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THESIS

DETERRENCE AND ENGAGEMENT: U.S. AND NORTH KOREAN INTERACTIONS OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

by

Geunho Kwak

December 2008

Thesis Advisor: James Clay Moltz
Second Reader: Edward A. Olsen

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### Deterrence and Engagement: U.S. and North Korean Interactions over Nuclear Weapons since the End of the Cold War

**Geunho Kwak**

Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA  93943-5000

#### Abstract

The North Korea nuclear crisis needs to be understood comprehensively, taking into account both international relations and the domestic political dynamics of the countries involved. Thus, this thesis analyzes North Korean and U.S. policies by examining their policies in the two nuclear crises (1993-94) and (2002-present) and proposing an improved option for reaching a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

This thesis finds that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons with a unique historical, cultural, political background-based strategy as a security mechanism and as a diplomatic tool to help overcome its economic difficulties. Recently it has shown a somewhat more predictable policy toward nuclear issues. In terms of U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear program, the Clinton administration attempted to modify North Korea’s bad behavior with engagement. By contrast, the Bush administration tried to change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-line approach. But, since North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, the United States has engaged again positively with North Korea. The best option to achievement of North Korean denuclearization is to apply multilateral and integrated threat reduction programs in North Korea in a comprehensive manner with responsibility shared by all of the partners in the current Six-Party Talks.

#### Subject Terms

North Korea, North Korean Nuclear Weapons, North Korea Nuclear Negotiation, U.S. North Korean Policy
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Geunho Kwak
Lieutenant, Republic of Korea Navy
Bachelor of Management Science, The Republic of Korea Naval Academy, 1998

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2008

Author: Geunho Kwak

Approved by: James Clay Moltz
Thesis Advisor

Edward A. Olsen
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This thesis will analyze the interactions between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) over North Korea’s nuclear program since the end of the Cold War in order to clarify a set of issues that have thus far defied resolution. It will first assess Pyongyang’s intentions regarding its nuclear program in light of North Korea’s security concerns and in reaction to the approaches of successive U.S. administrations. Second, it will evaluate American efforts to deal with the North Korean nuclear program. Finally, this thesis will assess prospects for a successful negotiation of the nuclear issue and for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

B. IMPORTANT

The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most troublesome, unstable and dangerous regions in the world. Along with Afghanistan and the Middle East, Korea is one of the most confrontational places in the post-Cold War world, and it will remain a source of problems for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s nuclear program is a major contributor to the instability of the entire region, and it remains the focus of prolonged efforts by the United States and the international community to contain it.

North Korea’s status as an established nuclear power could be a trigger for the proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in Northeast Asia (Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan), arms races, and conflicts, thus, which depend on the successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Indeed, the resolution of the crisis could be an opportunity to improve security conditions in Northeast Asia and finally move beyond the Cold War in Asia.
Consequently, this thesis will make a contribution to the academic and political debates on the North Korean nuclear crisis by attempting to develop an improved policy option for solving the North Korean nuclear problem and achieving stability, peace, and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This rest of this chapter will focus on reviewing interpretations of U.S. and North Korean nuclear negotiating strategy and behavior toward one another. William Zartman argues that negotiation has three components: actors, structure and process, and values.\(^1\) An analysis of actors raises the matter of culture. Commonly, it is assumed that negotiators from different cultures negotiate in different ways. Also, different cultural actors may deploy different negotiating behavior. However, interactions between actors may produce change. A structural perspective that considers the distribution of power and interactions is more comprehensive than an explanation that analyzes only an actor’s preferred behavior.

Negotiators bargain to achieve their specific goals, but they also negotiate within the constraints of larger goals.\(^2\) Peter Berton identifies six critical variables in the negotiation process: the distribution of power, the issues to be negotiated, the type of relationship between the negotiating parties, the past record of negotiations, the place of negotiations, and the personalities of the negotiators.\(^3\)

In December 2002, the United States Institute of Peace issued a special report, *U.S. Negotiating Behavior*. The report notes that four factors allow us to explain negotiating behavior on any given occasion.

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\(^2\) Ibid., 3-5.

• Structural factors, such as a country’s geopolitical situation and its political system
• The national culture of the negotiators, which shapes conceptions of conflict and negotiation, patterns of communication, attitude toward time, the use of language, and the role of the media
• The specific issues being negotiated
• The personalities of negotiators

The report argues that recent U.S. negotiators have adopted a distinctive style: forceful, explicit, legalistic, urgent, and results-oriented.\(^5\)

Scott Snyder, in his book, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior*, reveals patterns in North Korea’s negotiating style that North Korea used brinkmanship tactics, threats, and crisis escalation diplomacy during the first North Korea nuclear crisis.\(^6\) In terms of the origin of North Korean brinkmanship tactics, he explains that it has historic roots in the DPRK’s guerrilla experience in battle with Japanese armed forces during the colonial period and the second World War, explaining:

> The guerrilla partisan experience, through which leaders felt unconstrained by norms that might limit options of full-fledged members of the international community, has had direct application to and influence on North Korean preferences for crisis diplomacy and brinkmanship to gain the attention and respect of negotiating counterparts.\(^7\)

Also, Snyder argues that the same pattern of North Korean behavior has been shown as well in North Korean public statements by spokesmen of the foreign ministry have played an important role in underlining solutions that could make the North Korean position advantageous in the nuclear negotiation.\(^8\) Additionally, since the beginning of the Six-Party Talks on August 27, 2003, the circumstances of the nuclear negotiations

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\(^5\) Ibid.


\(^7\) Ibid., 144.

have turned into multilateral approach. These multilateral negotiations have limited the ability of North Korean negotiators to effectively use crisis escalation or brinkmanship tactics.9

During the first North Korean nuclear crisis negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1993-1994 in Geneva, the North Korean negotiator attempted to force the U.S. negotiator to choose between only two options: either unveiling the North Korean’s nuclear past or dismantling its present activities. Also, Robert Gallucci stated that Kang Sok Ju, the chief negotiator of North Korea showed no flexibility and used hard-line tactics in 1993, mentioning Kang’s remarks that “If the United States just only interested in North Korea’s nuclear past, Pyongyang would be happy to cooperate with the IAEA immediately.”10 North Korea negotiators divided issues into pieces and made use of each piece.

The main reason the North Korean negotiators adopted a pattern of tough behavior at the negotiating table is because the stakes were very high. But, if the negotiations failed, the consequences were unacceptable to their counterparts. Thus, in the nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang in Geneva, there were strategies of mutual brinkmanship. “North Korean had drawn a red line over UN sanctions for which is said it was prepared to go to war, United States had drawn a clear red line over North Korean reprocessing, which it, likewise, was prepared to go to war.”11

Yong-Sup Han, professor at the Korean National Defense University and a visiting fellow at the RAND Corporation during 1999-2000, argues that North Korean negotiators employed varied diplomatic tactics to achieve its goals in the first crisis. He says that North Korea did not use the brinkmanship tactics in the negotiations with South Korea, which commonly were used by North Korean negotiators with the United States.

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9 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 147.
Therefore, he suggests that the United States should consider a balanced carrot and stick approach to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis. Such an approach requires more knowledge and understanding of the internal dynamics of the two Koreans.\(^\text{12}\)

According to Chuck Downs’s argument in his book, *Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy*, North Korea’s strategy is extraordinary—irrational, unpredictable, and unreasonable—because it is formed by the character of the Pyongyang regime and rooted in its unique circumstances and worldview. He points out that for the United States and the Republic of Korea, the negotiations with North Korea have been aimed at peace on the Korean Peninsula and charitable motivation toward a cruel and belligerent regime. But, for North Korea, it was negotiating for its very survival.\(^\text{13}\)

Additionally, Jasper Becker in his book, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea*, states that Pyongyang achieved its goals by the deployment of brinkmanship:

The brinkmanship used during this first crisis also allowed Pyongyang to achieve a number of other objectives, such as entering into direct talks with the United States for the first time. … North Korea also opened up ties with its old enemy Japan and received the first offer of reparations. Lastly, there were strategic gains. Washington did remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea and it temporarily suspended the U.S.-South Korean annual “Team Spirit” military exercises. It looked like, as with the Soviet Union, nuclear arms reduction talks could turn into a stage for exploring new relationships.\(^\text{14}\)

North Korea’s strategy toward nuclear weapons can also be understood by analyzing its October 9, 2006 nuclear test. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress of October 24, 2006 in surveying North Korea’s possible motivations, states that “determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of


possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon.”15

As with many foreign policy decisions, it says, Pyongyang’s calculations probably reflect a combination of factors.16

- An attempt to secure bilateral talks
- An attempt to ensure security of the regime
- Domestic political factors
- Technical motivations

The report also enumerated possible medium and long-term implications of Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons.17

- Growing nuclear threats to the region
- A nuclear arms race in Asia
- Proliferation to other states or non-state actors
- Likely impact on other proliferators
- The uncertain fate of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal in a North Korean Collapse Scenario

Graham T. Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans under President Clinton, made the gloomy prediction that a domino effect of nuclear proliferation would take place in Northeast Asia by 2010.18 In other words, debates on nuclear deterrence and its effects have been getting more complicated.

North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program has been the focus of U.S. policy toward the second North Korean nuclear crisis since James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang on October 2002; did North Korea cheat or did the Bush administration raise an inconvenient and possibly irrelevant concern?

Selig S. Harrison asserts that the Bush administration’s accusation regarding the uranium program should not have been used to terminate the 1994 Agreed Framework,

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16 Avery, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” 5.
17 Ibid.
given the small scale and the serious financial and technical difficulties of the North Korean HEU program.\textsuperscript{19} In contrast, Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert Gallucci argue that North Korean might have overcome these obstacles through the nuclear smuggling network of Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, which provided North Korea with prototypes and blueprints for its centrifuge enrichment program.\textsuperscript{20}

On February 13, 2007, the Agreement on the Six-Party Talks was made between the United States and North Korea. It called for dismantling the 1994 Agreed Framework, denuclearization, removing the DPRK from the terrorism sponsor country list, and lifting economic sanctions. But, many factors make the relationship between the two countries difficult. Daniel Pinkston and Leonard Spector also argue that HEU program has become a major obstacle in attempts to implement the February 13 Six-Party Agreement; they introduce additional evidence of the DPRK HEU program and a senior U.S. intelligence official’s public testimony asserting a continued North Korean HEU effort.\textsuperscript{21}

Amid debate over the North Korean HEU program and its plutonium bomb test on October 9, 2006, Daniel Pinkston and Shin Sungtack argue that additional nuclear tests are likely expected to maximize its nuclear deterrent.\textsuperscript{22} So far, the Pyongyang regime has not conducted a second test, so that North Korea’s nuclear strategy remains mysterious to the international community.

\textsuperscript{19} Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” \textit{Foreign Affairs} (January/February 2005).
A recent study by North Korean expert David Kang points out three obstacles to managing the North Korea nuclear problem: political issues related to dealing with North Korea; the costs and controversy involved in disabling nuclear programs; and legislative obstacles to lifting sanctions from North Korea.\textsuperscript{23} He presents a gloomy set of prospects and notes pitfalls that will be difficult to resolve.

