



China's Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy

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Summary

Given its relatively low savings rate, the U.S. economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows from countries with high savings rates (such as China) to help promote growth and to fund the federal budget deficit. China has intervened heavily in currency markets to limit the appreciation of its currency, especially against the dollar. As a result, China has become the world's largest and fastest growing holder of foreign exchange reserves (FER). China has invested a large share of its FER in U.S. securities, which, as of June 2007, totaled \$922 billion, making China the 2nd largest foreign holder of U.S. securities (after Japan). These securities include long-term (LT) Treasury debt, LT U.S. agency debt, LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term debt.

U.S. Treasury securities are issued to finance the federal budget deficit. Of the public debt that is privately held, about half is held by foreigners. As of October 2008, China's Treasury securities holdings were \$653 billion, accounting for 21.5% of total foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, making it the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries (replacing Japan in September 2008). China's holdings of U.S. Treasuries rose by \$45 billion September 2008 and by \$66 billion in October, reflecting in part a movement by China away from purchases of U.S. agency asset backed securities (such those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to more "safe" U.S. government securities.

Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that China might try to use its large holdings of U.S. securities, including U.S. public debt, as leverage against U.S. policies it opposes. For example, in the past, some Chinese officials reportedly suggested that China could dump (or threaten to dump) a large share of its holdings to prevent the United States from imposing trade sanctions against China over its currency policy. Other Chinese officials reportedly stated that China should diversify its investments of its foreign exchange reserves away from dollar-denominated assets to those that offer higher rates of returns. The recent global financial crisis has heightened U.S. concerns that China might reduce its U.S. asset holdings.

A gradual decline in China's holdings of U.S. assets would not be expected to have a negative impact on the U.S. economy (since it could be matched by increased U.S. exports and a lower trade deficit). However, some economists contend that attempts by China to unload a large share of its U.S. securities holdings could have a significant negative impact on the U.S. economy (at least in the short run), especially if such a move sparked a sharp depreciation of the dollar in international markets and induced other foreign investors to sell off their U.S. holdings as well. In order to keep or attract that investment back, U.S. interest rates would rise, which would dampen U.S. economic growth, all else equal. Other economists counter that it would not be in China's economic interest to suddenly sell off its U.S. investment holdings. Doing so could lead to financial losses for the Chinese government, and any shocks to the U.S. economy caused by this action could ultimately hurt China's economy as well.

The issue of China's large holdings of U.S. securities is part of a larger debate among economists over how long the high U.S. reliance on foreign investment can be sustained, to what extent that reliance poses risks to the economy, and how to evaluate the costs associated with borrowing versus the benefits that would accrue to the economy from that practice. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Because of its low savings rate, the United States borrows to finance the federal budget deficit and its capital needs in order to enjoy healthy economic growth. It therefore depends on countries with high savings rates, such as China, to invest some of its capital in the United States.

China's central bank is a major purchaser of U.S. assets, largely because of its exchange rate policy. In order to mitigate the yuan's appreciation against the dollar, China's central bank must purchase U.S. dollars.¹ This has led China to amass a huge level of foreign exchange reserves (FER); these totaled \$1.9 trillion as of September 2008. Rather than hold dollars, which earn no interest, the Chinese central government has converted some level of its FER holdings into financial securities. Since foreign exchange holdings facilitate trade and prevent speculation against their currency, the central bank also holds securities from other foreign countries. The United States is a major destination of China's overseas investment. China is the second largest holder of U.S. securities, which include U.S. Treasury securities that are used to finance the federal budget deficit. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that China's large holdings of U.S. securities may pose a risk to the U.S. economy should China stop purchasing those securities or attempt to divest itself of a large share of its holdings. In addition, China's FER are expected to continue to grow rapidly in the near future, potentially continuing (and possibly increasing) China's role as a major buyer of U.S. securities.

