REDEFINING SECURITY: 2000 AND BEYOND

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WAYNE C. THOMPSON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, CAF
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Air University
United States Air Force
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REDEFINING SECURITY: 2000 AND BEYOND

by

Wayne C. Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel, CAF

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Advisor: Colonel John C. Mollison, Jr.

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TITLE: Redefining Security: 2000 and Beyond

AUTHOR: Wayne C. Thompson, Lieutenant Colonel, CAF

The end of post-World War II, East-West ideological rivalry and military confrontation challenges mature and responsible nations to redefine security interests, objectives and strategies for the 21st century. Coherent security and defence policies must take into account an increasingly interdependent world whose future physical survival might well depend on preventing the proliferation and use of an increasingly lethal array of weapons of mass destruction. Traditional strategic thinking aimed at countering specific threats, including through nuclear deterrence and strategic defence, will appear increasingly anachronistic to a public bent on reaping "peace dividends" accruing from the end of the Cold War. This paper argues that mature and responsible nations have no logical or rational alternative but to lead the way toward more "cooperative" notions of security, based on the complementary principles of power control and war prevention. Nations will be secure to the extent they constrain purely unilateral military efforts and cooperate in the pursuit of mutual security within a suitable framework of internationally-binding agreements. Fortifying international justice with cooperative international military power, if necessary, is the ultimate goal of cooperative security, and the essence of a rational security paradigm for the twenty-first century.
Lieutenant Colonel Wayne C. Thompson, MVO, C.D., has been interested in international security affairs and defence policy development since he was assigned, from 1988-91, as Section Head of Conventional Arms Control Policy within the Directorate of Nuclear and Arms Control Policy at Canada's National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada. During that assignment, where he was responsible for recommending and coordinating Canadian arms control policy, he participated on Canadian Delegations to arms control negotiations and deliberations within various multilateral fora such as the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO. He is a graduate of Canadian Forces Staff School and Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, where his study dealing with NATO's nuclear strategy was published in 1987. Commissioned as a pilot in the Canadian Air Force in 1970, his flying experience includes tactical aviation, jet instructor, air defence/electronic warfare, VIP transport, and aerobatic demonstration as a member of the Canadian "Snowbirds". 
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REDEFINING SECURITY: 2000 AND BEYOND

INTRODUCTION

Dramatic changes have been witnessed recently in the international security setting. Besides the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in all its various dimensions, other events are unfolding at an astonishing pace. On the heels of a stunning United Nations coalition victory in the Persian Gulf, Middle East peace talks have begun, North and South Korea appear on the verge of meaningful dialogue, apartheid in South Africa has ended, and military strife in Central America has subsided. Absent, however, is the relative stability and predictability that were once a feature of East-West bipolar confrontation. Apparently ascendant are potentially explosive regional instabilities fueled by ethnic, territorial and religious rivalries, the resurgence of nationalism, and the ever vexing plague of state-sponsored and international terrorism. Moreover, there remains the devastating potential and global reach of modern instruments of war, and the proliferation both of weapons of mass destruction and of the means for their delivery.

Developing appropriate security strategies to deal with the uncertain future was, perhaps, never more challenging. Indeed, there is every possibility that future history will record this time as one of the great milestones in human evolution. It is a time when individual nation-states are beginning to consider self-imposed limitations on traditional notions of sovereignty in the interests of larger, more economically and militarily secure
"communities" of nations. It is a time when global communications permit the uncensored sharing of ideas, and the convergence of psychosocial values and attitudes. It is a time when environmental concerns transcend national boundaries and cause responsible citizens to reassess the way business is conducted in nearly every field of endeavor. And, it is a time when national security policies need to be refocused, taking into account an increasingly multipolar and interdependent world. From a military perspective, as military forces are scaled back in line with shrinking defence budgets within many industrialized nations, it is a time when the relationship between political ends and military means needs to be reexamined.

