnerships and relationships with the sector and State and local government entities to achieve success. This engagement supports a balanced approach that fairly addresses both public sector and private sector concerns and, more importantly, ensures that risks are appropriately and reasonably mitigated.

The partnership framework for those relationships is laid out in the NIPP. As you know, the NIPP is an outcome of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7), which identified 17 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource sectors and tasked the Department with developing a plan to enhance protection and security found in and around the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). In addition, HSPD–7 designated the Department as the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for a number of the 17 (now 18) CIKR sectors, including the Commercial Facilities Sector. Subsequently, DHS, in conjunction with 17 executive branch signatory departments and agencies, developed the NIPP, along with the associated Sector Specific Plans (SSP). DHS, as the SSA for the Commercial Facilities Sector, spearheaded the development of the Sector’s SSP, which was released in May of last year.

The NIPP provides guidance on addressing both terrorist threats and all-hazard incidents using the Sector Partnership Model through which coordinated planning and program implementation may take place. The Commercial Facilities SSP, much like the other SSPs, molds the NIPP’s guidance to effectively address the diverse, complex, and unique environments and relationships found within the Sector. More-
over, the Sector Coordinating Model serves as an avenue through which the sector can inform the Department of requirements for tools, information, and training.

Reviewing the wide range of products and services that DHS has developed in collaboration with the Commercial Facilities Sector, I once again emphasize the importance of strong partnerships between and among DHS, the private sector, and State and local government officials. Ultimately, security and emergency response planning is the primary responsibility of the private sector and State and local officials at the venue level. The role of the Federal Government is to augment and facilitate this planning process as appropriate. Incident response typically highlights this division of roles; in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, local law enforcement and emergency services providers will be the first on the scene, immediately coordinating and collaborating with the private sector. The more informed both parties are of facility and community capabilities and gaps, the better the planning process and overall joint response will be.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SITE SECURITY PLANNING

To facilitate strong interaction among DHS, the private sector, and local authorities, the Department has developed a series of programs and initiatives that involve face-to-face, venue-level engagements. The interactions serve a variety of purposes, including leveraging security specialist subject matter expertise to identify vulnerabilities and security gaps, recommending strategies to close security gaps, facilitating communications, initiating and maintaining relationships between the private sector and local authorities, and providing training and situational awareness.

As you are no doubt aware, the Department’s infrastructure protection work is not performed only in Washington, DC; rather, it takes place across the country via the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) cadre. PSAs are in place in communities throughout the Nation to assist with local efforts to protect critical assets, providing a Federal resource to communities and businesses. During natural disasters and contingency events, PSAs work in State and local Emergency Operations Centers. PSAs also provide real-time information on facility significance and protective measures to facility owners and operators, as well as State and local representatives.

Typically, PSAs are engaged to support the planning and execution of National Special Security Events (NSSEs), led by the U.S. Secret Service, as well as state NSSEs, led by the Department’s Office of Operations Coordination and Planning under the direction of my colleague Vice Admiral Roger Rufe. These programs are designed to provide an objective framework through which Federal, State and local entities can identify special events occurring within their jurisdiction; request Federal support and training; and, after careful evaluation and assessment, receive Federal operational support as appropriate. I’ll defer to VADM Rufe for a more in-depth discussion of the NSSE program, although I will briefly describe contributions from personnel within the Office of Infrastructure Protection. These personnel administer a variety of training courses for the relevant public and private sector personnel; conduct site assistance visits and buffer zone plans for the venue and adjacent infrastructure; provide situational awareness and intelligence briefings; and provide geospatial products of area CIKR. Over the life of the program, PSAs and other security specialists from my office have provided support to over 400 mass gathering and special events, and 156 Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) Levels 1, 2, and 3 Special Events. Most recently, we have supported security assessments and planning for the Papal Visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, Super Bowl XLII, and the Rose Bowl.

As part of their steady-state activities, PSAs work with State and local law enforcement and the private sector in identifying critical infrastructure assets, identifying vulnerabilities, recommending and implementing protective actions/measures, and providing risk mitigation training designed to teach terrorism prevention, detection, and awareness to facility owners/operators and State and local law enforcement entities.

DHS has provided similar support to sporting organizations and events, such as the National Football League, Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Collegiate Athletic Association, as well as sporting and mass gathering venue managers associations in general. For example, specific to race events, PSAs work closely with NASCAR—having conducted over 30 outreach efforts to NASCAR venues, including mass evacuation and emergency response planning, providing situational awareness in the run up to and throughout events, exercise planning and observation, participating in NASCAR Security Summits, and conducting security surveys.

In addition to the PSA program, the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) grant initiative, one of the Department’s most successful, long-running programs, is
administered by my office in conjunction with FEMA. This program is designed to provide local law enforcement and emergency responders and other public sector entities with the resources necessary to enhance security and responsiveness “outside the fence” at CIKR sites, including those in the Commercial Facilities Sector. Local entities are able to purchase equipment and training resources for the purpose of increasing preparedness, thereby complicating a terrorist’s plans to attack from the vicinity adjacent to CIKR sites, ultimately buying down risk on a local and regional level. As of May 2008, the amount of BZPP grant funds awarded to the commercial facilities sector has exceeded $50 million.

The Site Assistance Visit (SAV) program is another long-running DHS program that has had a measurable impact on the Commercial Facilities Sector, particularly those sites that would be considered places of mass gathering. SAVs identify vulnerabilities, leading to a dialog between DHS and the facility owners/operators and local authorities concerning means of mitigating identified vulnerabilities. As of May 2008, there have been 246 SAVs performed at various commercial facilities across the Nation. We are also in the process of adding a cybersecurity analysis component to the SAV program, which will further enhance this program’s value to our private sector partners.

PLANNING DOCUMENTS AND TOOLS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR USE

To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts, in coordination with our private sector partners, DHS has created a suite of planning and informational resources that assist owners and operators of the Nation’s CIKR in enhancing security around their facilities. One of these products, the Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports League, released in January 2008, has been specifically designed for use by participating representatives of the Sports Leagues and Public Assembly Sector Coordinating Subcouncil (an organization formed under the NIPP framework). Private sector participants included Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, NASCAR, the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, the National Hockey League, and the United States Tennis Association. The guide provides an overview of protective measures that can be implemented to assist sports teams and owners/operators of sporting event facilities in planning and managing security at their facilities. DHS plans to develop additional protective measures guides for the remaining six Commercial Facilities subsectors over the next 2 years, with guides for the Retail, Lodging, and Outdoor Events (Amusement Parks/Fairs) subsectors to be released in fiscal year 2009.

The Department has also developed Common Vulnerability (CV), Potential Indicators of Threat (PI), and Protective Measures (PM) Reports based on data gathered from Site Assistance Visits and the Buffer Zone Protection Program, for use by local law enforcement and asset owners and operators to support their efforts in securing CIKR assets. The CV, PI, and PM reports have been updated and conveniently integrated into a single document for 17 facility types within the Commercial Facilities Sector. They have been distributed widely, including via the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council and its eight Subcouncils, in addition to the Homeland Security Information Network—Commercial Facilities Sector (HSIN-CFS) portal.

FEMA has also created the Risk Management Series, designed specifically for commercial facilities, which includes a large suite of man-made disaster publications directed at strengthening the building inventory to reduce the potential impact from the forces that might be anticipated in a terrorist assault. The objective of the series is to reduce physical damage to structural and nonstructural components of buildings and related infrastructure, and to reduce resultant casualties from impact by conventional bombs, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents; earthquakes; floods; and high winds.

One publication in the FEMA Risk Management Series, Methodology for Preparing Threat Assessments for Commercial Buildings (FEMA 452), is designed to assist commercial facility owners/operators in assessing the vulnerabilities, threat, and risks associated with their facilities. FEMA 452 has been used to assess hundreds of buildings within the Commercial Facilities Sector. Currently, the number of people trained in FEMA has increased to 775; it is estimated that an additional 15 training sessions will be offered by September 2009.

In terms of self-assessment tools available to the Commercial Facilities Sector, DHS is currently redeploying the Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool (ViSAT), to be designated the Risk—Self-Assessment Tool (R–SAT). R–SAT’s building block, ViSAT, is a Web-based self-assessment tool developed by DHS and provided free of charge to CIKR asset owners/operators. The goal of this program is to raise the level of security at CIKR facilities across the Nation and to assist in establishing a common baseline of security from which all assets in certain sectors
or subsectors can identify weaknesses and establish protection plans. Modules have currently been deployed for stadiums, arenas, convention centers, performing arts centers, and speedways. Approximately 1,000 commercial facilities have access to ViSAT, and DHS has provided a grant to the International Association of Assembly Managers, a co-chair of the Public Assembly Subcouncil, to promote and provide training for this tool.

INFORMATION SHARING

The Department’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) conducts all-source intelligence research and analysis to assess the potential threat to critical infrastructure and key resources across the Nation, as well as develop lessons learned products derived from attacks on commercial venues abroad. HITRAC’s goal is to provide owners and operators of CIKR with strategically relevant and actionable information on threats they face, primarily from terrorists. HITRAC conducts outreach to both private and public sector partners through classified and unclassified threat briefings to members of private sector coordinating councils; Government coordinating councils; State and local officials; and individual companies. In the last 10 months alone, DHS HITRAC has released more than seven products specific to places of mass gathering, including bulletins related to Super Bowl XLII, the recent Papal visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, and threats to popular sports and entertainment venues.

Among other means, DHS disseminates these bulletins by the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the Department’s primary platform used to facilitate the information-sharing necessary for coordination, planning, mitigation, and response by the Government and the private sector regarding threats to sectors identified by DHS. HSIN is an internet-based platform that enables secure, encrypted Sensitive But Unclassified/For Official Use Only (SBU/FOUO) level communications between DHS and vetted private sector members, both within the Commercial Facilities Sector and across other sectors identified by DHS. The Commercial Facilities Sector maintains an independent site on the HSIN portal, which was designed and implemented in collaboration with its Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council, and presently has 131 registered GCC and SCC organizational users.

The next generation of HSIN for the Commercial Facilities Sector, based on requirements developed by the sector itself, will include additional features enhancing the value and utility of the platform. Updates will include a virtual incident coordination center acting as a “one-stop-shop” for incident operations information sharing and improved Sector content management capabilities.

TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES

We are also firm believers that in addition to providing on-site assessments, self-assessment tools, and disseminating threat and intelligence information, providing training to the private sector is a critical component of enhancing security capabilities. DHS engages the private sector through a number of different educational opportunities, including conferences and seminars, and takes advantage of association and trade conferences, working with our partners in the Commercial Facilities Sector. DHS has made presentations, facilitated table-top exercises, or exhibited educational materials at 12 major sporting events related seminars or conferences since 2005. Audiences have included sport-specific conferences as well as facility manager conferences.

The Private Sector Counterterrorism Awareness Course is designed to improve the knowledge of private sector security professionals by providing exposure to key elements of soft target awareness, surveillance detection, and improvised explosive device (IED) recognition. The workshop training materials enhance and reinforce participants’ knowledge, skills, and abilities related to preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats and incidents. The workshop outlines specific counterterrorism awareness and prevention actions that reduce vulnerability and mitigate the risk of domestic terrorist attacks. DHS has provided this training to 336 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.

The Soft Target Awareness Course is available to property/facility managers, supervisors, first-line managers and their security and safety staff, and entry level employees. Participants receive an introduction to terrorism; learn to recognize and prevent terrorist activities (basic surveillance detection methods); learn the basics of prevention, response, and recovery; and then discuss with other attendees issues specific to their sector of business. DHS has provided this training to 1,935 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.
The Surveillance Detection Course is intended for commercial infrastructure operators and security staff. This course is designed to provide attendees with a foundation for identifying locations conducive to observing facility operations and/or personnel, employing the fundamentals of surveillance detection, and observing and reporting suspicious individuals and activity around facilities. DHS has provided this training to 509 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.

The Protective Measures Course is the Department’s newest training available to Commercial Facilities Sector personnel in the public/private sector and is designed to provide students with the knowledge to identify vulnerabilities and select appropriate Protective Measures for their unique facility. The course focuses on providing information pertaining to common vulnerabilities, available Protective Measures, and strategies for selecting appropriate Protective Measures.

DHS is also developing an Active Shooter Training Guide to enhance CIKR employee preparation for active shooter events. An active shooter event is generally defined as a situation where an armed person has used deadly force against other persons and continues to do so while having access to additional victims. The final product will be a desk reference guide addressing how employees, managers, training staff, and human resources staff, at their respective levels, can mitigate and appropriately react in the event of an active shooter. This material is slated to be distributed to the commercial facilities sector partners prior to the 2008/2009 holiday shopping season.

The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) is designed to increase private sector and citizen awareness of activity associated with bomb making, including the manufacture of homemade explosives for use in the construction of IEDs. The program reaches out to businesses that manufacture and sell many of the materials that bomb makers will attempt to acquire, instructing retail employees not only which materials they need to be aware of but also how to better identify “suspicious behavior.” The awareness tools, which include cards and posters, are industry-specific and can be kept at the point of sale for easy reference. DHS has provided this training to 28 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.

DHS also has developed a number of courses and training tracks for Commercial Facilities Sector association training venues, such as the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM) Academy for Venue Safety and Security (AVSS). This training includes security planning and life safety management for the public assembly venue industry. The core educational tracks are Risk Management, Emergency Planning, Security Operations, and Training. These tracks familiarize students with the many types of emergencies that can occur at public assembly facilities, and they offer techniques for planning, implementing, and ensuring the safety of patrons, staff, and facilities. Later this month, we will visit the Academy to discuss Evacuation Planning at Events/Venues of Mass Gathering.

Going beyond private sector association activities, DHS is reaching out to academia for research and education focused on the Commercial Facilities Sector through the University of Southern Mississippi’s Center for Spectator Sports Security Management Advisory Board. The Center was established through a grant awarded by DHS. The Center is the first of its kind in the United States, building capabilities among those responsible for sports events and security management through research, education, and outreach efforts. Research conducted at the Center for SSSM has already paid off, identifying gaps in the education and training of current sport event management professionals. DHS works closely with the Center, participating with the Advisory Board in an information-sharing capacity.

NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events

Last, as you know, earlier this year, DHS released the NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events, which was developed through a DHS/NASCAR coordinated effort and provides guidance on utilizing a mass evacuation plan template for NASCAR-sanctioned facilities. The template was designed to assist NASCAR venues in developing site-specific evacuation procedures for responding to potential incidents in an all-hazards environment. The guide was rolled out to the sector in January 2008 at the annual NASCAR Security Summit. The development of this guide was an extensive collaborative effort. Meetings with NASCAR security officials between December 2006 and January 2008 hinged upon on-site visits to four NASCAR tracks—Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Talladega Superspeedway, Infineon Raceway, and the Milwaukee Mile.

Our intent was to develop a flexible guide that each NASCAR venue type could use as a baseline for developing an individualized plan suited to the unique characteristics and jurisdictions that exist from track to track. This requires a collaborative planning process with the active participation of both private and public sec-
tor stakeholders at the local level. This process also ensures that the plan is developed to the resources available to support plan implementation.

Our long-term objective is to develop similar evacuation guides for other venues within the Sports Leagues Subsector and, eventually, for the entire Commercial Facilities Sector. A working group comprised of Federal agencies, stadium associations, universities, and private sector partners is currently making adaptations to the NASCAR guide for use at collegiate and professional sports stadiums. This guidance will be deliverable by January 1, 2009.

PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR MASS GATHERINGS

Concluding my discussion of our progress and accomplishments in evacuation planning, I would like to take a moment to thank the committee for the commentary and constructive criticism provided within the report on Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings. The report highlights the complexity of the Commercial Facilities Sector, and the Sports Leagues Subsector in particular, to wit: there are 42 NASCAR events annually, 32 NFL teams, 30 NBA teams, 30 MLB teams, 30 NHL teams, 14 MLS teams, 116 Division 1 college football teams that compete weekly from late August through early January of each year, among a host of other sporting events that occur each and every week of the year at the professional, amateur, and recreational level.

From State to State, jurisdictional boundaries vary, law enforcement and emergency services capabilities vary, legal authorities vary, and even the characteristics of the numerous sports venues themselves vary significantly. The one constant is that the individual facility owner or operator, and the corresponding State and local officials know the unique circumstances facing the specific asset, and are, therefore, best positioned to serve as primary lead in coordination of security and emergency response planning at the venue level. DHS’ role in Commercial Facility Sector events is to augment and facilitate planning and operational support where necessary, with the specific facility developing the individual plan side-by-side with local and State authorities. As I previously outlined, DHS facilitates this coordination through a variety of engagements. These programs have been made readily available to the private sector and will be provided on a continual basis to ensure that DHS thoroughly engages with the multitude of facilities of this type throughout the Nation—also ensuring that the parties with the unique knowledge are enabled and contributing to the planning process. The feedback we have received from our partners has validated our efforts, and we will continue to solicit feedback on our activities and refocus where and as necessary.

We are committed to continued engagement with the Commercial Facilities community not only by sharing our expertise, but also by enabling frank, two-way discussions focused on the overarching goals of enhancing their security efforts and protecting the general public.

Thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am sure the people in Tennessee appreciate that shout-out for Mule Day.

Vice Admiral Rufe for 5 minutes, please.

STATEMENT OF ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG (RET.), DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Admiral RUFE. Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King and Members of the committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased to appear today alongside Assistant Secretary Stephan and the other distinguished witnesses. Thank you for inviting me to discuss how the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning conducts plannings for mass gatherings and other special events.

It is important to recognize that, as Assistant Secretary Stephan just acknowledged, that the vast majority of planning that must be done for special events is the responsibility of State, local and tribal entities. As such, as it is in almost all cases, Federal support to
a special event or a mass gathering not on Federal property comes only after a request is received from the special event planners for support and is deemed to require Federal coordination.

A special event is defined as a function that draws a large public crowd to the host city or venue. It may also be a significant political function or world event hosted on U.S. soil. It can be free or a ticketed event. It may be local or have regional importance.

The Special Event Working Group, known as the SEWG, or SEWG, is a group of representatives of various Federal entities who are involved in planning and coordinating Federal activities for a special event. The SEWG facilitates a unified interagency planning and coordination effort for all special events. In addition, the SEWG identifies events that may require a coordinated Federal response and collectively coordinates Federal assets to bridge any capability gaps identified by State and local partners that have not already been addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance agreements.

Within this process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf of the Secretary to fulfill his Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency planning and coordinate operations for designated special events.

The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives designated by their respective Federal departments, agencies and components. Presently, there are upwards of 50 Federal entities with representatives assigned to the SEWG. I submitted a list of these member agencies along with my written statement today.

DHS has developed a method for assigning a relative risk level to the multitude of special events Nation-wide brought to our attention by State, local and tribal entities. This is important as the Federal Government cannot support every special event occurring across the 56 States and territories of the United States. It is important to understand that entry of a request to be evaluated for a designated risk level is completely voluntary. Except in rare cases, DHS does not evaluate events for risk level unless the event is nominated by an appropriate State, local or tribal entity.

The first step in this evaluation process is a Special Event Data Call. This automated system allows special event planners from across the country to enter information regarding upcoming events into a database. The most recent data call, which covers calendar year 2008, had over 4,000 events entered primarily by State and local planners.

Once the data call is closed, the events are run through the risk methodology program, which analyzes response criteria captured by the questionnaire and then assesses stages of threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for each event. This results in a preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating, or SEAR, level for an event, categorized as SEAR levels 1 through 5.

The preliminary ratings are passed to the SEWG co-chairs by OPS for further consideration. The SEWG co-chairs are made up of FEMA, OPS, our risk management folks at DHS, the FBI and the Secret Service.

These co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as a starting point to identify the final SEAR level. The co-chairs analyze the initial ranking to account for any special circumstances,
such as whether there has been a request for assistance from planners and whether a current threat has been identified for the event.

The Federal Government coordination and non-SSE special events is concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level 1 or 2. These events are ones for which either direct or extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness is required and some level of predeployment of Federal assets is required. For every SEAR Level 1 or 2 special event, a Federal coordinator is appointed by the Secretary to serve as the Secretary's representative and has responsibility for coordinating Federal assets for an event. An Integrated Federal Support Plan is also developed.

For these events, SEWG’s interagency threat committee also generates a Joint Special Event Threat Assessment. These assessments are crafted by interagency Intelligence Community professionals and are distributed to Federal partners as well as to State and local fusion centers in need of the information. The focus is upon intelligence, threat, risk information and identifies critical infrastructure and key resources in proximity to large events.

Regardless of the SEAR level designation assigned, the Federal Government can remain involved with a special event. DHS will maintain awareness of all known special events through monitoring by a national operations center. In addition, State and local planners may request support for their events from the Federal Government and agencies located near the event.

I am pleased to report to you today this progress that DHS has made with the interagency community and how we deal with these special event requirements each year. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

[The statement of Admiral Rufe follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER T. RUFE, JR.**

**JULY 9, 2008**

Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am pleased to appear today alongside Assistant Secretary Stephan and the other distinguished witnesses. Thank you for inviting me to discuss how the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) conducts planning for Mass Gatherings and other Special Events. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Special Events Working Group and how their planning effort facilitates the ability of the Secretary of DHS (Secretary) to execute his incident management responsibilities in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive–5 (HSPD–5).

The Secretary's role in this arena is that of his overall responsibility for the execution of the key missions of DHS: preventing terrorist attacks; reducing the country's vulnerability to terrorism; minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. It is important to recognize, though, that the vast majority of Special Events are the responsibility of State, local and tribal entities. As such, in almost all cases, Federal support to a Special Event or a Mass Gathering not on Federal property, comes only after a request is received from the Special Event planners for support and is deemed to require Federal coordination.

SPECIAL EVENT WORKING GROUP (SEWG)

The Special Event Working Group (SEWG) is a group of representatives of various Federal entities who may be involved in planning for or coordinating Federal activities for a special event. To paraphrase, a special event is defined as a function
that draws a large public crowd to the host city or venue in combination with political importance and local, regional or international significance. The SEWG was formed in April 2004, to validate a methodology for identifying and categorizing special events (other than those designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE)), and coordinating Federal support to those events.¹

The mission and purpose of the SEWG is to support a unified interagency planning and coordination effort for Special Events and to ensure coordination of Federal support to the designated event. The SEWG identifies events that may require a coordinated Federal response and collectively coordinates Federal assets to bridge any capability gaps identified by State and local partners that have not already been addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance agreements. Within this process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf of the Secretary and his HSPD–5 responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency planning and coordinate operations for designated Special Events in order to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from terrorist threats/attacks.

The SEWG consists of several elements: (1) The five Co-chairs of the SEWG who consist of senior or executive level (GS–15/SES) managers from OPS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Secret Service (USSS) and DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (RMA); (2) the SEWG General Membership itself; and (3) the DHS programmatic, coordination and administrative staff dedicated to SEWG which is housed in OPS.

The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives designated by their respective Federal Departments, Agencies and/or Components. These representatives are traditional Federal agencies with missions that are related to Special Events planning, coordination, and execution, and span the four pillars of the National Response Framework: Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery. Presently, there are upwards of 50 Federal Departments/Agencies and their Components with representatives assigned to the SEWG (see the attached exhibit No. 1).

PRIORITIZING SPECIAL EVENTS

DHS, including the Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) and the Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) has developed a method for assigning a relative risk level to the multitude of special events Nation-wide brought to our attention by State, local and tribal entities. This is important as the Federal Government cannot possibly support every “Special Event” occurring across the 56 States and territories of the United States. It is important to understand that a request to be evaluated for a designated risk level is completely voluntary. Except in exceedingly rare cases, DHS does not evaluate events for their appropriate risk level unless the event was nominated by an appropriate State, local, or tribal entity. On numerous occasions, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis has reviewed and provided substantive input into a State and local produced threat assessments.

The first step in this evaluation process is the Special Event Data Call. This automated system, allows Special Event planners from States, cities and localities to enter information regarding upcoming special events into a database. The most recent Data Call which covers Calendar Year 2008 had over 4,000 events entered primarily by State and/or local Planners. This list is the crucial starting point and is the only method that provides DHS and the SEWG with situational awareness. In order to ensure the Special Event Data Call properly conducts a preliminary assessment of events, the DHS SEWG has developed a questionnaire for individuals at the State and local level who are users of the system and entering their special event data. Once the data call is closed, the events are run through the risk methodology program, which analyzes response criteria captured by the questionnaire and assesses stages of threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for the event. This results in preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) level results, which are categorized as SEAR Levels 1–5. The preliminary ratings are passed to the SEWG co-chairs by OPS for further consideration. The SEWG, OPS, RMA, and IGP work with their respective subject matter experts to ensure the methodology fits the needs for the users at the Federal, State and local levels.