The recent financial crisis in the United States and the Administration's proposed plans to purchase troubled assets is expected to cost the government hundreds of billions of dollars, at least initially. This will require a substantial level of new government borrowing, some of which will likely be financed by foreign investors. China could be a major purchaser of new U.S. government debt.

This report examines the importance to the U.S. economy of China's investment in U.S. securities, as well as U.S. concerns over the possibility that China might unload a large share of those holdings, the likelihood that this would occur, and the potential implications such action could have for the U.S. economy. The report concludes that a large sell-off of Chinese Treasury securities holdings could negatively affect the U.S. economy, at least in the short-run. As a result, such a move could diminish U.S. demand for Chinese products and thus could lower China's economic growth as well. The issue of China's large holdings of U.S. securities is part of a broader question that has been raised by many economists: What are the implications of the heavy U.S. reliance on foreign investment to maintain healthy economic growth and to finance the budget deficit?²

China's Foreign Exchange Reserves

As indicated in **Table 1**, China's foreign exchange reserves have increased sharply in recent years, both in absolute terms and as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). These rose from

¹ China's accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has also occurred because of large annual current account trade surpluses, high levels of foreign direct investment in China, and inflows of "hot money" from overseas investors who anticipate that the Chinese government will appreciate the yuan in the near future. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32165, *China's Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade Policy*, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.

² For a discussion of the implications of a possible global sell-off of U.S. securities, see CRS Report RL34319, *Foreign Ownership of U.S. Financial Assets: Implications of a Withdrawal*, by James K. Jackson.

\$216 billion in 2001 to \$1,528 billion in 2007 (and hit \$1,906 billion as of September 2008). China's reserves as a percent of GDP grew from 18.1% in 2001 to 47.1% in 2007 – an unusually high level for a large economy.

Table 1. China's Foreign Exchange Reserves: 2001-September 2008

Year	Billions of U.S. Dollars	As a % of Chinese GDP
2001	215.6	18.1
2002	291.1	22.1
2003	403.3	28.1
2004	609.9	31.5
2005	818.9	35.5
2006	1,068.5	38.6
2007	1,528.2	47.1
September 2008	1,905.6	N.A.

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

Note: Year-end values (except for 2008).

A listing of the world's top five holders of FER as of September 2008 is shown in **Table 2**. Not only was China by far the world's largest FER holder, its accumulation of additional reserves from 2006-September 2008 (\$830 billion) was larger than the combined FER increases of the other four major holders – Japan, Russia, India, and Taiwan.³ According to the IMF, as of December 2007, China accounted for 23.9% of the world's FER.⁴

Table 2. Top 5 Holders of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Changes to Holdings From 2006-September 2008

Country	Reserves (billions of U.S. dollars)			
	2006 Year End	2007 Year End	September 2008	Dollar Change: 2006-September 2008
China	1,068.5	1,528.2	1,905.6	837.1
Japan	879.7	948.4	969.2	89.5
Russian Federation	295.3	386.2	402.3	107.0
India	170.2	266.6	277.3	107.1
Taiwan	266.1	270.0	281.1	15.0

Sources: EIU Database, IMF International Financial Statistics, and Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Note: Ranked according to total holdings as of September 2008.

³ China overtook Japan in 2006 to become the world's largest holder of FER.

⁴ Total reserves for all countries in 2007 were estimated at \$6,390 billion. Worldwide, 41% of reserves were held in dollar-denominated assets.

China's Holdings of U.S. Securities⁵

China's central bank is a major purchaser of U.S. financial securities because of its exchange rate policy. In order to mitigate the yuan's appreciation against the dollar, the central bank must purchase dollars. Rather than hold dollars, which earn no interest, the Chinese central government has converted some level of its foreign exchange holdings into financial securities. Since foreign exchange holdings facilitate trade and prevent speculation against their currency, the central bank also holds securities from other foreign countries.