Events of the recent past provide the opportunity to reappraise customary and contemporary notions of security. It is increasingly evident that security today cannot be defined in purely military terms, and that no one nation today can expect to ensure its security through purely unilateral military means. Not only is there opportunity to redefine security, but there is also sufficient motivation, not least of which is the lethality and global impact of modern instruments of war, including weapons of mass destruction. A fundamental question is whether the traditional security paradigm establishes a valid basis for formulating security concepts in the 21st century, or whether the security model of the past was, and therefore may yet be, entirely wrong in its most basic conceptions. In the words of strategist Bernard Brodie, writing in 1959: "We know from even
the most casual study of military history how fallible man is in matters concerning war and how difficult it is for him...to adjust to new weapons. Yet compared to the changes we have to consider now, those of the past, when measured from one war to the next, were almost trivial. And almost always in the past there was time even after hostilities began for the significance of the technological changes to be learned and appreciated. Such time will not again be available in any unrestricted war of the future."

Redefining security for the twenty-first century and beyond is the thrust of this paper. While recognizing that there are many other dimensions to security than the military one, the focus will narrow primarily on military aspects. Beginning with a retrospective assessment of military security considerations of the recent past, and continuing with an appraisal of security challenges of the near term, it will aim to establish fundamental and enduring principles upon which future security concepts might be based. The paper will argue that mature and responsible nations have no logical or rational alternative but to break from "collective" military traditions of the past, and to lead the way toward more "cooperative" notions of security, based on the complementary and mutually supporting principles of power control and war prevention.

THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM

From the earliest days of recorded history to the
evolution of the modern nation state, mankind has struggled for survival and for the power that would assist in this struggle. In a continuum of recorded wars, some nobly waged to preserve an ideal, some to protect life and property, and some to acquire yet more power, security has hinged on the ability to wage and survive war. This legacy found expression in the statement "if one desires peace, then one must prepare for war."* Attesting to the forcefulness with which this legacy was burned into human consciousness, the validity of war "as the continuation of policy by other means" remained unchallenged despite the advent of nuclear weapons. For some, however, a paradoxical question emerged from the post-World War II "balance of terror" strategic concept: if large-scale nuclear war threatened global destruction, how could war serve survival? For only the past two generations, this question has presented a strategic and moral dilemma, and shaken the traditional security paradigm to its roots. Whereas in the past, wars served to settle political arguments, normally granting the victor a greater measure of security than might have been possible by other means, security for future generations was now held hostage to the threat of total war itself.?

Within the customary security framework, however, nuclear weapons were treated officially as just another rung on the ladder of increasing weapons lethality. From the beginning of the Cold War, it was widely held that small yield nuclear weapons could be used and controlled without risking large-scale nuclear escalation. Even large-scale nuclear use was considered by some to
be a viable way of seeking a decision to a conflict, on terms favourable to one side. Of course, all of these considerations were (and continue to be) purely theoretical, as were the opposing arguments. Such arguments focused on the lesser known and longer-term theoretical effects of multiple nuclear detonations. For example, might command and control of nuclear weapons be disrupted or rendered ineffective, considering uncertain factors such as electromagnetic pulse generated by nuclear bursts? Could loss of control lead to unconstrained nuclear escalation? Might this leave the planet's fragile ecosystem damaged beyond repair, and existing social structures and life (as we know it) untenable? From this debate emerged one central fact - that the potential costs of validating theoretical conceptions of nuclear weapons use were too enormous to imagine. With this realization came the understanding that nuclear weapons, barring any effective defence or countermeasures, represented far more than just another evolutionary step in the increasing lethality of firepower. Some forty years after the first use in war of atomic weapons, it was officially recognized that "nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought."

