



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE IN A
CHANGING WORLD**

by

Craig W. Mastapeter

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Christopher Bellavita
John Rollins

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2008	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Instruments of National Power: Achieving the Strategic Advantage in a Changing World			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Craig W. Mastapeter			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT This thesis employs the historical method to illustrate that the central aim of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy is and has been to achieve and maintain the core national interests — ensure the physical security of the nation, the nation's values, and the nation's economic prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power in peace and in war. To accomplish this, U.S. national security policy and strategy must dispose of the artificial walls currently separating its foundations and realign and resynchronize the capabilities resident in its instruments of national power. Doing so will enable the U.S. to achieve the strategic advantage. In sum, this thesis illustrates that national security encompasses homeland defense and security and that the current architecture is counterproductive because destabilizes and retards the capabilities, including the "reach," of the instruments of national by creating unnecessary friction and competition for resources between them and their proponents and denigrating their capabilities to achieve the strategic advantage. Absent a secure homeland, there is no national security and no strategic advantage.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Instruments/Elements of National Power – Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Finance, and Economic; Presence; Projection of Power; Deterrence; Containment; Basic National Security Policy; MIDLIFE; BNSP, Strategic Advantage, Decision Advantage; Strategy; Ends, Ways, and Means; International Relations; Threat			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 315	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER: ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGE IN A CHANGING WORLD**

Craig W. Mastapeter

Senior Planning Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.

B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1981

M.A., George Washington University, 1985

M.S., U.S. Defense Intelligence College, 1988

Diploma, U.S. Army War College, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2008**

Author: Craig W. Mastapeter

Approved by: Christopher Bellavita
Thesis Advisor

John Rollins
Co-Advisor

Harold Trinkunas, Ph.D.
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis employs the historical method to illustrate that the central aim of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy is and has been to achieve and maintain the core national interests — ensure the physical security of the nation, the nation's values, and the nation's economic prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power in peace and in war. To accomplish this, U.S. national security policy and strategy must dispose of the artificial walls currently separating its foundations and realign and resynchronize the capabilities resident in its instruments of national power. Doing so will enable the U.S. to achieve the strategic advantage. In sum, this thesis illustrates that national security encompasses homeland defense and security and that the current architecture is counterproductive because destabilizes and retards the capabilities, including the "reach," of the instruments of national by creating unnecessary friction and competition for resources between them and their proponents and denigrating their capabilities to achieve the strategic advantage. Absent a secure homeland, there is no national security and no strategic advantage.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	PURPOSE	1
II.	RESEARCH ARGUMENT	5
III.	METHODOLOGY	7
IV.	OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY	13
V.	THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES	71
VI.	THE ART AND SCIENCE OF STRATEGY	91
VII.	STRATEGY IN PRACTICE	119
VIII.	NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: INTERESTS AND INTENT	155
IX.	THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER	179
X.	ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE	249
XI.	CONCLUSION	269
	LIST OF REFERENCES	277
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	301

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Strategic Management Process Triangle	115
Figure 2.	The OODA “Loop”	137
Figure 3.	From Conception to Winning	177
Figure 4.	Relationship of Political Objectives to National Strategy and Supporting Strategies.....	183

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express sincere appreciation to Dr. Christopher Bellavita and John Rollins, J.D. for their assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. In addition, special thanks to the CHDS staff, my past and present supervisors, and co-workers for their confidence and support throughout the entire Master's Program. Finally, I would like to my wife Mary, my daughter Heather, and my son John ... and our two Scottish Terrier pups Arthur and Morgan, my “study buddies” who patiently, hour by hour and day by day, kept watch over as I researched and drafted this thesis ... for their trust and unwavering support that made this whole experience possible. Thank you all.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. PURPOSE

Defining national security is complicated. George F. Kennan (1904-2005; U.S. foreign service officer, diplomat, and historian) offered perhaps the least complicated definition: “the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference.”¹ Although the specific modern English term “national security” itself came into common parlance in the post-Second World War years, national security refers to, and has referred to, the requirement of governments and their civilian and military leaders to maintain and ensure the sovereignty and survival of the (their) nation-state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. Methodologies to achieve and maintain the highest possible desired state of national security have been constantly and consistently developed and refined to establish, ensure, and maintain political, diplomatic, military, financial, and economic sovereignty and security.

At the end of the Second World War, the term “national security” came into full usage in U.S. political discourse. Edward Mead Earle, in the seminal work on modern strategic studies *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler*, pointed out as early as 1943 that “national security strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors: economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”²

In general, “national security” is a collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. It is the foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or purposes. National security interests include, and have included, preserving U.S. political identity,

¹ Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett, *Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

² Edward Mead Earle, Gordon Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), viii.

framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

At its simplest, U.S. national security is the use of national power — all of the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives — in peace and war to further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s three core interests: physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity. The instruments of national power are all the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives.³

It is this author’s intention to argue in this thesis that basic U.S. national security policy in the post-Cold War era, and in fact throughout its history as an independent nation, encompasses not only the fundamental instruments of national power, but that the disciplines of homeland defense, homeland security, and comprehensive all-hazard (national) emergency preparedness are not separate and distinct disciplines, but rather components of U.S. national security that are, or should be, vertically and horizontally integrated and operationalized through the nation’s instruments of national power.⁴ Secondly, the author intends to illustrate that the national security — physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity — of the U.S. is best served by a basic national security policy and strategy emphasizing a forward-deployed presence possessing a concomitant ability to project power globally, but selectively, through the nation’s instruments of national power in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland.

Given the transformation of the threat facing the U.S. in the second decade following the Cold War, from a symmetric bi-polar nation-state peer competitor environment to an asymmetric multi-faceted transnational non-state environment, it is critical that U.S. national security policy continues to be able to detect, deter and prevent, deny and disrupt, contain, and defeat current and emerging threats to the nation’s

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-0: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), x, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).

⁴ Hereafter referred to as the instruments of national power.

survival, and vital, and important interests. These activities must be executed overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland. The U.S. must simultaneously maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and abroad in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the effects and consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. RESEARCH ARGUMENT

It is this author's contention that the U.S. national security establishment — government, private sector, and academia — may have, since the end of the Cold War and especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001, unintentionally created an unnecessary and counterproductive compartmentalization of U.S. national security.

This artificial compartmentalization of U.S. national security has unintentionally obfuscated the natural alignment and synchronization of the nation's instruments of national power.⁵ This in turn has hampered the national leadership in optimally identifying core national security objectives and expectations (desired end state); selecting the appropriate instrument or elements of national power (resources or means) to achieve the desired end state; and employing the most effective and efficient course of action to conduct operations in pursuit of the desired end state. Above all, artificially compartmentalizing these disciplines has hampered the U.S. ability to achieve and sustain the strategic advantage and its ability to plan and decisively execute joint and combined operations because it has inhibited the alignment and synchronization of the capabilities resident in the instruments of national power.

This thesis will contend and argue, using classical historical method outlined in *A Guide To Historical Method* by Gilbert J. Garraghan, S.J.,⁶ that the U.S., in order to remain responsive to the constantly evolving spectrum of transnational threats facing the nation and its survival, vital, and important interests as it closes out the first decade of the twenty-first century, should eliminate the artificial separation of homeland defense,⁷

⁵ Geographic, natural resources, population/demographics, military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, economic, and the national will.

⁶ Gilbert J. Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method*, ed. Jean Delanglez (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1946).

⁷ Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats, aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense.

homeland security,⁸ and comprehensive all-hazard emergency preparedness⁹ and adopt a more holistic and integrated definition and organization of U.S. national security.¹⁰

Secondly, this thesis will contend and argue that the U.S. should adopt a nominally unilateral and realistic national security posture that emphasizes a forward-deployed presence possessing a concomitant ability to project power globally, but selectively, through the nation's instruments of national power in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland. This national security posture should be operationalized through the presence of the full spectrum of U.S. instruments of national power that have been appropriately forward-deployed to ensure presence and possess the ability to project U.S. power and influence to achieve and maintain the strategic advantage. It must be able to detect, deter and prevent, disrupt and deny, contain, and decisively defeat, through joint and combined operations, current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests in at least two major theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland. It must also simultaneously maintain the highest state of readiness in preparation to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from any disruptive event that could affect the homeland and the core national survival interests.

⁸ Homeland security is the concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for homeland security. In addition, its responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies.

⁹ It is the policy of the United States government to enhance the preparedness of the nation by developing and maintaining a standardized risk-based approach to national planning to integrate and affect policy and operational objectives to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards and comprises. All-hazard emergency preparedness and incident management strengthen and ensure the preparedness of the United States to protect against and mitigate the effects of prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

¹⁰ On May 17, 2007, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13434 (National Security Professional Development) that directed the Federal Executive Branch to establish and maintain a cadre of senior officers capable of leading operations across organizational boundaries and disciplines during periods of national crisis.

III. METHODOLOGY

In researching and preparing this thesis, the author predominantly employed the classical historical method outlined in *A Guide to Historical Method*¹¹ by Gilbert J. Garraghan, S.J. and the author's undergraduate training as an historian at the University of Oklahoma (1977-1981). Garraghan predominantly employed secondary research techniques that involved the summary, collation, and/or synthesis of existing research rather than primary research.

The historical method comprises the techniques and guidelines by which historians and historiographers use historical sources and other evidence to research and then to write history. There are various history guidelines commonly used by historians in their work, under the headings of external criticism, internal criticism, and synthesis. This includes higher criticism and textual criticism.

Though items may vary depending on the subject matter and researcher, the following concepts are usually part of most formal historical research:

- Identification of origin date
- Evidence of localization
- Recognition of authorship
- Analysis of data
- Identification of integrity
- Attribution of credibility

Given that the art and science of formulating and implementing a nation's basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation's national security occurs within the framework of the international environment and because any discussion of basic national security policy and strategy must be entered into with an understanding of the international environment and international relations theory, this thesis opens the thesis with an introductory overview of international relations theory in Chapter IV.

¹¹ Garraghan, *A Guide to the Historical Method*.

Chapter IV recognizes that the strategic environment — past, present, and future — is always defined by the character of politics and the interactions among political entities. This environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance that defy any purely rational explanation. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment

Then follows a discussion in Chapter V a discussion of the current and contemporary threat environment in which U.S. basic national security policy and strategy must operate in. The international environment is fraught with threats, both foreign and domestic, to the national security of the United States. The current threat environment is highly ambiguous and characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests. Chapter V acknowledges that there are enduring challenges for the current and future U.S. national security establishment, at home and abroad, and will include familiar military activities, such as defending against attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and terrorist networks and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include dealing with the collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in combination with the non-military instruments of national power to deter and prevent conflict around the world.

In Chapter VI, the author introduces the art and science of strategy and the nexus it has with both the complex international environment and the threats to U.S. national security that are resident within the international environment. Chapter VI advances the formulary that basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy is formulated and implemented to (a) defend against threats to the core national end state and the core national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it, and (b) to advance, achieve, and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. Distilled to its essence,

grand strategy is about determining a state's vital interests — those important enough to fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand policy lies,” Paul Kennedy observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancements of the nation's long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) best interests.”¹²

Chapter VII introduces the position that the defense of the homeland is, and always has been, the core national interest and central to U.S. BNSP and strategy. Chapter VII discusses and analyzes the differential strategic approaches and how U.S. BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power to: detect; prepare for and protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, recover from if necessary; and decisively defeat these threats. Chapter VII also introduces the calculus that although American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional when all of its instruments of national power are deployed, the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness in the pursuit of national interests, remains.

Chapter VIII focuses on the criticality and essentiality of the leadership identifying clearly defined national interests and subsequently pursuing clearly defined and attainable goals, consistent with national values, whose achievement best furthers the national interest(s). Chapter VIII concurrently expands on the fundamental purpose of the U.S.'s BNSP and its corresponding course of action is to provide a comprehensive strategy that balances the ends, ways, and means of the instruments of national power to: (1) achieve national security, and to (2) protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life. The chapter articulates how U.S. BNSP shapes the global environment and how it provides enduring security for the American people by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic — on the international system at the international, state, group/organization,

¹² J.A. Bassani, Jr., *Saving the World for Democracy - An Historical Analysis of America's Grand Strategy in the 21st Century* (2005) Storming Media, <http://www.stormingmedia.us/85/8566/A856634.html> (accessed August 15, 2008).

and individual levels in order to shape and control its external environment by detecting, deterring and preventing, and defeating current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests. Although departments and agencies have, alone and in combination, substantial capabilities (i.e., means and resources or the instruments of national power) at their disposal and have developed standard ways of applying those means, the absence on clear ends, which are derived from and justified by interests, renders the strategic equation insolvable.

The instruments or elements of national power – geography, natural resources, population and demographics, military, informational (ideological), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic and the national will — are introduced and defined in Chapter IX. The instruments of national power are the means, or resources, which a nation through its government, possesses to operationalize its power through its BNSP and strategy in order to achieve its desired end state. Achieving and maintaining a satisfactory national security posture involves every instrument of element of national power. Given that national security strategists operate across organizations and disciplines and subject each potential objective, as well as the ways to achieve it, to rigorous mission analyses to assess the costs, risks, and likelihood of success, Chapter IX argues that only after completing such analyses can the strategist recommend an objective(s) to the policymakers that best furthers the national interest and employs, alone or in combination, the strengths and capabilities resident in and represented by the instruments of national power. Finally, Chapter IX expands on the concept and definition of grand strategy, which is seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal, and introduces the “Instrument-Element Model” because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which competitors, rivals, and belligerents contend and interact with each other.

Chapter X closes the body of thesis by introducing and discussing the operationalization of a U.S. BNSP and strategy based on forward presence and power projection that is capable of detecting, deterring and containing, denying and disrupting, discrediting and delegitimizing, and decisively defeating threats to its core national

security end state and supporting interests. Chapter X closes by discussing a layered, defense-in-depth BNSP and strategy focused primarily on the U.S. homeland and the approaches to U.S. territory.

The thesis concludes by restating the premise that the principal nexus of the definitions of national security, homeland security, and national defense is defending and securing the homeland and ensuring the enduring sovereignty of the government and people of the United States. The secondary nexus is that only by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power can the United States achieve and maintain its core interests by framing and shaping the international environment in ways favorable to the nation's desired end state. The third and final nexus is the ever-changing international environment.

Secondly, the author reemphasizes:

1. U.S. BNSP is the sum (Σ) of history; prior decisions; actors; laws, rules, regulations, and authorities; and actions and reactions over time. The executive branch's national security establishment, in partnership with the legislative branch, determines and defines the survival, vital, and important national interests; determines and defines the domestic and foreign threats to those interests; and develops and implements actions (i.e., courses of action or ways) using the resources (i.e., means or capabilities) resident in the instruments of national power to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats; and
2. National power is the capacity to influence the decisions and actions of other actors favorable to the U.S. National power is exerted through the instruments of elements of national power. Although national power has both domestic and foreign components and domestic and foreign applications, the core purpose of the application of national power is to create and maintain conditions favorable to the nation's core interests and end state. In the practice of national security, there is a constant need to balance ends, ways, and means. Achieving this can be likened to a three-legged stool with the stool itself representing the strategy. A strategy is balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (course of action) is capable and has sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end (objective).

In closing, any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must be (1) a strategy of intent, (2) iterative, (3) offensive, but not necessarily preemptive, aggressive, and antagonistic, (4)

one of annihilation, and (5) asymmetric. Any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must focus on its ability to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, and discredit and delegitimize enemy/adversary actions through the measured and commensurate application of swift, precisely targeted, and devastating retaliatory reprisals — through any one of, any combination of, or all of the instruments of national power — without warning. The retaliatory action must demonstrate that costs and risks of future action far outweigh the benefits and gains and that the objective of the U.S. is to eliminate the enemy's/adversary's ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will.

IV. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The art and science of formulating and implementing a nation's basic national security policy and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation's national security occurs within the framework of the international environment. Consequently, any discussion of basic national security policy and strategy must be entered into with an understanding of the international environment and international relations theory.

International Relations Theory (IRT) entails the development of conceptual frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and phenomena in world politics, as well as the analysis and informing of associated policies and practices.

Although its origins can be traced back to the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia and the establishment of the European concept of the nation-state, the discipline of IRT was "officially" established within the social sciences' community as an inter- and multi-disciplinary field of study following the First World War with a view to avoiding future mass conflicts and ensuring peaceful change.

This remains a worthy goal, but today the scope and complexities of world politics, especially the introduction of an escalating transnational asymmetric and unconventional threat, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and advanced high explosives (CBRN-E) and other weapons of mass destruction and effect (WMD/E) posed by state and non-state actors (NSAs), demand an understanding of a much wider range of issues. Moreover, new normative and empirical conceptual frameworks and theories are required to improve understanding and assist in the development of better policies and practices.

IRT is a branch of *political science* and incorporates and represents the study of foreign affairs, national security and defense, and global issues actors within the international system, including the roles of states, non-state actors, international (inter-governmental) organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs). IRT is both an academic and public policy field, and

can be either positive (i.e., quantitative/empirical) or normative (i.e., qualitative) as it both seeks to analyze as well as formulate the national security (defense and foreign policy) of particular states. Because of the increased threat posed by radicals and extremists who employ terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, the study of IRT, and its companion discipline of comparative politics and government, is increasingly incorporating the study of homeland defense and security. As this thesis will argue, the core, central *raison d'être* of any nation's basic national security policy and strategy is to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity or as Kennan said, "the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference."¹³

Apart from political science, IRT is a multi- and interdisciplinary field of study that operates across organizations and disciplines. It draws upon such diverse fields as finance and economics, diplomacy, history, law and juridical science, philosophy, geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, military art and science, intelligence tradecraft, and cultural studies and involves a diverse range of issues, such as globalization and its impacts on societies and state sovereignty to ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, terrorism, organized crime, human security, and human rights. Foreign affairs is also a synonym for international relations, that is, the activities of a government concerned with basic national security and defense policy; foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy; international economics and finances; intelligence operations; international representation; and the academic study of these activities.

Many modern political scientists, especially international relations theorists, conceptualize and treat political entities as "unitary rational actors," the social equivalents of Newton's solid bodies hurtling through space. Real political units, however, are not unitary nor are they always rational. Rather, they are collections of intertwined, but fundamentally distinct actors and systems. Their behavior derives from the internal interplay of both rational and irrational forces, as well as from the peculiarities of their own histories and of sheer chance. Strategists who accept the unitary rational actor model

¹³ Bergen and Garrett, *Report of the Working*.

as a description of entities at war will never understand either side's motivations or actual behavior. Such strategists ignore their own side's greatest potential vulnerabilities and deny themselves potential levers and targets — the fault-lines that exist within any human political construct. In fact, treating an enemy entity as a unitary actor tends to be a self-fulfilling and counterproductive prophecy, reinforcing a sense of unity among disparate elements which might otherwise be pried apart.

Given this, modern political scientists postulate that in order to survive over time, the various participants in any system must adapt not only to the “external” environment but to each other. These agents (or actors) compete or cooperate, consume and are consumed, join and divide, and so on. In fact, from the standpoint of any individual agent, the behavior of the other agents is itself a major element of the environment. The collective behavior of the various agents can even change the nature of the “external” environment. Such changes in the environment will, in turn, necessitate and reward adaptive changes elsewhere in the system. And, of course, the environment can also be changed by the intrusion of external factors, setting off yet another round of adaptations.

A system created by such a multiplicity of internal feedback loops is called a complex adaptive system (CAS). Such systems nestle one inside the other, constructing, interpenetrating, and disrupting one another across illusory “system boundaries.” Such systems are inherently dynamic.

Although they may sometimes appear stable for lengthy periods, the complex network of interconnected feedback loops demands that its subcomponents constantly adapt or fail. Slight changes are sometimes absorbed unnoticed by the system. Other slight changes — an alteration in the external environment or a local mutation — can send the system into convulsions of growth or collapse; sometimes both simultaneously.¹⁴

One of the most interesting things about complex adaptive systems is that they are inherently unpredictable. It is impossible, for example, to know in advance which slight

¹⁴ Christopher Bellavita, “Introduction to Homeland Security” (classroom lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007).

perturbations in a system will settle out unnoticed and which will spark catastrophic change. This is so, not because of any flaw in our understanding of such systems, but because the system's behavior is generated according to rules the system itself develops and is able to alter. In other words, a system's behavior may be constrained by external factors or laws, but is not determined by them. Every system evolves according not only to general laws but to local rules established by evolution, accident, and happenstance — or, if an intelligent agent is involved, through conscious innovation or intervention.

Another characteristic of complex adaptive systems is that the system itself exhibits behaviors and creates structures which are utterly different from those of the individual agents which create it. Systems starting from a similar base will come to have unique individual characteristics based on their specific histories.

Quantitative methods and science can describe, and often explain the evolution and behavior of a complex adaptive system, but cannot predict it. Oftentimes, however, the chain of events is so subtle and convoluted, and the evidence so fragmentary, that the sequence of events and the web of causation can never be satisfactorily understood, even in retrospect and behavior cannot be predicted based on an understanding, however detailed, of the individual agents they comprise: One must always consider the system as a whole rather than as a collection of independent parts.

The reason social scientists dwell on the complex adaptive system is that it provides so much insight into human history and political constructs. Any group of humans who interact will, over time, form a unique system broadly similar to the ones previously described. Humans build all sorts of social structures and engage in complex behavior. Human structures include families, tribes, clans, social classes and castes, secret societies, street gangs, armies, feudal hierarchies, commercial corporations, church congregations, political parties, bureaucracies, criminal mafias, states of various kinds, alliances, confederations, and empires. These structures participate in distinct but thoroughly intertwined networks one calls social, economic, and political systems. Those networks produce, and sustain, markets, elections, and wars.

Such networks and structures create their own rules and are thus fundamentally unpredictable. Economic and political events can be subjected to rigorous analysis before and while they occur, and can be described and often plausibly explained afterwards. Nonetheless, as any regular watcher of the evening news has long since discovered, they cannot reliably be predicted.

Indeed, both evolutionary scientists and historians of human events find steady employment in seeking better ways to “postdict” the past, which can be just as puzzling as the present or future. One can certainly see “patterns” in human history, yet history does not repeat itself. “Victory” goes, not only to those participants who learn the existing rules, but also to those who succeed in making new ones.

When it is said that politics and war are unpredictable, it does not mean that they are sheer confusion, without any semblance of order. Intelligent, experienced military and political actors are generally able to foresee the probable near-term results, or at least a range of possible results, of any particular action they may take. Broad causes, such as a massive superiority in manpower, technology, economic resources, and military skill will definitely influence the probabilities of certain outcomes.

Conscious actions, however, like evolutionary adaptations, seldom have only their intended effects. As many political scientists and historians have wryly observed, there is an unremitting “law of unintended consequences.” As the ripples from any one action spread out, their effects unpredictably magnify or nullify the ripples from other actions. Thus, actions that seemed at the time to have great importance may prove to lead nowhere, while actions so minor as to escape notice may have tremendous consequences.

Further, human systems are “open” systems, without any clear boundaries. Events wholly outside the range of political and military leaders’ vision can have an unforeseen impact on the situation. New economic and social concepts, new religious ideas or the revival of old ones, technological innovations with no obvious military applications, changes in climatic conditions, demographic shifts, all can lead to dramatic political and military changes.

The cumulative effect of all these factors is to make the strategic environment fundamentally uncertain and unpredictable. The onset of competition, conflict, and war merely intensifies this effect. Friction, misunderstandings and misinterpretations, imperfect knowledge, low-order probabilities, and sheer random chance introduce new variables into any evolving situation allowing events begin to spin out of control. History is too full of examples of great states defeated by seemingly inferior powers, of experienced leaders and armies overthrown by inexperienced newcomers, to believe that politics and war are predictable, controllable phenomena.

All of the social structures described above have engaged in warfare. Nonetheless, practitioners of international relations theory and the community of strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians tend to associate war with the nation-state and to blame it on the essentially anarchic nature of the international state system. It is certainly true that the state form of organization has been effective in all forms of politics, including war. It has been so effective, in fact, that virtually all of the world's land surface and its people are now recognized as belonging to some more or less effective territorial state.

Given the current international environment and the threat posed by non-state actors who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change in the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political power, one must remember that it is incorrect, qualitatively and quantitatively, to think that war is something that occurs exclusively between states, or that it is a product of the state or of the state system. While it has correctly been said that "War made the state, and the state made war,"¹⁵ even that formula acknowledges that warfare was a pre-existing condition. The anthropological evidence for large-scale human-on-human violence in non-state societies is overwhelming.¹⁶ Therefore, it would be equally accurate to say that "War made the state, and the state made peace."¹⁷

¹⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976).

¹⁶ Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33.

¹⁷ Bruce Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994), 78.

The modern European state system originated in an effort (the Peace of Westphalia) to put an end to one of the bloodiest fratricidal conflicts in Western history, the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Although warfare between states continued, successful states were able to control the ultimately more costly endemic local warfare typical of non-state societies.

Although the state is a stabilizing force, the state has not been able invariably to maintain its desired monopoly on the legitimate — socially sanctioned — use of violence. Entities including organized criminals, narcotraffickers, human smugglers, terrorists, insurgents, guerillas, radicals, extremists, anarchists, and revolutionaries, other than the state make war, most often on each other, but sometimes on the state itself.

In either case, the state will become involved, either in self-defense or to assert its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The monopoly on violence cannot be preserved by an entity unwilling to use violence effectively. Should it fail to involve itself in the struggle, the state will lose a major justification for its existence and will likely find that existence challenged. If the state fails to meet this challenge, it will likely be destroyed, or taken over by some new entity willing and able to take on this fundamental function. This new entity may be another state, or possibly a supranational entity like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (U.N.). Or it may be a new revolutionary government evolving out of what formerly was a non-state entity.

Thus one sees that states exist within a rather precarious zone between order and chaos. They are created and maintained by the interaction of various others, hopelessly intertwined but essentially autonomous systems. Leaders and governments have various levers to influence events, but they do not truly “control” their political entities so much as they more or less skillfully “ride the wave.” If they impose too much order the system will stagnate and die, like the former Soviet Union. If they cease to provide enough coherence, the system will fly apart.

The salient point is that, despite the persistence of some political forces and entities, the political movements and individual states and governments that wage wars are remarkably changeable and often fleeting things. In other words, there is nothing

permanent about any particular political entity. A state or political movement exists only so long as it serves some powerful set of human needs. Ultimately, its creation, existence, and disappearance depend entirely on its population's willingness to sustain belief. Radical changes in the distribution of power can occur in remarkably short periods.

Strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners, of the art and science of strategy and international relations theory, stress the fragility of political entities for two reasons.

- First, it is helpful to remind ourselves of our own, U.S., vulnerability. Powerful and inspiring as it is, the existence of the grand democratic experiment we call the United States of America is not inevitable. It continues only through the strenuous efforts of its government and of other elements in society which perceive it as a benefit. It can be, and occasionally has been, stressed to the breaking point.
- Second, it is necessary to remember that every enemy, no matter how seamless and monolithic it may appear, has political fault-lines that may be vulnerable to exploitation.

From its inception (ca. 1648-1918), IRT has been a policy-oriented discipline. There is no agreed-upon methodology for it (other than taking a normative perspective), but the field seeks to not only analyze foreign policy but to help formulate it. This has led, as one might imagine, to various debates (called theoretical debates) about ways of thinking in international relations. The content and character of those debates have shaped the field into what might be called the following "Schools of Thought" which roughly followed one another chronologically, despite overlap: (1) realism; (2) behavioralism; (3) neorealism; (4) neoliberalism; (5) world systems theory; (6) critical theory; and (7) postmodernism. The two dominant perspectives today are neorealism and neoliberalism, or perhaps realism and neoliberalism, as Gaddis (2003) points out, Kissinger (2001), being the most prominent American "realist" and Nye (1999) being the founder of "neoliberalism."¹⁸

Theories of international relations (IR) are attempts to capture, categorize, and explain the behavior of international actors. Foreign policy and strategy is crafted by

¹⁸ Thomas O'Connor, "An Overview of the Field of International Relations," Austin Peay State University, <http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3040/3040lect02a.htm> (accessed 28 December 2007).

drawing on theory to achieve long-term goals. The strategic theorist Colin Gray has commented extensively on the nexus between theory and the application of strategy. He correctly observed, “Strategic ideas and theory must define, organize, and explain for the practical world wherein threats or deeds have strategic consequences.”¹⁹

Most national leaders work within this context. They subscribe to a particular IR worldview (theory) which they then transform into policy (practice) in the international arena. Simple put, theories of international relations (IR) are broadly used by policymakers as the conceptual framework to determine conduct between nations. Decisions as heady as whether or not to go to war, or as mundane as whether or not to raise a tariff, are generally governed by an administration’s degree of adherence to a particular IR theory-in-practice (TIP). Bernard Brodie noted that strategy is “nothing if not pragmatic...Above all, strategic theory is a theory for action.”²⁰

Excellent overviews of the field of international relations include James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*,²¹ and Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*.²² These are two of the most comprehensive and inclusive surveys and syntheses available on the subject. They have been thoroughly revised and updated to reflect the various paradigmatic and theoretical debates that have emerged since the end of the Cold War and now incorporate the most significant current writings on all areas of theory from neo-realism, neo-liberal theory, postmodernism, constructivism to globalization, ethnic conflict, international terrorism, and new approaches to deterrence amidst proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effect (WMD/E) technologies.

¹⁹ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 124 and 354-355.

²⁰ Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: MacMillan and Sons, 1973), 452.

²¹ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 5th ed. (New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, Harper and Row Publishers, 2001).

²² Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993).

In “classical” international relations theory, the international system operates at “levels.”²³ Simplified, the levels of analysis are international, nation-state, and individual.²⁴ The first level, or international system level, suggests that nation-states behave the way they do because of certain fundamental characteristics of the system; a system partially self-imposed by the actors themselves (i.e., dispositional) and partially by characteristics of the operational environment (i.e., situational) of which they are all a part. The idea is simply that the system itself exerts a kind of force on the states, and increasingly the non-state actors, that compels them to behave and react in certain predictable ways.

For strategic leaders of the twenty-first century primarily concerned with the issues of foreign policy and national security, the international system with which they will be dealing is likely to only partially reflect the traditional international system. While the nation-state, first codified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, remains the dominant political body in international politics, its ability to influence events and people is being challenged by an assortment of non-state actors, failed or failing states, and ungoverned regions. This is occurring in combination with the transnational threats posed by terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, drugs, pandemics, and environmental degradation, as well as by elements of the system that also have potentially positive impacts such as globalization and the information revolution.²⁵

The international system refers to the structure of relationships that exist at the international level. These include the roles and interactions of both state and non-state actors, along with international organizations (IO), multinational corporations (MNC), and non-governmental organizations (NGO). States make foreign and national security policy against this external environment.

²³ U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd ed. Ed. by Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 81-82.

²⁴ Ibid., 81-82.

²⁵ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=839> (accessed September 19 2008).

The international system frames the forces and trends in the global environment; it also frames the workspace of national security policy and strategy makers. As they work through the formulation process, with an understanding for the interests and objectives of any actors in a given situation, those involved in the business of policy and strategy making must be able to account for the associated state and non-state actors present in the international system.

The national security establishment must be able to understand the threats to order in the international system represented by both conventional and transnational entities. If the policymaker or strategist can accurately assess all these factors, he might be able to determine friends and enemies, threats and opportunities, and capabilities and constraints inherent in the contemporary world (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges/threats analysis or SWOC/SWOT).²⁶ However, it must always be remembered that strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges are not constant; strengths can be weaknesses, challenges can be opportunities, weaknesses can be strengths, and opportunities can be challenges. Equally important is the idea that threats must have both intent and capability to constitute an actionable threat.

Threats, challenges, and opportunities can come in many shapes and sizes. A traditional threat might take the shape of a nation-state in possession of WMD/E and a hostile attitude (i.e., capability and intent). This is also true for a non-state actor, potentially going down to the individual level if he is willing to fly an airplane into a building. Less direct, but also significant in the twenty-first century world are the threats that can be made to the successful execution of a nation-state's policies, if other nation-states are unwilling to provide support in a given situation. Threats, challenges, and opportunities will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IX.

Theories such as the balance of power are based on this kind of analysis; for example, that if a single nation-state seeks to dominate the system (a hegemon), other states will join together to counter the power of that single state (balancing). Who

²⁶ John M. Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement* (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons, 2006).

possesses how much and what kinds of power (political, economic, military, etc.) at any given time are the critical variables. This leads to a basic focus on the distribution of power in the international system as a key explanation for system and hence nation-state behavior.

The reasons for this are found in the characteristics of the international system. The system is largely anarchic and possibly increasingly archaic because it is largely state-centric, in that the emergent dominant power, or “tipping point leader,” in this complex adaptive system is increasingly the non-state actor. In other words, there is no collective decision-making body or supreme authority to manage conflict, and enforce conflict resolution, among the competing states, and increasingly the proliferating population of non-state actors, in the system.

States, and increasingly non-state actors, a population that ranges from terrorists to multi-national corporations, compete with each other and manage their conflicts through their own use of organic power. This means that the system basically relies on self-help by the individual states, so the states must be concerned about developing their power relative to other states in the system. The more power one has, the more that state is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less power one has, the more that state may be subject to the whims of other states. These two characteristics mean that each state has a basic goal of survival and must be the guardian of its own security and independence.

The second level of analysis is commonly referred to as the nation-state level. This second level of analysis argues that because states are the primary actors, it is the internal character of those states that matters most in determining overall patterns of behavior. Because states are sovereign entities, they act relatively independently; because they are all part of the same system, the interaction of those independent decisions is what leads to war or peace or conflict or cooperation. One of the most common state-level approaches emphasizes the nature of the political system as a major determinant of state behavior.

Actors:

- State: The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, considered the classic legal definition for states, indicates that states

possess the following characteristics: permanent population, defined territory, and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and conducting international relations with other states. In addition, the government must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the state, and other states in the international system must recognize the sovereignty of that government. In contemporary international law, sovereign states are treated as equals; every recognized state can participate in the international system on the same plane. This sovereign equality possesses the following elements:

- States are legally equal.
- Every state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
- Every state is obligated to respect the fact of the legal entity of other states.
- The territorial integrity and political independence of a state are inviolable.
- Each state has the right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic, and cultural systems.
- Each state is obligated to carry out its international obligations fully and conscientiously and to live in peace with other states

Since the seventeenth century, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the nation-state has been the dominant entity in the international system, in part because of the power the concept of sovereignty gave the recognized states—both in terms of absolute domestic control and independence on the international level.

- Non-State: The term non-state actor (NSA) typically refers to any participant in the international system that is not a government. It is an entity or group that may have an impact on the internationally related decisions or policies of one or more states. Examples of non-state actors would be international bi- and multi-lateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multi-national corporations, the international media, and armed elements attempting to free their territory from external rule, or terrorist groups. An individual may also be a non-state actor. ²⁷

The third level of analysis emphasizes the role played by individual leaders — “the Great Man Theory” versus the philosophical analyses of human nature theory. Recently this level has been referred to as the decision-making level, which tends to point

²⁷ Yale University, “Convention on Rights.”

to factors more general than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, and to the fact that decisions about war and peace, conflict and cooperation are made by individuals, organizations, and institutions within a society. But the primary emphasis remains the same: real people make decisions that determine the pattern of behavior among states in the international system.

International Relations (IR) theories can be roughly divided into one of two epistemological camps: “positivist” and “post-positivist”.²⁸ Positivist theories aim to replicate the methods of the natural sciences by analyzing the impact of material forces. They typically focus on features of international relations such as state interactions, size of military forces, balance of powers, etc.

Post-positivist epistemology rejects the idea that the social world can be studied in an objective and value-free way. It rejects the central ideas of neo-realism/liberalism, such as rational choice theory, on the grounds that the scientific method cannot be applied to the social world and that an empirical and quantitative (i.e., replicable) science of IR is impossible.

A key difference between the two positions is that while positivist theories, such as neo-realism, offer causal explanations (such as why and how power is exercised) post-positivist theories focus instead on constitutive questions, for instance what is meant by ‘power’; what makes it up, how it is experienced and how it is reproduced. Often, post-positivist theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. This is something which has often been ignored under traditional IR as positivist theories make a distinction between facts and normative judgments, or values.²⁹

²⁸ William M.K. Trochim, “Positivism and post-Positivism,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, Social Research Methods (2006) <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php> (accessed December, 28, 2007).

²⁹ Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006).

*Realism:*³⁰ Sometimes called the power-politics school, realism focuses on (nation) state security and power above all else. Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war.³¹ Realism stresses that the international system is naturally in conflict. “Classical” realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr believed that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars.³² Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.

Early realists such as E.H. Carr, Daniel Bernhard, Bernard Brodie, and Hans Morgenthau, argued that nation-states are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival. Any cooperation between states is explained as functional in order to maximize each individual state’s security (as opposed to more idealistic reasons).

Many realists saw the Second World War as the vindication of their theory. Realism is defined by the following assumptions: the international realm is anarchic and consists of independent political units called states; states are the primary actors and inherently possess some offensive military capability or power which makes them potentially dangerous to each other; states can never be sure about the intentions of other

³⁰Edward Hallett Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 277; Frank V. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., *Makers of American Diplomacy*, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons 1974), <http://faculty.ncwc.edu/TOConnor/430/430lect03.htm> (accessed December 28, 2007); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³¹ Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), 29.

³²*Ibid.*, 29.

states; the basic motive driving states is survival or the maintenance of sovereignty; states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.³³

*Neo-Realism:*³⁴ Neo-realism, or what is sometimes called structural realism, is largely based on the work of Kenneth Waltz (who first coined the term “structural realism” in his book *Man, the State, and War*).³⁵ While retaining the empirical observations of realism, that international relations are characterized by antagonistic interstate relations, neo-realists point to the anarchic structure of the international system as the cause and rejected explanations that take account of states’ domestic characteristics, viewing all states as black boxes whose intentions cannot be gauged with 100 percent certainty. Neorealist theory ignores human nature and focuses on the effects of the international system.³⁶ States are compelled by relative gains and balance against concentration of power.³⁷

Unlike classical realism, neo-realism seeks to be scientific and more positivist. What also distinguishes neo-realism from realism is that the former does not accept the latter’s emphasis on the behavioral (i.e., dispensational) explanation of international relations. In a neo-realist environment, states seek to survive within an anarchical system. Although states may seek survival through power balancing, balancing is not the aim of that behavior; balancing is a product of the aim to survive.

Given that the international system is regarded as anarchic in the neo-realist paradigm and based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles; hence the

³³ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*; Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*.

³⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

³⁶ Walt, “International Relations,” 29.

³⁷ David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001).

international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular point in time, may be characterized as ³⁸uni-polar, bipolar or multi-polar.

An important refinement to realism was the addition of offense-defense theory; laid out by Robert Jervis, George Quester, and Stephen Van Evera, who argued that war was more likely when states could conquer each other easily. When defense was easier than offense, however, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined, and cooperation could blossom. If the defense had the advantage, and states could distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, then states could acquire the means to defend themselves without threatening others, thereby dampening the effects of anarchy.³⁹

For these defensive realists, states merely sought to survive, and great powers could guarantee their security by forming balancing alliances and choosing defensive military postures (such as retaliatory nuclear forces). Not surprisingly, Waltz and most other neorealists believed that the United States was extremely secure for most of the Cold War. Their principle fear was that it might squander its favorable position by adopting an overly aggressive (hegemonistic by default or by choice) foreign policy. By the end of the Cold War, realism had moved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding about human nature and taken on a slightly more optimistic tone.⁴⁰

Liberalism — Idealism — Liberal Internationalism: Liberalism et al., is occasionally referred to as institutional liberalism precisely because of the focus on spreading democratic institutions. Liberalism is a Lockean dispensational political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favors civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority.

In IR, liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. In general, liberalists stress that the international system is naturally cooperative. One strand

³⁸ Yale University, "Convention on Rights and Duties."

³⁹ Walt, "International Relations," 29.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 29.

of liberal thought argues that economic interdependence discourages states from using force against each other because warfare threatens each side's prosperity. A second strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, envisions the spread of democracy as the key to world peace, claiming that democratic states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argues that international institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could help overcome selfish state behavior, mainly by encouraging states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation.⁴¹

In a liberal IR paradigm, states are but one actor in world politics, and even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the propensity of basing interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors, such as trans- and multi-national corporations, the International Monetary Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank), and the United Nations play important roles in framing and shaping the behavior of states.

Adherents of liberalist international relations posit that states mutually gain from cooperation and that war is so destructive to be essentially futile and thus counterproductive if not self-destructive. Liberal internationalism states that, through bi- and multi-lateral non-governmental international organizations such as the United Nations, it is possible to avoid the worst excesses of "power politics" in relations between nations.

Liberal internationalism argues that liberal states should intervene, including military intervention and humanitarian aid, in other sovereign states in order to pursue liberal objectives. The goal of liberal internationalism is to achieve global structures within the international system that are inclined towards promoting a liberal world order. To that extent, global free trade, liberal economics, and liberal political systems are all encouraged. In addition, liberal internationalists are dedicated towards encouraging democracy to emerge globally. A new version of "idealism," centered on human and civil

⁴¹ Walt, "International Relations," 29.

rights, liberties, and freedoms as basis of the legitimacy of international law, has been advanced. Examples of liberal internationalists include Woodrow Wilson, Paul Berman, and Oliver Kamm.⁴²

Neo-Liberalism: Neo-liberalism is institutional liberalism that distinguishes itself by contrast and/or selective inclusion with the ideas of “commercial” liberalism (the linking of free trade with peace), “republican” liberalism (the linking of democracy and peace), and “sociological” liberalism (theories of international integration). The more inclusive theories, according to Baldwin (1993),⁴³ tend to be the best challengers to realist/neorealist orthodoxy, and neo-liberalism is best understood as opposed to realism/neo-realism orthodoxy (its war-mongering and militaristic thrusts).

Neo-liberalism defines “security” in broad terms, often arguing that factors such as health, welfare, and environmental issues need to be included in institution-building efforts, whether passive (non-interventionist) or active (interventionist).⁴⁴ Neo-liberalism seeks to update liberalism by accepting the neorealist presumption that states are the key actors in international relations, but still maintains that non-state actors (NSAs) and inter- and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs) matter.

Proponents of neo-liberalism as such argue that states will cooperate irrespective of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains. This also means that nations are; in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting policy without any international organizations blocking a nation’s right to sovereignty.⁴⁵ Neoliberalism also contains an economic theory that is based on the use of open and free markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other

⁴² Louis Auchincloss, *Woodrow Wilson*, (New York: Viking Group, 2000); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993); Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*; John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (Jackson, TN: Basic Books, 1989); Max Singer and Adam Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (Comparative Politics and the International Political Economy) (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1996); and Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).

⁴³ Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.

⁴⁴ Thomas O’Connor, “An Overview of the Field of International Relations.”

⁴⁵Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.

conglomerates from forming. The growing interdependence throughout and after the Cold War through international institutions led to neo-liberalism being defined as international institutionalism.⁴⁶

Classical realism and classical liberalism have a long and respected tradition in American political culture as well as in many other countries. However, the literature researched suggested that it must be acknowledged that neither classical realism nor classical liberalism are fully equipped to assist in meeting the strategic challenges of the twenty-first century.

International Society Theory (the English school): The “English School”⁴⁷ focuses on the shared norms and values of states and how they regulate international relations. Examples of such norms include diplomacy, order, and international law. Unlike neo-realism, it is not necessarily positivist.

The “opposite” of International Society Theory is Behavioralism, or the “American School.” Behavioralism “peaked” in the 1960s and is the term commonly used when interdisciplinary borrowing takes place (of ideas, concepts, models, theories, or methods) from one of the other fields in social science.

Behavioralist theories tend to be eclectic, cross-level, and some are cutting-edge while most are at least an attempt to expand the boundaries of the discipline. They are distinguishable by either a heavy empirical research thrust and/or a heavy discursive critique of the “classical” tradition in IR.⁴⁸

Social Constructivism: Constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes. They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes

⁴⁶ Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Independence*, 3rd. ed. (London, U.K.: Longman (Pearson) Publishing, 2000).

⁴⁷ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School Of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁴⁸ Thomas O'Connor, “An Overview of the Field of International Relations.”

accepted norms of behavior. Consequently, constructivism is especially attentive to the sources of change. This approach has largely replaced Marxism as the preeminent radical perspective on international affairs.⁴⁹

The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Therefore, social constructivism is a post-Cold War situationalist theory that encompasses a broad range of theories that aim to address questions of structure and the relative role of material forces (i.e., situational/environmental) versus ideas (i.e., dispensational).⁵⁰

Constructivism is not a theory of IR in the manner of neo-realism, but is instead a social psychological theory which is used to better explain the actions taken by states and other major actors.⁵¹ Constructivist theory rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of anarchy (lack of a higher authority or government) is a structural condition inherent in the system of states. Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt's words, that "Anarchy is what states make of it."⁵² That is, anarchy is a condition of the system of states because states, in some sense, "choose" to make it so. Anarchy is the result of a process that constructs the rules or norms that govern the interaction of states. The condition of the system of states today as self-helpers in the midst of anarchy is a result of the process by which states and the system of states were constructed. It is not an inherent fact of state-to-state relations. Thus, constructivist theory holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system of states.⁵³

Critical Theory: Critical Theory is the application of critical social theory or social psychology. It is an approach or methodology which seeks to take a critical stance

⁴⁹ Walt, "International Relations," 29.

⁵⁰ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*.

⁵¹ Timothy Dunne, "The Social Construction of International Society," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 3 (1995): 367-389.

⁵² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

⁵³ Mark Beavis, "The IR Theory Knowledge Base," IR Theory Website, (2007) <http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm> (accessed December 28, 2007).

towards itself by recognizing its own presuppositions and role in the world; and secondly, towards the social reality that it investigates by providing grounds for the justification and criticism of the institutions, practices and mentalities that make up that reality and therefore attempts to bridge the divides in social thought between explanation and justification, philosophical and substantive concerns, pure and applied theory, and contemporary and earlier thinking — to international relations.⁵⁴

Proponents focus on the need for human emancipation from the nation-states. Hence, it is critical of mainstream theories that tend to be state-centric. Almost all “critical theorists” hold to the belief that all theories are for someone and for some purpose. Critical theorists, therefore, try to merge or connect knowledge and practice (called praxis), fact and value, and the knower and the known.⁵⁵

In international relations and diplomacy, the three most common approaches are unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism. While most scholars and practitioners would agree that unilateralism constitutes actions taken by a power without seeking the consultation and the agreement of other states with interest in the given issue area, and bilateralism constitutes interaction between two states, the meaning of what multilateralism entails is rather elusive.

Bilateralism is a term referring to political and cultural relations between two states. Most international diplomacy is done bilaterally. Examples of this include treaties between two states, exchanges of ambassadors and other accredited diplomatic personnel, and state visits. The alternatives to bilateral relations are multilateral relations, which involve multiple states, and unilateralism, when one state acts on its own.

Realism and realists generally explain state behavior in international relations through looking at their relative level of material power and the role of self-interested considerations. Such a framework would argue that states are more unilateral if they have

⁵⁴ Steven C Roach, ed., *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2007); Richard Wyn Jones, ed., *Critical Theory and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2001).

⁵⁵ Thomas O'Connor, “An Overview of the Field of International Relations;” and Beavis, “IR Theory Knowledge Base.”

more material (i.e., military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and/or economic or any combination thereof) power invested in the issue at hand.

Realists tend to see and emphasize manifestations of material power (i.e., military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and/or economic or any combination thereof) that states have in different areas and then suggest that states with more relative power within an area are more inclined to unilateral action. A state will adopt a unilateral position if it has, relatively speaking, greater actionable power within an area; but will adopt a multilateral stance if it is relatively weak in this same arena or if such a choice will allow them to advance their national interest while sharing the costs with other states.

Liberalism and liberalists investigate and weigh the interests of important players in domestic politics as the major determinant of state behavior in international relations. They generally do not look at states as unitary actors and emphasize the influence of domestic lobby groups and other power centers within society, such as legislative and executive branches, on the foreign policy decision making process.

Liberal theorists are concerned with finding an explanation as to why certain domestic groups prevail over others in influencing foreign policy. In general, states will adopt a unilateral or multilateral position due to pressures applied to them by powerful domestic interest groups. Furthermore, if a state is more vulnerable to the impacts of other states and the international environment, it is more likely to embrace a multilateral approach.

Constructivists generally focus on what would be the appropriate norms of action for the actors based on their identities. This investigative and analytical framework investigates what norms of behavior (i.e., experiential, situational, dispensational) are more appropriate for the particular state and argue that the resulting uni-, bi-, or multi-lateral action in certain issue areas is guided by norms of appropriateness.

The focus of the inquiry of the constructivist approach is on the perceived rules of appropriate conduct at the time of engagement. Since the norms of appropriateness can

change over time, it is possible that different actors have taken different approaches on the same issue due to changes in their identity and respective change in the norms of appropriateness. Therefore, states selection of a unilateral or multilateral position within an issue area will depend on the understanding and interpretation of norms of appropriateness for the states with certain identities.

*Unilateralism:*⁵⁶ Unilateralists tend to believe that the international environment is, and has been, unpredictable, unstable, and dangerous. They believe nation-states must use their power to protect, and in many cases propagate, its interests and values.

Unilateralists contend that an assertive approach to national security policy is justified on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. Adherents of this perspective posit that the essence of unilateralism is that a nation-state does not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter it from pursuing its fundamental security interests or, in practice, nor should it compromise when pursuing its national security interests.

Unilateralists believe that a nation-state should not squander its position and capabilities by compromising and diluting its objectives and lessening its expectations in order to attract allies and partners. If the cause is justifiable, the nation-state should pursue it without compromise or caution and other nation-states, regardless of their position, can either accept the arguments and follow or be left behind as the other nation-state does what it should and must to advance its interests and values and maintain its national security. Adherents of unilateralism argue and defend the position that one of the main advantages of unilateral approaches to problems is that they provide maximum freedom of action.