According to Bruce Cumings’ argument, the Bush administration’s policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis has failed because it destroyed the 1994 Agreed Framework’s successful eight-year freeze. He also notes that the Agreed Framework did not include the North Korean HEU program. In regard to this, he suggests that Washington should make an effort to restore trust and confidence with South Korea, which declined during the escalating crisis with North Korea, and to normalize relations with North Korea to achieve a formal peace in Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{24}

When it come to the solutions for the North Korea nuclear confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang, James Clay Moltz and Kenneth Quinones emphasize multilateral institutions and forums, including the key regional powers—South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan.\textsuperscript{25} They additionally argue that consensus among the non-DPRK partners of Six-Party Talks is necessary to achieve “Washington’s goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through a peaceful diplomatic solution.”\textsuperscript{26}

Overall, the literature on the North Korea nuclear issue needs to be understood comprehensively: involving international politics and relations, international institutions, nuclear strategy, and the internal political dynamics of the countries involved. Thus, the North Korea nuclear crisis is an aggregate of several major issues in world politics.


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 136, 143.
Given these complicated prospects over Korean Peninsula nuclear issues, this thesis assesses North Korean and U.S. policies toward the nuclear crisis by analyzing their nuclear negotiation strategies and behavior in the first and second North Korea nuclear crises.

Finally, this thesis suggests an improved policy option to settle the North Korea nuclear problem and further to enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

D. METHODOLOGY

As noted above, this thesis analyzes the interactions between the United States and North Korea regarding nuclear issues since the end of Cold War, surveys options for solving this lingering problem, and finally suggests the best approach to achieving a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and stabilizing Northeast Asia.

To accomplish these objectives, the thesis first explores the Pyongyang regime’s identity, its intentions for its nuclear program in light of North Korea’s security concerns, and its negotiation strategies and behavior in nuclear talks with United States since the end of the Cold War. Second, it evaluates U.S. responses to the North Korean nuclear program and U.S. negotiation strategies and behavior in nuclear talks with North Korea. Based on an analysis of the U.S. responses to the North Korean nuclear program during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis and multilateral negotiations after the nuclear explosion test on October 9, 2006, the thesis evaluates both countries’ approaches and explores policy options to solve the North Korean nuclear problem.
II. NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR POLICY AND RESPONSES TO U.S. POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

North Korean negotiators’ behavior is often described as “unconventional” or “full of stubbornness, brinkmanship, [and] rhetoric” by American negotiators. During the second North Korean nuclear crisis, these descriptions were repeated by the Bush administration and resulted in a hard-line policy toward Pyongyang.

However, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was a turning point that affected both U.S. and North Korean tactics and behavior in the Six-Party Talks that are the primary channel for negotiating on the North Korean nuclear issue.

This chapter examines North Korea’s nuclear policy. Specifically, two questions will be covered: What unique factors have shaped North Korea’s negotiating behavior? And what strategy have North Korean negotiators employed at the nuclear negotiating table with the United States?

The history of North Korea’s nuclear program is neither short nor simple. It began in the 1950s and its acceleration is closely related to the country’s security concerns and the economic failure in the 1970s through 1990s. The Pyongyang regime has recently pursued nuclear weapons to overcome its challenges by “proliferation through negotiation.” In other words, North Korea has perceived its nuclear weapons as both a defensive military tool and a bargaining chip.

With regards to negotiating tactics, North Korean negotiators have deployed unilateral and brinkmanship behavior with the United States because of North Korea’s unique cultural background and unfavorable external factors. Also, after the 2006

27 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (London: Lynne Reinner, 2002).
28 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 55.
explosive test, the regime faced limitation on its nuclear negotiating behavior, after recognizing that its behavior needed to demonstrate less brinkmanship and more predictability.

B. WHAT MAKES NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR DIFFERENT?

1. History

Negotiations to resolve conflicts and crises have been shaped by traditional Korean hierarchical style. These historical patterns are shared by the two Koreas, even though they now have totally different political and economic systems.31 The Korean dynasty’s hierarchical order was reinforced by the Confucian concept of virtue, which justified privilege, landowning, and the intellectual elite’s superiority over the masses, who had no hope of social advantage or opportunity for financial gain.32 In general, negotiations were shaped by such hierarchical relationships and the associated social expectations.33

At the end of the nineteenth century, Korea’s weakened international position allowed China, Japan, and Russia to compete for hegemony on the Korean Peninsula. Korea’s geopolitical context is described by the old Korean saying that Korea is as “a shrimp among whales.” These geopolitical traditions have shaped Korean identity and attitudes toward foreign policy and negotiation with other countries. To identify North Korean negotiators’ style, it is necessary to understand North Korea’s unique history.

Major influences on the North Korean socialization process include traditional experiences and new elements that are part of the DPRK’s process of state formation: especially the role of the partisan guerrilla tradition in shaping the modern DPRK.

31 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 19.
32 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place under the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 10.
33 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 19.
Kim Il Sung was a partisan guerrilla leader who fought against the Japanese colonists in Manchuria and later became the leader of a special Korean unit in the Soviet military during World War II. His guerrilla experience was eulogized for political purposes and his guerrilla days had a strong influence on North Korean leadership style and approach to political power. Arguably, the origin of Kim’s guerrilla experience is exaggerated in North Korea’s distorted historical record. Since its founding, North Korea’s political position has never been favorable, a fact that supports its use of guerrilla tactics in negotiations. An example is the belief that whatever the difficulties faced by the guerrilla troops, they should seek to survive, as survival will lead to eventual victory. North Korean brinkmanship tactics and policy of challenging the conventional order thus originates from Kim Il Sung’s partisan guerrilla tradition against Japanese colonial rule.

Kim Il Sung used guerrilla tactics not only to wage warfare against Japanese troops but also to rule the state. Cumings tracks the influence of the guerrilla experience on the management of the state from as early as 1946, in documents by Kim Il Sung’s official biographer claiming that “the officer [Kim] went on to recommend the guerrilla track as a good principle for party and mass organizations.” The Pyongyang regime has essentially applied “a divide and survive” strategy to deal with external threats, including South Korea and the United States. North Korean guerrilla tactics are demonstrated in their management of the crisis years, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and the Rangoon bombing in 1983.

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2. Culture

During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45), Japanese imperialists attempted to force Koreans to adopt the Japanese language and culture. Many significant Korean artifacts were either stolen or burned by Japan. As a Korean nationalist and guerrilla fighter, Kim Il Sung established several objectives, including Korea’s liberation at the end of World War II. Kim also wanted to remove the negative influences of the Japanese colonial dictatorship. The Japan government arguably became the third favorite target of North Korean propagandists after the war, and the Pyongyang regime has been concerned primarily with Japan’s remilitarization.

The result of the Japanese colonial experience is that North Korean negotiators remain sensitive to perceived threats to the nation’s sovereignty. Like Chinese negotiators, North Korean negotiators strongly emphasize the principles of noninterference with internal affairs and state sovereignty.41

Kim Il Sung took advantage of the combined legacy of the Japanese colonial experience and Stalinist structures he learned while living in the Soviet Far East to manage society; at the same time, Kim and his successor and son, Kim Jong Il, used Korean traditionalism, Confucian norms, and expressions of loyalty and filial piety as themes.

Confucianism was adopted by the Korean Yi dynasty as a central ideology for ordering social relations and patriarchal family relationships. Social position determined one’s role in the social order, and challenges to the balanced social order were punished strictly. Confucian traditions were manipulated by Kim Il Sung in founding the state as a “family” with himself as the patriarchic leader. In this context, Kim Il Sung honored his own pantheon, including his revolutionary father Kim Hyong Jik and even his grandfather, believed to be the commander of troops that had fought against the USS

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40 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 28.
41 Ibid., 31.
When Kim Il Sung died, Kim Jong Il also used Confucian norms to gain power and to deal with challenges to his authority by declaring a three-year national mourning period.\footnote{Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 32-33.}

The hierarchical structure of Confucianism is an important factor for characterizing North Korean behavior within the international community. North Korean negotiators emphasize unconditioned adherence to and protection of their own principles in negotiations.\footnote{Ibid., 34.}

In addition, \textit{“Juche”} ideology asserts Korea’s cultural distinctiveness and creativity as well as the productive powers of the working masses. \textit{Juche} ideology has influenced North Korean attitudes toward sovereignty. Although this concept of self-reliance is not found within Confucian, they may play supplementary roles in determining Pyongyang’s foreign policy.\footnote{Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 36.}

3. Politics


\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item An armed United States marine merchant schooner, the USS \textit{General Sherman} was destroyed by Korean troops, while she visited near Pyongyang to open up Korea to trade in 1866. This accident was significant to the end of Korea’s isolation policy in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. For details, see GlobalSecurity.org, “USS General Sherman Incident,” \url{http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/sherman.htm} (accessed August 13, 2008).
\item Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 32-33.
\item Ibid., 34.
\item \textit{Juche} is the ability to act independently without regard to outside interference. It has played an important role in setting policy-making priorities including in the North Korean foreign policy field. For details, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Pyongyang’s Stake in the Agreed Framework,” in \textit{The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia}, ed. James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (New York, Routledge, 2000), 236-237.
\item Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 36.
\end{itemize}
Pyongyang’s brinkmanship is not a distracting tactic in a larger war-fighting strategy. Instead it is an essential element of a strategy designed to create two results. The first result is a form of interim deterrence against what they perceive as U.S. brinkmanship—the world’s sole superpower applying a preemptive doctrine toward a cluster of rogue states and terrorists. North Korea’s aggressive policy is designed to compensate for their manifest weaknesses and to keep U.S. military capabilities off balance. The second goal is to set the stage for external diplomatic and economic intervention that will pull the confrontational U.S.-North Korea parties away from the brink and act as a catalyst to negotiated reunification of North and South Korea.49

Kim Jong Il adopted a “military-first”50 policy as a guideline for domestic governance and foreign policy. In 1961, Park Chung Hee, a general in the ROK army, conducted a bloodless coup, seized power and governed South Korea with a rigid military dictatorship. Although political liberties were lost, with the support of former officers he fueled South Korean economic development, which planted the seeds for eventual democratization. So it is hardly accidental that, Kim Jong Il has begun to talk favorably about Park Chung Hee as the biggest contributor to the modernization of the South.51

Since the Korean War (1950-53), the Pyongyang regime has created a garrison state. More than half of its population belongs to the military and military decision-making structure.52 It is easily to see why North Korean negotiators at the table, rather than using concession strategies, under their commander’s direction demonstrate warrior-like behavior.53

In terms of its decision-making structure, North Korea’s vertical reporting chain and the dictatorial power of the top leaders shorten the distance between negotiators and


50 North Korea’s “military-first” policy means to increase the role of Korean People’s Army (KPA) and to believe that reinforcing the military is the most important task. For more details, see Choo-Suk Suh, “North Korea’s Military First Policy and Inter-Korean Relations,” The Korea Journal of Defense Analysis XIV, no. 2 (Fall 2002), http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/09-suh.pdf (accessed October 23, 2008), 169-175.


52 Ibid.

the top decision maker, thus also making real negotiations more difficult. This kind of negotiating structure creates an unfavorable situation insofar as information can flow only to the decision maker. Within this structure, North Korea may be using negotiations for dual purposes: agenda setting and propaganda.54

4. Economics

North Korea Juche or self-reliance policy emphasizes self-sufficiency and isolation from external economic factors. North Korean economics have followed Juche since the 1950s.55

The Juche-based economic structure has restricted international trade and economic independence, discouraged direct investment from abroad, and emphasized core industries, mostly heavy manufacturing. Kim Jong Il persists in arguing that the country can be a strong country ideologically and economically only when its military is strong. In recent years, non-military industries have almost collapsed due to the cost of supporting the military.56

In the late 1980s, when Russia’s subsidies to North Korea were cut off by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the North Korean economy began to decline.57 During the 1990s, survival for most of the North Korean population depended on assistance from outside of the regime. In the meantime, North Korea’s centralized economy promoted state-owned heavy industries along with high military spending at around 15-25 percent of GDP. It suffered from drought and floods, which fueled the

54 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 28.
economic crisis. North Korea’s economic crisis seems to have been temporally solved, but its economy is still severely dependent on external aid to relieve famine among a large proportion of its people.  