The SEWG co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as a starting point to identify the final SEAR level. The co-chairs analyze the initial ranking to account

¹ National Special Security Events are significant domestic or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and therefore warrant additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. The designation process for NSSEs is established by NSPD–46/HSPD–15, Annex II and HSPD–7.
for any special circumstances, such as whether there have been requests for assistance from planners and whether a current threat has been identified.

SEAR LEVEL 1 & 2 EVENTS

The Federal Government involvement in non-NSSE special events is concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level 1 or 2.

An event is considered to be a SEAR Level 1 when it is an event of significant national and/or international importance that may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. Pre-deployment of Federal assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the State and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may also be warranted. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be designated, and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed.

A SEAR Level 2 event is a significant event with national and/or international importance that may require direct national-level Federal support and situational awareness. The magnitude and significance of these events calls for close coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities and may warrant limited pre-deployment of USG assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the State and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be designated and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed.

On the other hand, SEAR Level 3, 4 and 5 events do not have a FC identified nor an IFSP generated, however, State and local officials may still solicit resources from Federal agencies at the agencies’ expense.

Regardless of the SEAR Level designation assigned, the Federal Government can remain involved with the special event. DHS will maintain awareness of all special events through reporting produced by the National Operations Center (NOC). In addition, State and local planners may request support for their events from the Federal Departments and Agencies located near the event.

I would like to note that the SEAR levels themselves are an excellent illustration of the cooperation and coordination accomplished in the SEWG. The SEAR level system is the evolution of various Special Event ratings previously used in the Federal Government. Until 2006, DHS used Special Event Homeland Security (SEHS) as the DHS standard. The Federal Bureau of Investigation used Special Event Rating Level (SERL) as their standard. Often levels were different from one organization to another. Through interagency cooperation fostered by the SEWG, it was agreed that the SERL/SEHS terminology would be eliminated, and the common term SEAR would be utilized by Federal planners for all rated events. For the first time, the interagency community had one term and one method to describe and categorize Special Events.

A Federal Coordinator (FC) is assigned for every SEAR Level 1 or 2 special event. The FC is nominated by a SEWG member agency, approved and appointed by the Secretary, and has responsibility for coordinating Federal Assets for an approved SEAR Level 1 or 2 Event. He or she serves as the Secretary’s representative locally and is selected from the ranks of the trained Principal Federal Official cadre if available or another experienced senior or executive Federal manager. Whenever possible, the FC is selected from the local area of the event being supported.

Responsibilities of the FC include:
• Engaging Federal, State and local officials; consult State and local authorities on their event plans;
• Coordinating the field information required for the completion of the Integrated Federal Support Plan;
• Coordinating Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) input from interagency HQS elements through OPS Special Events Staff;
• Assessing, evaluating and de-conflicting requests for Federal assistance;
• Coordinating requests for assistance and identified capability gaps with DHS, HQ and/or Field Elements and other Federal Departments/Agencies.

For every SEAR Level 1 and 2 event, an IFSP is also prepared. The IFSP is a collaborative effort of the SEWG and is designed to:
• Inform the Secretary and FC of all the Federal activities and support in preparation for and execution of a Special Event;
• Facilitate the FC’s ability to initially participate within the Unified Coordination Group in case of an incident to support the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities;
• Educate Federal interagency partners on Federal resource application.
Additionally, there are special threat products produced for each SEAR Level 1 and 2 event. The SEWG has a robust interagency threat committee which works to generate Joint Special Event Threat Assessments (JSETA). These assessments are crafted by interagency intelligence community professionals who belong to the SEWG threat committee and are specific to Level 1 and Level 2 events. JSETA are distributed to the interagency community for situational awareness as well as to the State and local fusion centers in need of the information. They focus upon intelligence, threat and risk information, and identify critical infrastructure and key resources in proximity to large events.

CONCLUSION

I am very pleased to report on the progress DHS and the interagency community has made in how we support Federal, State, and local events. The SEWG, in conjunction with the SEWG Threat/Risk Assessments, Methodology, Airspace Security committees, continue to work together to ensure that appropriate events are covered from a Federal perspective. The SEWG also ensures that there are no gaps in local plans and/or duplication of Federal efforts to support those plans. The SEWG does not interfere or limit any member agency’s ability to conduct its core mission, if appropriate, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. The success of DHS in supporting Special Event Planners is due to the cooperation and coordination found in the SEWG, with the ultimate goal of rendering appropriate Federal support for mass gatherings and Special Events.

I hope that this testimony leaves you with an understanding for the efforts that DHS, OPS Coordination and Planning and the SEWG have made to improve planning and Special Event coordination. Thank you for the opportunity to report to the committee on our ongoing efforts. I request that you place this testimony and the list of SEWG member agencies in the permanent record and would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.

EXHIBIT 1.—2008 SPECIAL EVENTS WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP

The interagency Special Event Work Group has members from the following organizations:

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Office of Grants and Training (G&T)
- Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC)
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- United States Coast Guard (USCG)
- United States Secret Service (USSSS)
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
- Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
- Incident Management Division (IMD)
- National Operations Center (NOC)
- National Preparedness and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
- Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
- Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP)
- Risk Management & Analysis (RMA)
- Cyber Security & Communications (CSC)
- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
- Office of Private Sector Coordination
- Office of Science and Technology (S&T)
- Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
- Office of General Counsel (OGC)
- Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF)
- Counterterrorism Division/DOJ HQS
- Criminal Division/DOJ HQS
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)
- U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
- Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- Department of Commerce (DOC)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.
I will start our questions for our first panel.
Assistant Secretary Stephan, before I ask my first question, I want to just share with you my disappointment in the chemical security bill progress that we worked with your staff and this committee staff on for more than 9 months. At the beginning of that process, another committee had a hearing; and a day before the hearing, we received a letter saying you were against the bill. We had worked in good faith with you on that.
I have since sent the Secretary a letter asking for a clarification on how we worked for 9 months on getting a chemical facility bill through this body. This committee passed it. When another committee takes it up, you are against it.
So I just wanted to let you know that some of us are real concerned that if there was opposition to a bill, the way we work it out—and this committee does a good job at it—is we work it out before we go public. That was a real concern on my part, and I just wanted to make sure that you understood the disappointment we had. Because we spent time in my office and committee staff on trying to work the bill out.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, may I respond to your point?

Chairman THOMPSON. Sure.

Colonel STEPHAN. I just would like to remind you that we did, in fact, provide several objections to the bill during a previous testimony that I delivered personally to your committee Chairmanship and to several of the subcommittee meetings chaired by Chairwoman Jackson Lee. We have also worked with your staff to voice our objections over time as the bill seemed to get larger and larger and more complex over time, and I believe we did a fairly good job at bringing you and your staff and Ms. Jackson Lee up to speed in terms of our specific objections. Not many of those objections, however, were noted in the final version of the bill.

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, thank you. We are both on the record now. So we have a record.
Admiral Rufe, one of the things we are told by State and locals is that, every time an event occurs, they have to make an application, whether it is an event that—let’s take the mule event. If it happens every year, there is some concern as to whether or not the
laborious process of repeating the submission of the data can somehow be streamlined. Have you all looked at that?

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. We have a questionnaire that we have developed over time. In fact, we just met yesterday with a focus group to look at it again. We try to improve that over time to make sure it meets the needs of the State and local folks so that we are not asking for information that is not useful.

I understand the concern that we would be asking for the same thing for a similar event each year. But, over time, the State and local capacity to be able to handle those events may change, may get better or may degrade. The event itself may grow or shrink. The participation could grow or shrink. Certainly the threat from year to year may change. So while an event may rate at one level one year, it may change the next year depending upon the response to the questionnaire by the State and locals who are submitting the information.

Chairman THOMPSON. So is your testimony that you plan to at some point re-look at the information requested?

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. Actually, we do that every year. The process starts right about now for next year, in fact. We hope to have it complete by December 1.

The initial step in the process is to meet with representatives of about five to eight States who represent a focus group for us to look at what we did the previous year to make sure the questionnaire is meeting their needs as well as our needs and then changing it as we need to, and we will do that each year depending upon feedback that we get from our partners.

Chairman THOMPSON. Colonel Stephan, you know, most of us live in communities where there are a number of gatherings of all sorts, from State fairs to what have you. They do make attractive targets. To what extent have you communicated with State and locals what you have to offer in support of their security concerns?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I principally do that through my protective security advisors. I have 78 of them deployed now throughout the country, some in rural areas, some in major urban areas in the United States. We have a request for 10 additional positions in our 2009 budget which I hope that you all support.

Those are my eyes and ears forward. They are my boots on the ground. They have developed, over the 3 years of the program’s life span to date, very extensive collaborative relationships with State homeland security advisors, local officials, municipal officials, emergency managers and, most importantly of all, private sector owners and operators, to include commercial venue owners and operators where lots of these mass gatherings take place. Principally through that forward arm, they facilitate a more detailed level planning for events that don’t necessarily pop up on Admiral Rufe’s radar screen through his process.

I think top-down through that process as well as bottom-up through my protective security advisors, I think we are doing a fairly good job now of providing more blanket coverage situational awareness training exercise involvement doing site-specific vulnerability assessments and just helping out our State and local partners in many ways.
Chairman THOMPSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York for 5 minutes.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel, Admiral, I want to thank you for your testimony.

Secretary Stephan, one of the things we have learned over the last several years—and Congressman Lungren made this clear during the whole port security debate about the importance of layers of defense and levels of cooperation in trying to stop the enemy from getting here.

As you look back over the last several years with what you have tried to do with mass gatherings, what has struck you as being the most successful part of your program? As we look to a new administration, what do you feel has to be done over the next several years to strengthen our position? I am not asking you to give away any weaknesses. What particular areas would you recommend the next administration focus on when it comes to mass gatherings?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, some of the most important progress we have achieved again lies in the area of the massive boots-on-the-ground interaction we have now at these local venue levels. But I think we have also set up a framework with the leadership at the State and local level as well as within the private sector venue owner and operator community.

We have provided them risk assessment and vulnerability assessment methodologies. We focus, based upon risk, on actually conducting physical and cyber on-site assessments of these different facilities. We have provided them massive amounts of training to both security guys at the venues themselves as well as within State and local law enforcement jurisdictions that have responsibility in some way, shape or form for securities venues. We have attempted to target grant money specifically to capabilities gaps that have been identified in collaborative security plans.

So I think the planning framework, the training framework, the exercise framework is there. The challenge for the remainder of this administration and the next administration is to try to figure out how to stretch the dollars, the Federal grant dollars, and to support to the extent that you can so you can make sure that no important things fall through the cracks.

As Admiral Rufe pointed out, it is impossible for us to be everywhere, nor is it really our responsibility as the Federal Government to be everywhere. But we do need to continue the pace of the interaction providing the framework, the tools, the methodologies, the planning templates for security and mass evacuation and so on and so forth that we have established. So we just need to push that kind of activity further, further, further down the bean trail and hopefully at some point in time the trainer concept will kick in; and for every dollar I spend, State and local officials and the private sector, most importantly, will be spending $10, $100 or $1,000 based upon the models and templates we have provided them.

Mr. KING. Do you find that local officials are cooperative? For instance, is there a difference between doing a New Year’s Eve event in Manhattan and doing a Mule Day event in Tennessee? Do you feel that your Department is able to cope with different part of the country and adapt to different situations?
Colonel Stephan. Certainly. One thing I have learned is every jurisdiction is different from every other jurisdiction across the country, and I think the places where we have probably the most challenge is where a certain number of scarce resources are distributed across different law enforcement and emergency management jurisdictions. Getting everybody to acknowledge that they need to be part of a collective plan instead of all individually trying to own a shiny new fire truck and a swat team capability and sexy night vision goggle equipment—not everybody needs all of that. We need to have a collaborative plan, multijurisdictional in nature for these specific areas we can carve out and define across the United States and have people support their part of the plan. We train, organize and equip to do that. I think that is one of the most significant challenges we face.

Mr. King. Thank you.

Admiral Rufe, the DHS information network that you have that provides intelligence and information, how do you screen who is going to get that? What are the precautions that are taken? Who is going to receive that? At what level are they getting it?

Admiral Rufe. Yes, sir. In fact, I was going to add to what you just asked Assistant Secretary Stephan. One of the improvements I think we have made in this area is in that information-sharing piece. For each one of these SEAR Level 1 and 2 events, we do a Joint Special Event Threat Assessment, which is done by the intelligence professionals in the interagency; and that is shared, obviously, with the people who need to have it at the local events for which the threat assessment is made.

In addition to that, I think a great step forward has been our State and local fusion centers. Because any actionable intelligence that is going to affect the local community is pushed forward as soon as we have it to the State and local fusion centers to ensure it gets distributed adequately to anybody who needs to have access to it.

Mr. King. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman Thompson. Thank you.

I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Mrs. Christensen.

Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for holding this hearing. It is an important issue. Thank you for the report which really sets a good stage for us to begin to do some more work on this issue.

Welcome to our two panelists. As a physician, I am going to ask you some health-related questions.

First, I am extremely concerned about the ability of States, territories, tribes and localities to deal with mass casualties, which could certainly occur if a mass gathering were to be hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How has the infrastructure protection, Colonel Stephan, taken the requirements for medurge into account and especially given the inability of most hospitals to take on any more patients, given that they are stressed to the max as it is? Actually, both of you could answer.
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am. I will do my best, although I will have to defer to a FEMA representative in our Office of Health Affairs as they kind of own this responsibility within the Department.

Mrs. Christensen. That is going to get me to my next question.

Colonel Stephan. For example, we have worked very specifically with the NASCAR community over the past 18 months to develop a mass evacuation guidelines template for them. We have worked with the NASCAR leadership, security and emergency preparedness folks, looking at three or four different size and complexities of various NASCAR venues around the country. We work with them hand-in-hand and with a represented sampling of local officials, emergency managers and health community experts to build a planning guide, which I have actually brought with me to leave with the committee if you are interested.

This includes important medical and public health considerations, to include: What is the capacity? Have you thought about, if you don't have the capacity locally, where are you going to take your patients in prioritized sequence? Those kind of questions are asked in the template.

Now it is the responsibility for the NASCAR leadership to take this template to the two dozen or so major venues around the United States of America and push out this guidance and let's work with them to help build those plans to the extent that we have the resources to do that.

Mrs. Christensen. You made a comment about the need to provide the buffer funding.

Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. Christensen. Do you think that we need to pay at least the same amount of attention to building up the health and infrastructure in communities around our country so that they would be better prepared?

Colonel Stephan. I think as a general answer I would say, yes, we have to focus on the resiliency and the capacity of the medical and public health care community, especially with respect to very specialized types of threat factors, such as burn victims and so on and so forth, given certain types of threat scenarios where we probably do not still have sufficient capacity across the country.

Mrs. Christensen. Admiral, did you want to answer the question?

Admiral Rupe. The only thing I would add, ma'am, is that the national response framework which was recently published is the framework for our response to any event. Any event involving—whether it is a hurricane or a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, you always have to be concerned with the idea of a mass casualties. Within that national response framework there is a natural disaster medical system that HHS is primarily responsible for supporting. It does provide teams that can come into different areas to support the State and local folks and their needs for specialized training or for just augmented medical help.

Mrs. Christensen. Right. In the Virgin Islands we have taken advantage of some of the DEMAT and other teams.

But to go back to Colonel Stephan, you mentioned the Office of Health Affairs; and I am always interested in how they are being utilized within the Department. So how have you worked with the
Office of Health Affairs to address the health concerns? Have their policy and programmatic input been incorporated into the product?

Colonel STEPHAN. I think the principal distinction between Dr. Runge's job and mine is he is responsible for coalescing or coordinating the medical and public health aspects of the Department's approach to incident management to steady state policy development, and so on and so forth.

Where we have an overlap is in the medical and public health sectors, as defined in HSPD–7 as well as the food and agricultural sectors as defined in HSPD–7. We have a cross-fertilization especially in the research and development and modelling and simulation and analysis world with not only Dr. Runge's office but also Admiral Cohen's office, the Science and Technology Directorate, where I serve as a source of requirements from the field from those three sectors: medical, public health, food and agriculture.

We use an annual reporting process to determine what modeling simulation analysis, research and development and raw science requirements come up from the field. We risk them or we risk categorize them and push them both to Dr. Runge for his shop as well as to Admiral Rufe for final action to stay engaged in the process as we research and develop things.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. They do provide input into the planning and the process that you oversee in terms of identifying the needs and the vulnerabilities and implementing the actions and measures? They have provided input that is used?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma'am.

A specific example is we collaborated very closely with Dr. Runge's shop to develop the Pandemic Influenza Guide across the critical infrastructure sectors to include commercial venues. That is a document that has been finalized, writ large across the sectors, and we are in the process of either distributing or finalizing documents that are sector-specific. I, again, have a copy of this guidance document for you.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

I now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 minutes, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you to our witnesses for being here.

I would like to have you give me a sense of how you sort out what right the public has to know if their life is potentially in danger. We had this challenge before September 11. I chaired the National Security Subcommittee in 1998, and I focused on terrorism. That was the focus of our Committee on Government Reform. When I talked about a Department of Homeland Security, people said, what are we, Great Britain? It was just like foreign to them. But we all knew that the Twin Towers was a target. We all knew it. In 1999, 1998, 1997, it had been a target in 1993, and we knew it still was a target. They failed to get it the first time. It was still a target.

When September 11 happened, I had constituents who said: How come you didn't tell me? So I am going to quickly give you an example, a real-life example.
A number of years ago, we were given a very real briefing that there was a suspected—in December a suspected terrorist effort to hijack planes coming from Europe, Great Britain and Europe. We were told there were six cities that were potential targets for a dirty bomb. So I will just ask you rhetorically. Hearing that, would you have your daughter go to Europe, your son, daughter go to Europe during that time? No. Would you have them go to the celebration, the New Year’s celebration in New York? No. You are not going to do that. You are going to tell your friends not to do it. That is exactly what I did. Then I said it publicly, and the shit—excuse me—things hit the fan.

What I want to know is, where do you draw the line? If you know for a fact that five cities are a target and you believe a dirty bomb is what you are concerned about and you are using technology to determine if there is radioactive material, why doesn’t the public have a right to know if you sure would tell your own family?

I want both of you to answer.

Colonel Stephan. Sir, I will take a shot first, if you don’t mind.

I think that every one of these scenarios is actually an individual case study, although there are certain principles that I believe the Secretary, the Intelligence Community, and all the way up to the President kind of walk through in order to gauge the response or the final decision that is made.

Some things would be: How specific, how credible, how imminent is the threat? How mature and how advanced is the plot? What is the opportunity to apprehend more of the network if, by waiting, you could do that? If you waited 1 hour or 2 days, could you bag more of the network or not? What is that all about? Will public release have a deterrent effect? That is, if the cat is out of the bag, are they now going to execute their plot or are they going to move it elsewhere?

A final principle would be: Will public release, in fact, cause more mass panic and hence potentially self-generate casualties than the terrorist attack itself or self-generated consequences than the terrorist attack itself?

I think the senior administration decisionmakers, to include our Secretary and the FBI Director and others up to the President, have to walk through very carefully a series of principled questions before they can get to your answer.

Mr. Shays. Colonel, I think that was a very thoughtful answer. Thank you.

Admiral.

Admiral Rupe. Yes, sir.

I don’t think I can improve very much on what the Assistant Secretary just said. I would only add that I am sure that the Secretary—if we had very actionable, specific intelligence that was targeted at a specific community, and going through the criteria that Bob has discussed here, the Secretary would certainly lean forward in terms of talking to the Governor, talking to the mayor, talking to the local folks who are, after all, responsible for their citizens’ safety to make sure that that was a decision that they did together, rather than in isolation.

Mr. Shays. Now, in this case, they actually stopped 11 planes and they never flew from Europe. So we knew our intelligence was
pretty accurate. Eleven planes never flew from Great Britain because of suspected terrorists.

So you have gone through that process with me. Give me an example of where the public would have a right to know.

Admiral Rufe. I will just say that if we knew for sure that there was an attack that was imminent, that there was no opportunity to interrupt it or there was a high degree of uncertainty that we could interrupt it and that folks’ lives were in danger, I would say that would be a case where we would—I would expect—I can’t make that decision myself, but I would expect the Secretary and the President would be very forthcoming in terms of getting that information to the people who needed to have it.

Colonel Stephan. Sir, I would also add to that. The more specific the targeting information is—for example, if we could drill down to an individual facility—the easier the decision becomes. If it is a sector-wide threat or a widespread geographic area of the United States, the decision becomes more complex and complicated.

Mr. Shays. Thank you. I think your answers were very thoughtful. Thank you.

Mrs. Christensen [presiding]. Thank you.

The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Pascrell for 5 minutes.

Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.

Secretary Stephan, I am concerned about a couple of things here, and thank you for both of your answers to the gentleman from Connecticut—the sharing of information when there are potential events. It would seem to me one of the biggest criticisms in the first 2 or 3 years that we kept on hearing all over the country was locals being the last resort for information.

How do you put a list together? You have all of these events. You have an inventory of events out there; and, as you said, you can’t cover all of them. So you are really depending upon local responders and local enforcement folks to do what they usually do at these events.

Since 9/11, there has not only been a high alert from the Federal Government but also by local enforcement. You want them to have the resources. You want them to have the training. The training would seem that is very—you know, we have a role. The Federal Government has a role in making sure—but what is your specific relationship with the local governments in putting the list together and then making sure that they are involved in prevention, detention, and response?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, I am going to answer your question, but I want to defer the part about how the list comes together to my colleague, Admiral Rufe.

For known events on more of a major scale, specific threat assessments or risk profiles are put together by the Intel Community—that spans DHS, the FBI, the CIA and others—and we put together documents that are shipped out to the localities where the venue or the mass gathering is taking place.

Mr. Pascrell. But do you use local input in the first phase? That is my question.

Colonel Stephan. To the extent that there have been incidents or suspicious activities reports over time that have been generated not related to the event or specific to the event——
Mr. PASCRELL. Is the network set up to do that right now?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. I believe it is.

Mr. PASCRELL. So, in other words, you are saying that local folks on the ground, particularly law enforcement in this case, have the wherewithal, have been taught the strategy and are trained to provide this information to you? Is what you are saying?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I am saying, generally speaking, the answer to your question is yes. The fusion center, as Admiral Rufe pointed out——

Mr. PASCRELL. We will get to that in a sec.

Colonel STEPHAN [continuing]. Are going to put an immeasurable capability enhancement in place once those things get fully set up. Importantly, prior to the events taking place in many cases as well as during the events themselves, I have my protective security advisors actually manning the fusion centers, the State emergency OPS centers, the local OPS centers, basically provide the incident command and control for the venue. Though the means of that person, I am extracting information from the national headquarters in the intel community and I am feeding locally produced information through that guy back up to my headquarters.

Mr. PASCRELL. So you are getting information from—if I can use the term—"below" as well?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. Through my deployed network of boots-on-the-ground.

Mr. PASCRELL. That was not happening before 9/11?

Colonel STEPHAN. I didn't have this capability 3 years ago.

Mr. PASCRELL. This was not happening. This is a very important ingredient to protecting people.

Colonel STEPHAN. I agree.

Mr. PASCRELL. Now let me ask you this question: What are you preparing in terms of this information to the transition team of the next administration?

Colonel STEPHAN. In terms of——

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, what are you readying—what are you providing? GAO has done a report on what is being transferred, what is being prepared for whoever becomes the President of the United States.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sure.

Mr. PASCRELL. I can only assume—and I am not going to assume it—what are you preparing? What is your agency, which plays a very critical role in protecting America——

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PASCRELL. Are you preparing a transitional carry-off, hand-off to the next administration?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. I am. Every single one of the divisions that works for me is either a GS–15 or a senior executive service member that is career in nature. They will be in place. They know their programs.

Mr. PASCRELL. I am sorry.

Colonel STEPHAN. They know their programs. They know their people. Transition briefings have been or are being assembled, up-to-date, sector-by-sector checklists of what the status of the sector are, where we are going. In fact, Congress will receive a status of
the 18 critical infrastructure sectors series of reports the first week in November.

Mr. PASCRELL. We have been asking about this to many of the agencies that have come before the committee or subcommittees about their obligation. By the way, it is a legal responsibility that we do this. I just want to know, is your agency up to snuff right now?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PASCRELL. You are on time? You are on target?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, we are on time. We are on target. The only person that gets decapitated in this process is, unfortunately, me.