The traditional security mindset, however, was not prepared to yield to pressures urging a redefinition of security. Such pressures were manifest, for example, in calls for nuclear disarmament, and similarly simplistic solutions which failed to consider that a weapon once invented could not be disinvented. Those who argued for complete disarmament seemed not to
appreciate that weapons do not cause wars - wars essentially stem from the ages old belief that military force, including the waging of total war, is a viable means of protecting and asserting national self-interest. Thus, the "disarmament movement", by advocating treating the symptom rather than the cause of conflict, led to no serious questioning of customary security thinking. Disarmament, as a means of avoiding nuclear catastrophe, was rebuffed by those who believed that a nation which beat its swords into ploughshares was destined to plough the fields of those who didn't.

Instead, solutions to the nuclear dilemma, founded within the traditional security paradigm, focused on deterring nuclear war through threatening unacceptable retaliatory damage in the event of nuclear attack. At the same time, in an effort to minimize the potential damage of a pre-emptive nuclear attack, consideration was given to building unilateral strategic defences. Excess weapons and capabilities were subject to negotiated arms control. When squared-off against a nuclear-equipped adversary who threatened aggression, possibly with nuclear weapons, the concept of deterrence through controlled escalation up to and including total war (despite the attendant risk of global destruction) seemed almost rational. For many, however, the chinks in the security paradigm were beginning to widen. Clearly, from a public perspective, continuing to train organize, and equip military forces, as a matter of policy, for total war which could never be won, was becoming increasingly costly, and increasingly difficult
to justify as either realistic or prudent. Nevertheless, so long as the cold war persisted, neither fiscal realities nor the risk that war might destroy whatever political goals it was intended to preserve were sufficient to call into question the fundamental tenets of the traditional security model.

**THE CHANGING PARADIGM**

With the end of East-West bipolar rivalry, which has dominated the international security setting since the advent of nuclear weapons, and with the strengthening of international security cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations or of regional security regimes such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), security thinking may be more rationally focused. Certainly, it is less heretical today than it was a few years ago to suggest that war can no longer be considered the continuation of policy by other means. If policy does not entertain self-destruction as an end, then neither should war. Since modern war, potentially involving weapons of mass destruction, threatens survival, it can logically and irrefutably be cast as the antithesis of policy. The step from the customary security framework to a new definition of security must be a conscious one, taken in the full realization that war cannot be countenanced as a viable means of ensuring security. War, that puts at risk the institutions it is intended to protect, must, as a matter of policy, be relegated to the pages of history.

Instead, coherent and logical security policies of the future must aim at the prevention of war and its likely antecedents. To
address the possible reemergence of the threat of nuclear confrontation or intimidation, nuclear policies should aim toward the cooperative development of strategic defences, in concert with other nuclear-capable nations, combined with and contingent upon effectively verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels possible. Seeking enhanced security will continue to be a primary politico-military imperative. However, when confronted with the indefensible threat of weapons of mass destruction, security cannot be achieved by building unconstrained military power, but by controlling and channelling it. In other words, military forces must be used not to wage, but to prevent, war. This is the premier feature of the changing security paradigm.

EMERGING SECURITY PRINCIPLES

The first principle underlying security thinking for the 21st century is that a nation's security is achieved not by threatening, but by guaranteeing, the security of another. Nations, in the future, will be secure to the extent they constrain purely unilateral military efforts in the pursuit of mutual security. Translating this principle into policy will require nations to reappraise national sovereign rights to determine unilaterally defence needs and actions, in favour of security planning which strives, through negotiation and compromise, to accommodate the threat perceptions and military security needs of all willing partners in mutual security. This
might entail codifying, under internationally-binding arrangements, mutually-agreed military force levels, postures and deployments, as a first step toward comprehensive security cooperation. Second and subsequent steps could be taken, depending on the regional circumstances, to enhance security cooperation through measures designed to build mutual confidence concerning the non-aggressive military intentions and capabilities of neighboring states. Establishing agreed norms of military behaviour and building cooperative military security habits would ensure that no nation need feel threatened by the self-defensive actions of others. At the practical level, relations between nations, including security assistance to newly industrialized nations, could hinge on the extent to which security policies are aligned with this first principle.