North Korea’s economic difficulties and collapse influenced its negotiating behavior. An initial element of North Korean brinkmanship was demands for “unilateral concessions” in return for their agreement to negotiate. The Pyongyang regime pushed its counterparts to secure itself, but also to obtain economic concessions at the negotiating table. For example, North Korea extorted unilateral concessions to receive 150,000 tons of rice from South Korea and 500,000 tons from Japan in the summer of 1995; North Korea demanded food again 1996 and 1997 in return for participation in a joint briefing on the Clinton-Kim proposal for the Four-Party Talks. They also used the historic leaders’ summit in 2002 between the two Kims [Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il] to extort illegal financial payments by Kim Dae Jung to the North Korean regime.  

5. The Dynasty of Kim

Although the personality cult of the Kim family in the DPRK may seem extraordinary to outsiders, it makes sense when understood as an aspect of Confucianism and the tradition of the DPRK.

As Paul French notes, “The Kim family revolutionary dynasty is more than just the father and the son. Kim Il Sung’s ancestors have all been effectively beatified as revolutionary heroes, helping to create a dynasty of leaders that runs back into history.”

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59 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 78.
60 Ibid., 77-79.
The personality cult of Kim Il Sung was especially influenced by cultural factors like the Japanese colonial experience, the Stalinist cult of personality, the Confucian tradition, and Korean’s shamanist culture.63

The Kim dynasty created a theoretical justification for the succession of power from Kim the father to Kim the son. In 1972, when North Korea informally nominated Kim Jong Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il was called the “Center of the Party.” By this time he became the “Dear Leader,” then the “Guiding Leader” (Ryongdoja) in 1983. The following year he was called the “Unprecedented Great Man,” and later, in 1997, “Great Leader” (Suryong).64

The Kim family personality cult is strong enough to enforce North Korean negotiating patterns. For example, if foreign negotiators were to insult the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, within or outside of the negotiation, the insult would become a hot button issue for North Korean negotiators.65

C. WHY DOES NORTH KOREA WANT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

What interests are states trying to serve when they seek nuclear weapons? According to Victor Cha, there are various arguments regarding the DPRK’s intentions and the objectives of its nuclear programs. These include defensive military goals (nuclear weapons as a shield), offensive military goals (nuclear weapons as a sword), diplomatic goals (nuclear programs as a bargaining chip) and diplomatic goals (weapons programs serving as a badge).66

This chapter analyzes the logic and theoretical bases supporting these propositions. A neo-realist approach is adopted to explain the motivation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Toward this end, this chapter presents the tenets of this and other forms of so-

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63 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 38.
65 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 40.
called defensive realism and nuclear proliferation. It explains North Korea's nuclear weapons development with regards to a security model and defensive realism during the Cold War and immediately thereafter. It presents research on North Korea’s nuclear policy in relation to defensive realism since the 1970s. The chapter concludes that the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons not only to enhance its security, but also for leverage in the service of its bargaining-diplomatic goals, what Lim calls “proliferation through negotiation.”

1. The Security Model and Defensive Military Goals

If the USSR establishes general diplomatic relations with South Korea, it will make the USSR-DPRK alliance invalid. And the DPRK should make a decision to be the self-reliant regarding nuclear weapons policy.

a. Neo-realism and the Security Model

The neo-realist approach and the “security model” are general schools of thought explaining nuclear proliferation. Many analyses conclude that the leading motivation for nuclear proliferation comes from concerns about security. Additionally, because nuclear policy is normally a strategic top secret shared by a few high class elites, realism simplifies a state’s objectives to security and thus provides reasonable and uncomplicated explanations. This structural theory can clarify and help predict states’ behavior with regard to proliferation and non-proliferation.

As Waltz argues, the basic status of the international political system to which states must adapt are its “anarchic structure” and the number of great powers, which is determined by the distribution of capabilities. First, because the international order is anarchic and the primary goal of states is survival, states cannot help pursuing self-help measures. In other words, states must prepare against threats either by

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67 Lim “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 28-29.
68 Kim Yong-Nam, “This is an Unpleasant Affair for Unification,” Minju Chosun, September 19, 1990).
70 Ibid., 114.
increasing their military muscle or through security alliances with other states. Incidentally, nuclear weapons, because of their deterrent power, confer prestige on those states that possess them. Thus, the anarchic nature of the international system provides incentives for nuclear proliferation.\footnote{Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” \textit{American Political Science Review} 84, (September 1990), 3, Kenneth Waltz, “More May be Better,” in \textit{The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed} ed. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).}

Second, in the logic of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities empowers both the pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as nonproliferation. All states should be among the receivers under the two superpowers’ extended deterrence. The superpowers’ extended deterrence commitment was reliable and deterred against nuclear proliferation. But one superpower may have believed that the existence of one or more of its allied countries did not influence the balance of power. Therefore, that superpower might abandon its ally in the face of conflicts involving nuclear weapons threats.\footnote{In 1956, the United States abandoned French interests because of concerns about nuclear war against the USSR in the conflict between France and Soviet Union over Suez. In contrast, the USSR abandoned Cuban interests because the burden of nuclear war against the United States was too great.} Proliferation or non-proliferation is determined by the tension between these two factors: the credibility of extended deterrence, and fear of abandonment to the forces of the anarchic order.\footnote{Avery Goldstein, \textit{Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), ch. 2.} As Scott Sagan says:

\begin{quote}
Strong states do what they can: they can pursue a form of internal balancing by adopting the costly, but self-reliant, policy of developing their own nuclear weapons. Weak states do what they must: they can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence.\footnote{Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” \textit{International Security} 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/1997): 57.}
\end{quote}

When the strong states’ strategic interests are low, the weak states’ fear of abandonment grows stronger. Even if weak states face technical limitations, nuclear technology and facilities have spread since the 1970s, so economic and technical problems are no longer insurmountable barriers to those determined to possess nuclear weapons. Because it takes a long time to develop nuclear capability, states suspected of...
nuclear proliferation face the long-term risk of preventive strikes by the nuclear weapon states. Efforts to gain nuclear weapons to survive could boomerang against a regime.75 If a regime has reached out for nuclear materials and develops nuclear weapons capability, the chance of preventive strike by another country will decrease. Thus, becoming a nuclear power is an undeniable temptation for a state that wants nuclear weapons for security.76

What does the end of bipolarity mean for proliferation? Neo-realists assume that the end of bipolarity will lead to multipolarity. This could mean abandoning the extended deterrence that prevented proliferation during the Cold War. According to this argument, worldwide proliferation among multiple large powers is now inevitable. Neo-realists also argue that the speed of proliferation will be determined by how quickly extended deterrence is withdrawn.77 However, multipolar structures have not yet emerged and an unexpected unipolar structure has been maintained for an extended period.78

International concerns focus on the so-called, “rogue states,” weak countries estranged by the unipolar structure. Neo-realist theory argues that countries with no resources should try to affect the balance of power by bandwagoning with strong countries.79 In reality, the development of nuclear weapons means continued isolation from the world community. It is a hard choice for weak countries to survive economically in the long run. Therefore, considering security and alternative benefits, giving up nuclear options would be a reasonable alternative. In 2003, Libya chose this approach. At the time, Libya lacked sufficient nuclear materials to take the first step toward becoming a nuclear power, and the Bush administration prevented it from acquiring nuclear materials

by enhancing non-proliferation and counter-proliferation activities. By contrast, it was not known in 2003 whether the DPRK had sufficient nuclear material and equipment to make nuclear weapons.80 If minimum deterrence were to be achieved by possessing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons’ effects needed to be activated as a “strategic balancer,” regardless of the capabilities gap. A country with the capability to make nuclear weapons, therefore, is normally unwilling to abandon it. Muddling through allows a state to make nuclear weapons, and some day to be identified as nuclear state. In 1998, Pakistan chose this approach. Is the DPRK now attempting to pursue a similar course?

b. Defensive Military Goals

Waltz argues that the North Korean nuclear program is a military self-help policy for survival of the regime. It is unlikely that other states or regimes can prevent further North Korean nuclear proliferation. The DPRK wants be a nuclear power because the regime feels weak, isolated, and threatened. As the regime becomes more vulnerable, nuclear weapons become more desirable.81 Defensive military goals theory argues that the imbalance between North and South Korea's economic and conventional military forces, and North Korea's isolation, weakened alliances with China and Russia, and threats from the United States leaves it with, “no alternatives except the nuclear option.”82

Classical notions of collective security (or diplomacy) stet Military goals theory stet that North Korea’s motivation to pursue nuclear weapons comes from its external insecurity. The theories differ in that defensive military goal theory argues that North Korea’s intentions toward nuclear weapons cannot easily be altered. In other words, despite the DPRK regime’s sense of instability, if the United States provides a guarantee not to strike, a peace agreement, and a normalized relationship, the DPRK would

81 Waltz, “More May be Better,” 38-41.
completely dismantle its nuclear programs and declare what it already have and what it has been developing.\(^8^3\) Thus, the military-goal view holds that the DPRK is unwilling to abandon its nuclear programs regardless of U.S. policy, because nuclear weapons are more dependable than any legal security provided by strong states.\(^8^4\) The military force imbalance between the two Koreas may be the main reason for North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.

By contrast, Jervis and Glaser argue that cooperation can be a self-help approach in case of geographical separation, superiority of technology, and defensive military doctrines.\(^8^5\) But this author believes that these particular factors complicate North Korea’s nuclear issues and prevent their resolution. There are no geographical barriers between South and North Korea. The barriers preventing identification of North Korea’s intentions with its forward-deployed military forces since the mid-1970s are South Korean minefields in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and concrete walls. Until 1991, the United States deployed small tactical nuclear weapons to deter North Korea’s reinvasion of South Korea. Also, since the end of 1990s, U.S. military doctrine toward the Korean Peninsula has involved more proactive military actions,\(^8^6\) while in 2005 the use of nuclear weapons became simpler under the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.\(^8^7\)

From a defensive military prospective, North Korea clearly needs aid from outside. To get it, it should change its policy toward nuclear weapons. But it is difficult for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. The only way for the regime to solve both its economic and security problems is to declare denuclearization to the world

\(^8^3\) Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 119-120.


community, while secretly continuing to develop nuclear weapons. This is why Pyongyang gave the international community some relief by allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 1992 and cooperating with the 1994 Agreed Framework and the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, while at the same time continuing to develop its nuclear weapons. North Korea’s nuclear weapons policy is like “parasitic extortionism”\(^88\) to gain outside aid in order to maintain the regime.

c. **The Case of North Korean Proliferation**

(1) The Cold War and “Fear of Abandonment.” The security model says that weak states decide to pursue proliferation or non-proliferation in accordance with the credibility of extended deterrence from strong states. The case of North Korean proliferation during the Cold War era could be a good illustration of this proposition. North Korean nuclear weapons efforts originated not only from the U.S. threat, but also from losing the protection of the Soviet Union’s and China’s extended deterrence. The dynamics of North Korean nuclear weapons development show a typical secondary alliance dilemma.\(^89\)

The Soviet Union satisfied its East Asian alliances through extended deterrence in the 1950s.\(^90\) Following Khrushchev’s struggle for power in the early 1960s, his “revisionist” approach identified a peace and coexistence policy with capitalism. Khrushchev publicly criticized Stalin at the 20\(^{th}\) Party Congress in 1956 and the Communist Party Convention in 1961, and he offended both the Chinese and Albanian Communist parties. For North Korea, the Albanian issue was not just a simple ideological debate. Kim Il Sung commented that the DPRK should prepare to be abandoned by Moscow, as was Albania, and declared a policy of self-reliant survival in


In other words, North Korea had “fear of abandonment.” As Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction and lack of trust in Moscow increased, the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962 led Pyongyang to calculate that Khrushchev had surrendered to the U.S. nuclear threat and abandoned Cuba.\(^92\)

The DPRK revised its nuclear policy from the pursuit of extended deterrence to deterrence by punishment in 1962. At that time, North Korean leaders must have decided to develop their own nuclear weapons. In 1963, Pyongyang asked the USSR to assist with its nuclear programs, but Moscow turned it down.\(^93\) When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nuclear test succeeded in 1964, Kim Il Sung stated that “this success is self-help against the United States’ nuclear blackmail.”\(^94\) He suggested that the two countries share nuclear technology. Mao coldly responded that “small countries such as North Korea do not need nuclear weapons.”\(^95\) When Khrushchev was forced out in 1964, the DPRK again tried to get Soviet nuclear weapons assistance. Early efforts to develop nuclear weapons may have been deterred with conventional military assistance and more credible extended deterrence from the USSR.