Mr. PASCRELL. Why?

Colonel STEPHAN. Everybody below me—because I am a political appointee, sir.

Mr. PASCRELL. Some political appointees will be here next year, correct?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, some may; some may not. I don't want to forecast the future.

Mr. PASCRELL. I have seen some folks come before us that I would recommend. I don't care what your political persuasion is. I could care less. You do your job in protecting our families and our neighborhoods. The rest is all baloney.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, that is a great approach.

Mr. PASCRELL. Yeah. Well, that is me. I know I speak for myself. Let me ask this question—can I ask one more question, Madam Chair?

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. If it is very short, very brief.

Mr. PASCRELL. I will try to be short.

Admiral, the National Operation Center, a very key ingredient to what we are talking about today, you folks pay attention to mass gatherings. But what exactly do you do in the process? How do you do that?

Admiral RUFE. Well the National Operation Center is the Secretary's and is the Nation's, actually, primary situational awareness and incident management node. It supports the Secretary during the steady state times every day, 24/7, 365 days of the year.

They monitor—the watch monitors all manner of things going on during the course of the day, including the special events. So if the mule event that was described before, we are aware of that. We know the date is happening. We have contact information. Importantly, everybody who has a special event knows the National Operational Center is the way to contact the Federal Government should there be a need either just prior to the event or during the event for any kind of Federal support.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I am going to have to—

Mr. PASCRELL. Just one follow-up.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. No, I can't because I have too many other people.

Mr. PASCRELL. I am not going to ask a question.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. You are already 2—almost 3 minutes over time, and we have a lot of other people to ask questions.

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to go back to the point I made with what Mr. Stephan said before.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Maybe someone will yield you some time during their questions, but I have to give the other Members an opportunity to ask their questions.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lungren for 5 minutes.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much.

As maybe the only Member here who has ridden a mule on Mule Day in Bishop, California, I hope you are aware of that Mule Day as you are of the one in Tennessee.

I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your public service. I happen to think, both in the military service that you engaged but also now, you have made a real contribution to our country; and I appreciate the work product that you have put out and the status that we are at now versus where we were before the two of you took your positions.

Second, you are talking about transition. We are going to bring new people in no matter who wins the next election, and I hope you will have some lexicon for them of the acronyms that you have. Because I counted 24 in your two testimonies: DHS, SSA, NIPP, HSPD, CIKR, SSP, PSA, NSSE, SEAR, BZPP, SAV, CV, PI, PM, HSIN–CFS, whatever that is. I suppose if you had human relations there, it would be his and hers. But I don’t know how to pronounce it. CBR, ViSAT, R–SAT, HITRAC, BMAP, SEWG, RMA, IGP, SBU/FOUO.

We sometimes talk about our kids texting, and we can’t understand what they are saying. I don’t think they have anything on you two. So I appreciate the work that you have done.

Let me just ask you this. The Federal Government can’t do everything, can’t be everywhere, can’t be all things to all people; and I think we have to state that right up front. There seems to be a tendency in this town that nothing is important unless it is Federal. Whether it is the Supreme Court or whether it is the Congress or whether it is the President, if it is not the FBI investigating, it is not an important crime, which is just totally wrong since about 98 percent of all the violent crime is taken care of by local and State government.

That being the case, it seems to me very important that we don’t make your structures so heavy on the top that we don’t have that conductivity that is necessary, the interoperability, the exchange of information on the ground floor where things really happen.

The Chairman mentioned that we have a diversity of mass gatherings all the way from Mule Days to the Super Bowl and everything in between. So it seems to me it is important to set up the structures that you have talked about to make sure they are functioning.

But, to me, the overriding factor where the Federal Government can contribute, where local and State cannot do, is in the area of intelligence. What I mean by that is, you can be the gatherers of information from the bottom up, but, obviously, the Federal Government, through DHS, has a capacity for intelligence gathering around the world on its own with our intelligence agencies and foreign intelligence organizations as well. That is why I hope the Senate is going to complete the work on FISA today so that we will have a capability of getting that information in very real ways.
My question to you, Secretary Stephan, is this. To what extent is the intelligence received and analyzed by our various elements of the Federal Government broken down and given out to the people on the ground, the boots on the ground, local and State governments in a comprehensive and understandable way so that they can make it work from an operational standpoint?

To me, we can do all—everything else that you have talked about, but if we fail there we basically failed in the true Federal responsibility. How do you do that now? Where are there—if there are any holes in that, that you need to improve on, that we need to improve on?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, for my part of the information sharing puzzle, I try to focus on getting products together and disseminating them to the private sector; and then, through the operations center and other avenues within DHS, the State and local piece comes into play. I will defer that part to Admiral Rufe.

But we focus on building the products collaboratively with the private sector. So we have gotten these folks—now almost between 900 and 1,000 of them—security clearances so they can help in actual product development, be part of the process up front, help us craft a document that is not just written by just the intel folks. Because the intel folks again will have their own speak, and we need at the end of the day the products that are used in the field to be understood by the private sector folks.

So we build in now some things up front, a very important part of the process where the private sector can come in through our sector coordinating council process and the cleared members. We have made tremendous progress with the FBI and Intelligence Community to declassify or downgrade from Secret and above to FOUO.

We probably have still some work to do in terms of shortening that timeline so that we can get it more quickly in the hands of the private sector. But when I joined the Department in 2003, that was taking a week or more. Now it happens in the course of hours or a day or so, depending on what situation we are talking about. We have made tremendous progress there, but it needs to be a lot—just even a lot quicker than that.

We also need to expand the platform through which information is exchanged with the private sector. We released a new contract or awarded a new contract with the HSIN network about 2 months ago, working collaboratively with Admiral Rufe and his staff. He has the lead for this project.

The first priority of that advance-generation HSIN network is the private sector portals that are a piece of the overall puzzle. We are leading that first to get the information to the private sector at kind of the head of the line, if you will. So I think there will be tremendous strides made within the next 2 to 12 months.

We are going to cover down on about nine items of general functionality across the 18 critical infrastructure sectors within the first 60 days of the program in its advanced phase. In the course of the next year, we will develop additional capabilities and functionalities sector by sector using their inputs.

So we have got products that are built at the top. They are integrated by using overseas intelligence, domestically produced intel-
ligence, sometimes from the State and local community, sometimes from private sector folks. We have got more of them cleared in now to help shape the products.

We are pushing strategic and tactical level intel out to the field. We surge during special events to provide advanced capability. We are maturing and expanding the platform to get information out; and, ultimately, that is going to allow us to migrate a capability user potential from 7 to 10,000 to multiple tens of thousands, I believe, over the next year or so. So I think that is what this is all about.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you.

Admiral RUFE. Well, the only thing I would add for the National Operations Center that Mr. Pascrell asked about a few minutes ago, within the National Operations Center is an intelligence watch and warning branch that is our connectivity on a 24-hour basis with the Intelligence Community, CIA and all the other members of the Intelligence Community that brings in actionable daily intelligence. Anything that is hot, we get immediately. We disseminate that through that watch and warning branch to the State and local fusion centers any information that is of relevance or importance to them. So I think that system is working better, working well.

In addition to that, we have 10 different police departments that have put officers in the National Operations Center from around the country. So, for instance, Miami/Dade, Las Vegas Police Department, Chicago, Metropolitan Police Department all have officers in our operations center that see the same intelligence every day that I do.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you.

Admiral RUFE. They don't distinguish. They get the same access that I do.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. The Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Carney for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

This is for both of you. I represent an area that has kind of a unique event. I have the Little League World Series in my area. You know, in central Pennsylvania we don't have a lot of the resources available, but yet the world comes to central Pennsylvania. It is not just Little League players from around the country; it is from around the world too.

How much work do you do with organs of security of other countries, of the visiting countries, in preparation for something like this?

Admiral RUFE. Well, certainly part of what we do when we give our data call out to the State and locals to find out what events we are looking at, we ask them what capacity that is being brought to bear that they can address as part of what is being prepared for this event. That enables us to determine how much additional capacity they need.

In terms of what foreign support is given, I have to get back to you on that, because I don't know that, for instance, for the Little League World Series, that the nations that send their teams over here provide any particular intelligence or security support to those teams, but I can answer that for the record if you would like.
Mr. CARNEY. Sure. Well, I would like to see that. For example, you know, we had a team from Saudi Arabia before, you know, Latin America, various Asian nations represented as well. You can imagine a showcase like the Little League World Series, with what it is, it is as American as it gets. That is Rockwell’s America right there. What a target. So, you know, working with other security organs of the visiting countries I think is something I would really like to see what you do.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, we have protective security advisors on the ground. What they will do is they will plug in, if the State Homeland Security office is working the overall security protocols, they will plug in to whatever structure the State sets up. If the State passes it down to a more local level of responsibility, my folks would plug in to that type of event at that level.

We don’t do specific, direct outreach to foreign governments or foreign enterprises, but through the planning mechanisms and security collaborative framework that the State or the local guys set up to manage the venue.

Mr. CARNEY. Well, let me ask this then: Is there a way for foreign governments to reach out to you and say, “This is what we are doing”? Is there some sort of international outreach?

Colonel STEPHAN. Again, I would—since that particular event would be hosted in the principle security and emergency preparedness planning responsibilities either reside at the State or local level. It would be to reinforce them as they do their——

Mr. CARNEY. Sure. I guess I didn’t phrase the question well then. From just the general DHS perspective, do we have the opportunity or is there a way for foreign governments to keep us apprised?

Admiral RUFE. Sure. I mean, I don’t think there is any formal mechanism where we reach out to ask them. For instance, as Bob indicated, the event planners are the ones who are responsible to alert us to what are the particular peculiarities of the event and who is coming to support them, what the capacity is available locally and what the shortfalls are. That is usually the process in which we get that information.

Certainly if someone wanted to reach out to us, they could. If we saw a need, we would probably do it ourselves. Although, in your particular case, I don’t know whether we have.

Mr. CARNEY. Sure.

Colonel STEPHAN. For the bigger events such as the national special security events that are really led by the Secret Service, those types of formal mechanisms do exist.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Yeah, I mean, the Little League World Series certainly is not the Super Bowl or NASCAR, but it does get a lot of play, over a long period of time, frankly, and a lot of the games are televised. So it is one of the things we would need, I think, to pay close attention to. But I really want to understand how everybody works together, from our Nation to those of the visiting countries as well.

Thank you, ma’am. No further questions.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you.

Mr. Dent, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
To follow up on Congressman Carney’s question about these non-national special security events—he mentioned central Pennsylvania, Little League World Series—a few miles from there is Penn State, 110,000 people, six or seven Saturdays every fall, similar situations in other States, for college football games.

What can local municipalities and private organizations do better to utilize Homeland Security dollars to prepare for these types of non-national special security events? Anyone want to take a shot at that?

Colonel Stephan. In my opinion, as I stated earlier, I think a better cross-jurisdictional collaboration in terms of pulling resources together. In some places that just naturally occurs, but a lot of it is personality-driven and operating-environment-driven, jurisdictional-authorities-driven.

But I think one of the big things that I see across the country, many different States, many different local types of jurisdictions, the successful or the not-so-successful approach is based upon the relationships and the pre-event planning that takes place across jurisdictional boundaries to integrate a lot of different resources, authorities and capacities together to solve a common problem.

Admiral Rufe. Grant funding doesn’t fall in my area of expertise, but I know within the Department they are always reviewing their grant guidance on the various Homeland Security grants that go to State and locals. If you have something specific you would like to suggest in terms of a change to grant guidance, I would be happy to bring that back.

Mr. Dent. I guess my follow-up question would be, what kind of cooperation have you received from the NFL or Major League Baseball regarding the preparation for games that might not rise to a level of a national special security event? What kind of involvement does the Department have in planning for these types of events?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, our relationship with them is through our Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council. We have a sports league sub-council; that includes hockey, baseball, tennis, soccer, football, baseball, basketball. We have worked with them to develop a protective measures guide that we have recently published, actually in January of this year. That gives a template for, based upon different threat scenarios, what are physical protection, cyber protection, insider-threat-type protection issues you should look at, and how the private-sector owners and operators need to be connected with State and local law enforcement emergency managers at the local, State and Federal level. That is put together jointly with the sports leagues and now distributed widely across all the cities where these venues are housed. So that is one example.

Another example is providing them at Government expense, actually, standardized vulnerability assessment methodologies that are Web-based, user-friendly tools where the facility can do a self-assessment. We provide IED-specific training to security cadres, both on the law enforcement side as well as the private-sector venue owner and operator side, prior to the events, where we get with the Homeland Security advisors to understand the schedule. We push focus training to those particular jurisdictions based upon an annual event schedule.
Mr. DENT. Thank you.
At this time, I would be happy to yield the balance of my time to my friend, Mr. Pascrell from New Jersey, if he would like it.

Mr. PASCRELL. How much time is left?

Mr. DENT. One minute, 48.

Mr. PASCRELL. I wasn’t kidding before when I said the American people deserve to have a solid transition during the time of transferring of powers regardless of if it is a Democratic or Republican President. American people need to not have extended anxiety over, are we going to the next chapter? There should be one chapter here. We should be all on the same page when it comes to defending the Nation. That was my point, and I meant what I said.

I think we should, Mr. Chairman, go on record, I think we should go on record some time in stating this as a principle, that we believe there should be a continuity. If it need be, to have some people, even in political appointments—I have met some great political appointments from the Bush administration. I didn't find too many redeeming qualities in any other area, but in Homeland Security I thought there were some great folks that really loved this country and are seeing beyond the politics. We should insist upon that, that that is very important in securing the homeland.

That is my point. Thank you.

Admiral RUFE. I will just respond to that by saying that the Secretary has made it very, very clear to all of us that that is one of his main priorities, to make sure that he turns over a Department that is fully functional, operational and is in great shape for the next administration, no matter who it is.

He has taken steps, I think, in terms of putting, as Bob said, people in place at the non-political level, at senior levels in non-political positions, to make sure that we have in place—if the new administration decides to take all the politicals out, to make sure there are career civil servants in place at senior levels to make sure there is continuity across the Department.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON [presiding]. Thank you.
I think Mr. Pascrell is correct. As you know, we have had a hearing and some follow-up already on transition. So, this is a priority, as is the entire transition to the next administration, for the Department.

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, in April, Pope Benedict visited the United States, including stops in New York City and Yonkers. This was a wonderful opportunity for my community, but it came at great expense to the city of Yonkers. It paid over $400,000 for security. Unfortunately, no Federal funds helped cover the cost, and Yonkers was told it could reallocate previous DHS grants in the absence of new money.

Now, this is a recurring issue in New York—Washington, DC, I would say, as well—as the New York Police Department provides security for non-head-of-state diplomats attending United Nations meetings. To date, the New York Police Department is owed $40
million for security expenses. I am not sure of the amount of money, Ms. Norton isn't here, but I believe Washington, DC, faces similar expenses with Presidential inaugurations.

I would like to ask you whether the Federal Government should help offset the cost to local governments for the most high-profile national special security events.

Colonel Stephan. I believe that there are sources of funding available in terms of some existing Homeland Security grant programs that can be leveraged to provide enhanced security for exactly these types of special events, specifically the UASI program and the State Homeland Security Grant Program. Again, these moneys can be leveraged to support surge requirements.

Mrs. Lowey. Well, I would be happy to follow up with that, because Yonkers is out $400,000, and it is not a local football game. Having the Pope come is a national event. I was told that it could reallocate previous DHS grants.

What I was also told is, the way those grants are set up, that money is already obligated. So what I would like to do, and I would be happy to follow up with you, is to see whether there is any way they could apply directly. Because Yonkers was not given a positive response.

Colonel Stephan. We can reach out to your staff through our legislative affairs folks and get them in contact with the FEMA grant shop that really has responsibility for the grant guidance and the rules of the road, in terms of what can and can't be used.

Mrs. Lowey. So you are saying there may be a possibility, although we were told there wasn't, and I thank you.

Colonel Stephan. No, I think what I am saying is your information is accurate, that previously allocated grant moneys, moneys that the States were pushed in either 2008, 2007 or earlier, I believe can be used in some way, shape or form to cover down on some of these expenses, depending on what they might be.

Mrs. Lowey. Well, I would like to follow up, because the issue is, if they are already obligated, we are looking for moneys for an event that are clearly national events. So we will follow up with you.

When calculating the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program's awards, FEMA uses threat vulnerability and consequence criteria to calculate the relative risk of a terrorist attack on an urban area. While FEMA has not publicly released all variables that comprise the risk score, it does not appear as though mass gatherings are included.

Now, another question that I would like to follow up on: Is there any coordination between your offices and the FEMA grants directorate in determining how mass gatherings should impact grant allocations? If not, should mass gatherings be included in grant determinations?

Because it is not a surprise that New York and Washington, DC, for example, have these mass events. These are very, very difficult for a community to deal with and to absorb.

Colonel Stephan. Ma'am, in terms of the overall risk calculator of the Department, I own the input that feeds the FEMA folks the infrastructure component across all the risk engines of the Depart-
ment. That is based upon a tabulation of a Tier 1 and Tier 2 set of established criteria, sector by sector.

Inside the Commercial Facilities Sector, we have various categories of commercial venues that would be the sites where mass gatherings would generally take place. They could be colosseums, arenas, stadiums, amphitheaters, performing art centers, so on and so forth. Based upon criteria specific to each category of commercial facility, we do a risk ranking based on, principally from my shop, potential consequences and vulnerabilities. I feed that part of the algorithm that FEMA controls with respect to the infrastructure target set. There is very close collaboration between my staff and the FEMA staff that owns that overall algorithm.

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you very much.

I see my time is up, so I will save the other question on interoperability, because I am always interested in knowing who is talking to who and whether their equipment is interoperable. But I will save that, Mr. Chairman.

We will follow up with you. I thank you very much for your response.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am sure that the city of Yonkers appreciates your persistence.

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I am sure they do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THOMPSON. We now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, who I am sure has an interest in mass gatherings going forward, Mr. Perlmutter, for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do; we have the two conventions coming up.

The first question I have is, listening to you two today and just reading some of the materials, that there is a real focus on law enforcement, at least in the materials. How do you think the coordination has gone at either convention or generally with firefighters and paramedics and hospitals who might have to also respond to a mass casualty kind of a situation?

Admiral RUFE. Well, as you know, both conventions are NSSEs, national special security events. So that is under the guidance of the Secret Service, and they have that down very well, in my opinion. You would have to really speak to them directly to get their sense as to what the interaction is. But they have a principal Federal official designated from the Secret Service in each one of those places to be their guy. That person is, I am sure, working very closely not just with law enforcement, with the State and local responders from the fire and medical community as well.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I think they are. We have been working on the thing for about a year now, so I feel like there has been decent coordination.

Let’s move to the next level. Let’s say it is either one of these conventions or it is some other big gathering, and it isn’t a situation where there is intent to do harm but there is an intent to disrupt and just bring it to a halt, whatever the situation is. How do the Federal officials, how does the Federal coordination play a role in that?

So, I mean, let’s just say there is lots of vandalism, rioting, whatever it might be. Is there a Federal role? Do you just say, “Police, that is your problem. We are not getting involved.”?
Admiral RUFE. It is pretty much a State and local problem. But, obviously, if they are overwhelmed—and, in fact, this has happened before in a natural disaster. Katrina is a good example of that, where the local law enforcement was not able to keep up with that level of unrest, and we had to bring in Federal support to do that.

So I think when they do their planning for these big events like the conventions, obviously there have been disruptions at conventions in the past, a long time ago, most recently it is a long time ago, and that is part of the planning. Principally it is the responsibility of the State and the locals to handle that sort of criminal or disruptive activity. But the Secret Service certainly plays a role in that and would bring in extra Federal support, if needed.

Colonel STEPHAN. The key to making that successful is the joint operation centers that have law enforcement and emergency manager people from across jurisdictions of government and across disciplines are all sitting together in an incident command post, and everybody would know or have the same situational awareness, know what was happening, know what capabilities were being exhausted and where additional authorities, resources and capacities need to be brought into the fight. You do that through the nodes that are then connected up to the regional and the national level, such as the NOC.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I am sorry Sheriff Reichert isn’t here now, but the WTO up in Seattle, I assume that would be an NSSE, that would be a special event.

Admiral RUFE. No, I don’t think it has been. I am not sure where that came at this year. It is not at NSSE.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay.

Admiral RUFE. It would be categorized as one of the SEAR-level events. I am not sure where that would fall.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But there was one where people were there to make trouble. So, in that instance, there would still be an incident command post and everybody trying to work in a coordinated fashion. I mean, was there Federal involvement in that?

Admiral RUFE. An example of that is World Bank-IMF meetings here in the District of Columbia, which are sometimes the subject of considerable protest, and the chance for disruption is there. That, this year, is a Level 3 event. So that does not qualify at the higher level for Federal support.

But, certainly, if there is additional Federal support needed for any of these lower-level events, it is provided on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

Admiral, maybe you can help clear us up. If you take the highest level where Secret Service is in charge—is there a formula for Federal participation at that level? Or how is that derived?

Admiral RUFE. There is not, no, sir, Mr. Chairman. There is not a strict formula. There are some guidelines, however. For NSSEs, that is within the purview of the Secret Service, as we said. They look at each event individually and decide what level of support is needed.

You may have noticed that, just recently, that the Democratic Presidential candidate is going to do his acceptance speech now at
the Mile High Stadium, which is going to change, obviously, the requirements for protection for that event. So the Secret Service looks at those things as they move along and makes adjustments, as necessary, for those events.

On the SEAR 1, SEAR 2 and SEAR 3 events, there are some general guidelines. For example, for a SEAR 1 event, the FAA always puts in a temporary flight restriction in the area. That does not necessarily hold true for a SEAR 2 event. They might put in a TFR, but they might not. So it varies depending upon the type of event you have. In some cases, you will have a waterfront activity where the Coast Guard would play a pretty big role. In another case, it might be pretty far inland; there wouldn't be a Coast Guard role.

So there is no real set formula for the amount of Federal assets that are used. It is based on what capacity is available locally and with mutual aid agreements and then what the holes and the gaps are that need to be filled by the Federal Government.

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I guess the point I am trying to figure out is, how do we derive what is a State or local financial burden versus the Federal burden? Is that some formula that is worked out in advance? Or how is this done?

Admiral RUFE. No, sir, there is no formula for that. The formula is that when each one of these events, these 4,000 events is entered into the data call each year, the State and local officials who are putting the information in respond to the questionnaire, and among the questions that they have to answer is, "Is the State and local capacity sufficient to cover the requirement?" Oftentimes they answer yes. In that case, there really isn't a need for Federal assistance.

Now, whether the State and local capacity that is utilized is available for reimbursement from the Federal Government is another question. That is where the grants from DHS would play a role.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina for 5 minutes.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since we are on that topic, let me stay with it for a moment. Because there a lot of large mass gatherings that really, sort of, fall under the radar screen and don't get national notice. I can think of one in North Carolina where we will have the State fair and we will have 850,000 people in the course of a week, and on most any day there will be about 150,000 people moving through it.

I didn't realize how many Mule Days they have, since North Carolina has one in Benson. It is a large event. Roughly 60,000 people will show up for that event. Just for a parade, they are going to have somewhere in the neighborhood of 20,000 people.

I share those numbers for a reason: Because you don't hear about it here in Washington. It is the local folks who do all the planning, all the training, ensure that it is safe, it is enjoyable for the people who come and attend.

With that said, I think the Federal Government does help and does spend a lot of time in preparing for emergencies, developing best practices for securing large events and protecting the public
Let me tell you why I ask this question. Committee staff has heard that the Federal, State, territorial, tribes, local and private-sector personnel that plan events are often separated from other activities, such as training, standard-setting, and the identification and communications of the lessons learned.

Both of you are retired officers, and you know from your experience in the armed and uniformed services that it is critical to bring planning together with those activities. So my question is, what is being done and what can be done that we aren't doing to better integrate these efforts?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, I think to the extent that the special events are identified through either Admiral Rufe's process or from my protective security advisors that are my eyes and ears forward, my boots-on-the-ground forward, that when we have time and we know that something is coming, it is deliberately planned——

Mr. Etheridge. How much time do you need?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, it depends on the size and scope of the event, the complexity of the event. But for something that recurs on an annual basis, like a State fair, I will have my protective security advisor working with the State homeland security advisor to figure out a plan that does involve actually building the security plan, figuring out what Federal requirements might be needed, helping facilitate cross-jurisdictional collaboration and coordination, trying to tie a grant-funded State and local exercise program to the event.