Failure to accept this principle can only perpetuate the circumstances that led to two world wars in this century, and that will ultimately result in the continued development and widespread proliferation of increasingly lethal weapons of mass destruction. The principle of cooperative security, reversing the trends of the past, is rooted in firm political and military grounds. Since the devastation of war fought with weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained within sovereign territories, such war cannot be considered a politically-acceptable right of sovereignty. Therefore, security cooperation to control military power has become an international political responsibility. From a military perspective, it is neither sensible to assume that all
available means of firepower can be controlled once war begins, nor rational to aim at winning (or surviving) any war in which weapons of mass destruction might be used. In summary, the increasing lethality and potentially indiscriminate effects of modern weapons of war demand that security be redefined, in the first instance, emphasizing cooperative control of military power.

The second principle underpinning a new definition of security, and buttressing the principle of cooperative power control, is the principle of cooperative war prevention. As the world community moves closer to defining common values and establishing acceptable standards of state behaviour, international military cooperation will be required to deal with threats to those values and violations of those standards. Whereas collective security institutions (for example, NATO) traditionally have focused on deterring aggression through balancing military power, cooperative security efforts should aim to legitimize multinational responses to aggression or to other equally serious violations of internationally-agreed norms of state behaviour. Movement in this direction is evidenced by a growing tendency to use the United Nations as it was originally intended to be used, and to build supporting cooperative security institutions, such as the pan-European/trans-Atlantic CSCE. The potential shift to more cooperative concepts of security is also implicitly acknowledged in attempts to articulate the essence of a "new world order" envisaging the use of international military force to lend potency to international justice.
Failure to use military force, cooperatively and decisively, to punish violations of accepted state behaviour, where appropriate, would continue to encourage prospects of war and undermine security for all. Just as community law enforcement could not expect to prevent crime by prosecuting some violations and ignoring others, the purpose of war prevention could not be served by arbitrary or selective military intervention. Potential violators of international norms of behaviour can only be deterred by the certain expectation of an internationally-sanctioned and timely military response. This principle is fully supportable in politico-military terms. International military cooperation, as a cornerstone of cooperative security, will enable leaders to relate military roles and objectives plausibly to the enforcement of international law, rather than to the pursuit of controversial notions of national self-interest. Any flagging of public support for future internationally-sanctioned military action could be justifiably redressed on the basis of aligning public rights and responsibilities - in other words, by reminding citizens that the right to enjoy a just world peace carries with it the responsibility to empower international justice with the use of military force.16

Since applying these principles will entail considerable adjustments to contemporary security thinking, opposition can be expected. For example there are those who will argue for the continued and unbridled right to self-determination, including the right to pursue unilaterally national interests through armed
force, if necessary. Such an argument fails to appreciate the consequences of exercising traditional sovereign rights, including perpetuating the myth that security can be enhanced by preparing for and waging war. In a world where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them is commonplace, this argument has no logic. Clinging to the traditional sovereign right of unilateral action, that could ultimately lead to self-destruction, is anathema to both sovereignty and security. Assuredly, cooperative security is a concept that can be expected to attract only the more mature and responsible nations of the international community. It will be incumbent on these nations to lead by example in basing security policies on the logical and enduring promise that international cooperation and national self-interest are one and the same.