There are no official estimates of what share of China's foreign reserves are held in dollar-denominated assets (assets that were bought with dollars and are cashed in dollars), but the Treasury Department conducts an annual survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities by country, and reports data for the previous year as of the end of June.⁶ The report does not distinguish between government and private holdings of U.S. securities. U.S. securities include long-term (LT) U.S. Treasury securities, LT U.S. government agency securities,⁷ LT corporate securities (some of which are asset-backed), equities (such as stocks), and short-term debt.⁸ According to the latest Treasury survey (released in April 2008), China's total holdings of U.S. securities of \$927 billion at the end of June 2007 were more than triple its holdings in 2003 (see **Figure 1**).⁹ From June 2006 to June 2007, China's U.S. securities holdings grew by \$223 billion (or 32%), far more than any other country's.¹⁰ At the current rate, China could become the largest foreign holder of U.S. securities in a year or two.

⁵ For additional information on foreign ownership of U.S. securities, see CRS Report RL32462, *Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities*, by James K. Jackson.


⁶ Note, Treasury's annual survey does not include data on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States, which measures foreign ownership or investment in U.S. businesses. China's total FDI in the U.S. at the end of 2006 was \$554 million (on a historical cost basis), according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since these types of assets cannot be liquidated rapidly, they are not included in this report.

⁷ Agency securities include both federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises created by Congress (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to provide credit to key sectors of the economy. Some of these securities are backed by assets (such as home mortgages).

⁸ LT securities are those with no stated maturity date (such as equities) or with an original term to maturity date of more than one year. Short-term debt includes U.S. Treasury securities, agency securities, and corporate securities with a maturity date of less than one year.

⁹ Data on China's holdings of U.S. securities exclude holdings by Hong Kong (which totaled \$137.8 billion as of June 2007) and Macao (\$2.0 billion). These entities, though part of China, are reported separately by Treasury.

¹⁰ In comparison, Japan's holdings grew by only \$91 billion. U.S. Treasury, *Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2007*, April 2008, p. 11-12.

Figure 1. China's Holdings of U.S. Securities: June 2002-June 2007

Source: U.S. Treasury Department.

As indicated in **Table 3**, China was the second largest foreign holder of U.S. securities, after Japan.¹¹ China's main holdings were in LT Treasury securities and LT government agency securities (see **Figure 1**).¹² This likely indicates that a large share of China's holdings of U.S. securities are controlled by the Chinese government and that it has been pursuing a relatively low-risk investment strategy. In contrast, most of the United Kingdom's securities holdings were in corporate debt and equities. China's holdings of U.S. securities accounted for 9.4% of total foreign holdings of U.S. securities as of June 2007.

Although the Chinese government does not make public the dollar composition of its foreign exchange holdings, many analysts estimate this level to be around 70%.¹³ If this figure is correct, China's holdings of U.S. securities may have reached \$1.3 trillion as of September 2008.

¹¹ According to the Treasury Department, data on foreign holdings of U.S. securities should be treated with caution, due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate information on the *actual* foreign owners of U.S. securities. For example, chains of foreign financial intermediaries may be involved in the custody or management of these securities.

¹² China was the largest foreign holder of LT U.S. agency securities, accounting for 29% of total foreign holdings of these type of securities.

¹³ See testimony of Brad Setser, Senior Economist, Roubini Global Economics and Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford, before the House Budget Committee, *Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt: Is our Economy Vulnerable?*, June 26, 2007, p. 11. In addition, the *People's Daily Online* (August 28, 2006) estimated China's dollar holdings to total FER at 70%. A rough estimate can be made by taking the value of China's holdings of U.S. securities (\$922 billion at the end of June 2007) and dividing it by China's foreign exchange reserves (\$1,333 billion at the end of June 2007), which would equal 69.2%.