North Korea’s second experience of abandonment came with the 1968 Pueblo incident. The DPRK expected Soviet support against the United States’ hard line, but Brezhnev pursued the Soviet Union’s interests, noting that the alliance between the USSR and DPRK was restricted to defensive concerns. The Soviet reaction again provoked North Korea’s fear of abandonment.\(^96\)

Facing an enhanced nuclear threat and fear of abandonment, Kim Il Sung ordered independent nuclear weapons development in the late 1970s. The DPRK


\(^95\) Ibid.

\(^96\) Lim, “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 28-29.
began to build a 5MWe plant at Yongbyun in 1979; the international community also began detecting North Korean possible nuclear-design-related conventional explosions at weapons testing facilities in 1983. Meanwhile, since 1979 Pyongyang has strongly proclaimed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Countries developing nuclear weapons have all concealed their programs and taken a public anti-nuclear stance, as can been seen in the cases of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, China in the 1950s and 1960s, and India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. North Korea followed the same path. The international context for DPRK policy included the Soviet opening toward the West, the collapse of Eastern Europe’s communist countries, Soviet-South Korean diplomatic normalization, the start of U.S.-Chinese military cooperation, and Chinese diplomatic approaches to South Korea. Given these developments, the USSR and China did not need to use North Korea in their strategic competition. Consequently, in 1987 North Korea began to build a reprocessing plant, which became partly operational in 1989. Between 1989 and 1991, the regime obtained a plutonium stock by separating enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons.

(2) Post Cold War and “Proliferation through Negotiation.”

The security model can explain the case of North Korean nuclear proliferation in the Cold War era through the post-alliance dilemma. But the case in the post-Cold War world cannot be explained as clearly. The DPRK cooperated with the world community by agreeing to the IAEA safeguard agreement in 1992 and Geneva framework in 1994. At the same time, it concealed evidence of its past nuclear development and current nuclear activities.

When the United States agreed to a high-level meeting in March 1993, the DPRK returned to talks on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not as a regular member, but withholding secession for special status never officially granted. As talks

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98 Lim, “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 30.

with the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the IAEA made no progress, the DPRK started removing about 8,000 irradiated fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, the only evidence that could verify the past North Korean nuclear activities disappeared, and the DPRK enhanced its nuclear capabilities again. The first nuclear crisis that began with the removal of the irradiated fuel rods was resolved with the 1994 Agreed Framework, but Pyongyang insured its option to develop nuclear weapons again.

The tactics of partial cooperation and proliferation used by the DPRK before the 1994 Agreed Framework were used again. While freezing its plutonium program, North Korea developed a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program\textsuperscript{101} and resumed testing of high explosives assumed to work for nuclear-armed warheads.\textsuperscript{102} The ambiguous North Korean nuclear weapons strategy continued even though North Korean security improved through the Perry and Kim Dae Jung process.\textsuperscript{103} The Pyongyang regime tested a missile in August 1998; it is believed that the missile test was a step toward greater capability to deliver nuclear-armed missiles as well as an inducement to the United States to agree with North Korean demands.

\textsuperscript{100} Harrison, \textit{Korean Endgame}, 213.


\textsuperscript{103} South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung administration emphasized peaceful management of the divisions on the Korean Peninsula through engagement with North Korea; this was the so-called “Sunshine policy.” Norman D. Levin and Han Young Sup, \textit{Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies toward North Korea} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 14-23.
As shown in Figure 1, when the second North Korea nuclear crisis occurred, while the DPRK attended the three Six-Party Talks, they also removed around 8,000 irradiated fuel rods to increase their amount of separated plutonium in 2003 and again in 2005. Pyongyang declared that they possessed nuclear weapons in February 2005. Although the Six-Party Talks on denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula made progress in September 2005, the DPRK tested a long-range missile in July 2006 and exploded a nuclear device in October 9, 2007, against the United States hawk engagement policy.

How can one explain the DPRK’s simultaneous partial proliferation and cooperation with non-proliferation policy? A desire for ambiguity regarding its nuclear capabilities and a passion for the possession of nuclear weapons are part of the answer. The lack of transparency is a distinguishing characteristic of the second-generation proliferation, as seen in the cases of India, Pakistan, and Israel. The North Korean case shares this characteristic, but also shows an extraordinary pattern:

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104 Lim, “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 34.
“proliferation through negotiation.” Many second-generation proliferants (Israel since 1970, India and Pakistan until 1997, and Iran and Iraq from 1989 to 2002) are, according to Etel Solingen, “fence-sitter”\textsuperscript{107} cases. The DPRK is only the state that noisily moved back and forth between proliferation and non-proliferation, pulling out of the NPT in 2003. By showing a strong passion for nuclear weapons and a strategic decision for non-proliferation at the same time, the regime confused the international community and, in the process, has gradually developed its nuclear capabilities, including missile delivery capabilities.

As defensive realist theory argues, if the DPRK focused only on deterrence with nuclear weapons, its policy would be secret proliferation, a neither confirm nor deny (NCND) or “fence-sitter” strategy. This theory could not explain why North Korea froze its plutonium program from 1994 to 2002. If Pyongyang had not frozen its nuclear facilities, North Korea already would have become a nuclear state.\textsuperscript{108} Additionally, if the DPRK pursued regime survival with nuclear weapons, the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program would not be necessary. North Korea has tried to get benefits from nuclear weapons through proliferation and negotiations, which is extraordinary behavior in the post-Cold War world.

2. Rogue States and Offensive Military Goals

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were generally regarded as a tool not for revision, but for status quo by deterrence. Now, in the post-Cold War, the international community has raised concerns that regionally ambitious states and terrorist groups will use nuclear weapons for revisionary objectives. There is no doubt that the use of nuclear weapons by ambitious states and groups would result in their destruction by nuclear retaliation from the United States and its alliance. Nevertheless, as Les Aspin, U.S.


Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton, said, “In the past, we dealt with the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union through a combination of deterrence and arms control…. But the new possessors of nuclear weapons may not be deterrable.”  

This concern stems from the 1991 Gulf War, which held significant lessons for United States military strategy. First, the United States must prevent hostile and rogue states from possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Gulf War, the United States supported harder-line non-proliferation policies, including the IAEA’s decision to assert its right to conduct special inspections. Second, to deter adversaries from getting WMD, the United States decided it needed surgical counter-force strike capabilities and defensive capabilities to secure its homeland and allies against adversaries’ remaining nuclear weapons. These counter-proliferation actions were believed to be more effective than traditional non-proliferation activities.

Additionally, the Gulf War provided critical lessons to rogue states with a hostile relationship with the United States. First, never challenge the United States’ supremacy with conventional armed forces. Iraq could not resist at all, even though Saddam Hussein had about a million troops with plenty of battle experience from the Iran-Iraq War, due to absolute intelligence and air dominance by the United States. Second, WMD can generate the best security guarantee for such a regime. What if Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons and the capability to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Europe, and the United States? Would the United States try to expel Iraq from Kuwait without hesitation? What if, as a nuclear power, Iran invaded Azerbaijan to seize the Caspian oil fields and threaten the United States and Russia with nuclear weapons? How effective and rapid would U.S. responses be toward Iran’s aggression? What if, as a nuclear power, North Korea commits aggression against South Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula and threatens South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed missiles. In this case, would the United States intervene on the Korean Peninsula? If the United States takes action, how rapid would it be? How effective?

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Offensive military goals theorists believe that if North Korea has sufficient nuclear weapons and if Kim Jong Il invades the South, South Korean military forces would be mentally disarmed, and augmentation forces from the United States would be delayed or canceled. In other words, they believe that North Korean nuclear weapons are a sword for unifying the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, just as with defensive military goals, there is a low probability that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons completely. Also, negotiations are among the deception strategies that provide time and resources to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, defensive military goals theory argues that North Korean abandonment of nuclear programs could be achieved, based on the removal of external threats including the threat of a U.S. nuclear attack. Offensive theorists believe that if United States withdraws its nuclear attack threat from North Korea, it could increase the North's ambition to invade the South.111

In general, the DPRK’s ultimate national objective is believed to be the hegemonic unification of the Korean Peninsula. Some experts claim that North Korea’s national objective has changed since the end of Cold War to defensive status quo: to prevent unification by absorption into South Korea.112 Some critics argue that because the two Koreas’ economic gap will increase, North Korea’s defensive survival strategy will likely result in its absorbed unification by South Korea; therefore this is not a long-term strategy for the DPRK. If unification is not achieved by military force, South Korea, which overwhelms North Korea economically, will lead the unification process by economic logic.113 Consequently, analysts argue that trying to unify by armed force would be not only a revisionist ambition, but also an inevitable offensive survival strategy.114 But, as long as the U.S.-ROK security alliance is successful, any attempt by North Korea to unify with conventional forces would be self-destructive.115

111 Lim “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 41.
Offensive military goals theory emerged in the early 1990s. At the time, because estimates placed North Korea’s capabilities as only one or two Nagasaki class weapons without nuclear warhead technology, the regime did not appear as a military threat. This changed after the detection of high-explosive tests and long-range Taepodong-I missiles. Experts estimate that after unfreezing its plutonium program in 2003, the North Korean arsenal may have increased to about ten plutonium weapons. Also, recently it became more plausible to believe that North Korea has delivery technology. The DPRK tested a long-range Taepodong-II missile on June 4, 2006. Were they successful, these tests could eventually lead to more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missiles within range of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. west coast. However, analysts believe the missile is “fairly inaccurate.”

Evaluations by intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments of all seven missiles launched on July 4, 2006, reportedly conclude that North Korea increased the accuracy of its Scud and Nodong missiles and that the launches displayed the ability of North Korea’s command-and-control apparatus to coordinate multiple launchings of missiles at diverse targets.