**COOPERATIVE VS TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF SECURITY**

Contrasting security policies of the past with those that might evolve within a cooperative security framework will provide a clearer picture of the fundamental differences between cooperative and contemporary notions of security. Semantically, the term "cooperative security" is intended to give new and unique expression to what has been termed "collective security". Similarly, the terms "cooperative power control" and "cooperative war prevention" are intended to revamp traditional concepts of "arms control" and "deterrence". However, more than subtle semantic differences would exist, in practice, between apparently similar old and new expressions.
In the case of "cooperative" vs "collective" security, the differences relate to the purposes served by each. For example, traditional collective security, whether in the context of formal alliances (such as NATO) or informal geo-political groupings of United Nations member states (such as the Western European and other - WEOG - grouping) has tended generally to serve the purposes of nations who share common, often ideological, interests. Such collective security groupings were forged in response to commonly-perceived, specific threats to shared, discrete interests. Cooperative security, on the other hand, would encourage the cross-cultural groupings of nations who possess the requisite maturity and responsibility to recognize that all nations share a generic and enduring interest in power control and war prevention. The cooperative intentions of such nations would be manifest in their willingness to seek military security through negotiation and compromise, and to prevent war through legitimizing the use of military power only in self-defence, or as part of an internationally-sanctioned response to the abuse of military power or violation of internationally-agreed norms.

Distinguishing between "arms control" and "cooperative power control" further highlights the differences inherent in promoting discrete, alliance interests and advancing generic, international interests. In the bloc-to-bloc framework of the recent past, the tendency was to engage in "positional" bargaining, with the assumption that each side's opening gambit was aimed to build or protect certain military advantages. Certainly, the aim was to
seek enhanced security through negotiated agreement, but not necessarily through improving the security of the other side. In short, the process was vulnerable to the zero-sum game mindset of bi-polar rivalry. From the "power control" perspective, negotiation would be a "principled" process acknowledging that while military forces do not constitute the root cause of war, certain military postures can contribute to a greater likelihood of war. This process would aim to develop cooperative security habits and associated procedures among mature and responsible partners in security, with each seeking to assure the other, through the other's own eyes, that aggression is not contemplated. Cooperative power control measures would not only stabilize relations between neighbors, but also serve as a means of strengthening and preserving international law and order. Violations of agreements would constitute clearly identifiable and verifiable violations of international standards, and potential early signals of hostile intent.

In the case of "cooperative war prevention" and "deterrence", although the purposes are common, the logic and process differ. Contemporary notions of deterrence are primarily psychological in nature, and rely on persuading an adversary, through the threat of retaliation, that the costs of conflict would outweigh any potential advantages. Thus, deterrence presumes a measure of rationality on the part of an adversary — a condition not always present, as evidenced in the Persian Gulf War. In terms of nuclear deterrence, its effectiveness can only be assessed accurately in
the event of its failure, and such failure would have devastating global effects. Nuclear war avoidance, therefore, is a global rather than unilateral concern. "Cooperative war prevention", on the other hand, rests not on threatening retaliation, but on assuring punishment with decisive international military force where warranted. Preventing war and avoiding the use in conflict of nuclear arms, and other weapons of mass destruction, will demand resolute and cooperative action by mature and responsible nations - action that might include, in times of relative stability, cooperative development of strategic defences; and, in the event of conflict, cooperative military intervention to empower international justice and enforce international law and order.17

IMPACT ON MILITARY STRATEGIES AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS

What will be the impact on military strategies of applying principles of collective security, and how might military means be tailored to meet collective security objectives? Firstly, pursuing cooperative security will mean constraining unilateral military action in favour of international military cooperation; the two are mutually exclusive. Secondly, military strategies and resources, geared to generic rather than specific threats, would be derived in accordance with the will and capabilities of individual nations, and would reflect what a nation felt it could afford within the risks and obligations it would be willing to assume. The need to maintain credible military forces would be
justified publicly and politically by the requirement to shoulder a nation's share of the cost of ensuring global security, as a responsible member of the international community.