For the Vice Presidential and Presidential debates coming up, we are doing this very thing to bring bombing prevention, IED prevention and awareness training, soft target awareness training to those communities specifically, and to make sure that all of these folks are connected to the national information-sharing network all around the various venues.

So I think we are making progress, again, principally because now I have a cadre of people deployed across the country that have been taken up under the wings of the State and local officials that they support every day.

Admiral Rufe. The only thing I would add would be, sir, that for the SEAR 1 and SEAR 2 events, we appoint a Federal coordinator that is the Secretary's representative for the event. Generally, it is somebody from the local area. We try to get somebody who has some local knowledge from one of the Federal agencies that is in the area. They are tasked with putting together, with our support, an integrated Federal support plan. As its name indicates, it is a support plan to support the State and locals. It is supposed to be integrated completely with the planning that is being done at the State and local level.

Mr. Etheridge. The best practices?

Admiral Rufe. Absolutely.

Mr. Etheridge. Assistant Secretary Stephan, let me follow that up, because I understand that the Department has been working with State and local governments and with the private sector to develop the planning guidance.
I guess my question, how would you assess the Department’s efficiency in providing material that these non-Federal actors can actually use in the field?

I guess the second part would be, what are you doing to improve that effort? Because I think that is a critical piece, because there is more out there in the private sector, really, than in the public sector.

Colonel Stephan. Absolutely, sir. In this particular sector, commercial facilities, there is just such a wide diversity in the number of actors involved, it is a difficult problem set.

But we try to conquer that challenge two ways. One is to enroll and engage the stakeholders in the development of the guidelines documents, so that they are understood and translatable down to the local level. So the people that are going to have to use them are actually involved part and parcel in terms of the process that guides their development.

The second part that we really need to work on is to get more guidance and guidelines pushed out the door to the various sub elements of this sector. We have hit the sports leagues. We are working on stadiums and arenas. We have a shopping mall, giant retail piece about to go out this fall, early next year.

I just need more time. In fact, I am not going to have more time. The next administration will have to pick up this ball, understand where we have been able to reach out and touch folks, and continue to push the products and the guidelines out, hopefully using the template of bringing in the stakeholders from the very beginning of the process.

Mr. Etheridge. Very quickly, scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the best, what would you rate?

Colonel Stephan. Sir, I hate those kind of questions.

Mr. Etheridge. I knew you would.

Colonel Stephan. You know, it is a 10 in terms of the places where we had the guidance out right now, 9 or 10. In places where we don't have the guidance, it is at the 1 or a 2 level. I mean, it is different depending on which piece of this sector you are talking about.

Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman Thompson. Thank you.

Colonel, can you provide the committee with a listing of where you had the guidance out versus where you don't have the guidance out?

Colonel Stephan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to do that.

Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I think that will help us.

We will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for 5 minutes, Ms. Clarke.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. This has been a very informative and interesting hearing, especially coming from a place like New York City, where it seems, every time I leave my house, I am involved in a mass gathering.

There are a number of facilities and environments across the United States that routinely handle mass gatherings that I believe would likely be classified as SEAR 1 or 2. For example, in New
York we have Madison Square Garden, which is an extremely popular venue for high-profile events that is right in the heart of the city. Certainly, being in the heart of the city, it is also in the middle of a commercial hub. So you have not only the people who gather in the venue, but you have, I would estimate, maybe hundreds of thousands of people that are just moving about either in the subway system, Amtrak is right there, and you have this massive shopping area. So potentially hundreds of thousands of people are there.

With these types of environments, how do you offer support and resources? Is it only in the direct run-up to a specific event? Or do you work with them on a continuing basis if there are facilities that commonly hold mass gatherings, such as stadiums and similar venues?

Colonel STEPHAN. Ma’am, I think we actually approach it from both angles. We do lots of what I refer to as steady-state activities, collaborative planning, trying to target the various grant programs to fix gaps that have been identified through collaborative security planning efforts, so on and so forth.

Then during particular special events, depending, again, on the risk factor, surge, additional Federal support as required. For example, in New York City, the U.S. Coast Guard is very active in working as a team with local law enforcement officials, in terms of the waterways around Manhattan island; the TSA folks, in terms of no-fly zones during certain periods to cover certain special events; TSA, also, in terms of helping beef up with additional bomb dogs and things like that, in terms of the subway system up there.

So I think the answer to your question is actually both approaches, trying to work them together.

Ms. CLARKE. Is that a consistent, in your estimation, a consistent operation?

In other words, New York is always going to be dynamic like that. One of the issues that I think the citizenry of the city has is the fact that we get comfortable, because this is the way we live. We want to be comfortable in the fact that the individuals who are entrusted with our safety are not as relaxed about the environment we reside in but are always in a state of readiness.

For instance, what is the protocol in place for these types of environments that creates and maintains the state of readiness for the deployment of emergency response? Is that something that your offices would monitor, or is it something that has to be requested from the ground up?

Colonel STEPHAN. Ma’am, I think we have consistency in terms of the guidance and protective guidelines, vulnerability assessment methodologies, training, exercise programs, across my mission area, from city to city or from rural area to rural area. The guidelines are there, but they are flexible enough to allow themselves to be tailored to the specific operational risk environments where they have to be applied.

I think where you are going to find a variance, however, is there is a tremendous difference in resources city by city across America. A New York City and a Wichita, those are apples and oranges. New York City is on a heightened alert posture almost every day of the year, whereas other communities around the United States
of course do not feel, necessarily, that sense of urgency with respect to the homeland security mission set.

So you will find different levels of focus, different levels of resources being applied. But in the plans that we push out and the guidance documents we push out, we try to maintain consistency, yet approach that allows flexible tailoring of things to the local landscapes.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you very much for what I think is a very important hearing that allows us to discuss the best way to go forward in ensuring the safety of the American people.

Secretary Stephan, let me thank you also for your concerted leadership. Of course, as we have been quite tough in our questioning on a number of occasions, we do appreciate the fact that both you and the Admiral are consistent in your commitment and dedication, and I truly appreciate it.

As you well know, I chair the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, so I am quite familiar with the many issues we have been discussing today.

We recently had a hearing, and I wanted to ensure that a number of the issues of that hearing could be framed in the hearing today. I think that it is clearly important for a country that loves to come together at big events, that we focus our attention on how we can be more effective. The hearing I speak of was held on March 12. So I am going to ask a series of questions back to back, and then I will yield to you, Mr. Secretary, if I can.

During our hearing, several experts testified that Congress should consider creating a lead at the Department of Homeland Security for non-national special security events. I would like to get an assessment of the progress being made there.

In addition, I think it is important that DHS develops clear metrics for the implementation of security and response-related measures in the CFS, the Commercial Facilities Sector. I would like to get your assessment of how far along the Department is.

Additionally, I think that it is important that the CIPAC will seek to incorporate members that do not merely represent an association. This, of course, is encouraging the Department to utilize the authority that Congress has already allocated, such as the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. But I would like to see how you incorporate individual asset owners. So go outside of the boundaries of Government and see whether or not they can participate as well and give us extra insight.

I also hope that the Department leverages its Voluntary Private-Sector Preparedness Certification Program. This program can be used to encourage companies to meet voluntary standards. I would like to hear from you how that program is proceeding and how this program has been introduced to the Critical Facilities Sector.
Then I am interested in something that I have discussed with you for a period of time, and that is exercises. I think we have had some long-standing discussions on exercises. I have listened to the Congresswoman from New York, Mrs. Lowey, about the unexpected visit—or, let’s say, the visit by the Pope. I just think that these exercises are important, and I am interested in a full description of these exercises. Probably some of that may be in writing, but, anyhow, if you could give just a quick assessment, their participants and their frequency.

Again, let me make my request of utilizing the area in the Southwest region, in this instance a city like Houston, for an opportunity, but I believe we should spread those opportunities and have some method of doing so.

I think there are about 5 points there, and I know that—if you give a snippet on each, you will be able to write some of the answers presented in writing.

Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma’am, you are going to have my staff busy for quite a while over the next couple of weeks, but we are going to get back to you to answer all these questions very fully.

In terms of exercises, we have integrated really more than an observer capacity for the first time. All of the elements of the critical infrastructure sectors that wanted to be engaged, starting back in TOPOFF 4, full players, full members of the exercise design control simulation cell, as well as players during the exercise event itself. We carried that forward a couple of months ago, in May, when we had another national-level exercise. For the first time, I opened up our National Infrastructure Coordinating Center to seat members of the private sector in the hub of the nerve center of my operation.

I think you will receive a favorable report, if you query the folks that were involved, that they now have a special exercise working group of the private-sector coordinating councils across the board.

Ms. Jackson Lee. If I could just get you to answer the point about ensuring that we have a person, a lead at DHS for non-national special security events.

Colonel Stephan. I am proud to announce that that individual is seated to my left. Admiral Rufe is the lead.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent. I only have a short time, if you want to finish your last sentence.

Colonel Stephan. The individual asset owners and operators, ma’am, their equities, their interests and concerns are incorporated really by my deployed cadre of 78 protected security advisors that have solid and growing, ever-maturing, professional relationships with the owners and operators in their geographic areas of responsibility.

The private-sector voluntary standards program, in accordance with the statutory requirements, has been briefed to the sector coordinating council membership writ large. FEMA has the lead for that program within DHS. The status we are at now is mining what constitutes preparedness standards, figuring out what kind of standards are out there, defining what the accrediting body will be, and pushing out a contract to bring those folks in.

We are going to roll in through the sector coordinating council structure, under the national infrastructure protection plan, the private sector input across the 18 sectors into that process. That
will move out over the course of the next year. I will have the FEMA folks put together a more comprehensive status briefing.

The metrics piece, specifically for this sector but all the sectors really, will come to you in the sector annual reports. I just received each of those on July 1. I am aggregating them into a national-level cross-sector risk report that will be coming to the Congress of the United States the first week in November per statute. That contains a detailed metrics piece sector by sector for you.

I believe I have covered five of five.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think you have, but we will pursue it further in further discussions.

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

In the event, Ms. Jackson Lee, there is something that you asked or wanted to ask and we did not, we will gladly provide our witnesses with anything you provide us in terms of questions for their response.

We want to thank our first panel of witnesses. You have been very thorough in your answers, and we appreciate, again, your service to this country. Thank you very much.

We will now call our second panel of witnesses.

We would like to welcome our second panel of witnesses. I appreciate your patience and, obviously, your service to the country.

Our first witness, Dr. Thomas Blackwell, is a medical director for the Center for Prehospital Medicine at the Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina. He is also the medical director for MEDIC, the Mecklenburg EMS agency, Lowe’s Motor Speedway, and the Bank of America Stadium, all in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Dr. Blackwell, we want to thank you, especially for making the time to testify today. We know that you have deployed your mobile hospital to the State of Indiana to provide support as part of the response to the recent floods there. We appreciate your dedication to providing emergency medical care throughout the Nation.

Our second witness is Sergeant Scott McCartney. Sergeant McCartney is the program manager and lead exercise planner for the Large Stadium Initiative for the State of California. He is also a member of the Critical Incident Negotiation Team for the Sacramento County sheriff’s office.

Welcome.

Our third witness, Mr. Doug Reynolds, is the director of security for the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota. We commend his service in this capacity, as well as his previous 21 years of service as a member of Army National Guard. Speaking of the Mall of America, my wife appreciates the security.

We thank our witnesses for their service to the States and to the Nation and for being here today.

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted into the record.

I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Dr. Blackwell.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Dr. Blackwell, Chairman Thompson, distinguished Members of the Committee on Homeland Security, good morning. Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning.

My name is Dr. Tom Blackwell. I am an emergency physician at Carolinas Medical Center’s Level 1 trauma center in Charlotte, North Carolina. I also serve as a clinical associate professor of emergency medicine at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

My other positions do include the medical director for the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, the 911 medical provider for Charlotte, and the medical director for Lowe’s Motor Speedway, the Wachovia Championship PGA, and Bank of America Stadium, home to the Carolina Panthers.

I have had the opportunity to read the committee’s report on public health, safety and security for mass gatherings, and applaud the efforts at better understanding the issues we face with preparedness and with response. It was a pleasure to spend time with Dr. Asha George, Scott Springer, and other staff members during their several visits to Charlotte.

Before I begin, I would like to iterate that planning and preparedness for any mass gathering event goes hand-in-hand with any mass casualty planning resulting from a disaster. Thus, my comments this morning will apply to both of these situations.

As you think about mass gathering medical support, there are four primary criteria that I believe must be acknowledged and addressed: No. 1, the coordination between State and local authority, including the Federal and tribal governments when those are applicable; No. 2, the participation of all law enforcement, fire services, EMS, public health and hospitals and emergency management agencies; No. 3, the comprehensive preparedness, planning and training; and No. 4, the procurement or availability of assets or resources required to save lives, ease suffering and successfully mitigate the medical consequences.

In Charlotte, we have addressed many of the issues in the report and have created solutions that will preserve human life and infrastructure, all of which have direct implications for mass gathering events and disaster management. First is the development of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team, or ALERT, which is a multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire and medical staff trained to respond to a weapon of mass destruction. No. 2 is the design, development and implementation of the state-of-art mobile hospital.

Our ALERT multidisciplinary program has been training and preparing since 1998, way before the events of 9/11. It also includes a medical online surveillance tool that was integrated into a State-wide detection system. This system is able to track disease or potential disease spread and provides epidemiologic feedback to the region or the area affected.

Now, while this is an important public health component, the real issue facing communities in mass gathering venues today is the acquisition of appropriate resources required to manage patient
care, especially given to current state of health care delivery in the United States.

The 2006 Institute of Medicine report entitled “The Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System” outlined the degree of emergency department overcrowding and hospital closings. Since many hospitals across this Nation operate at surge capacity on a daily basis, it is extremely difficult to successfully handle any incident that results in mass casualties.

So to support the ALERT initiative and the overcrowded state of our health care system we developed and constructed a mobile hospital that was different in design from the traditional tent systems that have been used in the past. This unit is designed to quickly move to the site of a disaster, can be deployed in under 20 minutes, and supports the provision of comprehensive medical and surgical care for traumatic injuries, infectious disease, and general emergency and ambulatory care.

It incorporates a two-bed operating room, four-bed intensive care unit, and an eight-bed emergency department in an expandable 53-foot tractor trailer. When more beds are needed, a shelter system can be deployed from the trailer that can support an additional 250 beds.

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, MED–1 was dispatched to Waveland and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Within an hour after set-up, we began seeing patients. Within 24 hours, we had conducted our first surgical procedure, transferred our first pregnancy who was soon to deliver in Gulf Port, and saw our first traumatic injury.

This case involved a 12-year-old boy who was riding an all-terrain vehicle when he was struck by a car. Due to the head injury, the child had stopped breathing on their arrival at our facility. We resuscitated and stabilized the child and quickly transferred him by Coast Guard helicopter to the trauma center in Jackson. It is my pleasure, Mr. Chair, to report to you that this child eventually survived, walking out of the trauma center in Jackson with no permanent nor long-term disability.

During the 7-week deployment, we saw more than 7,500 patients, sometimes going up to 350 a day. Six months later, MED–1 was called to assist in the excessive surge capacity conditions in New Orleans, during the first Mardi Gras celebration following the hurricanes. During the 2 weeks of deployment, 575 patients were treated.

At this very moment, Carolina’s MED–1 is on its third deployment in Columbus, Indiana, providing emergency department services in the wake of the severe flooding that destroyed Columbus Regional Hospital on June 6.

We are confident that the MED–1 asset, due to these deployments and our lessons learned, would be a useful resource for any mass gathering event and for tornados, earthquake and floods that have plagued our country. The time is now, Mr. Chair, to seek unique solutions that support a combination of health care needs and mass gathering special events.

Finally, I would like to comment on two additional important issues that we have concerns, and that is sustainment and mutual aid.
It is important to realize that while many of our assets and programs are grant-funded, sustainment dollars are equally significant to keep those initiatives operational and functional.

Last, I would encourage Congress to entertain methods to expedite the process for requesting and authorizing mutual aid, using the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC. When devastated communities and populations need emergency care, deployment strategy should be as streamlined as possible so as to facilitate that response.

I thank you again, Mr. Chair and committee Members, for your time. I am pleased to answer questions that you may have.

[The statement of Dr. Blackwell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. BLACKWELL

JULY 9, 2008

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of the committee and guests, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Dr. Tom Blackwell and I am an emergency physician at Carolinas Medical Center, a designated Level 1 trauma center in Charlotte, North Carolina. I also serve as Medical Director for the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, which is the 9–1–1 EMS provider for the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. Additionally, I am a Clinical Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill School of Medicine and the University of North Carolina—Charlotte.

Carolinas Medical Center, is the flagship hospital of Carolinas HealthCare System and is a State-designated Academic Medical Center Teaching Hospital. Carolinas HealthCare System is the largest healthcare system in the Carolinas and the third-largest public healthcare system nationally.

I have dedicated the last 10 years of my career to improving our community’s and this Nation’s ability to address surge capacity medical needs and to respond to incidents resulting from natural and man-made disasters. Today, I would like to share with you my experience in developing our local capacity to respond to a mass casualty event in our region. I would like to emphasize that when you prepare for mass casualty incidents at mass gatherings, the same preparation applies with mass casualties resulting from a natural disaster; thus my comments this morning will apply to both situations.

In our region, we have addressed many of the issues in the committee’s Report Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings and have created solutions that will preserve human life and infrastructure. Since 1998, I have been integrally involved in two comprehensive medical management initiatives in Charlotte, both of which have direct implications for mass gathering events and disaster management.

1. The development of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team, or ALERT which is a multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire, and medical staff trained to respond to a weapon of mass destruction.
2. The design, development, and implementation of a state-of-the-art mobile hospital.

Put simply, I am the doctor in the field at ground zero who will be there when any incident unfolds. As such, I believe that I am able to provide to you a unique perspective from the ground up as to how we address patient care issues.

DEVELOPMENT OF ALERT

Charlotte is the second-largest banking center in the country and is the only city in the world that has two nuclear power plants within 25 miles from the center of our uptown district. It hosts the NFL Carolina Panthers and the NBA Charlotte Bobcats. The Lowe’s Motor Speedway, home to several prominent NASCAR events, sits just outside of Charlotte in Cabarrus County, North Carolina. In addition, Charlotte hosts a number of other annual mass gathering events such as the Central Intercollegiate Athletic Association (CIAA) Basketball Tournament and the Wachovia Championship Golf Tournament. The Charlotte-Douglas International Airport is the tenth largest airport and the largest hub for US Airways. Charlotte
has the sixth-most Fortune 500 companies and is home to many international businesses.

Our wake-up call came in February 1998, when a man entered the Mecklenburg County Court House in uptown Charlotte carrying a bomb. The Court House is a mass gathering at 9 am and 2 pm every day when district court convenes. This man told deputies that he had a second device that could be remotely detonated in the trunk of his car several blocks away. A rapid search of his home revealed ingredients for constructing a bomb, in addition to potential chemicals and biological agents on-site. While the incident was successfully resolved, the emergency response revealed several issues that we, as a community, needed to address. Collaborative agreements were fostered between emergency management, law enforcement agencies, the fire department, EMS, public health, and hospitals. The result of our labor was the formation of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team (ALERT) to ensure preparedness for urban terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as natural disasters (such as hurricanes and floods). The team makeup is comprised of local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical staff, and incorporates resources to effectively and efficiently respond to any terrorist incident or natural disaster.

ALERT has been training for terrorism and mass casualty responses including tactical operations involving bombs, biological, and chemical agents detection/disposal, decontamination, triage and scene treatment, hospital response, and incident command. ALERT exemplifies the kind of “culture of collaboration” among various private and public entities that the committee’s Report Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings so appropriately recognized is essential to protecting our citizens and preserving the community’s infrastructure.

Two areas that are most critical in medical response and readiness are real-time detection and surge capacity. Real-time detection is a prerequisite to containing disease outbreak, particularly in a mass gathering environment. Our ALERT program includes a medical on-line surveillance tool that was integrated into a State-wide detection system. This system is able to track disease or potential disease spread, and provides epidemiologic feedback to the region or area affected. Another critical issue facing communities and mass gathering venues today is surge capacity—ensuring the availability of appropriate and adequate resources required to manage an enormous influx of ill or injured patients. In the 2006 Institute of Medicine Report entitled “The Future of Emergency Care in United States Health System,” one of the three reports “Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking Point” focused on surge capacity. The report outlined the degree of emergency department overcrowding and hospital closings. This, along with the fact that many hospitals across this Nation operate at surge capacity on a daily basis, makes it extremely difficult to successfully handle any incident that results in mass casualties, particularly from mass gatherings where tens of thousands of people could be affected.

DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE HOSPITAL

Learning from the anthrax attacks, our deliberations surrounding the ALERT initiative, and the overcrowded state of our hospitals, we set out to design and construct a mobile hospital that was different in design from the traditional tent systems that have been used in the past. Initiated in 2002, we wanted to build a medical facility that could quickly move to the site of a disaster, be rapidly deployed on arrival, and be able to provide comprehensive medical and surgical care so as preserve hospital resources for the most critical patients. Amid the growing concern of biological threats, including infectious disease outbreaks which raises the issues of isolation, containment, and quarantine, it was essential that the mobile hospital serve patients that could not and should not be transferred to local hospitals. Transferring patients who may have an infectious disease could contaminate and jeopardize the integrity of a hospital’s infrastructure for indefinite periods of time. Our design incorporated a 2-bed operating room, 4-bed intensive care unit, and an 8-bed emergency department in an expandable 53-ft. trailer. While 14-beds are helpful, a mass casualty incident or pandemic outbreak could result in hundreds or even thousands of patients. Thus, to plan and accommodate the expected large number of patients, we developed a shelter system that could be deployed from the trailer that can support an additional 250 beds.

The Department of Homeland Security was incredibly supportive of our approach and plan. We applied for a grant and received funding from the Department to build the prototype hospital. In April 2004, we unveiled the Carolinas MED–1 mobile emergency department. The MED–1 unit is owned and operated by Carolinas Medical Center, and includes emergency physicians, trauma and orthopaedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, nurses, and paramedics as the healthcare team. Additional sup-
port personnel includes drivers, clinical engineers, and security staff provided by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.

After much training, planning, and operational exercises, the MED–1’s first deployment came in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. MED–1’s emergency response unit and team was dispatched to Mississippi to provide care to the survivors of the hurricane under an Emergency Management Assistance Compact between the States of Mississippi and North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, it was our great fortune to serve the communities of Waveland and Bay St. Louis, and to support Hancock Medical Center which was incapacitated by the storm.

Carolinas MED–1 set-up in a K-Mart shopping center parking lot, located approximately 1 mile from Hancock Medical Center. Approximately 150 refugee families were living in make-shift structures on hot asphalt, all without any significant medical care. Within an hour of our arrival, we began seeing patients. On day 2, we conducted our first surgical operation, transferred our first pregnancy who was soon to deliver, and saw our first traumatic injury. The trauma involved a 12-year-old boy who was riding an all terrain vehicle when he was struck by a car. The local EMS provider noted that the child had stopped breathing as they arrived at MED–1. Our team was able to resuscitate and stabilize the child, provide head injury therapeutics, and complete a full diagnostic evaluation including labs and X-rays. He was transferred by Coast Guard helicopter to the Level 1 trauma center in Jackson, Mississippi. It is my great pleasure, Mr. Chairman to let you know that this boy eventually walked out of the hospital intact and with no permanent nor long-term problems. Epidemiologists would comment on the cost-benefit ratio of a MED–1 unit. In my opinion, that 12-year-old’s life was worth the cost of 1,000 MED–1s.

During the 7 weeks of deployment in Mississippi, we saw more than 7,500 patients. The MED–1 staff along with the hundreds of physicians, nurses, EMTs and paramedics, and other allied health personnel from across North Carolina will forever have a bond with the people of Waveland and Bay St. Louis. Our prototype, again funded and supported by the Department of Homeland Security, was a true success story from the devastation invoked by Hurricane Katrina.

Six months later, Carolinas MED–1 was called back into service to serve as a stand-alone emergency department to assist in the excessive surge capacity conditions present in New Orleans during the first Mardi Gras celebration following the Hurricane Katrina and Rita. The unit quickly became the primary receiving facility for the city of New Orleans EMS and other services in the surrounding parishes. During the 2 weeks of deployment, 575 patients were treated. Dr. Juliette Saussy, the Director of Emergency Medical Services for New Orleans has been working for the last 2 years to obtain funding for a full-time MED–1 for her city.