It is not clear to what extent China's investments have gone into U.S. sub-prime mortgage securities, but they are likely to be small relative to their total investments. As seen in **Table 3**, China has invested \$376 billion in long-term agency securities, most—but not all—of which is likely to be debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. *The South China Morning Post* (September 25, 2008) estimated that Chinese banks held \$9.8 billion in U.S. sub-prime loans at the end of 2007 and \$25 billion in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities as of June 30, 2008. Whatever risk China faced from its holdings of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities was greatly reduced in September 2008 when these two institutions were placed in conservatorship by the Federal Government and thus have government backing. The Bank of China (one of China's largest state-owned commercial banks) reportedly had the largest exposures to U.S. sub-prime mortgage-backed securities among any banks in Asia when the financial crisis began. However, it reported that holdings of such securities as a share of its total investment securities portfolio were reduced from 3.5% in March 2008 to 1.4% in October 2008.¹⁴


Table 3. Top Five Foreign Holders of U.S. Securities as of June 2007
(\$ billions)

	Total	LT Treasury	LT Government Agency	LT Corporate	Equity	Short Term
Japan	1,197	553	229	119	220	76
China	922	467	376	28	29	23
United Kingdom	921	43	28	405	421	24
Cayman Islands	740	23	52	347	279	38
Luxembourg	703	45	39	340	233	44
World Total	9,772	1,965	1,305	2,737	3,130	635
China's Holdings as a % of World Total	9.4	23.8	28.8	1.0	0.9	3.6

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, *Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2007*, April 2008, p. 8.

Note: LT securities are those with no stated maturity date (such as equities) or with an original term to maturity date of more than one year. Short term securities have a maturity period of less than one year.

¹⁴ The Bank of China either reduced its holdings or wrote off the losses.

Figure 2. Composition of China's Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 2007

Source: Department of Treasury.

Note: LT stands for long-term debt.

China's Ownership of U.S. Treasury Securities¹⁵

U.S. Treasury securities are the main vehicle the U.S. government uses to finance the federal debt, which totaled \$10.0 trillion at the end of September 2008. Of this amount, 47% was held by U.S. government trust funds and 53% was privately held. Of the total level of privately-held U.S. Treasury securities (\$5.3 trillion), foreigners owned 54% of the total (\$2.9 trillion).¹⁶ China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities holdings (as of September 2008) accounted for 11.0% of total private holdings (including foreign governments and citizens) of U.S. Treasury securities and 5.9% of total U.S. public debt securities (combined public and private).¹⁷

Table 4 lists the top five major foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities as of October 2008. China was the largest holder of U.S. Treasury Securities (overtaking Japan in September 2008) at \$653 billion (China was the 7th largest holder in December 1997).¹⁸ Over the past few years, China has become a major purchaser of Treasury securities. From December 2001 to October 2008, China's share of total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities rose from 7.6% to 21.5%. From October 2007 to October 2008, China's holdings increased by \$193.8 billion (or 42.2%). On the other hand, Japan's holdings over the same period fell by \$16.2 billion (or 2.8%). During this period, China accounted for 26.1% of net new holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. China's purchases of U.S. Treasury securities were relatively large in September and October

¹⁵ For a general discussion of foreign ownership of U.S. debt, see CRS Report RS22331, *Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt*, by Justin Murray and Marc Labonte.

¹⁶ U.S. Treasury Department, Financial Management Service, *Ownership of Federal Securities*, available at <http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html>.

¹⁷ Although yields on U.S. Treasury securities are relatively low compared to other types of investment, they are also considered to be relatively low in risk. Thus they are viewed by many central banks to be a safe investment for their FER.

¹⁸ Treasury constantly revises its estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. securities. Thus, data which compares historical Treasury data with current data should be viewed with caution.

2008, at \$44.6 billion and \$65.9 billion, respectively. This may in part reflect a movement by China (and other foreign investors) away from purchases of U.S. agency asset backed securities (such those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to more “safe” U.S. government securities.