*Multilateralism:*⁵⁷ Multilateralism can be defined as relations among three or more states according to a (common) set of rules or principles. Multilateralism refers to multiple states and/or international governmental and non-governmental organizations working together in concert on a given issue.

⁵⁶ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*, 15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

Multilateralists acknowledge that there are circumstances in which a nation-state should not rule out acting unilaterally, particularly when “vital survival interests” are at stake. However, multilateralists argue that most important issues facing the modern nation-state, including the U.S., in the twenty-first century are not amenable to or solvable through unilateral solutions. This concern is best represented by the emergence of a number of transnational threats posed by state and non-state actors.

Throughout U.S. history that has meant observing a shifting national security strategy, based on the relative influence of one of the broad traditional IR theories: classical realism, classical liberalism, isolationism, and idealism (also known as utopianism or internationalism).

The term “idealism” was coined by historian and international relations theorist Edward Hallett Carr as an epithet to describe the foreign policy orientation of President Woodrow Wilson, as well as several other international leaders after World War I.⁵⁸ Carr made the case for “realist” policy approaches by demonstrating, as he saw them, the weaknesses and fallacies of idealism. Broadly defined, idealism is “an approach to international relations that stresses the importance of moral values, legal norms, internationalism and harmony of interests as guides to foreign policy-making...a focus on institution building...(and) favoring a mixed-actor model which includes international organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), MNCs (multi-national corporations), and other non-state players” as central to modern interactions between nations.⁵⁹

Isolationism — like idealism, a term that carries much negative baggage — implies little involvement with the community of nations. Isolationism in this sense is more of a conceptual and hypothetical construct as opposed to an IR TIP. Neo-isolationism, the more practicable off-shoot of isolationist thinking which has at times dominated U.S. national security strategy, is defined more broadly as “a broad spectrum of aspirations, assumptions and attitudes” which “suggest that permanence is a vice and

⁵⁸ Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, 10, 20-21, 93-94.

⁵⁹ Graham and Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary*, 235, 362.

flexibility a virtue” and that “America’s engagement with the world outside its own hemisphere should be selective and dictated by national priorities above all else”.⁶⁰

Likewise, classical realism and classical liberalism require definition within the context of this paper. Classical realism, broadly defined, is the belief that a state or nation-state is the principal self-interested actor in international politics and “its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. International politics, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as a “struggle for power.”⁶¹

Power, in this sense, is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself. Rooted in the Hobbesian (pessimistic) view of human nature, the state is a necessary creation to protect individuals from an inherently anarchic world and the worst impulses manifested by human beings.⁶² Classical liberalism is similarly broadly defined as “an ideology, or current of political thought, which strives to maximize liberty, i.e., freedom of thought for individuals, limitations on the powers of government and religion, the rule of law...and fundamental human rights...to include the right to life, liberty, and property.”⁶³ In this construct, the state is held as the medium through which “natural rights” of an individual are attained, the most fundamental of which are personal liberty and equality. All IRT schools see the excessive concentration of power achieved by the United States after the Cold War as problematic or at least potentially so.

Realists, with their assertion of the centrality of power, whether as a means or an end, for understanding the dynamics of international politics, view American hegemony with apprehension because the kind of excessive crusading that comes when a nation abandons the pursuit of “interest defined in terms of power” for absolutist goal.

⁶⁰ Graham and Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary*,

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Susan Lloyd and Sharon Sreedhar, “Hobbes’ Moral and Political Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/> (accessed August 8, 2008).

⁶³ Celeste Friend, “Social Contract Theory,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Tennessee Martin (2006) <http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soc-cont.htm#H2> (accessed August 8, 2008).

While realist views tend to suggest a certain inevitability to the emergence of an anti-American coalition, liberal institutionalists and constructivists are not so fatalistic in their assessment. Whether from the perspective of power transition theory or other views of peace settlements, liberal scholars see the United States as able to shape the response of other states to the status quo.

Finally, because the constructivists locate the source of national interests in a nation's identity, the way the United States views itself may well determine its ability to pursue the kind of institutional strategy recommended by those emphasizing "imperial" hegemonic cooperation and coexistence. There is some evidence that the United States is moving increasingly in the direction of an imperial definition of its identity.

In the end, all three schools of theory converge on conclusions concerning hegemony. American leaders would do well to heed the observation of Edmund Burke in 1793 when Great Britain stood at, simultaneously, the height and brink of its power:

...Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded . . . we may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin...⁶⁴

An additional aspect to IRT is the concept of polarity. Polarity in international relations is a description of the distribution of power within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. There are three types of systems, uni-polarity, bipolarity, and multi-polarity. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or internationally.

Uni-polarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, theory and practice, describes a distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the executable instruments of national power — military, informational (i.e., cultural and

⁶⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 163.

ideological), diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic. This is also called a hegemony in which the state is a hegemon or hyperpower.

Simply put, hegemony or hegemonism⁶⁵ can be defined as the predominant influence, as of a state, region, or group, over another or others; leadership or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others; or preponderant influence or authority over others or domination. A hyperpower is a state that is militarily, economically, and technologically dominant on the world stage. Hegemons often see their strengths transformed into weaknesses and their opportunities consumed by challenges. The U.S., as the dominant global power of the post-Cold War twenty-first century, has been experiencing this since 2003-2004 due to current campaigns against radical extremists and the changing demographics of the global economy and the changing supply and demand for energy resources.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the United States, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991-1993, has become the dominant military force in the world, along with considerable economic, cultural, and political influence. As a result, the U.S. is often identified as the last superpower (i.e., a powerful and influential nation, especially a nuclear power that dominates its allies or client states in an international power bloc) or the last great power (i.e., a nation having great political, social, and economic influence in international affairs).

The superpower or hegemon in a uni-polar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over lesser (i.e., middle or regional powers) powers and minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system. Although it is early in the current financial

⁶⁵ The central idea of this theory is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the system. For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable system will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair. Ruth C. Lawson and Vincent Ferraro, "Theory of Hegemonic Stability" (lecture, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, 2008).

and economic crisis, the U.S. may be at the precipice in terms of maintaining global hegemony due to its overextension militarily and overexposure in the financial and economic sectors due to its large national debt and trade imbalance and changing domestic demographics.

Bipolarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, theory and practice, describes a distribution of power — or balance of power⁶⁶ — in which two states, superpowers or great powers, have the majority of military, informational (i.e., cultural and ideological), diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic influence internationally or regionally. In the majority of instances, spheres of influence and political-military alliance coalesce around these states. For example, during the Cold War, 1947-1993, most Western and democratic states identified with and aligned themselves with the U.S. under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other regional collective defense and security alliances, the Global Agreement on Taxes and Tariffs (GATT), and the European Union, while most Communist states, voluntarily or involuntarily, identified with and aligned with the Soviet Union and became members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Multi-polarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, in both theory and practice, describes a distribution of power describes a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. It is therefore a variant of bipolarity. Most scholars and practitioners believe this system to be the least stable of all of the systems in international relations. This is because the multi-polar system tends to create many shifting alliances until one of two resolving actions occur and temporarily stabilize — either a balance of power is

⁶⁶ As a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power and status—especially attempts by one state to conquer a region—will provoke counterbalancing actions. For this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of relations between states. A balance of power system functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when they are easily formed or broken on the basis of expediency, regardless of values, religion, history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. A weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring power. In theory, the bipolar system can extend to much larger systems, such as alliances or organizations, which would not be considered nation-states, but would still have power concentrated in two primary groups.

achieved because neither alliance see value in attacking the other or one alliance will initiate military operations and attack the other because it either fears the potential of the new alliance, or it feels that it can defeat the other side. In addition, one of the major implications, and drawbacks, of an international system with any number of poles, including a multi-polar system, is that decisions and decision making will be situational and experiential vice dispensational and will often be made for strategic reasons to maintain a balance of power rather than out of ideological or historical reasons.

In all three systems, there is a plethora of countries that are neither powerful nor powerless. These countries are called middle powers. The term is employed in the field of international relations theory to describe states that are neither superpowers nor great powers, but still have and wield legitimate political and diplomatic, financial and economic, scientific and technical, cultural and ideological, and military influence internationally. There is no single specific definition of which countries are middle powers and there is no standard agreed method to decide which states are middle powers.

Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but not dominance over any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers. The term regional power is also used to describe a nation that exercises influence and power within a region.

Finally, the issue of hegemony or hegemonism must be introduced and discussed. As stated earlier in this section, hegemony or hegemonism can be defined as the predominant influence, as of a state, region, or group, over another or others; leadership or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others; or preponderant influence or authority over others or domination. As previously defined, a hegemon or hyperpower is a state that is militarily, economically, and technologically dominant on the world stage and may be defined as a power that can dictate the policies of all other powers in its vicinity, or that is able to defeat any other power or combination of powers that it might be at war with.

First, hegemony is about raw, hard power. Militarily, a hegemon's capabilities are such that "no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it."⁶⁷ A hegemon also enjoys "economic supremacy" in the international system and has a "preponderance of material resources."⁶⁸ Second, hegemony is about the dominant power's ambitions. A hegemon acts self-interestedly to safeguard its security, economic, and ideological interests.⁶⁹ Third, hegemony is about polarity. Because of its overwhelming advantages in relative military and economic power over other states in the international system, a hegemon is the only great power in the system, which is therefore, by definition, uni-polar.⁷⁰ Fourth, hegemony is about will. A hegemon purposefully exercises its overwhelming power to impose order on the international system.⁷¹ Finally, hegemony is fundamentally about structural change, because "if one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic."⁷²

Based on these issues, questions naturally arise.

- Is the United States a global hegemon? Probably.
- An extra regional hegemon? Yes.
- Is the U.S. a hyperpower? Probably.
- Is the world now uni-polar? No.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, in a March–April 1999 article in *Foreign Affairs*:

⁶⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 40.

⁶⁸ Andrew Gamble, "Hegemony and Decline: Britain and the United States," in *Two Hegemonies: Britain, 1846–1914, and the United States, 1941–2001*, ed. Patrick Karl O'Brien, and Armand Clesse, 130 (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32.

⁶⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29–30, 144.

⁷⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 40.

⁷¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977), 44.

⁷² Mearsheimer, *Great Power Politics*, 34.

...there is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is uni-polar. A uni-polar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so... A bipolar system like the Cold War has two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to international politics. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A multi-polar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues...⁷³

Huntington continues by stating that

Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multi-polar system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states. The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power — economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural — with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world. At a second level are major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. They include the German-French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At a third level are secondary regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states. These include Britain in relation to the German-French combination, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil...⁷⁴

Consequently, although U.S. officials often act as if the world was uni-polar and they would clearly prefer a uni-polar system in which the U.S. would be the hegemon; in essence, U.S. officials expected x, they got y. They boast of American power and American virtue, hailing the United States as a benevolent hegemon. However, that moment has passed. In the uni-polar moment at the end of the Cold War and the collapse

⁷³Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

of the Soviet Union, the United States was often able to impose its will on other countries.⁷⁵ Given the current situation, the U.S., although still able to qualitatively and quantitatively eclipse its individual peer competitors in most, if not all, of the measures of national power, may not be able to impose its will as effectively as it has over the past decade.

According to Huntington, the superpower's efforts to create a uni-polar system stimulate greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multi-polar one. Virtually all major regional powers are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their own distinct interests, which often conflict with those of the United States. Global politics has thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a uni-polar moment—highlighted by the Gulf War – and is now passing through one or two alternating uni-/multi-polar decades before it enters a truly multi-polar twenty-first century.⁷⁶ The United States, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has said, will be the first, last, and only global superpower.⁷⁷ Brzezinski is probably correct in that the U.S. will remain the only global superpower. However, the U.S. will have to work harder and smarter to dominate an increasingly globalized and integrated world that is inherently more flexible, malleable, and transitory in terms of alliances and interests.

The major powers (i.e., middle or regional powers) prefer a multi-polar system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower. These powers, which currently include Russia, China, and India, currently feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of political and diplomatic, financial and economic, scientific and technical, cultural and ideological, and military global hegemony. American officials feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that hegemony because, according to former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott:

... in a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of Great Powers, the United States defines its strength—indeed, its very

⁷⁵ Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower.”

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

greatness—not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain dominance over others, but in terms of its ability to work with others in the interests of the international community as a whole...⁷⁸

None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo. For the US, rather than focusing on establishing unchallenged dominance in all places at all time, the status quo must focus on creatively combining and employing the instruments of national power to ensure its freedom of action in pursuing, achieving, and maintaining its core interests and its core end state.

In closing, Huntington argues that

...In the multi-polar world of the twenty-first century, the major powers will inevitably compete, clash, and coalesce with each other in various permutations and combinations. Such a world, however, will lack the tension and conflict between the superpower and the major regional powers that are the defining characteristic of a transitional uni-multi-polar world. For that reason, the United States could find life as a major power in a multi-polar world less demanding, less contentious, and more rewarding than it was as the world's only superpower.⁷⁹

Christopher Layne in *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*,⁸⁰ and his *The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment*⁸¹ argued that since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have embraced primacy and adopted an ambitious grand strategy of expanding the United States' preponderant power, notwithstanding the seemingly ironclad rule of modern international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter-hegemonic balancing of other great powers. Advocates claim that U.S. hard-power capabilities are so overwhelming that other states cannot realistically hope to balance against the United States, nor do they have reason to because U.S. hegemony is

⁷⁸Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower."

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

⁸¹ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7–41, Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.7> (accessed June 15, 2008).

benevolent, and because they believe that hegemony advances U.S. interest and that the United States can maintain its preeminence deep into the century.

However, Layne counters and challenges the United States' hegemonic grand strategy by using a balance of power paradigm that suggests the period of U.S. primacy is numbered and that other states have good reason to fear unbalanced U.S. power. Although Layne, like Huntington, does not condemn U.S. primacy, he acknowledges that unless the United States wields its preponderant power with restraint, it could fall victim to a counter-hegemonic backlash notwithstanding its relative invulnerability to conventional military threats.⁸² Layne's argument illustrates the transformation of strengths into weaknesses and opportunities into challenges.

Nevertheless, Layne makes it eminently clear that the United States' hegemonic power is not illusory. First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both military and economic power. Second, since the Soviet Union's disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge U.S. preponderance. In this sense, U.S. hegemony is the result of objective material conditions.⁸³ The material conditions, especially the financial and economic conditions, are being challenged and being placed under stress.

According Layne, U.S. hegemony marks the fulfillment of long-standing grand strategic objectives. Since the early 1940s, the United States has striven to create a unipolar distribution of power in the international system. And in the three regions that matter the most to it — Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf — it has maintained a permanent military presence both to prevent the emergence of new poles of power and to establish the kind of regional stability necessary to uphold a U.S.-dominated international order by more or less replacing anarchy with hierarchy in those regions.⁸⁴

Layne calls this a form of "Open Door" expansionism, drawing on a long tradition of revisionist work in U.S. diplomatic history. According to the author, Open Door

⁸² Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 7-41.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

ambitions dictate that the U.S. promotes an international system characterized by ideologically and economically friendly governments. In the terminology of international relations theory, such ambitions are a unit-level factor. The explanation for America's extraordinarily advanced global role over the past 60 years therefore lies in the specific intersection of international and domestic factors: American power acts as a permissive cause, while open door ambitions act as motivation. Given the U.S. dependence on foreign trade and commerce and the need for reciprocal transparency in trade and commerce, the "Open Door" policy, coupled with an ingrained sense of idealism and exceptionalism, has been at the core of the U.S.' national security policy since the nation's earliest beginnings.

In essence, the U.S. exists in a duality: The United States is a status quo power in that it aims to preserve the existing distribution of power. Yet, the United States is also an expansionist state that seeks to increase its power advantages and to extend its geopolitical and ideological reach. As Layne says, to preserve the status quo that favors them, real and perceived hegemony, including the U.S., must keep knocking down actual and potential rivals; that is, they must continue to expand. However, expansion in an increasingly globalized and integrated global environment may no longer be measurable in tangible metrics, but rather in terms of a actor's ability to establish and maintain transactional and relational communications through which dominance is achieved through consultation, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration; in essence, the ability to favorably frame and shape the situation in ways favorable to the actor will become the measure of successful expansionism and dominance.

As Kenneth Waltz noted, power does not mean that a state possesses the ability to get its way all of the time.⁸⁵ According to Layne, material resources never translate fully into desired outcomes (military strategists acknowledge this when they observe that "the enemy has a vote" in determining the degree to which a state can realize its strategic goals). Although a hegemon does not get its way all of the time, its vast power will help it get its way with other states far more often than they will get their way with it.

⁸⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 91–192.

Precisely because the United States is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of influence in its favor. In international politics, the United States does not get all that it wants all of the time. But it gets most of what it wants an awful lot of the time, and it affects other states far more than other states affect it.⁸⁶

Layne suggests that the optimal and expected realist strategy would, in fact, be a generally noninterventionist approach in relation to European and Asian security matters, but that at least since the 1940s, the U.S. has instead followed an extremely ambitious and dysfunctional strategy of global or “extra-regional hegemony.”

According to Layne, and to some degree Huntington, the most robust argument for long-lasting U.S. hegemony is that uni-polarity transforms the nature of international politics and negates the balancing dynamic because the United States’ hard power has surpassed this threshold and that the sheer magnitude of its military, technological, and economic power discourages would-be peer competitors from even attempting to compete geopolitically against it, and most states have no reason to balance against the United States because they do not feel militarily threatened by it. Although the United States can employ its many military, economic, and diplomatic instruments as inducements to ward off potential challenges to its preeminence, the fact that the United States is a democratic hegemon not only alleviates others’ fears of its hegemonic power, but the liberal democratic nature of the United States’ domestic political system legitimates U.S. hegemony and simultaneously reassures others of its benevolence.⁸⁷

Layne and Huntington would likely agree that although the U.S. is a hegemonic power, it has not necessarily sought hegemonic power. Instead, the U.S. has used its strengths to convert temporary vacuums of power into exploitable opportunities. By filling the vacuum of power, the U.S. has expanded and maintained its “reach” and its ability to control, direct, and dominate world affairs.

⁸⁶ Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” 7-41.

⁸⁷ John G. Ikenberry, and Charles A. Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power,” in *World Leadership and Hegemony* ed. David P. Rapkin, 52 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

Although many U.S. policymakers believe that the United States is a benevolent hegemon, other states must worry primarily about the hegemon's, in this case the U.S., capabilities rather than its intentions; the ability of the United States to reassure others is limited by its formidable, and unchecked, capabilities, which always are at least a latent threat to other states. Even in a uni-polar world, not all of the other major powers (super and great powers, middle, and regional powers) will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon.

However, according to Layne's argument, some are bound to regard the hegemon's power as menacing.⁸⁸ For example, although primacists assert that U.S. hegemony is non-threatening because U.S. power is "offshore," this manifestly is not the case according to Layne and Stephen M. Walt.⁸⁹

On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, American power is both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East Asia) and in the faces of Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an offshore balancer that is "stopped by water" from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United States has acquired the means to selectively project massive military power and non-military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to establish extra-regional hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

Given that the U.S. currently exists in a duality, it has only five postures available to it as it enters the second decade of the twenty first century.

- Isolationism: Isolationism has appealed to the populace in the past, especially during the early twentieth century. Its supporters assert that the United States is "not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order."⁹⁰ In adopting a global posture emphasizing isolationism, the size and capabilities of the military force structure would thus be modest and centered on a reactive, defensive posture.

⁸⁸ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 7-41.

⁸⁹ Stephen M Walt, "In the National Interest: A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy," *The Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum*, (February- March 2005) <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html>. (accessed June 2008).

⁹⁰ Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings, vol.1. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 10.

- Critics of isolationism argue that by only directly addressing the vital interest of protection of “security, liberty, and property” can the United States disengage throughout the world. Now, more than ever, the United States has an interest in the global environment. The immediate risks of isolationism would include a decreased economic prosperity, since U.S. corporations would find it more difficult to engage in trade with other nations and multi-national corporations. The U.S. economy is interdependent on the economies of other trading partners through treaties and international organizations. Longer-term risks include the global deterioration of basic human rights and prospects of more conflict as some failing countries are unable to secure basic human rights of their citizens and transition to democratic governments due to a withdrawal of United States support. Likewise, global terrorists and transnational criminal organizations will find an environment ripe for exploitation. While it is not likely that the United States would no longer enjoy a free representative government, it is very possible that individual security and prosperity would suffer if the United States retreated to a strategy of isolationism.⁹¹ “American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security, and the world is a safer place as a result.”⁹² The U.S. cannot abdicate its current position. Consequently, isolationism is not a viable BNSP approach.
- Collective Engagement/Offshore Balancer: A second possibility, collective engagement, is a strategic acknowledgement that the United States, acting as the offshore balancer — multilateral and realistic, cannot turn inward and that “no nation can build a safer, better world alone.”⁹³ Through active cooperation with international organizations and alliances such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and African Union, the United States can protect a wider range of national interests without a global military presence. Effective organizations and alliances foster norms of conduct by deterring would-be challengers through the certainty of collective retaliation.⁹⁴
 - However, skeptics argue that “international organizations have little if any power and therefore can do little to maintain or, particularly, restore peace;”⁹⁵ in part because it is difficult to reach a political consensus on the application of national or coalition

⁹¹ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 9.

⁹² William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for A New Century,” National Security Council (May 1997) <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy> (accessed June 2008).

⁹³ R. Craig Nation, "Contrasting Images of U.S. Grand Strategy," in U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings, vol. 1 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), 46.

⁹⁴ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 36.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

power. Furthermore, collective engagement requires a “sacrifice of [national] power and control over the intervention”⁹⁶ in exchange for a decrease in “human and economic resources” required to sustain national powers – especially military power. Although helpful in the face of direct threats to national security, collective engagement could make it harder to protect human rights and economic national interests when it lacks international consensus.⁹⁷

- Deterrence and Containment (Extra Regional Hegemon): A containment strategy, strategic internationalism and extra regional, loosely associated with collective engagement, supports international organizations and alliances for a narrowly defined role; it seemed to be successful in countering the expansion of the Soviet Union for the latter half of the twentieth century. While there is some dispute whether or not containment actually caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is clear, following the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 and attempts by terrorist groups to employ weapons of mass destruction, that containment will not always work against non-state actors or rogue and failed states, which can operate across borders and are not easily deterred. Similar to the strategy of isolationism, containment does not portend the loss of a free representative U.S. government.
- However, continued human rights abuses, the rise of totalitarian regimes, and direct threats to personal security pose a variety of risks. Although free trade under containment would result in greater prosperity under than isolationism and collective engagement, failure to restore failed states would pose a threat to continued globalization. Relying on the reactive coercive powers inherent in containment will not achieve national

interests. Indeed, the new global environment calls for a preemptive national strategy buttressed with positive incentives for all nations to join the global community.⁹⁸

- Selective Engagement: The selective engagement strategy is the U.S. acting as the offshore balancer — multilateral and realistic — and utilizes

⁹⁶ Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *Conflict after the Cold War*, 2nd ed., ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002), 201.

⁹⁷United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," in U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings, vol.1. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 137.

⁹⁸Daniel Limberg, *Army Transformation: Its Long-Term Ability to Support The National Security Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006)
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil401.pdf>. (accessed September 2008).

“carrots” and “sticks” to engage state and non-state actors. It has been the prevalent strategy, supported by administrations since the end of the Cold War, to create a favorable world order and was first promoted by the 1991 National Security Strategy and modified by the 2002 National Security Strategy’s advocacy of a balance of power favoring human freedom. Selective engagement recognizes that the United States “has developed an extraordinarily wide range of international commitments, and . . . [has] important interests at stake in every world region.”⁹⁹ This strategy recognizes that U.S. economic prosperity relies heavily on globalization, and “inside the global market all interests have transnational implications.”¹⁰⁰

- Critics argue that while the United States supports human rights, the United States is not consistent in applying the range of national power to protect human rights. These critics point out that the United States uses military power in some countries and uses only diplomatic power in other countries to further human rights.¹⁰¹ But the United States uses national power only after thorough analysis to determine the level of threat to a national interest and the appropriateness of using the wide range of national power to counter a given threat – “the most important strategic question is the opportunity cost.”¹⁰² A tailored strategy, designed to support national interests, has become the norm for states, regions, and non-state actors. The military force required for this strategy must be scalable and provide diverse capabilities. Selective engagement will have succeeded if a favorable world order and U.S. economic prosperity are sustained over the long run.
- Primacy (Global Hegemon): Primacy, global hegemony, the antithesis of isolationism, assumes “only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.”¹⁰³ As a grand strategy, primacy requires the uncontested supremacy of all forms of national power. Although the United States is the only remaining superpower with no near military competitor for the next few decades, economic power is bi-polar at best and steadily moving towards multi-polarity due to globalization. The United States recognizes the difficulty of seeking primacy and supports local and regional near-competitors by sharing economic, diplomatic, information and financial power in an effort to create a balance of power that is favorable to U.S. BNSP core interests and those of U.S. allies. Furthermore, while the

⁹⁹ Nation, “Contrasting Images,” 46.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 19.

¹⁰² Ibid., 17.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 29.

United States has no near singular military competitor, coalitions and non-state actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals could challenge the U.S. military primacy and bring great chaos and suffering to the U.S. homeland. Given that the United States has finite economic, diplomatic, and military resources and thus must continue to work with allies and governmental organizations to achieve its national interests and it is unreasonable to postulate that the United States can instantly achieve all of its national interests in view of the limited capability and resources available to wield the various forms of national power.

Isolationism is neither practical nor achievable. An engaged option is preferred.

The present Bush Administration's U.S. BNSP and strategy can be characterized as primacy-based selective engagement. Its predecessor's, the Clinton Administration, BNSP and strategy was a primacy-based collective engagement/offshore balancer strategy. Prior to 1993, the majority of the administrations adopted BNSPs and strategies that were largely characterized as being based on extra-regional hegemonistic deterrence and containment. Of note, the George W. Bush Administration (2000-2008) was the first administration since the James K. Polk Administration (1844-1848) to advocate, formulate, and execute a preemptive BNSP and strategy.

One of the most useful and traditional in the post-Westphalian era (1648-present), approaches to understanding the behavior of political entities is the concept of a balance of power. This concept is a tricky one, however, for the term is used to mean a number of quite different things. In fact, it has no widely agreed-upon meaning. It is nonetheless useful to examine some of the different, often contradictory, ways in which the phrase "balance of power" is used. These contradictions themselves reveal a lot about the nature of politics and the role of war. According to George Liska in Sheehan's *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, the balance of power is "at once the dominant myth and the fundamental law of interstate relations."¹⁰⁴

The term balance of power is usually used in reference to states, but it is applicable to any system involving more than one political power center. The phrase can mean any of the following:

¹⁰⁴ Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), 2.

- The actual distribution of power, however unequal that may be.
- A situation in which two or more entities or groups of entities possess effectively equal power.
- A system in which entities shift alliances in order to ensure that no one entity or group of entities becomes preponderant.

For the purposes of this paper, the most useful meaning of the term is the last given. Balance of power systems have appeared frequently in world history. Normally, such a system is created when several entities vie for supremacy (“hegemony”), yet none individually has the power to achieve it alone. All are suspicious of any potentially hegemonic power, for fear of being swallowed up. Historically, most societies have viewed this as an abnormal situation; the traditional Chinese ideal of uniting “all under heaven” is typical, as was the medieval European ideal of a universal church and empire. After all, there can be only one “best” solution philosophically, and that solution logically should apply to all of mankind. Most civilizations have ultimately achieved such unity; and paid for it with stagnation.

Only in the modern (post-Westphalian, ca. 1648) European world did the concept of a balance of power gain widespread recognition as a desirable state of affairs. This occurred when it became apparent that no one government or ideology had the power to unite Western civilization by force. Attempts to do so had become so costly and disruptive that they threatened social stability and the dominance of ruling classes everywhere.

Gradually, the ideal of a stable system of independent states took hold. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), most European wars were fought either to maintain the rough equality of the “great powers” or to contain or destroy the occasional “shark” who sought to overthrow the system and impose its hegemony. The object of the system was not peace, but rather the security, freedom, and independence of the participating states.

One of the great debates over the nature of the state system is over whether all states are by nature are sharks who would consume their neighbors given the opportunity or if instead most states are content to coexist peacefully, and sharks are the exception to

the rule. That debate is essentially irresolvable. It is clear, however, that the periodic arrival of an undeniable “shark” led to a steady decrease in the number of independent states even in Europe. Even non-aggressive states were forced to annex their smaller neighbors as a means of increasing their own powers of self-defense.

“Sharks” seek to overthrow the balance of power system. Their strategy is to eliminate all competitors (within a state, a region, or world-wide). In the West as a whole, this goal has frequently been attempted but never achieved. Such an effort tends to be disastrous, since it means taking on multiple enemies.¹⁰⁵ “Sharks” (e.g., Napoleonic France, Imperial and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) represent an obvious class of threats to a balance of power system. Ambitious powers must always be wary of what Clausewitz called the “culminating point of victory.”¹⁰⁶ This is the point at which one competitor’s success prompts its allies and other potential players to withdraw their support or even throw their weight against it.

Even if successful, the hegemonic solution has its limits. A political entity with no peer competition will most likely stagnate, a case of “nothing fails like success.” Because of the internal dynamics of any human system, inherently a complex adaptive system of systems, it is difficult for such a winner to maintain its military edge for long. For example, the reservoir of military experience inevitably ages (with all of the changes in attitude and values that this implies) and eventually dies off. Almost equally inevitably, a new enemy will arise, either from within via civil war or revolution or from off-stage. World historians have suggested that it was the success of hegemonic states in the Middle East, India, and China that left them so vulnerable to the emerging West, in which there remained the stimulus of furious internal political, economic, and military competition.¹⁰⁷

The conservative, fundamentally practical, doable, achievable, and realistic, strategic solution is to know when and where to stop, i.e., to understand the meaning of

¹⁰⁵ Christopher Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy” (2006) <http://www.clausewitz.com/StrategyBook/WholeThing.html>. (accessed September 6, 2008).

¹⁰⁶ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 566-573.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 3-30.

the culminating point of victory and to live within the balance of power system. Entities pursuing this strategy are not necessarily altruistic or unambitious. They simply recognize the nature of the system and use it to enhance their own positions. They draw strength from the other members of the system and benefit from the errors committed by sharks.¹⁰⁸

Knowing where to stop, in both their internal and external political struggles, has been a major factor in the consistent strategic success of powers like Great Britain and the United States. The greatest individual practitioner of this strategy, the art and science of realpolitik, was probably the Prussian/German chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In three short wars (1864, 1866, and 1870-71), Bismarck disrupted the European balance of power by unifying most of the small German states into a single, powerful German Empire.¹⁰⁹ Rather than use this power in a dangerous attempt to unify all of Europe; however, he used it to make Germany the new balancing power, working tirelessly to maintain peace among the great powers. His successors, by overplaying their hand, destroyed both Germany and Europe.

Less well understood, however, is another kind of threat, the “power vacuum.” A power vacuum occurs when there is no authority capable of maintaining order in some geographic area.¹¹⁰ As stated earlier in this chapter, the U.S. has, because of the great strengths resident in its instruments of national power, has taken advantage of the opportunity to fill these “power vacuums” and subsequently, in most case, exploit them to its benefit.

Power vacuums are disruptive to the balance of power in two distinct ways. First, the disorder in the vacuum tends to spread as violent elements launch raids into surrounding areas or as fanatics and criminal organizations commit other provocative

¹⁰⁸ Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War.”

¹⁰⁹ Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France In 1870-1871* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹¹⁰ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978); Carlton J.H. Hayes, *The Rise of Modern Europe: A Generation of Materialism - 1871-1900* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1941); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital: 1848-1875* (New York: New American Library 1978); and Richard Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism: 1865-1915* (New York, NY: Paladin Grenada Publishing, 1979).

acts. The disintegration of Soviet power in the early 1990s has provided many examples of this sort. Another example is the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which drew a reluctant NATO intervention force into Bosnia. Second, the power vacuum may attract annexation by an external power.

If this act threatens to add substantially to the annexing entity's power, other states will become concerned and may interfere. Many Russians saw NATO's intervention in Bosnia in this light. NATO's agreement to Russian participation in that mission represented an attempt to mitigate such concerns. Russia's recent actions (August 2008) in Georgia are highly illustrative of this effect. There have been examples of surrounding states peacefully cooperating to ensure that a power vacuum is eliminated in a manner that leaves the balance of power unchanged. For example, Prussia, Austria, and Russia had fought a series of exhausting balance-of-power wars in the 18th century. A new problem arose when Poland, bordered by these three states, became a power vacuum due to its own internal political failures. Eager to evade a new struggle, the three states avoided war by cooperating in three successive partitions of the Polish state.¹¹¹ Sometimes, neighboring entities are unwilling to take responsibility for maintaining order in a disrupted area. In that case, they will normally assist some local element to achieve sufficient power to reestablish order.

Another example of the problem of power vacuums also helps demonstrate the usefulness of the state form of organization. As a result of the Palestinian Intifada in the Israeli-occupied territories, a de facto power, but not de jure, vacuum developed. Israel could prevent the Palestinians from developing their own government, but it could not impose order. Israel had already discovered the difficulties of dealing with a disembodied, non-state terrorist organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO or Fatah).

Neither problem had proved soluble through military means. Israel has attempted to solve both problems by creating what is, in effect, a Palestinian state. This state can claim legitimacy in the occupied territories and can, in theory at least, be relied upon to put a stop to the turmoil there.

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan following the exit of the Soviet forces in 1989 and the Taliban's fellow travelers in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal

¹¹¹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1798-1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962).

Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan are also excellent examples of power vacuums being filled by de facto, but non-de jure, authorities. Al-Qa'ida, on the other hand, does not represent a de facto authority filling a real or perceived power vacuum. Instead, al-Qai'da is filling perceived philosophical vacuum.

Strategists must be keenly aware of the dynamics of the various balance of power systems that are involved in any given strategic problem¹¹²

First, one's own strategy (i.e., the U.S.) will be affected to some significant extent by the internal balancing and fractious jockeying for power that takes place between political parties, factions, and branches of government, and between various agencies, departments, and services responsible for maintaining the resources (i.e., means) resident in the instruments of national power. It takes strong leadership and willpower to prevent the bureaucratic balancing instinct from dominating the strategy-making process. The United States is not immune to the culminating point of victory.¹¹³

In addition, many participants in the coalitions that the United States has assembled since the end of the Second World War — specifically those formed to prosecute the 1990-1991 Gulf War and liberate Kuwait, the decade (1990-2001) long NATO-led peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping effort in the Balkans, and the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — are only temporary comrades in arms, with long-term goals that may diverge widely from the U.S.

Even some of the U.S.' customary allies, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia, and Japan for example, have long traditions as "great powers" and have not necessarily forgotten their own ambitions or, most recently and most importantly, their domestic political demographics and demands and their domestic economic requirements. Consequently, allies' and partners' attitudes toward American power, presence, and operations involving the U.S.' unilateral application of the U.S.' instruments of national power are complex. One need to only look at the reaction of, and divisions between, U.S. allies and partners to the crisis in Georgia to see that there are

¹¹² Bassford, "Policy, Politics, War."

¹¹³ Ibid.

great differences driven by domestic political demographics and domestic economic requirements. Consequently, a particular victory or setback may either weaken or strengthen U.S. alliances, dependent on the specific circumstances of the conflict.

Third, the balance of power mechanism is operational within the adversary's camp as well. During the early stages of the Second World War, for example, much of Italy's behavior was driven by concerns about her German ally's successes — and their failures. The resultant Italian actions caused great problems not only for the Western allies, but for Germany as well.¹¹⁴

During the current Iraq War, American policy and the community of strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of the art and science of national security were very concerned about the internal balance of power within a defeated Iraq. The United States desired the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but not if the result was the ascendancy of a radical new Shiite regime.

Like the “invisible hand” of market economics—supply and demand—the balance of power mechanism, itself a derivative of the supply and demand theory in which there is a supply of and demand for power, is always at work, regardless of whether the system's participants actively believe that it is a good thing. It will always influence events, but does not predetermine them.¹¹⁵

Balancing tendencies can often be overcome by strong leadership, by common interests, by a powerful threat from outside the system. They occasionally break down completely, and a single dominant power emerges. Consequently, the concept of a balance of power is a useful basis for strategic analysis, and the balancing mechanism is often a useful strategic tool.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle; The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

¹¹⁵ Deborah Boucoyannis, "Balance of Power: The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea" (presentation, annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, March 17, 2004).

¹¹⁶ Mark L. Haas, "Ideological Consensus and Balance of Power: Neo-Classical Realism and the Importance of Ideological Consensus in International Relations," *All Academic Research*, (2006). http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/1/6/3/pages151632/p151632-2.php (accessed August 8, 2008).

Despite the recurrence of various underlying strategic patterns, the strategic environment can take dramatically different forms depending on what Clausewitz called “the spirit of the age.” The First World War occurred in a multi-polar world dominated by powerful, militarized nation-states vying for national glory. In its aftermath, four empires ceased to exist—the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires.¹¹⁷ Into the power vacuums stepped the National Socialists in Germany, the Bolsheviks and Communists in Russia, and Kemalists and Young Turks in Turkey. The Austro-Hungarian Empire simply devolved into its distinct ethno-national entities before being consumed and absorbed into the Third Reich in the Second World War.

The Cold War, utterly different in character and duration, took place between vast coalitions in a bipolar world sundered by the ideological competition of communism and liberal democracy. The superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and their respective blocs of allies, associates, and partners, strove to repress or contain “local” conflicts everywhere (i.e., Berlin, Korea, Hungary, Vietnam and southeast Asia, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs, Malaysia and Kenya, Algeria, the Arab-Israeli Wars, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese Wars, etc.) for fear they might lead to global war — and the fear of initiating and consummating (losing by winning or winning by losing) thermonuclear war.¹¹⁸

In the post-Cold War world, the community of strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of the art and science of national security see, perhaps perceive is a better word, a global balance of power that is uni-polar and dominated by the United States and its Western or Westernized allies and largely free of fundamental ideological disputes, save in some cases religion.

¹¹⁷ Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (New York: Enigma Books, 1952).

¹¹⁸ Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); and Kenneth B. Payne, *The Fallacies of the Cold War and New Directions* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Press, 2002).

The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is exceptional — that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counter-hegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak.

Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States — that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional "hard" (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts attention from other forms of counter balancing — notably "leash-slipping" — by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of uni-polarity. Because uni-polarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. primacy.¹¹⁹ However, the U.S. will remain the "primus inter pares" because no other nation-state, nor any combination of nation-states, currently possesses, in their instruments of national power, the depth and breadth of capabilities required to establish and maintain genuine global dominance.

While a uni-polar global balance of power seems simple in theory, politics and the jockeying for political power did not stop with America's victory in the Cold War. The current situation in Georgia, and potentially east and central Europe with respect to the deployment of a new anti-ballistic missile defense system, are excellent examples. In Moscow's view, the missile defense sites are inexorably linked to U.S. relationships with Eastern Europe, including on-going NATO and EU expansion. Given this, the historic Russian fear of encirclement is very much alive at the moment.

However, many analysts in Europe and the U.S. widely believe Russia is using controversy over the agreement within Europe and NATO to further divide the U.S. and

¹¹⁹ Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of The United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.

its allies; and there may be some fact to this theory. There is a growing fear in countries such as Poland, Ukraine, and Estonia that they could be attacked, militarily, economically and financially, and diplomatically, by Russia as it attempts to reemerge as an international power. In addition, some U.S. European allies have been extremely reticent to support the missile shield agreement for fear it could amp up nuclear proliferation and cause nuclear ripples across the globe, where other countries such as India, China, or even Pakistan must reassess their own nuclear capabilities. The complexity of the situation is only beginning to emerge.

For example, there has been the recent emergence and promulgation of the Medvedev Doctrine.¹²⁰ The “doctrine” states that the Russian Federation has finally asserted itself and has proclaimed to the Russian people and the world that it will not allow itself to be encircled by the United States. The Russian Federation’s Presidential web site has the July 12, 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation on-line in its entirety.¹²¹ The Medvedev Doctrine, to say the least, is polarizing and it is not surprising that the Russians used the situation in Georgia to launch the doctrine.

¹²⁰ First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. The U.S. will build its relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law. Second, the world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something that cannot be allowed. It is unacceptable that there be a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict. Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. The U.S. will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible. Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. U.S. foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. The U.S. will also protect the interests of its business community abroad. It should be clear to all that the U.S. will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us. Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. The U.S. will pay particular attention to its work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, and close neighbors. (George Friedman, “The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy,” Geopolitical Intelligence Report, Stratford [September 2, 2008] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy [accessed September 6, 2008]).

¹²¹ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, Official Web Portal (July 2008) <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml> (accessed September 6, 2008).

Another region of concern is in East Asia involving China and Taiwan¹²² China and Taiwan, while in practice maintaining a fragile “status quo” relationship, periodically grow impatient with the diplomatic patchwork that has kept the island separate from the Communist mainland since 1949. After losing the civil war to Communist Chinese and fleeing to Taiwan in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) leaders of the Republic of China regarded the Communist Chinese government as illegitimate, claiming the mainland as rightfully their own. Beijing, in turn, regards Taiwan as a renegade province and has tried repeatedly to persuade the island to negotiate a return to the fold under terms similar to those governing the former British colony in Hong Kong.

While the threat of open war appears low and economic ties have grown steadily since the two began serious bilateral exchanges in the 1980s, periodic spasms of anti-Taiwan feeling in Beijing and of pro-independence sentiment on the island severely test the peace that has reigned in recent years across the Taiwan Strait. Experts say KMT’s return to power may bring better relations with the mainland. Fortunately, neither Russia nor China, nor a condominium of Russia and China, possess the requisite strengths to operationalize the current window of opportunity and challenge the U.S. for global dominance.

Additionally, potential “flash points” exist on the Indian subcontinent between an increasingly modern and industrializing India that is emerging on to the world stage along with China as a major force and an unstable and increasingly Islamic Pakistan that has ties to the global Islamic jihad. Similarly, Latin America’s resurgent leftist nationalism and xenophobic anti-Americanism for example are also emerging national security “flash points.” Additionally, a lucrative worldwide drug trade flourishes, financing criminal organizations that undermine or even seek to destroy legitimate governments. Burgeoning populations, especially in the littoral regions, threaten to overwhelm the abilities of corrupt or incompetent governments to provide justice and other vital services. Environmental disasters and disputes over resources as basic as water raise regional tensions.

¹²² Esther Pan, and Youkyung Lee, “China Taiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations (March 28, 2008) http://www.cfr.org/publication/9223/chinataiwan_relations.html (accessed September 6, 2008).

Consequently, the U.S. is dominant within an evolving international environment that is characterized by a host of new conflicts and new kinds of conflicts; the foremost among them are radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political power. This is new, that is, to a world grown used to the “long peace” imposed by the long stalemate of the Cold War. Bear in mind that the periods between 1815 (the end of the Napoleonic Wars) and 1860 (the beginnings of the Italian Wars of Unification and the Franco-Prussian War) and again between 1871 (the end of the Italian Wars of Unification and the Franco-Prussian War) and 1914 (the beginning of the First World War) were also characterized by the term “long peace.”¹²³

Long-suppressed ethnic, religious, regional, and even personal hatreds can trigger, and are triggering, large-scale violence. The result is often terrorism, civil war, secession, and sometimes the total breakdown of order. In Somalia, for example, the state completely disappeared, swamped by warfare between local clans and gangs.

No longer guided by the Cold War’s overarching strategic concept of “containment,” American strategists appear to be puzzled by this new strategic pattern or lack thereof. The United States finds itself drawn into local, regional, and transnational conflicts by a mixture of internal pressures, economic self-interest, humanitarian impulses, and balance-of-power concerns.¹²⁴

Like any complex system, the international environment is constantly subject to change, experiencing periods of both stability and instability. Instability tends to increase as the degree of interaction rises, particularly if one or more actors seek to impose change on the strategic environment. Periods exhibiting lower degrees of interaction are generally more stable. Periods characterized by stability tend to favor linear approaches to problems or challenges, while periods exhibiting greater instability tend to require nonlinear perspectives and problem-solving.

¹²³ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*; Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism*; Hayes, *The Rise of Modern Europe*; and Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army*.

¹²⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

As the level or complexity of interaction rises, the strategic environment potentially moves into a state of self-organizing criticality, at which time it lies on the border of order and disorder, and then is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing. Therefore, the strategic equilibrium is adjusted continuously, but on these occasions the strategic environment experiences dramatic change. Such major changes really reflect upheavals in the key continuities of the strategic environment's different communities — business, government, academic, military, religion, etc.

What this body of literature shares is an appreciation that the strategic environment is in the midst of a major reshaping as a result of changes generally attributed to the convergence of a number of events or trends: the end of the Cold War, massive changes in economic relationships, the rise of globalization, and seminal advances in technology. At the heart of these changes are the establishment of information and knowledge — their production, dissemination, storage, and use — as the fundamental social and economic activity, rather than the cultivation of agriculture or the production of manufactured goods.¹²⁵

It is a transformation of social and economic life on a global scale. Such a widespread change in multiple subsystems has dramatic implications for the strategic environment and the states and actors that compose the international system. Moreover, it will impose further change both at the international and domestic levels of most, if not all, actors.

Strategists in the first quarter of the twenty-first century must recognize that the emerging strategic environment is the product of such an upheaval. In terms of chaos or complexity theory, the strategic environment is in the process of bifurcation. The order or relative balance of the bipolar Cold War becomes part of the past as a new order is formed. While not all the rules must change, because of the heightening the sense of

¹²⁵ Michael J. Mazarr, "Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A 'Leapfrog' Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy," in *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University, (April 2003) <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/complexity,%20global%20politics%20and%20nat'l%20sec%20-%20sept%20098/index.html> (accessed December 2007).

uncertainty and instability, many will need to be changed or reinterpreted as states and actors seek a new equilibrium.

The current period of great and rapid change presents both threats and opportunities. The period has already displayed its characteristics in broad terms. It favors service economies over industrial manufacturing economies; it is global and local in scope at the same time, global in its reach and local in its focus; it allows and encourages decentralized production while it democratizes decision making; it challenges and replaces authorities who cannot compete; and it appears to be ushering in a period of hyper-competition among businesses, cultures, and nation-states, non-state actors, and/or other new state-like actors.¹²⁶

In essence, it will be a period of revolutionary change until a new equilibrium is achieved, with the strategic environment now teetering on the edge of chaos. It is a period of great opportunity and risk for the strategist in any system. In retrospect, the latter Cold War period appears to have been relatively stable, with established rules for the international strategic environment that orchestrated the relationships and interaction among the states and actors — in short, a stable, but uneasy and volatile equilibrium of sorts.¹²⁷

Efforts to adjust to this an uneasy and volatile equilibrium in which smaller-scale warfare will be highlighted, however, must be tempered by concerns about the possible emergence of a new peer competitor (i.e., Russia or China or potentially a resurgent European Union) or some other strategic surprise (i.e., a pandemic, a catastrophic natural disaster, or climate change). However clear the general pattern of conflict may be in any era, there are always exceptions. The pattern can always change, with little or no warning. As demonstrated earlier, radical changes in the distribution of power can occur in remarkably short periods.

¹²⁶ Mazarr, “Theory and U.S. Military Strategy.”

¹²⁷ Harry E. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, Air War College (2006) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/strat_theory_21c_yarger.pdf (accessed September 7, 2008).

However, given the current financial-economic contagion and the keen competition for scarce military-industrial resources, it is highly unlikely that a genuine peer competitor to the U.S. will arise in the near term with the requisite strengths to operationalize the current window of opportunity and challenge the U.S. for global dominance. However, as unlikely as this scenario is, the U.S., in formulating and executing its BNSP, must constantly be on guard against such developments and maintain its freedom of action so that it can (1) detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat threats to its core interests and end state; and (2) ensure the highest level of preparedness necessary in order to effectively protect its population and critical infrastructures, including its instruments of national power, from the effects and consequences of potential threats; proactively and preemptively prevent, when possible and prudent, these threats from materializing and manifesting themselves against the U.S.; responding to, when necessary, to these threats; and recovering from the effects and consequences of threats that have impacted the U.S.

In any particular strategic situation, one can discern certain consistent patterns — like the balance of power mechanism — and use them as a framework to help understand what is occurring. At the same time, the U.S. must realize that each strategic situation is unique: In order to grasp its true nature, the U.S. must comprehend how the characters and motivations of the antagonists will interact under specific, often new, circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity,” composed of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; (2) of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and (3) of (war’s) element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason. The first of these three aspects more concerns the people; the second more the commander and his army; the third more the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. The task of today’s

strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of the art and science, therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance among these three tendencies, like an object floating among three sources of attraction.¹²⁸

In other words, Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined by the dynamic interplay among them.¹²⁹

Thus the strategic environment, past, present, and future, is always defined by the character of politics and the interactions among political entities. This environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance which defy any purely rational explanation. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.¹³⁰

The art and science of formulating and implementing a nation's basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation's national security occurs within the framework of the international environment. Any discussion of basic national security policy and strategy must begin with and be entered into with an understanding of the international environment and international relations theory. The strategic environment — past, present, and future, is always defined by the character of politics and the interactions among political entities, foreign and domestic. This environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of

¹²⁸ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," *Parameters* (Autumn 1995): 9-19. This article demonstrates the fundamental difference between Clausewitz's original concept of the "trinity" and the version popularized by U.S. Army thinker Harry Summers, Jr., in his influential book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). Summers interpreted the trinity as being "people, army, and government." This approach, while important and useful (and derived directly from an illustration Clausewitz provided), misses the larger point Clausewitz sought to make about the nature of the strategic environment.

conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance that defy any purely rational explanation. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment

The international environment, in which U.S. basic national security policy and strategy must operate in, is fraught with threats, foreign and domestic, to the national security of the United States. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests.

The current threat environment is highly ambiguous and characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests. Based on the recently completed National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* and the Department of Homeland Security's *Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008–2013*, the future threat environment is projected to be equally ambiguous and similarly characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.