Presently, Carolinas MED–1 is deployed to Columbus, Indiana to provide emergency department services in the wake of the severe flooding that destroyed Columbus Regional Hospital. Our first patient to arrive was in respiratory failure. A breathing tube was required and inserted, he was placed on a ventilator, antibiotics were immediately administered, and he was transferred by helicopter to Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis. Today, MED–1 and the Columbus Regional Hospital staff is seeing approximately 60–70 patients a day.

Overall, each of our deployments has been a tremendous success. We developed MED–1 to meet a critical need in Charlotte and elsewhere, and developed a company to produce more MED–1s to meet local preparedness needs in other parts of the country. Los Angeles County procured its second MED–1 and is in the process of building a program similar to the one in North Carolina. Several County Supervisors have expressed a great desire to deploy the unit to mass gatherings within the County such as the Tournament of Roses Parade, Rose Bowl, and the Los Angeles Marathon. Plans are also being developed to use MED–1 to provide routine outpatient medical care to the people of Los Angeles County. Frequent use will translate to quality training for the medical staff, thus ensuring proficiency when a true disaster occurs.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on my experience with ALERT and MED–1, as you think about mass gathering medical support, I have several specific recommendations for your consideration.

Recommendation No. 1: Coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities is essential both before and after a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

Mass casualty incidents don’t recognize county or State lines, and our responses shouldn’t either. We designed MED–1 to be set up in just 20 minutes. After Hurricane Katrina, MED–1 began providing patient care services shortly after arrival at the K-Mart parking lot. However, it took 4 days from the time Hurricane Katrina
hit for MED–1 to actually be deployed. At the time, extensive conversations were conducted between the Federal Government, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Carolinas Medical Center. Each time we deploy, there is a great deal of paperwork and contracting that has to occur between the public and private entities before we are able to move MED–1 toward the patients that need the care. We must consider ways to simplify the process by which MED–1 and other critical assets get deployed to minimize time delays. That means ensuring coordination between the various entities ahead of time to the greatest extent possible.

More specifically, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, (EMAC) is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid thus allowing a disaster-impacted State to request and receive assistance from other member States quickly and efficiently. Based on my experience deploying MED–1 several times out of State, we need for all States to amend their EMAC legislation so that the same immunity that applies to State employees will also apply to all employees that work with the responding State to provide the help that is needed. MED–1 and the employees who agree to be part of an emergency response often deploy with or as a part of a State’s emergency response assets. An amendment to the EMAC model State laws that are enacted in each State would save valuable time that is now being spent on drafting and executing contracts between the hospitals and the responding State so that the hospital employees will be covered by the immunity given to the State.

Recommendation No. 2: All law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, public health and hospitals, and local emergency management agencies must participate in disaster planning and response.

ALERT’s success is due in large part to the participation of all relevant private and government entities. This participation is reflected in four key elements: ALERT’s operational guidelines are established collaboratively; ALERT members plan, prepare, and respond as one unit; ALERT’s equipment is standardized and has been approved by all member agencies; and ALERT personnel wear a standardized team uniform with nametags for personal recognition and familiarization, thus fostering cohesion and nourishing ALERT’s team concept. The relationships fostered through our joint preparedness activities ensures our cohesive and comprehensive response to any incident.

Recommendation No. 3: Developing comprehensive all-hazards preparedness plans and consistent training on those plans.

Medical preparedness planning includes an understanding of who is going to do what and how regarding evacuation, containment, medical care, triage, transport, and recovery. To ensure that preparedness plans are complete and to identify and fill gaps in the plans, it is critical to test and evaluate the plans through ongoing and sustained training and adjust where necessary. It is a never-ending, fluid process and we are always learning from our training and experiences with both ALERT and MED–1.

Recommendation No. 4: Procurement or availability of assets and resources required to save lives, ease suffering, and successfully mitigate the medical consequences of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

Local medical needs include ongoing financial support for equipment, personnel, and training. Just maintaining MED–1 on an annual basis and having it ready to go costs over $800,000. Ensuring adequate response and recovery in the event of a mass casualty incident at a mass gathering costs money. Critical assets like real-time detection of a biological release should be made available at all mass gathering venues. It is not plausible to think that any public hospital or local government agency will have the resources on hand to provide the funds necessary for full preparedness. While many of the assets and programs we do have are grant funded, sustainment dollars are equally significant to keep these initiatives operational and functional.

Last, I would like to emphasize that the time is now to seek solutions that support healthcare needs at special events and mass gatherings. As a Nation, our preparedness for terrorist attacks also serves to ensure our preparedness for the more common occurrence of various types of natural disasters which are plaguing the United States more and more each year.

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee for your time, and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.
We now will hear testimony from Sergeant McCartney. If you would, summarize your statement in 5 minutes, please.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Sergeant MC CARTNEY. Chairman Thompson and Members of the committee, on behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Director Matthew Bettenhausen of the California Office of Homeland Security, I would like to thank you for opportunity to appear before you this morning regarding California’s Large Stadium Initiative and the challenges protecting mass gatherings in a post-9/11 world.

My name is Sergeant Scott McCartney, and I work for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. I am assigned there to the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security as the program manager of the Large Stadium Initiative.

I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman Thompson, his staff and the Members of the committee for recognizing the importance to preparing States’ stadiums and venues to be more aware of homeland security challenges.

In 2004, California recognized the need to develop a comprehensive approach to the safety and protection of the people and economy relating to mass gatherings of California and began the California Office of Homeland Security Large Stadium Initiative.

Originally, the Large Stadium Initiative was focused on specific stadium priorities and specific events that rose to high-profile status. The program has since evolved into a multi-event, multi-venue program utilizing an all-hazards approach to public safety.

LSI assists mass gatherings with strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities: establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums, regardless of the building’s size or type; integrating private partners into NIMS, an ICS structure, in understanding local, State and Federal systems; and provides customized training in venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned, mass care in sheltering, and crisis communication.

LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-step approach to enhancing homeland security preparedness using best practices, infrastructure security plans through automatic critical asset management systems, shared discoveries, and discussion-based exercises such as seminars, workshops and tabletops.

LSI was the focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 full-scale exercise, and events were held in all three regions of California. The venues and public safety agencies that participate in the LSI program are integrated into the State-wide exercise planning cycles to allow them to fully assess their strengths and identify any areas of improvement during annual Golden Guardian exercise.

LSI partnered with other professional and collegiate venues around the State, as well. The Large Stadium Initiative program highlights target capabilities in the area of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. LSI works with venues and first responders to raise awareness regarding criminal and terrorist activities, against spectators or venues during mass gatherings.
LSI has partnered with OHS Special Projects Division and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to develop a comprehensive preventative strategy for building a surge capacity to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats at mass gatherings in California. LSI prepares venues and stadiums for critical infrastructure protection, which enables them to identify, assess, prioritize and design protective measures to increase the security and safety of venues.

The LSI program also collaborates and coordinates with emergency public safety and security responders, venue operators and security partners and to reduce the impact of natural, manmade and any other all-hazard incidents by discussing and exercising their safety and security plans from mass care in evacuations.

The LSI program is designed to assist mass gathering venues with information on structural damage assessments, restoration of lifelines, and continuity of business and economic recovery.

To return a mass gathering facility to a full operation, which is vital to the economic sustainment and growth of the community, LSI is evolving to meet the needs of mass gathering venues of non-national significance. Future program goals of the program: major sports television networks, chaplain and community services, major award ceremonies and convention gatherings.

I would like to highlight how LSI assists colleges and universities in creating the implementing policies and procedures for their stadiums. These venues augment security with student services and still require assistance from first responders. Funding can be an issue regarding training and equipment needs for these venues.

As a result of the program, we see relationships develop between universities and first responders and the increase in strategic planning, crisis communication and memorandums of understanding. The areas of improvement noted during the LSI university series include communication process, development of evacuation plans for different buildings, safety and security equipment resources for normal operations, including consistent training and exercising, identification of mass casualty incidents, incident command and unified command training, recovery and remediation.

California and the Large Stadium Initiative is committed to keeping all mass gatherings, both national and non-national significance, protected by partnering with local, State and Federal entities in a post-9/11 world. LSI is developing new, state-of-the-art ideas to design strategies to better prepare all stakeholders and spectators in venue safety and security during mass gathering venues for natural and man-made disasters and all other hazards incidents.

Again, thank you for this opportunity today, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The statement of Sergeant McCartney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCCARTNEY

JULY 9, 2008

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee, on behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Director Matt Bettenhausen and the California Office of Homeland Security, I would like to thank you and the committee
on Homeland Security for the opportunity to appear before you this morning regarding the California Large Stadium Initiative and the “Challenges of Protecting Mass Gatherings in a Post 9/11 World”.

My name is Scott McCartney and I am a Sergeant with the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, California. I am assigned as a Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert to the Office of Homeland Security as the Program Manager of the California Large Stadium Initiative—LSI. It is an honor for me to share with the committee our accomplishments and strides California is making on the Large Stadium Initiative and mass gathering venues for the State of California and the Nation.

I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman Thompson, his staff and the Members of the committee on Homeland Security for recognizing the importance of large-scale mass gatherings and the commitment to better preparing States, stadiums and venues to be more aware of Homeland Security challenges and to increase their capabilities for the prevention, preparation, response and recovery to mass gatherings that encompass the true American spirit of freedom.

LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need to develop programs to deal with terrorism prevention, response and recovery at mass gathering venues. Large public venues, such as sports stadiums, present unique security and disaster response challenges. Through the Large Stadium Initiative, California is able to work with our public and private partners to tailor exercises to their specific needs to ensure the greatest possible protection for the public at these venues.

California recognized the need to develop a comprehensive approach to the safety and protection of the people and economy relating to mass gatherings of California; and in 2004, the California Office of Homeland Security began the Large Stadium Initiative (LSI). Originally, the LSI program was focused on specific stadium properties and specific events that rose to a high profile status. The program has since evolved into a multi-event, multi-venue program utilizing an all hazards approach to public safety.

The LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue Homeland Security preparedness issues and assists in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities as set forth by Presidential Directive No. 8.

The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise that a majority of stadiums are not owned by municipal or State governments, and therefore security varies from facility to facility. Managers rely on a combination of private security companies, local police/sheriff, State, Federal partners and their own employees to protect their facilities.

At a single facility, security strengths and weaknesses, the quality of supervisory personnel and operational practices can vary from event to event. Consequently, instituting a high level of security practices in stadiums across the Nation regardless of the stadium size or event type is a critical step in establishing a solid infrastructure protection standard for the stadium or mass gathering industry.

With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are provided with customized training and exercises which focus on venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned and mass-care and shelter issues from previous disasters and crisis communication during incidents of both national and non-national significances. California is committed to keeping all large-scale mass gatherings protected in a post-9/11 world through the Large Stadium Initiative.

In working with the owners and operators of facilities in California and other States, OHS–LSI has developed plans, policies and procedures that follow the DHS/Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines for Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery to assist local, State and Federal partners who help secure these large-scale mass gathering venues. At each venue, we assess with preventative measures used not only for criminal acts of terrorism, but hazard prevention based on the facility, disaster preparation and prevention of criminal activities not associated with terrorism. We look at the physical plant of the facilities and make recommendations on protective measures that can be employed to deter criminal acts or provide for the greater safety of the spectators.

LSI in conjunction with our Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIPP) and Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) assesses response plans within each facility and make sure those plans work together with the response plans for the public agencies that will respond to an event within the facility. I facilitate meetings between venue operators and public safety personnel to build relationships and resolve discrepancies in the plans.
California provides training in the form of Seminars and Workshops following the (HSEEP) guidelines to assess policies and procedures, and identify strengths and areas for improvement. Table top exercises are developed for these facilities and venues and their first response partners, in order to assess their capabilities. The exercises are designed to highlight first responders, private security and venue facilities on their preparedness, response, recovery and recovery procedures for mitigating and managing a terrorist attack or disaster or other incident, which may occur at their venue during events.

I also work with venue operators to develop comprehensive recovery plans so they can move toward the return of their facility to normal operations as soon as possible. These recovery plans not only deal with the physical plant (structure, stadium or venue), but with a marketing plan to inform and reassure the public regarding the safety and availability of the facility for use. This is an important step in the economic recovery of the affected area or region.

LSI ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The goal of the State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Division is to conduct a series of exercises for Large Stadium and Mass Gathering sites, which includes a seminar, workshop and table top exercises during a calendar year in support of the Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI).

CA–LSI assists large-scale mass gathering stadiums/venues and sites with:
- Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities;
- Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country regardless of the building size or event type;
- Integrating private partners into SEMS/NIMS/ICS structure and understanding local, State and Federal systems.

CA–LSI partnered with large-scale and mass gathering venues and provided customized training:
- Venue roles and responsibilities;
- Lessons Learned;
- Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters;
- Crisis Communication during incidents of national or non-national significance.

CA–LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness using:
- Best Practices;
- Exemplars;
- Infrastructure Security Plans;
- Shared Discoveries;
- Exercises.

CA–LSI was the focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 Full-Scale Exercise with events in the Southern, Inland and Coastal Regions of California, specifically the Honda Center and Angel’s Stadium in Anaheim, University of the Pacific (UOP) Spanos Center in Stockton and the H.P. Pavilion in San Jose.

Past CA–LSI accomplishments have been with:
- Arco Arena in Sacramento involving Professional Basketball;
- Staples Center in LA involving Professional Basketball;
- Monster Park in San Francisco involving Professional Football;
- PacBell Park in San Francisco involving Professional Baseball;
- Dodger Stadium in LA involving Professional Baseball;
- AAA Club Speedway in Fontana and Infineon Raceway in Sonoma involving Professional Motor Sports;
- University of California at Davis involving Collegiate Athletics.

The California Large Stadium Initiative has worked since 2004 to assist these partners and venues with the latest and most progressive practices and technologies of Homeland Security. Our goal is to better prepare them to respond and recover from terrorist attack, natural disaster and all other hazards or incidents while spectators are visiting facilities to view sports or other large-scale events. The LSI program works with the venues to match their approach to their specific or desired focus of their event with first responders.

LSI SEMINARS

LSI Seminars are designed for specific audiences at local, State and privately owned mass gathering venues. The seminar focuses on shared, new and innovative equipment, local, State and Federal resources. The seminars are informal discussions, designed to orient participants to authorities, strategies, new or updated plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and/or ideas (e.g., a sem-
inar to review a new Evacuation Standard Operating Procedure). Seminars provide a good starting point for jurisdictions that are developing or making major changes to their plans and procedures.

**LSI Workshops**

The LSI workshop is designed to build specific products, such as a draft plan or policy (e.g., a Mass Evacuation Plan Workshop is used to develop a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan). The workshop, a type of discussion-based exercise and represents the second tier of exercises in the building-block approach. Although similar to seminars, workshops differ in two important aspects: increased participant interaction, and a focus on achieving or building a product (e.g., plans, policies). A workshop is typically used to: test new ideas, processes, or procedures; train groups in coordinated activities; and obtain consensus.

**LSI Table Top Exercises**

A table top exercise (TTX) involves key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an informal setting. TTXs can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined incident. TTXs are intended to stimulate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical situation. During a TTX, senior staff, elected or appointed officials, or other key personnel meet in an informal setting to discuss simulated situations. TTXs are typically aimed at facilitating understanding of concepts, identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Participants are encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through slow-paced, problem-solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision-making that occurs under actual or simulated emergency conditions. TTXs can be breakout (i.e., groups split into functional areas) or plenary (i.e., one large group).

**OHS Approach for LSI**

**Prevention**

LSI is working with the venues and local first responders on information gathering and recognition indicators and warnings for the ability to see gathered data, potential trends, indications, and/or warning of criminal and/or terrorist activities (including planning and surveillance) against U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure of the stadium or venues during large-scale mass gatherings.

LSI, in partnership with members of the Special Projects Division of The California Office of Homeland Security, is currently working with all directorates inside of OHS to partner or leverage opportunities on a State-wide collaborative effort to develop a comprehensive, preventive strategy to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats within California’s borders. The purpose is to give State and local response entities, the tools and resources necessary to interdict and resolve radiological and nuclear terrorist threats. California has convened a group of key State, Federal and local stakeholders to develop this program which is being developed in close partnership with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In addition to everyday monitoring and detection efforts on our land and waterways, one capability CA is looking to develop is a surge capacity for radiological nuclear detection resources that could be deployed throughout the State as needed for large-scale events and mass gatherings.

**Protection**

Under this priority, LSI works with venues and stadiums on critical infrastructure protection which enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and design protective measures to increase the security and safety of the venues. Some of the protective measures could involve hardening of the facilities, adjusting schedules, installing enhanced fire protection or security systems and the training of the facility staff in security and hazard mitigation.

**Response**

The LSI program collaborates with emergency public safety and security responders, venue operations and security partners to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident either terrorist, natural or an all-hazards-type event by discussing and exercising their safety and security plans for mass care and evacuations. The process works to build continuity among venues and first responders to assist in providing security support to other response operations and properties and sustaining operations from response to recovery. This inclusive program requires the coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).
Recovery

This part of the LSI program is designed to assist large-scale mass gathering venues with information on structural damage assessments, restoration of lifelines and continuity of business and economic and community recovery to return the large-scale mass gathering facilities to full operation. It is important to note here the significance both to the venue recovery and employee’s recovery after an incident. The return of patrons to these venues is vital to the economic sustainment and growth of the community and Nation. By discussing plans and procedures both as a private partner and local community, we show the importance of establishing the recovery process for venues and patrons to return to the venue with minimal delay or concern.

FUTURE GOALS OF LSI

California LSI is working with the following organizations, stadiums and mass gathering venues to introduce them to the LSI program and series to them in the hopes of developing a standardization of preparedness, response and recovery to large-scale mass gathering sites in California and the Nation.

• College and University Stadiums
• Major Awards Ceremonies and Conventions Gatherings (The Oscars, The Tonis)
• Major Sports Television Networks
• Chaplin and Community Services

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STADIUMS

I see many ways to expand into the collegiate level mass gatherings. Most college or university venues are private or publicly owned and operated, which can pose problems with funding and training of venue security. Many of these venues require the assistance of local law enforcement, fire and emergency management services, which can place a strain on the finances and staffing of the locals. Frequently, the collegiate venues use student services to augment security and to help with the basic needs of the venue. This is a good way to involve students and staff, but with that type of service, training becomes one of the biggest concerns.

Training and equipment for these venues can strain the resources of the colleges and universities that operate them. While training can be provided by local agencies, funding is often a problem. Many of the universities have working police officers, which is beneficial in the development of plans and procedures; however, those universities who do not employ their own law enforcement professionals must create plans and procedures without first responder expertise.

The LSI program works with these colleges and universities to help them through the plan development process and networking with locals to help solve problems or close issues while planning for events on their campuses. One of the major strengths I see from working with these universities is the relationships they developed with their local first responders. They also work on strategic planning and crisis communication plans with local first responders and have memorandums of understanding (MOU) for response and assistance at the venue regarding incidents.

I have also seen some areas for improvement during my visits to campuses. The development of evacuation plans and training of those plans needs to occur more often. Facility staff and management need to ensure information sharing between departments on campus; and messaging internally in facilities with staff, families and students for family reunification is very important.

In working with some of the colleges and universities in California, I have been given many examples of what they need to overcome some of the areas discussed above. Here are some of the concerns and questions facing college campuses with large-scale mass gatherings:

• Communication process—lines of responsibility during an incident;
• Development of evacuation plans for different buildings;
• Consistent training and exercising should be a priority;
• Safety and security equipment resources for normal operations;
• Communication between various campus groups during events or about events;
• Identification of mass casualty incidents during an event;
• Incident Command and Unified Command training;
• Recovery and remediation needed to restore patrons’ faith.

MAJOR SPORT TELEVISION NETWORKS

Create a seminar or workshop, as a part of the LSI program, for the major sport networks to raise situational awareness of safety and security issues at venues among media personnel. This exercise series would provide reporters an opportunity
to learn about crisis communication and how their roles could change once an incident occurs. The seminar’s intent is to raise awareness within the sports-casting community about how to react to a catastrophic incident, how to transition from a sportscaster role into more of a newscaster role or even function as a Public Information Officer (PIO) or Joint Information Officer (JIC) within the Incident Command Structure (ICS) structure during and incident. Perhaps teach the staff of the networks how to integrate with the venue security and operational staff to increase the overall understanding of incident response and crisis communication.

**CHAPLIN AND COMMUNITY SERVICES**

The LSI program would assist mass gathering venues and community first responders to create a network or system of chaplains or community volunteers for each venue, whether it is a professional sport stadium, public gathering venue or collegiate facility to respond to the emotional and reunification needs of the people, both spectators and first responders, involved in an incident. Within this network, a phone list (call down system) would be developed to go into effect in the event of an incident. One person would initiate the phone tree to bring in local law and fire chaplains to assist with recovery, reunification and other volunteer functions as needed. A number would be provided to the venue Incident Commander to activate this network of agency and community chaplains. Eventually there would be a Nation-wide database of chaplains who could be brought into a facility in a time of need. These chaplains could be recruited through local first responder agencies as well as through local, State and national volunteer organizations.

**MAJOR AWARDS CEREMONIES AND CONVENTION GATHERINGS**

The LSI program would utilize the same exercise series: seminar, workshop, and tabletop exercises with these mass gathering sites to increase awareness among the venue security and first responder communities regarding major awards and convention gatherings. The exercise process would develop strategies and procedures to meet protection, response and recovery goals during these events. It would also work with event staff to better understand the need for evacuation and sheltering plans and protocols during the planning process. With the cooperation of site security and local first responders, the venues would be better prepared for a terrorist attack or an all hazard and/or natural incident.

**BEYOND THE LSI PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA**

The LSI Program is one of many pieces of California’s effort to protect its citizens from hazards and improve our ability to respond to and recover from them. Each year, California hosts a series of Functional and Full Scale Exercises that are designed to assess the ability of California to respond to and recover from any incident. The venues and public safety agencies that participate in the LSI program are integrated into the State-wide exercise planning cycles to allow them to fully assess their strengths and identify areas for improvement during the annual Golden Guardian Exercise.

In closing, California and the Large Stadium Initiative is committed to keeping all large-scale mass gatherings both of national significance and non-national significance protected by collaborating with local, State and Federal partners in a post-9/11 world. The CA–LSI program is working with and developing new state-of-the-art ideas to design strategies, following DHS/OHS and HSEEP guidelines for safety and security at mass gathering sites, to better prepare all the stakeholders in spectator and venues safety and security during mass gathering large-scale venues, natural disasters, and all hazard incidents.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I will be happy to take your questions.

**OHSTED: OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRAINING AND EXERCISE DIVISION**

**LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE**

The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch (OHSEB) conducts a series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass Gathering sites, which includes—a seminar, workshop, and tabletop exercises (TTXs)—during a calendar year in support of the California Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI).
OBJECTIVES

The CA–LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue Homeland Security preparedness issues and assists in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response, and recovery capabilities in an open, stress-free environment.

The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise a majority of stadiums are owned by municipal or State governments, and therefore security varies from facility to facility. Managers rely on a combination of private security companies, local police, and their own employees to protect their facilities. Even at a single facility, security weaknesses, strengths, the quality of supervisory personnel and operational practices can vary from event to event. Consequently, a critical step in establishing a solid infrastructure protection standard for the stadium industry is to establish a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country regardless of the size of building or the type of event.

With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are provided with customized training which focuses on venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned and mass-care and shelter issues from previous disasters and crisis communication during incidents of national significance.

MISSION STATEMENT

Provide to large stadium owners and stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness by using Best Practices, Exemplars, the Infrastructure Security Plans, Shared Discoveries, and Exercises.

GOAL

The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch conducts a series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass Gathering sites, which includes: a seminar, workshop and table top exercises during a calendar year in support of the California Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI).

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CA–LSI assists large stadiums/venues:
- Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities;
- Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country regardless of building size or event type.

CA–LSI partners are provided with customized training:
- Venue roles and responsibilities;
- Lessons Learned;
- Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters;
- Crisis Communication during incidents of national significance.

CA–LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness using:
- Best Practices;
- Exemplars;
- Infrastructure Security Plans;
- Shared Discoveries;
- Exercises.

CA–LSI is a focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 Full-Scale Exercise with events in the Southern, Inland and Coastal Regions.

FUTURE PLANS

- Racetracks and Speedways.
- Professional Outdoor Sporting Venues.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you, Sergeant.
We will now hear from Mr. Reynolds for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MALL OF AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA

Mr. Reynolds. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee. My name is Doug Reynolds. I am the director of security for Mall of America, located in Bloomington, Minnesota. It is
an honor to be here today to acquaint you with the security program of Mall of America and to share our challenges for the future.