Victor Cha argues that U.S. involvement might be deterred even if the regime lacks the capability to strike U.S. territory. The DPRK invasion could be achieved through two denial strategies: delaying U.S. augmentations by persistent chemical and biological attacks on South Korean ports and logistics nodes, and deterring U.S. actions by holding Japan’s population centers as nuclear hostages. The feasibility of this strategy depends not on U.S. and Japanese capitulation, but on the allies’ indecision for a long


enough time for North Korean forces to overtake Seoul. If the DPRK takes Seoul, it would hold considerable leverage. It might cease hostilities and seek to negotiate from a position of strength. Therefore, Cha argues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are critical not as part of a defensive existential deterrent doctrine, but as an offensive military strategy.122

3. **Diplomatic Goals**

To deter a U.S. response, the DPRK must overcome a critical obstacle, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK troops. The invasion of North Korea differs from the Iranian and Iraqi cases. The USFK presence allows automatic involvement of the United States in conflicts between the South and North. Therefore, if USFK pulled back from South Korea, once a North Korean invasion take place, its deterrent capabilities against U.S. intervention would become more probable. For this reason, an argument can be made that Pyongyang will use the nuclear card to pull USFK from the Korean Peninsula.

One might argue that Pyongyang is willing to use nuclear-armed missiles as a bargaining chip with the United States in peace negotiations. But it becomes clear that enhancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could motivate Japan to become a nuclear weapons state. However, if the United States withdraws extended deterrence from Northeast Asia due to concern about the nuclearization of Japan, U.S. interests will be harmed. First, the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear commitment in the Northeast Asia and pullback of USFK could conceivably lead to the nuclearization of South Korea automatically. Second, if South Korea did become a nuclear power, Japan’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapons would dramatically increase.

In sum, North Korean nuclear strategy is the paradoxical coexistence of nuclear proliferation and denuclearization bargaining, in other words, Lim’s “proliferation through negotiation.” For Kim Jung II, nuclear proliferation was a tool for both

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deterrence and effective bargaining. In the bargaining process, North Korea has tried to establish moral justification for its nuclear programs to appeal to the international community.

After the October 2006 nuclear test, the complete denuclearization of North Korea seems unlikely. However, it is not reasonable for North Korea to deploy nuclear weapons as long as its nuclear policy simultaneously pursues deterrence and coercion against the United States. It is expected that North Korea will try to adjust its nuclear capabilities through negotiations to a certain level of denuclearization, thus maximizing the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons.

D. NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES AND BEHAVIOR IN NUCLEAR TALKS WITH UNITED STATES

The words brinkmanship, crisis diplomacy, unpredictable, irrational, and crazy are frequently used to characterize North Korean negotiating behavior. Despite these descriptions, North Korea’s negotiating behavior and patterns have been extraordinarily consistent and predictable. As Chuck Down argues, “Few nations have so regularly practiced negotiation as their principal foreign policy instrument, so a familiar set of negotiating tactics, and so doggedly pursued a set of fundamental negotiating objectives.”

Harold Nicolson categorizes alternative modern diplomatic approaches as those of the “warrior” and the “shopkeeper.” The warrior style draws on the military and hierarchical approaches, while the shopkeeper style focuses on helping peaceful commerce.

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123 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 9.
Traditionally, North Korean negotiators employed the warrior’s style in talks with Western negotiators in the armistice dialogue during the Korean War. North Korean negotiators chose the warrior pattern because they were affected by the revolutionary fervor of anti-imperialism and communism.

However, the Pyongyang regime’s negotiating style changed during the first and second nuclear crisis. In other words, North Korean negotiators also adopted the position of a shopkeeper, seeking a common understanding based upon rationality and confidence.

1. Drawing the United States into Direct Bilateral Negotiations

The DPRK’s announcement of its intent to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993 and its nuclear explosive test in October 2006 induced the United States to direct talks. In general, a weak state is not in a favorable position to induce a strong counterpart to negotiate, and a strong state sets various preconditions that are difficult for a weak state to accept.

North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT was a desperate response to an IAEA special inspection. At the time, the Pyongyang regime faced a dilemma. If the IAEA special inspection could not confirm North Korea’s innocence, the North would gain nothing. However, if North Korea was proven to be developing nuclear weapons, it would result in more international pressure. Thus, if Pyongyang accepted all special inspections by IAEA, it would lose its nuclear weapons and potentially its national prestige.

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129 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 52-54.


132 Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 75.
What was the main reason for Pyongyang’s efforts to induce the United States to negotiate bilaterally? North Korean negotiators thought that both the ROK and the IAEA were “puppets” of the United States, so Washington would be more likely than others to compromise. In this context, North Korea’s negotiating pattern focused on extracting more concessions from the United States than from the ROK or IAEA.133

2. Initial Negotiating Stage

a. An Aggressive Stance

The initial North Korean attitude in nuclear talks has been described by Snyder as “If you don’t accept our proposal, we will walk out,” or “We accept your proposal, but you do X first,” a maximum demand for unilateral concession with intentions to break a negotiation.134

An aggressive stance eliminates any possibility that the North Korean negotiators can be dominated. In talks with the United States, North Korean delegates follow their leadership’s instructions, which stress that negotiation with the United States means fighting against “imperialists.”135 As Kim Yong Ho argues, “It certainly serves to protect the delegation from charges back home of weakness or deviation from the party line.”136

b. Raising Principles First

In the initial stages, North Korean negotiators prefer to raise principles that both countries can agree upon. This strategy was clearly used during the first and second rounds of the U.S.-North Korean high-level talks in 1993.137 At the first round of talks in June, North Korea demanded that the United States agree on two principles for

133 Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 76.
134 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 76.
135 Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 76.
136 Ibid.
137 Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 77.
future agreements regarding assurance against the threat and use of forces including nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{138} These principles gave North Korea room for a range of potential disagreements. North Korea used loopholes in the previous agreement.\textsuperscript{139} During the two countries’ high-level talks in 2000, the Six-Party Talks in 2003-04, and in February 2007, Pyongyang insisted on unacceptable details, such as the replacement of the armistice treaty with a bilateral peace treaty, U.S. support for North Korea’s unification formula for Korean Confederation,\textsuperscript{140} and removing North Korea from the U.S. list of countries supporting terrorism.\textsuperscript{141} The 1994 Agreed Framework did not contain removal of North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list. But during the second round of North Korean nuclear tensions, the issue was a major objective of the North Korean negotiating strategy as a precondition for denuclearization.

3. The Middle Negotiating Stage

\textit{a. Demands for High and Unconditional Concessions}

In the middle of negotiating, North Korean negotiators manipulate the agenda by demanding strong and unconditional concessions. This pattern is clearly seen when Kim Jong Il escalated the stakes in the nuclear talks with the United States. Such behavior is an effective signal of a maximalist stance. North Korean negotiators demanded U.S. assurance of no nuclear threat, abandonment of the joint U.S.-ROK Team Spirit exercise, and withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea, all demands largely focused on security goals and regime survival.\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{139} Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 77.
\item\textsuperscript{140} Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, “Chronology of U.S.- North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,”
\item\textsuperscript{141} Larry Niksch, “North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?” \textit{CRS Report for Congress} (January 14, 2008): 1.
\item\textsuperscript{142} Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 77-78.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The response to the pattern of unconditional demands is best illustrated by the rice donations from South Korea and Japan in 1995. But North Koreans made no concessions in return.\textsuperscript{143} Having achieved their objective, North Korean negotiators were confident that the United States would devote itself to resolving the nuclear crisis.\textsuperscript{144} As time passed, North Korea continuously demanded concessions, including political and economic rewards such as diplomatic normalization between the two countries as part of the 1994 deal, energy aid, and benefits from dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

During the Six-Party Talks in February 2007, the North Korean negotiator Kim Gye Gwan reportedly demanded energy assistance so strongly that U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill warned that demanding too much risked collapse of the entire agreement.\textsuperscript{145} North Korea was provided with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil yearly under the Agreed Framework in 1994 and now wanted even greater compensation of 1 million tons.

From the view of most American negotiators, the North Korean behavior depicted follows an unrealistically aggressive pattern of bluffing, maximum demands, and calls for unilateral concessions.\textsuperscript{146} North Korean delegates, in Snyder’s words, “always push as far as they think they can go so that the negotiating counterpart may be operating at a disadvantage.”\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{b. Distracting Negotiating Issues}

In the middle of nuclear talks, negotiators from Pyongyang have distracted their counterparts with new bargaining issues. North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 created a transition of the core negotiating issue, from the IAEA special

\textsuperscript{143} Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 78.
\textsuperscript{144} Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 78.
\textsuperscript{146} Snyder, \textit{Negotiating on the Edge}, 79.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
inspection to North Korea’s continued membership in the NPT. At the second round of high-level talks, supply of the light-water reactor was the main new agenda item at the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{148}

A final example of the tactic of introducing distracting issues is North Korea’s use of long-range missile development to preserve a favorable negotiating position.\textsuperscript{149} After Pyongyang agreed to a long-range missile moratorium with the Clinton administration, nuclear talks were in a deadlock with the Bush administration. North Korea pushed the agenda off-track by testing missiles in July 2006.\textsuperscript{150} The Pyongyang regime induced the United States back to the table to engage in a peaceful diplomatic manner, resulting in the agreement of the Six-Party Talks in February 2007. In the end, nuclear negotiations between the two countries focused not only on nuclear and military issues, but also on political and economic topics like energy aid and diplomatic and economic normalization.

c. Brinkmanship Tactics against U.S. Brinkmanship

Since the early 1990s, brinkmanship has been cited as the most notorious characteristic of North Korean negotiators’ behavior. This negotiating tactic is closely related to crisis diplomacy.\textsuperscript{151}

Charles L. Pritchard argues that “the primary reason Pyongyang is taken seriously at the negotiating table is because of its track record for violence and because the stakes are usually too high, and the consequences for others (not necessarily the negotiators) unacceptable if diplomacy fails.”\textsuperscript{152} The 1993-94 first crisis was seen as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148} Kim, “Warrior or Shopkeeper?” 78-79.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Olsen, “The Goal of North Korean Brinkmanship: Mediation,” 1.
\end{itemize}
mutual brinkmanship. Pyongyang had drawn a red line, saying that any sanctions would be regarded as a declaration of war. Washington also drew a red line over North Korean reprocessing, seeing that as a cause to go to war.\textsuperscript{153}

In other examples, brinkmanship occurred when North Korean negotiators asserted that North Korea planned to test nuclear weapons in the Six-Party Talks, as the DPRK foreign ministry stated, “bolstering its nuclear deterrent as a self-defense measure.”\textsuperscript{154} Why would North Korea adopt a reckless manner that resulted from being included in Bush’s “axis of evil”?\textsuperscript{155} Pyongyang’s brinkmanship is not simply a distracting behavior, but rather it is an essential strategy to create security and economic benefits. Regarding security benefits, Pyongyang wants a deterrent against U.S. brinkmanship. They believe that the Bush administration has adopted a preemptive doctrine with rogue states and terrorists. Setting the stage for diplomatic and economic normalization with the United States is the goal, with the intention of moving the two countries away from mutual brinkmanship.\textsuperscript{156}

d. Crisis Diplomacy

Crisis diplomacy is a highly effective trait of the North Korean negotiating style. It stems from the regime’s internal dynamics, which forces Pyongyang’s line to the top of the list of negotiating issues with the United States, and from North Korea’s partisan guerrilla history. During the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korean negotiators have, whether instinctively, strategically, or unwittingly, employed the tactics of crisis diplomacy to get attention and concessions.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{153} Pritchard, “North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship Testing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.”