Chapter V will acknowledge that there are enduring challenges resident within the international environment for the current and future U.S. national security establishment, at home and abroad and will include familiar military activities, such as defending against attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and terrorist networks and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include dealing with the collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in combination with the non-military instruments of national power to deter and prevent conflict around the world.

V. THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES¹³¹

The international environment is fraught with threats, both foreign and domestic, to the national security of the United States. The current threat environment is highly ambiguous and characterized by the acronym “VUCA;” volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests.

It has been seven years since 9/11. It has been more than seven years since the attack on the USS Cole, ten years since the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 15 years since the first attack on the World Trade Center, and 25 years since the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Over that quarter-century, the threat the U.S. faces from radicalism, extremism, and terrorism has constantly mutated, sometimes in tragically unexpected ways.¹³²

No one state, and no one particular threat or actor, state or non-state, threatens the United States directly. The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse, but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United States directly and concurrently, have the potential to undermine wider international stability. They include

¹³¹ Michael Chertoff, *Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HSTA)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2007); Thomas Fingar, “Security Threats to the United States” (statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C. February 16, 2005). U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/42445.htm>. (accessed September 8, 2008); and Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States; Michael McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007) Senate Armed Services Committee (July 2007) <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/February/McConnell%2002-27-07.pdf> (accessed September 8, 2008); and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *The Joint Operating Environment* (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2007).

¹³² Michael Leiter, “Looming Challenges in the War on Terror” (presented to the Washington Institute, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2008, http://74.125.95.104/custom?q=cache:Px2NK9u2yQkJ:www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/wash-inst-written-sfr-final.pdf+nctc+threat+assessment&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us&client=pub-1415334591037307 (accessed September 8, 2008).

international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and transnational crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalization.

According to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the dominant contemporary threat facing the U.S. is no longer emanating from a peer nation-state competitor (i.e., the former Soviet Union) as it was between 1945 and 1993. Instead, the dominant contemporary threat facing the U.S. is the transnational threat; specifically the extremist non-state-based Islamist threat.¹³³

According to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), J. Michael McConnell, General Michael Hayden, Director of CIA, General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Mr. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR), the current and projected threat to the U.S. is dominated by the transnational terrorist threat.¹³⁴

In his February 2008 Unclassified Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the DNI characterized the threat as broad and increasingly non-traditional. The threat to U.S. national security and core interests was highlighted by the continuing global terrorist threat; the continuing challenges in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, where many of the U.S.' most important interests intersect; the persistent threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related proliferation in North Korea and Iran; the threats to vulnerabilities in the U.S. information infrastructure to increasing cyber attacks by foreign governments, non-state actors and criminal elements; the growing foreign interest in counter-space programs that could threaten critical U.S. command, control, communications, and computer (C⁴), military, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;

¹³³ Chertoff, HSTA; Fingar, Thomas, *Security Threats*; McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment, USJFCOM, Joint Operating Environment*.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

issues of political stability and of national and regional conflicts in Europe, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia; growing humanitarian concerns stemming from the rise in food and energy prices for poorer states; and concerns about the financial capabilities of Russia, China, and OPEC countries and the potential use of their market access to exert financial leverage to achieve political ends.¹³⁵

Earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there was a widespread sense of optimism about peace, but that was all shattered on September 11, 2001 by the terrorist attacks on the United States and the long war against state and non-state actors who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Today, the United States is challenged by many different and evolving threats, including enemies with many faces and no borders — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, infectious diseases, cyber attacks, natural and man-made technological disasters, and illegal trafficking.¹³⁶

Over the past 25 years, it has become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and defeat these escalating and evolving threats; especially those characterized as being inherently asymmetric and unconventional. Although the U.S. maintains overwhelming dominance in terms of symmetric, conventional military, informational/ideological, diplomatic/political, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments (elements) of national power, the transnational, non-state-based extremist Islamist threat has become increasingly resilient and resistant to being contained by the aggregation of U.S. national power. These multifaceted threats, especially the terrorist threats to the homeland and to allies, remain the pre-eminent challenge to U.S. national security¹³⁷ and represent the next war the U.S. must prepare for, respond to, and win.

¹³⁵Chertoff, HSTA; Fingar, Thomas, *Security Threats*; McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment, USJFCOM, Joint Operating Environment*.

¹³⁶Michael McConnell, United States Intelligence Community, *500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration*. Office of Director of National Intelligence (October 2007) <http://www.dni.gov/500-day-plan.pdf>. (accessed December 29, 2007).

¹³⁷McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the transnational, and increasingly non-state-based, threat, primarily the Islamist terrorist threat, has rapidly and dramatically expanded in size, scope, and complexity and escalated in operational tempo. The introduction of an escalating transnational asymmetric and unconventional threat, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and advanced high explosives (CBRN-E) and other weapons of mass effect (WME) or destruction (WMD) posed by state and non-state actors must be considered as permanent for at least the foreseeable future. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) National Intelligence Council (NIC) judged, in its unclassified July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), *The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, that the U.S. homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years.¹³⁸

Although many of the current threats to U.S. national security and core interests are indeed generated by rational state and non-state actors, there many threats generated by irrational (or ill-informed) state and non-state actors. Consequently, they may be willing to accept destruction or disproportionate loss and thus may not be deterrable from striking out against the U.S. and its core interests. Consequently, the U.S. national security establishment must ensure that the nation is prepared to protect and mitigate against the effects and consequences of these threats and contain them; prevent these threats from occurring when and where possible; respond to and contain the against the effects and consequences of these threats; recover from them by detecting them as early as possible; denying and disrupting the threats distant from the U.S. homeland; and decisively defeating these threats.

For the foreseeable future, this threat environment, and, therefore, the threat to U.S. and its core interests (survival, vital, and important), will best be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology — and those who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures — that seeks to overturn the international state system. Beyond this transnational struggle, the U.S. faces other threats: including a variety of irregular (i.e., asymmetric and unconventional) challenges; the quest by rogue

¹³⁸ McConnell, *500 Day Plan*.

states for nuclear weapons; the anarchic instability and chaos caused by fragile, failing, and failed states; and the rising military power of other states. These are long-term challenges. Success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international power through the instruments of national power, over years or decades to come.

Violent extremist movements such as al-Qa'ida, its associates, and fellow travelers comprise a complex and urgent challenge. Like communism and fascism before it, today's violent extremist ideology rejects the rules and structures of the international system. Its adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power.

Fragile, failing, and failed states constitute another threat axis. The inability of many states, best characterized as failing or failed states, to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left unchecked, instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, its allies, and friends and perhaps even the homeland itself.

Rogue states such as Iran and North Korea similarly continue to threaten the international order. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism and is attempting to disrupt the fledgling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology and enrichment capabilities poses a serious challenge to security in an already volatile region. The North Korean regime also poses a serious nuclear and missile proliferation concern for the U.S. and other responsible international stakeholders.

The U.S. must also consider the possibility of challenges by more powerful states— Russia and China, for example, and now increasingly India. Some of these states, such as Russia and China, may actively seek to counter the United States in some or all domains of traditional warfare or to gain an advantage by developing capabilities that offset those of the U.S. Others may choose niche areas of military capability and competition in which they believe they can develop a strategic or operational advantage.

That some of these potential competitors also are partners in any number of diplomatic, commercial, and security efforts will only make these relationships more difficult to manage.

China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities. The U.S.' interaction with China will likely be long-term and multi-dimensional and will involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded combat capabilities. The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term challenges while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over time.

Russia is another ascendant state. Russia's first on-schedule change in leadership since communism and the first voluntary transfer of power from one healthy Kremlin leader to another was been clouded, however, by former President Putin's service as prime minister under his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev; a move that raises questions about who will ultimately be in charge of Russia. Coming at a time of uncertainty about Russia's direction, the Medvedev-Putin "cohabitation" raises questions about the country's future and the implications for Western interests.¹³⁹

As projected, Russia's retreat from openness and democracy, most recently exhibited in its actions recently with the Republic of Georgia, could have significant security implications for the United States, its European allies, and the U.S.' allies and partners in other regions. Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors; all of which are causes for concern.

Russia could become a more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered Moscow's confidence. Although Russia probably will work with the United States on shared interests such as counterterrorism, counter narcotics, and counter proliferation, growing suspicions about

¹³⁹ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

Western intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence and defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on areas of concern to the United States.

Other elements of Russian national power — from trade and energy, to diplomatic instruments and military and intelligence capabilities — are on a path to grow over the next four years. For example, Russia is positioning to control an energy supply and transportation network spanning from Europe to East Asia. Aggressive Russian efforts to control, restrict, or block the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian to the West — and to ensure that East-West energy corridors remain subject to Russian control — underscore the potential power and influence of Russia's energy policy. The Russian military has begun to reverse a long, deep deterioration in its capabilities that started before the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰

Russia also has begun to take a more active military stance, such as the renewal of long-range bomber flights and naval deployments, and has withdrawn from arms control and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.

China, as discussed previously in this paper, sees itself as a regional power with global interests. Its strategic priorities focus on sustaining economic growth and political stability, partly as means to reinforce China's status as a great power and to uphold its territorial integrity. Beijing sees a peaceful external environment as vital to achieving these goals. As a result, China's global engagement is not driven by Communist ideology or military expansionism, but instead by a need for access to markets, resources, technology and expertise, and a desire to assert its role in the international community.

China's efforts there have largely focused on gaining greater access to natural resources — especially oil; but China's involvement in these regions also helps promote its regional and global influence by burnishing China's image as a leader of the

¹⁴⁰ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

developing world. Public statements by Chinese leaders indicate that Beijing perceives itself as being in the midst of a twenty-year “window of opportunity” favorable to China’s growth, development, and rise in influence.¹⁴¹

As a result, Beijing is seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. and the rest of the world, which will allow China to fully capitalize on a favorable strategic environment. Indeed, Chinese officials consistently emphasize the need to seek cooperative relations with Washington, because conflict with the United States would risk derailing China’s economic development. They also seek to alleviate international concerns about China’s strategic intentions. As China’s influence grows, however, Beijing probably will increasingly expect its interests to be respected by other countries. This will be especially true within East Asia, as Beijing tries to leverage its growing influence into a greater leadership role in the region.¹⁴² Notwithstanding China’s external goals, the leadership is focused on threats to domestic stability. President Hu Jintao’s domestic policy agenda is an attempt to strengthen the Communist Party’s hold on power and maintaining China’s impressive economic growth.¹⁴³

China’s impressive economic growth, it is the world’s second largest economy and one of the largest investors in and owners of U.S. debts, masks significant distortions and risks, including a rigidly controlled currency that contributes to excess liquidity and wasteful investment; government policies that favor exports over domestic consumption; and a state-run banking system slowly recovering from a series of credit problems. China’s demographic problem of an aging population, high incidence of chronic and infectious disease, environmental degradation, and an increasing energy dilemma are likely to slow economic growth over the long term.¹⁴⁴

A sudden and sharp slowdown in China’s economy could exacerbate vulnerabilities in the global economy; hardest hit would be its neighbors who sell about 50 percent of their goods to China and commodity producers who have enjoyed high

¹⁴¹ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

prices and expanding export volumes because of China's rising demand for raw material, metals, and food. A sudden and sharp slowdown would also injure China's military modernization.

The U.S.' southern borders and neighbors also pose additional national security challenges beyond the contemporary concern over the porosity of this border. Although the gradual consolidation of democracy remained the dominant trend over the last year in Latin America, a small, but expanding, group of radical populist governments continues to project competing vision that appeals to many of the region's poor.

Indeed, the persistence of high levels of poverty and striking income inequalities will continue to create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism's message, especially in the less developed areas of Latin America. Inspired and supported by Venezuela and Cuba, leaders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and, more tentatively, in Ecuador and Uruguay, are pursuing agendas that undercut checks and balances on presidential power, seek lengthy presidential terms, weaken media and civil liberties, and emphasize economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches. Moreover, each of these governments, to varying degrees, has engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba, and increasingly Iran, on international issues, and advocated measures that directly clash with U.S. initiatives.

Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis, including natural, man-made, and technological crises, by the (Cuban) leadership could lead to political instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass migration. Illegal migration, drug smuggling and associated violence, and human trafficking continue to threaten to Mexico's internal security and the security of the U.S. southern border. The government also faces a rejuvenated threat from domestic insurgents and the narcotraffickers and their cartels and by a return to violence by the radical leftist Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR).¹⁴⁵

In Africa, where the Department of Defense just "stood up" a new geographic combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), persistent insecurity in Nigeria's oil producing region, the Niger Delta, poses a direct threat to U.S. strategic

¹⁴⁵ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Ongoing instability and conflict in other parts of Africa pose less direct though still significant threats to U.S. interests because of their high humanitarian and peacekeeping costs, drag on democratic and economic development, and potential to get worse.¹⁴⁶

Southeast Asia, now recovered from the late twentieth century's economic "bubble burst," includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the United States as a source of stability, wealth, and leadership. However, the region is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations, crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. Burma remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on democracy and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is particularly at risk from avian flu, which will be addressed later at greater length. Al-Qa'ida-affiliated and other extremist groups are present in many countries, although effective government policies have limited their growth and impact.

Now more than ever, access to stable and affordably priced energy supplies is, and has long been, a critical element of national security. Sustained increases in global demand and the interactive effects of energy with other issues, such as the emergence of China and India as major oil consumers and users due to rapid industrialization, have both magnified and broadened the significance of developments in the global energy system.

Geopolitical uncertainties and tensions heighten the risk of a major oil supply disruption and the attendant negative repercussions for the global economy. Threats to Iraqi and Nigerian oil output remain a concern despite some positive developments last year. Terrorist attacks against Persian Gulf oil facilities and the potential fallout from mounting tension with Iran over its nuclear program are significant additional risks.

In Iraq, completion of a new pipeline and security improvements have helped Baghdad boost production and exports in recent months by several hundred thousand barrels per day, but output remains vulnerable to episodic violence. Ethnic and political violence and criminal activity threaten a large portion of Nigeria's 2.2 million barrels per

¹⁴⁶ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

day (b/d) of oil output. Public statements by al-Qa'ida leaders indicate that terrorists are interested in striking Persian Gulf oil facilities. Iran could withhold some or all of its 2.4-million b/day oil exports or even try to impede the flow of 18 million barrels per day of oil through the Strait of Hormuz if its pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle sparks a major crisis; however, the U.S. assesses Tehran is likely to take these provocative steps only if it perceived it had little to lose. Venezuela's President Chavez has pledged solidarity with Iran and might also curtail some or all of his country's exports of about 2 million b/d in such a scenario.

High energy prices and escalating demand for oil and natural gas, also has resulted in windfall profits for producers. OPEC countries earned an estimated \$690 billion from oil exports last year, nearly three times the revenues earned in 2003. The increased revenues also have enabled producers like Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and Russia to garner enhanced political, economic and even military advantages and complicated multilateral efforts to address problems such as the tragedy in Darfur and Iran's nuclear program.

With about 70 percent of global oil reserves inaccessible or of limited accessibility to outside oil companies, competition between international oil companies to secure stakes in the few countries open to foreign investment is likely to intensify. Determined to secure the energy inputs necessary to fuel continued robust economic growth, Chinese and Indian state-owned and private energy companies are pursuing strategic investments in energy assets worldwide. There is also a sharp rise in Russia's investment abroad, much of it driven by Russian energy companies. Moscow is using the power of its energy monopoly to ensure that East-West energy corridors remain subject to Russian influence.¹⁴⁷

Global food prices also have been rising steadily over the past two years driven by higher energy prices, weak harvests, historically low stocks, and robust demand. There is little near term relief in sight because production increases in several countries, including Australia, are hampered by water shortages and land constraints. High food prices in

¹⁴⁷ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

several countries, including Russia, China, India, and Vietnam, are forcing governments to engage in market distorting practices such as banning food exports, increasing subsidies, or fixing prices: The double impact of high energy and food prices is increasing the risk of social and political instability in vulnerable countries.¹⁴⁸

The international spread of infectious diseases and the increasing emergence of new ones remain challenges to U.S. national security. The spread of infectious disease is exacerbated by poverty, an insufficient global health infrastructure, increasing globalization, urbanization (especially in the developing world), migration, complex humanitarian emergencies with resultant refugee flows, and environmental degradation. Additionally, misuse of antibiotics has led to an increase in resistant bacteria strains.

Disease also indirectly threatens us with its potential impacts upon the international economy, civil society and critical infrastructures. Even if an outbreak does not threaten the U.S. directly, the resulting instability or humanitarian emergency can place additional demands on U.S. resources.

The most pressing infectious disease challenge for the United States is still the potential emergence of a severe influenza pandemic. Although the avian H5N1 virus (“bird flu”) has remained primarily a threat to poultry, it continues to expand its geographic coverage and to evolve — indeed it retains the potential to evolve into a human pandemic strain. A virulent virus from such an emerging pandemic also has, albeit small, the potential to be used as a weapon by a terrorist group or a technically experienced lone actor; such an attack would likely be devastating, both economically and socially (i.e., the October 2001 anthrax attacks).

While the Intelligence Community (IC) does not currently see this level of technical sophistication in terrorist groups, isolating a virulent strain is difficult, the

¹⁴⁸ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

possibility cannot be ruled out; therefore, the IC will continue to use its intelligence resources to try to help detect any such preparations to use a virus as a terrorist weapon.¹⁴⁹

Therefore, population, resource, energy, climatic and environmental crises are likely to combine with rapid social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty. This uncertainty is exacerbated by both the unprecedented speed and scale of change, as well as by the unpredictable and complex interaction among the trends themselves. Globalization and growing economic interdependence, while creating new levels of wealth and opportunity, also create a web of interrelated vulnerabilities and spread risks even further, increasing sensitivity to crises and shocks around the globe and generating more uncertainty regarding their speed and effect.

As already illustrated, there are many drivers and trends shaping the future global environment in which the U.S. national security establishment must operate: demographic and social change; increased economic integration and competition; rapid technological innovation and diffusion; environmental pressures and growing energy demand; broad geo-political changes; and new forms of governance. Each driver and trend independently produces unique changes and challenges; those points where factors intersect often reinforce and amplify the effects of change and create a series of complex and often unpredictable threats and risks that transcend geographic borders and organizational boundaries.

None of these trends and drivers is more visible than globalization. Global networks of information, finance, commerce, transportation, and people shape and empower these threats. This infrastructure increasingly is being targeted for exploitation, and potentially for disruption or destruction, by a growing array of state and non-state adversaries.

It is therefore quite evident that the international strategic landscape of the twenty-first century will be shaped by complex and contradictory forces. This world will

¹⁴⁹ Chertoff, HSTA; Fingar, Thomas, *Security Threats*. McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*, USJFCOM, *Joint Operating Environment*.

be characterized by turmoil, changing patterns of state-to-state relationships, as well as conflicts within states caused by ethnic, religious, and nationalistic differences have become commonplace. International terrorism, drug cartels, and threats created by net-centric information-age technology will add to the turmoil and uncertainty.

The world of the twenty-first century will be a dynamic world in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing. The continued march of globalization, the growing number of independent nation-state and non-state actors, in combination with advancing technologies, have increased global connectivity, interdependence, and complexity, creating greater uncertainties, systemic risk and a less predictable future. These changes have led to reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles.

Although this interconnected world offers many opportunities for technological innovation and economic growth, it also presents unique challenges and threats. In this environment, the key to achieving lasting strategic advantage is the ability to rapidly and accurately anticipate and adapt to complex challenges. Future trends portend and describe a world in which rich and prosperous states represent a smaller and smaller portion of humanity, while the poorest and least economically dynamic societies on earth grapple with rapid population growth, explosive mega-cities, and cultural and environmental change that stresses already-fragile social and political structures.

Globalization has the potential to lift millions from abject poverty, but its uneven impact will produce social dislocation, and because of raised expectations may produce dissonance and disorder if societies cannot translate gains in global trade into local prosperity. As more people around the world have access to markets, trade and travel, these flows become more vulnerable to disruption. Finally, greater complexity in the operating environment and rapid rates of technological change and surprise are changing security paradigms, placing greater emphasis on prevention, and blurring enemies, adversaries, competitors, and friends.

As articulated by the DNI, the threat environment of the twenty-first century will encompass a broad spectrum of threats to U.S. national security and U.S. core

interests.¹⁵⁰ The spectrum includes foreign and domestic terrorism, state-based threats and non-terror-related threats, including weather, earthquakes, and man-made and technological disasters.

Other “national security shocks”¹⁵¹ are possible. Should they come to pass, they would have dramatic effects on U.S. national security and the wider global security environment. These “national security shocks” include significant disruptions to energy security or, conversely, the development of alternatives to oil.¹⁵² Other “national security shocks” include technological surprise, loss of access to the global commons, or the emergence of man-made or natural pandemic that kills and sickens a significant portion of the world’s population. Finally, nuclear attack on one or more of America’s cities, or a global depression that disrupts the U.S. economy would overturn the international system and result in wide-ranging and dramatic changes to the U.S. security posture.

These emerging or evolving threats are likely to pose serious problems several years out for the nation and capture the national security community’s current understanding of strategic threats — both deliberate and naturally occurring — that have the potential to harm and have high consequences for the nation and its citizens in terms of loss of life, economic damage, and psychological impact.

The FBI divides the terrorist threat facing the United States into two broad categories, international and domestic. International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. Acts of international terrorism are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or affect the conduct of a government. These acts transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators operate.

¹⁵⁰ McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment*.

¹⁵¹ National Security Shocks are a collection of less likely surprises that would be highly consequential for U.S. security and upset the balance of the current international system.

¹⁵² USJFCOM, *Joint Operating Environment*.

During the past decade, the FBI has witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing extremism overtook left-wing terrorism as the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat to the country. During the past several years, special interest extremism, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), has emerged as a serious terrorist threat. Generally, extremist groups engage in much activity that is protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly. The FBI estimates that the ALF and ELF have committed more than 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, resulting in damages in excess of 43 million dollars. Animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism continue to pose a threat. Extremists within these movements generally operate in small, autonomous cells and employ strict operational security tactics making detection and infiltration difficult. These extremists utilize a variety of tactics, including arson, vandalism, animal theft, and the use of explosive devices.

Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect widespread political change. Special interest extremists continue to conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered important to their causes. These groups occupy the extreme fringes of animal rights, pro-life, environmental, anti-nuclear, and other movements. Some special interest extremists—most notably within the animal rights and environmental movements — have turned increasingly toward vandalism and terrorist activity in attempts to further their causes.

While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by international terrorists to the homeland, the U.S. must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the United States. Domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of political or social issues, continue to use violence and criminal activity to further their agendas.

Despite the fragmentation of white supremacist groups resulting from the deaths or the arrests of prominent leaders, violence from this element remains an ongoing threat to government targets, Jewish individuals and establishments, and non-white ethnic

groups. The militia/sovereign citizen movement similarly continues to present a threat to law enforcement and members of the judiciary. Members of these groups will continue to intimidate and sometimes threaten judges, prosecutors, and other officers of the court. Sporadic incidents resulting in direct clashes with law enforcement are possible and will most likely involve state and local law enforcement personnel, such as highway patrol officers and sheriff's deputies.

Some U.S.-based black separatist groups follow radical variants of Islam and, in some cases, express solidarity with international terrorist groups. These groups could utilize black separatists to collect intelligence on U.S. targets or to identify radical elements within the African-American community who could act as surrogates on their behalf.

Domestically, a variety of homegrown extremist groups organized around anti-globalization, environmental, political, and religious issues will continue to operate in the United States. They often adopt extremely violent rhetoric, although their activities generally fall within the purview of state and local law enforcement. Activities range from simple harassment and assault to arson, murder, small scale explosives, and vandalism. Yet, the openness of the U.S. environment, easy access to weapons and knowledge about how to use them, and the ability to train out of sight in remote parts of the country could set the stage for more consequential extremist violence, given the right stimulus.

Most prominent domestic extremist groups are well-known. However, splinter cells and "lone wolves" who split-off from the larger organizations are of concern because they are difficult to identify, track, and disrupt. Homegrown domestic Islamic extremists will pose the greatest potential domestic extremist threat. Recent plots uncovered at the Fort Dix, New Jersey military installation and John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York illustrates continued intent from these groups to carry out attacks against the United States. In addition, Islamic radicalization in prisons is

increasingly of concern as prison environments are permissive to the proliferation of radical ideologies and are easily exploited by charismatic recruiters who are looking for a new generation of jihadists.

Non-Muslim terrorist, guerilla, and insurgent groups, especially environmentally focused and often referred to as “single-issue” groups by the FBI, probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories, but this violence is likely to be on a small scale. Other domestic extremist groups, particularly those espousing vehement anti-government views, maintain substantial supplies of arms and explosives. Many of these groups are reactive, and certain government actions could precipitate an increase in the level and severity of activity. White supremacists and militias are more likely to opt for violence on the scale of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, but animal rights and environmental extremists are the most active and cause the greatest economic damage.¹⁵³

Enduring challenges for the current and future U.S. national security establishment, at home and abroad, will include familiar military activities, such as defending against attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and terrorist networks and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include dealing with the collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in combination with the non-military instruments of national power to deter and prevent conflict around the world.

A global multi-polar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of non-state actors — businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks — also will increase. By 2025 a single “international community” composed of nation-states may no longer exist as power (i.e.; influence, leverage, prestige, etc.) will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game, while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken.

¹⁵³ James F. Jarboe, "The Threat of Eco-Terrorism," (testimony to the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, Washington, D.C., February 12, 2002 <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm> (accessed September 8, 2008); and Robert S. Mueller, III, (statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2007) <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/mueller011107.htm> (accessed September 8, 2008).

Furthermore, the unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East now under way will likely continue. As some countries become more invested in their economic well-being, incentives toward geopolitical stability could increase. Although the United States will remain the single most powerful country, it will likely be less dominant and shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the U.S. into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic versus foreign policy priorities.

Given these transformative forces, Chapter VI introduces the art and science of strategy and the nexus it has with both the complex international environment and the threats to U.S. national security that are resident within the international environment. Chapter VI advances the formulary that basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy is formulated and implemented to (1) defend against threats to the core national end state and the core national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it; and (2) to advance, achieve, and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. Distilled to its essence, grand strategy is about determining a state's vital interests — those important enough to fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand policy lies,” Paul Kennedy observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancements of the nation's long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) best interests.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Bassani, “Saving the World for Democracy.”

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF STRATEGY

Basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy is formulated and implemented to (1) defend against threats to the core national end state and the core national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it and (2) to advance, achieve, and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. Grand or national strategy is associated with actions at the state/national level.

Grand strategy — what Edward Meade Earle called “the highest type of strategy” — is the most critical task of statecraft.¹⁵⁵ As Geoffrey Parker observed, grand strategy encompasses the decision of a state about its overall security — the threats it perceives, the way in which it confronts them, and the steps it takes to match ends and means.¹⁵⁶ Distilled to its essence, grand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interests — those important enough to fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand policy lies,” Paul Kennedy observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancements of the nation’s long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) best interests.”¹⁵⁷ Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern what is possible.¹⁵⁸

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. The strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership will use the power (resources or means) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.¹⁵⁹ When applied to a particular set of ends and means, the product, that is strategy, is a

¹⁵⁵ Edward Mead Earle, “Political and Military Strategy for the United States,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 19, no. 2, (Jan., 1941):2-9.

¹⁵⁶ Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1555-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and The Hague,” *The Journal of Military History* 69, no.1, (January 2005): 205-209.

¹⁵⁷ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 13.

¹⁵⁸ Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 22.

¹⁵⁹ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as the state moves through a complex and rapidly changing environment into the future.¹⁶⁰

Strategy is thus both a process and a product and an art and a science. At the highest levels, ends are expressed as national interests. Interests are a nation's wants, needs (or requirements), and concerns. Specifically, national interests normally involve four main areas: survival and security, political and territorial integrity (and sovereignty), economic stability and well-being, and stability. Conflict can arise as a result of a threat (or perceived threat) to any one of these four areas. Interests are central to a discussion of strategy because interests signal a nation's desires and intentions to other nations.¹⁶¹

Certain interests that a nation sees as essential are referred to as vital interests. Vital interests are distinguished from other interests by the fact that nations are usually unwilling to compromise on them and are often prepared to resort to conflict in support of them.¹⁶² Thus, when examining a strategic situation, a strategist must identify not only what interests are at stake but also which interests one or more of the participants view as vital.

National interests are often vague or consist of highly generalized abstractions rooted in the ideological and socio-cultural history of the nation and its people. While national interests underpin national strategy, the specifics of the strategy must focus on more concrete ends. The specific goals and aims of national strategy are often referred to as objectives. Objectives are the ends a nation must achieve to promote, protect, or attain its interests. Objectives tend to be more tangible than interests because they normally

¹⁶⁰ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

¹⁶¹ United States Marine Corps (USMC), "Strategy: Ends and Means," *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1:Strategy*, PCN 1420000700 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/chap2.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).

¹⁶² Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Process and Problems* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 27–28.

describe specific activities or conditions which must be attained. Objectives provide the departure point for national strategy in that they describe what a state is actually trying to do.¹⁶³

The strategic environment is overwhelmingly political and psychological in nature, because warfare is nothing but a violent expression of the political process. Therefore, one is accustomed to thinking of “strategy” as the preserve of the highest levels of political and military leadership, and of the most dangerous levels of warfare.

In addition, the strategic environment, encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College in the acronym VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity), is marked by a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where U.S. capability to defend and promote its national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).¹⁶⁴ The current operational environment can aptly and accurately be described as one fraught with “VUCA.”

Characterized by the four earmarks, the strategic environment is always in a greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or “chaos.” The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and in compliance with policy guidance.

In addition, the strategic environment is often referred to as a system of systems in order to emphasize its complexity and its characterization as a complex adaptive or complex evolving system; the strategic environment is a composite of complex systems, linked vertically and horizontally. As such, the strategic environment exhibits complex, self-organizing behavior, it continuously seeks to find an acceptable order or relative

¹⁶³ John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 167.

¹⁶⁴ William J. Doll, “Parsing the Future: A Frame of Reference to Scenario Building,” (unpublished paper, Dahlgren, VA: Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 2005), 2-3.

balance (i.e., the balance of power) in which it can exist. Thus the world is more a place of instability, discontinuity, synergies, and unpredictability and “tipping points” than strategists and planners prefer.

Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to achieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time. In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own, possibly conflicting and incoherent, objectives.¹⁶⁵

In other words, strategy is the application of the power inherent in the natural (i.e., dispositional) and societal (i.e., situational, contextual, and environmental) resources of the state toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive strategic environment. Both strategy and planning (to include mission analysis) are subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes and differs from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can be understood and applied.

Any discussion of ends and means in conflict, including conflict in its penultimate expression, war, must begin with two basic points. First, as strategists throughout the ages have observed, conflict, war, is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party in a conflict or waging war, even though those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature, are by definition political goals. Second, conflicts and wars are fought by political entities that have unique characteristics and often very

¹⁶⁵ David Jablonsky, *Why Is Strategy Difficult?* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), 10.

dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, strategists must appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.

An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that all nation-states and non-state actors have interests they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end states categorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorable world order, and enduring national or group values. Interests are derived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategic environment and can be stated more specifically in the context of issues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or advance national or group interests.

Resources are applied through the use of instruments of power. The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests — which are achieved through the application of the instruments of power to specific objectives to create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policy guidance — is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.¹⁶⁶

Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shape the future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. This is the first premise. Strategy is not crisis management. It is to a large degree its, crisis management, antithesis. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails to properly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive. A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy; this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz' famous dictum, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."¹⁶⁷

Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. In its finest form, policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more objectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance regarding

¹⁶⁶ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

resources, limitations on actions, or similar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidance yields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and justification for the actions embodied in a strategy.¹⁶⁸

Achievement of the objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired end state. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives determined by the political purpose. The development of strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategic environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy of the art of the possible.¹⁶⁹

Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the strategic environment. Strategy is developed from a thorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the nature of the strategic environment. In today's parlance, this is called situational awareness of the common operating picture.

The strategic environment possesses both physical (i.e., tangible) and metaphysical (i.e., intangible) attributes. It has both domestic and external components. The international environment is the external component, consisting of the physical geographic environment, the international system, and other external actors — and their cultures, beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal physical realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles at play within the United States. Indeed, within the United States, there are groups that have worldviews significantly different from those of the national leadership, which makes the domestic element of strategy formulation even more complex.

Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the status quo and initiate a search for a new equilibrium. Stability within the environment resists change; instability within the environment urges adoption of a new strategy.

¹⁶⁸ Gregory D. Foster, "A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1990): 43.

¹⁶⁹ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 607-608.

The nature of the strategic environment can be described as an interactive, chaotic, complex system of systems. The strategist must recognize that, to be successful, a strategy must account for both the external and internal components of the strategic environment. For the political state, these can be identified as the domestic and international environments on a grand scale, but external elements can be further divided into adversaries, allies, and other actors.

Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment in its formulation and execution. Therefore, strategy is holistic in outlook. It demands comprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategist may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis in order to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended purpose at his level. He, the strategist, is concerned with external and internal factors at all levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy.

In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect, objective, concept, and resource has effects on the environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, third-, etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on the same level with him, whether they be friendly, adversary, or indifferent actors.

The strategist's efforts must be integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, coordinate, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically, that is, comprehensively. They must be cognizant of the "big picture," their own organization's capabilities and resources, and the impact of their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy is never developed piecemeal or in isolation.

Any strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors. Any strategy, once known or implemented, introduces change into the strategic environment, even when it seeks to maintain the status quo.¹⁷⁰ Change can occur on multi-ordered

¹⁷⁰ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 60.

levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatens the existing equilibrium or status quo in the strategic environment, raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing are better or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategy can anticipate the future through the pursuit of proper objectives, but strategy cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, neither the achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences of achievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether the attainment of the specified end justifies the risks of initiating action, and the strategist must also consider how other actors may react.

Strategy is grounded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished; strategy cannot be formulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The strategist must know the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfully focuses on a desired or preferred end state among an array of possible end states in a dynamic environment. Strategy provides direction for the persuasive or coercive use of the instruments of power to achieve specified objectives to create strategic effects leading to the desired end state.

Strategy is an inherently human enterprise and is central to all human endeavors. Not solely a consideration of objective factors, “strategy involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”¹⁷¹ The role of belief systems, worldviews, and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the formulation of strategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductive bias while ensuring the strategy meets criteria of acceptability at home and abroad while compensating for differences as appropriate.

Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction is the difference between the ideal strategy and the applied strategy; how it is supposed to work versus how it actually unfolds in execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic and complex nature of the strategic environment, chance, and human frailty. Friction cannot be eliminated, but it

¹⁷¹ Jervis, *System Effects*, 60.

can be understood and accounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in the formulation of the strategy.¹⁷² In practical terms, friction can be best defined within the VUCA acronym.

Strategy focuses on root causes and purposes and is inherently adaptable and flexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empowering subordinate levels. Strategy incorporates learning from experience and is sufficiently broad in its construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary's countermoves.

Strategy addresses linear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is largely cause and effect and usually linear, strategy is a process interacting with the strategic environment: Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. Process is facilitated by constructing strategy with flexibility and adaptability in its component parts. Strategy's focus on root causes and purposes ensures that the direction provided to subordinate levels is sufficiently broad to allow adaptability and flexibility while not deviating from strategic purpose.¹⁷³

Strategy is hierarchical. The political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence over the instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of state strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lower levels.

Generally strategy originates at the top as a consequence of a grand strategy (often undocumented), national security strategy, or other stated national-level strategies and policy statements in regard to specific issues. Grand and national security strategies lay out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. National policy provides broad strategic guidance from political leaders, generally articulating the national interests as they relate to specific strategic circumstances. From these strategies and policies the major activities and departments develop subordinate strategies.

¹⁷² Stephen J. Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 7-14.

¹⁷³ Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Chaos*, 7-14; and Murray and Grimsley, *The Making of Strategy*, 1.

The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02) defines the levels of strategy as they pertain to the military element of power within the state as:¹⁷⁴

- *Grand Strategy* [italics added]. An overarching strategy summarizing the national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all the instruments of national power in order to accomplish the grand strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster national economic prosperity; and promote national values. Grand Strategy may be stated or implied.
- *National Security Strategy* [italics added] (also sometimes referred to as Grand Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contributes to national security.

Strategy has a symbiotic relationship with time. A key component of strategic competency is thinking in time — the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices with the past and the consequences of their intended and unintended effects in the future. A strategic choice must have continuity with the past as it bridges to the future. Strategy must account for the past in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction and history within the strategic environment. A strategic action that has characteristics contrary to the past experience or culture of the society it affects is less likely to be successful. Strategists extrapolate the possible futures from the present strategic circumstances with a clear sense of the long past from which these possible futures flow; then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeks to shape a more favorable future.¹⁷⁵

Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative; once enacted, they become a part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulative from several different perspectives. It is cumulative from the perspective that once implemented, a strategy becomes part of the continuities of the strategic environment.

¹⁷⁴ “War, National Security Policy and Strategy,” (course handout, course II AY2005, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2004), 158.

¹⁷⁵ Murray and Grimsley, *The Making of Strategy*, 6-7.

Regardless of whether it is successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change and interaction in the strategic environment and its consequences must be considered in any future strategy.

Strategy is cumulative from a stratified perspective also. The effect of a policy is the summation of the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interaction related to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of the parts. It is also possible that the value of one level of strategic efforts might be negated by the effects of another level. Strategies at different levels interact, with the cumulative effects influencing the success of higher and lower strategy and planning over time.¹⁷⁶

Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. This is not to say that efficiency is not desired. Good strategy is both effective and efficient, but the purpose of strategy is to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favor the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Strategy must emphasize effectiveness because failure, whatever the cause, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated multi-ordered consequences. Concepts and resources serve objectives without undue risk of failure or unintended effects; efficiency is necessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.¹⁷⁷

Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought at its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well as contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels.

Ends, ways, and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally and externally. Strategic objectives and concepts have a proper relationship

¹⁷⁶ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

¹⁷⁷ Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, eds. *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 128-129.

within a strategy, but must also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourced with the appropriate types and quantity of resources.

From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves suitability and acceptability — the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. The synergistic balance also achieves feasibility — the strategic concept is executable with the resources made available.¹⁷⁸

Risk is inherent in all activity. The best one can do is seriously consider and evaluate the risks involved, producing a favorable balance against failure.

Strategy is subject to the nature of the strategic environment, in which risk exists, and uncertainty is inherent in that environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and interaction with other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigated by questioning the thinking behind the strategy. Nonetheless, no matter how probing the questions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either the failure to achieve one's own objectives, thus providing a significant advantage to one's adversaries, or creating unintended adverse effects.

In peacetime, national interests and objectives lead to specific policies and commitments. Policy is a pattern or patterns of actions designed to attain specific objectives. Policy can represent a broad course of action or intent. Policy is the ways (courses of action, methods, or patterns) by which strategy pursues and achieves its objectives. Commitments are expressions of a nation's intention to use its instruments of national power. Whereas policy might express general intent, a course of action, or restraints on action, commitments pledge nations to take specific actions at specific times and places. While conflict is always related to some national interest or objective, it is normally the outgrowth of a specific policy or commitment.

In war, the national strategy is expressed in the *National Defense Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* and focuses on employing the non-military instruments of

¹⁷⁸ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

national power (informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic) alone or in combination¹⁷⁹ in order to ensure achieving its political ends or objectives, the end state, as articulated by the political leadership. Informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to attaining the objective of national strategy and achieving and maintaining the desired end state.

- Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of national power towards the accomplishment of the political objectives, in combination and conjunction with the other instruments or elements, of the overall national strategy. The departure point for military strategy, therefore, is the objectives of the national strategy. From there, military strategy must identify a military goal or objective that will lead to accomplishment of the political objective.
- The military objective then provides the basis for the identification of specific ways, or courses of action, to accomplish that objective. The selection of one of these courses of action and its further development results in a strategic concept that embodies the key components of the chosen military strategy.
- The military strategy is not developed in isolation from the other instruments of national power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives and strategies.

As stated in the opening sentence, the articulation of national interests, objectives, policies, and commitments linked to use of the instruments of national power is sometimes referred to as “grand strategy,” “grand national strategy,” “basic national security policy,” or, currently in the United States, “national security strategy.” Grand strategies or national security strategies are implemented by subordinate strategies — political or diplomatic strategies, economic strategies, national military strategies, and so forth — for the use of each of the instruments of national power.

Strategy is essentially a matter of common sense. At its most basic, strategy is simply a matter of figuring out what is needed to achieve and maintain the desired end

¹⁷⁹ Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments make up the instruments of national power. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. In earlier joint doctrine publications, instruments of national power were referred to as elements of national power and the informational instrument was called the psychological instrument. The February 1995 edition of *Joint Publication 0-2* updated this terminology.

state, determining the best way (i.e., course of action) to use the resources at one's disposal to achieve it, then executing the plan.

Unfortunately, in the practical world of politics and war, none of these things are easily done. Goals are complex, sometimes contradictory, and many-sided. They often change in the middle of a war. The resources at one's disposal are not always obvious, can change during the course of a struggle, and usually need to be adapted to suit one's needs. And the enemy is often annoyingly uncooperative, refusing to fit one's preconceptions of him or to stand still while one erects the apparatus for his destruction

According to the U.S. Army War College's *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, there are several ways to categorize strategies. One has a conceptual basis: strategy can be declaratory, actual, or ideal. Declaratory strategy is what a nation says its strategy is. Declaratory strategy may or may not be the nation's true strategy, and the nation may or may not actually believe it. Actual strategy addresses the difference between the declared strategy and reality. It asks the question, "what is its real strategy?" An ideal strategy is what a strategist would prefer to do if he had unlimited access to all the necessary resources (both quantitative and qualitative). It is a textbook strategy and may or may not correspond to reality.¹⁸⁰

A second method of categorization, according to the U.S. Army War College's *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, is based on the pattern of execution: sequential, simultaneous, and cumulative. This paradigm attempts to make distinctions between strategies based on whether the strategist is attacking objectives progressively, simultaneously, or in essentially random order. Thus, a typical sequential campaign would involve actions to gain control of the air, followed by efforts to defeat the enemy's fielded forces, and culminate in the attack on or occupation of political objectives. A simultaneous campaign would include near-simultaneous attacks

¹⁸⁰ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*, 83.

on each of those target sets. A cumulative strategy produces results not by any single action or sequence of actions, but by the cumulative effect of numerous actions over time.¹⁸¹

Attrition, exhaustion (or erosion per Russell Weigley, in his classic and seminal book *The American Way of War*),¹⁸² and annihilation are also standard historical strategic categories as strategic paradigms based on deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. Another way, as mentioned briefly above, to categorize strategy is organizational or hierarchical. This method discusses grand or national strategy at one level and theater, campaign, or operational strategy at another level.

It was not until the end of the Second World War, however, that the term “national security” came into full usage in U.S. political discourse. Although Edward Mead Earle pointed out as early as 1943 that “national security strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”¹⁸³

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has an approved joint definition of strategy: “The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives...strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means)...”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*, 83.

¹⁸² Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (McMillan and Company, New York, 1973), xxii.

¹⁸³ Earle, Golden and Gilbert, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, viii.

¹⁸⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Electronic Library (April 2001) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, 357 and 507 (accessed September 8, 2008); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, Joint Electronic Library, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_encyclopedia.htm, 542 and 731 (accessed September 8, 2008).

The U.S. Army War College defines it, strategy, as a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives (ends) in the international system.¹⁸⁵ Suitable, acceptable, and feasible grand strategies include or at least consider all instruments of national power. These are the ways of grand strategy. Contemporary U.S. national security doctrine recognizes four to seven categories — instruments or elements — of power available to a nation or strategist: political, economic, military, and informational (PEMI) or diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) and military, information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE). The means are the physical and programmatic capabilities resident in the departments and agencies assigned responsibility under statute.¹⁸⁶

When discussing the strategy a country employs in pursuit of its interests, the community of interest and its subject matter experts usually use terms such as national strategy, national security strategy, or grand strategy. They generally use the latter term in their writings to denote a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives, or ends, in the international system. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. Ways or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources. Each of these components suggests a related question. What does the actor want to pursue (“ends”)? With what resources (“means”)? How to pursue and accomplish (“ways”)? The rationale, or “why,” is defined by a nation's goals and objectives; survival, vital, and important interests; and national values, principles, and ethics.

The essential point is that a country, including the United States, adopts objectives based on its interests and values and how they are affected, threatened, or challenged in the international system. The means it possesses to pursue those objectives fall into four or seven (depending on how one conceptualizes them) broad categories of national power, which are called instruments of national power.

¹⁸⁵ Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy Development,” in *U.S. Army War College Guide Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 12.

¹⁸⁶ U.S. Army War College, “National Security and Strategy,” (module 2, Department of Education, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1996).

Since 2001-2002, the U.S. has identified the instruments of power [as the military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic, or MIDLIFE, instruments of national power. Prior to the first Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, the U.S. traditionally defined the instruments of national power as diplomatic, military, informational, and economic (DIME) or political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. How a country marshals and applies those instruments of national power constitute the "ways" of its grand strategy.

The literature amply demonstrates that strategy is neither static nor stagnant. If strategy is a function of (1) the desired effects and (2) an expected positive end state, then it ought to change or be different as the political ends change. This proposition leads directly to what Clausewitz, who in *On War*, called the supreme judgment about a war — its nature; The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature ... No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.¹⁸⁷ Conversely, one must also always remember B. H. Liddell Hart's corollary: "Grand strategy must always remember that peace follows war."¹⁸⁸

Policy, in this case basic national security policy, is, or should be, characterized as a rational process. The making of policy is a conscious effort by a distinct political body to use whatever power it possesses to accomplish some purpose; if only the mere continuation or increase of its own power.

¹⁸⁷ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 577-627.

¹⁸⁸ Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 311.

Policy is a rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned purposes and actions of individuals in the political struggle. War can be a practical means, sometimes the only means available, for the achievement of rational policy aims — that is, the aims of one party in the political dispute.

Hence, to describe war as an “instrument of policy” is entirely correct. It is an act of force to compel one’s opponent to do one’s will. War is a part of politics. It does not replace other forms of political intercourse but merely supplements them. It is a violent expression of the tensions and disagreements between political groups when political conflict reaches a level that sparks organized violence. Thus war, like every other phase of politics, embodies both rational and irrational elements. Its course is the product not of one will, but of the collision of two or more wills.

Liddell Hart went on to say, “Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources — for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy — which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will...Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace — for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita* — still awaiting exploration, and understanding.”¹⁸⁹

U.S. “grand” strategy involves the use of national power in peace and war to further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s

¹⁸⁹ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 335-336.

three core interests: physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity. These core U.S. national interests have not changed significantly over the three-quarters of a century. They express and reflect the enduring values that are held by Americans: “The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.”¹⁹⁰ These are core interests that can never be compromised.

The *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) is based on American core (i.e., survival, vital, and important domestic and foreign political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) interests and values and its aim is to ensure the security of the nation while making the world a safer and better place through the advancement of U.S. interests. Since 2002, its goals are political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The NSS includes strengthening alliances and working with others to defeat global terrorism and defuse regional conflicts; preventing U.S. enemies from threatening the United States, its allies, and friends with WMD; and transforming America’s national security institutions.

- Protect the American people and American interests [worldwide]. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before [detect, deter, prevent and contain, and defeat] the threats can do grave damage.
- Avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining U.S. fundamental values and institutions
- Defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies and partners
- Defend against and defeat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and advanced high explosives; CBRN-E] and missile threats before they are unleashed; and *improved protection* to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. We [the U.S.] aim

¹⁹⁰ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed September 28, 2008).

to convince our adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD, and thus deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these weapons in the first place.

- Expand economic liberty and prosperity [opportunities]...promote free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development.
- Build and sustain strong, flexible alliances
- Advance human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals.¹⁹¹

Basic national security policy (BNSP), from which the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (NSHS), *National Military Strategy* (NMS), and other “strategies” are derived, provides strategic direction for senior U.S. decision-makers (i.e., cabinet secretaries, agency directors and administrators, ambassadors and chiefs of mission, combatant commanders, etc.) These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).¹⁹²

U.S. BNSP identifies, defines, articulates, and supports the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States. It includes descriptions of the nation’s foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to deter, contain, and defeat state and non-state aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

In addition, it describes the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other instruments, or elements, of the national power of the United States that are maintained and employed to protect or promote the interests and achieve the nation’s goals, objectives, and end state. Lastly, it outlines and defends

¹⁹¹ White House, *The National Security Strategy*, iii.

¹⁹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), II-2 and II-3.

the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the BNSP and strategy.

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and conduct of operations using the operational art to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military forces. Operational art governs the mobilization, generation, deployment, and employment of resource and force packages, their commitment to or withdrawal from tactical situations, and the arrangement of tactical activities and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.¹⁹³

The tactical level focuses on planning and executing activities (i.e., battles), engagements, and activities to achieve objectives assigned to tactical units operating in the immediate proximity of the threat. Forces at this level generally employ various tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) to achieve their objectives. Tactics are therefore the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.¹⁹⁴

In sum, strategy, and the ways to develop, maintain, implement, and enhance strategy, is perspective, position, plan, and pattern. Strategy is the bridge between policy or high-order goals on the one hand and tactics or concrete actions on the other. In short, strategy is a term that refers to a complex web of thoughts, ideas, insights, experiences, goals, expertise, memories, perceptions, and expectations that provides general guidance for specific actions in pursuit of particular ends. Operational art and science, the “art of the campaign,” straddles the gap between ends and means.

Strategy is at once the course one charts, the journey one imagines; and, at the same time, it is the course one steers, the trip one actually makes. Even when one is

¹⁹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, II-2 and II-3.

¹⁹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, II-2 and II-3; and Earle, Golden, and Gilbert, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, viii.

embarking on a voyage of discovery, with no particular destination in mind, the voyage has a purpose, an outcome, an end to be kept in view.