**Table 4. Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities:
October 2007 and October 2008**
(\$ billions)

	Oct 2007	Oct 2008	Oct 2007-Oct 2008 Change in the Value of its Holdings	Holdings as a Share of Total Foreign Holdings as of Oct2008 (%)
China	459.1	652.9	193.8	21.5
Japan	601.7	585.5	-16.2	19.2
United Kingdom	155.0	360.2	205.2	11.8
Carribean Banking Centers	105.6	219.5	113.9	7.2
Oil Exporters ^a	141.6	187.7	46.1	6.2
Total Foreign Holdings	2,299.2	3,042.7	743.5	100.0

Source: Department of Treasury, *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities Holdings*, December 15, 2008.

a. Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria.

Note: *Data are based on surveys which are done annually or biannually. A new survey may often significantly revise data of a previous survey. Thus, time series data should be viewed with caution.

U.S. Concerns Over China’s Large Holdings of U.S. Securities

Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over China’s large holdings of U.S. securities, including Treasury securities, contending that China could use it as a political tool against the United States. To illustrate, an August 7, 2007 article in the *Telegraph* (an online British newspaper) cited interviews with officials from two leading Chinese government think tanks who reportedly stated that China had the power to make the dollar collapse (if it chose to do so) by liquidating large portions of its U.S. Treasury securities holdings if the United States imposed trade sanctions to force a yuan revaluation, and that the threat to do so could be used as a “bargaining chip.”¹⁹ The article prompted concern among many U.S. policymakers, including Senator Chuck Grassley, who, in an August 9, 2007 letter to the Chinese ambassador to the United States (Zhou Wenzhong), called the comments “dangerous” and a factor in why the United States “is right to be concerned with China’s currency practices.” The letter asked the Chinese government to confirm that “the comments do not reflect the official position of the Chinese government.”²⁰ In response, the Chinese ambassador wrote to Senator Grassley on August 13,

¹⁹ The Telegraph, *China Threatens ‘Nuclear Option’ of Dollar Sales*, August 7, 2007.

²⁰ See text of letter at <http://grassley.senate.gov/public/>.

2007, that “China does not have a plan to drastically adjust the structure of its foreign reserves.”²¹ In addition, China’s *Xinhua News Agency* on August 13, 2007, quoted an unnamed official at the People’s Bank of China as stating that “dollar-denominated assets, including U.S. government securities, are an important component in China’s foreign exchange reserve investment portfolio,” and that China was “a responsible investor.”

Numerous reports have appeared in the media citing various Chinese officials who have claimed or hinted at government plans to reduce its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities for economic reasons. For example, on September 29, 2007, the Chinese government officially launched the state-owned *China Investment Corporation*, which Chinese officials state was created to better manage its foreign exchange reserves. It reportedly will initially manage over \$200 billion of China’s reserves, making it one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds. Some contend the creation of this entity could signal Chinese plans to diversify away from relatively low-yielding assets, such as Treasury securities, and perhaps dollar-denominated assets in general.²² On November 7, 2007, Cheng Siwei, the vice chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, reportedly made remarks that the Chinese government “will favor stronger currencies over weaker ones, and will readjust accordingly.” The media claimed that his remarks were a major factor in sparking a sharp decline of the dollar against the euro in international currency markets that day.²³ However, on November 14, 2007, Yi Gang, assistant governor of the People’s Bank of China, was quoted as saying that “the U.S. dollar is the main currency in our reserves and that policy remains very firm,” and said that statements by other officials to the contrary were “opinions.”²⁴

Some U.S. policymakers have recently raised concerns that China, for economic reasons (such as concerns over the safety of its current holdings of U.S. securities), might seek to liquidate such assets or significantly cut back on purchases of new securities. These fears have been heightened as a result of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and the subsequent global financial crisis.²⁵

What If China Reduces its Holdings of U.S. Securities?²⁶

As the previous data illustrate, China has accumulated large holdings of U.S. assets in recent years. These accumulations are the result of U.S. borrowing to finance its large trade deficit with China (the gap between U.S. exports and Chinese imports). All else equal, Chinese government purchases of U.S. assets increases the demand for U.S. assets, which reduces U.S. interest rates.