For those of you who have never visited Mall of America, it is important to understand this is much more than another shopping center in fly-over country. In fact, Mall of America is the Nation’s largest retail and entertainment complex. It is two to three times as large as the typical, super-regional shopping malls found on either coast. Our building is 4.2 million square feet, large enough to fit seven Yankee stadiums. It includes a 7-acre indoor amusement park. It is home to more than 520 stores and 50 restaurants. It is open to the public.

Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in the United States. In fact, we have more than 42 million visits every year, which is more than the combined populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and all of Canada.

On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people—— [Laughter.]

Mr. Reynolds. Yeah, pretty big.

On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people in Mall of America, making it the third-largest city in the State of Minnesota. Those numbers increase dramatically during holiday and summer seasons. Mall of America employs more than 13,000 people and has an annual economic impact of nearly $2 billion for the State of Minnesota.

Mall of America hosts more than 350 events every year. Each event is free and open to the public, which can pose some unique security challenges. These events may attract from a few dozen to more than 50,000 participants. Given the sheer number of visitors to the Mall of America and our status as a symbol of consumerism and capitalism, security remains a top priority for us.

Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has approximately 100 people, and we run our operation 24 hours a day, every day of the year. We work closely with the local police department, as well as other local, State and Federal authorities, for the protection of our regular visitors, celebrities and VIPs.

We have been able to institute many programs, procedures and policies that help ensure the safety of our guests, employees and facilities. Some of the programs that are unique to the Mall of America include extensive ongoing training. Our security officers go through 240 hours of initial training and 50 hours of recertification training every year, including such things as effective communication, first aid, defensive tactics, verbal judo, crisis intervention, terrorism awareness, and rapid response.

That is more training than many municipal police departments require.

We also have two highly trained canine explosion detection units that patrol public and non-public areas of the Mall. In addition to that, we cross-train with canine units from the adjacent 11 counties to maintain our proficiency.

We have recently implemented two separate ion detection systems that can be used to detect explosive residue as well as chemical agents. The stationery unit is used to check all delivery vehicles that enter our secure loading docks, and the portable unit can be used throughout the Mall.
Most importantly, we have created our own counterterrorism unit. We call it the risk assessment and mitigation unit. It specializes in behavior profiling. Our RAM unit, or Risk Assessment and Mitigation unit, is based on a technique that has been perfected over the years in Israel. In fact, leaders of our unit received training in Israel at our expense to help us develop a special program.

These officers look for intent, rather than means. The objective is to focus on suspicious indicators in three categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like backpacks, shopping bags, suitcases. Our unit has eight full-time equivalent positions and is staffed every day of the year.

External connections have also helped us strengthen our security program due to strong support from other agencies. We have been able to establish a strong working relationship with our local contact with the Department of Homeland Security, Glenn Sanders. He has been helpful with sharing relevant information, providing access to needed resources and just as a voice of reason or a sounding board to make sure our decisions are on track with the big picture.

In 2007, I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive Board through the FBI. This was made possible when they activated my security clearance. This has proven to be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and our security program. However, I would like to note that it took more than 7 years for us to forge these relationships and to gain this limited access. We had to be persistent, diligent, methodical in order to gain access; and this really is just the beginning.

As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently asked to share our expertise and knowledge with other large venues and groups across the globe. Whenever time and resources permit, we are more than happy to share with others.

For example, we have worked with the Canary Wharf financial and retail complex in London, the world-famous Mayo Clinic and a Canadian retail development company, helping each structure a strong security program.

With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive and firearm threats, we are taking steps to remain effective leaders in the private industry. However, in order to continue to succeed, we need timely, relevant information from proper agencies, insight into new trends or issues and additional. Access to training opportunities for our officers is critical to the continued success of our programs.

Although we are a private entity, we are also a national icon. If a major terrorist incident were to occur at Mall of America, the ramifications to the retail industry and other malls throughout the country would be devastating. Our goal is to prevent that from ever happening.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your continued leadership on the issue of security in public venues.

Chairman THOMPSON. I thank all our witnesses on this panel for their excellent testimony and your excellent testimony. I will leave it at that.

[The statement of Mr. Reynolds follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS REYNOLDS

Honorable Chair and Members of the committee, this testimony is submitted on behalf of Mall of America, the Nation's largest retail and entertainment complex located in Bloomington, Minn. It is an honor to be asked to acquaint this committee with the security program in place at Mall of America; and to share our challenges for the future.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

As a major tourist attraction—and a national symbol of consumerism and capitalism—Mall of America (MOA) faces security challenges and opportunities that are unique within the industry. Mall of America remains committed to working closely with local, State and Federal agencies to ensure the safety and security of our guests, employees and facilities. We are also committed to sharing our expertise with other entities, and continued growth and vigilance of our security program.

TESTIMONY FOR NON-NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS HEARING

For those Members of the committee who have never visited Mall of America, it is important to understand that MOA is much more than another shopping center in fly-over country located somewhere in the Midwest. In fact, Mall of America is the Nation's largest retail and entertainment complex.

MOA is two to three times as large as the typical super-regional shopping malls found on either coast. Our building is 4.5 million square feet, which is large enough to fit seven Yankee Stadiums, 32 Boeing 747's or 258 Statues of Liberty. MOA also includes a 7-acre indoor amusement park; a 1.2-million-gallon aquarium; is home to more than 520 stores and 50 restaurants; and is open to and easily accessed by the public.

Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in the United States. We have more than 42 million visits every year—which is more than the combined populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and all of Canada. In fact, on any given day there are well over 100,000 people in Mall of America, making it the third-largest city in the State of Minnesota. Those numbers increase dramatically during holiday and summer seasons.

Mall of America employs more than 13,000 people and has an annual economic impact of nearly $2 billion on the State of Minnesota. We host more than 350 events every year. Each event is free and open to the public which can pose unique security challenges. These events may attract from a few dozen to more than 50,000 participants.

Given the sheer number of visitors to Mall of America—and our status as a symbol of consumerism and capitalism—security remains a top priority for us.

Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has approximately 100 officers, and we run our operation 24 hours a day, every day of the year. We work closely with the Bloomington Police Department as well as other local, county, State and Federal authorities for the protection of our regular visitors, celebrities and VIP's.

We have been able to institute many security programs, procedures and policies over the years that help ensure the safety of our guests, employees and facilities. Some of the programs that are unique to MOA include:

- Parental Escort Policy. We have been a leader in the Nation by instituting a policy that helps redirect responsibility for kids back onto parents. This policy has been a model throughout the Nation and requires children under the age of 16 be accompanied by parents or adults age 21 or older on Friday and Saturday evenings. In fact, we receive calls from other malls, businesses and reporters almost every week to learn about our program.
- Extensive on-going training. Our security officers go through 240 hours of initial training and 50 hours of recertification training every year (including effective communications, first aid, verbal judo, crisis intervention, terrorism awareness and rapid response). That is more training than some municipal police departments require.
- We have two highly trained canine explosive protection units that patrol public and non-public areas of the mall. We also cross-train with canine units from the 11-county metro area.
- We have recently implemented two separate Ion Detection Systems (one stationary and one portable) that can be used to detect for explosive residue as well as chemical agents. The stationary unit is used to check all delivery vehicles that enter our secured loading docks, and the portable unit can be used throughout the mall.
• Most importantly, we have created our own counter-terrorism unit—our RAM Unit—that specializes in behavior profiling. Our RAM Unit is based on a technique that has been perfected over the years in Israel. In fact, leaders of our unit received training in Israel—at our expense—to help us develop this special program. These officers look for intent rather than means. The objective is to focus on suspicious indicators in three categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like backpacks or shopping bags. Our unit has 8 Full Time Equivalent positions and is staffed every day of the year.

External connections have also helped us strengthen our security program due to strong support from other agencies.

• We have been able to establish a strong working relationship with our local contact with the Department of Homeland Security, Glen Sanders. He has been helpful with sharing relevant information, providing access to needed resources and just as a voice of reason or sounding board to make sure our decisions are on track with the big picture.

• In 2007 I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive Board through the FBI. This was made possible when they activated my security clearance. This has proven to be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and our security program.

However, I would like to note that it took more than 7 years for us to forge these strategic partnerships with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Department of Homeland Security, and to gain this limited access. Over the years we had to be persistent, diligent and methodical in order to gain access. And this really is just the beginning.

A good example of some of the challenges we face is that of the MJAC. Mall of America was the No. 1 source of actionable intelligence in the State of Minnesota to the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center, supplying more intelligence than any other single entity. Unfortunately, we were pulled off of this system of information sharing. It is actions such as this that make our job of securing a top national tourist destination much more difficult and challenging.

As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently asked to share our expertise and knowledge with other large venues and groups across the globe. Whenever time and resources permit, we are more than happy to share with others. For example, we have worked with the Canary Wharf financial and retail complex in London, the world-famous Mayo Clinic and a Canadian retail development company; helping each structure a strong security program.


With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive and shooting threats we are taking steps to remain effective leaders in the private industry. However, in order to continue to succeed, we need timely, relevant information from proper agencies, insight into new trends or issues. Additional access to training opportunities for our officers would be quite helpful.

In short, here’s what we need to remain successful:

• Access to real time, relevant information;
• Additional training opportunities;
• Resources to strengthen our security program.

Although we are a private entity—we are also a national icon. If a major terrorist incident were to occur at Mall of America, the ramifications to the retail industry and other malls throughout the country would be quite severe. Our goal is to work hard to prevent that from ever happening.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your continued leadership on the issue of security in public venues.

Chairman THOMPSON. Dr. Blackwell, first of all, let me thank you for the help you have given in the past in addressing natural disasters not just in the State of North Carolina but my home State of Mississippi as well, as well as Indiana.

But I am interested in your notion of sustainability for your own local unit and how you see the Federal Government helping with that. Also the notion of mutual aid you talked about and how we can somehow put that in some structure that people can just plug into, rather than people coming together just because they have good will.
Dr. BLACKWELL. First, Mr. Chair, let me say that I can think of no better place to initiate our project than Waveland and Bay St. Louis. The people there were grateful, they were a pleasure to help, and it was a great experience that will long live with all of us for the rest of our lives.

As far as sustainment goes, these programs are expensive. When a MED–1 unit is sitting on the ground not deploying, there is a cost for that. When MED–1 goes out to a venue to provide mass gathering support, to provide medical care in any mass gathering venue or strategic event, there is a cost for that. For those two costs, our hospital is absorbing those costs right now.

Carolinas Medical Center is a Level 1 trauma center, sees the need for that, supports the initiative but is providing the funds for the sustainment dollars. When there is a deployment, obviously, the Federal Government steps in, be it HHS or FEMA or whatever. With our three deployments, we have been under a Federal contract. So the Federal Government does step up. But to get that unit prepared and ready to go and on the ready, there is a cost for that readiness; and no one is picking up the tab for that. So sustainment dollars, again, are equally important through the Department of Homeland Security to support these initiatives to keep them functional and operational.

Regarding getting out the door, it was a real chore for us. It took 4 days before we could deploy before moving to the Gulf Coast. We were ready to deploy. Our units were packed. We were staged. We had units from physicians, nurses and allied health personnel, 22 vehicles, 100 staff ready to deploy to the Gulf Coast; and it took 4 days before the agreements could be mustered to get us out the door.

Attorneys from both sides were settling contracts. They were disputing contracts, and we were ready to go see patients. They needed help in the Gulf Coast. We wanted to go. We were ready to go. But we had to wait until those contracts were signed.

There is a process in place called the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the EMAC agreement. All 50 States are part of that today. But to get a streamlined approach to this, I would encourage Congress to really take a critical look at that EMAC agreement and see if there are ways—when people need help, they need help. Attorneys don’t need to be arguing over contracts for that.

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, and as you know we held some oversight hearings on some of those issues. We have heard stories of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police offering help; and, after about 4 days, they just called Continental Airlines from Canada, flew to Houston, rented vehicles, and drove into Louisiana. There were a number of stories.

I think it is incumbent on all of us to fix the mutual aid situation so it is seamless. Now we put some language in the reorganization of FEMA to cut down on a lot of red tape in times of natural disasters. Our national response plan basically provided for a seamless approach to that process. But we do have to fix it, and your comments won’t fall on deaf ears because we know what you are trying to do.
Mr. Reynolds, you talked about a 7-year effort to get into the JTTF program. With 100,000 people on any given day in operation, that is, in my mind, a significant venue of a gathering. What was their reluctance to include the Mall of America into this Joint Terrorism Task Force?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Thompson, I am not 100 percent certain of where that reluctance came from. I do know that when a new ASAC arrived for the area, we gave him a tour of our facility, and he understood what we were doing, saw it as cutting edge and said, I will get you access to the JTTF Executive Board. I had replied, with all due respect, I have heard that before, and it hasn't happened. However, he was true to his word, and he did speed the process up and get it through.

I know in the past when we had inquired about access—and I had an active Top Secret SCI clearance from the military they said, yes, I understand that is a military clearance. It is not any good to, you know, the JTTF board. I found it frustrating, especially when it was the same paperwork I filled out to get the access that he ended up giving me, eventually.

Chairman THOMPSON. So, since your inclusion, you feel that you are a full partner in the effort?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Absolutely. We had talked about—we have people out there looking for what we call suspicious indicators. We need real-time intelligence to tell our people what it is, what the trends are, what the bad things are they should be looking for. I do feel we are a great contributor. In 2007, we were the No. 1 source of actionable intelligence for the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center; and that is a private entity.

Chairman THOMPSON. I guess one of the other questions is, Admiral Rufe talked about having to submit paperwork annually for every event. Now, as a private entity, are you required to submit any paperwork showing how many people come into the Mall every day? Or are you exempt from that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is one of the benefits of sitting on the JTTF board. We share that information with others, what events we have coming up, that type of thing. We have had assessments done by many different agencies that come in and look at our facility. Are we required to submit that paperwork? No.

Chairman THOMPSON. But they are aware of what is going on?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Correct. That is one of the great things, again, about being on that board, is just being able to exchange information openly with people, build those contacts.

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. Yield to the gentleman from California for 5 minutes.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to echo your words of compliment to the three that are testifying here. I would hope that more members of the public would have a chance to be exposed to this kind of testimony to realize how much work has gone into protecting our Nation on this level since 9/11; and I think we are far better prepared than we were before 9/11, although we still have much to do.

Mr. Reynolds I want to congratulate you. Without feigning an accent, you managed to sound like a Texan in the beginning of your testimony. Everything is the biggest and the best and the largest.
I haven't heard that since I sat down with my colleagues from Texas.

Mr. Reynolds. Thanks y'all.

Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that.

Dr. Blackwell, one of the concerns I have is, in terms of responding to a particular incident, the surge that we need to do that, there has always been the question of adequate medical personnel, and particularly nurses. I just know in my State we have a lot of nurses well-trained who are retired now—and I am not talking about 80, 90 years of age. I am talking about retired, raising families, doing other things. But certainly still sharp, still capable. Is there any kind of program you have in your State or can you visualize a program in which we could create a reserve of nurses as something like a military reserve so that, when we did need that, that they would have adequate training to sort of keep their skills high in order to be able to assist when the surge is necessary?

Dr. Blackwell. Yes, sir. There is a program that exists today. It is the Medical Reserve Corps. It is active in all 50 States that I know of. It is very active in North Carolina. We have a central repository of data where any healthcare provider—I agree with you. Nurses—I have run two plane crash disasters in Charlotte; and I can tell you, the nurses are the ones who made it happen. They are the ones that really get the emergency department operational and get patients cared for. The physicians do their work, but the nurses orchestrate it.

It is the same on our MED–1 unit. We are always looking for nursing staff. Seventy percent of our staff are nurses on our MED–1 hospital.

But there is a medical reserve component that private citizens can sign up for, and it is a repository for their credentials to ensure that they have active license with the State Board of Nursing or the State Medical Boards, whatever, depending on who is signing up. We do have that physician——

Mr. Lungren. Is there a specific program which allows them to have training dedicated to the Medical Reserve Corps to bring them up? Or is it a repository of information which tries to coordinate, as opposed to a specific program that we need to focus on these folks who aren't going to be working during the year but need to bring their credentials and their training up to snuff?

Dr. Blackwell. There is not a centralized training that I am aware of. That is up to each individual State to put that in place. Our State office of EMS does for our State, and we do have those programs in place. But that is State-dependent. I don't believe that there are Federal programs out there.

Mr. Lungren. Thank you.

Sergeant, again thank you for the work that you are doing and how much you have advanced this effort in our home State of California.

Let me ask you particularly about the college setting. A lot of college campuses, if they have their own facility, they rely on volunteers or they rely oftentimes on a core of retired folks who are ushers. I mean, my alma mater, Notre Dame, they have got some great ushers, but they were there when I was in college. They do a great job in terms of getting people to their seats——
Football, we play a little bit there. We are going to even play more this year. In fact, we have got some nice trips to Mississippi. But, anyway——

They do a very, very good job of creating an environment of welcome and showing people to their seats. But, in many cases, they would not be the most physically fit individuals to assist in a disaster where you may need some additional hands. How do you deal with that in terms of working with the colleges and universities?

Sergeant McCartney. Congressman, I appreciate the question.

The important thing to remember, too, with colleges and universities that I enjoy or that the Office of Homeland Security enjoys in the LSI program is we go in and work with first responders, the venues, the school, the administrators, the staff and try to help them better understand programs or games or facilities, basketball, baseball, football, graduation. Six thousand people show up to a graduation at a facility in UOP, as you know, in Stockton, and with that many people they don't have—you know, there is an evacuation plan that has to go into effect.

So the training of staff, the training of students is a huge component of that because they use students to augment security at these venues.

Mr. Lungren. That is a question that I would run into. You have a large number of students usually at these venues——

Sergeant McCartney. Right.

Mr. Lungren [presiding]. Many of them sober—and capable of working out. I am just not aware of a program which tries to enlist the student body at large, not to be ushers, not to be official volunteers but to be able to respond if there were an emergency so that they would know their particular assembly points in the stadium to assist. Is that kind of thinking going on? Are you doing that sort of thing?

Sergeant McCartney. Yes. Through the Large Stadium Initiative, what we do when we go to those schools is we talk about that exactly. During their evacuation plans, one of the things is they can set up an evacuation plan on paper. But if they don't train to that and if they don't exercise to that, then it does nobody any good.

One of the other things we noticed is that what if all the lights go out in the basketball arena? It is pitch black. You can't see anything. So flashlights was a big proponent, because they didn't have flashlights.

So through the LSI program, through the first responders and the local operational areas in California and the different regions throughout California, we are able to help with some funds through grants or other funds through the after-action reporting and the improvement planning to get them to those things, flashlights, basic necessity.

But, again, if this building right now was to—lights to go out, minus the light from outside, it would be very dark in here; and flashlights for those that are doing security and those trying to evacuate people is very important. So we rely on the schools and the first responders really to help in the training; and through the facilitation of the program, we kind of develop policies, procedures and new evacuation plans to assist these universities.
Mr. LUNGREN. May I ask one more?
Chairman THOMPSON. Sure.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Reynolds, I am going to be attending a convention up in your neck of the woods later this summer. I expect that my wife and I and others may visit your mall. I presume you are making special efforts for that while you are up there. What kind of pressure does that put on the mall when you are going to have a national convention in the area where you probably would expect more than the 100,000 a day?
Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly we will adjust our staffing levels. We are already training up for that. The RNC crew has put me on the Crisis Management subcommittee, which helps, again, develop what the big picture is, gets us involved in that, who we can report to if we see different incidents, what we should be watching for, that type of thing.
Mr. LUNGREN. Have you noticed a ramp-up in terms of the participation you get from DHS and the Federal establishment with respect to that versus your everyday large operation and relationship to the Federal Government?
Mr. REYNOLDS. Two weeks ago, I was invited to or just completed some training with the FBI directly relevant to the RNC coming up. Prior to that—there is a lot with the local law enforcement. The Capitol Police have been out to visit us. I had a chance to visit with them yesterday as well.
Yes, there are a lot of entities that are regularly calling and stop out for tours, visits, want to know what our plan is, anticipate their people will be coming out to our area and want to know what kind of facilities we have and what kind of security arrangements we have.
Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I look forward to seeing you there.
Mr. REYNOLDS. We look forward to seeing your billfold, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. We are sure you will invest in the economy.
We will now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands for 5 minutes, Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few questions.
Dr. Blackwell, on MED–1, you have deployed it at several places. I have operated under the tents, the ones that you blow up after Hurricane Hugo. We were able to do surgery, deliveries and do regular medical emergencies there. So one question would be, how is MED–1 better than the tents? A couple of ways that you could tell us that they are better. Do you feel that MED–1 units should be used either in whole or in part at mass gatherings? Do you think they have a role there? Also, I don’t know how many there are. Is yours the only one in the country?
Dr. BLACKWELL. No, ma’am. Los Angeles County just bought the first one after ours.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. How many do you think we should have? What would be—the last question on that would be, what would be the optimum number that we should have to be able to have enough to be deployed?
Dr. BLACKWELL. Yes, ma’am. I have got a bit of an interest in MED–1 just because our charge—we received grant funding from
the Department of Homeland Security to build this as a prototype. Our charge was to build something different than a tent, and that is something that was aesthetically pleasing. You as a physician know that a tent looks like a tent, smells like a tent and leaks like a tent.

Mrs. Christensen. It was not aesthetically pleasing. We did what we had to do.

Dr. Blackwell. Yes, ma’am. It was probably very functional at the time. What we did is create an environment that would be pleasing to patients, No. 1, that anybody that has just suffered a disaster——

When we rolled into Mississippi, there were 150 refugee families living on hot asphalt 7 days after the storm with no health care; and so many of these had chronic conditions, as you can imagine. When we rolled in and set up, they were in an emergency department. It looked like a hospital. It was clean like a hospital, and it wasn’t a tent.

No. 1 for the patients, No. 2 for the healthcare providers, physicians, nurses, allied help that don’t work in those austere environments. We want them to feel comfortable, that they are not worried about leakage coming down. But, literally, after 30 seconds after you are in this, we think that you forget that you are in a tractor trailer. It looks like a hospital.

So we think we have accomplished our mission on what Homeland Security asked us to do and that was create something different and prototype it and see if it is something that can be used.

Which brings us to the next, should it be used in a mass gathering venue? I think absolutely. It will raise the level of care.

Most mass—not most but many mass gathering venues, depending on the level of care they are providing, might just be Band-Aid stations or first aid—Boy Scout first-aid-type procedures. What we do at Lowe’s Motor Speedway and Bank of America, we try very hard to keep people on-site. We don’t want to separate them from their family or friends because that is a repatriation issue. So we provide a higher level of care.

But using a MED–1 does several things. It raises the level of care for patrons that are visiting those. It prepares you for a mass gathering event, should a terrorist incident actually occur; and it provides training for your staff that when the river does rise or when the terrorist incident does occur, your staff is ramped up and trained on that unit.

Do I think they need to be across the United States? Yes, ma’am. We have proven it. We think it is what is needed today. I would say start in every FEMA region across the United States and expand it from there.

Mrs. Christensen. That is what I was thinking, to the regions.

Sergeant McCartney, could you speak to the impact of handling numerous events that are happening at one time across the State or a big city? Earlier—I think you were here—the New York folks particularly talked about having a number of things happening on any given one day in New York City. Can you speak to that at all?

Sergeant McCarty. Yes, ma’am. One of the things that California does and through the Large Stadium Initiative—and I have to say, the first responders in all the communities in California and
I am sure across the United States are the real doers of all these mass gathering events. What they do especially is they work together in a unified and ICS structure. That is how they manage those big mass gathering events or multiple events within a community.

One of the ways we recognize that and one of the ways we help with that in the Office of Homeland Security is the fact that we do a State-wide exercise where we bring all three regions together at the same time in different parts of the State and say, this just occurred. They, through mutual aid, through operational areas, work through up to the State and to the Federal, depending on the needs, to manage that type of event.

Last year, in 2007, we did use a large stadium mass gathering event which happened in the coastal region on the Bay Area, San Jose. It happened in the inland region in the Stockton—middle of the country—middle of the State, I should say, and then in the southern region down in the Anaheim area where all three areas were impacted by mass gathering events during a day. Each local first responder had to come in using unified command ICS structure and how they work through a problem, along with emergency medical systems, fire, private partners and dealt with the catastrophic events. So, through the training and exercising, it really works that way.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. May I ask just a real quick question, Mr. Chairman?