Strategy, then, has no existence apart from the ends sought. It is a general framework that provides guidance for actions to be taken, and, at the same time, is shaped by the actions taken. This means that the necessary precondition for formulating strategy is a clear and widespread understanding of the ends to be obtained. Without these ends in view, action is purely tactical and can quickly degenerate into nothing more than a flailing about.

When there are no “ends in view” for the organization writ large, strategies still exist and they are still operational, even highly effective, but for an individual or unit, not for the organization as a whole. The risks of not having a set of organization-wide ends clearly in view include missed opportunities, fragmented and wasted effort, working at cross purposes, and internecine warfare.

For the leadership of an organization to remain unclear or to vacillate regarding ends, strategy, tactics and means is to not know their own minds. The accompanying loss of morale is enormous.

Ultimately, strategy is about means. It is about the attainment of ends, not their specification. The specification of ends is a matter of stating those future conditions and circumstances toward which effort is to be devoted until such time as those ends are obtained.

Strategy is concerned with how one will achieve one’s aims, not with what those aims are or ought to be, or how they are established. If strategy has any meaning at all, it is only in relation to some aim or end in view.

Strategy is one element in a four-part structure. First are the ends (end state) to be obtained. Second are the courses of action for obtaining them, the ways in which resources will be deployed. Third are tactics, the ways in which resources that have been

deployed are actually used or employed. Fourth, and last, are the resources themselves, the means at one's disposal. Thus it is that strategy and tactics bridge the gap between ends and means.

Establishing the aims or ends of an enterprise is a matter of policy and the root words there are both Greek: *politeia* and *polites* — the state and the people. Determining the ends of an enterprise is mainly a matter of governance not management and, conversely, achieving them is mostly a matter of management not governance. Those who govern are responsible for seeing to it that the ends of the enterprise are clear to the people who people that enterprise and that these ends are legitimate, ethical, and that they benefit the enterprise and its members.

Strategy is the joint province of those who govern and those who manage. Tactics belong to those who manage. Means or resources are jointly controlled. Those who govern and manage are jointly responsible for the deployment of resources. Those who manage are responsible for the employment of those resources — but always in the context of the ends sought and the strategy for their achievement.

Over time, the employment of resources yields actual results, and these, in light of intended results, shape the future deployment of resources. Thus it is that “realized” strategy emerges from the pattern of actions and decisions. And thus it is that strategy is an adaptive, evolving view of what is required to obtain the ends in view.¹⁹⁵

However, strategy, whether military, civilian, or business, is not planning. Strategy is non-linear and partakes of a different mindset. Planning makes strategy actionable. It relies on a high degree of certainty — a world that is concrete, or at least knowable, and can be addressed and defined in explicit terms. In essence, planning takes a gray world and makes it black and white through the analysis of the facts and assumptions about the unknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusing heavily on first-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future results can be precisely known if enough is known about the facts and the conditions affecting the undertaking.

¹⁹⁵ Fred Nickols, “Strategy: Definitions and Meaning,” Distance Consulting (2000) http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_definition.htm (07 September 2008).

The planning process, including programming and budgeting, is essential to reduce uncertainty at the tactical level by allowing detailed actions to be prescribed.

The planning process works because the lower the level, the more limited the scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline; hence, the number of unknowns is limited and can be compensated for in branches and sequels to create “certainty.” In reality, increases exponentially as one ascends from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level.

Planning is not strategy, or policy for that matter. Strategists must understand the difference between strategy and planning in order to produce good strategy. The planner must understand the difference between planning and strategy in order to execute strategy successfully.

Planning bridges the gap between strategy and execution. The purpose of planning is to create certainty so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of strategy formulation is to clarify, influence, manage, or resolve the earmarks — volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)¹⁹⁶ — of the strategic environment through the identification and creation of strategic effects in support of policy goals.

Strategy lays down what is important and to be achieved, sets the parameters for the necessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to allocate in terms of resources. Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature, identifies the objectives to be achieved and defines the box in which detailed planning can be accomplished; strategy bounds planning. Within that box, planning adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts, figures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve the strategy’s objectives.

Strategy is the direction and scope of an organization over the long-term which achieves an advantage for the organization through its configuration of resources within a

¹⁹⁶ Yarger, *Strategic Theory*.

challenging environment, to meet the needs of markets and to fulfill stakeholder expectations. In other words, strategy is about where the organization wants to be in the long-term.

In its broadest sense, strategy is about taking “strategic decisions” — decisions that answer the questions above. In practice, a thorough strategic management process has three main components, shown in the figure below:




Figure 1. The Strategic Management Process Triangle

Strategy bridges the gap between policy and tactics. Together, strategy and tactics bridge the gap between ends and means. Strategy therefore refers to the means by which policy is affected, accounting for Clausewitz’s famous statement that war is the continuation of political relations via other means — the instruments or elements of national power.

The underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that states and other competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Hence, there is the need for strategists and practitioners of the art and science of strategy to have a thorough understanding of the international environment (Chapter IV).

Interests are desired end states such as survival, economic well-being, and enduring national values. The national elements of power are the resources used to

promote or advance national interests. Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests through the application of the instruments of power. Strategy is fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition. In doing so, strategy confronts adversaries and some things simply remain beyond control or unforeseen. Consequently, there is the need for strategists and practitioners of the art and science of strategy to have a thorough understanding of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous threat environment. Strategy is developed from a thorough analysis and knowledge of the strategic situation/environment (Chapter V).

Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction is, by nature, proactive. It seeks to control the environment as opposed to reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is the antithesis of crisis management. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory (Chapter XIII).

A second premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished — that is, he must know the end state that he is trying to achieve. A third premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategy must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available. In formulating a strategy the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole; and if one is discussing a strategy at the national (grand) level with a national level end, the ways and means would similarly refer to national level concepts and resources. That is ends, ways, and means must be consistent. Thus a basic national security policy and strategy end must be supported by concepts based on all the instruments of power and the associated resources (Chapter IX).

A fourth premise of strategy is that political purpose must dominate all strategy; thus, Clausewitz' famous dictum, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government.

A fifth premise is that strategy is comprehensive. That is to say, while the strategist may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his purpose at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at all levels. In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect — objectives, concepts, and resources — has effects on the environment around him. Consequently, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening and the strategist's efforts must be fully integrated with the strategies or efforts of senior, co-equal, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically, that is comprehensively; good (i.e., actionable) strategy is never developed in isolation.

Chapter VII will introduce and discuss how U.S. BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power to detect; prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, recover from if necessary; and decisively defeat these threats. It also introduces the calculus that although American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional when all of its instruments of national power are deployed, the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness in the pursuit of national interests, remains

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VII. STRATEGY IN PRACTICE

In the post-Cold War and post-September 11, 2001 threat environment, as described in Chapter V, defending the nation against its enemies remains the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government. The defense of the homeland is, and always has been, the core national interest and central to U.S. BNSP.

In order to detect; prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, recover from if necessary; and defeat this threat, U.S. BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power. Countering this amorphous, asymmetric and unconventional threat will require the nation's BNSP to seamlessly link and integrate with Carl von Clausewitz's famous "trinity of will," composed of the people of a nation; that nation's military commander and the army; and lastly, the government of the nation.¹⁹⁷

The literature review established that strategy, regardless of discipline, is simply a problem solving process. It is a common and logical way, methodology, to approach any problem — military, national security, personal, business, or any other category one might select. According to the preliminary and cursory literature review, strategy asks three basic questions:

- What is to be done (goals, objectives, desired effects, expectations, end state)?
- What capabilities are available or can reasonably be obtained that might help in meeting goals, objectives, desired effects, expectations, end state?
- What is the best way to use what is available to do achieve the desired effects and meet the expectations?

According to the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. defense establishment has an approved, albeit broad, national security, and defense-centric, definition of strategy: The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational

¹⁹⁷ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

objectives.¹⁹⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Joint Electronic Library's Joint Encyclopedia* deepens and expands on this definition by adding that these strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).¹⁹⁹

The U.S. Army War College defines strategy in two ways:²⁰⁰

- Conceptually – the relationship among ends, ways, and means.
- Strategic Art — the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources or capabilities) to promote and defend the national interests.

By consensus, the literature review established the requirement that any strategy must be examined and tested for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility against the three components:²⁰¹

- Suitability tests whether the proposed strategy achieves the desired end state. If it does not, it is not a potential strategy.
- Acceptability tests ways. Does the proposed course of action or concept produce results without excessive expenditure of resources and within accepted modes of conduct?
- Feasibility tests means. Are the means at hand or reasonably available sufficient to execute the proposed concept?

A strategy must meet or at least have a reasonable expectation of satisfying all three tests. The art becomes the analysis necessary to select the best or most efficient or least risky. However, strategy is made and executed by the institutions of particular

¹⁹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 357 and 507; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 542 and 731.

¹⁹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 357 and 507; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 542 and 731

²⁰⁰Richard A. Chilcoat, "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for Twenty-First Century Strategists," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 205; Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development," 11.

²⁰¹ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*, 81-82.

societies in ways that express cultural preferences and the acceptability of a strategy beyond morality and legality, a truly acceptable strategy must fit the norms of the military, government, and people.

When great powers choose between (or among) alternative grand strategies, the most important question is which is likely to yield the most security. During World War II, U.S. policymakers realized that their nation's enormous relative power gains created an unparalleled opportunity to mold the postwar international system, leading to an ambitious conception of America's postwar strategic, economic, and ideological interests. When World War II ended, the United States enjoyed an almost unfettered range of grand strategic choices and conditions were much more conducive to U.S. expansion because of the political collapse of Europe, after World War II Western Europe, in effect, was zero polar. It was a power vacuum into which the United States could expand. And it did.

The U.S. was the only great power to record absolute and relative gains in its wealth and power, emerging from World War II in a position of unprecedented economic ascendance. The United State emerged from the war predominant in military power, capability, and reach. Even as World War II was ongoing, U.S. policymakers understood that the war's end would find the United States in an overwhelmingly powerful position in international politics; and even before World War II ended, U.S. policymakers had begun to redefine America's security interests as global in scope, rather than merely regional.

This was underscored in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's October 1944 telegrams to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, which declared that "there is in the global war literally no question, either military or political, in which the United States is not interested."²⁰² During his 1945 mission to Moscow, presidential envoy Harry Hopkins reiterated to Stalin that America was a global power and, thus, legitimately was concerned with events in Soviet-occupied Poland (a country where, before World War II, the United States had no discernable strategic interests) because "the interests of the United States were world wide and not confined to

²⁰² Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*.

North and South America and the Pacific Ocean.”²⁰³ U.S. military planners held a similar view of America’s postwar role. As Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall stated, “It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world.”²⁰⁴

Since the early twentieth century, the U.S. has been far more secure than any great power in modern history. Consequently, the U.S.’s BNSP has been based on what one might call strategic internationalism: the belief that the U.S. must exert the full panalogy of its power — military, economic, and ideological — on the international system in order to shape its external environment.

- From an objective standpoint, the American homeland essentially was unthreatened until the development and deployment of intercontinental weapons delivery systems (ca. mid-1950s). Precisely because it has never had to worry about rivals in its own regions, once the U.S. emerged as a great power and established its primacy in the Western Hemisphere, it has been free to concentrate its resources and ambitions on seeking extra regional primacy (or hegemony through selective engagement and presence).
- The U.S. is the most powerful global actor the world has ever seen and its position is unprecedented, because the U.S. is the only great power in the history of the modern international state system to have attained hegemony in its own region and to have attained near- hegemonic primacy extra regionally.

American grand strategy is predicated on the belief that if the U.S. abdicated its roles as regional stabilizer, Europe and East Asia would sink back into the pre-World War II days of multi-polar power politics, and the ensuring regional instability would

²⁰³ Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

jeopardize important U.S. economic interests.²⁰⁵ As the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) somewhat delicately put it, if the credibility of the U.S. commitment to maintaining regional stability is questioned, that “in turn could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of

²⁰⁵. America's interest in maintaining regional peace and stability is linked crucially to U.S. economic interests, hence, the importance of the Open Door policy in American basic national security policy since at least 1940 and perhaps since the e of U.S. diplomatic history holds that beginning in the –policy, first in the Western Hemisphere and then in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Because of the Open Door, U.S. policymakers defined threats not only in terms of the distribution of power in the international system, but also ideologically in terms of threats to America's "core values"—its idealism, and its sense of self-exception. As William Appleton Williams put it, the goal of U.S. grand strategy has been to create an "Open Door world" - and international system, or "world order," made up of states that are open to and subscribe to the U.S.'s liberal values and institutions and that are open to U.S. economic penetration (Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*).

An Open Door world rests on, therefore, on two pillars: the economic Open Door (maintaining an open international economic system) and the political Open Door (spreading democracy and liberalism abroad). These pillars are linked by perception that "closure" abroad threatens the survival of America core values - what policymakers call "the American way of life" –at home.

The Open Door has always been more than simply an explanation of the role of economic factors in the U.S. grand strategy. Ideology, or what Williams called the "American system," is at the heart of the Open Door. America's domestic economic and political system can be safeguarded only in a world that is sympathetic ideologically to the U.S.

In other words, U.S. grand strategy is based on the Open Door-derived assumption that political and economic liberalism cannot flourish at home unless they are safe at home. This deeply rooted belief was reiterated by President George W. Bush in his second inaugural address, at which he declared, "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." (George Bush, "Second Inaugural Address," [address given in Washington, D.C, January 20, 2005], *Inaugural Addresses of Presidents*, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres67.html>).

Indeed, the Open Door prescribes that American economic power should be used precisely for the purpose of restructuring the international system along lines that are congenial with America's ideology. The Open Door has always been a strategy that has aimed to use "America's preponderant economic strength" to expand "American economic and political power throughout the world, that is, to expand U.S. economic and political influence." (Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*). The political Open Door is the manifestation of Woodrow Wilson's liberal approach – and conceptualization of American Exceptionalism, idealism, and liberalism, to international politics, which has bequeathed to the United States a twofold grand strategic legacy. First is the belief that states' domestic political systems determine whether their external policies are peaceful or warlike, that is, that "defects in states cause wars among them (Merli and Wilson, *Makers of American Diplomacy*). Secondly, the corollary proposition that the U.S. can be secure only in a world constituted of states whose domestic political systems mirror that of the U.S. and that "defects" in other states can be remedied by using U.S. power to transform non-democracies into democracies. In short, the current Bush administration has sought security by expanding U.S. power and pursuing hegemony. In this respect, it has stayed on - not left - the grand strategic path followed by the United States since the early 1940s. Nearly a century later, Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama's advocacy of "realistic Wilsonianism" illustrates the continuity in U.S. BNSP (Fukuyama, *The End of History*)

alliances and coalitions on which we rely on to protect our interests abroad.”²⁰⁶ Over the past five years, the QDR’s projection has, because of the war in Iraq, to a certain degree manifested itself.

The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one of benign expansion, and that strategy’s logic inexorably has driven the U.S. to attempt to establish its primacy in the world’s three most important regions outside North America itself: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The current Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein is another example of continuity in U.S. grand strategy since 1989. Iraq was not the first, but merely the latest, U.S. war of hegemony since the cold war’s end. Since the cold war waned in the late, in the 1980s, the United States has been involved in a series of such military interventions.

There are different strategies in which the instruments of national power are employed alone or in combination. The formulation and employed of a specific strategy — erosion versus annihilation or offensive versus defensive — is a product of the nation’s or group’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges resident in its instruments of national power .

All competitions, conflicts, and war involve power; real, perceived, and/or imagined. Political competition and conflict often escalates into war simply because the opponents disagree as to their relative power. The resort to naked force is the only way to determine the truth.

Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of money or other resources, for example, or possession of the physical means for coercion (weapons and troops or police). Power is just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or scientific authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s ability to excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for diplomatic or military strength.

Power provides the means to attack, but it also provides the means to resist attack. Power in itself is therefore neither good nor evil. By its nature, however, power tends to

²⁰⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (May 1997) <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/> (accessed October 2008).

be distributed unevenly, to an extent that varies greatly from one society to another and over time. Power, real, perceived, and/or imagined, is personified in a nation's instruments of national power. The instruments of national power will be discussed, in detail, in the next chapter.

War is a continuation of politics by other means and is the employment of violent means to achieve them (Clausewitz).²⁰⁷ The political aims of an entity at war always appear somewhere along a continuum of objectives, which despite their variety can all be usefully labeled as either "limited" or "high-end." The distinction is fundamental. A high-end political objective amounts to the elimination of the opponent as a political entity, that is, elimination of the enemy political leadership, not necessarily of the organization, state, or society it leads. A limited political objective, on the other hand, is one which does not inherently require the elimination of the political entity who is currently one's opponent.²⁰⁸

There are essentially only two ways to use force to impose one's will on an enemy. The first is to eliminate his capacity to use military force, leaving him helpless to resist one's demands. The other is to inflict such high costs or political pain that he is willing to negotiate an end to hostilities on the terms desired.

The first of these alternatives represents what has traditionally been called a strategy of annihilation, in which the military objective is unlimited: One seeks to eliminate the enemy's ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of one's will (however limited or however extreme ultimate intentions may be).

The second alternative is a strategy of erosion, in which the military objective is limited: One seeks to raise the enemy's costs so high that the enemy will find ending the war on the opponent's terms more attractive than continuing to fight.

The goal of a strategy of annihilation or incapacitation is to deprive the enemy of the capability of resistance, to make him militarily helpless. "Incapacitation" is perhaps a

²⁰⁷ Bassford, *Policy, Politics, War*.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

better literal description of the strategic goal described here, but, as with so many potentially useful terms, that word tends to conjure up counterproductive images, in this case, of non-lethal weapons, limited applications of force, and “surgical strikes,” which are contrary to this meaning.

Thus, one usually uses the term “annihilation.” Of course, the word “annihilation” is also problematical: It triggers strong emotions and is sometimes confused with a policy of extermination. The latter is a political, not military, goal. It cannot be achieved, however, without first annihilating the enemy’s means of resistance. What is being annihilated (literally, “made into nothing”) is the enemy’s physical means to oppose. Deprived of the means to fight, any residual will to resist is, one believes or hopes, irrelevant. Thus, this thesis uses the terms “disarm,” “annihilation,” “incapacitation,” and “high-end” or “unlimited” military objective more or less interchangeably.

Normally, a strategy of annihilation is viable only when one possesses some very great superiority over the enemy, in terms of brute strength, military skill, leadership, technological capabilities, or morale. Sometimes one can achieve the necessary superiority through surprise, although this is hard to achieve and dangerous to count on. If one’s opponent has any strategic depth, he may recover from his surprise before one’s victory is assured. To seek to annihilate an enemy’s military capabilities without some such overwhelming superiority entails a willingness to pay a very high price for total military victory. (This is often called “attrition” warfare.). Such a price may well be justified, as in the American Civil War²⁰⁹ or the war against Hitler²¹⁰. Oftentimes, however, the advantages to be gained through complete military victory are not sufficient to justify its cost.

Some societies will accept such a defeat and adjust to the demands of the victor, as did Vichy France in 1940 and Germany in 1945. Others, however, will simply redefine

²⁰⁹ Richard E. Beringer, *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991); David Herbert Donald, *Why the North Won the Civil War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War* (Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

²¹⁰ Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War: A Complete History* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004); and John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin Publishers, 2005).

their goals and seek different means to continue the struggle. The American South, for instance, in 1865 lost a war for territorial independence to the North's strategy of annihilation, which left the South's armies in ruins and its economy too wrecked to support continuation of the conventional war. White Southerners then turned to the less ambitious (i.e., politically limited) goal of maintaining their own preferred social order in the face of Northern efforts at "reconstruction." They used the means of passive resistance to the national government and violent terrorism against local opponents. By 1876, the national government had tacitly accepted Southern victory in this follow-on struggle, in return for national unity. This political compromise endured for nearly a century.

In many cases, an annihilation strategy is pursued by an entity conscious of the temporary nature of its military superiority. Nazi Germany, for example, was well aware of the superior economic and manpower potential of Germany's enemies in either a long war or a long arms race. The Germans' mobilization strategy and the actual conduct of their campaigns therefore aimed at fighting a short war against unprepared foes. To be anything more than a gamble, such a strategy must be based on a reasonable probability that one's military superiority, whatever its basis, will be decisive before an enemy's superior mobilization potential can affect the dynamics of the war. It also requires that the effects of one's victory be such as to preclude the enemy from reopening the conflict after such mobilization. That is, victory, even if limited, must remove the source of the enemy's potential superiority.²¹¹

The second approach, of which the American North's second and victorious strategy is an example, for this thesis, shall be called a strategy of erosion. Its objective is to convince the enemy that a settlement of the outstanding political issues on one's terms

²¹¹ Gilbert, *The Second World War*; Keegan, *The Second World War*.

will be easier and more attractive than continued conflict. To put it another way, one seeks to present the enemy with the probability of an outcome worse in his eyes than peace on one's terms.²¹²

One accomplishes this through erosion, literally “wearing down” [quotation added] the enemy's will to fight rather than destroying his ability to resist. Strategists, policy makers, and decision makers will choose this approach when they are either unable or unwilling to destroy the enemy's war-making capability. Perhaps their goal requires such a modest concession from the enemy that they believe he will acquiesce after modest resistance. Perhaps one needs to keep the other entity's military forces in existence as a buffer, or as a factor in the balance of power. Perhaps the public will not support the commitment of sufficient forces to wage a campaign of annihilation. In the latter case, however, one must ask why one thinks the public will tolerate instead the long, drawn-out struggle that strategies of erosion often imply. Strategists, policy makers, and decision makers might also ask themselves why they expect the enemy to fold before they will.

In many cases, however, strategists, policy makers, and decision makers pursue a strategy of erosion simply because the enemy is too powerful: the outright destruction of his military power is beyond their capabilities — or that the costs outweigh the gains and risks are not worth the benefits. The Afghan guerrillas' successful erosion strategy against the Soviets falls into this category as does the Taliban's current campaign, and its accompanying rhetoric, against the U.S. and NATO. So does the American effort against Great Britain during the American Revolution. In the American Civil War, the selection and employment of a strategy of erosion by the Confederate States of America was unsuccessful.²¹³

Sometimes strategists, policy makers, and decision makers face enemies who simply cannot be dissuaded from the pursuit of policies they find intolerable by limited

²¹² Beringer, *Why the South Lost*; Donald, *Why the North Won*; and Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*.

²¹³ Ibid.

political and military action (i.e., erosion). Strategists, policy makers, and decision makers sometimes find themselves in the awkward and uncomfortable situation where an annihilation strategy is also unavailable — because the enemy is too powerful, or domestic opinion will not support it, or their allies and neutrals would be too disturbed by their foe's elimination.

If strategists, policy makers, and decision makers can neither forcibly persuade nor destroy them, such enemies can only be contained through never-ending efforts. This may in fact be the case the U.S. and its partners are, and will be, facing in the current struggle and conflict with radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political power. Whether one's objectives in such struggles are essentially limited or high-end is a moot point: One's eventual victory will result from the employment of all of the instruments of national power, alone or in combination; military operations are merely a holding action.

The strategic attacker is the antagonist seeking to add to his relative power. It usually is the side that initiates a war, although defenders sometimes launch preemptive attacks. An attacker may be seeking to completely overthrow the balance of power or may simply want an upward adjustment in his relative position. This distinction affects the kinds of strategies both sides pursue and the intensity of the struggle.

The strategic defender is the participant that wants to keep what he has or to maintain his relative position in a balance of power system. In many important respects, defense is inherently stronger than offense. The strength of the strategic defense derives from human psychology and the balance of power mechanism as well as the forces of friction and inertia. People are naturally willing to endure great sacrifices in defense of their homes and homelands but much less willing to endure such sacrifices in military adventures abroad.

- An aggressor's action frequently causes anxiety and hostility in neighboring allied and neutral countries; they often interpret a challenge to the existing balance of power as a threat and are more naturally inclined to support the defender. Friction and inertia are normally on the side of the defender as well: it is inherently easier to hold onto something than to take it away from someone else.
- These political and psychological strengths of the strategic defense are present in all conflicts and wars, even those in which territorial gains and losses (i.e., economic and financial, prestige and relative power, access to raw materials, etc.) are not major factors. The strength of the defense is often reinforced operationally since the attacker is normally moving away from his base of supply and the center of his political power, while the defender is falling back on his.
- The relative superiority of the strategic defense is not an absolute. Obviously, a defender with few resources and poor leadership is not stronger than an attacker with vastly greater resources and good leadership. However, all other things being equal, the defender has the advantage.

At the tactical and operational levels, the roles of attacker and defender may frequently change hands or even be shared more or less evenly. At the strategic level, however, the roles tend to be fixed throughout any given conflict. In the Second World War for example, the Western Allies held the advantages of the strategic defense even as their armies marched into Germany. They were perceived as being restorers of the balance of power rather than as threats to it.²¹⁴

However, in some situations, the roles of strategic attacker and defender can be reversed. When war is endemic in a society, when the origins of the conflict are poorly remembered, or when the war guilt has come to be equally shared, the advantages of the original defender tend to be lost. In such a case, the balance of power mechanism usually tends to support the current defender and to oppose whichever contender seems momentarily to have the initiative.

²¹⁴ Gilbert, *The Second World War*; Keegan, *The Second World War*.

Strategies can also be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. That is, the contending powers may pursue mirror-image ends or rely on similar means, or they may pursue quite different kinds of goals or apply dissimilar means.²¹⁵

A symmetrical military strategy is one that attempts to match, or rather, to overmatch, the enemy strength for strength, to beat him on his own terms. Symmetrical strategies usually involve peer or near peer competitors and rivals.

An asymmetrical strategy is one that attempts to apply one category of means against another category, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively respond in kind. Many conflicts and wars, including the one the U.S. and its partners are currently engaged in against radicals and extremists that employ terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, are fought between very different enemies and are thus profoundly asymmetrical in character.²¹⁶

- For example, a terrorist organization may wage war against a government or even against the international community as a whole.
- The terrorist campaigns of the Irish Republican Army against the United Kingdom and the Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel are illustrations.

Most states would like nothing better than for terrorists to act symmetrically and resort to open battle, which would make them vulnerable to the state's superior conventional military forces. On the other hand, terrorists may also seek to provoke a symmetrical response: the purpose of many terrorist attacks is to provoke governments into actions that antagonize ordinary citizens such as restrictive security measures or even reprisals in kind. These acts undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the government

²¹⁵ There is a long tradition of military theory involving asymmetrical strategies. It appears in Chinese military theory most prominently in Sun Tzu and in the works of Mao Zedong. A particularly clear discussion appears in Edward O'Dowd's and Arthur Waldron's, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," (*Comparative Strategy* 10 [1991]:25–36). British military thinker B. H. Liddell Hart propounded asymmetry in his theory of the "indirect approach" most powerfully in his books, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932); *The Ghost of Napoleon* (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), and *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954). See also Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (trans. Samuel B. Griffith [New York: Oxford University Press, 1971]) especially the introduction written by Griffith.

²¹⁶ David Brannan and Anders Strinberg, "The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security" (lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007).

and play into the hands of the terrorist strategy. Because of the fundamentally different natures of the adversaries, the political effects of these similar actions are dramatically different.

Most real-world strategies are a mixture of symmetrical and asymmetrical elements, and it is often difficult to determine the overall balance between them. Thus any discussion of symmetry or asymmetry in war is a matter of degree as well as kind. The usefulness of the concept is that it helps to analyze the dynamics of a struggle. For example, the American strategy of deterrence and containment during the Cold War always involved strong elements of both symmetry and asymmetry.

From a military standpoint, Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy was fundamentally an asymmetrical strategy: the United States would reply to any type of Soviet aggression "by means and at places of our own choosing."²¹⁷ This was generally interpreted to mean a U.S. nuclear response to a conventional Soviet provocation. From the national strategic standpoint however, Eisenhower's strategy was broadly similar to the Soviet Union's in that both relied primarily on deterrence rather than on the actual application of military force.

The Kennedy administration's subsequent flexible response strategy was militarily a symmetrical strategy of matching the Soviets strength for strength. However, it also took advantage of economic and political asymmetries.²¹⁸

There is no innate advantage or disadvantage to either a symmetrical or asymmetrical strategy. The choice depends on the situation and on the constraints of time and creativity. The interplay between symmetry and asymmetry in any struggle is unique and covers a wide range of possibilities. In India's post-World War II struggle for independence, for example, British military power was overthrown by the most asymmetrical approach imaginable: Gandhi's campaign of nonviolence.

²¹⁷ "Massive Retaliatory Power," *Time*, (January 25, 1954)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823199,00.html?iid=digg_share (accessed September 8, 2008).

²¹⁸ United States Marine Corps (USMC), "Strategic Opposites," *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1: Strategy*, PCN 1420000700 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997)
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/chap3.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).

A particular strategy must take into account the similarities and differences between the opponents and must, when necessary or advantageous, seek to create new ones. The effective strategist is not biased in favor of either symmetry or asymmetry but is keenly aware of both and of the interplay between them.

Deterrence means dissuading an enemy from an action by means of some countervailing threat. There are essentially two methods of deterrence: denial and reprisal. To deter by denial means to prevent an enemy's action by convincing him that his action will fail. Conceptually, this is a symmetrical approach (although the actual means of denial may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical). For example, a state may deter conventional invasion by maintaining sufficiently credible forces to defend its borders. It may deter the use of poison gas by training and equipping its forces and population to function effectively in a chemical warfare environment. Terrorists may be deterred from attacks on airports by tight security.

The second approach, reprisal, is conceptually asymmetrical. A nation or group may concede to the enemy that he is capable of taking what he wants from, but one seeks to convince him that his prize will not be worth the price he will pay for it. For example, a state weak in conventional forces may seek to deter enemy occupation by credibly preparing to wage a long, painful guerrilla war of resistance. Conventional invasion might also be deterred through the threat of nuclear retaliation.

There are overlaps between denial and reprisal. Tight airport security may deter terrorists by convincing them either that their efforts will fail (denial) or that they will be caught and punished (reprisal). A demonstrated capability to wage chemical warfare may deter a gas attack both by denying the enemy an advantage and by threatening to retaliate in kind.

As these examples indicate, in practice denial and reprisal are often more effective when applied in tandem. The ability of one side to deny its enemy an advantage cannot always be absolutely convincing, especially if the other side is inclined to take risks. Deterrence by denial also implies a certain passivity. An enemy may be willing to test the defenses if he believes that failure carries no further penalty. On the other hand,

while deterrence by reprisal compensates for some of the weakness of denial, reprisal has its own weaknesses. Retaliation, even if carried out successfully, may come too late to avoid suffering significant damage.

Not all strategies are the product of conscious thought; after all, viruses have strategies (often very successful ones that handily defeat one's own conscious efforts). Warfare is driven by politics at every level, and rational calculation is only one of many factors in politics. As a practical matter, most of the elements of any given strategy are predetermined by choices made long before the present conflict.²¹⁹

Strategies by intent are those developed primarily through the rational consideration of options and their likely implications. Strategies by default, on the other hand, are those determined primarily by ideologies or by unconscious assumptions and prejudices that prevent strategists from considering all of their options in what we would consider a fully rational manner — they are driven by what one is rather than by what one thinks. While conceptually distinct, the two are rarely mutually exclusive; most strategies involve elements of both intent and default. Therefore, the first question one must ask when confronted with a strategic problem is often not “What should we do?” but rather “What are we doing?”

Dictatorships have difficulty waging coalition warfare. However sensible it might be to cooperate with similar entities to overthrow the balance of power, dictatorships by their very nature demand that decisions be made unilaterally. They attempt to treat potential allies as servants, subordinating others' interests completely to their own. Theocratic states, which find their justification for existence in the alleged demands of God, have similar difficulties in compromising.

Liberal democracies, which are cooperative, compromising, balance-of-power entities internally, are much more likely than dictatorships or theocracies to demonstrate these same characteristics in their external relationships — and to attempt to treat very different kinds of political entities as if they shared those values.

²¹⁹ United States Marine Corps. “Notes: The Study of Strategy,” *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1: Strategy*, PCN 1420000700 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/notes.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).

What are described are, of course, only tendencies. Insightful and strong-willed leaders occasionally overcome such tendencies. Strategic analysts therefore must seek to understand which elements of their own and the enemy's strategies are fixed by nature and which are subject to conscious change. A policy which seeks merely to convince the enemy to change his behavior (which is the case in most erosion strategies) will fail if he is incapable of change. A strategic concept that requires one to behave in a manner contrary to one's nature has little likelihood of success, unless one is prepared to change one's own character in the process.

Usually, when one talks about the conscious formulation of a particular strategy, one is talking about a specific method of using specific means to reach specific ends. This is a strategy "tailored" to deal with a particular problem where the means are finely adapted to fit one's ends, and vice versa. Because such strategies are by nature unique, there is little to be gained from discussing them in general other than noting them as a category.

There are large classes of problems, however, which do not lend themselves to such tailoring. These problems usually fall into one or both of two categories:

- One lacks the time to tailor a unique response to a specific problem. This can be the case in rapidly unfolding strategic problems or in cases where one is for some other reason (including stupidity or simple stubbornness) unwilling or unable to adapt.
- One lacks the specific knowledge one needs in order to craft a unique strategy in response to a specific situation, but one recognizes the problem (or think one does) as being of a certain, familiar kind.

In either case, the strategist is left with little option but to go with an existing strategy (an existing set of means and ends), whether or not it is truly appropriate to the specific problem.

If, in the process of formulating strategy, one runs into certain types of problem often enough, strategists, policy makers, and decision makers, including commanders, develop reflexes, standard operating procedures (SOPs), branches, and sequels, or simply

strategic habits and patterns, that are generally appropriate to that class of problem. Experience tells them that they will work more often than not.

Consequently, nations and some groups create and maintain bureaucracies to maintain and administer these “iterative” strategies. In general, the purpose of iterative strategies is not to maximize success in every particular case, but rather to maximize success on the average and over the long run. In many cases, however, iterative strategies are designed not so much to solve a class of problem as to reliably gain time to find an appropriate, more specific solution.


Iterative strategies are not fixed: They can be changed and improved, usually on the basis of experience. Learning by experience in war, however, is highly dependent on the famous “OODA Loop,” the iterative cycle of Observing, Orienting, Deciding, and Acting.²²⁰ The OODA Loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) is a concept applied to the combat operations, often at strategic level in both the military and commercial operations. It was created by military strategist and U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd in the 1960s.

The OODA loop was first developed to describe the process of air-to-air combat, but obviously applies to any interactive competition. Each party to a conflict first observes the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients; that is, he makes an estimate of the situation. On the basis of the orientation, he makes a decision. Then he implements the decision and acts. Because the action has created a new situation, the process begins anew. The party that consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy’s reactions become increasingly slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events (see Figure 2 below).²²¹

²²⁰ Value-Based Management, “OODA Loop - John Boyd,” Value-Based Management (March 25, 2008) http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html (accessed August 15, 2008).

²²¹ John Boyd "The Patterns of Conflict," ed. Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney, Defense and the National Interest, (January 2007) www.d-n-i.net/boyd/patterns.ppt (accessed September 8, 2008).

Boyd's OODA "Loop" Sketch



Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, and in turn is shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming into our sensing or observing window.

Also note how the entire "loop" (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.

From "The Essence of Winning and Losing," John R. Boyd, January 1996.

Defense and the National Interest, <http://www.d-n-i.net>, 2006

Figure 2. The OODA "Loop"²²²

Even though iterative strategies are more obvious at the tactical level, political entities do develop iterative strategies at the political/strategic level. These generally find expression, not within a single war, but over the course of many wars. Such a strategy's immediate payoff in any particular case may be less than completely satisfying, but it can offer great advantages over the long-term. These strategies build a certain reputation, which may strongly influence the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals. As a hypothetical example, an entity that habitually exterminates its enemies might find itself challenged infrequently. When war does occur, however, such an entity would encounter maximum resistance and hostility.

²²² Kettle Creek Corporation, "The OODA 'Loop' Sketch," Defense and the National Interest (March 2006) www.d-n-i.net/boyd/boyds_ooda_loop.ppt (19 September 2008).

The United States pursues similar iterative strategies in its conduct of conflict resolution and war. Such strategies include decent treatment of prisoners, adherence to rigid military, informational, diplomatic/political, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic rules of engagement (ROEs), and strict observance of the international laws of warfare (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), respect for the independence of allies, relatively mild occupation policies, and the generous and systematic reconstruction of conquered states (as well as a persistent economic isolation of enemies the U.S. has failed, or not tried, to subdue).

These policies often run counter to the emotions stirred by violence but are consistent with American moral precepts. They also reflect a recognition that wars end and that then one has to live with the survivors; human societies are far more tolerant of massive destruction and bloodshed in battle than they are of ill treatment afterwards.

Further, as a practical matter, these policies make it more difficult for enemies to create and sustain firm popular resistance to American power and influence. They make it easier for other states to serve as American allies and help to minimize the impact of the “culminating point of victory” and other balance-of-power concerns. Combined with the American reputation for overwhelming firepower and a demonstrated willingness to use it in war, such policies have contributed greatly to America’s strategic success.

Regardless of the strategy selected, it is critical that the strategists, policy makers, and decision makers responsible and accountable for developing and implementing the strategy fully understand the implications and ramifications of its execution; especially with respect to the opponent’s survival.

Survival can therefore mean different things to different elements. It is strategists’, policy makers’, and decision makers’ task to isolate those elements — centers of gravity — of the enemy political system, if any, whose survival is intolerable to their end state. In implementing and executing the selected strategy, they must provide credible reassurances to the rest of the enemy’s population that the aims, goals and objectives, expectations, and desired end state do not threaten their survival.

If the aim is not the enemy's complete destruction, he must be made to understand why submission to one's demands will not be fatal. Even if one's aim is truly the elimination of an enemy entity, it is not necessarily wise, let alone advantageous, to advertise that fact. A threat to its survival will provoke an entity to maximum resistance. A prior commitment to its eradication is wise only if that expressed goal is necessary in order to motivate one's own people and allies.

Not only do different entities define survival in different ways, they also tend to define their enemies' survival in ways parallel to their own. This can lead to a profound misunderstanding of the strategic situation. The Confederate leadership in the American Civil War saw their goal, secession, as a purely defensive act that posed no threat to the survival of the northern Union. The Union leadership saw things differently.²²³

As Lincoln indicated clearly in his Gettysburg Address, the sundering of the original Union called into question the validity of democratic institutions. National institutions that cannot maintain the integrity of the nation are by definition fatally flawed. Were the South's secession accepted, there would be no logical basis on which to maintain the cohesion of the remaining states. Thus the Union would not survive secession, nor would the American dream of self-sustaining republican government "of the people, by the people, for the people." Nor, for that matter, would the Lincoln administration itself survive defeat. The titanic Union war effort cannot be understood on any other basis.²²⁴

Conversely, victory can be as hard to define as survival. At the strategic level, victory ultimately requires an end to the war and the reestablishment of peace. Logically speaking, victory in a strategic sense should mean the accomplishment of the specific political aims of the entity at war. In practice, however, the resort to war is often a mistake from which neither side truly benefits. In such cases, victory may mean merely ending the war on terms less unfavorable to oneself than to the enemy. In the aftermath of

²²³ Beringer, *Why the South Lost*; Donald, *Why the North Won*; and Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*.

the Second World War, the British Empire ceased to exist for all intents and purposes and transformed itself into the “Commonwealth.” France and Holland also lost their empires due to costs of the war.

Therefore, because war is so dangerous and destructive, even to the victor, the only sensible goal of war is the establishment of a peace more favorable to an entity’s interests than could have been gained without recourse to warfare. Initial calculations may be proven erroneous by events, however. If the costs of continuing a military struggle come to exceed the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable. As Clausewitz put it, since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.²²⁵

That this does not always happen is due in part to the fact that “senseless passion” is, in practice, seldom absent. Because one cannot put a precise or “dollar” value on most war aims, it is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds the value of victory. Leaders may also flinch at the political cost of admitting their miscalculations. Further, entities at war may come to seek the thrill of victory for its own sake, for war’s excitement may become addictive to influential elements of society. As General Robert E. Lee put it, “It is well that war is so terrible, else we should grow too fond of it.”²²⁶ Union General William Tecumseh Sherman perhaps said it best ...”war is hell.”²²⁷

In sum, strategy is the congregate application (the ways) of one or more of the instruments of national power (the means) to achieve success. In the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu says that “Victory is the main object of war.”²²⁸ In *On War*, Clausewitz states that “the importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate

²²⁵ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 92 and 177.

²²⁶ Civil War Talk, “Civil War Quotation,” Civil War Talk, <http://civilwartalk.com/forums/civil-war-quotations/19858-lee-robert-e.html> (accessed August 22, 2008).

²²⁷ Civil War Talk, “Civil War Quotation.”

²²⁸ J. Boone, Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” *Parameters*, (Summer 2008): 25-36. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/08summer/bartholo.htm> (accessed October 2008).

pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first exercise of authority is to demand that the victory should really be complete.”²²⁹

Baron Antoine Jomini, a contemporary, and rival, of Clausewitz with service in the French and Russian armies during the Napoleonic wars, also gave modern U.S. theory and doctrine several terms. In his *Art of War* (translated by Charles Messenger and republished by Stackpole Books in 1996), Jomini was specific about how to plan a campaign.²³⁰ First, the national political-military leadership selected the theater of war. Next, the leadership identified and prioritized the decisive points in the theater. The selection of bases and zones of operation followed. Then one of these was designated the objective point. The line of operations was then the line from the base through the decisive points to the objective point.

B. H. Liddell Hart, British veteran of the First World War and later an influential British military historian and theorist, advanced the idea that the military means is only one of the means of grand strategy and that strategy responsibility is to seek it [a military decision] under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable results. Although Jomini and Liddell Hart would be appalled at being compared with Clausewitz, this statement is similar to the Prussian’s comment, “Military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated.”²³¹ In other words, military victory is the total and absolute defeat of the enemy and the enemy’s instruments of national power.

The French general and theoretician Andre Beaufré provided another way to think about strategy. He was generally Clausewitzian in his acceptance both of the political and psychological natures of war and his characterization of war as a dialectic struggle

²²⁹ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 177.

²³⁰ Antoine Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. Charles Messenger (Mechanicsburg, PA Stackpole Books, 1996.)

²³¹ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 137.

between opposing wills and was adamant that wars are not won by military means alone (destroying the enemy army) but only by the collapse of will. Most importantly, Beaufré recognized the criticality of non-military instruments, or elements of national power — political, economic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and informational — and that strategy was neither an exclusively wartime activity.²³²

To support his theory, Beaufre’ coined the term “total strategy” and defined it as the highest national level how the war would be fought and coordinated the application of all the elements of power. In order for a nation to execute its “total strategy,” Beaufre’ identified two general principles of strategy, which he borrowed from Clausewitz: freedom of action and economy of force.²³³

For Beaufré, a nation’s “total strategy” could be executed in one of two modes: direct or indirect. According to Beaufre, all elements of power played in both modes, but the direct mode emphasized the military instrument. Indirect strategy, which he carefully distinguished from Liddell Hart’s indirect approach, used primarily the nonmilitary instruments to achieve political goals.²³⁴

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S. Navy (ret.), who was influenced considerably by Jomini, sought to define the relationship between sea power and national greatness and secondly to establish some guiding principles of naval strategy and naval warfare. On the issue of sea power and national greatness, Mahan argued that a study of history revealed that the “mastery of the seas [sea control] had been a determinant of victory in war and of prosperity in peace.”²³⁵

²³² U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid., 88-90.

²³⁵ Ibid.

To Mahan, sea power was the key to national greatness.²³⁶ In his most influential and celebrated work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*,²³⁷ he sought to demonstrate the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations.²³⁸ Mahan considered and defined sea power to include the overlapping concepts of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness.”²³⁹

Although Mahan remains an important reference for maritime/naval strategists, the modern community of practitioners recognizes that sea power must be balanced with a strong economy, a stable and responsive government, a developed industrial base and a highly capable military force. Sea power is not enough in itself to achieve national greatness and is in fact wholly dependent upon a nation’s geography. If a nation’s geography is pertinent and appropriate, sea power should be considered as simply one of a number of measures that provides a means of protecting vital interests and enhancing autonomy and not a strategic planning panacea.

Sir Julian Corbett provides a much more appropriate foundation for speculation about the future of sea power in the twenty-first century.²⁴⁰ Corbett, a lawyer and an historian, came to the study of naval strategy late in life. He is best remembered for his book *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* which was published in 1911.

In this work, Corbett developed a number of concepts relating to a general theory of war, the theory of naval war, and the conduct of naval war. Corbett theorized that

²³⁶ Thomas, H. Etzold, “Is Mahan Still Valid?” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (August 1980): 38; William Needham, “Mahan,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1993): 44; Barry M. Gough, “Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power,” *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (Winter 1988): 56; and Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: ‘The Naval Historian’”, in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1986), 451.

²³⁷ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (Annapolis, MD,: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001).

²³⁸ Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 450.

²³⁹ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*.

²⁴⁰ Geoffrey Till, “Sir Julian Corbett and the Twenty-First Century: Ten Maritime Commandments,” in *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*, ed. Andrew Dorman, A., Mike L. Smith, and Matthew R.H. Uttley (London, U.K.: MacMillan Press, 1999), 19.

strategy needs to be consciously related to foreign policy and naval strategy to land strategy.²⁴¹ Corbett saw that the reward for being strong at sea was the capacity it conferred to influence events ashore — for that was where events were actually decided. This led him to develop concepts that examined the role of sea power in the wider scheme of things.²⁴²

Like Mahan, Corbett upheld the principle of command of the sea; sea control, and sea denial. He considered that the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.²⁴³ However, unlike Mahan, Corbett saw that the aim of command of the sea was to ensure the control of maritime communications and not the total destruction of an enemy's fleet. To Corbett, command of the sea was a relative and not absolute concept. Rather he saw command as being asserted in theatres and used to prevent the enemy from disrupting one's own communications.²⁴⁴

Edward Luttwak is an American economist and historian, who has written extensively on strategic theory, focuses on attrition and maneuver as the forms of strategy. A post-Second World War theoretician, Luttwak is at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., senior associate, and has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a number of allied governments as well as international corporations and financial institutions. He is also frequent lecturer at universities and military colleges in the U.S. and abroad and has testified before several congressional committees and presidential commissions.

²⁴¹ Gough, "Maritime Strategy," 58; Andrew Dorman, A., Mike L. Smith, and Matthew R.H. Uttley, *The Changing Face of Maritime Power* (London, U.K.: MacMillan Press, 1999), 5.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1988), 91-95.

²⁴⁴ Gough, "Maritime Strategy", 58; and Dorman, Smith, and Uttley *The Changing Face*, 5.

In Luttwak's paradigm, articulated in his book, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* ²⁴⁵ identifies five levels (technical, tactical, operational, theater strategic, and grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical across levels and horizontal in levels) of operations and emphasizes two modes of operation (attrition and relational maneuver).

Attrition is the application of superior firepower and material strength to eventually destroy the enemy's entire force unless he surrenders or retreats. The enemy is nothing more than a target array to be serviced by industrial methods.²⁴⁶

The opposite of attrition warfare is relational maneuver, "action related to the specifics of the objective." The goal of relational maneuver, instead of physically destroying the enemy as in attrition, is to incapacitate his systems. Those systems might be the enemy's command and control, his fielded forces, or even his doctrine, or perhaps the spatial deployment of his force, as in the penetration of a linear position.²⁴⁷

Martin Van Creveld, in his book *The Transformation of War*, represents a segment of modern scholars that believe Clausewitz no longer explains why, how, or by whom wars are fought and that the world is seeing a decline of the nation-state, without a comparable decline in organized violence. Given this argument, the nature of the participants dictates the nature of the reasons they fight. Because the participants are not states, they will not be fighting for state-like reasons.

To Van Creveld, war is no longer a rational political act conducted among states; if it ever was, and that future wars will be dominated by non-state actors. He points out that warfare waged by non-state actors dominated conflict in 1991 rather than the organized, political, interstate warfare between great powers that the international community seemed to expect (and Clausewitz seemed to predict). War is no longer fought by the entities one has always assumed fought wars. The combatants in modern

²⁴⁵Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

²⁴⁶ Luttwak, *Strategy*.

²⁴⁷Ibid.

wars no longer fight for the reasons one has always believed. Finally, they do not fight in the manner one has always accepted as standard.²⁴⁸

Van Creveld argued that Clausewitz's model of war distinguishes between the affairs of the population, the army, and the government and criticizes this philosophy as too narrow and state-focused, thus inapplicable to the study of those conflicts involving one or more non-state actors. Instead, he proposed five key issues of war: by whom war is fought — whether by states or by non-state actors; what is war all about — the relationships between the actors, and between them and the non-combatants; how war is fought — issues of strategy and tactics; what war is fought for — whether to enhance national power, or as an end to itself; and why war is fought — the motivations of the individual soldier.²⁴⁹

Like Luttwak and his nemesis Clausewitz, Van Creveld sees strategy as paradoxical. He believes pairs of paradoxes define strategy. If the object of war is to beat one's opponent's force with one's own, then one must design maneuvers to pit strength against weakness. Because war is competitive, the enemy is doing the same thing, and one must conceal or protect our weakness from the opponent's strength. Thus, the essence of strategy is "...the ability to feint, deceive, and mislead" because in the future, wars will be waged by groups of terrorists, guerrillas and bandits motivated by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties; conventional battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres. Weapons will become less, rather than more, sophisticated.²⁵⁰

Of note, Van Creveld is a contemporary of Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama, whose seminal work, *The End of History and the Last Man*, argued the neo-conservative

²⁴⁸ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

theory²⁵¹ that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy and thus visualizing the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism. Having now distanced himself from the neo-conservative movement, he now argues that just as every other country does, the U.S. has a right to promote its own values in the world, but more along the lines of what he calls “*realistic Wilsonianism*,” [italics added] with military intervention only as a last resort and only in addition to other measures.²⁵²

According to Fukuyama , a latent military force is more likely to have an effect than actual deployment. The U.S. spends more on its military than the rest of the world put together, but Iraq shows there are limits to its effectiveness. The U.S. should instead stimulate political and economic development and gain a better understanding of what happens in other countries.²⁵³

The best instruments (or elements of national power), according to Fukuyama, are setting a good example, providing education, and, in many cases, money. The critical ingredient in sustainable national development and stabilization, be it political or economic, is that it never comes from outsiders, but always from people, the citizens, in the country itself in partnership with its government and national leadership.²⁵⁴

According to Fukuyama, the one activity the U.S. proved to have consistently excelled at in the aftermath of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War was the formation of international political and economic institutions. He recommended a

²⁵¹ Neo-conservative thought gained momentum after the Cold War as the U.S. sought to define its role as the sole superpower – the global hegemon. This is not surprising since it is an appealing theory on many levels. The U.S. was culturally, economically, and militarily at the peak of power; indeed, it was the most powerful nation in all respects that has existed to this point in history. A confluence of events since the end of the Cold War provided the best possible moment in time for the U.S. to launch an ideological, cultural, and military campaign if so desired. Without any real military peer on the horizon to intervene there were no barriers to virtual unilateral action. From a neo-conservative-realist orientation a historic opportunity was provided: to seize a competitive edge (the strategic advantage), to endure present instability and war to ensure the sovereignty and security of future generations, and to lead the U.S. electorate to this end state for their own good.