²¹ Letter reprinted in *Inside U.S. Trade*, August 13, 2007.

²² Others are concerned that China will attempt to use the fund to purchase major U.S. companies. See the *New Yorker*, *Sovereign Wealth World*, November 26, 2007. According to the article, “were China’s fund so inclined, it could buy Ford, G.M., Volkswagen, and Honda, and still have a little money left over for ice cream.”

²³ *Bloomberg News*, November 8, 2007.

²⁴ *China Daily*, November 15, 2007.

²⁵ See CRS Report RL34742, *The U.S. Financial Crisis: The Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy*, by Dick K. Nanto et al.

²⁶ From the perspective of the macroeconomic effects on U.S. investment, interest rates, and so on, it does not matter what type of U.S. security is purchased when foreign capital flows to the United States. Thus, Chinese purchases of all types of U.S. securities (not just Treasury securities) should be considered when attempting to understand the impact China’s investment decisions have on the U.S. economy.

If China attempted to reduce its holdings of U.S. securities, they would be sold to other investors (foreign and domestic), who would presumably require higher interest rates than those prevailing today to be enticed to buy them. One analyst estimates that a Chinese move away from long-term U.S. securities could raise interest rates by as much as 50 basis points.²⁷ Higher interest rates would cause a decline in investment spending and other interest-sensitive spending. All else equal, the reduction in Chinese Treasury holdings would cause the overall foreign demand for U.S. assets to fall, and this would cause the dollar to depreciate. If the value of the dollar depreciated, the trade deficit would decline, as the price of U.S. exports fell abroad and the price of imports rose in the United States.²⁸ The magnitude of these effects would depend on how many U.S. securities China sold; modest reductions would have negligible effects on the economy given the vastness of U.S. financial markets.

Since China held \$922 billion of U.S. government assets as of June 2007 (and possibly \$1.3 trillion as of September 2008), any reduction in its U.S. holdings could potentially be large. If there were a large reduction in its holdings, the effect on the U.S. economy would still depend on whether the reduction were gradual or sudden. It should be emphasized that economic theory suggests that a *slow decline* in the trade deficit and dollar would not be troublesome for the overall economy. In fact, a slow decline could even have an expansionary effect on the economy, if the decrease in the trade deficit had a more stimulative effect on aggregate demand in the short run than the decrease in investment and other interest-sensitive spending resulting from higher interest rates. Historical experience seems to bear this out—the dollar declined by about 40% in real terms and the trade deficit declined continually in the late 1980s, from 2.8% of GDP in 1986 to nearly zero during the early 1990s. Yet economic growth was strong throughout the late 1980s.

A potentially serious short-term problem would emerge if China decided to *suddenly* reduce their liquid U.S. financial assets significantly. The effect could be compounded if this action triggered a more general financial reaction (or panic), in which all foreigners responded by reducing their holdings of U.S. assets. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. The dollar depreciation would not cause a recession since it would ultimately lead to a trade surplus (or smaller deficit), which expands aggregate demand.²⁹ (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods takes time, so the dollar may have to “overshoot” its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.)³⁰ However, a sudden increase in interest rates could swamp the trade effects and cause (or worsen)

²⁷ Testimony of Brad Setser before the House Budget Committee, *Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt: Is our Economy Vulnerable?*, June 26, 2007. Brad Setser is Senior Economist, Roubini Global Economics, and Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford. Setser does not detail how much U.S. debt he assumes China would sell to reach his estimate.

²⁸ The extent that the dollar declined and U.S. interest rates rose would depend on how willing other foreigners were to supplant China’s reduction in capital inflows. A greater willingness would lead to less dollar depreciation and less of an increase in interest rates, and vice versa.

²⁹ A sharp decline in the value of the dollar would also reduce living standards, all else equal, because it would raise the price of imports to households. This effect, which is referred to as a decline in the terms of trade, would not be recorded directly in GDP, however.