When compared to traditional threat-based rationalization of military expenditures, the cooperative security approach to sizing and shaping military forces would offer a considerable degree of budget stability. This, in concert with directed efforts to encourage broad economic cooperation within overall national security strategies, would enable streamlining military acquisition structures and processes. It will mean less emphasis on establishing why specific forces are needed (planning), and on answering how to address service shortcomings (programming), and more emphasis on aligning force levels with realistic expectations of what funds will be available (budgeting). The transition toward cooperative ways of managing security will mean that military economic systems can more closely resemble a free market. Military procurement would place as much emphasis on international interoperability as it would on maintaining a defence-industrial base, and would be tailored to promote international free trade and healthy industrial competition. Clearly, increasing security interdependence will curtail the ability of nations to act unilaterally in their self interest. The corollary is that increasing interdependence will render such action unnecessary, and indeed undesirable. At the heart of any cooperative security strategy would be the recognition that economic, scientific, and industrial interdependence is crucial to future global stability.
and security.

Of course, an essential responsibility of government is to ensure territorial defence through underwriting, as a first priority, a nation's claim to sovereignty. This primary role could well determine the shape of a nation's forces, including force mix and equipment capabilities. Missions and training could be optimized to meet uniquely national conditions, leading to natural specialization and strengths in certain mission areas which could then be applied in a wide variety of combined military operations as part of cooperative security efforts. Those nations possessing the will and the means to play a leadership role in the cooperative security arena would need to ensure an adequately balanced force, and an expeditionary capability to respond rapidly and effectively to global crises. In advising governments on how best to design defence forces in support of cooperative security, it will be the responsibility of committed leaders to avoid parochial interests and to ensure that a nation's armed forces maintain professional fighting and supporting capabilities in all services. Overall, a nation's armed forces must be tailored to meet its sovereign and cooperative security objectives constrained only by realistic expectations of the profile that nation would be willing to adopt and fund in pursuit of global stability and security.

REQUIRED INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

It has long been an ideal of mature and responsible governments to balance sovereign rights (those of acting
unilaterally in the pursuit of national security, with international responsibilities (those of acting cooperatively with others in the pursuit of global stability). Indeed, such is the basis of the Charter of the United Nations which gives the General Assembly the right to "...consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments." The end of bipolar competition only serves to remove what might be the toughest barrier to developing increasingly cooperative security policies through revitalizing and strengthening international security institutions.

The acid test of the viability of cooperative security any time in the future is whether the United Nations can continue to function effectively, and whether interlocking regional security institutions can continue to grow in support, and as appendages, of the UN. The answer will be found in the degree of political will that ultimately emerges to pull, not push, consensus toward greater multilateral cooperation. The logic of such cooperation may be flawless, and there may be every good reason to labor tirelessly towards it, but cooperation will always be constrained by those who are vain, petty and self-interested. The need for enlightened leadership within mature and responsible nations, and within national institutions including the military, has never been more acute.

The good news is that the United Nations has survived (up to now) its first major post-Cold War test of adequacy in fusing an
effective and cooperative international military response to Iraqi aggression in the Middle East. The precursor political and military conditions leading to that fusion were relatively easy, aggression was sure and military forces were ready; and yet, one year later, not all internationally-agreed sanctions have been fully implemented. There may be both cause and opportunity for effective institutional reforms to enable more dynamic and credible security cooperation. In recent years, former Soviet President Gorbachev outlined a number of interesting proposals. For example, the Security Council could convene a Military Staff Committee, as envisioned by the framers of the UN charter, to coordinate a collective military response to international crises; and the UN could create a military reserve force, with troops of different countries placed under UN command, to staff observation posts in potentially explosive areas or along borders that a member state believes may be attacked. Reforms such as these could go a long way toward advancing the goal of cooperative war prevention.20