\textsuperscript{157} Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 69.
The Pyongyang regime reacted to increased external pressure by threatening to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 and by actually withdrawing in January 2003,\(^{158}\) thus escalating the nuclear crisis between the United States and DPRK.\(^{159}\)

Other significant examples of crisis diplomacy include North Korea’s initiation of the removal spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor in May 1994, extraction of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon storage pool in May 2005, missile tests in August 1998, May 2005, July 2006, and nuclear explosive testing in October 2006.\(^{160}\) This style of diplomacy presents a major challenge to U.S. negotiators. However, it does not always have good results for Pyongyang, as crisis diplomacy also leads to imposition of international sanctions and increased isolation from the external world.\(^{161}\)

E. CONCLUSION

1. Proliferation through Negotiation

This chapter has examined what makes North Korean behavior different in the international community, why they want nuclear weapons, and what kind of negotiating patterns are used by North Korean delegates. The Pyongyang regime has a unique historical background and has continuously faced an unfavorable external environment, economic failure, and insecurity. The Kim family has pursued nuclear proliferation as a diplomatic tool to overcome the limits on its negotiations with the


\(^{159}\) Ibid., 70.


\(^{161}\) Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 71-72.
United States. While bilateral negotiations and agreements contributed to the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear programs in the first and second nuclear crisis, the nuclear material stockpile of North Korea is believed to have grown.\(^{162}\)

This author concludes that North Korean nuclear policy is to seek nuclear weapons as the best diplomatic option to solve threats from the United States and to extract concessions from Washington and its allies. No doubt, Kim Jong Il possesses some nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Even so, he continues to pursue negotiations with Washington, because the regime does not want greater isolation and a worsened relationship with the United States.

1. **Limitations of Brinkmanship and Crisis Escalation Diplomacy**

North Korea’s nuclear strategy and negotiating behavior toward the United States resulted in nuclear proliferation and enhancement of its economic interests. Since the Six-Party Talks became the primary channel for resolving North Korean nuclear issues and North Korean negotiating patterns have been revealed internationally, Pyongyang can no longer use its trademark negotiation strategy of brinkmanship and crisis escalation. During the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korea dealt with U.S. brinkmanship by supporting its own economic interests instead of unilateralism and brinkmanship. This shows that North Korean strategy has changed from traditional brinkmanship, crisis diplomacy, ideology and guerrilla tactics toward the United States to more pragmatic approaches. Examples include freezing the Yongbyon plutonium program after the 2007 Six-Party Talks, providing nuclear activities information to Chinese officials in Beijing on June 26, 2008,\(^{163}\) and demolishing the Yongbyon cooling tower on June 27, 2008.\(^{164}\) These events are evidence of limits on brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy and may represent a change to a more predictable nuclear strategy.

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III. U.S. RESPONSES TO THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States’ policies toward the North Korean nuclear program have attracted increased attention in the series of North Korean nuclear crises since 1993. The Washington-Pyongyang nuclear negotiations that began in June 1993 resulted in the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, even though the negotiations were held in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. But normalization of the diplomatic and economic relationship between the two countries did not emerge and, as the second nuclear crisis erupted, mutual distrust continued to grow on both sides. Indeed, the policies of the United States toward the North Korean nuclear program today are increasingly complicated regarding U.S. national interests versus North Korea’s national interests.165

U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear agenda has been the focus of numerous articles and books. During the post-Cold War era, the United States was attentive to what the DPRK wanted to have, but the foreign and defense policies of United States did not prioritize North Korea’s nuclear problem. As a result, U.S. North Korean policy was not deemed as very important and false hopes at the DPRK’s possible internal collapse caused a disinclination in Washington to deal directly with Kim Jong Il.166

Growing tensions between both sides centered on the North Korean nuclear agenda that became more ominous to post-9/11 America because it was thought that Kim Jong Il might take advantage of the United States’ preoccupation with Islamic terrorists.

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At the same time, U.S concerns became more ominous to North Koreans because it was thought that the United States might attempt to apply the preemptive paradigm of the Bush Doctrine to the North Korean nuclear crisis.\textsuperscript{167}

After North Korea’s explosive test on October 9, 2006, the Bush administration showed a new flexibility to resolving the North Korea nuclear problem. Bush’s decision to change his policy toward North Korea was significant to resolve this tension. Moreover, it was a turning point toward the agreement reached in February 2007.

To examine the U.S. response to the North Korean nuclear program, this chapter begins by looking at U.S. goals toward the North Korean nuclear issue. It will then move on to U.S policy during the first and second North Korean nuclear crises. Finally, it will attempt to describe and explain overall U.S. negotiation strategies in nuclear talks with DPRK.

In sum, the United States pursued denuclearization in North Korea as a U.S. strategic goal in order to maintain stability and peace in Northeast Asia and to enhance a U.S.-led global non-proliferation policy. During the first nuclear crisis, initially, a coercive and aggressive diplomatic pattern had been adopted by the Clinton administration. However, as tension grew and both sides recognized the others intentions, Washington used a give-and-take diplomatic policy to resolve the crisis so that the Agreed Framework in 1994 could be signed by the two hostile countries. However, after the breakout of the North Korean uranium program issue and 9/11, the Bush administration adopted hawkish approaches to deal with the North Korea nuclear program by breaking up the 1994 Agreed Framework. As tensions between the two countries increased, Bush’s hard-line approach failed to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missile development. After North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, the United States engaged again in a cooperative negotiation with North Korea by signing the Six-Party Talks Agreement in February 2007.

In terms of U.S. negotiation strategies with the DPRK, U.S. policy toward North Korea has been influenced by not only the American leader’s perception regarding the

\textsuperscript{167} Olsen, “The Bush Administration and North Korea’s Nuclear Policy,” 47.
North Korean regime, but also the internal and external context that the United States faced. Fundamentally, during the Clinton term, the United States attempted to modify North Korea’s bad behavior through deterrence and engagement responses. In contrast, the Bush administration tried to change the Pyongyang regime by labeling the North Korea regime as part of the “axis of evil,” and attempting to coerce it into favorable policies after the apparent failure of the Bush administration’s hard-line approach, the United States attempted to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis by adopting a new flexibility after North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006.

B. U.S. GOALS TOWARD NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE TWO NUCLEAR CRISES

U.S. negotiations with North Korea in 1993 were closely related to its global non-proliferation policy and goal of preserving the NPT system. Moreover, the North Korean nuclear and missile programs became directly linked to a U.S. security concern. A Pyongyang regime with nuclear weapons could threaten U.S. allies, escalate nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, and transfer such technology to other regions of the world.

Given the U.S. troop presence in South Korea and Japan, there is no doubt that Northeast Asia is of strategic importance to the United States. Unavoidably, U.S. forces would be involved in any initial conflict such as war on the Korean Peninsula. The primary goal toward North Korean nuclear weapons is the non-proliferation of WMD, which is in the interest of all countries in international community. But, American presidents have refrained from enunciating the specific consequences that would result from a North Korean nuclear weapon program. An attempt at regime change similar to the Iraqi Freedom model is improbable because of the prospect of high costs.

The United States was concerned that North Korea might choose to sell nuclear material to possible states and terrorist groups after 9/11. The disturbing fact is that it would be impossible to know whether such a transfer ever took place because of the impossibility of searching all ships departing port and catching smuggling across North Korea’s border in nearby China.168

In sum, U.S. goals toward North Korean nuclear weapons are to deter North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and eliminate existing nuclear weapons in the DPRK in order to improve security in Northeast Asia and secure herself from potential nuclear terror and North Korea’s long-range missile threat. U.S. goals regarding the non-proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons are also significant for the international community.

C. U.S. POLICY DURING THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

1. Historical Background

The first North Korean nuclear crisis emerged in the early 1990s. In the first few years after the Cold War’s end, new evidence of a North Korean nuclear program drove the United States to support a series of measures persuading North Korea to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

North Korea took its time and moved slowly, not signing its safeguards agreement with the IAEA until April 10, 1992, seven years after it signed the NPT. When the safeguards had been agreed, the Pyongyang regime declared its nuclear facilities in early May. The IAEA immediately sent inspectors to each of the nuclear facilities to make sure the DPRK was complying with the agreements and its regulations. These IAEA inspections began in May 1992. The declaration included details of North Korean uranium mining sites, nuclear plants, two nuclear reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon, as well as other nuclear related facilities.

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The North’s threat to withdraw from the NPT brought the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992 to an abrupt halt. Tensions were high on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington deepened.\textsuperscript{171}

North Korea had already reprocessed more plutonium than it had declared, but the IAEA did not know this. The North Korean nuclear reactor had been shut down for about 100 days in 1989. No countries, including the United States, took any action when North Korea did this. The policy adopted by the international community was to have the Pyongyang regime remain in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and then bring it into compliance.\textsuperscript{172}

In the midst of the dispute over demand for a special inspection by the IAEA on suspected sites in February 1993,\textsuperscript{173} North Korea provocatively announced that it would withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993. Under the treaty regulation, the withdrawal of a state does not take effect until after a three-month waiting period, which would mean a deadline of June 12 for negotiations to keep them in the treaty.\textsuperscript{174}

In this grave atmosphere, the United States responded by holding high-level meetings with the DPRK in New York in early June 1993. Initially, the talks produced a joint statement outlining the basic principles for continuing the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, North Korea’s “suspension” of its NPT withdrawal, and a symbolic promise of concessions from the United States. However, confrontation between the IAEA and DPRK continued for three months with regards to a full range of ad hoc and routine


\textsuperscript{173} For more details of special inspection by the IAEA, See “IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections 1992-1993,” North Korea Special Collection, \url{http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea92.htm} (accessed September 17, 2008).

\textsuperscript{174} Aftergood and Kristensen, “Nuclear Weapons Program–North Korea,” 2.
inspections. On November 1, 1993, IAEA Director General Hans Blix submitted a report to the UN General Assembly that North Korea had not cooperated with the IAEA and had continually violated its safeguards agreement.175

As the attempted diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear confrontation appeared to be falling, hard-liners who demanded a tougher approach gained strength in the United States.176 Also, most Clinton administration officials, except a few moderates including Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, viewed that a more hard-line approach toward the North Korean nuclear issue would be necessary.177 Amidst this continued stalemate, the United States provided a draft of UN sanctions and consulted with the members of the UN Security Council. The situation was moving forward in an increasingly conflictual direction.178

A senior Defense Department official announced that the United States had intensified its intelligence operations on the Korean Peninsula in June 11, 1994, and set up a four-step military plan for the peninsula.179 President Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary William Perry, and Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea Gary Luck assembled a meeting at the White House where three military options were drawn up.180 From spring to summer of 1994, heavy tanks, Bradley armored vehicles, and brand new ammunition-loading equipments arrived and a total of six batteries with 48 launchers and over 300 Patriot missiles were

180 Oberdorber, The Two Koreas, 323-325.
additionally deployed to South Korea. The Korean Peninsula had become the staging ground for the most serious preparation for war since 1953.

In the midst of the mounting crisis, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to talk to Kim Il Sung not as an official envoy of the United States, but as a concerned citizen. Carter’s visit in June 1994 helped to defuse tensions and President Clinton embraced Carter’s proposal, which was that U.S. would likely accept a deal that committed North Korea to a verifiable nuclear freeze in exchange for U.S. economic assistance and talks on normalizing diplomatic relation. U.S-DPRK talks opened in Geneva July 8, 1994. However, the talks were recessed by news of Kim Il Sung’s death, then resumed again in August. Both sides signed with the Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994.

2 The Agreed Framework of 1994

The Agreed Framework in 1994 entailed a set of joint and national-level obligations. The details of the Agreed Framework are as follows:

- The United States would provide two LWRs of a thousand megawatts each to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities by the target date of 2003. The United States will organize an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project and will serve as “the principal point of contact with the DPRK.”

- If the project would require U.S. equipment, as is likely, the United States and the DPRK would conclude a bilateral cooperation agreement, as required by U.S. law.