³⁰ Since the decline in the dollar would raise import prices, this could temporarily increase inflationary pressures. The effect would likely be modest, however, since imports are small as a share of GDP and import prices would only gradually rise in response to the fall in the dollar.

a recession. Large increases in interest rates could cause problems for the U.S. economy, as these increases reduce the market value of debt securities, cause prices on the stock market to fall, undermine efficient financial intermediation, and jeopardize the solvency of various debtors and creditors. Resources may not be able to shift quickly enough from interest-sensitive sectors to export sectors to make this transition fluid. The Federal Reserve could mitigate the interest rate spike by reducing short-term interest rates, although this reduction would influence long-term rates only indirectly, and could worsen the dollar depreciation and increase inflation.

Some U.S. officials have expressed doubts that a Chinese sell-off of U.S. securities would cause liquidity problems or have much of an impact on the U.S. economy. In January 2007, Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson was asked at a Senate Banking Committee hearing whether or not he was concerned over China's large ownership of U.S. debt. Paulson stated that the daily volume of trade in Treasury securities was larger than China's total Treasury securities holdings and concluded: "given the size of our debt outstanding and the way it trades and the diversity and so on, that's not at the top of the list."³¹ According to the Treasury Department, gross foreign purchases and sales of U.S. marketable Treasury bonds and notes in 2006 were \$11.0 trillion and \$10.8 trillion, respectively.³² In addition, the average daily trading volume by primary dealers of all U.S. Treasury securities sold in the U.S. in 2006 was \$524 billion.³³

In March 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly stated in a letter to Senator Shelby that "because foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities represent only a small part of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding, U.S. credit markets should be able to absorb without great difficulty any shift of foreign allocations." He also reportedly stated that "even if such a shift were to put undesired upward pressure on U.S. interest rates, the Federal Reserve has the capacity to operate in domestic money markets to maintain interest rates at a level consistent with our economic goals."³⁴

The likelihood that China would suddenly reduce its holdings of U.S. securities is questionable because it is doubtful that doing so would be in China's economic interests. First, a large sell-off of China's U.S. holdings could diminish the value of these securities in international markets, which would lead to large losses on the sale, and would, in turn, decrease the value of China's remaining dollar-denominated assets.³⁵ This would also occur if the value of the dollar were greatly diminished in international currency markets due to China's sell-off.³⁶ Second, such a move would diminish U.S. demand for Chinese imports, either through a rise in the value of the yuan against the dollar or a reduction in U.S. economic growth (especially if other foreign investors sold their U.S. asset holdings, and the United States was forced to raise interest rates in

³¹ Congressional Transcripts, Congressional Hearings, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, *Hearing on U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue*, January 31, 2007.

³² These figures include purchases of newly issued securities, as well as transactions executed in the United States (buying, selling, and redeeming) of outstanding long-term U.S. Treasury securities (excluding nonmarketable Treasury bonds), as reported by banks, securities brokers and dealers, and other entities in the United States. See Treasury Department, Financial Management tables on capital movements at <http://www.fms.treas.gov/>.

³³ Source: *Securities Industry and Financial Services Association*.

³⁴ Reuters, *Bernanke-China Holdings of US Debt Not Problematic*, March 26, 2007.

³⁵ Since there are many other holders of U.S. assets, it is possible that if China believed a decline in asset values was imminent, it could minimize its losses by dumping its U.S. assets first, however.

³⁶ Selling off U.S. dollar assets could cause the yuan to appreciate against the dollar, which would lower the value of remaining U.S. assets since the assets are dollar-denominated.

response).³⁷ The United States purchased about 30% of China's total merchandise exports in 2007. A sharp reduction of U.S. imports from China could have a significant impact on China's economy, which heavily depends on exports for its economic growth (and is viewed by the government as a vital source of political stability).³⁸ Finally, any major action by the Chinese government that destabilized (or further destabilized) the U.S. economy (whether deliberate or not) could provoke "protectionist" sentiment in the United States against China.