Another bright light on the horizon of increasing international security cooperation and serving as a successful example of what might be viewed as a UN subsidiary, regional security institution, is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Clearly, the CSCE has played an integral part in the evolving European security environment over the past twenty-five years. With a comprehensive and holistic approach to security (which includes human rights and economic
cooperation along with political principles and military security) its credentials are impressive, including a record of success in formalizing a series of measures to build military confidence among participants. The prospects for the CSCE as a viable cooperative security institution were quickened in late 1990 with the declaration of the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" which developed important institutional foundations, including establishing a permanent secretariat and a European crisis prevention centre. Now, with the disintegration of the USSR, the CSCE is being pushed ever more into the spotlight as a principal forum for managing pan-European security. With regard to cooperative war prevention, it might well serve as the umbrella agency for cooperative NATO and former Warsaw Pact military efforts to end existing intrastate conflict in the trans-Caucuses. Perhaps this will be the first test of true cooperative security outside the formal framework of the United Nations.

CONCLUSIONS

For over forty-five years, the primacy of nuclear deterrence and of sustaining "the balance of terror" confounded the evolution of coherent security thinking. The thoughts presented in this paper attempt to step outside the security paradigm that was, in large part, the genesis of the nuclear deterrence paradox. Some might view these thoughts as heresy, and denounce suggested cooperative security principles as utopian and fanciful. Revolutionary ideas can expect no less.24 At the end of the 19th
century, those who envisaged the concept of total industrialized war could rightly be branded heretics by those who clung to the dogma of dynastic war. Whether security thinking is about to undergo a revolution, similar in scope to that of a century ago, remains to be seen. If the initial events of the immediate post-cold war years are any indication, that revolution may have already started.

Suffice it to say, the unprecedented change ongoing in the international security setting along with diminishing defence resources challenges those charged with ensuring security to respond in ways that emphasize innovation, creativity and forward thinking. The military mindset and military decision-making traditionally have been based on the presumed inevitability of hostilities, and the ensuing need to counter military threats, and to advance national self-interest through unilateral military means. They must change. With the end of the cold war, a fundamentally different world has emerged. The chance now exists to make order out of potential chaos.

An important step requires recognizing that the framework within which security thinking was conducted is a political and military anachronism. Using military force to advance self-interest in a world increasingly held hostage to weapons of mass destruction is a hopeless pretension which promises the grimmest of consequences. No nation will enjoy true security so long as the will to wage war, or to intimidate by threat of war, remains. The way out is through redefining security in the understanding that
national self-interest and cooperative security, relying on cooperative power control and cooperative war prevention, are one and the same. Nations will be secure to the extent they constrain purely unilateral military efforts and cooperate in the pursuit of mutual security within a suitable framework of internationally-binding agreements. Fortifying international justice with cooperative international military power is the ultimate goal of cooperative security, and the essence of a rational security paradigm for the twenty-first century.
NOTES

1. For example, although it is uncertain how the future integration of Europe will ultimately unfold, there appears to be steady progress towards political unity within the European Community (EC).

2. For a comprehensive overview of changing elements of the post-cold war era, see John L. Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World", Foreign Affairs, Vol 70, No 2, Spring, 1991, pp. 104-122. In particular, "Integration is happening in a number of ways. Consider, first, the communications revolution, which has made it impossible for any nation to deny its citizens knowledge of what is going on elsewhere. This is a new condition in international politics."


5. Liddell Hart suggests that this be restated "if one desires peace then one must understand war." See B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (London : Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 373.

6. See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror." Foreign Affairs, Jan, 1959.

7. Brodie, p. 409. "Of future total wars we can say that winning may be less ghastly than losing, but whether by much or by little we cannot know."

8. For a collection of essays on nuclear targeting and weapons effects, see Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. by Desmond Ball and J. Richelson, (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1986). The question of "winning" a nuclear war is academic to the extreme and focuses on what would constitute "victory". Nevertheless, it became fashionable, in some circles, to speak of deterring nuclear war and, in the event deterrence fails, fighting and winning.
9. Differing opinions on escalation control are evident in wide-ranging academic and unofficial debate over nuclear deterrence strategy. See, in particular, Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). Opinions also differ as to the degree of physical destruction and environmental and social devastation that might follow even a "limited" nuclear exchange. Perhaps the worst case scenario is outlined by Carl Sagan, "Nuclear Winter and Climatic Catastrophe", *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1983-84):274. In the end, what matters is that no one can be certain what might remain of existing societies and ways of life in the event of nuclear war. Should such uncertainty be written off because it doesn't suit policy or doctrine? This has happened in the past with devastating results - and we are quick to condemn those in the past who were so dogmatic in clinging to traditional ways of waging war in the face of increasing firepower. Tomorrow, such errors may be so calamitous that the opportunity to critically appraise today's strategic decisions might not be available.