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182 While U.S. military options were widely reported, the fact that the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Luck prepared for a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) was not widely reported. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 326.

183 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 343.


• The United States would arrange to supply the DPRK with 500,000 tons of oil annually “to offset the energy forgone” owing to the freeze of the DPRK’s nuclear program, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

• The DPRK would freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and the related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and the related facilities. The IAEA will be allowed to monitor the freeze. Dismantlement of the DPRK’s reactors and reprocessing plant would be completed when the LWR project is completed.

• The United States and the DPRK would cooperate in storing the spent fuel from the 5-MW (e) experimental reactor during construction of the LWR project and disposing of the fuel in a way that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

• The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. Both sides would work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

• The DPRK would remain a party to the NPT and would allow IAEA inspections under the treaty. On conclusion of the supply contract for the LWR project, IAEA inspections would resume at all declared sites.

• When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK would allow inspection of the disputed sites. More precisely, it would allow the IAEA to take all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

• Terms of repayment: KEDO would be repaid by the DPRK interest-free over 20 years, inclusive of a three-year grace period, beginning with the completion of each LWR plant.186

The primary U.S. concern was focused on the constraints imposed on North Korea’s nuclear weapon program, in return for U.S. leadership of the LWR project and the provision of heavy fuel oil. In other words, the Clinton administration attempted to change the North Korean nuclear policy by providing economic and political incentives that could meet the DPRK’s energy and security needs.

In the initial phase of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, the Clinton administration dispatched substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared

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for striking the North’s nuclear facilities. Grave tensions promoted a “crime-and-punishment approach,” which portrayed North Korea as a threatening rogue state.\textsuperscript{187} However, whenever the United States used an aggressive policy to coerce North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons program, the North became more recalcitrant.

After the turning point of Jimmy Carter’s extraordinary unofficial diplomatic initiative, Washington showed a more cooperative attitude toward nuclear talks with North Korea, and Pyongyang responded with concessions. The Clinton administration recognized that North Korea’s policy could be read as a bargaining chip to get economic and political concessions in return for an abandonment of the nuclear option. Then, the United States employed a “give-and-take” diplomatic policy to settle the nuclear crisis with the DPRK.\textsuperscript{188}

In sum, the U.S. response toward the North Korean nuclear issue during the first crisis shifted from a coercive and aggressive approach to reciprocity, along with recognition of the Pyongyang regime’s intention for its nuclear program and the uncertainty of military actions. In doing so, the United States attempted to ultimately achieve a modification of North Korea’s rogue behavior, particularly its development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and threatening of the United States and its allies.

D. DEBATE ON ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO SOLVE THE NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ISSUE

After the Agreed Framework, the tension seemed to be relieved and the implementing agreement was created to successfully freeze the North Korean nuclear program. However, there were still unsettled problems regarding funding of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, as well as provisions of heavy fuel oil until


\textsuperscript{188} Sigal, \textit{Disarming Strangers}, 21.
the light water reactors were completed. The Pyongyang regime continued to stall on implementing IAEA inspection at the Yongbyon nuclear facility as well as additional suspected nuclear facilities.

A few weeks before, the Republicans had swept the congressional elections in 1994, and this jeopardized the congressional funding of the Agreed Framework. Also, many of Clinton’s administration officials believed that North Korea’s political and economic collapse was imminent; this assumption created concern among U.S. officials about a backlash from Pyongyang.

North Korea’s severe famine became one of the most-debated foreign policy problems in Congress in 1996 and 1997, while its ballistic missiles program dominated the congressional debate on Northeast Asia in the final two and a half years of the Clinton administration. U.S. policy toward North Korea during the Clinton years pursued an inducement and engagement policy to achieve further U.S. objectives. But, the Congress, dominated by the Republicans, stated critically that the “U.S. assistance served only to prop up a dangerous and brutal regime and reward it for misbehavior.”

Debate on engagement strategies toward North Korea within the United States dramatically shifted on August 31, 1998, when the DPRK launched a three-stage Taepodong missile that flew over Japan. Despite the fact that the U.S. intelligence community eventually estimated that the test was unsuccessful, this clearly demonstrated a more advanced development in ballistic missile technology than U.S. and its allies intelligence agencies had previously assessed. In the U.S. response to the test of Taepodong missile, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States had concluded that the Pyongyang regime “would be able to inflict major

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192 Hathaway and Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,” 725.

destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability.”

However, the CIA had assessed in 1995 that North Korea would not have long-range missile capability at least until 2010.

On the North Korea issues about missile and nuclear programs, U.S. intelligence agencies during the 1990s were split, the Department of Defense frequently raised more significant assessments than the State Department and CIA. For example, Thomas Ricks reported, in the Wall Street Journal of September 30, 1997, that the U.S. Department of Defense predicted that the Pyongyang regime was likely to try Korean reunification by military force because the DPRK’s failing economic condition was becoming worse; however, the State Department and CIA believed the regime’s primary goal was self-preservation, and U.S action for war might push the DPRK into a confrontation which it sought to avoid. Additionally, Anthony Lake, former Clinton National Security Advisor stated that the State Department and CIA had often reported diametrically opposed estimates on North Korea’s motivations during the first North Korean nuclear crisis.

The Clinton administration’s North Korea policy was poorly coordinated. Legislation that the U.S. Congress approved in October 1998 mandated the appointment of a senior administration official to coordinate with North Korea, and President Clinton appointed former Defense Secretary William Perry to that position on November 12 to review U.S. engagement strategies toward North Korea. After ten months of review, the Perry report was submitted to Clinton and Congress on September 15, 1999, suggesting a two-track strategy:

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195 Hathaway and Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,” 729.
The first path envisioned a comprehensive set of negotiations that would lead to reciprocal actions by Washington and Pyongyang to eliminate the North Korean nuclear and long-range missile threats and would result in the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations. The second, less desirable path was a continued policy of containment, most likely leading to an increase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula.198

Congressional opinions on the Perry report and a new agreement regarding suspension of North Korea missile tests until 2001 were mixed. Some Republicans sharply criticized the partial lifting of sanctions, complaining that U.S. policy would be uneasy until Pyongyang surely guaranteed it would freeze all its nuclear and missile programs.199 But most Democrats continued to support Clinton’s approach. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking Democrat Joseph Biden stated that “The question is not whether North Korea is a desirable partner for peace. Kim Jong Il has all the appeal of Saddam Hussein. The question is how we manage the North Korean threat. I can’t imagine how the situation would be improved if we did not offer North Korea a chance to choose peace over truculence.”200 During Russian President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2000 and North Korean Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok’s visit to Washington in September 2000, Kim Jong Il proposed a comprehensive missile deal with the United States. When North Korean Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok visited Washington, President Clinton considered a path-breaking trip to Pyongyang. The issue of the North Korea engagement debate was placed on center stage. In reply to Jo Myong Rok’s Visit, President Clinton sent Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000 to negotiate the North Korean missile problem. In the end, the United States ran out of negotiating time. The tactical stand-off, combined with outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential elections and the Clinton administration’s focus on the Middle East peace negotiations in late 2000, doomed the effort to reach a U.S.-North Korean missile agreement.201

198 Hathaway and Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,” 730.
199 Ibid., 731.
Some Republicans asserted that Clinton was attempting to “beef up his resume before leaving office.”

On the other hand, Selig S. Harrison warned that a decision not to go would strengthen hard-liners in Pyongyang to disagree with the abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and commented to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that “they only want to talk about the U.S. end of it, but the real question for us is what the consequences will be in Pyongyang. I’m afraid we’ll pay dearly if he doesn’t go, whoever is president.” In the end, Clinton’s decision not to travel to Pyongyang came in a response to the Republican opposition that there would be insufficient time to specifically nail down a missile agreement and that he “should not tie hands of a possible Republican successor.”

E. U.S. POLICY DURING THE SECOND NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

1. No Engagement Policy

Many people argue that the fundamental difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations is their perceptions of the DPRK. President Bush considered North Korea to be a reckless and aggressive regime with which the United States could not engage and achieve its goals. As a result, the Bush administration concluded that U.S. foreign policy should be tougher and hawkish and should punish North Korea’s rogue behavior after September 11, 2001.

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202 Hathaway and Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,” 731.
204 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 230.
205 Ibid., 229.
After taking office in January 2001, President Bush distrusted North Korea’s self-described peaceful intentions toward its nuclear program policy. He expressed this perception to Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung in March 2001. Bush stated, “I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea….I am concerned about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world.”

Richard L. Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, in the Bush administration had previously drafted a Republican blueprint for North Korean policy titled “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea.” The report was delivered during the Clinton years and was not an official policy statement of President Bush. But, it described the Bush administration’s initial North Korea policy because Bush’s comprehensive approach to North Korea was based on the Armitage report and the advice of key Bush officials, such as head the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Carl W. Ford and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. Even though the enhancement of deterrence was a main component of this comprehensive approach, the report mentioned that this approach meant that U.S. North Korean policy is “prepared to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relations.”

As the Armitage report recommended, the Bush administration initially considered diplomacy to be a good approach to test Kim Jong Il’s intentions, whether or not diplomacy produced positive results. In fact, U.S. North Korean policy in the Armitage report was not very different from the Clinton administration’s approach, as reviewed by the Perry report. William Perry recommended diplomacy to seek complete and verifiable assurances that North Korea give up nuclear weapons ambitions and missile-related affairs. In cases engagement approaches produced unsuccessful results, as Armitage did, Perry concluded that the U.S. policy toward the DPRK should include


209 Armitage, “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea.”

210 Hwang, “Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy toward North Korea,” 19.
strong deterrence mechanisms—to contain and preempt North Korean nuclear and long-range missiles facilities.\(^{211}\) Although the Armitage report described a more pessimistic prediction than the Perry report, in consideration of North Korea’s intentions, the perceptional gap regarding North Korea between the two administrations made a difference with regard to the recommended North Korean policies, and was shaped by internal and external context that the United States faced, such as the 9/11 attack and power transition in Congress and the administration.

However, from January to June 2001, the Bush Administration reviewed U.S. policy toward North Korea with several motivated factors: a more skeptical perception of the Pyongyang regime by the administration, on-going difficulties of implementation of the Agreed Framework, and suspicion of covert nuclear weapons development and continued missile development and sales. This formal policy review did not reject engagement toward North Korea, but was based on a slowdown approach—emphasizing verification and reciprocity and broadening the agenda for negotiation.\(^{212}\) The Bush administration determined that the United States needed to change U.S. policy toward the North Korea nuclear issue.

The Bush administration appeared to have a tougher and more realist approach to dealing with the Pyongyang regime, suspecting the regime’s intentions and commitment to real peace on the Korean Peninsula.\(^{213}\) The Bush national security team reassessed the true goals of the Kim Jong Il regime and concluded that a hard-line realist approach was the best option to deal with North Korea’s negotiating tactics of brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy.\(^{214}\)


\(^{214}\) Downs, Over the Line, 14.
The Bush administration officials also viewed the 1994 Agreed Framework differently. For example, as foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, argued, “The Agreed Framework attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons, but there is a trap inherent in this approach because the possibility for miscalculation is very high.”215 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz noted that it “does not solve the North Korean nuclear problem but simply postpones that problem and may, in the process, make its solution ultimately more difficult.”216 As a result, the Bush administration adopted a limited Clinton-level engagement that treated the Agreed Framework as the initial phase of a policy toward the North Korea nuclear crisis, and not as the end of the crisis. It also quietly shelved talks on a missile deal, believing North Korea could not be trusted. Former Secretary Defense Perry strongly criticized the Bush administration for abandoning the missile talks.217

After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration’s foreign policy appeared to toughen by identifying North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”218 and introducing preemptive action as an option in the war on terrorism in 2002. The following lists the events of the Bush administration policy.