²⁵² Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*.

²⁵³ Fukuyama, *The End of History*.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

return to support for these structures would combine American power with international legitimacy, but advises that such measures require a considerable patience.²⁵⁵

Regardless of the course of action (i.e., ways) or the assets (i.e., means) employed, there are only two fundamental national strategic goals in any conflict: survival and victory. Any specific aims that the U.S. as a nation may pursue will reflect one or both of these two goals.

Survival is the minimum goal of opponents and a prerequisite for victory. Victory is normally associated with the achievement of the political aims of the war, but it also requires an end to the war and the reestablishment of peace. The strategist must strive to understand what survival and victory mean in the specific situation at hand to each of the struggle's participants.

Survival is the continued existence of the political entity that is at war. However, survival can mean different things to different political entities. Survival often equates to the real or perceived continuance of a way of life or the well-being of the population.

Threats to this type of survival are usually met with fierce resistance. The U.S. and its global partners appear to be encountering this phenomenon with respect to the current campaign against global extremists who are employing terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures to gain and exercise political power in order to serve the greater good of their constituency.

“The way forward” [quotations added] against the dominant threat facing the U.S. in the twenty-first century, first and foremost, is for the U.S. and its partners to create a more secure environment in which to combat extremism, radicalism, and terrorism while simultaneously guarding against, deterring, and containing state-based threats such as those posed by a resurgent and confident Russia and a growing and increasingly influential and capable China. Secondly, they must discredit and delegitimize those who use terrorism as means to advance their political ends.

²⁵⁵ Fukuyama, *The End of History*.

Any effective U.S. policy framework must address the common ideological and political factors at the global and local levels. The U.S. and its partners must recognize that terrorism, particularly international terrorism, which is a small, artificially defined segment of political violence that represents the actions of very small groups, may be the dominant threat, but it remains but one of the threats the U.S. faces in the post-Cold War era of the twenty-first century.

The U.S. and its partners must keep that in mind when looking for, and finding solutions to, root causes while simultaneously not being distracted from the plethora of threats generated by an increasingly globalized, interconnected, and integrated world.²⁵⁶ Doing so will require the application of all of the nation's instruments of national power — as military, informational (ideological), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic.

Paraphrasing Brian M. Jenkins, armed force alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological. In the continuing campaign against today's terrorists, insurgents, and guerillas; and for that matter, resurgent state competitors and rivals; political/diplomatic, ideological, financial, and economic warfare must be an essential part of America's arsenal. It is not enough to outgun the terrorists and fellow travelers and those states that would wish to use them to their advantage and the disadvantage of the United States.²⁵⁷

The U.S. and its partners must destroy the extremists' appeal and halt their recruiting. It is not enough to kill or apprehend individual members. The ideology must be delegitimized and discredited. Most recently, this calculus was echoed by both Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates in a speech introducing the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* and a RAND study.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 8.

²⁵⁷ Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation*.

²⁵⁸ White, Josh. "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1: New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus From Conventional Warfare," *The Washington Post*, (July 31 2008) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/30/ar2008073003240.html> (accessed August 15, 2008); and Seth G. Jones, and Martin C. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End Lessons For Countering Al Qa'ida," *RAND Research Brief* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/rb9351/index1.html (August 2008).

In another RAND study, the U.S. faces three key audiences in the struggle against terrorism: terrorists who attack the U.S., radical institutions that nurture terrorists, and sympathetic communities that harbor and support terrorists. Within each, the authors concluded that a confluence of anti-Americanism, radical Islam, and general support for political violence provides an environment in which terrorists can be nurtured or persuaded to conduct attacks against US targets. Strategic influence campaigns that delegitimize and discredit one or any combination of these audiences could help to disrupt this confluence. Doing so has the potential to reduce future support for al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists.²⁵⁹ Although, Anthony H. Cordesman stated that terrorism can never be totally eliminated as a tactic, but the ideology that drives organizations like al-Qaeda can be discredited and its promoters isolated.²⁶⁰

Although the most pressing current threat involves especially radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures, recent events involving Russia, India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Iran, and the Koreas illustrate that the global environment contains many threats to U.S. national security. In each of these events, there is a strong undercurrent involving the real or perceived survival of the nation-state and its people.

As stated at the very beginning of this paper, national security refers to, and has referred to, the requirement of governments and civilian and military leaders to maintain the survival of the nation-state through the use of economic, military, and political power and the exercise of diplomacy – the instruments of national power. Methodologies to achieve and maintain the highest possible desired state of national security have been constantly and consistently developed and refined to establish, ensure, and maintain diplomatic, military, and economic security.

²⁵⁹ Kim Cragin, and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle against Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 2006).

²⁶⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the War on Terrorism: The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (September 18, 2006) http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3490/type,1/ (accessed August 15, 2008).

In some situations, the survival of a particular individual or group will take priority over the interests of the whole. In such a case, strategies that seek to compel submission by threatening the interests of the nation or of its people may have little direct impact. Finally, some political groups or ideological movements are willing to fight on, rationally or irrationally, until they are destroyed. Their hopes of survival lie in leaving behind a heroic legend to influence future generations or in making some other kind of lasting statement to humanity or God. For these groups, even the threat of annihilation may have little impact on their actions.

Victory can be as hard to define as survival. Victory normally means the accomplishment of the specific political aims for which the group or nation went to war. In practice, however, victory may mean merely ending the war on terms less unfavorable to oneself than to the enemy. If the costs of continuing a military struggle come to exceed the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable. Given the nature of war, however, such cost-benefit analysis is more easily described than accomplished.

A major problem with victory as a goal is that victory, like defeat, is an emotion-laden word. A compelling example is the recently released, and discussed previously, Medvedev Doctrine which articulates Russia's historic concern about encirclement and envelopment and a real or perceived loss of freedom of action. Another is China's increasing willingness to employ its burgeoning economy and excess investment capital to challenge the U.S. and the west, including Japan, for predominance in Asia and in the international market community.

The accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not satisfy the emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not feel like victory. Because one cannot precisely measure the value of most wars aims or accurately judge the cost of their attainment, it is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds the value of victory.

The main point in this discussion of survival and victory is that the problem of identifying what survival and victory mean to various participants in war can be extremely difficult. The analysis must involve a multitude of considerations that are

different in every conflict. A most important consideration therefore must be the national will — a political entity's willingness to accept risk to achieve victory and its desired end state to ensure its survival and continued growth and prosperity.

Each nation, state, or political entity has its own distinct character. This character is derived from a variety of sources: location, language, culture, religion, historical circumstances, and so forth. While national character is always evolving, changes generally occur only over the course of decades and centuries and may be imperceptible to the outside observer. As such, national character can be looked upon as a norm or constant. National character is akin to global climate patterns that change very slowly through history.

Judging the national character of an adversary (or an ally) goes well beyond traditional orders of battle and related calculations regarding military and economic power. It requires consideration of national history, culture, religion, society, politics — everything that contributes to the makeup and functioning of a nation. The strategist must compile a complete dossier on a nation similar to that commonly prepared on enemy commanders. At the strategic level, success in war is facilitated by having a similar comprehensive psychological profile of each nation or political group involved in the conflict, including enemies, allies, potential enemies or allies, and even one's own nation.

It is of critical importance that sweeping dogmatic assertions do not govern the analysis of national characters. Such assertions often spring from ethno-centric attitudes and a failure to examine the true nature of a political presence. Rather, what is required is rational, objective, and informed thought about the makeup of a national character and its possible effects on a nation's action or reaction to an event.

When discussing strategy in the abstract, strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians often treat the ends, ways, and means permanent and fixed. In reality and practice, however, the community of strategic practitioners constantly adjusts, and in fact manipulates, both.

Although ends have no natural upper limit, save the limits imposed by one's material and psychological means, there is always a bottom limit to one's aims, however,

defined by one's conception of survival and freedom of action. The events of war, one's own successes and failures, the lessons learned, new ideas, chance events, the entry of new contestants cause ends, ways, means and goals to shift. As resources increase, as one gains confidence in one's abilities, as one finds one's enemy more vulnerable than originally imagined then the community of strategic practitioners tends to expand its goals.

A pejorative term for this process is "mission-creep," but it would be foolish for the strategist to ignore new opportunities simply because they were not covered in one's original planning. On the other hand, when the community of strategic practitioners finds its resources or abilities inadequate, it reduces its ambitions, goals and objectives, ends, and end state to match. Fortunately, the resources (means) and courses of action (ways) to achieve one's end state (ends) can be developed, given time, determination, and creativity. Means are adjustable to some degree at every level, and ends can affect the means available.

Interestingly, although the public discussion of American interests changed dramatically with the September 11, 2001 attacks, the interests themselves have changed little, if at all. In particular, security of the homeland and the safety of the American population were always vital national interests even before the 2001 attacks.

As the 1995 *Annual Report* of the Secretary of Defense put it: Since the founding of the Republic, the U.S. government has always sought to secure for its people a set of basic objectives:

- The protection of their [Americans] lives and personal safety, both at home and abroad.
- The maintenance of the nation's sovereignty, political freedoms, and independence with its values, institutions, and territory intact.
- Their [America] material well-being and prosperity.²⁶¹

²⁶¹ William J Perry and Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995).

Similar phrasings can be found in most pre-9/11 American strategic documents; security of the homeland and the population hardly emerged as interests in 2001. As with American interests, few truly new threats to those interests have appeared in the last decade, and few have disappeared. Their relative severity has changed (certainly their perceived severity), but the list itself has not.

As with American interests, few truly new threats to those interests have appeared in the last decade, and few have disappeared. Their relative severity has changed (certainly their perceived severity), but the list itself has not. Priorities, obviously, have changed and, in particular, “non-traditional” threats now receive much more prominent treatment than they did before 2001. But 2001 neither created new threats nor eliminated old ones.

American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All the instruments of national power are and must be deployed to combat a transforming world fraught with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness in the pursuit of national interests, remains. U.S. BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power in order to “tame” the international environment’s transformative volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity and to frame and shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. This will be discussed the next chapter.

VIII. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: INTERESTS AND INTENT

The fundamental purpose of the U.S.'s basic national security policy (BNSP) and its corresponding course(s) of action are to provide a comprehensive strategy that balances the ends, ways, and means of the instruments of national power to (1) achieve national security; and to (2) protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life. U.S. BNSP is designed to shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic — on the international system at the international, state, group/organization, and individual levels in order to shape and control its external environment by detecting, deterring and preventing, and defeating current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests.

The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation's national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation's foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully justified, not merely assumed.²⁶² When leaders are asking Americans to die, they have to be able to explain it in terms of the national interest.²⁶³

Based on grand strategic decisions, U.S. political leadership provides (issues, communicates) national policy in the form of broad guidance (i.e., vision, intent) concerning America's global role in pursuit of core national objectives. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions. They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important. National interests also help to

²⁶²Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 45.

²⁶³Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 4.

determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy.²⁶⁴

Today, national security means more than the capacity to deter, fight, and win wars. In light of the characteristics of the international arena and contemporary conflicts, challenges to U.S. national security might take any number of non-traditional forms, from economics to unconventional operations and includes homeland defense, homeland security, national emergency preparedness, and incident management. Of course, the capacity to deter nuclear war and deter, contain, wage and decisively terminate conventional conflicts remains essential for the conduct of U.S. national security policy, even in the twenty-first century.

In this new era, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and effects (WMD-E) (including chemical and biological warfare), and information warfare have become increasingly important dimensions of national security. Consequently, national security policy must be carefully developed and implemented according to priorities distinguishing survival (i.e., vital) interests from others.

Paraphrasing Sun Tzu, if almost everything is a matter of national security, then the concept of national security becomes virtually meaningless. If national security policy and strategy followed such a pattern, the United States would have to defend everything everywhere; as a result it would be unable to defend anything. Resources and personnel would be scattered across the globe and rarely be in a position to bring sufficient force to bear, even if survival were at stake. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.²⁶⁵

These answers were elusive at the start of the post-Cold War period and became even more complicated after September 11, 2001. This is because each generation of Americans seeks to interpret national values, national interests, and national security in terms of its own perspective and mindset. Although there is agreement about core

²⁶⁴ Bartholomees, Jr., J. Boone, ed. *National Security Policy and Strategy*, vol. 2, 3rd ed., rev. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), Strategic Institute, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub871.pdf (accessed September, 11, 2008).

²⁶⁵ Tzu, *The Art of War*.

elements such as protecting of the U.S. homeland, interpretations differ about the meaning of national security, the nature of external threats, and the best course of conduct for security policy. This is to be expected that in a country with multiple power centers and shifting focal points; there will be different interpretations as well as outright differences.

Whether Americans like it or not, they can neither withdraw from external responsibilities nor retreat to isolation. Regardless of the policies of any administration, the United States has links to most parts of the world: politically, economically, culturally, and psychologically. What the United States does or does not do has a significant impact on international politics.

Short of clear threats to U.S. territory, Americans often disagree over priorities involving and/or relating to national interests. Even when there is agreement on priorities, there is disagreement on resource commitment and strategy. Yet a system of priorities provides a way to identify levels of threats and helps in the design of strategies. But all this must be guided by the meaning of national security and its conceptual dimensions.

In a very generic sense, national interests are “that which is deemed by a particular state (actor) to be a...desirable goal.”²⁶⁶ The attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself. Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, and/or moral well-being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which the actor belongs.²⁶⁷ This holds true within the territory of the actor, as well as in any external relations that the actor may undertake outside of the administrative control of that actor.²⁶⁸ Interests, therefore, serve as the foundation and guiding direction for the

²⁶⁶ Department of the Army, *Peace Operations, FM 100-23* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994); and Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations, FM 3-07*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003).

²⁶⁷ Robert D. A. Blackwill, “Taxonomy for Defining US National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond,” in *Europe in Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe*, ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning, (Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1993), 103.

²⁶⁸ Donald E. Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests in a Changing World* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 6-7.

formulation of policy. For a nation state, there is more often than not a direct correlation between the nation's interests and BNSP.

Some political scientists, like Hans Morgenthau, believe that national interests are permanent features of the international system. Regardless of what government is in power, the interests of a nation state remain fixed components of the policymaking process. Other theorists have argued that interests are likely to be a diverse, pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change periodically, both in response to the domestic political process itself, and in response to shifts in the international environment. The national interest therefore is more likely to be what the policymakers say it is at any particular time.

Using a portion of the preamble of the Constitution, all U.S. national security strategies have identified three core interests, all previously identified and discussed, that have remained timeless in some manner, shape, or form for the United States: “provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”²⁶⁹ These have been translated in those national security strategies into the modern day interests of: enhancing security at home and abroad (security), promoting prosperity (economic well-being), and promoting democracy and human rights (democratic values).

For purposes of twenty-first century America, these three core interests have been defined as:

- *Security* [italics added]: “Protection of the people (both home and abroad), territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers.”²⁷⁰ This has always included defense of the American homeland. Domestically, it, pursuant to the *National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)*, would now include protection of critical infrastructure such as energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water

²⁶⁹ Congress of the United States. *The Constitution of the United States of America* (Philadelphia, PA: Congress 1787).

²⁷⁰ Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” in *National Security Policy and Strategy*, 3rd ed., rev. ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Washington, D.C. Department of National Security and Strategy, 2008) International Relations and Security Network, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=90194> (accessed September 8, 2008).

systems, and cyber networks. America's expansion into the world that began in the nineteenth century resulted in a broadening of the external portion of this core interest to now include components like protection against WMD proliferation, freedom of movement, access to key facilities, and assurance that U.S. national security institutions are transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.²⁷¹

- *Economic Well-Being* [italics added]: "Promotion of (American) international trade and investment, including protection of United States private economic interests in foreign countries." The nineteenth century American entry onto the world stage also ensured that this core interest would evolve to now incorporate expanded global economic growth through free markets and trade, to include the advance of globalization.²⁷²
- *Democratic Values* [italics added]: Until the twentieth century, this core interest was confined to ensuring that the domestic democratic process and associated values framed the traditional American tenets of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The nation's continued expansion into the world witnessed a change that in the twenty-first century can be said to include the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.

All three of these, now twenty-first century core interests, have also evolved as a result of the American experience in the aftermath of the two world wars of the twentieth century into what can be considered a fourth core interest for the United States:²⁷³

- **Stable and Secure World Order:** A favorable world order based on the "establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or cope with aggression."²⁷⁴ Requirements for global stability in the twenty-first century world would also include secure alliances and coalitions, the security of regions or countries in which the U.S. has a sizable economic stake, and the need to respond to humanitarian or other concerns, such as response to natural and manmade disasters, protecting the global environment, minimizing destabilizing refugee flows, and support for health problems like HIV/AIDS and food and water shortages.

²⁷¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006).

²⁷² Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests*.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests*.

As discussed previously in the chapter on International Relations Theory, there are multiple schools of thought on international relations and relationships and actor interactions and transactions. Consequently, it is not surprising that there are two dominant schools of thought on interests that are similarly aligned.

The realist school of thought is founded on the premise that as a tool for the policymaker the national interest is intended to identify what is in the best interest of his state in its relations with other states.²⁷⁵ The term “best” is defined in terms of power and security.

Realists view national security as the primary basis of a state’s national interest because of the threat of anarchy and constraints on sovereign states that are part of the international system. Anarchy in the international system would be manifested as disorder, disarray, confusion, or chaos. This could either be interpreted as a description of the general condition of the international system or as the absence of any authoritative institutions, rules, or norms that are more powerful than any sovereign state actor and, thus, have the ability to ensure security in the overall system.²⁷⁶ The result is a lack of security for the actors that are members of the system. For the national interest, the emphasis in realism is on doing what is primarily and almost solely to the advantage of that particular state actor. It is done with an express focus on power and security.

In contrast, morality-based interests can be and are defined more broadly to encompass intangible values like human rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease.²⁷⁷ While military power could still be the national power element

²⁷⁵ Iain McLean, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 333.

²⁷⁶ Evans and Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations*, 345.

²⁷⁷ Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests*.

of choice, morality-based interests would promote concepts such as “the values of national self-determination and economic egalitarianism.”²⁷⁸

The last part of the twentieth century witnessed a surge in support for these kinds of morality-based interests through the execution of humanitarian intervention in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Humanitarian intervention is “armed interference in a sovereign state by [other states] with the...objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state including genocide.”²⁷⁹ Morality-based interests are not developed only to benefit the actor that crafts the interest. Rather, they are designed so other actors in the international system are also likely to benefit.²⁸⁰

Given the complex world of the twenty-first century, neither one of these approaches is likely to be the sole rationale for why any given interest will be developed to guide policymaking. The bipartisan Commission on America’s National Interests assessed that the difference between realism and morality-based interests was more an alternative expression of valuation between the two has opposed to two dichotomous poles in contraposition to each other. The American people are oriented on the survival and well-being of the United States, while at the same time, owing much to historically embedded values, they are concerned about human rights and the welfare of individuals in other countries.²⁸¹

The issues associated with the twenty-first century world will require the crafter of national interests — the electorate, the elected government, and the media — to

²⁷⁸ James F. Miskel, “National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases,” *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2002): 9, Navy War College, [https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%2520War%2520College%2520Review/2003/Index%2520of%2520vol%252055%2520Winter%25202003.pdf+Miskel,+James+F.+\(2002\).+National+Interests:+Grand+Purposes+or+Catchphrases&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us&client=pub-1415334591037307](https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%2520War%2520College%2520Review/2003/Index%2520of%2520vol%252055%2520Winter%25202003.pdf+Miskel,+James+F.+(2002).+National+Interests:+Grand+Purposes+or+Catchphrases&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us&client=pub-1415334591037307) (accessed September 15, 2008).

²⁷⁹ Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests*.

²⁸⁰ Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests*.

²⁸¹ Graham T. Allison, Dimitri K. Simes, and James Thomson, *America's National Interests: A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests, 2000* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center For Science and International Affairs, 2000), 18 Belfer Center, http://Belfercenter.Ksg.Harvard.Edu/Publication/2058/Americas_National_Interests.Html (accessed September 15, 2008).

simultaneously be both a pragmatic realist and an advocate of morality. Based on circumstances, sometimes one theoretical foundation will have greater influence than the other for the development of interests. With all of the many complex issues that will be present in the twenty-first century, this is likely to be true for American policymakers so long as the United States intends to maximize its influence on a global basis.²⁸²

In the end, while some may believe as Lord Palmerston stated to the House of Commons in 1848 that “we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. (Only) our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow,”²⁸³ the challenges and opportunities found in the twenty-first century will require the flexibility to craft interests that can work in this complex world, writ large. They may be rationalized in terms of either realism or a morality-based approach, or by a combination thereof in accordance with the particular circumstances of the issue. In turn, this rational determination is likely to drive how future policymakers decide to categorize and prioritize future interests. It will not be easy, but it must be done.

U.S. national interests are expressions of U.S. values projected into the international and domestic arenas. The purpose of interests includes the creation and perpetuation of an international environment that is most favorable to the peaceful pursuit of U.S. values. It follows that these interests nurture and expand democracy and open systems. It follows logically that according to the March 2006 *National Security of the United States of America*, the best way to provide enduring security for the American people is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.²⁸⁴

Similarly, the United States wishes to prevent the expansion of closed systems by their use of force or indirect aggression. In the twenty-first century, the domestic arena has become an important consideration in pursuing national interests because of asymmetrical threats, the information age, and international terrorism — or at least actors

²⁸² Allison, Simes, and Thomson, “America's National Interests,” 18.

²⁸³ Jay, Anthony, ed. *The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 284.

²⁸⁴ White House, *National Security Strategy*.

who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change in the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political power — as well as catastrophic natural disasters such as Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina.

Such concerns were heightened by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and increased with U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the U.S. homeland has not experienced a successful attack since September 11, 2001, a number of threats have been detected, disrupted, and neutralized. 9/11 was not an anomaly: al-Qaeda has struck American interests in the past, has vowed to attack the homeland again, and has attempted to do so several times since 9/11.²⁸⁵

In sum, U.S. national security is the ability of national institutions, through the instruments of national power, to prevent adversaries from using force to harm America and Americans or their national interests and the confidence of Americans in this capability. In sum, homeland security is national security and national security is homeland security.

Therefore, three statements serve as reference points. First, U.S. values as they apply to the external world are at the core of national interests. Second, pursuing national interests does not mean that U.S. national security strategy is limited to the homeland. This may require power projection into various parts of the world, especially when combating international terrorism. Third, the President, as Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, and Head of State, is the focal point in defining and articulating U.S. national interests.

In specific terms, at the core of U.S. national interests is the survival of the homeland and political order. Therefore, national interests can be categorized in order of priorities as follows:

²⁸⁵ Dallas Boyd, Lewis A. Dunn, James Scouras, and Jonathan Fox, *Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency*, ASCO Report No. 2008 07, (Washington, D.C.: Office Defense Threat Reduction Agency, June 2008) <http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/4287> (accessed September 11, 2008).

- *First Order: Survival Interests.* This requires protection of the homeland and areas and issues directly affecting this interest — Ensure physical [territorial and border] security, promotion of [political, economic, ideological, and cultural] values, and economic [domestic and international] prosperity; Dissuade, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, or defeat any potential peer competitor; Detect, deter and contain, discredit and delegitimize, deny and disrupt, and defeat all manners of adversaries; and Prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, recover from all disruptive events regardless of their causality. This may require total military mobilization and resource commitment. In homeland defense, this also may require a coordinated effort of all agencies of government, especially in defense against terrorist attacks and information warfare.²⁸⁶
- *Second Order: Vital Interests.* These are areas and issues that do not directly affect the survival of the United States or pose a threat to the homeland but in the long run have a high propensity for becoming First Order priorities. Critical interests are measured primarily by the degree to which they maintain, nurture, and expand open systems. Many also argue that moral imperatives are important in shaping national interests.²⁸⁷
- *Third Order: Important Interests.* These are issues that do not critically affect First and Second Order interests yet cast some shadow over such interests. US efforts are focused on creating favorable conditions to preclude Third Order interests from developing into higher-order ones. All other interests are peripheral in that they have no immediate impact on any order of interests but must be watched in case events transform these interests. In the meantime, peripheral interests require few, if any, U.S. resources.²⁸⁸

However, survival cannot be limited to the “final” defense of the homeland. In light of international terrorism and today’s weapons technology, weapons proliferation, and chemical/biological warfare, homeland survival means more than retreating to the borders and threatening anyone who might attack with total destruction. By then it is too late for national security policy to do much good, and in the new war, the attacker can be difficult to identify. If national interest is invoked only when the homeland is directly

²⁸⁶ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008). <https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47e148fd47a65.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2008).

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

threatened and survival is at stake, then the concept may be of little use, too late to overcome the peril. Hence, the need for any U.S. basic national security policy and strategy to embrace the concepts of presence and power projection; detect, deter and prevent, and defeat current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland through forward presence and projection of power.

U.S. national interests are formed and framed by U.S. national values. U.S. values are based on what is required for the philosophical, legal, and moral basis for the continuation of the U.S. system and "way of life." These attributes are deeply engrained in the U.S. political system and domestic environment; they also apply to the way in which the public perceives justice in the international system and "just cause" in the conduct of war. In other words, values are principles that give the U.S. political system and social order their innate character; they provide substance to U.S. culture and create further principles upon which to base national interests.

Modern U.S. values derive from the Judeo-Christian heritage, the Anglo-Saxon legacy (including the Reformation, the Renaissance, the philosophies of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, and the principles rooted in the American Revolution), the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution. From among these many historical reference points, there are at least six fundamental values that define the United States and its role in the international world.²⁸⁹

- First, there is the right of self-determination, a dual concept in this context: it applies not only to the nation-state but also to people within that state. It is presumed that each nation-state has the right to determine its own policy and to govern in any way it chooses as long as it does not threaten neighbors or oppress its own people. At the same time, people within that nation-state also have the right of self-determination. From the US perspective, this means that through free and fair elections people in a nation-state have the right to determine how and by whom they will be ruled, with the option to replace rulers as they see fit.
- Second, it follows that there is an inherent worth to any single individual in his/her relationship to others, to the political system, and to the social

²⁸⁹ Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, *U.S. National Security*.

order. Every person is intrinsically a moral, legal, and political entity to which the system must respond. Each individual has the right to achieve all that he or she can, without encumbrances other than protection of fellow citizens as well as homeland protection and survival. Individual worth must therefore be reflected in economic, political, and legal systems.

- Third, rulers owe their power and accountability to the people, which is the essence of democratic political legitimacy. The people are the final authority: there is a continuing responsibility by elected and appointed officials to rule and function according to the moral and legal principles, and the right of the people to change leaders is absolute. In this respect, no consuming power can dominate government or establish its own rationale for rule. Furthermore, individual worth necessitates limited government with no absolute and permanent focal point of power. To ensure this, rule and governance must be open: decisions and policies must be undertaken in full public view, with input from a variety of formal and informal groups. The system of rule must be accessible to the people and their representatives. This is the essence of what are called “open systems.”
- Fourth, policies and changes in the international environment must be based on the first three values outlined above. Thus peaceful change brought about by rational discourse among nation-states is a fundamental value. Resort to war can be acceptable only if it is clearly based on homeland protection and survival or other core values, and only if all other means have failed. In this respect, diplomacy and state-to-state relationships must be based on mutually acceptable rules of the game.
- Fifth, any system professing such values and trying to function according to their principles must be protected and nurtured. Nation-states whose values are compatible with U.S. values are thought to be best served by an international order based on those same values.
- Sixth, U.S. values are grounded in the Judeo-Christian heritage that predated the founding of the republic in the late eighteenth century. For many Americans, this instills a sense of humanity, a sensitivity to the plight and status of individuals, and a search for divine guidance. These precepts add a dimension to what is seen to be proper and just in the minds of many Americans and are considered by many to be beyond the legal definition of government.²⁹⁰

²⁹⁰ Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1994).

Although none of the literature suggests that these values are perfectly embodied in the U.S. system, there are many historical examples of value distortions and their misuse to disguise other purposes, these values are esteemed in their own right by most Americans and are embodied in the political-social system. Furthermore, the system of rule and the character of the political system have institutionalized these values, albeit imperfectly.

The expectations of most Americans and their assessment of other states are, in no small measure, based on these values and they, in conjunction with U.S. survival, vital, and important national interests, form the basis for the goals and objectives, the end states, articulated in the current (March 2006) *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.²⁹¹

Although the U.S. war against terrorism became the dominant theme in 2001, spelled out in the Bush Doctrine of President George W. Bush, such matters now are

²⁹¹ White House, *The National Security Strategy*.

magnified and complicated by U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; the ongoing “troubles” with Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea; the reemerging competition with Russia; and a variety of other issues linked to homeland security — energy, illegal immigration, the economy, natural disasters, etc. All of these issues go beyond the new kind of period of tension, conflict, and perhaps war.

The U.S. national interest is to promote U.S. values and objectives. To promote these means to protect them by establishing and implementing effective national security policies.

A core responsibility of the U.S. government is to protect the American people — in the words of the framers of the Constitution, to “provide for the common defense.” Today, the United States, its allies, and its partners face a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources.

The U.S. national security establishment must respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. It must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. government and among international partners. To succeed, the U.S. must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends, and partners — and occasionally adversaries and enemies.

A United States at war against terrorism and the notion of a new concept of war have become intermixed with globalization, economic expansion, homeland security, and the attempt to pursue U.S. values peacefully. In this new environment, U.S. national security policy and priorities have become complicated, often ambiguous, and even inconsistent — not because of immediate threat of major conventional war but rather the unpredictable, uncertain, and confusing characteristics of the international arena. Although questions have been raised about national interests, national security, and the

U.S. role around the world, the terrorist threat and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology seem to have overshadowed much of the traditional perspectives also, at least for the foreseeable future.²⁹²

U.S. national security is the ability of national institutions — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power — to prevent adversaries from using force to harm Americans or their national interests and the confidence of Americans in this capability. There are two dimensions of this definition: physical and psychological.

The first is an objective measure based on the strength and military capacity of the nation to challenge adversaries successfully, including going to war if necessary. This also includes a more prominent role for the geographic, demographic, natural resources, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power and other non-military measures as well as the ability to use them as political-military levers in dealings with other states.

The psychological dimension is subjective, reflecting the opinion and attitudes of Americans on the nation's ability to remain secure relative to the external world. It is the national will. It affects the people's willingness to support government efforts to achieve national security goals and objectives — ensuring physical (territorial and border) security, promoting of political, economic, ideological, and cultural values, and ensuring economic (domestic and international) prosperity. Underpinning this is that the majority of people have the knowledge and political will to support clear policies to achieve clear national security goals.

For the United States, the purpose of its BNSP is to prevent conditions detrimental to the United States and maintain relations with other countries to enhance conditions favorable to U.S. national interests. The instruments of national power , and thus national security policy and strategy, are primarily military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic diplomatic

²⁹² Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, *U.S. National Security*.

and political, but include to one degree or another, geography, natural resources, and population demographics and the all-encompassing subtleties of the national will.

America's concept of national security today is infinitely more complex than at any time in its history. The same is true for the relationship between the foreign and domestic components of national security.

Until recently, most Americans felt that U.S. values could not be imposed on other states unless survival was at stake. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001; the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, Spain; and the July 7, 2005 attacks in London, not to mention the real and perceived threats posed illegal immigrants, narcotraffickers, gangs, and organized crime, cyber and identity attackers, energy insecurities, economic and financial recession, and the media's coverage of successfully interrupted, disrupted, and thwarted threats, national security is now seen by many to include the projection of U.S. values abroad. This adds to the confusion and highlights the interrelationship among foreign, domestic, and national security policies.²⁹³

The difficulties of determining U.S. national interests and establishing national security priorities are compounded by the increasing linkages between a number of national security and domestic policies. The domestic economic impact of certain national security policies links U.S. domestic interests and policies to the international security arena. This is seen in economic sanctions, embargos on agriculture exports to adversaries or potential adversaries, diminished foreign oil sources, border security, and the export of technologically advanced industrial products. And in a dramatic way, September 11, 2001 obscured dramatically, and perhaps forever, the distinction between domestic (i.e., homeland defense, homeland security, and national emergency preparedness) and national security policy.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ David Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State," in *U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War*, ed. David Jablonsky, Ronald Steel, Lawrence Korb, Morton H. Halperin, and Robert Ellsworth, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 39–40.

²⁹⁴ Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?" *Homeland Security Affairs Journal* 4, no. 2 (June 2008) <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1> (accessed September 15, 2008).

Owing to the special characteristics of the U.S. democratic system and political culture, it is increasingly difficult to isolate national security issues from domestic policy. Besides the relationship and link between foreign and national security policies, domestic interests are important in establishing national security priorities and interests. Some scholars call these “intermestic” politics and policies.²⁹⁵ Nonetheless, national security policy by definition normally involves the use or the threat to use military force. Distinctions must be made between foreign and domestic policy and national security.

The primary distinction rests in the likelihood of military force as well as in use of the military as the primary instrument for implementing national security policy. These observations are the basis for defining national security policy, expanding on the concept of national security: National security policy is primarily concerned with formulating and implementing national strategy involving the threat or use of force to create a favorable environment for U.S. national interests. An integral part of this is to prevent the effective use of military force and/or covert operations by adversaries or potential adversaries to obstruct or deny the ability of the United States to pursue and protect national interests.²⁹⁶ In light of the characteristics of the international arena and contemporary conflicts, challenges to U.S. national security might take any number of nontraditional forms, from economics to unconventional operations.

Of course, the capacity to deter nuclear war and wage conventional conflicts remains essential for the conduct of U.S. national security policy, even in the twenty-first century. In this new era, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and effects (WMD/E) (including chemical and biological warfare), and information warfare have become increasingly important dimensions of national security.

First, the stark limitation of military power alone to resolve conflicts across the spectrum, from terrorism and insurgency to regional war, is obvious. Second, the erosion of a compelling American position of leadership and the failed illusion of democracy as a

²⁹⁵ Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 11th ed. (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2006).

²⁹⁶ Carnes Lord, “Strategy and Organization at the National Level,” in *Grand Strategy and the Decision-Making Process*, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 141–159.

global force for stability limits the United States' ability to influence international relations. Third, slowing U.S. economic growth, precarious national fiscal health, and spiraling program costs continue to constrain force structure. Fourth, globalization is making commerce and information the coins of the realm, but areas that benefit least from them are rife with resource competition and potential extremist ranks. Fifth, U.S. conventional military supremacy spurred state and non-state actors toward asymmetric capabilities and stratagems, including show-stopper weapons and technologies, putting America on the horns of a vulnerability dilemma. Finally, the ambiguous nature of non-state adversaries and the plethora of nonmilitary targets available to them diminish the relevance of conventional forces, no matter how lethal or precise.²⁹⁷

The leadership intent of U.S. BNSP is to protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life, shape the global environment, and provide enduring security for the American people against a broad and diverse spectrum of threats to U.S. national security and U.S. core interests. The spectrum includes foreign and domestic terrorism, state-based threats and non-terror-related threats, including weather, earthquakes, and man-made disasters. The dominant contemporary threat facing the U.S. is the transnational threat; specifically, but not limited to, the extremist Islamist threat. This transnational threat must be considered as permanent for at least the foreseeable future. In addition, the U.S. must guard against ascendant potential peer competitors such as Russia and China.

U.S. BNSP must ensure physical (territorial and border) security and sovereignty, (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and economic (domestic and international) prosperity of the United States. To do so, it must protect the American people and American interests (worldwide), anticipate and counter threats, use all of the available instruments of national power to detect, deter, prevent and contain, deny and disrupt, and defeat threats that could do grave damage to the U.S. and its interests, and avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining the (American) fundamental values and institutions.

²⁹⁷ John Patch, "The Maritime Strategy We Need," *Armed Forces Journal*, <http://www.afji.com/2007/06/2729159>. (accessed September 14, 2008).

The BNSP must be able to:

- Defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies and partners;
- Defend against and defeat WMD/E and missile threats before they are acquired and employed;
- *Protection* against and mitigate the effects and consequences of WMD/E if used;
- Convince adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD/E and deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these weapons in the first place;
- Expand economic liberty and prosperity; promote free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development;
- Build and sustain strong, flexible alliances; and
- Advance human dignity in word and deed by speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals.

The intent of U.S. BNSP is to:

- Protect the United States from direct attack; protect the sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the United States against threats and aggression;
- Anticipate, detect, deter, prevent and contain, deny and disrupt, and defeat attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies;
- Defeat aggression promptly and decisively by preventing conflict and surprise attack and prevailing against adversaries;
- Maintain the strength and diversity of the U.S. economy and the nation's fundamental values and institutions; expand economic liberty and prosperity by promoting free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, and the integration of the global economy; and
- Increase U.S. influence and access to markets and resources by building and sustaining strong, flexible alliances and promoting regional stability and spreading democracy.

It must concurrently prevent, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, combat and defeat terrorism, subversion, and terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur; block or roll-back the proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons (of mass destruction and effect) and take actions to counter their use as instruments of intimidation or war; and achieve and maintain the highest level of preparedness in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from terrorist, catastrophes, man-made and natural hazards, and other disruptive events that affect the security of the United States.

Simultaneously, U.S. BNSP must guard against and prevent outright defeat and capitulation — military, political and diplomatic, economic and financial, informational and ideological, intelligence, and law enforcement — and humiliation; failure, but not outright defeat, that results in a withdrawal, reduction of and/or loss of freedom of action, loss of prestige, reduction in and/or loss of politico-economic influence and leverage, reduction in and/or loss politico-military leverage and influence, etc.; continued, and potentially increased, attacks against the nation's survival, vital, and important interests; citizens, facilities, and properties; and institutions, icons, and infrastructures; uncertainty in the ability to fully ensure the nation's physical (territorial and border) security and sovereignty, promotion of (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and economic (domestic and international) prosperity; inability to respond to, defend against, and recover from other domestic and international contingencies because of a lack of situational awareness (i.e., visibility) and the over commitment of resources and assets; national and international political embarrassment; negative impacts on the domestic economy and financial markets; civil unrest and disobedience and political, economic and financial, and ideological and cultural instability; loss of allies and partners; and the forced withdrawal from forward facilities. It must also guard and protect against the concomitant loss of ability to detect, deter and prevent, and defeat current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland through forward presence and projection of

power; the loss of affordable access to vital raw materials, commodities, and services; and negative, derogatory, and prejudicial domestic and foreign media exposure and impact.

U.S. BNSP must be able to achieve and maintain the core national interests — ensure the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and international) prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments or elements of national power in peace and in war. Accomplishing these actions requires the selection of a course of action that suitable, distinguishable, acceptable, feasible, and complete.

America’s instruments or elements of national power are the taproot of its international influence and the ultimate guarantor of its security.²⁹⁸ Those who wish to challenge the U.S.’ position and actions in the international environment and with the global community must first acknowledge its power and reach.

In addition, U.S. allies, partners, competitors, adversaries, and enemies must also acknowledge the four entrenched threads of American character: a belief in the ethical importance of American instruments or elements of national power as means and ends in themselves; a belief in the universal applicability of liberal values and institutions to mankind; a belief in the ethic of reciprocity as a normative means to achieve positive interactions among nations; and a belief in the value of maintaining strategic flexibility in an increasingly complex strategic environment. These ethical and value-based tenets are constants which historically influenced U.S. international behavior through the medium of four international relations theories: classical realism, classical liberalism, isolationism, and idealism.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, if almost everything is a matter of national security, then the concept of national security becomes virtually meaningless ... If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. Adopting this strategic philosophy and mission

²⁹⁸ Walt, “In National Interest.”

analysis paradigm dilutes the visibility of the core national interests and core national end state. It also retards the nation's ability to exert the full spectrum and reach of its instruments or elements of national power to protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people. In sum, it makes an already complex environment complicated.²⁹⁹

Therefore, as strategy tends to be long term in its development, its execution, and its effects, early and accurate selection of an appropriate overarching goal is the critical keystone for creating and executing successful strategy. Thus, with adequate focus on the appropriate goal, much can be accomplished with little; but absent a specific, clear, attainable, and unifying goal, little may be accomplished despite great exertion. Therefore, it is critical and essential that the leadership must identify and pursue clearly defined and attainable goals, consistent with national values, whose achievement best furthers the national interest(s).

The objective of national policy is to achieve unity of effort across the agencies of government. The process begins with formation of a shared conception of the conflict. The conceptualization needs to be revisited as the conflict evolves. Second, enduring principles and long-term policies are derived from the conception. Policies drive roles and missions of the various agencies and determine adequacy of means, the instruments, in terms of numbers but more importantly in terms of balance. Ultimately, strategic ends, objectives, necessarily follow from the meaning of winning.

The resulting BNSP and strategy statement should provide, as a minimum, four things:

- A conception of the conflict, including
- threat,
- underlying causes,
- U.S. interests and objectives, and

²⁹⁹ Tzu, *The Art of War*

- strategy;
- A process for overseeing the conflict through implementation;
- Identification of the departments and agencies, and their capabilities (i.e., means and resources or the instruments of national power) that have roles to play; and
- Assignment of roles and missions to those agencies.

Departments and agencies have substantial capabilities (i.e., means and resources or the instruments of national power) at their disposal and have developed standard *ways* of applying those means. However, absent consensus on clear ends, which are derived from and justified by interests, the strategic equation is insolvable (see Figure 3 below).




Figure 3. From Conception to Winning

This selection is not as simple as one might think. Strategic activities always involve every instrument of element national power and each has different strengths, weaknesses, corresponding opportunities, and challenges that come to bear depending upon the objective being pursued. Finally, national security strategists operate across organizations and disciplines and subject each potential objective and the ways to achieve it, to rigorous analyses that assess the costs, risks, and likelihood of success. Only after

completing such analyses can the strategist recommend objective(s) to the policymakers which best further the national interest and employ, alone or in combination, the strengths and capabilities resident in and represented by the instruments of national power which will be discussed in the following chapter.

IX. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

A nation's basic national security policy and strategy cannot be operationalized without the creation and maintenance of its national instruments of power. The instruments of national power are the means, or resources, which a nation, through its government, possesses to operationalize its power through its BNSP and strategy. Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others and the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Power derives from strength and will.

Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities – the instruments of national power. The national will infuses objectives with resolve and accomplishes the objectives through the employment of the instruments of national power.

The instruments of national power “fall” into two basic categories:

- The natural, or dispositional, instruments of national of are geography, resources, and population. They focus on, are derived from, and are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment.
- The social, or situational and/or contextual, (i.e., environmental) determinants (economic, political/diplomatic, military, psychological, informational, finance, and law enforcement, or in contemporary U.S. parlance; military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, and economic — MIDLIFE) of power focus on, derive from, and concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment.³⁰⁰

These categories, as well as the differentiation of the instruments of national power into “hard and soft” powers, will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The key judgments found in the recently completed National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* and the Department of Homeland Security's *Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008–2013*, articulated in

³⁰⁰ U .S. Air War College, "Gateway to the Internet," *Military Theory, Theorists, and Strategy* <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm#atmahan> (accessed September 8, 2008).

Chapter V, make very clear the importance and value of each and all of the instruments of national power, the means (resources) through which the selected course of action secures the desired end state.

Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify and operationalize the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.³⁰¹

Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. But national power is historically inextricably linked with military capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the ultimate discriminator and ratio of power. In the purest sense, the means in war³⁰² is combat — physically attacking and defeating the enemy or defending against and repelling his attacks.

As discussed in detail in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII, strategy is the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others. Strategy is defined in *Joint Publication 1-02* as “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”³⁰³

³⁰¹ Charles W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 3.

³⁰² War is defined as a contest between nations or states, carried on by force, whether for defence, for revenging insults and redressing wrongs, for the extension of commerce, for the acquisition of territory, for obtaining and establishing the superiority and dominion of one over the other, or for any other purpose; armed conflict of sovereign powers; declared and open hostilities. War is a condition of belligerency to be maintained by physical force. In this sense, levying war against the sovereign authority is treason (Brainy Media, “Definition of War,” Brainy Quote, (2008) <http://www.brainyquote.com/words/wa/war238447.html> [accessed September 8, 2008].)

³⁰³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 357 and 507; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 542 and 731.

However, war³⁰⁴ is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one instrument, one element used to implement a national strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments of power, military, information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic — must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in conflict and/or war.

Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. Hans Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one element of that power the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.”³⁰⁵ Another aspect of this fallacy is the failure to distinguish between potential and actual, or actionable, power. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the term “power” has taken on the meaning of both the capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the capacity. A nation’s ability to convert potential power into operational power is based on many considerations, not the least of which is the political and psychological interrelationship of such factors as government effectiveness and national unity.³⁰⁶

As stated in the previous chapter, strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When one applies this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product, that is, the strategy is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends.

As stated in the chapters on strategy, strategy is both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in war must begin with two basic points. First, as observed,

³⁰⁴ War: Etymology: Middle English werre, from Anglo-French werre, guerre, of Germanic origin; akin to Old High German werra strife; akin to Old High German werran to confuse. Date: 12th century. (1) a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations; (2) a period of such armed conflict; and (3): a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism b: a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end. (Merriam Webster, s.v. “War” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war> [accessed September 1, 2008]).

³⁰⁵ Jablonsky, David, “National Power,” *Parameters* (Spring 1997) <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97spring/jablonsk.htm> (01 September 2008).

³⁰⁶ Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr., eds. *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/00354.pdf> (01 September 2008).

war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party waging war, even though those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature, are by definition political goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities (political entities do not have to be recognized sovereign states) that have unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, one must appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.³⁰⁷

In a conflict or a war, the national strategy focuses the instruments of national power³⁰⁸ on achieving its political ends or objectives as articulated by the political leadership. Military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to attaining the objective of national strategy.

Strategists must be able to analyze the overall strategic situation and appreciate the larger context in which military strategy is executed. In order to formulate and implement an effective military strategy, they must understand the ends and means of the larger national strategy as well as the strategies of the enemy, allies, and related neutral parties (see Figure 4 below).

³⁰⁷ USMC “Strategy: Ends and Means.”

³⁰⁸ Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments make up the instruments of national power. Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 February 1995. In earlier joint doctrine publications, instruments of national power were referred to as elements of national power and the informational instrument was called the psychological instrument. The February 1995 edition of Joint Publication 0-2 updated this terminology (Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces* [Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995] www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp0_2.pdf [accessed September 10, 2008]).




Figure 4. Relationship of Political Objectives to National Strategy and Supporting Strategies³⁰⁹

Presidents and their national security staffs, as do the leaders of other political entities, strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through use of the “interagency process.” However, the interagency decision making process, across organizations and disciplines, and between jurisdictions, is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity.

Given ever expanding responsibilities and the competition for resources, the instruments of national power, it is imperative that national security professionals master the National Security Council System in order to work effectively within it. The complex challenges to national security in the twenty-first century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort and purpose within the government. It is also imperative that changes be made to make the system and the process more effective

Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the “Instrument-Element Model”

³⁰⁹ USMC “Strategy: Ends and Means.”

because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which competitors, rivals, and belligerents contend and interact with each other.³¹⁰ Each actor is described and modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the military. Competitors, rivals, and belligerents, even allies, partners, associates, and neutrals, affect each other using the instruments of national power — military, information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic.³¹¹

A nation's instruments of national power are more often than not grounded in the natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) of power. The development, maintenance, and application of a nation's instruments of national power are wholly political in accordance with Clausewitz's "remarkable" (and paradoxical) trinity of forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity"); non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or intent, such as "friction" and "the play of chance and probability"); and rationality (war's subordination to reason, "as an instrument of policy").³¹²

Using the "social contract theory"³¹³ tenets and underpinnings of the Enlightenment ca. 1648-1815), particularly Thomas Hobbes and to a lesser degree Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Clausewitz connects each of those forces "mainly" [quotations added] to one of three sets of human actors: the people, the army, and the government.

The people are paired mainly with irrational forces — the emotions of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (or, by implication, the lack thereof — clearly, it is quite possible to fight and even win wars about which one's people do not give a damn, especially if that is the case on both sides.). The Hobbesian state of nature, that is, a condition without government. Perhaps one would imagine that people might fare best in

³¹⁰ Ian Russell Nesbitt, "The Instrument-Element Model: A Grand Strategic Model for War" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: 2005) <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439612&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf/> (accessed August 8, 2008).

³¹¹ Nesbitt, Ian Russell, "The Instrument-Element Model."

³¹² Villacres and Bassford, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity."

³¹³ Garth Kremerling, "Social Contract Theory," *Philosophy Pages* (2002) <http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s7.htm> (19 September 2008).

such a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge, jury and executioner in her own case whenever disputes arise — and that at any rate, this state is the appropriate baseline against which to judge the justifiability of political arrangements.