To Mr. Reynolds, in the training that you listed—this is just a real brief question—you listed “verbal judo”. What is that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, ma’am. It is sometimes known as tactical communication, also. A gentleman named Dr. George Thompson wrote a textbook on it. It is used a lot within law enforcement. You are probably familiar with it.

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Very familiar with it.

Mr. REYNOLDS. There is a version for teachers, also. It is a way of talking to people and de-escalating situations. There was a time in our past when we thought that the way to handle things was to increase numbers and, you know, force on force and that type of thing. That wasn’t the solution. The solution was to de-escalate it and to prevent it from getting worse. Given the option of talking to somebody into leaving and going hands-on with them, I would rather use my brain every time.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

I have a couple other questions that I would like to throw out. Mr. Reynolds, one of the challenges in any kind of potential situation is the ability for people to communicate with each other. Since you are in a private setting, are you allowed to have the ability to communicate with local law enforcement on their radio frequencies?

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is an excellent question.

There are a couple different ways to look at that. We do have one of the police base radios and one of their handheld radios within our dispatch center. Yes, we are. We have direct ring-down lines to the local police department that, we pick it up, it goes straight
to their dispatch. We have unlisted phone numbers to their dispatch area. We have a great communication center with the local police department.

Chairman THOMPSON. So with real-time communication though, it is like a relay system or something like that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Absolutely. We pick it up. Their dispatch knows it is us on the other end. We know it is them. It is a direct call line to them.

Chairman THOMPSON. Was that difficult to work out, to get the ability to have a radio?

Mr. REYNOLDS. No. I started working for Mall of America in 1996, and we have had it ever since I started, before I started. We have continued to make improvements on that along the way.

Chairman THOMPSON. Sergeant McCartney, while you are working with the LSI initiative, have you seen that interoperability challenge?

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. It is certain challenges in certain areas, depending on interoperability in the local area. But for the most part in California that has been the huge component of getting ourselves better prepared. Law enforcement, fire, EMS, private partners, especially private partners in college stadiums which have mostly law enforcement first responder assistance during those venues.

Some colleges in California have police departments that are actually the police for that university. Some other colleges don't. So in some of the stadiums in some of the other areas they used first responders to assist in that. In either/or, with first responders being there or the private police or the police department from the university, they can work together. Quite frankly, they are retired from the police department in the city is usually how they build the police department in the university. So they do work together to make sure that if there is a problem anywhere on one of those sites that local first responders can talk to each other and talk to them to get the best resources in to take care of the problem.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

Mr. Lungren.

Mr. LUNGREN. Following up on that, Mr. Chairman. We haven't solved the interoperability problem Nation-wide. We haven't solved it here with the Capitol Police, as a matter of fact. We are working on that in another committee. But as I understand it looking at the technology, we don't have automatically compatible systems. There are patches.

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Correct.

Mr. LUNGREN. I have seen the vehicles that can come in. As long as you have someone who really knows what they are doing, they can patch one through to the other and it almost is instantaneous.

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Right.

Mr. LUNGREN. I presume that is part of the efforts that you have ongoing?

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Yes, Congressman. What we do in the Sacramento area—I can speak to that in California as much as Los Angeles area in the southern region and the Bay Area. There are multiple communication vans or vehicles that are out traveling through local areas in California. Through those vehicles, just like
the Congressman stated, a gentleman or woman who is very knowledgeable in that activity can go in there and I can bring—the three of us could have three different radios from three different places, walk into this facility, hand them our radios. They get them back and the three of us are now best friends because we can all talk.

I am sure in the Carolinas and I am sure in Minnesota it is the same as far as that type of response when it comes to those type of vehicles and the knowledge those people have.

Mr. LUNGREN. I just want to make sure that as we are moving forward to the interoperability solution, which we are not at, even this many years after 9/11, we don’t forget what I call the interim fix, which I call these mobile patch units. I just want to make sure that if something comes up in the mean time where we decide that there is an interoperability problem immediately that we make sure that those kinds of fixes can be made and funds can be directed to that. I was just asking those of you as experts whether that makes sense. I mean, is that technology out there? Are you using it now? Should we make sure that that is available as we look to the ultimate solution, the better solution where I think we are going to get but it is going to be a number of years?

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. I think it is very important very quickly to go off of what was talked about in the first panel, mutual aid. It is very important to have that connectability with those other departments. Because during mutual aid, as we all know, we are bringing in resources from faraway places to assist us. Fires in California have been astronomical, and we require help from other States. So it is nice when we can bring those people over and we have that opportunity to communicate so we can handle those catastrophic events in California at least.

Mr. LUNGREN. I was just thinking, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Canadian Mounted Police coming down and assisting.

Chairman THOMPSON. Right.

Mr. LUNGREN. We wouldn’t necessarily have them on the same frequency as some of the others. But I know if we have one of those vehicles, I know it is a possibility. It is kind of the flexibility and agility that we need to build into the system, as opposed to rigidity.

Chairman THOMPSON. If the gentleman would yield. One of the problems with that is how do we plan for the agility? Because everybody wants their own piece of equipment. If we have to buy mobile command centers for everybody who has a unit to deploy, then we won’t have many other resources to push toward the problem.

One of the other problems associated with this, too, is our vendors have been very strategic in going out and convincing some less sophisticated departments that all they need to do is buy a new system. Well, that new system is fine for that unit. If it is a police system but they can’t communicate with the fire, you all have stovetopped that communication.

So you are absolutely correct. The temporary piece is how can we patch everyone in with these units. Ultimately, from a technology standpoint we just have to be able to move it even further. But that has been one of our real, real problems.

I yield back.

Mr. LUNGREN. The other thing is, I have been reading Dwight Eisenhower’s memoirs from World War II called Crusade in Eu-
rope; and it is amazing as you pick up insights into leadership and so forth.

One of the things that he points out, and Stephen Ambrose writing about World War II did, the success of the American Armed Forces was attributable to many things but one of them was the creativity of the average GI, the sergeant. They give example after example where they did things that weren’t planned, but they responded.

I guess if I could just ask one question, my last question would be this: How do we ensure that in all the planning that you do that we still allow for that creativity, that we still allow for someone to figure out the answer to a question that you didn’t really fully map out beforehand? In other words, are we assured that within these plans—all the planning and cooperation that we have, that there is enough left there that someone with a spark of creativity can respond to a situation as opposed to—well, you know, I got the Director from DHS which came out to the Office of Homeland Security down to us, and we figured out this thing at the Mall of America, and that is the way we are going to do it. Is there a way to ensure that that maintains itself, that possibility of creative response to an unanticipated problem?

Dr. BLACKWELL. Congressman, on the medical side of things, you raise a great issue. Where would we be if we didn’t have that? I would simply say, every deployment that we go on, we learn something else. The key to our success is after-action planning. We debrief on the mission. We spend a lot of time around the table and say, what did we do right? What did we do wrong? How can we make it better?

We learned lots of lessons after Katrina, we learned a lot of lessons after Mardi Gras, and we utilized those lessons in improving our system. The radio communication you just mentioned, we realized we were dealing with multiple ambulance services coming in, bringing us patients and we had no way to communicate with them. Now we have UHF, VHF, 800 megahertz radios, and a ham radio and a communications officer that travels with us and that mixing box that makes all that happen.

We have learned those lessons, and we have gotten creative every time we deploy. That is what is so vital in all this, and that is why I think using our asset for mass gathering venues—every time you deploy that, you are going to learn something else and make your program better.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you.

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. I think also, in law enforcement, it is very much the same way as it is in medical and fire as far as creativity. The first-line folks, the folks that are doing the job every day have valuable information when it comes to how to solve problems and do certain things. Leadership, yes, definitely is a process of that. But I think it is the leaders—and I can speak for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department in the sense that we allow those people to make those creative decisions. We test those things. We exercise; and again we also, through after-action reporting and learning, we learn new things. When we learn new things, we develop new programs, policies, procedures.
As you know, we have the air show that comes to Sacramento. I am the traffic commander for that entire event.

Mr. LUNGREN. You have improved.

Sergeant McCARTNEY. We have improved over the last 2 years.

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that. It is not too far from where I live. The lines are shorter.

Sergeant McCARTNEY. We do a lot of creative thinking, planning and using our first-line responders to help us make those decisions and work with us to find better ways to fix whatever the problem may be.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Whether you are doing a real scenario or a real situation or a training exercise, again, one of the keys is to quickly have after-action reports after it. So often when people are done with these, they see the situation as being done and they want to leave. You have to gather them quickly, put pride aside, and if you had some shortfalls, you have got to point those out and, again, put pride aside at all levels, like you were discussing. It can’t just be the command level. It has got to be the person on the ground, getting the boots muddy, who has got to be able to give you input and what they saw going right and what they saw going wrong or else you are not going to make a difference, you are not going to improve.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your excellent presentations to the committee and again for the service all of you do for our country. We appreciate it.

I think I speak for the entire committee. Our commitment is to do all we can to make sure that the planning, the equipment, and the resources at the Federal level get pushed down in concert with working with State and locals and the private sector to see that mass gatherings are as safe as any other venue in this country. Thank you again.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR COLONEL ROBERT B. STEPHAN, USAF (RET.), ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. What are the challenges unique to those mass gathering events that are not considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs)?

Answer. Similar to challenges for an NSSE, specific challenges for non-NSSEs vary from one event to another. There is no direct Federal funding mechanism for non-NSSE mass gathering events. When local event sponsors/planners do not have the necessary resources to overcome specialized equipment and manpower (security and emergency response) challenges, they must first exhaust the mutual assistance agreements they share with their neighboring localities. If these agreements are implemented and the event planners still face the challenge of additional resource shortfalls, they may choose to request Federal support as needed to fill a particular gap they have identified, such as adequate maritime security or airspace security coverage. Other examples could be a need for specialized radiological detection equipment or bio sensors beyond their local and neighboring resources and capabilities. In such cases, many individual Federal agencies and departments that comprise the SEWG may be able to supplement local gaps and shortfalls if it is in keeping with their core mission areas and responsibilities. Direct requests from the localities is one way to determine the level of Federal assistance that may be required; the application of SEAR levels to all special events is another (automated) way to determine the likely level of Federal assistance that may be required.

Question 2. What additional resources do you think are necessary to help secure the venues that host mass gatherings that are not considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs), from whom, and why? What additional contributions are you/Infrastructure Protection prepared to make to improve security at these venues?

Answer. While the responsibility for securing non-NSSE events resides primarily with the local authorities, local planners can request Federal support from the Federal agencies in their area, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. These authorities are responsible for developing their own Special Event Plans. The coordination conducted on behalf of the SEWG does not provide for Federal operational oversight of member organizations, nor does the Federal Coordinator have operational oversight of Federal organizations during an event. As your question implies, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP), other DHS Components and SEWG member agencies are in a position to support local planners, if their core mission calls for such support.

Question 3. How can the Department of Homeland Security, State, territorial, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector work together better to ensure public health, safety, and security for mass gatherings of all levels?

Answer. The continued participation and engagement of each State Homeland Security Advisor and their S/L/T/T planners in the annual DHS special event data call is of vital importance to strengthening the Federal-State working relationship that can solve resource and capability gaps and therefore better ensure the public health, safety, and security for mass gatherings of all levels.

The information from this annual special event data call allows the Department to ensure that all of the entered events are accurately assessed, rated and communicated to the Federal community for overall situational awareness and, when warranted, signal the need for direct Federal support to occur. The State Homeland Security Advisors, OPS and the SEWG are open to suggestions and feedback from our partner data call users to ensure a consistent, reliable and trouble free entry of events experience by all of the data call system users. In addition to the data call itself, OPS works closely with the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs to
craft special event program messages to the Homeland Security Advisors during the year and to communicate whenever necessary via written correspondence and by hosting joint tele-conference calls with the States.

Question 4. How do the Operations Coordination Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Risk Management Analysis, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Grants Program Directorate (now sitting in FEMA) interact? Short of Secretary Chertoff, who is responsible for coordinating the activities of these various entities that all have something to do with mass gatherings?

Answer. The Federal Government coordination mechanism for non-NSSE Special Events is the Special Event Working Group. While concentrating on SEAR level 1–2 events, the SEWG, which consists of over 50 Federal Departments, Agencies and DHS components, is also a mechanism for coordinating and interaction on all non-NSSE Special Events. The agencies noted above are all members of the SEWG.

Question 5. We have observed and heard from Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector personnel that planning efforts are often disconnected from other activities (such as training, exercises, standard setting, and the identification and communication of lessons learned), even within the Department of Homeland Security. What is being done, will be done, and/or can be done to better integrate these efforts?

Answer. Following Hurricane Katrina, the President and Congress directed DHS to conduct a Nation-wide plan review. The results of that review, which were provided to Congress, included a series of recommendations to address how planning should be more closely synchronized with other elements of the preparedness cycle (e.g. training, equipping, evaluating, assessing, and corrective actions). Since then, Federal, State, tribal and local governments have made significant progress in modernizing emergency planning and ensuring it serves as the foundation for preparedness activities. The National Response Framework clearly identifies the value of planning in Chapter IV. The President issued Annex I (National Planning) HSPD–8 in December 2007.

The Integrated Planning System (IPS) will formally establish a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning that will facilitate the integration of planning efforts across multiple levels of government and link planning to other preparedness activities. Efforts directed by IPS will provide planning guidance to Federal departments and agencies at the national and regional level and examine possible approaches for a long-term evolution to a national planning system. IPS will also translate policies, strategies, and planning guidance into a family of strategic, operational, and tactical plans, fostering integration and synchronization with State, local, and tribal officials, to include linkages with Comprehensive Preparedness Guide efforts.

The newly updated FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, CPG 101 (A guide for all-hazard emergency operations planning for State, territorial, and local governments), provide guidance about emergency operations planning to State, local, territorial, and tribal governments. The Guide provides emergency managers and other emergency services personnel with recommendations on how to address the entire planning process, from forming a planning team, through writing and maintaining the plan, to executing the plan. It also encourages emergency managers to follow a process that addresses all of the hazards that threaten their jurisdiction through a suite of plans connected to a single, integrated emergency operations plan (EOP). Additionally, CPG 101 incorporates concepts that come from disaster research and day-to-day experience. The Guide is part of a larger series of emergency planning related CPGs published by FEMA. Follow-on guides will provide detailed information about planning considerations for different response functions and hazards.

The 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) mandated the transfer of certain DHS preparedness functions to FEMA. As part of this transition, FEMA created the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) with a mission of unifying DHS’ preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery missions. Since 2007, NPD has overseen the coordination and development of the capabilities and tools necessary to prepare for terrorist incidents and natural disasters. NPD is working closely with the disaster operations directorate on implementation of the IPS and planning integration and synchronization with State, territorial, local and tribal governments.

The IPS and CPG documents are driving the development of planning curricula at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), as well as planning instruction for Federal planners. EMI operates within the National Integration Center (NIC), which develops, manages, and coordinates all homeland security training, external education, exercise, and lessons learned programs.
The FEMA National Exercise Division (NED) supports an all-hazard, capabilities-based approach to exercises. Exercises are designed and facilitated to address identified needs and underdeveloped capabilities at the Federal, State, local, and tribal level of government. Each exercise is targeted to a jurisdiction’s needs or to exercise previously untested/under-tested capabilities, including those capabilities that address hazards specific to a mass gathering event.

Through the Regional Exercise Support Program (RESP), the NED has delivered or scheduled 72 exercises for State and local communities in fiscal year 2008. Of those exercises, the following exercises represent a sample of exercises with scenarios related to supporting planning relative to a mass gathering event:

- **Loudoun Speedway (NASCAR).**—Facilitated in Loudoun, New Hampshire, this Table Top Exercise (TTX) occurred in March 2008. The exercise validated command and control plans for a small town (a population less than 5,000) that has a NASCAR track, which can become overwhelmed on NASCAR weekends. The town depends heavily on State/mutual aid and, because New Hampshire is a strong commonwealth, the State cannot become involved in an emergency event unless requested by local officials.

- **Martinsville Speedway (NASCAR).**—Facilitated in Martinsville, Virginia, this TTX occurred in May 2008 and was the third in a series of building block exercises supported by NED. This exercise is a good example of how to use the building block approach, through workshops and seminars, to develop plans and then validated plans in the TTX. The State and local officials have indicated that they will request a full-scale exercise through RESP in fiscal year 2009.

- **Olympic Trials Preparation.**—Facilitated in Portland, Oregon, this Functional Exercise was held in June 2008 to validate plans and procedures related to the pending Olympic Trials in Oregon.

- **Baltimore Ravens Stadium (M&T Bank Stadium).**—This Full Scale Exercise will be facilitated in Baltimore, Maryland, on August 2008. The exercise will test evacuation, security, and decontamination plans and procedures. The exercise will utilize approximately 1,000 volunteers for a scenario involving a “dirty bomb” inside the stadium.

- **Presidential Candidate Debate at Hofstra University.**—This exercise, scheduled for September, 2008 in New York, will support the local emergency preparedness community with their preparations for the actual debate, scheduled for October 2008.

**Question 6.** Committee staff members have visited a number of venues that feature mass gatherings that are not declared National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs), and have witnessed the presence of FEMA, ICE, and other organizations from the Department of Homeland Security. Please provide a list of all organizations from the Department of Homeland Security that provide support at mass gatherings that are not National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs). What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to institutionalize such support at these types of gatherings?

**Answer.** Some DHS organizations that have participated in past SEAR Level 1 & 2 special events include the Immigration Customs Enforcement Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Health Affairs, the United States Coast Guard, The United States Secret Service and the Transportation and Security Administration among others. Local planners are always able to solicit Federal support from the local Federal agencies represented in their area, if the local planners feel such support is needed, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. DHS OPS continues to support special events and mass gatherings through interagency coordination efforts. Formalized procedures for the Special Events Working Group are in development. The formal procedures, when completed, will develop processes for SEAR Level 1 & 2 special event support to include air space security procedures, joint threat assessments, joint risk assessments, Federal Coordinator designations, Integrated Federal Support Plans and other inherently Federal roles that cover the spectrum of prevention, protection, response and recovery activities. A copy of a list of all members of the SEWG is attached for your information.*

**Question 7.** How have you involved high-level decisionmakers at the Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local levels personally in planning efforts? What are you doing to improve the processes by which this should occur?

**Answer.** From a Federal perspective, the SEWG (for non-NSSE events) is the established planning process. All high level decisionmakers in the Federal organizations represented on the SEWG endorse these planning efforts.

DEA that the SEWG have made considerable efforts to identify special events through the annual special event data call and through continued outreach to the

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* See Exhibit 1, Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., page 18.
Homeland Security Advisors of each State. During the annual mass teleconference between DHS OPS and the State Homeland Security Advisors there is an open forum to discuss any feedback to improve the data call program. Outside of this call, the HSAs remain in regular contact with the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs, a key working partner and member of the SEWG.

The data call process enables any event considered important enough to Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local planners to be easily entered electronically for ultimate evaluation by the SEWG co-chairs and member organizations. Electronic submission and tabulation eliminates the introduction of favoritism based upon any pre-existing relationships between local high level decisionmakers and DHS program administrators.

On-going relationships at the local level between local event planners and local Federal field offices enable specific requests for assistance to be made to specific Federal organizations at any time in keeping with core mission responsibilities in the communities they serve.

Question 8. Mr. Thompson has said that the Department of Homeland Security must provide additional guidance to the public and private sector about what to do when the National Threat Level changes. What are you doing to get guidance out about what mass gathering venues should do when the National Threat Level changes—especially at mass gatherings that are not National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs)?

Answer. DHS, in conjunction with the FBI and other affected Federal agencies, uses a coordinated notification process when the national threat level changes. This process involves notification to appropriate Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local officials, and if appropriate, the American public. The guidance is often in the form of a national advisory or sector-specific area, so it may not be specific or applicable to all individual special event venues in every locality Nation-wide.

The listing of current and upcoming special events is monitored by the National Operations Center (NOC) at DHS. Should a change to the National Threat Level occur and specifically and disproportionately affect a particular State or city, the NOC may contact the State’s Homeland Security Advisor regarding the event and provide? establish mutual? [sic] situational awareness. In addition to the Homeland Security Advisor of the affected State/s or areas, other agencies, such as the FBI, may engage and collaborate further with local high level decisionmakers. Any ultimate determinations about whether an event should be canceled or not is made at the local level in tandem with event organizers. Local/city managers would engage pre-determined local communication mechanisms to announce any changes to the local public and/or event attendees.

Question 9. We applaud the Department’s willingness to work with the non-Federal Government and private sector to develop planning guidance. However, we question the efficiency of the Department’s processes to do so. For example, evacuation planning guidance has been returned by the private sector to the Department six times. What can be done to make these processes more efficient?

Answer. To say that the document was returned to the Department six times is misleading and does not properly illustrate the level of Federal and private-sector collaboration that was involved in the development of the product. The document was developed over a 1-year period between the 2007 and 2008 National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) Security Summits.

From the outset of the project, the release date for the final document was set for the January 2008 NASCAR Security Summit. The development process included an initial scoping meeting with the NASCAR Security Director. Two additional teleconferences were held to finalize an initial draft. NASCAR had the opportunity to review this draft document before and after the inaugural "dry run" visit to Lowes Motor Speedway in Concord, NC, during the Coca Cola 600. The initial draft was intended to be a foundation document of common evacuation practices.

After the Coca Cola 600, DHS, NASCAR track officials, and local first responders attended a validation meeting to ensure that the document correctly captured the NASCAR racing environment and recommended realistic processes for evacuating a NASCAR facility. It was also suggested during this session that DHS refine the initial draft to reflect lessons learned and prepare for the three unique track type visits. DHS provided drafts before and after each visit to the unique track types of Talladega, AL (large track), Infineon, CA (road course), and Milwaukee Mile, WI (small track). The draft document was shared before each visit to ensure that all attendees (i.e., DHS personnel, NASCAR track personnel, State and local first responders, and other Federal partners) had a similar foundation for the 2-day sessions at each track. These sessions were carefully planned to ensure that the document captured the uniqueness of each track type. The document was reviewed after the visits to the three unique track types to ensure that it reflected the wide span
of NASCAR facility types and was ready to be presented at the January 2008 NASCAR Security Summit.

We will continue to engage with the sectors and stakeholders to identify ways to improve the process.

**Question 10.** How has Infrastructure Protection worked with the Office of Health Affairs to address the health concerns that could arise from mass gatherings? How—if at all—has policy and programmatic input from the Office of Health Affairs been incorporated into your products—including guidance to commercial facilities and other venues where mass gatherings occur?

**Answer.** The Office of Infrastructure Protection is the Commercial Facilities (CF) Sector-Specific Agency. We have worked with the Office of Health Affairs, and through that Office, with the Department of HHS, which has the lead for health and public health under HSPD–7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, to address health concerns that could arise from mass gatherings—most notably in its work in accordance with the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan. This important work has been accomplished through a series of briefings, workshops, and conferences with the CF stakeholders representing each of its eight sub-sectors. Information provided through these venues is representative of intradepartmental and interagency coordination and collaboration to support CF Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Business planning. Examples include identification of essential functions and personnel, targeted layered containment strategies, supply chain management issues, infection control information, etc.

**Question 11.** We are extremely concerned about the ability of our States, territories, tribes, and localities to respond to mass casualties—which could certainly occur if a mass gathering were to be hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How has Infrastructure Protection taken the requirements for medical surge into account—especially considering the inability of most hospitals to take on many more patients, as they are at top capacity on a daily basis right now?

**Answer.** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to ensuring that the Federal response, whether it is a medical, environmental, or law enforcement response, is well-coordinated with State and local officials to ensure a seamless and integrated response. The role of the Federal Government is to supplement the State and local efforts, and to provide assistance when it is needed.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the primary responsibility for building and enhancing medical surge capacity. DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) works closely with HHS, which in turn works with State and local jurisdictions to assist in developing inter-State and multi-State agreements to provide supplies, hospital beds, medical professionals during a catastrophic event. Also, HHS has response assets such as the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) which partners with the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs for the care and transport of disaster patients. DHS constitutes the fourth partner in the NDMS consortium. These partnerships are important to ensure medical surge capacity.

The Office of Infrastructure Protection works with the OHA through active participation on the Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) for the Health and Public Health and Emergency Services Sectors, organized under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework. Both offices work with private sector representatives through those sectors’ Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC). This partnership framework supports coordination and collaboration with the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to address the issues that affect our Nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and respond to a mass casualty event.