10. Officially, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev both proclaimed in a joint Summit statement issued at Geneva in 1985, that "nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought."

11. See, for example, Bruce Russett, "Doves, hawks and US Public Opinion", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol 105, No 4, Nov 1990, pp 515-538. "By 1987, 83% [of Americans] thought there could be no limited nuclear war; that a nuclear war would become all out and all mankind would be destroyed."

12. We should recall the advice of Carl von Clausewitz ... "War can never be separated from political intercourse," wrote the German philosopher of strategy in the nineteenth century, "and if this occurs, we have before us a senseless thing, without an object." Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)

13. For many nations, self-imposed limitations or restrictions on the use of national military power might go against the grain and unacceptably reduce the role that any nation might play in influencing international security affairs. To the degree that this solution goes against the grain of national goals, nations will continue to perpetuate the likelihood of nuclear confrontation and lead the world precariously to uncertain ends.

NOTES (cont)

15. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the CSCE and its potential role in managing future European security see Col B. A. Goetze, "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Alternatives for European Security?", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, Oct 1990, pp. 27-31. As Col Goetze mentions, the "so-called Basket Three initiatives enabled concrete meaning to negotiation of commitments on human rights". In terms of internal (vice external) state behaviour, these commitments might be seen as early attempts to articulate internationally-agreed norms of state action.

16. The importance of aligning security strategies with public expectations cannot be overstated. See, for example, Philip A. Croll, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers", from The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No 20, Oct 6, 1977, pp. 1-14. In a list of 6 fundamental questions used to analyze and assess the validity of military strategy, Croll asks: "How strong is the home front... Can the war plausibly be explained as a just war?" If the risk exists of precipitating use of weapons of mass destruction, unilateral military action to advance a nation's self-interest can never plausibly be explained to a concerned public. When these risks exist, as they did for a time during the Persian Gulf war, public opinion will likely insist on cooperative military action, undertaken only in support of international law.

17. See, for example, Dr. Edward Teller, "The world is at a turning point", Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Nov 1991, p. 29. Dr. Edward Teller writing on SDI: "If the defensive effort in all its phases can be turned into an international undertaking, then our collaboration on them could do a lot to reduce the cause of war...the most important topic may be the establishment of an open world in which active cooperation between every nation can begin to lay the foundation of a peaceful world community."


19. Brodie, p 9. "Any real expansion of strategic thought to embrace the wholly new circumstances which nuclear weapons have produced will therefore have to be developed largely within the military guild itself...they must remain the prime movers of change in this field."

NOTES (cont)

21. It is not always easy to identify fundamental changes when they occur. Moreover, change in the face of uncertainty implies risk, and military institutions when it comes to reappraising plans or policies tend to be risk-averse. Unfortunately, there are far too many who simply do not understand or who do not want to understand that there are alternatives to the way security has been formulated in the past. There must never be a nuclear war to test doctrines and strategies. We must step forward knowing that a revolution is underway in thinking about security.

22. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, "Technology and Decision-Making", in The Professional Soldier, The Free Press, 1960, p 34. "Weapons of mass destruction socialize danger to the point of equalizing the risks of warfare between soldier and civilian... If the military is forced to think about avoiding wars, the traditions of the 'military mind', based on the inevitability of hostilities, must change, and military decision-making must undergo transformation as well."