Hobbes terms this situation the condition of mere nature:

...a state of perfectly private judgment, in which there is no agency with recognized authority to arbitrate disputes and effective power to enforce its decisions ... Dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine, and revenge would make impossible all of the basic security upon which comfortable, sociable, civilized life depends ...there would be no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short ... If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid it, which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized public authority, for “so long a man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good and evil.”³¹⁴

The army (which refers, of course, to military forces in general) and its commander are paired mainly with the non-rational forces of friction, chance, and probability. Fighting organizations deal with those factors under the creative guidance of the commander (and creativity depends on something more than mere rationality, including, hopefully, the divine spark of talent or genius).

According to Hobbes, taken together, these plausible descriptive and normative assumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with divisive struggle. The right of each to all things invites serious conflict, especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surely be over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands, spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may (citing the right of nature) invade them, and may rationally plan to strike first as an anticipatory defense. Moreover,

³¹⁴ Stanford University, “Hobbes Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (August 23, 2003) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/> (accessed August 8, 2008).

that minority of prideful or “vain-glorious” persons who take pleasure in exercising power over others will naturally elicit preemptive defensive responses from others. Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement in religious views, in moral judgments, and over matters as mundane as what goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits. Hobbes imagines a state of nature in which each person is free to decide for herself what she needs, what she’s owed, what’s respectful, right, pious, prudent, and also free to decide all of these questions for the behavior of everyone else as well, and to act on her judgments as she thinks best, enforcing her views where she can. In this situation where there is no common authority to resolve these many and serious disputes, we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of nature would become a “state of war”, even worse, a war of “all against all.”³¹⁵

The government is paired mainly with the rational force of calculation — policy is, ideally, driven by reason. This corresponds to the famous argument that “war is an instrument of policy.” Clausewitz knew perfectly well, however, that this ideal of rational policy is not always met: “That [policy] can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there.... here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community.”³¹⁶

The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (1762), is meant to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by the development of society. According to Rousseau, since a return to the state of nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of politics is to restore freedom to us, thereby reconciling who we truly and essentially are with how we live together. Rousseau maintains, by submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free and equal persons. Like Hobbes and Locke before him, and in contrast to the ancient philosophers, Rousseau posits that all men are made by nature to be equals, therefore no one has a natural right to govern others, and therefore the only justified authority is the authority that is generated out of agreements or covenants. The most basic covenant, the

³¹⁵ Stanford University, “Hobbes Moral and Political Philosophy.”

³¹⁶ Villacres and Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity.”

social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity, which by definition is more than and different from a mere aggregation of individual interests and wills. This act, where individual persons become a people is “the real foundation of society.” Through the collective renunciation of the individual rights and freedom that one has in the state of nature, and the transfer of these rights to the collective body, a new ‘person’, as it were, is formed. The sovereign is thus formed when free and equal persons come together and agree to create themselves anew as a single body, directed to the good of all considered together. So, just as individual wills are directed towards individual interests, the general will, once formed, is directed towards the common good, understood and agreed to collectively. Included in this version of the social contract is the idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals who constitute it, and each individual is likewise committed to the good of the whole.³¹⁷

Most importantly, national power is relative, not absolute. Simply put, a nation does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor or actors in the international arena.

Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of money or other resources, for example, or possession of the physical means for coercion (weapons and armed personnel). Power is just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or scientific authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s ability to excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for diplomatic or military strength.

Power provides the means to attack and the means to resist attack³¹⁸. Power in itself is neither good nor evil. By its nature, however, power tends to be distributed unevenly in ways that vary greatly from one society to another.

³¹⁷ Friend, Celeste, “Social Contract Theory,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Tennessee Martin (2006) <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont.htm#H2> (accessed August 8, 2008).

³¹⁸ Attack: Etymology - Middle French *attaquer*, from Old Italian *estaccare* to attach, from *stacca* stake, of Germanic origin; akin to Old English *staca*. Date: 1562. (1) to set upon or work against forcefully; (2) to assail [with unfriendly or bitter words], (3) to begin to affect or to act on injuriously, (4) to set to work on, and (5) to threaten (Merriam Webster, s.v. “attack” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attack> [accessed October 3, 2008]).

Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not permanent. No particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in particular, rapid changes in military technologies (i.e., “revolutions in military affairs or RMAs”) have accelerated this dynamism as have similar revolutions across the spectrum of human pursuits and endeavors — economic, finance, industry and manufacturing, transportation, communications, technology, politics, philosophy, the law, and religion. These revolutions cause dynamic shifts to occur in relative potential and relative actionable power. Power, as Hobbes long ago pointed out, is what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words, confers power on a nation-state regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same time, there are examples throughout history of nations that continued to trade on past reputations, only to see them shattered by a single event.³¹⁹

Power is, therefore, situational and not dispositional. Power is, therefore, contextual and relevant in the existing circumstances for the particular situation. Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied to certain situations involving certain actors. Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied, with any certainly of success, effectiveness, or efficacy, to certain situations involving certain actors.

This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more complications when the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into account. In an increasingly multi-centric world, nation-states will increasingly deal with transnational and non-state actors in the exercise of national power.

Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power than to another. Multinational corporations for example, generally react to economic factors more rapidly than the United Nations or a national liberation movement. Conversely, negotiations and appeals to human morality may prove to be more powerful at the United Nations than in the corporate boardroom or in the field. The allegiance of an uneducated people in a newly independent country may help create a powerful national liberation

³¹⁹Cerami and Holcomb, *Guide to Strategy*.

movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the United Nations. National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other states, but to other global actors, including extremists and terrorists, as well.

National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the power elements and only in relation to another player or players and the situation in which power is being exercised. A nation may appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but the assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict. The question should always be: power over whom, and with respect to what?³²⁰ Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the “ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own objectives.”³²¹

Contextually, the instruments of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated only artificially. In reality, they are linked — through various strategic, operational, and tactical course of action (COAs) or “ways” — syncretistically, synergistically, and symbiotically and employed alone, in tandem, and in various sequential and parallel combinations in order to achieve national objectives and goals commensurate with and favorable to national expectations and end states . Together, they constitute the resources, or means, for the attainment of national objectives and goals. Although these objectives and goals and expectations and end states may be judged as moral, immoral, or amoral, the instruments, or elements of, national power are simply means to national strategic ends and as such are morally neutral.

³²⁰ John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996), 144-145; Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 102-103 and 309-311; and Gordon C. Schloming, *Power and Principle in International Affairs* (New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1991), 528.

³²¹ Spanier and Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 128; Theodore A. Coulombis and James H Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1982), 64; Abramo F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), 104; Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 245; Robert Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), 29; Papp, *Contemporary International Relations*, 102-103 and 308; and Michael P. Sullivan, *Power in Contemporary Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 98.

The literature suggests that the order of strategic priorities drives the importance and primacy of an instrument or element of national power. The order of strategic priorities was dependent upon what arena was judged to be the contemporary center of gravity.

Most post-modern strategists agree that national power can be distinguished between natural (predominantly dispositional) and social (predominantly situational, environmental, and contextual) determinants of power. In practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the natural and social elements precursors to the instruments of national power.

The natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) of power focus on, derived from, and are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment.

Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more recently, informational) of power focus on, derived from, and concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment.

With respect to the instruments of national power that are determined by social, situational, contextual, and/or environmental factors, there are two general components of power: hard and soft. It is much more difficult to systematically or consciously develop, manage, control, or apply soft power than hard power.

Power does not have to be used to be effective. It is often enough that the other actors acknowledge the presence of power, either implicitly or explicitly, since the potential exercise of acknowledged or presumed power can be as intimidating as its actual use; hence the concept and practice of deterrence. Historically, some international actors have sought power for power's sake; however, most nation-states normally seek and use power to achieve or defend their survival, vital, and important interest, goals, objectives, and expectations.

- Hard power³²² refers to the influence, leverage, and capability that is derived and generated from direct military and economic means. This is in contrast to soft power, which refers to power that originates with the more indirect means of diplomacy, culture, and history. Hard power describes an actor's ability to induce another actor to perform or stop performing an action. This can be done using military power through threats or force. It can also be achieved using economic power relying on assistance, bribes, or economic sanctions.
- Soft power³²³ is a term used to describe the ability of an actor to indirectly influence the behavior of other actors through cultural, informational, or ideological means. In contrast with the primary tools of hard power, the organic and inherent ability to threaten or reward, the sources of soft power are cultural and informational: values, principles, morals, and ethics; and diplomatic and foreign policies. Soft power uses an attraction to shared values and the perceived justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.

Regardless, whether it is hard or soft, an actor's power is measured in terms of the elements of power that it actually possesses. The literature suggests that the instruments of national power — natural or social; military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic — represent the hard and soft powers that a nation-state possesses and can operationalize and effectively employ.

The military, economic, and financial instruments of national power represent the hard power capabilities of the U.S. and the diplomatic/and informational instruments of national power represent the soft power capabilities of the U.S. The legal and law enforcement and intelligence instruments of national power can be characterized as either hard or soft and similarly employed. By and large, they bolster and complement the employment of the other instruments of national power.

Prior to the issuance of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in September 2006, the U.S. defined its instruments of national power in terms of

³²² Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006)

³²³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Jackson, TN: Public Affairs, 2004).

diplomatic, information, military, and economics.³²⁴ However, in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration determined that the paradigm for combating terrorism must now involve the application of all elements of the nation's national power and influence. In the future, not only would the U.S. employ military power, diplomacy, information, and economics — the key elements and instruments of national power that trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s — but it would augment and complement their effectiveness by employing, alone or in combination, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities and operations. As a result, current U.S. instruments of national power are defined as military, informational (ideological), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic. This will be discussed in somewhat greater detail later in this chapter.

This shift in policy definition and articulation was largely driven by marked realignment since the end of the Cold War of the instruments of national power which are available to the U.S. in pursuing its interests around the world. Because of resource constraints and new threats, some former mainstays of defense and foreign policy — such as strategic nuclear forces and foreign aid — are less central today. At the same time, the U.S. government is developing new techniques to deal with changing circumstances which rely more on coalition partners, high technology, the private sector, and additional roles for the Armed Forces.³²⁵

From the beginning, perhaps as early as 1983, the current campaign against extremists and terrorists, as with any asymmetric conflict, has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. In the short term, the “five meter target,” the conflict involves the application of all of the instruments of national power to detect, deter and contain, and defeat those state actors (i.e., nation-states) and non-state actors (i.e., persons and/or organizations) who wish to threaten or cause damage to the U.S. and its core national

³²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed September 8, 2008).

³²⁵ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick, L. Clawson, “Tuning the Instruments of National Power,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1995-1996) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2010.pdf. (September 2008).

security interests — physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity; its citizens, or its government. In the long term, “the 25-meter target,” successfully prosecuting the conflict, this campaign, will require winning the battle of ideas.

Although previous wars and conflicts required the U.S. and its allies, partners, and associates to undeniably and unquestionably defeat and destroy their enemies’, predominantly, if not exclusively, state actors; centers of gravity — political (i.e., government); military (i.e., armed forces); economics (i.e., financial institutions and system, industries, and manufacturing and production — delivery capabilities and systems); and ideology (i.e., association with, faith in, and adherence to the politico-economic entities); the U.S.’ ability to terminate these conflicts, including the Cold War, on terms favorable to the U.S. was largely the product of waging and winning the battle of ideas. It is no different in the current conflict. Violent extremism is simultaneously a threat to the nation’s way of life as a free and open society and to an increasingly integrated, globalized, and interdependent world.³²⁶

Consequently, because the strategic environment is always defined by the character of politics and the interactions among political entities, there is no one dominant instrument, or element, of national power. The environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors; all of which influence the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument, or element, of national power individually and in combination and direct and control the opportunities and challenges presented in the operational environment.

Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance that defy any purely rational explanation. To be effective, both the community of practitioners — strategists, policy makers, and decision makers — and the academics and politicians must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.

³²⁶ White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2008).

The natural, or dispositional, determinants of power are geography, resources, and population. They focus on, are derived from, and are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment.³²⁷

Geography is the first and foremost natural determinant of power. Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size and topography, influence a nation's outlook and capacity.

Location, in particular, is closely tied to the foreign policy of a state. Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely, Great Britain, the U.S., and Japan have been protected by large bodies of water throughout their histories. Each, in turn, used the combination of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power. With its oceanic moats, the U.S. was able to avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully for almost a century, free of external interference. In addition, that expansion came about primarily without conquest, through the purchase of huge land tracts from European powers that found the location of the territories too remote to defend easily.

The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental that it gave rise in this century to geopolitics as a field of study. The study of international relations is impossible without a firm grasp of geography. The geographic factor in world history is the most fundamental because it is the most constant. Populations increase and decrease, natural resources are discovered and expended, political systems frequently change, empires and states rise and fall, technologies decline and advance, but the location of continents, islands, seas and oceans has not changed significantly throughout recorded history.

Sir Halford John Mackinder (15 February 1861–06 March 1947) was a British geographer and politician. Mackinder was specialist in physical geography who, because

³²⁷ Spanier and Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 128; Coulombis and Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations, 64; Organski, *World Politics*, 104; Jones, *The Logic of International Relations*, 245; Dahl, and Stinebrickner, *Modern Political Analysis*, 29; Papp, *Contemporary International Relations*, 308; Sullivan, *Power in Contemporary Politics*, 98; Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 43; Schloming, *Power and Principle*, 528-531; and Julian L Simon, *Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and Immigration* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990).

of his interest in evolution and how the context of historical events — social, cultural, political, economic, military, religious, etc. — impact human development later branched into economics and political theory, arguing that physical and human geography should be treated as a single discipline. According to Mackinder, “The actual balance of political power at any given time is... the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment and organization of the competing peoples.”³²⁸

In 1902, Mackinder wrote his first major book, *Britain and the British Seas*. In writing this book, Mackinder may have been strongly influenced by Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S. Navy (ret.) (September 27, 1840 – December 1, 1914) and Sir John Knox Laughton KCB (April 23, 1830 - September 14, 1915).

Mahan, president of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island between 1886-1889 and 1892-1893, is best known for his famous and influential treatises, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*. Published 1890 and 1892 respectively, these books argued that controlling sea-borne commerce (i.e., the sea lanes of communication or SLOCs) was critical to domination in war. If one combatant could deny the sea (i.e., sea control/sea denial) to the other, the economy of the second inevitably would collapse, leading to victory at sea and on land.

According to Mahan, “the strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political.”³²⁹ Once the enemy has been sufficiently weakened on sea and on land, the shift to the strategic offensive should not be delayed so that complete victory could be achieved as quickly and efficiently as possible.³³⁰

³²⁸ U.S. Air War College. "Gateway to the Internet."

³²⁹ U.S. Air War College. "Gateway to the Internet."

³³⁰ John J. Klein, “Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory,” *Naval War College Review* 57 no. 1, (Winter 2004), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w04.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2008).

Mahan's books were greatly acclaimed, and closely studied in Britain and Imperial Germany, influencing their forces build up before World War I. Mahan influenced the naval portion of the Spanish-American War, and the battles of Tsushima, Jutland, and the Atlantic and work influenced the doctrines of every major navy in the interwar (ca. 1919-1939) period;

Sir John Knox Laughton, a friend of Mahan, was a British naval historian and arguably the first to argue for the importance of the subject as an independent field of study. In the 1870s he turned more and more to teaching and lecturing on history, delivering a now famous lecture to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in 1874 on the importance of actually analyzing historical events, rather than merely reporting events chronologically.

This was a new idea at the time and would not have been seen then as stating the obvious, as perhaps it would today.³³¹ During his time as a lecturer in naval history, Laughton was undoubtedly an influence on the more famous naval historian-strategists of his age — Mahan, Corbett³³² and Richmond.³³³ Mahan, described as “one of Laughton's disciples,” wrote of him saying that “He probably knows more naval history than any English speaking man living.”³³⁴

Although primarily concerned, in Mackinder's words, “to present a picture of the physical features and conditions” of Britain, the book's chapters on “The Position of

³³¹ John Hattendorf, “The Caird Lecture, 2000: The Anglo-French Naval Wars (1689-1815) in Twentieth Century Naval Thought,” *Journal for Maritime Research* (2000) <http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/conJmrArticle.30/viewPage/2> (accessed September 15, 2008).

³³² Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (12 November 1854 - 21 September 1922) was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, whose works helped shape the Royal Navy's reforms of that era. One of his most famous works is *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, which remains a classic among students of naval warfare. Corbett was a good friend and ally of naval reformer Admiral John "Jackie" Fisher, the First Sea Lord.

³³³ Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond (15 September 1871 - 15 December 1946) was a prominent naval officer, who also served as Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge University and Master of Downing College, Cambridge.

³³⁴ Lambert, Andrew, review of *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* by Roger J.B. Knight, 2000, Institute of Historical Research <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/knight.html> (accessed September 15, 2008).

Britain,” “Strategic Geography,” and “Imperial Britain” contain insights on global affairs that foreshadowed Mackinder’s subsequent geopolitical works.³³⁵

In the book, Mackinder described Britain as being “of Europe, yet not in Europe,” and as lying “off the shores of the great continent.” British predominance in the world rested on its “command of the sea,” wrote Mackinder, because “the unity of the ocean is the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern globe-wide world.” “A new balance of power is being evolved,” Mackinder opined, and it included “five great world states, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and America.” Mackinder suggested, however, that Britain’s position as the preeminent world power was endangered due to “permanent facts of physical geography” in the form of “the presence of vast Powers, broad-based on the resources of half continents” (i.e., Russia and the United States).³³⁶

In 1904, Mackinder, then a director of the newly formed London School of Economics, presented a professional paper on *The Geographical Pivot of History* at the Royal Geographical Society, in which he formulated the Heartland Theory. This is often considered as a, if not the, founding moment of geopolitics, as a field of study, although Mackinder himself did not use the term. Although the Heartland Theory initially receiving little attention outside the profession of geography, this theory would influence the foreign policies of world powers ever since.³³⁷

According to one his biographers, Mackinder’s avowed purposes in writing the “pivot” paper were to establish “a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations,” to provide “a formula which shall express certain

³³⁵ Francis P. Sempa, “Mackinder's World,” *American Diplomacy* 5, no. 1 (Winter 2000), University of North Carolina, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_14/sempa_mac1.html (accessed September 12, 2008).

³³⁶ Halford J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969), 12, 350-51, and 358.

³³⁷ Sempa, “Mackinder's World.”

aspects... of geographical causation in universal history,” and to set “into perspective some of the competing forces in current international politics.”³³⁸

Mackinder’s next major work, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, was published in 1919. It was a perspective on the 1904 work in the light of peace treaties and Woodrow Wilson’s idealism. This contains his most famous quote: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.”³³⁹ This message was composed for world statesmen at the Treaty of Versailles; the emphasis on East Europe as the strategic route to the Heartland was interpreted as requiring a strip of buffer state to separate Germany and Russia. These were created by the peace negotiators but proved to be ineffective bulwarks in 1939.

Geopolitics has many insights to offer; for example consider the connection between the British and American development of democracy and civil rights and the relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed on the North European plain or the continuing Russian (Soviet between 1917-1993) drive for warm-water ports and the continuing value of maritime choke points relative to the sea lanes of communications. Of note, the eight international regions called the “U.S. Lifelines and Transit Regions” by the Department of Defense contain chokepoints that require attention are as follows:

- The Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean Sea with the Panama Canal
- The North Sea-Baltic Sea with several channels and straits
- The Mediterranean-Black Sea with the Strait of Gibraltar and access to Middle Eastern areas
- The Western Indian Ocean including the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and around South Africa to the Mozambique Channel

³³⁸ Brian W Blouet, *Halford Mackinder: A Biography* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 33.

³³⁹ Sempa, “Mackinder's World.”

- The Southeast Asian Seas with the Malacca and Lombok Straits among others,
- The SLOCs passing the Spratly Islands,
- The Northeast Asian Seas with SLOCs important for access to Japan, Korea, China, and Russia
- The Southwest Pacific with important SLOC access to Australia, and the Arctic Ocean with the Bering Strait

Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant effect on national power. The poorest and weakest states in modern times have all been located outside the temperate climate zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zones. More successful nation-states have been located in the broad temperate zones between 30N/S and 60N/S in the northern and southern hemispheres respectively.

According to the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), global climate change presents a serious national security threat which could impact Americans at home and abroad and the nation's ability to employ its instruments, or elements of national power in pursuit of its interests and objectives, and heighten global tensions.³⁴⁰ The study, *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, explored ways projected climate change is a threat multiplier in already fragile regions, exacerbating conditions that lead to failed states — the breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. The report includes several formal findings:

- Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America's national security.
- Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
- Projected climate change will add to tensions even in stable regions of the world.

³⁴⁰ Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change," CNA Corporation (2007) <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf> (accessed September 12, 2008).

- Climate change, national security and energy dependence are a related set of global challenges.

The report also made several specific recommendations:

- The national security consequences of climate change should be fully integrated into national security and national defense strategies.
- The U.S. should commit to a stronger national and international role to help stabilize climate changes at levels that will avoid significant disruption to global security and stability.
- The U.S. should commit to global partnerships that help less developed nations build the capacity and resiliency to better manage climate impacts.³⁴¹

Size and topography are also geopolitical characteristics that can have advantages and disadvantages for a nation.

The Soviet Union, with its eleven time zones, was able to use its vast size during the Second World War to repeat the historical Russian military method of trading space for time when invaded. At the same time, that immense size certainly played a role in the complex ethnic and political centrifugal forces that eventually pulled apart the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the American Civil War, the great rivers in the Eastern Theater ran northwest to southeast and constituted natural barriers, natural defensive lines, that benefited the Confederate States and frustrated, time and time again, the Lincoln Administration and its field commanders in their relentless campaigns to invade the “cradle of the Confederacy,” that 100 mile corridor between the Potomac River and the James River. Conversely, in the Western Theater, the great rivers ran north to south and were natural corridors for both commerce and invasion. Once conquered, the federal advance in the Confederacy’s most strategic territory, the Trans-Mississippi, was unvexed to the sea.³⁴²

³⁴¹ CNA, “National Security.”

³⁴² Donald, *Why the North Won*; Beringer, *Why the South Lost*; and Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*.

In the future, technology may mitigate some of these factors in the same way that intercontinental missiles affected the importance of insular locations. But here, as in other areas, there are many geographical obstacles to the acquisition of power that are costly or impossible to overcome. However, the communities of practitioners — strategists, policy makers, and decision makers — and the academics and politicians must always remember that it is politics, not technology that determines the character and intensity of war. Modern technology, with its awesome killing power, may be applied with great restraint, depending on policy objectives and political constraints. At the same time, in a conflict propelled by powerful ethnic hatred and fear, half a million people can be slain in a few days with machetes — as happened in Rwanda in 1995.

Population, or demographics, in the form of size, trends, and structure are an important aspect of national power.³⁴³ Demographic change is but one factor limiting a state's ability to impose its will abroad or maintain itself at home. Over the past few generations, demographic change has not only radically altered human numbers but has profoundly affected their composition and global distribution. While the role of population in world affairs may seem self-evident, its relevance to state power and national security is often far from obvious.

Regardless of their exact calibrations, virtually all current population projections anticipate comparatively slow population growth in today's more developed regions (Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, North America and Oceania) and comparatively rapid growth for the less developed regions (the rest of the world). With variations, these projections point to a continuation of trends evident since the end of World War II. If these trends continue for another generation or two, the implications for the international political order and the balance of world power could be enormous. The fastest-growing

³⁴³ Schloming, *Power and Principle*, 528-531 and Simon, *Population Matters*.

Third World areas are those least likely to share Western values, and could produce “a fractious, contentious and inhumane international order” rather more dangerous than the Cold War.³⁴⁴

In the 1980s and 1990s, portions of the national security community in the U.S. have embraced two other visions of how demographic factors might affect international security. The first can be loosely termed the “dynamic” paradigm of population and national security. This new, more “dynamic” paradigm emphasizes not population size as a component of national power calculations, but rather the interactions between population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, resource depletion, forced refugee flows, ethnic conflict, hyper-nationalism, and urbanization in order to understand the roles that population factors play as both independent and dependent variables in the occurrence of armed conflict. Scholars like Homer-Dixon³⁴⁵ and Gleick³⁴⁶ do not see demographic factors as just a determinant of national power potential, but instead have come to identify changes in population sizes and patterns as both catalysts and shapers of political instability and armed conflict.³⁴⁷

Overall, the emergence of the new dynamic school of thought concerning demographics and national security is a positive development for three reasons. First, it provides American policymakers with a new set of indicators with which to pinpoint “zones of danger” where conflict may be looming. If such a zone were to coincide with a

³⁴⁴ Nicholas Eberstadt, “Population Change and National Security,” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1991) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19910601faessay6092/nicholas-eberstadt/population-change-and-national-security.html> (accessed September 12, 2008).

³⁴⁵ Thomas Homer-Dixon, Ph.D. holds the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Chair of Global Systems Studies at the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo, in Waterloo, Ontario. His research has focused on threats to global security in the twenty-first century and on how societies adapt to complex economic, ecological, and technological change. It is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on political science, economics, environmental studies, geography, cognitive science, social psychology, and complex systems theory.

³⁴⁶ Peter H. Gleick, Ph.D. is a scientist working on issues related to the environment, economic development, and international security, with a focus on global freshwater challenges. He works at the Pacific Institute in Oakland, California, which he co-founded in 1987. Among the issues he has addressed are conflicts over water resources the impacts of climate change on water resources and the problems of the billions of people without safe, affordable and reliable water and sanitation.

³⁴⁷ Brian Nichiporuk, *The Security Dimensions of Demographic Factors* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1088/MR1088.chap2.html (accessed September 12, 2008).

region of vital interest for Washington, these measures could afford ample time for policymakers to formulate political intervention strategies that might head off impending conflict and allow the United States to avoid the need for a potentially costly military intervention. Second, the dynamic school serves the longer-term purpose of allowing the United States to better target its modest foreign aid resources, focusing them on regions where they might prevent some of the negative strategic consequences of intense population pressures. Third, it will help defense decision makers to make some educated predictions about the nature of future warfare in the developing world and to propose new operational concepts, tactics, and technologies the U.S. military may wish to consider as it tries to better prepare itself to meet the challenges posed by the next generation of armed conflicts.³⁴⁸

Why has this dynamic view attracted more interest in the recent past? One can posit two logical reasons: the end of the Cold War's bipolar U.S.-USSR competition, and increasing globalization.

As the Cold War wound down, conflict became more regionalized and the previous narrow focus of most American security analysts upon the Central European conventional military balance and strategic nuclear arms control suddenly broadened to include other important regions of the world — regions where population pressures were thought to be driving some of the security problems that local elites worried about. Second, the increasing globalization of Western economic and security interests is making the spillover effects of demographic pressures, even in regions remote from Europe, North America, or Northeast Asia, hard to ignore.

There are many in the U.S. national security policymaking community who argue that the continued stability of the current liberal international order is dependent upon the ability of the Western industrialized nations to prevent regions of anarchy from developing in which basic human rights cannot be even partially respected. Demographic factors such as differential fertility rates between ethnic groups and the existence of large refugee populations are, in turn, helping to drive the political problems that many of these

³⁴⁸ Nichiporuk, *The Security Dimensions*.

particular regions face. Although one should be careful not to overstate the importance of economic interdependence, it is clear that these linkages and feedback loops between demographic shifts in developing regions and America's interests as the world's sole superpower need to be better understood by intelligence analysts, diplomats, and national security planners.³⁴⁹

A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic guarantee of strength. For example; Canada is more powerful than the more populous, but less industrialized Mexico, and Japan, with a small population marked by widespread technical skills, has been able to exercise national power far in excess of China for all its masses.

At the same time, trends in population growth and decline can have significant effects on national power. The Prussian unification of the German-speaking peoples in 1870, for example, instantly created a great power with a population that grew by 27 million between then and 1940, even as that of France reflected the shift in European power, increasing by only four million in the same period³⁵⁰.

The historical increase in American power was partly due to the arrival of more than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924; most of these unskilled laborers, ideally suited to working in America's rapidly expanding mining and extracting and manufacturing and production industries, came from poverty-stricken eastern and southern Europe. During the same century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory and developmental level but with populations less than a tenth of America's, remained secondary powers.³⁵¹

Similar trends, traits, and characteristics represented centrifugal forces and more complex causes and effects. For example, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a large and growing population during most of that same period, remained a secondary

³⁴⁹Nichiporuk, *The Security Dimensions*.

³⁵⁰Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*.

³⁵¹Daniel Walker Howe, "What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848" in *Oxford History of the United States* ed. David Kennedy and Comer Vann Woodward (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

power — in comparison to Germany, France, and Great Britain -because it was divided ethnically, weak politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial development and manufacturing productivity. Imperial Russia, although vast and rich in resources, was a third-rate power in terms of actionable industrial development and manufacturing productivity.

In the future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national populations, particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population reached one billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years (1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the population increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-developed countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation³⁵² for which there is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.³⁵³

³⁵² A potentially Malthusian condition in which a population tends to increase at a faster rate than its means of subsistence and that unless it is checked by moral restraint or disaster (as disease, famine, or war) widespread poverty and degradation inevitably result. However, since 1800, global food production has generally kept pace with population growth, but increasing numbers of humans call for new ways "to increase yields while preserving natural habitats and biodiversity. (Antony Trewavas, "Malthus Foiled Again And Again," *Nature* 418, (August 8, 2002):668-670, <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/full/nature01013.html> (accessed February, 23, 2008])

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) was an English political economist and demographer who expressed views on population growth and noted the potential for populations to increase rapidly, and often faster than the food supply available to them. Malthus regarded ideals of future improvement in the lot of humanity with skepticism, considering that throughout history a segment of every human population seemed relegated to poverty.

He explained this phenomenon by pointing out that population growth generally preceded expansion of the population's resources, in particular the primary resource of food. Malthus also saw that societies through history had experienced at one time or another epidemics, famines, or wars; events that masked the fundamental problem of populations overstressing their resource limitations: "The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and tens of thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world." (Alan Macfarlane, "Thomas Malthus and the Making of the Modern World" [2008] www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/Malthus_final.pdf [accessed September 12, 2008]).

To give a mathematical perspective to his observations, Malthus proposed the idea that population, if unchecked, increases at a geometric rate (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc.), whereas the food-supply grows at an arithmetic rate (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.). (Wikipedia, "Thomas Malthus," (2008) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Malthus [accessed October 3, 2008]).

³⁵³Cerami and Holcomb, *Guide to Strategy*.

Population structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. Important here is the percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to be somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the nation's military and industry as well as create the following generation. Similarly, a comparison of the middle population group to the older will provide a picture of trends that can have significant consequences for a nation's power.

Any nation with an increasing cohort of retired people coupled with generous social welfare benefits will eventually have to face hard choices between "guns and butter" on the one hand and possible limits to its national power as well as to its investment and economic growth potential on the other. These choices already face the United States as the "baby boomer" generation approaches retirement age against the backdrop of a staggering explosion in social entitlements; hence the crisis in Social Security.

The ability of a nation to grow and defend itself is controlled in large part by the availability of natural resources. Nations that do not possess sufficient mineral, energy, agricultural, and water resources within their boundaries must obtain them on the international market, where prices can be volatile and supplies unreliable. In times of war, all or part of the international market may be inaccessible and critical resources unavailable for import, hence, the historical importance of natural resources and access to and control of cost-efficient transportation systems and networks.

The word resource refers to a naturally occurring concentration of minerals or fuels, whereas the word reserve refers to the portion of a resource that meets minimum criteria related to its extraction and processing. An accumulation of gold, for example, may be a resource but not a reserve if it cannot be mined and refined using existing technology. Resources can become reserves over time as technology improves and the economics of extraction and processing change.

Therefore, the distinction is one of economics and engineering rather than geology. Resources are described as being measured, indicated, or inferred depending on

the degree of certainty with which they are known. A measured resource is one for which the size has been established by geologic mapping, test drilling, and sampling.

An inferred resource is one for which there is a reasonable amount of geologic evidence, but that has not been verified by drilling or sampling. Reserves are similarly described as being proven, probable, or possible.

Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid, either in modern industrial products or in the raw materials themselves. But these resources, whether they are arable land and water or coal and oil, are unevenly distributed around the world and are becoming increasingly scarce. Most importantly, very few, if any, nations, however, are self-sufficient.³⁵⁴

As in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition. Harkening back to the discussion on geography and its importance as a discriminator in determining national power, the worldwide distribution of energy resources such as coal, petroleum, and uranium ore is controlled by geology and is far from uniform. Some nations, therefore, have an abundance of resources whereas others have little or no domestic supply of strategically important materials.

In their raw state, for example, minerals and energy sources are generally useless. Consequently, for example, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the Native American tribes near Lake Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of indifference to the native tribes who roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with great industrial organizations and manufacturing infrastructures — for example, the Group of Eight (G-8) representing the seven largest, most productive, and most successful economies in the post-war world — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., and Russia — have traditionally been able to convert the potential power of natural resources into actual national power.

³⁵⁴ Cerami and Holcomb, *Guide to Strategy*.

As stated previously, very few, if any, nations, however, are self-sufficient. For time immemorial, nations have traditionally made up for such difficulties in several ways. One time-honored, and oft-employed, method is to conquer the resources, a principal motivation for the Japanese expansion that led to the opening of the Pacific Theater of Operations in the Second World War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that led to the First Gulf War.³⁵⁵

A second method is to develop resources in another country by means of concessions, political manipulation, and even a judicious use of force — all used earlier to considerable effect by the U.S. in Latin America between the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine 1824 and the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama to ensure the security of and U.S. access to the vital Panama Canal.

The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to purchase them. In recent years, however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of resources has changed the global economy into a seller's market, while providing considerable economic influence and leverage to nations in control of vital commodities. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) control of oil, for example, has, since 1973, provided its members — Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela, all twelve are “less developed countries” from the “developing world,” — with influence completely out of proportion to their economic and military power.

The ability of a modern nation to defend itself or, should it be aggressive, to expand its territory depends on a reliable source of energy. Until the beginning of the

³⁵⁵ In the event the nation possessing the resource cannot be controlled or compelled to "share" the resource, nations often take extreme and risky measures to achieve self-sufficiency. A lack of petroleum reserves forced Nazi Germany to embark on an ambitious synthetic fuels program during the 1930s. The raw material for the German synthetic fuel program was coal, of which Germany had abundant supplies and which had satisfied its industrial and military energy needs until the beginning of the twentieth century. Two synthetic fuel processes were employed by the Germans. One process produced automobile and aviation fuel and the other produced lubricating oil and diesel fuel. Twenty-one synthetic fuel plants, some of them using forced labor, had been constructed in Germany by the end of World War II (1945). Of note, the U.S. also possesses significant coal reserves and coal processing technology. (William Haneburg, "Natural resources and National Security," Espionage Information: Mo-Ne, Advameg, Inc. [2008] <http://www.espionageinfo.com/Mo-Ne/Natural-Resources-and-National-Security.html> [accessed October 3, 2008]).

twentieth century, this meant coal. Although coal remains an important energy source that is used to generate most of the electricity used in the United States, it has been joined in strategic importance by petroleum and nuclear fuels.³⁵⁶

The United States currently imports more than three billion barrels of oil per year from countries ranging from neighboring Canada and Mexico to Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Iraq, and Angola.³⁵⁷ Although the United States contains significant petroleum reserves, they are not large enough to satisfy the long-term demand. It is, in most cases, also more expensive to produce oil from domestic reservoirs than to import it from countries that have abundant and easily recovered petroleum resources. The federal government maintains a Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help offset the potential effects of an oil embargo or other supply interruption. The continued growth of economies, and their industrial production and consumer components, such as the economies of the People's Republic of China and India add additional pressures to the energy market by increasing demand within an environment of relatively static supply.

Similar situations exist relative to mineral resources. The importance of critical and strategic metals to the security of modern nations was recognized by the United States during the First World War, when tungsten, tin, chromite (chromium ore), optical grade glass, and manila fiber for ropes were all in short supply. The War Department subsequently prepared a list of 28 materials that had been in short supply during the First World War, and since then Congress has funded stockpiles of strategic materials that are essential for national security.

This concern carried through into the mid-1990s under a series of programs that were focused on developing and sustaining a credible and effective capability to harness

³⁵⁶ Haneberg, "Natural Resources." Haneburg references - K. S. Deffeyes, *Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1991); W. L. Youngquist, *Geodesinies* (Portland, OR: National Book Company, 1997); and M. R. Cartwright, "Mineral Resources/Reserves in Appraisal." March 21, 1999. http://www.Minval.Com/Reserve_Mineral.Html (accessed December 14, 2002).

³⁵⁷ Energy Information Administration, "Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries" (September 2008) http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html (accessed September 19, 2008).

the mobilization potential of America in support of the armed forces, while meeting the needs of the national economy and other civil emergency preparedness requirements and providing for the maximum civilian contribution to military operations as well as for the continuation of essential civilian services. It shall also provide for effective utilization of military resources to assist civilian authorities in responding to peacetime and wartime emergencies.³⁵⁸ Currently, the program is represented by and operationalized through the Defense Production Act that was enacted on September 8, 1950, in response to the start of the Korean War as part of a broad civil defense and war mobilization effort in the context of the Cold War.

The Act, now managed by the Department of Homeland Security / Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) has been periodically reauthorized and amended, and remains in force with three major sections.

- The first authorizes the President to require businesses to sign contracts or fulfill orders deemed necessary for national defense.
- The second authorizes the President to establish mechanisms (such as regulations, orders or agencies) to allocate materials, services and facilities to promote national defense.
- The third section authorizes the President to control the civilian economy so that scarce and/or critical materials necessary to the national defense effort are available for defense needs.

The Act also authorizes the President to requisition property, force industry to expand production and the supply of basic resources, impose wage and price controls, settle labor disputes, control consumer and real estate credit, establish contractual priorities, and allocate raw materials to aid the national defense.³⁵⁹

A third class of natural resources that is vital for national security includes agricultural land and water. As is the case for other resources, food or water that cannot

³⁵⁸ John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Strategic Implications of Industrial Preparedness," *Parameters* (Summer 1994): 38-47, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/1994/brinker.htm> (accessed September 19, 2008); and John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Emergency Preparedness Mobilization Board," *Homeland Security Institute*, (October 2001) http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_Oct01.htm (03 October 2008).

³⁵⁹ Larry Hall, telephone interview with author, September 16, 2008.

be produced within a nation must be imported. Therefore, countries with large amounts of arable land, favorable climates, and fresh water can be less dependent on outside supplies than nations that lack one or more of those resources. In cases where technological solutions do exist, for example desalinization of seawater to produce drinking water in arid coastal areas, they can be too expensive for all but the wealthiest of nations. A similar transformation may occur in the future with those nations that are major food producers as the so-called “Green Revolution” faces the prospect of more depleted lands and encroaching deserts.

Finally, there is the chronically acute short supply of strategic, and often esoteric, minerals and raw materials so necessary for high technology and modern weapons. One consequence of this diminishment of and competition for raw materials has been the emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese reserves, as a new venue of international geopolitical competition, in which those nations — specifically Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.³⁶⁰ — with long coastlines and extensive territorial waters reaching beyond the 1982 United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 200 nautical mile (370 km) and naval forces capable of performing “blue water, open ocean” missions such as control and denial of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), presence and deterrence, and protection of shipping and freedom of navigation — have the advantage.

The social, or situational and/or contextual, (i.e., environmental) determinants (economic, political/diplomatic, military, psychological, informational, finance, and law enforcement, or in contemporary U.S. parlance; military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, and economic — MIDLIFE) of power focus on, derive from, and concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ Wandel, J.W, “USA, Russia, Canada, Demark, Norway, and the Arctic,” discussion posted August 10, 2007, <http://www.able2know.org/forums/about101576.html> (accessed October 15, 2008); and Spiegel Online International, “Black Gold under the Ice: The Race for the Arctic Seabed Arrives in Greenland,” *Der Spiegel* (May 27, 2008) Spiegel Online International, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,555775,00.html> (accessed September 10, 2008).

³⁶¹ U.S. Air War College. "Gateway to the Internet."

Ultimately, however, sustainable national power and influence is derived from and flows from the social determinants of power. Although extremely difficult, if not impossible, to operationalize in nations and societies lacking the natural, or dispositional, determinants of power, nations and societies lacking the foundation and structure of strong social, situational, contextual, and/or environmental determinants have, with the exception of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, historically failed to achieve prominence and influence.

Important factors supporting the development, maintenance, and sustainment of the situational, contextual, and/or environmental instruments of national power include, but are not limited to the following: common language literacy and formal education; culturally plausible and defensible political representation, enfranchisement, “ownership,” and empowerment that translates into believable and actionable national pride and cohesion and a willingness to make sacrifices for the nation ; economic systems, to include employment, modernization and market expansion, and the ability to operationalize and harness through industry, manufacturing, transportation, and distribution, the natural, or dispositional, determinants of power — geography, resources, and population.; achievement and maintenance of the “quality” of life and associated goals, objectives, and expectations that include the ability of the individual to participate successfully in the national financial environment; and social mobility based on a ready acceptance of innovation. Other important attributes include, but are not limited to the following: a common national identity and history of shared successes and triumphs, failures and setbacks; and strengths and opportunities and weaknesses and challenges; a common religious identity and history; a common social psychology — morals, values, principles, and ethics; socio-cultural structure — individuals, families, clans, and tribes, and the national identity to include ethnicity and race; philosophical foundations and social cognition schemas; legal and law enforcement systems and crime and punishment paradigms; as well as long-standing societal and cultural frictions.

The instruments of national power overlap, interconnect, and are complementary. For example, diplomats’ power to sway other governments is greatly dependent on those governments’ awareness of their own and their opponent’s economic and military power

and on their assessment of a nation's, their nation and other nations, willingness to use that power. Economic and financial power is bolstered by military and diplomatic power, reinforced with the investigatory and prosecutorial authorities and tools available through the legal and law enforcement instrument of national power that can defend economic and financial interests. Military power is often dependent on the diplomats' ability to gain basing rights, port access, diplomatic immunity and status of forces agreements, and over flight permission from other countries or to enlist them in alliances and coalitions. Military power is directly dependent on the financial and technological strength of the nation's, and its opponent's, economy.

The ability to select and apply, alone or in combination, the instruments of national power in achieving an objective is predicated on, and underpinned by, accurate, relevant actionable intelligence.

The U.S. must seek to achieve its goals as economically as possible and with the right combination of means — the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic. The way in which the U.S. combines these means in any given conflict will be greatly affected by the kind of BNSP the U.S. formulates, pursues, and by the strategic goals the nation seeks. Contextual descriptions of the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power follow.

According to Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000),³⁶² the purpose of the Armed Forces (of the United States) is to fight and win the nation's wars if deterrence fails. As the (executive agent for the) military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces (of the United States) must ensure their adherence to U.S. values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields, and has wielded, the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

³⁶² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces*.

Military power is an essential instrument of national power, often reserved for those crises in which other forms of national power have been ineffective in protecting national interests. When the diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal and law enforcement options prove ineffective in securing national interests, military power - strong, flexible, and rapidly deployable – is essential to the successful achievement of the U.S. BNSP and its goals, objectives, and end state.

The military instrument is the use of force or the threat to use force to achieve national objectives. Military power is the sum of a nation’s weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment capacity. The military instrument can be employed in a variety of ways that are short of combat such as training allies, establishing presence, or acting as a show-of-force. However, the main use of military power is in conflict. While the military instrument is often the main effort during war, the nature and objectives of the particular conflict must be examined to determine the appropriate relationship between the use of military force and the application of the other instruments of national power.³⁶³

Since time immemorial, military strength has been historically the gauge for national power. Although the threat to the modern nation-state has changed dramatically, the military instrument, or element, of national power — specifically remains the dominant contemporary discriminator — especially with respect to the ability to project national power abroad through either the presence of military forces overseas or the ability to mobilize, generate, and employ military forces distant from a nation’s borders. The ability to project military power abroad has historically afforded nations to influence international events in their favor and terminate conflicts and disputes, military or otherwise, on terms favorable to their national interests and end states.³⁶⁴

Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, defeat in war has normally signaled the eclipse and decline, if not the end of a nation’s power, while military victory has usually heralded the ascent of a new power. However, in the aftermath of the Second

³⁶³ USMC, “Strategy: Ends and Means.”

³⁶⁴ Earle, Gordon, and Gilbert, *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

World War and the advent of the Cold War, military defeat in war has led to the transformation of former military powers into highly visible and influential actors on the international stage.

For example, Germany and Japan were utterly and completely defeated in 1945. Their militarily, economic and financial, political and diplomatic, and ideological centers of gravity were destroyed by the Allies' pursuit of total war. However, both nations, with the help of the U.S. and other former adversaries, transformed themselves into regional economic and financial powers, equipped with modern industrial and manufacturing infrastructures backed by democratic free market political and economic systems, allied with and complementing their former enemies.³⁶⁵

Military power is more than just the aggregation of personnel, equipment, and weaponry. It includes strategy, the operational art of the campaign linking strategy to tactics, leadership, morale, and discipline. All of these remain vital factors of military power and a nation's ability to project national power abroad through either the presence of military forces overseas or the ability to mobilize, generate, and employ military forces distant from a nation's borders and thus influence international events, in combination with one or more of the other instruments of national power, in their favor and terminate conflicts and disputes, military or otherwise, on terms favorable to their national interests and end states.³⁶⁶

The military instrument, or element, of national power is highly sensitive to perturbations in military technology and the integration of emerging military technologies with military operations and tactics. Hence the quality of arms technology, tactical innovation, and application also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs.

³⁶⁵ Hanss Maull, "W. Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990/91), Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19901201faessay6053/hanns-w-maull/germany-and-japan-the-new-civilian-powers.html> (accessed September 12, 2008).

³⁶⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5.0: Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006) <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm> (accessed September 12, 2008).

Timely inventions ranging from the crossbow to the airplane have often been decisive when accompanied by appropriate changes in military organization and doctrine. These changes are called “revolutions in military affairs” by military historians and can have tremendous impact on how wars, campaigns, and battles are fought and won; how conflicts are terminated; and how new powers emerge to dominate the world stage. These “revolutions in military affairs,” or RMAs³⁶⁷, can be symmetric or asymmetric, conventional or unconventional, or a combination of both. Regardless of their characteristics, they usually result in a genuine qualitative and quantitative paradigm shift in military capability; strategy, operations, and tactics; and flexibility and adaptability.³⁶⁸

Conversely, when “revolutions in military affairs,” especially “revolutions in military technologies,” fall into the hands of rogue states, failing states, or non-state actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals, they are transformed into actionable asymmetric, unconventional threats that threaten those more powerful and capable. This is because most nations build and maintain instruments of national power to counter the corresponding capabilities of their peer or near-peer competitors.

Asymmetric and unconventional capabilities pose a major challenge for most nations because they are difficult to detect, forecast likelihood and consequences, and warn against; difficult to protect against and prevent; difficult to deter and contain; and difficult to respond to and recover from. In sum, asymmetric and unconventional tools, tactics and techniques, and procedures derived from “revolutions in military affairs,” especially “revolutions in military technologies,” in the hands of rogue states, failing states, or non-state actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals and

³⁶⁷ Project on Defense Alternatives, “RMA Overview,” Common Wealth Institute, <http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html> (accessed August 8, 2008).

³⁶⁸ Project on Defense Alternatives, “RMA Overview;” and Leonard G. Litton, “Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War,” *Air and Space Power Journal* (September 6, 2000) <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Litton.html> (accessed August 8, 2008).

transformed into actionable asymmetric, unconventional threats frustrate, irritate, and annoy established nations and powers because they complicate and obfuscate their basic national security policies (BNSP).³⁶⁹

This is because their BNSP are constructed to address the symmetric and conventional threats posed by their peer and near-peer competitors within the established international environment. Because rogue states, failing states, or non-state actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals do not adhere to or play by the rules of the established international community, their acquisition and employment of asymmetric, unconventional tools, tactics and techniques, and procedures are, and will continue to be, destabilizing.³⁷⁰

The informational instrument (previously known as the psychological element or instrument and more recently as strategic communications)³⁷¹ refers to the use of information and ideas to advance the interests and achieve the objectives of the nation. The objective in the use of the information instrument is to influence the perceptions and attitudes of allies, adversaries, and interested observers. Until recent times, information has almost been an ancillary instrument of national power, augmenting other efforts of the government. Now information itself is becoming critical for both economic growth and military success in operations.

Informational power may seem, and may in fact be, the “fuzziest” of all the elements, but it is at least as important as the others, and political entities make huge efforts to increase it. It consists of national will and morale, national character, and degree of national integration. It is this most ephemeral of the social power determinants that has repeatedly caused nations with superior economic and military power to be defeated or have their policies frustrated by less capable actors.

³⁶⁹ John A. Nagl, “Asymmetric Threat to U.S National Security to the Year 2010” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA396933&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed August 12, 2008).

³⁷⁰ Robert David Steele, “Takedown: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 98-99).

³⁷¹ Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, “Bureau of Public Affairs, Strategic Communications and Planning,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/sep/> (accessed September 15, 2008).

Prior to the “revolution in information affairs,” it was the psychological instrument, or element, of national power. It involved all of the factors, including the awe, fear, or admiration that the U.S.’ physical power inspires, that its descendant currently encompasses.

From the military perspective, according to Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations* (13 February 2006)³⁷², information operations — the operational component of the informational instrument of national power — is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own information.³⁷³

The informational instrument of national power also involves the world’s perception — among the American and foreign publics as well as among political and military leaders — whether the U.S., or one or more of its competitors or adversaries, are supporting or threatening the balance of power. In general, it includes the sympathy or antipathy inspired by a nation’s culture; ideas; values, morals, ethics, and principles; and national will and the immediate cause for which one is fighting ... in sum, anything that affects the rational or emotional components of the human mind.

In conjunction and combination with this instrument of power, the role of the U.S. national intelligence community is to gather valid and current information about potential adversaries and disseminate this information to the appropriate decision makers (i.e., information and knowledge management and information- and intelligence-sharing). It is the responsibility of the decision makers to act on this information. The United States also maintains an extensive security apparatus (i.e., personnel, physical and facility, and information security and assurance; computer, information technology, and automated

³⁷² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).