**Question 12.** During the hearing, Mr. Etheridge asked Assistant Secretary Stephan about how the Department of Homeland Security has been working with State and local governments and with the private sector to develop planning guidance for mass gathering events. The Assistant Secretary responded that some guidance and guidelines had been developed and “pushed out the door.” Chairman Thompson subsequently asked Assistant Secretary Stephan if he could provide the committee with lists of where the guidance has gone out versus where the guidance is not yet out. Please provide those lists here, along with any necessary qualifying information.

**Answer.** Guidance documents currently provided to the Commercial Facilities (CF) Sector are shared with our various critical infrastructure partners at the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) level. Some guidance is shared with the entire SCC (e.g., the Pandemic Preparedness Guidance), which then shares it with members of its sub-sectors, be it one or more associations or a single group of security chiefs with assets at one or more locations. Guidance developed in close collaboration with private-sector partners (e.g., the Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports Leagues).
is shared only with the participating sub-sector’s chairperson, who then distributes
the document to the sub-sector’s membership. Some guidance (e.g., the Infrastructure
Protection Report Series Papers) is shared with all Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources stakeholders at the Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, and pri-
vate-sector levels during the execution of Infrastructure Protection outreach initia-
tives, private sector security training and awareness programs, and vulnerability as-
sements. Last, guidance developed for a specific organization (e.g., the NASCAR
Mass Evacuation Planning Guide) is shared with the specific organization, which, in
turn, shares the guidance within its membership. Current guidance documents
provided to the CF Sector that pertains to events of mass gathering are:
• NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide;
• Protective Measures Guide (Sports Leagues Sub-Sector);
• Bomb-Making Material Awareness Program;
• Commercial Facilities Pandemic Preparedness Guideline;
• Infrastructure Protection Report Series Papers for:
  • Racetracks (Horse and Dog);
  • Stadiums and Arenas;
  • Large Public Outdoor Gatherings (i.e., parades, fairs, festivals, rallies, flea
    markets, demonstrations, concerts, and celebrations);
  • Convention Centers;
  • Motor Race Tracks;
  • Performance Venues (i.e., theaters, movie theaters, concert halls, auditoriums,
    amphitheaters, and community playhouses);
• Hotels;
• Casinos;
• Office Buildings;
• Shopping Malls;
• Apartments.
Future guidance developed for the CF Sector will be shared as described above.
Guidance documents in development that pertain to events of mass gathering are
Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Stadiums, and Protective Measures Guide (Re-
tail, Outdoor Events, and Lodging Sub-Sectors).

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR VICE ADM-
IRAL ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG (RET.), DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDI-
NATION AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Does the Operations Coordination Division of the Department of
Homeland Security provide the same level of monitoring for all events receiving a
Special Events Assessment Rating? Please explain.
Answer. The Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) is broken up into 5 levels.
The levels are a starting point for further coordination and monitoring by the
DHS and the Special Event Working Group (SEWG) member agencies. All events,
level 1–5, are monitored by the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) for Situa-
tional Awareness.
DHS OPS and the SEWG further coordinate the Federal support and monitoring
of events that are identified as SEAR Level 1–2. Special events designated SEAR
Level 1–2 signify events which involve close monitoring by the National Operations
Center due to their scale, complexity and the large degree of Federal resources, sup-
port and manpower allocated, including the appointment a Federal Coordinator by
the DHS Secretary and the issuance of an Integrated Federal Support Plan docu-
ment. SEAR Level 3–5 special events are monitored by the NOC as well for situa-
tional awareness purposes, but due to their minimal or non-use of Federal re-
sources, they fall below the threshold of the appointment of a Federal Coordinator
and they do not require an Integrated Federal Support Plan.

Question 2. In your opinion, why do States not apply for Special Event Assess-
ment Ratings for many of the mass gathering events that occur throughout the
year? Is the application process prohibitive?
Answer. “Applying for a SEAR rating” mischaracterizes the process for obtaining
a SEAR rating. The only way a special event is given a SEAR rating is by partici-
pation in the DHS coordinated Special Event Working Group (SEWG) data call,
which is conducted each year in the fall.
Prior to the opening of the yearly special event data call a mass State Homeland
Security Advisors (HSA) tele-conference is convened with assistance and coordina-
tion provided by the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs. The purpose of the
mass HSA tele-conference is to notice the upcoming DHS special event data call for
the new year, welcome and encourage participation of every State in the process,
engage active discussion as to any difficulties that are occurring, provision of on the
spot technical support to system questions and last to open a yearly forum for any suggested improvements for system users. The special event data call that quickly follows is open to all State/local/territorial/tribal (S/L/T/T) Planners. Further participation within the State is coordinated directly through the State Homeland Security Advisors that participated on the teleconference kick-off call. Each HSA can encourage participation locally but there is no penalty for non-participation. Reasons for non-participation may include no forthcoming Federal funds to assist local special event planners and no anticipated need for Federal resource allocation to the special events in question.

The DHS/SEWG purpose for the data call is two-fold. First, the list compiled from the data call enables DHS and the Inter-Agency SEWG members to monitor activities and events around the Nation for situational awareness. Second, the iconic nature of SEAR Level 1–2 local events often requires considerable Federal support and coordination. All Federal support for these Level 1 & 2 events generally comes from the SEWG members’ operating budgets, and not State and local budgets. DHS and the SEWG have no leverage to compel S/L/T/T Planners to participate in the data call, yet many S/L/T/T participate and users entered approximately 4,000 events for 2008.

The data call itself is not a prohibitive process. A focus group of past S/L/T/T users is convened by DHS prior to the mass Homeland Security Advisors teleconference and the special events data call to discuss changes and their suggestions and comments. The Homeland Security Advisors are briefed in detail before the data call and asked to identify S/L/T/T personnel responsible for entering the events into the system. The entry of data itself is quite easy, using a web-based secure application, which includes helpful drop-down guidance boxes for individual assistance with many of the questions and also provides some examples of entries for new uses. This year, users who enter events in the data call will see the entire list of special events, as an added user benefit and situational awareness. If an event reaches the criteria warranting a Federal Coordinator or an Integrated Federal Support Plan (SEAR Level 1–2), the local elected official is notified by the Secretary.

Question 3. Do you believe that each mass gathering venue or event should have an emergency action plan? Do you believe that an emergency action plan should be required of each mass gathering venue or event that applies for a Special Event Assessment Rating? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes, the benefit of an emergency action plan to a special event planner is immeasurable. However, the lack of a plan or an insufficient plan may be an indication that a special event, usually an S/L/T/T event by definition, may require some type of Federal assistance or guidance. Accurate event data are crucial to the DHS data call process and enables the SEWG and DHS to identify and/or fill any gaps, if appropriate.

Many localities are achieving a common national standard by adopting the Incident Command System as part of their training and procedures on their own schedule. It is not the intent of the SEWG to dissuade event planners from access to the system based on whether or not they have achieved emergency action plans for all of their mass gatherings. The data call system does question each locality as to whether their event security and resources are met by their local existing capabilities. The capabilities question is one of many that help to determine an events SEAR Level; however, the SEWG, a Federal interagency mechanism, does not have the authority to actually mandate submission of emergency action plans or require them for events occurring in a local domain.

Question 4. Who is the individual responsible at the Department of Homeland Security for events designated as Non-National Security Special Events?

Answer. The Secretary of DHS has delegated programmatic, administrative and operational coordination of Special Events to Roger T. Rufe, Jr., Director of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS). The interagency Special Event Working Group (SEWG) is the coordination body for non-NSSEs, and the OPS Future Plans/Special Events Branch coordinates this entity.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR DR. THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Question 1. How do you (as head of emergency medical services, as Director for Medical Services at Lowe’s Motor Speedway in North Carolina, and Director for Medical Services for the Carolina Panthers games) gather and analyze health data for unusual trends at mass gatherings? If you do not do so, are you aware of anyone who does? How would you recommend this be done or done better?
Answer. A patient care report is generated for every patient encountered at each mass gathering venue covered. The reports are similar regardless of the type of mass gathering event. Reports are analyzed and specific data is entered into a secure database to track the number of patients encountered, types of injuries or illnesses, medical supplies used, and number of patients transported for further care. While this is a retrospective review of the activity and as such would not provide real-time information during an incident, our mass gathering venues are such that direct interoperable communications is maintained. Physicians and nurses staffing the Emergency Care Centers on-site would immediately be apprised of multiple patient encounters where similar signs or symptoms presented during a finite period of time.

I am unaware of how other stadiums, arenas, or race tracks conduct their medical or public health activities.

To improve our system, an electronic patient care reporting system that supports real-time downloading of patient information could expedite a system of epidemiologic surveillance. Perhaps the best scenario would be to activate Fusion Centers that include public health, hospitals, and emergency medical service staff so that intelligence-sharing of potential threats is enhanced. If a biological or chemical incident did indeed occur, this advanced knowledge would lessen the time for definitive diagnoses and treatment algorithms.

Question 2. What types of mobile hospitals do you think would be of most use at disasters involving large numbers of people—whether they occur at mass gatherings, or otherwise? What are your recommendations in this regard?

Answer. When Carolinas Medical Center received the Homeland Security Grant to design, construct, and deploy a mobile hospital, we set out to create a facility that is different from previous structures, specifically tents, which are often used as medical shelters at mass gathering events. Patients and healthcare workers alike should not have to endure the nuances of tents that leak, mildew, smell, and have size restrictions. The MED-1 design incorporates an esthetically-pleasing therapeutic environment such that one forgets that the infrastructure is a trailer shortly after entering. Just as important, the set-up time from site arrival until commencing patient care is approximately 20 minutes. Patients inflicted by a disaster should not have to wait hours or days for a medical shelter or structure to be erected.

Using MED–1 mobile hospitals at mass gathering events would accomplish several objectives.

1. The equipment would be used on a regular basis keeping it operational and functional (important for medical devices).
2. Staff would be afforded the training opportunity to refresh their knowledge and skills on the set-up, equipment, patient care, and movement processes associated with a mobile facility. Thus, retention and recall, along with core competencies are maximized when a disaster does occur.
3. The mobile hospital would continue to store current medical supplies and pharmaceuticals so that when an unexpected incident occurs, the unit is always in a state of readiness to respond.

Question 3. You have deployed the MED–1 mobile hospital three times following natural disasters. Do you feel that the MED–1 unit could be used for mass gatherings and if so, should more of these units be available for use or deployment across the country?

Answer. Absolutely. A MED–1 unit could be deployed to any mass gathering venue to provide routine medical care before, during, and after the event. Should a disaster occur, the asset is deployed and staffed, ready to begin triage and treatment of patients, and would serve to immediately augment the local healthcare delivery system to prevent excessive hospital surge and to preserve resources for more critical patients.

Question 4. We understand that MED–1 has been deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina to the State of Mississippi, and that the hospital is currently deployed to Indiana to help provide emergency medical services after the floods. How have your experiences responding to disasters with this mobile hospital helped you provide support at mass gatherings, and vice versa?

Answer. The three MED–1 deployments have provided valuable feedback and information to improve our system of response and care delivery. Following each deployment, After-Action Reports and debriefing sessions serve to identify gaps in our system and targeted areas for improvement. The third design version of the MED–1 unit is currently under construction and incorporates each of the identified improvements in infrastructure that were noted from these deployments. All design modifications serve to address patients in any mass casualty incident regardless of a mass gathering or natural disaster.
Question 5. What sorts of detectors for weapons of mass destruction and agents of terrorism do you believe are necessary to be used at mass gatherings for which the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, and/or other Federal agencies do not bring in their own detectors?

Answer.

Chemical
Current and periodic training for staff in recognizing clinical signs and symptoms of chemical nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary agents, blood agents, and riot-control agents would be the best preparation for recognizing a chemical agent release.

Biological
The Biowatch air samplers would likely assist in determining what particular agent was released if multiple patients presented simultaneously. Again, the key for any biological event will be the syndromic surveillance and advanced intelligence activities. The SMART Tickets (Litmus paper) for biological detection have high false positive rates and would not be useful unless they show a negative reaction.

Radiological
While the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) film badge and dosimeters records the quantity of radiation to which one is exposed, a Geiger-Muller tubes would be useful for surveying a scene to determine if it is safe to enter.

Question 6. What issues do you have with hand-held detectors for weapons of mass destruction and agents of terrorism—especially those being used by emergency medical services and other first responders in the mass gathering context?

Answer. As outlined above, the actual detectors that are available today are not particularly practical for first responder use, if biological detectors are setup in advance of an event and can provide direct, real-time information at the time of an agent release, this assists in planning for those mass casualties that would likely present days to weeks later. Public information would be important under such a scenario. Chemical agent detectors are very time-consuming to use and do not measure all of the specific chemicals that could be used. The radiological detectors are easy to use and easily deployable.

Question 7. What challenges have you faced in deploying your mobile hospital?

Answer. The main challenges we have faced are two-fold: (1) Sustainment funding to ensure readiness and (2) rapid deployment when the need arises.

Sustainment
Simply having a MED–1 mobile hospital does not translate to a unit being capable of responding. Supplies, pharmaceuticals, clinical engineering and preventative maintenance, generator maintenance, tractor and trailer maintenance, etc. are all required to keep the resource active. Maintenance staff, administrative oversight, and training are all cost-generating areas.

Deployment
When disasters strike and patients are suffering, all means and processes for medical assets to respond must be simplified and streamlined. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreement is in place to afford such processes; however, inordinate time periods plague this system. The three deployments have all been associated with contract negotiations between States, resulting in prolonged delays in our response.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND FOR DR. THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Question. Your job is to provide prehospital medicine, and it is clear that you are expert at doing so in a variety of environments. As the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I am particularly interested in emerging biological threats. Can you talk about how you would treat patients that have been attacked with a biological agent, such as weaponized anthrax, at a mass gathering occurring at either of the stadiums for which you serve as medical director? Do you feel that you have the right assets at your disposal to be able to adequately treat numerous patients—especially if you were told that there would be no evacuation, and that people would have to shelter in place? What would you need to deliver the adequate prehospital care in this context?

Answer. A specific pharmaceutical cache is required to provide the antibiotics or other countermeasures indicated for the specific biologic attack. Most large cities en-
gaged in Federal preparedness programs have prepackaged pharmaceuticals in strategic locations. These can be mobilized quickly and efficiently if the training component has been satisfied. If anthrax were disseminated, stockpiles of antibiotics (doxycycline or ciprofloxacin) would be required for initial treatment of exposed patients. If chemical nerve agents were released, the nerve agent antidotes (atropine and 2-pralidoxime chloride) would be required. Each of the pharmaceutical resources are stockpiled at our hospital facility.

The stockpiles of these agents are not sufficient to treat a population that would be present at our larger mass gathering events, e.g. Lowes Motor Speedway or Bank of America Stadium. A mechanism of triage would be required to identify those individuals who have the highest likelihood of survival and to provide comfort care to those noted to be moribund. To achieve the numbers of pharmaceuticals required, the Strategic National Stockpile of pharmaceuticals would need to be requested. The issue now becomes one of time. The request procedures, approval processes, mobilization, transportation, delivery, inventory, and distribution all are time-prohibitive to be completely effective unless the stockpile were within a few hours of the event. In such instances where prolonged times were inherent, there would need to be a facility for the sheltering in place that supports emergency medical care. The MED–1 mobile hospital provides such a platform. In the basic form, there are 14 beds capable of providing acute care. Expanding the awning system that extends from MED–1 unit to a full-scale general medical-surgical hospital will support up to 250 beds. Having this capability prevents surge capacity and keeps isolated/quarantine patients off-site while providing the acute and ambulatory and surgical care required during such conditions.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR SERGEANT SCOTT McCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

Question 1. What lessons have you learned as part of your work with large stadiums in California that could be applied to securing mass gatherings nationally?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

Question 2. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion Center to support your activities with the Large Stadium Initiative in California?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

Question 3. What partnerships have you seen (via the Large Stadium Initiative and other activities) that you think should be utilized at all venues?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

Question 4. How have you seen information shared with trusted non-Federal and even non-governmental (private sector)?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

Question 5. How have you seen State assets stretched to support mass gatherings? If so, how?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

Question 6. Would you speak to the impact of handling numerous events—including mass gatherings—in a State simultaneously?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND FOR SERGEANT SCOTT McCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

Question. You’ve done a great deal of work with large stadiums in California. To what extent have you addressed the biological threat to such venues? Have you exercised any biological scenarios? If you have not addressed this threat, can you talk about how you would?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MALL OF AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA

Question 1. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion Center to support your activities at the Mall of America in Minnesota?
Answer. Unfortunately there is no State Fusion Center in Minnesota. If the action directly pertains to Mall of America (such as a mall shooting) then the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN JAC) contacts me directly. If the information is not determined to impact me directly then it is filtered through the Bloomington Police
Department. The filtered information may be trends in terrorism that the sender does not see as being relevant to MOA. However, we use these trends to develop a list of possible methodologies and create associated suspicious indicators. It is difficult to generate suspicious indicators for our Risk Assessment and Mitigation (RAM) Team without adequate intelligence. Our RAM Team, which utilizes behavior profiling and other techniques to detect potential terrorist incidents, was the number one source of actionable intelligence in Minnesota for 2007. Due to changes in the past year, we can no longer submit information directly to the MN JAC. All of our reports now go through local law enforcement which delays or stops the report from reaching the necessary recipients. A cleaner line of communication (directly to the Minnesota JAC) would help Mall of America and the United States greatly.

**Question 2.** What partnerships have you seen (via the activities you participate in) that you think should be utilized at all venues?

**Answer.** We have many strong partnerships, most of which could be utilized by other mass gathering venues. These partnerships include local/Bloomington Police, Federal Air Marshalls, Airport Police, various Metro Area Police Departments, local County Sheriff (mostly for intelligence), 55th Civil Support Team, numerous K–9 units (Federal Protective Service, A.T.F., and the FBI (for peroxides to train our in-house K–9 teams), Minnesota ARNG (Military Intelligence, Joint Operations Center, etc.), Metropolitan Emergency Manager’s Association, Bloomington Fire Department, HSAS, Imulk Juchtam with International Consultants on Targeted Security (ICTS) for behavior profile training, and the International Association of Bomb Technician’s and Investigators.

**Question 3.** How have you seen information shared with trusted non-Federal and even non-governmental (private sector)?

**Answer.** We are an active member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (I am on the Executive Board), Tripwire (HSAS), the Security Management Daily publication (ASIS), ICEFISHX (MN JAC) which shares Law Enforcement Sensitive Information through local law enforcement. Information from private-to-private entity is created by developing strong relationships before the incident occurs. In emergency management it is well known that a crisis is no time to exchange business cards. Develop the contacts before the need whenever possible. There is a tool that is used by the Federal Marshall’s called the Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS). This allows for a searchable platform to determine if others in your area/industry are seeing the same trends as you are. It is used to validate, or mitigate concerns and show patterns. It can provide invaluable intelligence for both the end users and those echelons above that are developing national or global trends. Those that enter and retrieve data would be credentialed into the program. The private sector could benefit from a process similar to TISS and the cost would be minimal.

**Question 4.** Do you think that Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governmental support to private sector entities that host mass gatherings can be improved? If so, how?

**Answer.** Yes. It took Mall of America Security 7 years (2008) to gain access to classified information. Prior to that we had to hope for someone to forward information to us, but that was sporadic and spotty. For example, MN JAC would share information with Bloomington PD who in turn might share it with Mall of America. The private sector needs direct access to searchable intelligence. All money should be controlled by the private sector that it is designed to protect instead of at the determination of law enforcement, for example:

- Money for the private sector could help cover over time and temporary security positions needed during heightened alert levels. Currently the money is given to law enforcement and they determine when they need to provide overtime coverage. The person in charge of the venue should be making that determination.
- Federal intelligence programs should have open seats for the private sector to be represented.
- Federal training should be open to credentialed critical private sector groups. The private sector can pay for their own lodging and travel expenses. This would be utilizing seats that often go unfilled at government conducted training. This provides common language, an understanding of acceptable standards, and forms critical relationships prior to an incident.
- Federal grants could be used for equipment such as CBRN (monitoring & response), rescue equipment, K–9’s, CCTV and digital recording. These are all assets that protect the public and may aid in the recovery of evidence or the prosecution of those with harmful intentions.

**Question 5.** What could the Department of Homeland Security do better to help secure the public from terrorist attacks in facilities such as yours?

**Answer.** Information sharing is the key to our success.
• We would like access to verify ID’s (for nationals and non-nationals) and to verify that license plates are associated with the correct vehicle and not stolen.
• Access to a TISS-type system for same or similar incidents; a searchable database of suspicious or terrorist activity.
• Access to International Alien Query (IAQ) information. IAQ is currently available to law enforcement only. The IAQ is used to check an international traveler’s status in the United States and determine if they are properly registered to be in the United States.
• Ability to share ideas that are effective such as our RAM program. MOA has created several programs that we are quite proud of. I would like to share these programs with others in the industry and walk them through the hurdles we had to overcome.
• Assign Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Teams (aka: Intelligence and Information Teams) during major events to assist with identifying suspects; and be alert for pre-event; surveillance and rehearsal.
• Training and intelligence sharing.
• Mall of America will train other private entities or groups to be familiar with our RAM program. The training would be fee or minimal—I would simply ask for them to pay for their travel, lodging, and meals.

Question 6: Minneapolis/St. Paul is hosting the Republican National Convention this September, with a mass influx of people coming into the Twin Cities for over a week. How is the Mall of America preparing from a security standpoint, and how can the Federal Government be of assistance?

There are a number of areas that the Federal Government could be of assistance including:
• CCTV—Mall of America has a very developed camera system. We could use additional people to assist with monitoring these cameras during peak RNC times. Although we will always have at least two people assigned, it is difficult to actively monitor hundreds of cameras with a small group of people. If more people are assigned to our CCTV area it can turn from mostly reactive to a more proactive approach.
• Access to police operation’s and communication centers for real time information and answers about our assets. This will allow a better understanding of how we can assist law enforcement. We have our own K-9 department, limited chemical monitoring unit, and more. These assets may not be properly utilized if the responding officers don’t know they exist. This is more likely as law enforcement officers from throughout Minnesota are drawn together.
• Detection (radiological) equipment provided by the Department of Energy. This was provided the day before the RNC and provided another tool to use should a threat arise. We were treated as equals by those we trained with and the level of respect appreciated.
• Access to Federal training programs.
• Assigning R&S personnel to Mall of America—we would supply an office and communication center they could use as their base of operations.
• K-9 teams—we could use an additional four teams on site.
• Funding for MOA Security staff overtime.
• MOA owned chemical agent detector.
• Training with FBI, Bloomington Police Department and the ATF. We conducted many training exercises that ranged from reactions to protestors to WMD incidents. We were treated as equals by those we trained with and the level of respect appreciated.

Ways that we prepared for the Republican National Convention included:
• Restricted time-off for security staff.
• Purchased chemical detection equipment and trained staff for proper use.
• Conducted regular protest awareness briefs.
• Held regular protest intelligence meetings.
• Conducted in-house training to deal with the most likely scenarios that might occur during the RNC.

Questions from Honorable James R. Langevin of Rhode Island for Douglas Reynolds, Director of Security, Mall of America, Bloomington, Minnesota

Question. As a director of security at the Mall of America, you must be aware that there are numerous planning scenarios in which a biological agent such as Yersinia pestis—plague, is released at a popular mall. Please describe the steps you have taken to protect the Mall of America from biological threats such as this one?

Answer. There are a number of actions we have taken:
• There is restricted access to our ventilation systems including required security escorts to those areas that house our primary ventilation systems.
• We have a strong partnership with the 55th CST and done have done many studies and much training with them as well as the local fire and law enforcement agencies for WMD incidents.
• Our RAM offers routinely train on rehearsal, surveillance, and execution techniques associated with this threat.
• CCTV and door alarms are monitored 24/7—including primary ventilation access areas.
• We rely on intelligence and information-sharing—biological threats are generally slow to develop and recognize.
• In rapid incidents (i.e. Anthrax) we rely on recognizing an incident, isolating the area, and alerting the Bloomington Police Department as well as the State Duty Officer.
• We have stopped chasing the means, and look at intent instead—this is a specialty area of our RAM officers. Too often the U.S. counter-measures focus solely on the means (look for the weapon). The weapon can change and be almost anything; I hope that lesson was learned on 09/11/01 by most Americans. Although the means may change, it is hard to conceal intent. That is why we focus on intent. This is not to say we ignore means, it is just not viewed as the sole indicator.
• We utilize intelligence to track trends and techniques.
• For biological threats we rely heavily on other circles or aspects of a broader security plan to not let the suspect get this far.

Again, I thank you for this great honor and to be associated with your efforts to enhance the security of this great Nation.