Concluding Observations

Many economists argue that concerns over China's holdings of U.S. securities represent part of a broader problem for the U.S. economy, namely its dependence on foreign saving to finance its investment needs and federal budget deficits.³⁹ The large U.S. current account deficit (the manifestation of the high U.S. saving/investment gap) cannot be sustained indefinitely because the U.S. net foreign debt cannot rise faster than GDP indefinitely.⁴⁰ Some economists argue that at some point foreign investors may view the growing level of U.S. foreign debt as unsustainable or more risky, or they may no longer view U.S. securities as offering the best return on their investment, and shift investment funds away from U.S. assets, thus forcing U.S. interest rates to rise to attract needed foreign capital. This would result in higher interest rates and lower investment rates, all else equal, which would reduce long-term growth.⁴¹ Other economists contend that, although the low U.S. savings rate is a problem, the U.S. current account deficit and high levels of foreign capital flows to the United States are also reflections of the strength of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, and therefore discount the likelihood that foreign investors will suddenly shift their capital elsewhere.⁴²

The United States continues to press China to make its currency policy more flexible so that the yuan will appreciate more significantly against the dollar and to adopt policies that promote domestic consumption as a major source of China's economic growth (as opposed to export and fixed investment-led growth that has resulted from China's currency policy).⁴³ This is viewed as a major step towards reducing global trade imbalances, including the large U.S.-China trade

³⁷ In addition, if a "dollar collapse" occurred, U.S. imports from other major trade partners would decline, which could slow their economies. This in turn could weaken their demand for Chinese products.

³⁸ Although a falling dollar may harm China's short-term growth via reduced Chinese exports (and export sector-related employment), it would also improve China's terms of trade with the United States, raising China's overall consumption since it could now spend less to acquire the same amount of American goods (which would also create jobs in other sectors of the economy because of increased consumer purchasing power).

³⁹ Nations (such as the United States) that fail to save enough to meet their investment needs must obtain savings from other countries with high savings rates (such as China). By obtaining resources from foreign investors for its investment needs, the United States is able to enjoy a higher rate of consumption than it would if investment were funded by domestic savings alone. The inflow of foreign capital to the United States is equivalent to the United States borrowing from the rest of the world. The only way the United States can borrow from the rest of the world is by importing more than it exports, which produces a trade (and current account) deficit.

⁴⁰ The current account deficit rose from \$389.4 billion in 2002 to \$811.5 billion in 2006, and as a percent of GDP, it increased from 4.4% to 6.1%, respectively. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that the current account deficit fell to \$739 billion in 2007 (5.3% of GDP).

⁴¹ See CRS Report RL33186, *Is the U.S. Current Account Deficit Sustainable?*, by Marc Labonte.

⁴² See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, *The U.S. Capital Surplus*, February 2006, p. 144.

⁴³ In November, the Chinese government announced it would implement a two-year \$586 billion stimulus package, mainly dedicated to infrastructure projects.

imbalance. However, in order for that to occur, the United States must also boost its level of savings. If China consumed more and saved less, it would have less capital to invest overseas, including in the United States. Thus, if the United States did not reduce its dependence on foreign savings for its investment needs, and China reduced its U.S. investments, the United States would need to obtain investment from other countries, and the overall U.S. current account balance would likely remain relatively unchanged.

Some U.S. policymakers have expressed hope that China will increase its U.S. debt holdings in order to help the Federal government pay for its financial rescue plan and future stimulus packages.⁴⁴ But others have expressed concern that becoming more reliant on Chinese purchases of U.S. debt would increase China's political leverage over the United States and may make it more difficult for the United States to induce China to appreciate its currency more quickly and to make other needed reforms to its economy.

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⁴⁴ See CRS Report RS22984, *China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States*, by Wayne M. Morrison.