³⁷³ Ibid.

information systems security; communications security; and operations security) to protect critical information from being obtained by these same adversaries.³⁷⁴

Finally, the use of “propaganda” vehicles like the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe allows the United States to spread the message of democracy to people who would otherwise be denied this information. In this arena, the informational instrument directly supports, complements, and enhances the diplomatic instrument of power.

In sum, the information instrument, or element, of national power is understood to mean the U.S. government communicating its intent and views, i.e. communications, in order to achieve, maintain, and employ the strategic advantage through information superiority and dominance. Strategic influence and its elements have been known by many names: foreign information program, international information activities, political warfare, propaganda, psychological warfare, psychological operations, public information, public affairs, public diplomacy, international military information, information operations, influence operations, and perception management, to name just a few.

Further, strategic influence has always had both overt and covert components. Today, key informational components of strategic influence include public affairs, political warfare, political advocacy, public diplomacy and psychological operations. This is because the communications revolution, which began over a century ago with the advent of global transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in recent decades with the development of fax machines, television satellites, and computer linkages.

As the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated in the fall of 1989, a new fact of life in the international arena is that it is no longer possible for any nation-state to deny its citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere. Ideas, in other words, move more freely around the world than at any other time in the past.

³⁷⁴ ASIS International, “Security Disciplines,” (2008) <http://www.asisonline.org/careercenter/careerdisc.xml> (accessed September 15, 2008); Interagency Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS) “Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World,” <http://www.iooss.gov/> (accessed September 15, 2008); and the OPSEC Professional Society, “What is Opsec?” <http://www.opsecsociety.org/> (accessed September 15, 2008).

This has had particularly fortunate results for the United States. Even as some other aspects of power have gone into relative decline, America's influence as a source of ideas and as a shaper of culture has increased. This "soft power," in Joseph Nye's words, has been a major factor in formulating the U.S. national security strategic objective of "enlargement."³⁷⁵

Therefore, information has contributed to the concept of the world as a global village. This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information, however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in national strategy. In the economic realm, for instance, global interdependence has been enhanced by information-communication improvements.

Conversely, the near instantaneous downturns of major economies (the current crisis is an outstanding example) are always a possibility with the immediate transmission of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or transnational economic actor. Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance the ability of governmental elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national consoler in times of tragedy, such as the Challenger explosion or the Oklahoma City bombing. At the same time, these developments can also aid the demagogues, the great simplifiers always waiting in the wings to stir fundamental discontents and the dark side of nationalism.

In terms of psychological power, Winston Churchill demonstrated repeatedly that the pervasive distribution of targeted information can have momentous effects on intangibles such as national will. Conversely, however, this type of ubiquity has the pernicious potential of altering in a matter of years, basic values and cultural beliefs that take generations to create. Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and access to information more far-reaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, information dominance can create operational synergies by allowing those systems that provide battle space awareness, enhance command and control, and create precision force to be integrated into the so-called "system of systems."³⁷⁶

³⁷⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*.

³⁷⁶ U.S. Army War College, *U.S. Army War College Guide*.

One result of all this is to compress the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, previously considered as separate and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities. The commander will be faced in the future with the much more complex job of recognizing those events occurring simultaneously at all three levels and integrating them into the calculation that results from the traditional consideration at the operational level of which tactical battles and engagements to join and which to avoid. Equally important, shorter time for decisions — occasioned by both the compressed continuum of war and electronically gathered information — means less time to discover ambiguities or to analyze those ambiguities that are already apparent.

At the higher level of cyber war, the two-edged potential of communications and information is even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information warfare on another state's computer systems, targeting assets ranging from telecommunications and power to safety and banking.

Such an onslaught could undermine the more advanced aspects of an adversary's economy, interrupt its mobilization of military power, and by affecting the integrity of highly visible services to the population, create almost immediate pressure on government at all levels. As activities rely increasingly on information systems rather than manual processes and procedures, information infrastructures of the most developed nations, such as the United States, become progressively more vulnerable to state and non-state actors. Even as there are advances in information security technologies, hacker tools are becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst concludes in this regard that, for the United States, "the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor cannot be dismissed out of hand."³⁷⁷

Examples of the use of the informational instrument, or element, of national power are operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander's intent, and project accurate

³⁷⁷ Jablonsky, David, "National Power."

information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary's decision cycle, which aligns with the commander's objectives.

The political-military and political-economic capabilities of influence operations are psychological operations (PSYOP), operations deception (OPDEC), operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, covert action (CA), propaganda and counterpropaganda operations, and public affairs (PA), public diplomacy, and strategic communications operations. Public affairs, public diplomacy, and strategic communications operations, while a component of influence operations, are predicated on their ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences. These activities of influence operations allow the leadership to prepare and shape the operational environment by conveying selected information and indicators to target audiences, shaping the perceptions of policy and decision makers, securing critical friendly information, defending against sabotage, protecting against espionage, gathering intelligence, and communicating selected information about activities to the global audience.³⁷⁸

In closing, strategic communication is defined as the informational instrument of national power in an era of globalization. It focuses U.S. government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and policies. It uses coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions in collaboration with other elements of national power to achieve, maintain, and employ the strategic advantage through information superiority and dominance.

The political instrument of national power is the execution of a nation's foreign policy through diplomatic means. Diplomacy arises out of the "fundamental character of the nation-state system, with its basic assumption that nation-states are sovereign, but

³⁷⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*.

divergent in their interests and unequal in their power.”³⁷⁹Diplomacy is dependent on the power of persuasion, convincing others to take actions that allow for the successful prosecution of a nation’s foreign policy. Rarely, if ever, is diplomacy successful without the strong support of the other instruments of national power as well.³⁸⁰

Diplomacy can be defined as the influencing the international situation through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, negotiations, and engagement with the United States. The Department of State has the overall lead for U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. The diplomatic element is conducted with foreign nations, the United Nations, and also non-governmental/international organizations.³⁸¹ Diplomacy can also be defined as the art of employing communications and establishing relationships in the global environment. Ideas, prestige, and commitment are the currencies of the field.

The diplomatic instrument uses a nation’s international position combined with diplomacy to achieve national objectives. Diplomatic tools may include negotiations, political recognition, treaties, and alliances. While the diplomatic instrument is normally emphasized before hostilities actually begin, it remains a key element of the national strategy in any conflict situation. In certain situations (especially military operations other than war), the diplomatic instrument continues to be the main effort, even after the commitment of military forces.

Similarly, diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of foreign relations: international law; trade and commerce; war, deterrence, containment, conflict initiation and termination; economics and finance; and

³⁷⁹ National Defense University, “Diplomacy,” Strategic Assessments ’96: Instruments of U.S. Power, National Defense University, www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa96/sa96ch02.html (accessed September 15, 2001).

³⁸⁰ John E. Hyten, “Other Instruments of National Power,” *A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space* (2000). <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html> (accessed September 15, 2008).

³⁸¹ John R. Mills, “All Elements of National Power: Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War,” *Strategic Insights* 5 no. 6 (July 2006), Center for Contemporary Conflict, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/jul/millsjul06.asp> (16 September 2008).

society and culture. International agreements and treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians.

Diplomacy is, therefore, the instrument or element of national power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation. Diplomatic exchanges with other countries promote cooperation that serves and advances mutual interests and builds capacity that bolsters the capabilities of U.S. allies financially, operationally, and logistically.³⁸²

The legal and *law enforcement instrument, or element*, of power relates to legal means within the operational environment, such as the PATRIOT Act and United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* specifically addresses UNSCR 1373, which imposes binding obligations on all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, suppress the recruitment of terrorists, and deny them sanctuary. It, along with the military instrument, or element of national power, is perhaps the most dispositional of the situational, environmental, or contextual instruments of national power because the legal and law enforcement authorities and powers of nation are simultaneously the most fundamental in ensuring its internal sovereignty and in pursuing and achieving its core interests — ensuring physical [territorial and border] security, promoting [political, economic, ideological, and cultural] values, and ensuring economic [domestic and international] prosperity — and the most malleable with respect to the changing threat. It is also perhaps, along with the informational instrument, or element, of national power, the most diverse.³⁸³

The overarching mission of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, and the U.S. federal law enforcement community is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime;

³⁸² U.S. Department of State, “Diplomacy and the Global Coalition against Terrorism. On the Diplomatic Front,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/coalition/dplm/> (accessed September 16, 2008).

³⁸³ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2003*, U.S. Department of State (March 2004), <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29915.htm> (accessed September 16, 2008).

to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.³⁸⁴

Combating terrorism and other threats to national security is the highest priority mission of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, and the U.S. federal law enforcement community. Combating terrorism and other threats to national security is inherently inter-and multi-agency and includes the following functions.

The mission of the U.S. federal law enforcement community — Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. Secret Service (USSS); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS); Transportation Security Administration (TSA); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (US-CIS); U.S. Border Patrol (USBP); Federal Protective Service (FPS); the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS); the criminal investigations' and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense; the military services (including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and the investigative services and police forces organic to the other federal departments and agencies — is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners; and to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States.

The major functions of U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, and the U.S. federal law enforcement community are to:

- Conduct professional investigations and authorized intelligence collection to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic and international terrorists and their supporters within the United States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice,

³⁸⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, "Featured News," U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/> (accessed September 16, 2008).

- Design, develop, and implement counterterrorism initiatives which enhance the nation's ability to minimize the terrorist threat,
- Conduct counterintelligence activities and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies in the intelligence community within the United States. (Executive Order 12333 (as amended) includes international terrorist activities in its definition of counterintelligence.),
- Coordinate the efforts of U.S. government agencies and departments in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure by identifying and investigating criminal and terrorist group intrusions through physical and cyber attacks,
- Investigate violations of the laws of the United States and collect evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, except in cases in which such responsibility is by statute or otherwise specifically assigned to another investigative agency;
- Locate and apprehend fugitives for violations of specified federal laws and, when so requested, state and local fugitives pursuant to federal statutory authority,
- Conduct professional investigations to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and emerging criminal enterprises whose activities affect the United States, and
- Address international criminal organizations and terrorist groups, which threaten the American people and their property, through expanded international liaison and through the conduct of extraterritorial investigations as mandated by laws and Executive Orders.³⁸⁵

Additional missions and functions include, but are not exclusively limited to, providing for the security of federal court facilities and the safety of judges and other court personnel; apprehending criminals; exercising custody of federal prisoners and providing for their security and transportation to correctional facilities; executing federal court orders, seizing assets gained by illegal means and providing for the custody, management, and disposal of forfeited assets, assuring the safety of endangered

³⁸⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, "Federal Bureau of Investigation," *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/fbi.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

government witnesses and their families; collecting and disbursing funds;³⁸⁶ regulating the firearms and explosives industries;³⁸⁷ enforcing controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States;³⁸⁸ safeguarding the nation's financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security Events (NSSEs)³⁸⁹ enforcing immigration and customs by targeting illegal immigrants and the people, money and materials that support terrorism and other criminal activities;³⁹⁰ managing, securing and controlling the nation's border to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by extending the zone of security beyond the physical borders protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual property and unfair trade practices; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting import duties; enforcing trade laws related to admissibility; regulating trade practices to collect the appropriate revenue; and maintaining export controls; controlling the borders by apprehending individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agriculture and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; processing all people, vehicles and cargo entering the United States;³⁹¹ promoting confidence in the nation's civil aviation system by detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air

³⁸⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, "U.S. Marshals Service," *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/usms.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁸⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, "Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives," *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/atf.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁸⁸ U.S. Department of Justice, "Drug Enforcement Administration," *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁸⁹ U.S. Secret Service, "U.S. Secret Service," *U.S. Secret Service Strategic Plan (FY 2008-FY2013)*, U.S. Treasury, http://www.ustras.gov/usss/usss_strategic_plan_2008_2013.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁹⁰ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "About," U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁹¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Protecting America: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2005-2010 Strategic Plan," U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/strategic_plan_05_11.ctt/strategic_plan_05_11.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008).

carriers, airports, passengers, and crews;³⁹² preventing terrorists and terrorists' weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States;³⁹³ protecting the nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.³⁹⁴

The intelligence instrument, or element, of national power integrates foreign, military, and domestic capabilities through policy, personnel, and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policy makers, diplomats, financiers and economists, strategic communicators, war fighters, homeland security officials, and law enforcement. In this environment, the key to achieving lasting strategic advantage is the ability to rapidly and accurately anticipate and adapt to complex challenges.³⁹⁵ Simply put intelligence guards against surprise.

In addition to its traditional role supporting other instruments of American power, intelligence today has an ability to create conditions to prevent, preempt, and deter adversaries. Having an understanding of the intelligence capabilities of the adversary and his ability to develop the situation from his perspective, is also a critical element in understanding the operational environment.

Given this, the intelligence instrument, or element, of national power is inherently inter- and multi-disciplinary. It is composed of a diverse community of interlocking and mutually supportive disciplines that include, but are not exclusively limited to indications and warning intelligence, current and operational intelligence, counterintelligence, counter-proliferation, science and technology, and of course, anti- and counterterrorism.

³⁹² U.S. Transportation Security Administration, "Our Mission," U.S. Transportation Security Administration, <http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/mission/index.shtm> (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁹³ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Who We Are and What We Do," U.S. Customs and Border Protection (September 3, 2008) http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/who_we_are.xml (accessed September 21, 2008).

³⁹⁴ Aviation Security, Public Law 107-71, 107th Congress, Stat. 597, Title 1, (2001): 115. Government Printing Office, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ071.107 (accessed September 21, 2008); and U.S. Coast Guard, "Missions: Ready Today...Preparing for Tomorrow," U.S. Coast Guard, (November 2008) <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/> (accessed November 16, 2008).

³⁹⁵ Director of National intelligence, *Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 6.

Intelligence is both information and an organized system for collecting and exploiting it — planning, direction, and targeting; collection; exploitation, processing, and analysis; production and dissemination; and evaluation and feedback. It is both an activity and a product of that activity. Perhaps most importantly, it is an evolving discipline focused on ensuring its ability to accurately forecast the future environment and anticipate future threats and missions for U.S. policy and decision makers through an intelligence enterprise strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means. Intelligence, overtly, covertly, or clandestinely, is therefore the primary enabler in a basic national security policy that is designed to detect, deter and contain, discredit and delegitimize, deny and disrupt, and defeat all manners of adversaries.

Intelligence is something broader than information:

- Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities; or
- Intelligence is the process of gathering, processing, reporting, and disseminating finished, actionable intelligence to decision makers and other users with a need to know. *Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around the U.S.; the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers.*

Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence possible.³⁹⁶

The United States intelligence effort provides the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign

³⁹⁶ Executive Order no. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities (1981)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/amended12333.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2008).

security threats. All departments and agencies cooperate fully to fulfill this goal and³⁹⁷ the national intelligence effort takes into account and considers the responsibilities and requirements of state, local, and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United States.

Intelligence and operational coordination among the federal departments and agencies is essential to protect the United States from terrorist attacks and other disruptive natural, man-made, and/or technological incidents. It is critical that actionable intelligence relative to situational awareness and incident management be continuously communicated and socialized among federal agencies.

The United States intelligence effort provides the President and the National Security (and Homeland Security Council) Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. Given that the current and anticipated strategic environment models closely resemble chaos theory: initial conditions are essential, trends are nonlinear, and challenges will emerge suddenly due to unpredictable systems behavior. In this environment, one prerequisite for decision advantage is global awareness: the ability to develop, digest, and manipulate vast and disparate data streams about the world as it is today. Another requirement is strategic foresight: the ability to probe existing conditions and use the responses to consider alternative hypotheses and scenarios, and determine linkages, all federal executive branch departments and agencies cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.³⁹⁸

Intelligence employs quiet means to improve U.S. decision making while simultaneously frustrating that of the nation's enemies. The U.S. Intelligence Community works behind the scenes to inform and facilitate the actions of diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and other customers. It seeks to ensure that U.S. decision and policy makers

³⁹⁷ Executive Order no. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

know as much as possible about a situation and that their initiatives have the best chance for success. At the same time, intelligence also helps to impair the reliability, speed, and efficacy of adversaries' decision-making in to help our customers achieve decision advantage.

Decision advantage results in the ability of the United States to bring any one or all of the instruments of national power to bear in ways that resolve challenges, defuse crises, or deflect emerging threats. According to Jennifer Sims, Director of Intelligence Studies, Georgetown University "...the key to intelligence-driven victories may not be the collection of objective 'truth' so much as the gaining of an information edge or competitive advantage over an adversary. Such an advantage can dissolve a decision-maker's quandary and allow him to act. This ability to lubricate choice is the real objective of intelligence."³⁹⁹

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States.⁴⁰⁰ The intelligence community consists of: the Director of National Intelligence, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence.⁴⁰¹

These agencies are included in the IC as specified in Title 50 of the U.S. Code. In addition to these organizations, there are other departments and agencies which have intelligence requirements and participate in information-sharing activities with the

³⁹⁹ Director of National Intelligence, *Vision 2015*, 8.

⁴⁰⁰ United States Intelligence Community, "Definition of the Intelligence Community," United States Intelligence Community, <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-definition.shtml> (accessed September 21, 2008).

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

statutory members of the IC. These organizations, known as “Non-Title 50” entities, include the Department of Transportation, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The IC’s activities include, but are not limited to, the following:⁴⁰²

- Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities; and, as appropriate, the Congress of the United States;
- Production and dissemination of intelligence;
- Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the U.S., international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;
- Special activities;
- Administrative and support activities within the U.S. and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
- Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC). The DNI also acts as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The President appoints the DNI with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director is assisted by a Senate-confirmed Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI), appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰² United States Intelligence Community, “Definition.”

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

By ensuring the timely and effective dissemination of intelligence to those who need it, ranging from the President, to heads of executive departments, to military forces, and to law enforcement communities, the *intelligence* instrument of power relates to continuous operations to develop the situation and generate the intelligence that allows the U.S. government to take actions against adversaries.

Intelligence systems permit the U.S. government to understand adversary/enemy intent and capabilities; identify and quantify relative and acceptable risk; predict threat actions and vectors; describe and quantify effects, costs, and consequences; and detect an adversary's/enemy's movements, providing them the time necessary to take protective, preventive, and proactive response and recovery measures. Long before conflict occurs, intelligence must help provide a more thorough understanding of adversaries' motivations, goals, and end state to determine effective deterrent courses of action.

Achieving decision superiority (i.e., information dominance) in a dynamic environment requires the synchronization and integration of all sources of intelligence and information to include those from DoD and non-DoD agencies, law enforcement and multinational partners. Intelligence support must also be continuous across the entire spectrum of conflict, and span the range of all operations: pre-hostility, crisis, and major combat operations; to post-conflict stability operations.⁴⁰⁴

Intelligence operations strategies that support conflict prevention, mitigate against surprise attack, and position intelligence to best answer war fighting needs are an essential element of this support. Intelligence campaign plans implement these strategies by defining the comprehensive intelligence needs for all phases of operations and campaigns, including intelligence all-source analysis and production as well as multi-discipline collection, processing, and supporting information architecture. Such plans also provide for the widest possible dissemination and sharing of relevant information to ensure national and international unity of effort without compromising security. By

⁴⁰⁴ Lisa S. Disbrow, "Decision Superiority: Transforming National Security Decision-Making" (Washington, D.C.: National War College, 2002) <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA441507> (accessed September 21, 2008).

addressing all aspects of intelligence operations, these plans focus the intelligence capabilities of the intelligence community on providing the critical information that leads to decision superiority.⁴⁰⁵

Given that the U.S.' primary line of defense remains well forward of the homeland, U.S. assets, military and non-military, operating in key regions are essential to the defense of the United States and to the protection of allies and U.S. interests. U.S. theater security activities with multinational partners provide access to information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats. This access supports the ability of the United States to project power against threats and support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist ideologies.⁴⁰⁶

In addition, intelligence partnerships with other nations can take advantage of foreign expertise and areas of focus and provide access to previously denied areas. These relationships are essential mission components to protecting the United States, contributing to deterrence and conflict prevention, as well as preventing surprise attacks.

The contemporary international environment is a dynamic world in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing. The continued march of globalization, the growing number of independent actors and advancing technology has increased global connectivity, interdependence, and complexity, creating greater uncertainties, systemic risk and a less predictable future. These changes have led to reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles.

To these persistent threats, the intelligence community is adding a growing array of emerging missions that expands the list of national security (and hence, intelligence) concerns to include: infectious diseases, science and technology surprises, financial contagions, economic competition, environmental issues, energy interdependence and security, cyber attacks, threats to global commerce, and transnational crime. Foremost

⁴⁰⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 33 www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008).

⁴⁰⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 18.

among these challenges is the blurring of lines that once separated foreign and domestic intelligence, and the increased importance of homeland security.⁴⁰⁷

Terrorism cannot occur without some infusion of and access to financial assets. The amounts involved do not necessarily have to be large. They will vary according to the strategies and methods adopted by the terrorists. Whereas some will have major projects (such as the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, recruitment, or the provision of welfare to their supporters) that require significant long-term funding, others will have more modest financial needs. However, all terrorists need money to finance expenditure, if only for day to day living expenses.

As such, there is an almost constant need for them to raise and move money. The means by which they do so encompasses a wide range of both legal and illegal activity. Terrorism can often be financed from legitimately obtained income. Charitable contributions, for example, can be major sources of funding, with non-governmental organizations having been the focus of much investigative work over recent years. Informal money transfer systems can also be vulnerable to use by terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Terrorist attacks against the United States; U.S. citizens, nationals and persons; and/or U.S. interests worldwide constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Given the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists. Therefore, there a need exists for further consultation and cooperation with, and sharing of information by, the United States and foreign governments and financial institutions as an additional tool to enable the United States to combat the financing of terrorism.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 18.

⁴⁰⁸ White House, "Executive Order on Terrorist Financing: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," White House, (September 24, 2001) www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-1.html (accessed September 21, 2008).

Terrorists use a wide variety of methods to move money within and between organizations, including the financial sector, the physical movement of cash by couriers, and the movement of goods through the trade system. Charities and alternative remittance systems have also been used to disguise terrorist movement of funds. The adaptability and opportunism shown by terrorist organizations suggests that all the methods that exist to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk.

Disrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, constraining overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their ability to execute attacks.

Disrupting terrorist financing involves both systemic safeguards, which protect the financial system from criminal abuse, and targeted economic sanctions informed by counter-terrorism intelligence.

There is a significant body of professional and scholarly literature that highlights the links between financial tools and wider counter-terrorist activity. The effectiveness of authorities at both detecting and investigating terrorist activity is significantly enhanced when counter-terrorist intelligence and financial information are used together to detect, deter and contain, disrupt, and defeat terrorism through the auspices and authorities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tax and Regulation; FinCEN, known as Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network; the Office of Foreign Asset Control, known as OFAC; the U.S. Mint; and the Office of Terrorist Financing.

For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) February 2008 Financial Action Task Force recommended four areas which could be the focus of efforts to further strengthen counter-terrorist financing efforts: (1) action to address jurisdictional issues including safe havens and failed states, (2) outreach to the private sector to ensure the availability of information to detect terrorist financing, (3) building a better understanding across public and private sectors and (4) enhanced financial intelligence to exploit the value of financial investigation as a tool in fighting terrorism.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁹ Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "Terrorist Financing," Financial Action Task Force,(2008) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2008).

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) marshals the department's intelligence and enforcement functions with the aim of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction and effects (WMD/E) proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. The mission, goals and objectives, and expectations of the office, in partnership with other U.S. financial enforcement and regulatory organizations and their foreign counterparts, is to gather and analyze information from the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial communities as to how terrorists and other criminals earn, move, and store money and take appropriate policy, regulatory, or enforcement action based on this analysis, including: freezing the assets of terrorists, drug kingpins, and their support networks; cutting off corrupt foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions from the U.S. financial system; developing and enforcing regulations to address the vulnerabilities of the U.S. to terrorist financing and money laundering; promoting the international adoption and implementation of counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering standards; tracing and repatriating assets looted by corrupt foreign officials in such countries as Iraq, Liberia, and Haiti; and promoting a meaningful exchange of information with the private financial sector to help it detect and address threats to the financial system.⁴¹⁰

The *financial* instrument of power is closely related to the *economic* instrument of power; there are, however, some important differences. The economic instrument of power concerns issues such as regional and bilateral trade, infrastructure development, and foreign investment. Examples of the use of the *economic* instrument of power might include enacting trade sanctions, enacting restrictions on technology transfers, and reducing security assistance programs. The *financial* instrument of power concerns issues such as the transfer of funds and banking.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) states that financial systems are used by terrorist organizations as a fiscal sanctuary in which to store and transfer the funds that support their survival and operations. Terrorist organizations use a

⁴¹⁰ FATF, "Terrorist Financing."

variety of financial systems, including formal banking, wire transfers, debit and other stored value cards, online value storage and value transfer systems, the informal “hawala” system, and cash couriers.⁴¹¹ According to the NSCT, the United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism ... We will identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists’ assets through alternative financial networks.⁴¹²

According to Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000),⁴¹³ the economic instrument of power is the leveraging of a nation’s wealth to influence the behavior of others. The more global the world’s economy becomes, the more important the use of economic power becomes—and the more effective.

Unlike the ideological conflicts that dominated the world throughout the entire twentieth century, economic concerns now tend to dominate decisions and priorities. Application of economic power shapes, focuses, and tailors international activity through United States government spending and taxation -both discretionary and entitlement program activities (the Office of Management and Budget is the overall lead), policy on money supply and interest rates (the Federal Reserve Board is the lead federal agency), trade agreements, trade policy, and other negotiated trade arrangements in addition to U.S. government policy to promote international trade activity (through the auspices of the U.S. Department of Commerce and Department of State) and sometimes U.S. trade interests. Although boring and mundane compared to the other elements of national power, this element, especially the money supply and interest rate aspect, is critical for stability both domestically and overseas.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 17.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces*.

⁴¹⁴ Mills, “All Elements of National Power.”

The economic instrument uses the application of material resources to achieve national objectives. Nations employ economic means to protect their own industries and markets, to improve the quality of life of their people, to stabilize the economy and government of friends and allies, and to deter destabilizing and hostile actions by other nations. Specific economic means include regulation of trade practices, loans and loan guarantees, monetary and investment policies, foreign aid, subsidies, and technology transfers.

As with the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument generally has primacy over the military instrument during peace and is often used before military force during a crisis; changes in trade or monetary policy, economic sanctions, or some type of embargo are frequently the first steps taken in an effort to influence an adversary's behavior. However, economic considerations continue to be at the forefront of any conflict, and the use of economic measures to support the friendly war effort and to undermine the enemy's ability to resist continues throughout the course of a conflict or war.⁴¹⁵

A nation can choose a variety of methods in applying economic power. Liberal or restrictive trade policies can open up or deny markets to the other nations of the world. The United States has long used foreign aid to entice other nations into taking actions favorable to U.S. interests and applied economic sanctions against enemies of the United States in attempts to influence the behavior of "unfriendly" nations.

Other examples of the application of the financial and economic instruments of power include, but are not exclusively limited to, the use of, or the threat to use, economic means against a country in order to weaken its economy and thereby reduce its political and military power. Economic warfare also includes the use of economic means to compel an adversary to change its policies or behavior or to undermine its ability to conduct normal relations with other countries. Some common means of economic warfare are blockades, trade embargoes, boycotts, sanctions, trades, tax, and tariff discrimination, the freezing of capital assets, the suspension of aid, the prohibition of

⁴¹⁵ USMC, "Strategy: Ends and Means."

investment and other capital flows, and expropriation, capturing critical economic resources, depriving the enemy forces of those resources so that they cannot fight the war properly, preemptive purchasing, and blacklisting of individuals, corporations, and state agents.

Historically, the effectiveness of the economic instrument of national power has not been very good – particularly in cases of dealing with authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships, failing and failed states, and/or rogue states. In these cases, the withdrawal of foreign aid or the application of economic sanctions often failed to impact the intended targets. A nation’s population might have been impacted, but the leadership was left largely untouched. It is rare that a government has actually changed its policy based on the application of economic power alone, but in combination with the other instruments of national power, economics can be a very effective tool.

Naming a country on the terrorism list triggers a series of economic sanctions under different U.S. laws. These sanctions include:

- Restrictions on export licenses (or a general ban) for dual-use items or critical technology (under the Export Administration Act of 1979)
- Ban on sales or licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions Control List (under the Arms Export Control Act)
- Ban on U.S. foreign assistance including Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees (under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)
- Authorization for the president to restrict or ban imports of goods and services from designated terrorist countries (under the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985)
- Prohibition of financial transactions by US persons with the governments of designated terrorist countries (under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
- Requirement that US representatives at international financial institutions vote against loans or other financial assistance to that country (under the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977)

- Ineligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, under the Trade Act of 1974)⁴¹⁶

Another central legislative initiative with respect to U.S. counterterrorism policy is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Act provides for the designation of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) by the Secretary of State, a designation equivalent to the state sponsor designation. The Act also included provisions aimed at disrupting financial flows to FTOs: Section 303 makes it a crime for U.S. residents to knowingly provide material support or resources to a designated FTO. In addition, financial institutions are required to block funds in “which a foreign terrorist organization, or its agent, has an interest” and report the existence of these funds to the Treasury. The Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions to freeze assets of a designated FTO.⁴¹⁷

The “USA PATRIOT Act” passed by Congress at the end of October 2001 strengthened the criminal laws against terrorism and expands the ability of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies to track and detain suspected terrorists. The act also includes several measures to disrupt money laundering and other methods of terrorist financing.⁴¹⁸

The PATRIOT Act requires that foreign banks with corresponding accounts in U.S. banks designate a point person to receive subpoenas related to these accounts. Furthermore, U.S. banks are barred from doing business with banks that have no physical facility or operate outside the regulated banking system. The Treasury also has the authority to require banks to scrutinize deposits from residents of nations that do not cooperate with U.S. officials.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁶ FATF, “Terrorist Financing.”

⁴¹⁷ Charles Doyle, “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary,” Federation of American Scientists (June 3, 1996) www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁴¹⁸ Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), “USA PATRIOT Act,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

The Act also includes a provision that allows the Treasury to impose sanctions on banks that refuse to provide information to law enforcement agencies. The threat of U.S. sanctions sends an important message about the level of U.S. commitment to foreign banks. Nevertheless, previous efforts to extend the force of U.S. sanctions to third countries have always been contentious. Coordination of efforts within the G-8 and the United Nations Security Council may eventually prove to be successful in securing international cooperation than the threat of secondary economic sanctions.⁴²⁰

Economic capacity and development are key links to both the natural and social determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, as already illustrated, a nation may be well-endowed, but lacks the ability to convert/translate (i.e., operationalize) its abundance of natural resources into military capabilities, scientific and technological advancements and actionable engineering initiatives — especially in communications, information and knowledge management systems, and automated system command and control architectures, commercially viable and tradable economic and financial instruments, sustainable manufacturing and distribution industries and systems, operational high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power.⁴²¹

Although economic capacity and development are essential to establishing, operationalizing, and maintaining national power — specifically military power — an excess of military spending can erode the underlying basis for a nation’s power and its basic national security policy and capabilities if it occurs at the expense of a larger economy and reduces the national ability to invest in future economic growth.⁴²²

For developing countries already, and chronically, short of economic investment capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources. However, even

⁴²⁰ FinCEN, “USA PATRIOT Act.”

⁴²¹ Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 96 (Winter 1995-96): 49, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2710.pdf (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁴²² Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Strategic Assessment 1996,” 49.

developed, advanced countries, especially since the end of the Cold War, have had to make some choices between military and non-military investments and resulting capabilities.

In the post-1945 environment, political stability and governmental legitimacy are increasingly linked to domestic economic performance. Excessive military spending, as the former Soviet Union discovered, can be dangerous and counterproductive, if not genuinely destructive, for large and small countries alike if the government cannot achieve and maintain the “quality” of life and associated goals, objectives, and expectations of its citizenry.⁴²³

Strong domestic economies and self-sustaining financial systems also produce actionable non-military national power in the international arena. Through their military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, and economic — MIDLIFE — instruments of national power, leading industrialized nations have available all the tools, tactics, and techniques for exercising power, including rewards or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and loans, as well as the mere consequences their domestic policies can have on the global economy.⁴²⁴

This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balance-of-payment deficits. In short, the strength of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and credibility of its international economic options.

Consequently, economic considerations are closely interrelated to other elements of power. The importance of economics is amply demonstrated in today’s increasingly interdependent world that is characterized by increasing competition for finite natural resources, divergent growth rates and disparities in age and gender cohorts, speed and complexity of communications and transportation, and dependence on technology.

⁴²³ Ka-Neng Au, ed. *The Causes and Consequences of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Newark, NJ: Rutgers, 2006).

⁴²⁴ Jablonsky, “National Power.”

Interdependence, including globalization and integration, has caused major changes in the economic element of national power. Globally, national economies have become, and remain, more dependent on international trade and on financial markets that have become truly global, integrated, and interpenetrated, in scope and operations.

From a security perspective, this type of economic interpenetration is reflected in the mutual vulnerability of national economies. Moreover, national economic policies are increasingly influenced by a myriad of international non-governmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while multinational corporations consistently, and quite effectively, manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states to further their transnational interests.⁴²⁵

Taken together, the financial and economic instruments, when backed by the operational capabilities of the intelligence and legal and law enforcement instruments, can be effective and powerful combination in deterring and containing, disrupting, and defeating potential adversaries by denying them access to financial resources. Conversely, however, history has also taught that denying certain actors' access to financial and related resources — Japan in the 1930s, can drive them towards initiating open hostilities.⁴²⁶

In sum, the instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic — are closely tied to the national will and are an expression of the national will. The national will is the cumulative, yet intangible, instrument of national power. Cultivating national will simply means that the national leadership explains to the American people why they would like to use the instruments of national power, especially the military instrument and when they expect to return those forces to the people, their rightful owners. The national will as a vital component of national power and is simultaneously dispositional and situational.

⁴²⁵ Jablonsky, "National Power."

⁴²⁶ Keegan, *The Second World War*; and Gilbert, *The Second World War: A Complete History*.

It seems virtually self-evident that national will is, at best, hard to recognize in a quantitative sense, but it remains equally true that it is the decisive element of power in a free society. The people are the ultimate source of a national strength and power.

The psychosocial element, the national will, is the cumulative instrument, or element, of national power. How powerfully, or how weakly, it manifests itself dictates to a significant degree how strongly the other elements of power can be employed within a national strategy to obtain national objectives.⁴²⁷ If misunderstood, it can lead the nation to the point at which the United States and its pursuit of national objectives are out of synch with the national will. This disconnect in a pluralistic democracy, in a free and open society, can lead ultimately to an inability to achieve objectives. The result is a loss of national prestige, credibility, and power.

Specifically, without a national will to exercise power, a nation becomes powerless to provide a decisive basic national security policy and strategy. A country can have all the tools, the instruments of national power, but without the will to use them, it expresses no power.

As stated earlier, all of the instruments of national power are linked. Therefore, how Americans as a nation accomplish core national objectives is interrelated, so much so that it is essential for national will to be equally considered if the nation is to be successful in achieving and sustaining its national policies and end state. The outcome will be a better national security strategy, effectively providing for and countering threats to national security.

The value of the psychosocial or national will element of power is often neglected by national leaders in developing an appropriate national strategy to achieve national objectives. In order for the U.S.' national will to be operationalized and employed as the basic national security policy and strategy and through its instruments of national power,

⁴²⁷Kevin A. Collins, "National Will: Achilles Heel In United States National Strategy," (research report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1990) <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA234908&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008).

history has demonstrated that Americans must perceive a threat to their territorial integrity or a catastrophe before its national will will allow for achievement of national objectives.

A traditional view of international politics holds that national will is “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war.”⁴²⁸ Put another way, national will is the “popular dedication to the nation and support for its policies, even when that support requires sacrifice.”⁴²⁹ These views of national will imply that it serves as an intangible, but extremely important factor without which the nation’s government cannot pursue its policies fully (if it can pursue them at all).⁴³⁰ Though not constant, this intangible factor can vary within the population, and it can vary overtime.

Why is national will important? It is important because the true resolve of a nation is reflected in the willingness of its citizens to sacrifice or fight for what they believe in. A noted scholar, Hans Morgenthau, has said that national will “exerts a permanent and often decisive influence upon the weight a nation is able to put into the scales of international politics.”⁴³¹

According to Clausewitz, the aim in war is to achieve one’s will.⁴³² The immediate requirement is to overcome one’s enemy’s ability to resist, which is a product of the physical means at his disposal and the strength of his will. One must either eliminate his physical ability to resist or, short of this, one must destroy his will to resist. In military terms, this means the defeat of the enemy’s fighting forces, but always in a manner and to a degree consistent with the national policy objective. Clausewitz also

⁴²⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 134.

⁴²⁹ Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, 177.

⁴³⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 134-140

⁴³¹ Collins, *Grand Strategy*, 211.

⁴³² Bassford and Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity.”

wrote that “When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces, we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical force: the moral element must also be considered.”⁴³³

The national will, then, can influence our national objectives in many ways. Its importance is that it is the sensing reason, justifying and confirming our physical efforts. “The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes.”⁴³⁴ It appears that regardless of physical effort or capability, the moral factor produces causes and effects which truly dictate our possibilities. “The moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.”⁴³⁵

National will, as an element of power, provides the framework for painting the American experience. While perception is a part of reality, a country’s will is something deeper and more enduring than image. It is more precious than military power, political power, or economic power. When military, political, or economic power fades, they can be recovered. When a national will fades, it is almost irretrievable.

The world is changing rapidly. American notions of the geopolitical structures of this lifetime are being fundamentally altered. The national will must accept the changes and recognize legitimate opportunities for leadership, if the U.S. is to stay the course. The real character of a nation is its will to persevere.

In the twenty-first century, as the elements of military power merge to essential equivalence, the nonmilitary actors of power become more important. The U.S. has the strength in the other elements of power. The U.S. must maintain its confidence to act in defense of its vital interests in what is now a highly fluid, dimensionally complex, multi-polar, and dangerous, world by judiciously employing U.S. instruments, or elements, of national power, individually and in combination, in ways consistent with American national will to achieve, maintain, and operationalize the strategic advantage.

⁴³³ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 97

⁴³⁴ Bassford and Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity.”

⁴³⁵ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 184-185.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

X. ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

The ultimate objective of basic U.S. national security policy and strategy is to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. in order to protect and advance the nation's core interests — ensuring the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation's (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation's economic (domestic and international) prosperity — and achieve and maintain the nation's core end state — provide enduring security for the American people. To be effective, the policy and strategy must align, synchronize, and balance both the courses of action (i.e., ways) and the capabilities of the instruments of national power (i.e., means or resources) to detect, deter and prevent, deny and disrupt, contain, and decisively defeat current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland while simultaneously maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and abroad in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the effects and consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur. To accomplish its goals, basic U.S. national security policy must be capable of achieving and sustaining the strategic advantage.

As stated previously in Chapter V, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. faces unprecedented challenges and opportunities. Secondly, globalization and the many “revolutions in technology” have done much to integrate the global community by dramatically shortening and expediting the ability of others to communicate, now nearly instantaneously, and process information to frame and shape, and sometimes corrupt, the operational environment.⁴³⁶ However, globalization has not reduced the amount of time required to mobilize, generate, and deploy resources distant from one's own border. Consequently, the need for overseas presence, and the concomitant ability to project actionable power, remains as great as ever.

⁴³⁶ Levin Institute, “A Student's Guide to Globalization,” State University of New York (2008) <http://www.globalization101.org> (accessed September 8, 2008).

While the nature of warfare will continue to be characterized as the violent clash of wills between nations or armed groups in the pursuit of advantageous political ends, the conduct of joint warfare includes both violent and nonviolent means. The successful and favorable resolution and termination of conflict will require employing all of the instruments of national power. Given this, conflict and warfare will most likely arise out of seemingly distant innocent crises characterized by deteriorating situations involving natural or man-made catastrophes leading to potential humanitarian, societal, or state instability and an increased likelihood of conflict. Preparing for and responding to these crises will continue to require the U.S. maintain elements of its military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power deployed and ready abroad in order to execute interagency mission operations associated with crisis resolution consistent with U.S. national interests and to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S.

What does this mean for U.S. basic national security policy and the national security establishment — the personnel, facilities, resources, and supporting infrastructures responsible for it — at home and abroad? First and foremost, departments and agencies responsible for formulating, implementing and executing, maintaining, and enhancing basic national security policy and strategy must emphasize the concepts of unity of purpose and effort⁴³⁷ and continue to engage, especially those resources stationed abroad, with allied, partner, adversaries, and competitor countries, even as the terms of these engagements grow more complex. Indeed, the number of programs operated out of U.S. overseas facilities and establishment (i.e., Embassies, Stations and Legation, and Geographic Combatant Command headquarters) is expanding.

According to Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, presence is defined as the state of being present, or of being within sight or call, or at hand; as opposed to absence.⁴³⁸ YourDictionary defines presence as the fact or condition of being present; existence,

⁴³⁷ Unity of Effort and Purpose is described as directing all actions toward a common purpose.

⁴³⁸ University of Chicago, "Presence," ARTFL Project; Webster Dictionary, 1913, University of Chicago, <http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=presence> (accessed September 8, 2008).

occurrence, or attendance at some place or in some thing.⁴³⁹ From the perspective of the purpose of this paper, the FreeDictionary provides the most relevant definition: the diplomatic, political, or military influence of a nation in a foreign country, especially as evidenced by the posting of its diplomats or its troops there.⁴⁴⁰

Interestingly enough, *The Joint Publications 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* does not include a definition of presence. However, *Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, clearly states that an extended U.S. presence will be required, post-termination, to conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state⁴⁴¹ and that, as a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives on terms favorable to the United States.⁴⁴² It can therefore be inferred from this entry that a U.S. presence is necessary prior to and during operations because presence demonstrates U.S. commitment, facilitates access, enhances deterrence, and supports the transition from peace to war and a return to peace once hostilities have ended on terms favorable to the U.S.

The U.S.’ ability to maintain and fully employ its military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic resources overseas enhances U.S. security and that of its partners, bolsters prosperity, and promotes democracy. This ability is commonly called “presence.”

In the context of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy, presence, especially forward military, informational (i.e., cultural), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence (overt, covert, and clandestine), financial, and economic presence, unequivocally demonstrates U.S. resolve and sets the conditions for stability and undeniable commitment to a cause. U.S. presence, government and private sector,

⁴³⁹ Your Dictionary, s.v. “Presence,” <http://www.yourdictionary.com/presence> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁴⁴⁰ Free Dictionary, s.v. “Presence,” Farlex, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/presence> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁴⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, vii.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, I-1.

creates a planning and future operational environment that is conducive to establishing and operationalizing information dominance, or knowledge superiority, (situational awareness of the common operating picture) and thus creating a strategic advantage.

Presence is therefore the ability to project actionable U.S. power and influence, the means by which the U.S. frames and shapes the international environment in ways favorable to the nation's interests and objectives. Presence is and has been a fundamental principle of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy since 1942, and perhaps as early as 1898. Ultimately, actionable influence and leverage is gained through the totality of the instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic – and underpinned by the strength of the nation's geographic and demographic position and its resources and/or access to resources.

Since the end of the Second World War, presence and power projection have been indispensable characteristics of the U.S. basic national security policy. Since the early 1990s, however, they have become a fundamental strategic concept in support of the President's *National Security Strategy of the United States* because the principal operational challenge facing the U.S. in this century so far is the requirement for early and continuous application of strategic responsiveness across the full spectrum of conflict, while simultaneously protecting against physical and asymmetric attacks targeting the continental U.S. (CONUS) and the global infrastructure that serves as its power-projection base.

Given this, the basis of the nation's post-Cold War strategic national security posture has been and remains based on selective, but actionable presence and power projection. Presence and power projection emphasize rapid mobilization, generation, and deployment of military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic resources to augment and enhance those already abroad in order to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. and to detect, deter and prevent, deny and disrupt, contain, and decisively defeat current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland while simultaneously

maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and abroad in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the effects and consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur.

The presence of U.S. national security resources overseas represents the actionable capabilities available to the U.S.; projection represents the operationalized capabilities of these U.S. instruments of national power.

The proactive nature of presence makes it conceptually well-suited to seize and exploit current opportunities and therefore influence the shape of the future international security environment with respect to protecting the American people and American interests. According to the most recent *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, these are:

- Avoiding a serious weakening the U.S. economy or undermining fundamental values and institutions;
- Defeating global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies and partners;
- Defending against and defeating weapons of mass destruction;
- Expanding economic liberty and prosperity and opportunities;
- Promoting free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development;
- Building and sustaining strong, flexible alliances; and
- Advancing human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals.⁴⁴³

Based on threat estimate provided by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the senior officials of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the national security challenges the United States will likely face at home and abroad in the next 15 to 20 years will require the departments and agencies (those holding permanent or occasional membership with the National and Homeland Security Councils or their derivative Policy

⁴⁴³ White House, *National Security Strategy*, iii.

Coordinating Committees) to recognize that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior — of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.⁴⁴⁴

Therefore, the opportunities to frame and shape the world environment are very possibly unique to this point in history. Given that the “tipping point” in the contemporary balance of power, the U.S.’ strengths, when combined with a posture of forward presence can operationalize U.S. influence which can shape the future concept and nature of conflict. If U.S. presence can exert the necessary influence it may be able to change how nations and non-state actors; the U.S., with the passage of time, has the opportunity to influence and change the behavior of the actors to produce a more stable international climate and decrease the possibility of protracted conflicts.

To prepare for and respond to a full spectrum of crises, which in today's intensely integrated and connected information-centric world develop much more quickly, precipitously, and aggressively, U.S. resources must be able to respond while in a posture of forward global engagement. The instruments of national power- military, informational — i.e., cultural, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence – overt, clandestine, and covert, financial, and economic – are key to power projection and is the ability to alert, mobilize, and deploy and operate anywhere in the world.

Because of the ambiguity and speed of the threats, and the compressed intelligence and decision making cycles times, facing the U.S., its allies and partners, and its adversaries and enemies, there is an overarching and compelling need for transcendent speed of action. Presence and power projection enable the U.S. national security establishment to achieve and operationalize the strategic advantage and subsequently

⁴⁴⁴Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture” (speech, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007) www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed September 20, 2008).

execute proactive, rather than reactive, operations to events in the pursuit of securing and sustaining core U.S. interests and frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S.

Presence, in addition to being the “leading edge” of the U.S.’ deterrence and containment capability since the mid-1950s, also provides the U.S. national security establishment with the ability to achieve and operationalize the strategic advantage⁴⁴⁵ and implement parallel operations — interagency operations that conducted simultaneously across the levels of conflict resolution and warfare — that allow for a higher level of integration and distributed operations — operations that conducted from dispersed locations across time and space to achieve the effects desired; frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. and decisively defeat the opponent as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. ability to establish and achieve, operationalize, and maintain the strategic advantage⁴⁴⁶ — which refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events — been based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and security. It was built on the following four foundations:

- Strategic deterrence and defense, which consisted of a credible nuclear deterrent composed of offensive and defensive capabilities;
- Forward presence, which consisted of military and non-military forces continually stationed or deployed worldwide;
- Crisis response, which was the ability to respond quickly to more than one regional crisis; and
- Reconstitution, which involved the ability to mobilize personnel, equipment, and the industrial base to regenerate and/or rebuild the strength and reach of the military and other instruments of national power and strength.

⁴⁴⁵ Bruce Berkowitz, *Strategic Advantage, Challengers, Competitors, and Threats to America's Future* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 2.

⁴⁴⁶ Berkowitz, *Strategic Advantage*, 2.

Presence, and therefore the ability to project actionable and operationalized power, is established and maintained by the U.S. country team. The country team is composed of the representative capabilities of the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power, and is headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission.⁴⁴⁷ The “country team” is the critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities all come together. The “country team” is the in-country nexus for creating and maintaining strategic partnerships based on communication and common goals and objectives.

The U.S. “country team” and its infrastructure overseas is the proverbial “tip of the spear” and the vanguard for establishing, achieving, advancing and enhancing, and sustaining and maintaining the objectives of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy by detecting, deterring and containing, denying and disrupting, and defeating the threats to U.S. core interests — ensuring physical (territorial and border) security, promoting of (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and ensuring economic (domestic and international) prosperity — distant from the U.S. homeland and before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S. At home, most, if not all, of the same partners support the same objectives by preparing for, protecting against, preventing when and where possible, responding to, and recovering from all disruptive events that may befall the United States and affect its core interests.

Presence makes it possible for the U.S. to:

- Selectively project its national power, influence, and leverage abroad.
- Promote regional stability by giving form and substance to U.S. bilateral and multilateral security commitments
- Prevent the development of power vacuums and instability

⁴⁴⁷ Robert B. Oakley, “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 47 (4th quarter 2007): 146, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i47/32.pdf (accessed September 25, 2008).

- Contribute to deterrence by demonstrating the U.S.’ determination and capability
- Position the U.S. to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S.
- Respond rapidly to crises and decisively resolve them
- Enhance the effectiveness of operations across the spectrum of conflict

Presence provides the U.S. with a foundation upon which to formulate and conduct security cooperation operations. The operations occur on a conflict spectrum that involves an imaginary tripwire. The purpose of presence is to limit American engagement to the near side of this tripwire, distant from the U.S. homeland and its critical infrastructures and key resources.⁴⁴⁸

Establishing and maintaining selective, but comprehensive, U.S. presence at home and abroad creates an environment favorable to two overarching strategic concepts — forward presence and knowledge superiority — and three operational concepts — shaping, framing, and controlling the operational environment, attacking the operational environment, and sustaining the operational environment. By combining the strategic and operational concepts, U.S. BNSP is better able to detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, and decisively defeat the threats to U.S. core interests — ensuring physical (territorial and border) security, promoting of (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and ensuring economic (domestic and international) prosperity — distant from the U.S. homeland and before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S.

Consequently, national security policy and decision makers, the leaders of the national security establishment, must ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort and purpose with their interagency and multinational partners. This is imperative with the advent of simultaneous, distributed, and parallel operations throughout a global operational environment and across the range of national security operations. They must also understand what specific conditions could result in mission

⁴⁴⁸ Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, “The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement,” American Enterprise Institute (2008) http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080611_CountryTeamReport.pdf (accessed September 20, 2008).

termination, as well as those that yield failure. Ideally, these major operations and campaigns should contribute to the attainment of established strategic objectives and desired end states⁴⁴⁹ in the most direct and efficient manner possible by seizing the initiative⁴⁵⁰, operationalizing the strategic advantage, and taking the offensive.⁴⁵¹

To optimize the United States' overseas presence posture, the departments and agencies (those departments and agencies holding permanent or occasional membership with the National and Homeland Security Councils or their derivative Policy Coordinating Committees) responsible for formulating, implementing and executing, maintaining, and enhancing basic national security policy and strategy must continually assess this posture to ensure it effectively and efficiently contributes to achieving U.S. national security objectives in various regions of the world. This means defining the right mix of permanently stationed "country team" forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily deployed forces and infrastructure, in each region and globally, to conduct the full range of operations.⁴⁵²

As stated in previously, the ability of the United States to achieve and maintain its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the U.S. government (USG) in employing all of the instruments of national power. They are the means or the resources the United States uses to apply its power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

449 End State is described as directing every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective that achieves intended strategic or operational outcomes.

450 Initiative is described as seizing, retaining, and exploiting opportunities to impose friendly will by establishing the terms and conditions of the action, and by forcing the adversary (if present) to react to them.

451 The purpose of an "offensive" action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by prudently concentrating the effects of the instruments of national power alone or in combination power at the right place and time to achieve decisive results.

452 White House, "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997," White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html> (accessed September 26, 2008).

Power projection⁴⁵³ is defined as the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. Effective power projection capabilities are largely dependent upon presence.

Since its independence, the United States has been a power projection nation; albeit predominantly a commercial and economic projector of power through the end of the Spanish-American War. Alone among the world's major powers, the United States today has a substantial overseas military presence, with enough capability in numerous strategically important parts of the world to make an actionable difference in normal day-to-day regional balances of power.⁴⁵⁴

Effective and efficient global power projection is the key to the flexibility demanded of U.S. forces and ultimately provides national leaders with more options in responding to potential crises and conflicts. Being able to project power allows the United States to shape, deter, and respond even when it has no permanent presence or limited infrastructure in a region. If necessary, it allows the United States to forcibly enter a theater or to create and protect forward operating bases.⁴⁵⁵

This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in executing its national security policy and its corresponding strategy. Any state able to direct its military forces outside the limited bounds of its territory might be said to have some level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries with a worldwide reach (or at least significantly broader than a state's immediate area).

⁴⁵³Joint Chief's of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).

⁴⁵⁴Michael O'Hanlon, *Unfinished Business U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2008) http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2008/06_military_ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf (accessed September 27, 2008).

⁴⁵⁵William S. Cohen, "U.S Forces," Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998) <http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr98/chap2.html> (accessed September 27, 2008).

Even states with sizable “hard” power (i.e., military and or economic) assets may only be able to exert limited regional influence so long as they lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale. Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the mobilization, generation, deployment, and sustainment and command, control, and direction of modern joint and combined arms military forces.

While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on “hard” power (i.e., military and or economic) assets, the developing theory of mobilizing, generating, deploying, and employing “soft power” (non-military and non-economic) notes that power projection does not necessarily have to involve the active use of military forces in armed hostilities and combat. Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses. The ability of a state to project its forces into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states’ behavior.

The foundation of executable national power projection, the operationalized presence, is the presence of robust and credible “expeditionary” military, informational (i.e., cultural and psychological, public and private), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence (overt, covert, and clandestine), financial, and economic resources — the “country team” — present where vital and important U.S. interests are most concentrated (i.e., selective extra hegemonic engagement).

Alone and in combination, they provide a security framework that is complementary that can build and sustain stability and favorably shape regions of interest favorably and advantageously to the U.S. and facilitate detecting, deterring and containing, denying and disrupting, and decisively defeating all manner of threats to the U.S., its core interests, and desired national end state distant from the U.S. homeland and before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S.

Framing and shaping the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. is a critically important goal, objective, and/or end state of U.S. national security. U.S. power projection facilitates advancing, achieving, and maintaining it employing effects-

based unified action to achieve objectives designed to shatter an adversary's political and military cohesion, will, and capacity for resistance quickly, decisively, and at lowest cost in lives and other resources; secure the U.S. homeland, critical infrastructures, key resources, and key strategic nodes; reduce the effectiveness of adversary asymmetric approaches while maintaining a relentless, forward operational pressure to preempt adversary efforts, strengths, and opportunities by maintaining continuous operational pressure against the adversary; and control the operational tempo and momentum across the levels of the operation.

The U.S. national security establishment accomplishes this by seeking, achieving, and maintaining full spectrum conflict dominance⁴⁵⁶ through unified action and the conduct of joint decisive operations, to synchronize all instruments of national and multinational power and apply appropriate capabilities to help supported or supporting agencies assess, contain, stabilize, manage, and resolve any situation to achieve the desired strategic and operational objectives and outcomes. By maintaining its instruments of national power in a global state of readiness (presence), the U.S. uses the global operational environment, the global battle space, to reach out (power projection) from the U.S. homeland and forward positions to the area of conflict or crisis to conduct operational level, joint decisive operations.

While the nature of war will continue to be characterized as the violent clash of wills between nations or armed groups to pursue advantageous political ends, the conduct of conflict resolution and warfare will include both violent and non-violent means. Future operations will be planned and executed by a scalable interagency force capable of timely global projection, assured access, and immediate employment for desired strategic and operational level objectives in joint decisive operations; and sustainable even in an austere environment for extended periods or in an area-denial environment.

The key feature threaded throughout this common interagency effort, is the overall capability for the interagency force, composed of resources drawn from the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial,

⁴⁵⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, "Foreword," in *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008).

and economic instruments of national power to successfully and effectively conduct operations to achieve and maintain full spectrum dominance across the range of operations, inclusive of robust support for U.S. national security efforts as necessary and directed. As state previously in this chapter, full spectrum conflict dominance is the decisive defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of operations through joint decisive operations.⁴⁵⁷

Joint decisive operations are the synergistic orchestration of joint and interagency force capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.⁴⁵⁸ It is the U.S. military's component of unified action and the homeland security community's concept of unified command or coordination.

The term "unified action"⁴⁵⁹ is a broad generic term referring to the broad scope of activities (including the synchronization and/or integration of the activities of all governmental and non-governmental departments and agencies) taking place within the U.S. national security establishment. Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multi-agency and multi-national planning and operations, and their supporting operations, to achieve unity of effort and purpose through unity of command⁴⁶⁰ in the operational area. Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

A new, but still contiguous with its predecessors, U.S. grand strategy has been emerging over the past decade, one that requires not only resources, but patience and commitment to the promotion of democracy and freedom abroad in face of a complex

⁴⁵⁷ Joint Staff, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2003) http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr_screen.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).

⁴⁵⁸ Joint Staff, *An Evolving Joint Perspective*.

⁴⁵⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*; and *Joint Operations*, 8.

⁴⁶⁰ The purpose of "unity of command" is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

threat environment. The acts of terror against the U.S. homeland exemplify the dangerous and uncertain strategic environment that will likely confront the United States in the future.

Increasing political, economic, ethnic, and religious divisions, the diffusion of power among hostile state and non-state actors, population growth and a scarcity of natural resources, and the proliferation of dangerous technologies and weaponry are dramatically increasing the range of threats to the U.S. homeland and the nation's global interests. These conditions are likely to endure and will both challenge and help shape the future joint force as it transforms. Evolving trends within the strategic and operational environments can be identified that both underscore the need for change and form the backdrop against which the Armed Forces of the United States will undergo transformation while conducting a broad range of military operations in the twenty-first century.

Within this strategic environment, the United States will continue to have extensive and diverse global interests and commitments requiring sustainment of the instruments of national power to protect and advance them. Religious extremism and intolerance, failing and failed states, competition over natural resources and greater economic disparity among populations will all be growing problems and potential adversaries will have greater access to a global commercial, industrial, and informational base, providing them with niche capabilities intended to impede or defeat the capabilities or will of the U.S. This will accelerate and enhance the appeal of asymmetric approaches that avoid U.S. strengths and opportunities and instead attack U.S. weaknesses (vulnerabilities) and challenges. Therefore, the potential for major war, with overlapping regional conflicts or crises, will not abate.

The U.S. operational environment, the "battle space," will be global and extend from the U.S. homeland and will include external asymmetric threats that will require renewed vigilance and a focus on homeland security. Mobilizing, generating, and employing the instruments of national power, alone and in combination, will continue to rely heavily upon coordination and synchronization with interagency and multinational partners. Although the U.S. will retain the capacity to intervene preemptively and

unilaterally, the U.S. will usually operate within a coalition of like-minded powers and actors as the rapid urbanization and population concentration will continue to change the physical and political makeup of nations and as a blending and compression of the levels of warfare — strategic, operational, and tactical — will increasingly result in tactical actions with strategic consequences.

National military capabilities and power continue to be, and will continue to be, key arbiters and requirements for great power status. However, the current threat environment, which includes a plethora of threats and threat vectors, demands that a nation, in order to be a serious and influential actor on the international stage, must possess not only sufficient military capability, it also must be able to project this capability beyond its borders in combination with its other, non-military, instruments of national power.

The end (marked by the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on December 25, 1991) of the Cold War and the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania served as bookends for the current generation of strategists, policy and decision makers, leaders and commanders, scholars and academics, and politicians and for two radically different approaches to U.S. basic national security policy and strategy. During this decade, U.S. strategists, policy and decision makers, leaders and commanders, scholars and academics, and politicians grappled with transitioning from the focused strategy of deterring and containing communism to a broad, effective strategy able to confront a wide range of potential conflicts — the majority of which involve nations and non-state actors, especially radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political power — anywhere in the world.

Events after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have shown the need for transformed alliances and partnerships (i.e., NATO), to include a deployed U.S. presence and a robust U.S. ability to initiate and execute power projection operations, that are capable of a wide range of missions, including projecting stability around the periphery of the operational environment or treaty theater of operations,

intervening in civil conflicts, coordinating power-projection operations, and countering weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, deployed resources should be ready for expeditionary operations to shape behaviors and expectations in operational environment or theater of operations and for responding to challenges in and around operational environment or theater of operations.

However, the contemporary “ full spectrum of conflict” dictates that all of the capabilities and strengths resident in and represented by the U.S.’ instruments of national power — geographic, natural resources, demographic, military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic and the aggregate national will — be integrated in order to for the U.S. to detect, deter and contain, discredit and delegitimize, deny and disrupt, and defeat all manners of adversaries. U.S. adversaries are fortunately not always present in the U.S. Consequently, as President George W. Bush said on June 1, 2002, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”⁴⁶¹ The U.S. must be able to, if necessary, fight and win a global war against a formidable enemy. The aggregated employment of the combined capabilities of all of the U.S.’ instruments of national power must be able to be mobilized, generated, and deployed forward into the theater of operations to be effective.

Presence and power projection allow the U.S. to concentrate the effects of its military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national power in multiple dimensions from dispersed locations at critical points and times, while allocating minimum essential power to secondary efforts that are necessary to preserve freedom of action and maneuver. The purpose of “maneuver” is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of power.

⁴⁶¹ White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” White House, (June 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (accessed August 15, 2008).

In the contemporary threat environment, presence and power projection capabilities facilitate achieving success by permitting the “maneuvering force”⁴⁶² to take offensive action, seize and maintain the initiative, control the tempo of operations, and apply capabilities effectively within its operational environment in order to overwhelm an opponent at related critical points distant from the U.S. homeland. Controlling and dictating the tempo of operations⁴⁶³ can transform limited successes in the operational environment into a rapidly cascading decline in adversary will and capability.

As stated previously, since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. ability to establish and achieve, operationalize, and maintain the strategic advantage has been based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and security.

To achieve these two objectives, U.S. BNSP and strategy has, since the end of the Second World War, defined three components: (1) peacetime engagement, to include presence, which was the broad range of non-combat activities to promote democracy, relieve suffering, and enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, which ranged from conflict’s high end represented by nuclear deterrence to conflict’s low end represented by peace enforcement to restore stability, security, and international law; and (3) fight and win two major regional contingencies. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued in May 2002 a revised Defense Planning Guidance⁴⁶⁴ that placed greater emphasis on a new, but thoroughly traditional, strategic concept,

⁴⁶² Joint maneuver is described as employing joint and multi-agency capabilities to gain and exploit positional advantage throughout the operational environment in order to generate the effects desired to facilitate achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

⁴⁶³ Tempo is described as establishing and controlling the timing, cycle, sequence, reach, and intensity of an operation to best exploit friendly capabilities against adversaries and situations.

⁴⁶⁴ The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) contains defense strategy and the guidance for key planning and programming priorities to execute that strategy. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) places responsibility and authority for program execution with the Services and other DoD components but maintains central direction. Serving this central purpose, the DPG presents the SECDEF’s strategic plan for developing and employing future forces. Prepared by OSD and published by 1 October in the odd year, the DPG is a principal product of OSD planning. It reflects military advice and information recommended by the CJCS; service long-range plans and positions on policy and other matters advanced by Service Secretaries; and CINC appraisals of major issues and problems bearing on command missions. By promulgating the Defense Planning Guidance document, the Secretary of Defense increased his authority over the development of programs and budgets. However, the practice of publishing a new document annually denies DoD components needed planning stability (Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, 1992).

forward deterrence, that is, a commitment to proactively and preemptively detecting, denying and disrupting, containing and controlling, attacking, and decisively defeating potential threats overseas.

This revised guidance led to the articulation of a deterrence policy based the concept of “layered defense,” which in itself is founded on the principles of presence and power projection. Specifically, this active, layered defense is understood to be global, seamlessly integrating U.S. capabilities (i.e., the MIDLIFE instruments of national power) in the foreign regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the United States. In short, it is defense in depth predicated on viewing the strategic environment as an open system in which people, trade, and information move continuously and for which the entire U.S. government contributes to its defense through a variety of capabilities in a synchronized manner.

For an active, layered defense to be effective, it “requires superior intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis (i.e., information dominance and superiority and the strategic advantage), calculated deterrence of enemies, a layered system of mutually supporting defensive measures that are neither ad hoc nor passive, and the capability to mass and focus sufficient war fighting assets to defeat any attack.”⁴⁶⁵ Although the concept of an active, layered defense had a global context, the strategy must now be focused primarily on the U.S. homeland and the approaches to U.S. territory.⁴⁶⁶

In closing and transitioning to the conclusion, therein lies the critical nexus of national security. The critical nexus is that the use of national power is the employment of all of the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives in peace and war to further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s three core interests — physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity, and provide for the enduring security of the American people.

⁴⁶⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2004) www.dtic.mil/jointvision/sd_joc_v1.doc (accessed August 15, 2008).

⁴⁶⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2005), 1, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf> (accessed August 15, 2008).

Basic national security policy and strategy intrinsically and inherently includes national defense, homeland defense, homeland security, national preparedness, emergency management, and the collaborative capabilities of all of the instruments of national power. It is focused on a must be capable of detecting, deterring and preventing, disrupting and denying, containing, and decisively defeating current and emerging threats to the nation's survival, vital, and important interests distant from the U.S. homeland while simultaneously maintaining the highest state of readiness in preparation to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from any disruptive event that could effect the homeland and the core national survival interests.

In order for the U.S. to consistently achieve, maintain, and operationalize the strategic advantage, the artificial walls must be eliminated, and the U.S. must formulate a multi-disciplinary national security policy and strategy that is intentional; iterative; offensively oriented through forward presence and power projection capabilities, but not necessarily preemptive, aggressive, and antagonistic; predicated on annihilation and eradication; and asymmetric.

XI. CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated that national security is a collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. A basic national security policy (BNSP) and its associated strategy uses the instruments of national power⁴⁶⁷ — all of the resources or means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives — in peace and war to further a strategic vision of America's role in the world that will best achieve the nation's three core interests — physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity. A BNSP balances the ends, ways, and means to protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power.

U.S. basic national security policy (BNSP) is a discipline pattern of government decisions and corresponding actions that is intended to counter perceived threats to the nation's interests, especially the nation's core survival, vital, and important interests. Because politics are an inherent component of policy, especially in a representative democracy with enumerated powers and prerogatives, politics, which is essentially a clash of current perceptions and future visions, cannot be separated from policy.

Therefore, U.S. BNSP is the sum (Σ) of history; prior decisions; actors; laws, rules, regulations, and authorities; and actions and reactions over time. The executive branch's national security establishment, in partnership with the legislative branch, determines and defines the survival, vital, and important national interests; determines and defines the domestic and foreign threats to those interests; and develops and implements actions (i.e., courses of action or ways), using the resources (i.e., means or capabilities) resident in the instruments of national power to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats.

⁴⁶⁷ Geographic, natural resource, and population/demographics; military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE); and the national will.

National power is the capacity to influence the decisions and actions of other actors favorable to the U.S. National power is exerted through the instruments of elements of national power. Although national power has both domestic and foreign components and applications, the core purpose of the application of national power is to create and maintain conditions favorable to the nation's core interests and end state.

Stripped to its essence, the problem posed at the onset of this thesis is the practical application of the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means. Strategy is a coherent expression of a process, a course of action, that identifies the ends, ways, and means designed to achieve a certain goal.

Mathematically, this relationship can be expressed as “Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means.”

Ends, or end state, are the objectives or desired outcomes of a given strategy. In this thesis, the end state is ensuring the enduring security of the American people by achieving and maintaining the three core survival interests of the U.S.: physical (territorial and border) security, (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and economic (domestic and international) prosperity.

Ways are actions. They comprise the methods and processes executed to achieve the ends. More simply, ways, or courses of action, answer the question of how the end state will be achieved and maintained – proactive/reactive, offensive/defensive, unilateral/multilateral, realism-neorealism/liberalism-neoliberalism, global hegemony, extra regional hegemony, off-shore balancer, isolationist, etc.

Means are the resources required to execute the way. Means are composed of and represented by the instruments of national power; geographic, natural resource, and population/demographics; military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE); and the national will. The means or resources can also be described as *centers of gravity* — primary sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance and/or *critical capabilities* — primary abilities which merit a center of gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation, or mission.

There is a constant need to balance ends, ways, and means. Achieving this can be likened to a three-legged stool with the stool itself representing the strategy. A strategy is balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (course of action) is capable and has sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end (objective).

However, if either the leg representing the ways (courses of action) or means (resources) is too short (due to inadequacies), or the leg representing the end state (the goals are unrealistic) is too long, the strategy is out of balance, and the risk is high. The likelihood of success is reduced. Therefore, the objective is to minimize, or ideally eliminate, the *critical vulnerabilities* — critical requirements or components thereof which are either deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner that achieves decisive results. *Critical requirements* are essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operative.

To bring the strategy back into balance, the legs must be adjusted; for example, desired ends can be scaled back to fit within the available means or resources, and the means or resources can be increased to more fully support the selected way(s). When the means or resources are inadequate, planners must consider alternative ways consistent with the desired end state and mission analysis. Because all of these “balancing” choices are strategic decisions, the balancing act is the heart of strategic art.

Based on the literature, the principal nexus of the definitions of national security, homeland security, and national defense is defending and securing the homeland and ensuring the enduring sovereignty of the government and people of the United States. The secondary nexus is that only by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power can the United States achieve and maintain its core interests by framing and shaping the international environment in ways favorable to the nation’s desired end state. The third and final nexus is the ever-changing international environment.

The research amply demonstrated that there has been continuity in change. The literature showed that although many of the variables — the threat, the global community

and international environment, domestic political demographics, and the domestic political balance of power — have certainly changed and evolved over not only over the past two decades, but over the whole period of the nation’s 232 years of independence. It is certain that these variables will continue to change and evolve and challenge the national security establishment’s community of strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians — all practitioners, of the art and science of strategy and international relations theory — in the future.

However, the literature concurrently showed that the nation’s core interests — ensuring the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and international) prosperity — and the core end state — protect, preserve, and promote the American political, economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people — have not changed. The literature also demonstrated that the resources (means) available – the instruments of national power – to the nation’s leadership in peace and in war, although they have most certainly evolved in terms of applicability and capability, have not changed.

The element of the equation that has changed has been the course of action (ways) that U.S. exerts the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power to achieve and maintain its core interests by framing and shaping the international environment in ways favorable to the nation’s desired end state.

The research and literature demonstrated that the U.S. has artificially, and unintentionally, compartmented the natural alignment and synchronization of the nation’s instruments of national power. This artificiality must be eliminated if the U.S. is to craft a BNSP capable of achieving and sustaining its unchanging and immutable core interests and end state.

The U.S.’ national security is best served by a BNSP that is focused on the “25 meter target.” The “25 meter target” emphasizes the longer term continuum of U.S. national security interests. Although the U.S. must remain capable of “putting out brush

fires” on its national security periphery, it must focus on building, achieving, and maintaining a BNSP capable of ensuring the achievement and maintenance of its three core interests and its core end state.

First, U.S. BNSP must be strategy of intent. Strategies by intent are those developed primarily through the rational consideration of options (ways or courses of action) and their likely implications (risks versus gains and costs versus benefits). It cannot adopt a BNSP and strategy by default because strategies by default are determined primarily by ideologies or by unconscious assumptions and prejudices that prevent strategists from considering all options.

Secondly, U.S. BNSP must be iterative (i.e., experiential, situational, environmental, and contextual). Iterative strategies are not fixed: They can be changed and improved, usually on the basis of experience. Learning by experience in war, however, is highly dependent on the famous “OODA Loop,” the iterative cycle of observing, orienting, deciding, and acting and are designed not so much to solve a class of problem as to reliably gain time to find an appropriate, more specific solution. An iterative strategy ensures freedom of action and maximizes U.S. success on the average and over the long run: the “25 meter target.” Because there is no one specific threat in today’s global environment, the U.S. should not adopt a tailored BNSP and strategy, which are built to address a solitary community of problems.

Thirdly, U.S. BNSP must be an offensive — but not necessarily preemptive, aggressive, and antagonistic — strategy that employs its strengths to exploit enemy/adversary weaknesses and vulnerabilities, create parallel and sequential opportunities, and overcome challenges by establishing and maintaining the strategic advantage through information dominance and superiority and operational maneuver. An offensive BNSP and strategy creates a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity in the mindset of the enemy/adversary and facilitates the implementation of a strategy of annihilation.

Fourth, U.S. BNSP must be one of annihilation (i.e., complete and utter incapacitation, unconditional surrender). U.S. BNSP and strategy must seek to eliminate the enemy’s/adversary’s ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus

leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will (however limited or however extreme U.S. ultimate intentions may be). Any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must require that the effects of U.S. victory be such as to preclude the enemy from reopening the conflict after such mobilization. That is, victory, even if limited, must remove the source of the enemy's potential superiority.

Fifth, U.S. BNSP must be asymmetric because the U.S. has no genuine peer competitors at present and it is unlikely that a genuine peer competitor will arise in the foreseeable future. Most importantly, the U.S.' current and projected enemies and adversaries are most certainly not peer or near peer competitors and rivals. An asymmetrical strategy is one that attempts to apply one category of means against another category, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively respond in kind.

Therefore, in order for the U.S. to create and successfully operationally employ a BNSP and strategy, especially one that emphasizes asymmetry, intent, annihilation, and the superiority and necessity of the offense, including seizing and maintaining the strategic advantage and freedom of action, it must focus on a BNSP and strategy that focuses on its ability to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, and discredit and delegitimize enemy/adversary actions through the measured and commensurate application of swift, precisely targeted, and devastating retaliatory reprisals — through any one of, any combination of, or all of the instruments of national power — without warning. The retaliatory action must demonstrate that costs and risks of future action far outweigh the benefits and gains and that the objective of the U.S. is to eliminate the enemy's/adversary's ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will.

Therefore, as articulated many times in this thesis, the central aim of U.S. BNSP and its operational COA must be to achieve and maintain the core national interests — ensure the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation's (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation's economic (domestic and international) prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power in peace and in war.

To accomplish this task, U.S. BNSP must dispose of the artificial walls that currently separate its foundations and realign and resynchronize the capabilities resident in its instruments of national power. Doing so will enable the U.S. to achieve, maintain and sustain, and operationalize the strategic advantage.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Albertini, Luigi. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. New York: Enigma Books, 1952.
- Allison, Graham T., Dimitri K. Simes, and James Thomson. "America's National Interests: A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests, 2000." Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000. Belfer Center, http://Belfercenter.Ksg.Harvard.Edu/Publication/2058/Americas_National_Interests.Html (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Anthony, Jay, ed. *The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Art, Robert J. *A Grand Strategy for America*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- ASIS International. "Security Disciplines." 2008 <http://www.asisonline.org/careercenter/careerdisc.xml> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Atkinson, Rick. *The Day of Battle; The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007.
- Au, Ka-Neng, ed. *The Causes and Consequences of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Newark, NJ: Rutgers, 2006.
- Auchincloss, Louis. *Woodrow Wilson*. New York: Viking Group, 2000.
- Aviation Security. Public Law 107-71. 107th Congress. Stat. 597. Title 1 (2001): 115. Government Printing Office. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ071.107 (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Baldwin, David A. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Bartholomees, Jr., J. Boone. Ed. *National Security Policy and Strategy*. Vol. 2. 3rd ed., rev. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008. Strategic Institute. www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub871.pdf (accessed September 11, 2008).
- . "Theory of Victory." *Parameters* (Summer 2008): 25-36. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/08summer/bartholo.htm> (accessed October 2008).

- Bassani, Jr., Joseph A. "Saving the World for Democracy — An Historical Analysis of America's Grand Strategy in the 21st Century." Storming Media. 2005.
<http://www.stormingmedia.us/85/8566/A856634.html>.
- Bassford, Christopher. "Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy." 2006.
<http://www.clausewitz.com/StrategyBook/WholeThing.html> (accessed September 6, 2008).
- Bassford, Christopher and Edward J. Villacres. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity." *Parameters* (Autumn 1995)
<http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Trinity/TRININTR.htm/> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Beavis, Mark. "The IR Theory Knowledge Base." IR Theory Website. 2007.
<http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm> (accessed December 28, 2007).
- Bellavita, Christopher. "Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?" *Homeland Security Affairs Journal* 4, no. 2 (June 2008)
<http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- . "Introduction to Homeland Security." Classroom lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007.
- Bergen, Peter and Laurie Garrett. *Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Beringer, Richard E. *Why the South Lost the Civil War*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991.
- Berkowitz, Bruce. *Strategic Advantage, Challengers, Competitors, and Threats to America's Future*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008.
- Binnendijk, Hans and Patrick, L. Clawson. "Tuning the Instruments of National Power." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1995-1996)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2010.pdf. (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Blackwill, Robert D. A. "Taxonomy for Defining US National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond." In *Europe in Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe*. Edited by Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning. Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1993.
- Blouet, Brian W. *Halford Mackinder: A Biography* College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.

- Boucoyannis, Deborah. "Balance of Power: The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea." Presentation, annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, March 17, 2004.
- Boyd, Dallas, Lewis A. Dunn, James Scouras and Jonathan Fox. *Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency*. ASCO Report No. 2008 07. Washington, D.C.: Office Defense Threat Reduction Agency, June 2008. <http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/4287> (accessed September 11, 2008).
- Boyd, John. "The Patterns of Conflict." Edited by Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney. *Defense and the National Interest*. January 2007. www.d-n-i.net/boyd/patterns.ppt (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Brainy Media. "Definition of War." Brainy Quote. 2008. <http://www.brainyquote.com/words/wa/war238447.html> (accessed September 8, 2008)
- Brannan, David and Anders Strinberg. "The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security." Lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007.
- Brinkerhoff, John R. "The Emergency Preparedness Mobilization Board." Homeland Security Institute. October 2001. http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_Oct01.htm (03 October 2008).
- . "The Strategic Implications of Industrial Preparedness." *Parameters* (Summer 1994): 38-47, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/1994/brinker.htm> (accessed September 19, 2008).
- Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: MacMillan and Sons, 1973.
- Bryson, John M. *Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons, 2006.
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2003*. U.S. Department of State (March 2004). <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29915.htm> (accessed September 16, 2008).

- Bush, George. "Second Inaugural Address." Address given in Washington, D.C, January 20, 2005. Inaugural Addresses of Presidents. <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres67.html>.
- Campbell, Kurt and Michael O'Hanlon. *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- Center for Naval Analysis. "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change." CNA Corporation. 2007. <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf> (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Cerami, Joseph R. and James F. Holcomb Jr., eds. *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/00354.pdf> (01 September 2008).
- Chertoff, Michael. *Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HSTA)*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2007.
- Chilcoat, Richard A. "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for Twenty-First Century Strategists." In *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. Edited by Joseph R Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.
- Civil War Talk. "Civil War Quotations." Civil War Talk. <http://civilwartalk.com/forums/civil-war-quotations/19858-lee-robert-e.html> (accessed August 22, 2008).
- Clinton, William J. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." National Security Council (May 1997) <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy> (accessed June 2008).
- Cohen, William S. "U.S. Forces." *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998. <http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr98/chap2.html> (accessed September 27, 2008).
- Collins, John M. *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973.

- Collins, Kevin A. "National Will: Achilles Heel in United States National Strategy." Research report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1990. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA234908&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008).
- Congress of the United States. *The Constitution of the United States of America*. Philadelphia, PA: Congress 1787.
- Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1988.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. "Winning the War on Terrorism: The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy." Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2006. http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3490/type,1/ (accessed August 15, 2008).
- Coulombis, Theodore A. and James H Wolfe. *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1982.
- Cragin, Kim and Scott Gerwehr. *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 2006.
- Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Crowl, Philip A. "Alfred Thayer Mahan: 'The Naval Historian.'" In *Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Edited Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1986.
- Dahl, Robert and Bruce Stinebrickner. *Modern Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976.
- Director of National intelligence. *Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.
- Disbrow, Lisa, S. "Decision Superiority: Transforming National Security Decision-Making." Washington, D.C.: National War College, 2002. <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA441507> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Doll, William J. "Parsing the Future: A Frame of Reference to Scenario Building." Unpublished paper, Dahlgren, VA: Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 2005.

- Donald, David Herbert. *Why the North Won the Civil War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Dorff, Robert H. "A Primer in Strategy Development." In *U.S. Army War College Guide Strategy*. Edited Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001.
- Dorman, Andrew, Mike L. Smith, and Matthew R.H. Uttley. *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*. London, U.K.: MacMillan Press, 1999.
- Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*. 5th ed. New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, Harper and Row Publishers, 2001.
- Doyle, Charles. "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary." Federation of American Scientists. 1996. www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (accessed September 25, 2008).
- Drew, Dennis M. and Donald M. Snow. *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Process and Problems*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988.
- Dunne, Timothy. "The Social Construction of International Society." *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 3 (1995): 367-389.
- Earle, Edward Mead. "Political and Military Strategy for the United States." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 19, no. 2, (Jan., 1941):2-9.
- Earle, Edward Mead, Gordon Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Population Change and National Security." *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1991). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19910601faessay6092/nicholas-eberstadt/population-change-and-national-security.html> (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Energy Information Administration. "Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries." September 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html (accessed September 19, 2008).

- Etzold, Thomas, H. "Is Mahan Still Valid?" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (August 1980): 38
- Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books, 1998.
- Executive Order no. 12,333. United States Intelligence Activities (1981).
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/amended12333.pdf>
 (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Financial Action Task Force. "Terrorist Financing." Financial Action Task Force.2008.
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, "USA PATRIOT Act," Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html (accessed September 25, 2008).
- Fingar, Thomas. "Security Threats to the United States." Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C. February 16, 2005. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/42445.htm> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Finnemore, Martha. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." In *Conflict after the Cold War*, 2nd ed. Edited by Richard K. Betts. New York: Longman Publishers, 2002.
- "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation." President of Russia, Official Web Portal. July 2008. <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml> (accessed September 6, 2008).
- Friedman, George. "The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy." Geopolitical Intelligence Report. Stratfor (September 2, 2008)
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy
 (accessed September 6, 2008).
- Friend, Celeste. "Social Contract Theory." The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Tennessee Martin. 2006. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont.htm#H2> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Foster, Gregory D. "A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy." *Washington Quarterly*. Winter, 1990.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1993.

- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Gamble, Andrew. "Hegemony and Decline: Britain and the United States." In *Two Hegemonies: Britain, 1846–1914, and the United States, 1941–2001*. Edited by Patrick Karl O'Brien, and Armand Clesse, 130. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002.
- Garraghan, Gilbert J. *A Guide to Historical Method*. Edited by Jean Delanglez. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1946.
- Gates, Robert. "Landon Lecture." Speech, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007. www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed September 20, 2008).
- Gilbert, Martin. *The Second World War: A Complete History*. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Gough, Barry M. "Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power." *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (Winter 1988): 56.
- Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Griffin, Christopher and Thomas Donnelly. "The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement." American Enterprise Institute. 2008. http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080611_CountryTeamReport.pdf (accessed September 20, 2008).
- Interagency Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS). "Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World. <http://www.iooss.gov/> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Haas, Mark L., "Ideological Consensus and Balance of Power: Neo-Classical Realism and the Importance of Ideological Consensus in International Relations." All Academic Research. 2006. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/1/6/3/pages/151632/p151632-2.php (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Haneburg, William. "Natural resources and National Security." Espionage Information: Mo-Ne. Advameg, Inc. 2008. <http://www.espionageinfo.com/Mo-Ne/Natural-Resources-and-National-Security.html> (accessed October 3, 2008).

- Hart, Basil H. Liddell. *The British Way in Warfare*. London: Faber and Faber, 1932.
- . *The Ghost of Napoleon*. London: Faber and Faber, 1933.
- . *Strategy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Hartmann, Frederick H. *The Relations of Nations*. 5th ed. New York: Macmillan, 1978.
- Hattaway, Herman and Archer Jones. *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*. Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991.
- Hattendorf, John. "The Caird Lecture, 2000: The Anglo-French Naval Wars (1689-1815) in Twentieth Century Naval Thought." *Journal for Maritime Research* (2000).
<http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/conJmrArticle.30/viewPage/2> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Hayes, Carlton J.H. *The Rise of Modern Europe: A Generation of Materialism — 1871-1900*. New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1941.
- Heinl, Jr., Robert Debs. *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Capital: 1848-1875*. New York, NY: New American Library, 1978.
- . *The Age of Revolution: 1798-1848*. New York: New American Library, 1962.
- Howe, Daniel Walker, "What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848." In *Oxford History of the United States* ed. David Kennedy and Comer Vann Woodward. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
- . "The Lonely Superpower." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999).
- Hyten, John E. "Other Instruments of National Power." *A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space*. 2000.
<http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Ikenberry, John G. and Charles A. Kupchan. "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power." n *World Leadership and Hegemony*. Edited David P. Rapkin, 52. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990.

- Institute for National Strategic Studies. "Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 96 (Winter 1995-96): 49.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2710.pdf (accessed September 25, 2008).
- Jablonsky, David. "The State of the National Security State." In *U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War*. Edited David Jablonsky, Ronald Steel, Lawrence Korb, Morton H. Halperin, and Robert Ellsworth. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997.
- . "National Power." *Parameters* (Spring 1997)
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97spring/jablonsk.htm> (01 September 2008).
- . *Why Is Strategy Difficult?* Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- Jackson, Robert and George Sorensen. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Jarboe, James F. "The Threat of Eco-Terrorism." Testimony to the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, Washington, D.C., February 12, 2002. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.
- Jervis Robert. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Jomini, Antoine. *The Art of War*. Translated by Charles Messenger (Mechanicsburg, PA Stackpole Books, 1996).
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*. Joint Electronic Library.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_encyclopedia.htm, (accessed September 8, 2008).
- . *Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp0_2.pdf (accessed September 10, 2008).
- . *Joint Publication 1-0: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).

- . *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Joint Electronic Library. April 2001.
- . *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_0.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).
- . *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
- . *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008).
- . *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm> (accessed September 12, 2008).
- . *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004. www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Joint Staff. *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2003. http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr_screen.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Jones, Richard Wyn, ed. *Critical Theory and World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2001.
- Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki. "How Terrorist Groups End Lessons For Countering Al Qa'ida." RAND Research Brief. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/rb9351/index1.html (August 2008).
- Jones, Walter S. *The Logic of International Relations*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985.
- Kahn, Herman. *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.
- Kaplan, Fred. *The Wizards of Armageddon*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
- Kegley Jr., Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 11th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2006.

- Keegan, John. *The Second World War*. New York: Penguin Publishers, 2005.
- Keeley, Lawrence H. *War before Civilization*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977.
- . *Power and Interdependence*. 3rd. ed. London, U.K.: Longman (Pearson) Publishing, 2000.
- Kettle Creek Corporation. “The OODA ‘Loop’ Sketch.” Defense and the National Interest. March 2006. www.d-n-i.net/boyd/boyds_ooda_loop.ppt (19 September 2008).
- Klein, John J. “Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory.” *Naval War College Review* 57 no. 1, (Winter 2004).
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w04.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Kremerling, Garth. “Social Contract Theory.” Philosophy Pages. 2002.
<http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s7.htm> (19 September 2008).
- Lambert, Andrew. Review of *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* by Roger J.B. Knight. 2000. Institute of Historical Research.
<http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/knight.html> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Lawson, Ruth C. and Vincent Ferraro. “Theory of Hegemonic Stability.” Lecture, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, 2008.
- Layne, Christopher. *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment.” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7–41, Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.7> (accessed June 15, 2008).

- Leiter, Michael. "Looming Challenges in the War on Terror." Presented to the Washington Institute, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2008.
http://74.125.95.104/custom?q=cache:Px2NK9u2yQkJ:www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/wash-inst-written-sfr-final.pdf+nctc+threat+assessment&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us&client=pub-1415334591037307 (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Levin Institute. "A Student's Guide to Globalization." State University of New York. 2008. <http://www.globalization101.org> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Linklater, Andrew and Hidemi Suganami. *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*. Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Limberg, Daniel. *Army Transformation: Its Long-Term Ability to Support the National Security Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil401.pdf>. (accessed September 2008).
- Litton, Leonard G. "Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War." *Air and Space Power Journal* (September 6, 2000).
<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Litton.html> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Lloyd, Susan and Sharon Sreedhar. "Hobbes' Moral and Political Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Lord, Carnes. "Strategy and Organization at the National Level." In *Grand Strategy and the Decision-making Process*. Edited by James C. Gaston. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.
- Luttwak, Edward N. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Macfarlane, Alan. "Thomas Malthus and the Making of the Modern World." 2008.
www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/Malthus_final.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Mackinder, Halford J. *Britain and the British Seas*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*. Annapolis, MD, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001.

- Manwaring, Max G., Edwin G., Corr, and Robert H. Dorff. Eds. *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- “Massive Retaliatory Power.” *Time*. January 25, 1954.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823199,00.html?iid=digg_share
 re (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Mauil, Hanss, “W. Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990/91). Council on Foreign Relations.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19901201faessay6053/hanns-w-mauil/germany-and-japan-the-new-civilian-powers.html> (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Mazarr, Michael J. “Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A ‘Leapfrog’ Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy.” In *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*. Edited by David S. Alberts and Thomas J Czerwinski. National Defense University. April 2003. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/complexity,%20global%20politics%20and%20nat'l%20sec%20-%20sept%2098/index.html> (accessed December 2007).
- McCausland, Jeffrey D. *Developing Strategic Leaders for the Twenty-First Century*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=839>
 (accessed September 19 2008).
- McConnell, Michael. *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007. Senate Armed Services Committee. July 2007. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/February/McConnell%2002-27-07.pdf> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- McConnell, J. Michael. *United States Intelligence Community, 500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration*. Office of Director of National Intelligence. October 2007.
<http://www.dni.gov/500-day-plan.pdf>. (accessed December 29, 2007).
- McLean, Iain. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
- Merli, Frank V. and Theodore A. Wilson, eds. *Makers of American Diplomacy*. Vols 1 and 2. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1974.
<http://faculty.ncwc.edu/TOConnor/430/430lect03.htm> (accessed December 28, 2007).

- Mills, John R., "All Elements of National Power: Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War." *Strategic Insights* 5 no. 6 (July 2006). Center for Contemporary Conflict.
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/jul/millsjul06.asp> (16 September 2008).
- Miskel, James F. "National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases." *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2002): 9. Navy War College.
<https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%2520War%2520College%2520Review/2003/Index%2520of%2520vol%252055%2520Winter%25202003.pdf>+Miskel,+James+F.+(2002).+National+Interests:+Grand+Purposes+or+Catchphrases&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us&client=pub-1415334591037307 (accessed September 15, 2008).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
- Moregenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. Rev. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.
- Moregenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations*. Brief ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992.
- Mueller, John. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. Jackson, TN: Basic Books, 1989.
- Mueller, III, Robert S. Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2007.
<http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/mueller011107.htm> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Murray, Williamson and Mark Grimsley. *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Nagl, John A. "Asymmetric Threat to U.S. National Security to the Year 2010." Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA396933&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed August 12, 2008).
- Nation, R. Craig. "Contrasting Images of U.S. Grand Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings*. Vol. 1. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 46.

- National Defense University. "Diplomacy." *Strategic Assessments '96: Instruments of U.S. Power*, National Defense University.
www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa96/sa96ch02.html (accessed September 15, 2001).
- Needham, William. "Mahan." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1993): 44
- Nesbitt, Ian Russell. "The Instrument-Element Model: A Grand Strategic Model for War." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: 2005.
<http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439612&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf/> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Neuchterlein, Donald E. *United States National Interests in a Changing World*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1973.
- Nichiporuk, Brian. *The Security Dimensions of Demographic Factors*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Rand Corporation.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1088/MR1088.chap2.html (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Nickols, Fred. "Strategy: Definitions and Meaning." Distance Consulting. 2000.
http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_definition.htm (07 September 2008).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Jackson, TN: Public Affairs, 2004.
- Oakley, Robert B. "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 47 (4th quarter 2007): 146.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i47/32.pdf (accessed September 25, 2008).
- O'Connor, Thomas. "An Overview of the Field of International Relations." Austin Peay State University. <http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3040/3040lect02a.htm> (accessed 28 December 2007).
- O'Dowd, Edward and Arthur Waldron. "Sun Tzu for Strategists." *Comparative Strategy* 10 (1991):25–36.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. *Unfinished Business U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2008.
http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2008/06_military_ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf (accessed September 27, 2008).

OPSEC Professional Society. "What is Opsec?" <http://www.opsecsociety.org/> (accessed September 15, 2008).

Organski, Abramo F. K. *World Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1968.

Pan, Esther and Youkyung Lee. "China Taiwan Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. March 28, 2008.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9223/chinataiwan_relations.html (accessed September 6, 2008).

Papp, Daniel S. *Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding*. New York: Macmillan, 1984.

Parker, Geoffrey. "The 'Military Revolution,' 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and The Hague." *The Journal of Military History* 69, no.1, (January 2005): 205-209.

Patch, John. "The Maritime Strategy We Need," *Armed Forces Journal* (2007)
<http://www.afji.com/2007/06/2729159> (accessed September 14, 2008).

Payne, Kenneth B. *The Fallacies of the Cold War and New Directions*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Press, 2002.

Perry, William J and Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Porter, Bruce. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. New York, NY: Free Press, 1994.

Posen, Barry R. and Ross, Andrew. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings*, vol.1. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005.

Project on Defense Alternatives. "RMA Overview." Common Wealth Institute.
<http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html> (accessed August 8, 2008).

Roach, Steven C., ed. *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader*. London, U.K.: Routledge, 2007

Rumsfeld, Donald. "Foreword." In *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.

- Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008. <https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47e148fd47a65.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2008).
- Schloming, Gordon C. *Power and Principle in International Affairs*. New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1991.
- Sempa, Francis P. "Mackinder's World." *American Diplomacy* 5, no. 1 (Winter 2000). University of North Carolina. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_14/sempa_mac1.html (accessed September 12, 2008).
- Shannon, Richard. *The Crisis of Imperialism: 1865-1915*. New York: Paladin Grenada Publishing, 1979.
- Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. London: Routledge, 1996
- Singer, Max and Adam Wildavsky. *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil (Comparative Politics and the International Political Economy)*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1996.
- Simon, Julian L. *Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and Immigration*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990.
- Spanier, John and Robert L. Wendzel. *Games Nations Play*. 9th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press 1996.
- Spiegel Online International. "Black Gold under the Ice: The Race for the Arctic Seabed Arrives in Greenland." *Der Spiegel* (May 27, 2008). Spiegel Online International. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,555775,00.html> (accessed September 10, 2008).
- Stanford University. "Hobbes Moral and Political Philosophy." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. August 23, 2003. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/> (accessed August 8, 2008).
- Steele, Robert David. "Takedown: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 98-99).

- Stolberg, Alan G. "Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century," in *National Security Policy and Strategy*. 3rd ed. Rev. Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Washington, D.C. Department of National Security and Strategy, 2008. International relations and Security Network. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=90194> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- Sullivan, Michael P. *Power in Contemporary Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990.
- Summers, Jr., Harry. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.
- Till, Geoffrey. "Sir Julian Corbett and the Twenty-First Century: Ten Maritime Commandments." In *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*. Edited by Andrew Dorman, A., Mike L. Smith, and Matthew R.H. Uttley. London, U.K.: MacMillan Press, 1999.
- Trewavas, Antony. "Malthus Foiled Again And Again." *Nature* 418 (August 8, 2002):668-670.
<http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/full/nature01013.html>
(accessed February, 23, 2008).
- Trochim, William M.K. "Positivism and post-Positivism." Research Methods Knowledge Base, Social Research Methods. 2006.
<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php> (accessed December, 28, 2007).
- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. "Bureau of Public Affairs, Strategic Communications and Planning." U.S. Department of State.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/> (accessed September 15, 2008).
- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." In *U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course Selected Readings*. Vol.1. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005.
- United States Intelligence Community. "Definition of the Intelligence Community." United States Intelligence Community. <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-definition.shtml> (accessed September 21, 2008).

- United States Marine Corps. "Notes: The Study of Strategy," *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1: Strategy*. PCN 1420000700. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/notes.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).
- . "Strategic Opposites." *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1: Strategy*. PCN 1420000700. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/chap3.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).
- . "Strategy: Ends and Means." *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1:1: Strategy*. PCN 1420000700. Department of the Navy: Washington, D.C.: 1997. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/chap2.htm> (accessed August 22, 2008).
- University of Chicago. "Presence." ARTFL Project: Webster Dictionary, 1913. University of Chicago. <http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=presence> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- U .S. Air War College. "Gateway to the Internet." *Military Theory, Theorists, and Strategy*. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm#atmahan> (accessed September 8, 2008).
- . *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 2nd ed. Edited by Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006.
- U.S. Coast Guard. "Missions: Ready Today...Preparing for Tomorrow." U.S. Coast Guard. (November 2008) <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/> (accessed November 16, 2008).
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "Protecting America: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2005-2010 Strategic Plan." http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/strategic_plan_05_11.ctt/strategic_plan_05_11.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . "Who We Are and What We Do," U.S. Customs and Border Protection (September 3, 2008) http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/who_we_are.xml (accessed September 21, 2008).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Peace Operations*. FM 100-23. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994.

- . *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*. Joint Electronic Library. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_encyclopedia.htm (accessed September 8, 2008).
- . *Quadrennial Defense Review* (May 1997). <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/> (accessed October 2008).
- . *Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept*. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2004. www.dtic.mil/jointvision/sd_joc_v1.doc (accessed August 15, 2008).
- . *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2005. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf> (accessed August 15, 2008).
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006.
- U.S. Department of Justice. “Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.” *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*. U.S. Department of Justice. <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/atf.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . “Drug Enforcement Administration.” *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*. U.S. Department of Justice. <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . “Featured News.” U.S. Department of Justice. <http://www.usdoj.gov/> (accessed September 16, 2008).
- . “Federal Bureau of Investigation.” *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*. U.S. Department of Justice. <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/fbi.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . “U.S. Marshals Service.” *Organization, Mission, and Functions Manual*. U.S. Department of Justice. <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/usms.htm> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- U.S. Department of State. “Diplomacy and the Global Coalition against Terrorism. On the Diplomatic Front.” U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/coalition/dplm/> (accessed September 16, 2008).

- U.S. Joint Forces Command. *The Joint Operating Environment*. Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2007.
- U.S. Secret Service. "U.S. Secret Service." *U.S. Secret Service Strategic Plan (FY 2008-FY2013)*. U.S. Treasury.
http://www.ustreas.gov/usss/usss_strategic_plan_2008_2013.pdf (21 September 2008).
- U.S. Transportation Security Administration. "Our Mission." U.S. Transportation Security Administration.
<http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/mission/index.shtm> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- Value-Based Management. "OODA Loop — John Boyd." Value-Based Management. March 25, 2008.
http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html (accessed August 15, 2008).
- Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War: the Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1993.
- Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1993.
- Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Walt, Stephen M. "In the National Interest: A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy." *The Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum*. (February- March 2005) <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html> (accessed June 2008).
- . "International Relations: One World, Many Theories." *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), 29.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- . *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Wandel, J. W. "USA, Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the Arctic." Discussion posted August 10, 2007. <http://www.able2know.org/forums/about101576.html> (accessed October 15, 2008).
- Wawro, Geoffrey. *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France In 1870-1871*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. McMillan and Company, New York, 1973.
- Weldes, Jutta. *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
- . *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- White House. "Executive Order on Terrorist Financing: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism." White House. 2001. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-1.html (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997." White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html> (accessed September 26, 2008).
- . *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2008).
- . *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed September 28, 2008).
- . "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point." White House. 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (accessed August 15, 2008).
- Wikipedia. "Thomas Malthus." 2008. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Malthus (accessed October 3, 2008).
- White, Josh. "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1: New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus From Conventional Warfare." *The Washington Post*. (July 31 2008) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/30/ar2008073003240.html> (accessed August 15, 2008).
- Wittkopf, Eugene R. ed. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.

Yarger, Harry E. *Strategic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, Air War College.
2006.http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/strat_theory_21c_yarger.pdf
(accessed September 7, 2008).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Roger Mackin
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C.
4. Robert Powers
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C.