- January 29, 2002: Identification of North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”219
- March 2002: Public release of the Nuclear Posture Review 2002, which included the prospective use of nuclear weapons in a major Korean contingency220


219 Ibid.

June 1, 2002: Announcement of the “Bush Doctrine,” which included preemptive strikes on North Korea\textsuperscript{221}

September 2002: Announcement of the National Security Strategy 2002, which described North Korea one of the United States’ national security threats\textsuperscript{222}

The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed the shrinking of Bush’s policy for engaging the DPRK and strengthened the Bush administration’s view of the Pyongyang regime as a “rogue state,” not a negotiating partner.\textsuperscript{223} After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the Bush administration had neither initiated its recommended “comprehensive approach,” nor begun a “serious discussion” linking the Pyongyang regime to the U.S. global war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{224}

2. Breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework

From October to December 2002, with the growing possibilities of an Iraq War, a more immediate and unpredicted second North Korean nuclear crisis loomed again. During U.S. special envoy James Kelly’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2002 the United States accused North Korea of cheating on the 1994 deal by possessing a covert highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. By the end of 2002, Washington and Pyongyang had discarded their respective commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. By ending the Agreed Framework, the Bush administration decided that the United States was willing to live with future uncertainties and dangers and regard North Korea as an illegitimate regime and a direct threat to vital U.S. security goals. It also seemed to believe that the DPRK would back down. But it did not.

The Agreed Framework in 1994 had successfully frozen the Kim regime’s nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including the work of a plutonium reprocessing facility. Had


North Korea’s reprocessing activities not been frozen, the North could have developed a significant numbers of nuclear weapons, as well as sold weapons-grade plutonium to other countries or groups.225

In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence revealed that North Korea had a covert HEU program, which triggered successive events that reasserted Bush’s no engagement approach toward the Kim Jong Il regime. U.S. official intelligence assessed that North Korea had secretly proceeded with on an alternative nuclear weapons program since the late 1990s. According to the CIA’s assessment, North Korea’s uranium activities appeared during 2001, including imports of materials for the building of a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility from Pakistan. This deal could have provided North Korea with an alternative fissile material to substitute for the frozen plutonium reprocessing activities under the Agreed Framework.226

Although the United States was initially unlikely to highlight the findings of the HEU program, this avoidance had ended by the early fall of 2002. Indeed, the Bush administration exploited the intelligence for political purposes. The evidence of North Korea’s malfeasant behavior provided powerful driving forces to scuttle the Agreed Framework. U.S. officials may have anticipated that a revived nuclear crisis could result in a more satisfactory and durable settlement than the earlier Agreed Framework.227

When it comes to two types of fissile material used for nuclear weapons, they are categorized as weapons-grade plutonium, which is a by-product of nuclear fission containing sufficient proportions of the plutonium-239 isotope, and uranium, enriched to 93 percent with the uranium-235 isotope.228 The gas-centrifuge method is believed to be the most practicable and effective way for states that are planning to pursue a covert enrichment capability. The question of whether plutonium or enriched uranium is the

preferred technology to produce nuclear weapons remains debatable. There are merits and liabilities to both paths, including such issues of “reliability and efficiency of design; volatility and availability of materials; complexity, cost, and ability to avoid detection; and the fissile material requirements for different types of nuclear weapon designs.”

The history of nuclear proliferation in the world reveals that there is no best path and each country’s nuclear history has been different, relying on the level of its nuclear projects and the specific technologies to which they could access. Amid debate on North Korea’s HEU activities in the United States, despite the constraints and the absence of a detected enrichment facility, the Bush administration asserted that Pyongyang was secretly developing an HEU program designed for military goals in violation of the Agreed Framework.

After two years of no bilateral negotiations between the two countries, the Bush officials’ accusation of Kim Jong Il’s HEU program was ignited by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s Pyongyang visit in October 2002. Kelly’s presentation during the meetings with his North Korea counterparts in Pyongyang depicted U.S. responses to North Korean nuclear strategy well. U.S. envoy James Kelly had no “room for maneuver, given the instructions of his superiors.”

As Kelly recounted:

I stated that the United States now had a pre-condition to further engagement—that the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program should be dismantled immediately. I told the North Koreans that we had been prepared to present a “bold approach” to improve bilateral relations…. But given the fresh information of nuclear weapons development efforts, I told my North Korean interlocutors that this approach was no longer possible without action on their part. I did not confront the Vice Foreign Minister with specific evidence of their uranium enrichment program, but I was

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230 Ibid.
231 Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?”; Reiss and Gallucci, “Red-handed.”
emphatic that the U.S. knew the program was being aggressively implemented and it was a serious violation of international agreements. I asked the North Korean government to weigh its response carefully.233

Kelly further stated that Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Kwan “angrily denied that the DPRK had an HEU program. He dismissed my statement, claiming it was a fabrication.”234 And then, in the last meeting in Pyongyang, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju admitted the existence of an HEU program:

Kang Sok Ju, who surprised me by making it quite clear, even before I was able to make my presentation, that North Korea was proceeding with an HEU program and that it considered the Agreed Framework to be “nullified.” … he tried to blame this situation on U.S. policy under the current Administration, but made no response when I pointed out that the HEU program began well before the current Administration.235

After Assistant Secretary Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, the State Department announced that the North had admitted to the existence of a covert HEU program, as well as contending that Pyongyang had declared its intention to end the Agreed Framework.236

Even though North Korea labeled Bush’s approach to her as hostile, President Bush and his officials repeatedly asserted that the administration had “no hostile intent”237 and the reemerged tension did not constitute a crisis but a “serious situation,” on which they focused on a “peaceful resolution through diplomatic channels.”238 The Bush administration seemed determined to deny Pyongyang’s satisfaction of a direct

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234 Ibid., 3.

235 Kelly, “United States to North Korea: We Have a pre-Condition,” 3.


response to North Korea’s violations of the Agreed Framework and remained unchanged by the calls of North Korea’s neighbors (South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China) for the United States to pursue a bilateral engagement with North Korea.

In October 2002, the fate of the Agreed Framework quickly became jeopardized, as both sides moved toward a breakdown of the Agreed Framework. Senior officials acknowledged that “as we know it is dead.” Furthermore, with the concurrence of South Korea and Japan, the United States made a decision to cut off shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. In response to this approach, a week later, North Korea declared that the Agreed Framework was dead, asserting that the oil supplies were the part of the framework that the United States had violated as obligations.

Despite the fact that Pyongyang abruptly reactivated its plutonium program and declared its withdrawal from the NPT, the Bush administration did not change its approach to the Pyongyang regime there would be no bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Breakdown of the Agreed Framework meant that the Bush administration decided to live with future uncertainties and dangers and to readdress the imperfect dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under the Agreed Framework.

3. Hawk Engagement Policy

From October 2002 to January 2003, successive U.S. foreign policy had brought the world to a most dangerous moment, with an increasing possibility of war not only in the Mideast, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Both confrontations are the consequence of the Bush administration’s proactive goal of regime change to overcome perceived threat to the United States and its allies’ interests.

The Bush administration had three motives in its response to North Korean nuclear issue. First, by identifying North Korea as an “Axis of Evil,” it could counter

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240 Ibid.

claims that the United States was focusing its “war on terrorism” against Islamic states alone. Second, the United States could compel Congress to approve funding for its missile defense system by emphasizing on North Korea’s nuclear threat. Third, Bush officials were relying on more hawkish advice, which asserted that a policy of isolating and pushing North Korea would encourage the collapse of its dangerous and undemocratic regime.242

With these motives, the Bush administration implemented a “hawk engagement” policy to justify its hard-line strategy aimed at accelerating the collapse of North Korea. Soon-to-be National Security Council aide Victor Cha argued that “engagement is the best way to build a coalition for punishment tomorrow.”243 A necessary condition for coercing North Korea is the formation of a regional consensus that every opportunity to resolve the problem in a non-confrontational manner has been exhausted. Without this consensus, implementing any form of coercion that actually puts pressure on the regime will not work.244 Cha also said that “engagement does not operate without a net, it is the exit strategy.”245

In terms of the type of “engagement” foreseen by the Bush administration, the U.S. response would be to bring pressure on Pyongyang through military approaches, while the administration would deny any crisis. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, requested the dispatch of a few more squadrons of warplanes to the region in January 2003. U.S. officials confirmed that the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson with its 75 aircraft had been sent to the region and that 24 B-52 and B-1 bombers had been deployed on alert to Guam in February 2003.246 By conjuring up threats of the

245 Ibid., 78.
United States as a prelude to talks, the first one was to disclose the existence of updated U.S. military plans described as “so aggressive that they could provoke a war.”247 The second one was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to intercept delivery of “WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the air, or on land.”248 Hard-liners in the Bush administration pushed for more military pressure, economic sanctions, and naval blockades to end the stalemate. The Bush administration demanded “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)”249 and required North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs in advance of U.S. reciprocity and the construction of the two nuclear plants promised in the Agreed Framework in 1994. Secretary of State Powell asserted that “They will hear what we think about the situation. They will hear our strong views.”250

While Pyongyang demanded bilateral negotiations with Washington to address the nuclear issue, the Bush administration was trying to build a united approach with regional partners, those countries significantly affected by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. When North Korea demanded bilateral talks with the United States, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage testified that “of course we’re going to have direct talks with the North Koreans….Before we do that, we want to have a strong international platform.”251 Thus, Bush’s hawk engagement policy produced strict instructions against negotiation or even to one-on-one talks with North Korea.252

While the Bush administration maintained a pretended commitment to a diplomatic settlement of the North Korean nuclear stalemate, the Six-Party Talks had very few productive results due to divisions within the administration over implementing its North Korean policy such as the BDA issue and bank sanctions. Outside expert Peter

Beck explained that “the neo-cons refuse to allow the State Department to engage in meaningful negotiations…and until this happens, the Six-Party Talks will be virtually meaningless.”253 As Beck explained, “Kelly was reduced to reading statements prepared by the most hawkish elements of the administration….When the North Koreans asked what they would receive if they gave up their nuclear programs, they did not receive an answer.”254 The Bush’s hard-liners were continually pursing “hawk engagement” as “an instrument for revealing Pyongyang’s unreconstructed intentions” and establishing a multilateral framework for “punitive actions.”255 Furthermore, U.S. delegates were acting as if there was nothing inappropriate in their pressure for Pyongyang to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing produced a joint statement in September 2005 to apparently settle North Korea nuclear problem. But in the face of the apparent success of the State Department, the U.S. Treasury Department had stepped up economic pressure on Pyongyang and underlined vigilance in the international banking sector regarding North Korea’s alleged money laundering and counterfeiting of U.S. currency. As a result, North Korea rejected the recently signed deal, the Pyongyang regime continued to produce plutonium at its Yongbyon nuclear facility.256

4. North Korea’s Nuclear Explosive Test in 2006 and Resumption of the Six-Party Talks

In the second term of the Bush administration, the United States approach to the North Korean nuclear issue began to change even before the North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006. This was caused by changes in the political context, personnel, and an identification of its unproductive policy.257 Bush’s officials realized that their hard-line


254 Ibid.


policy toward North Korea had been ineffective. Thus, a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea appeared at the meeting in New York on 7 March 2006. The United States proposed bilateral talks with the DPRK in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Additionally, leaders of the U.S. Congress argued that President Bush should offer bilateral talks and diplomatic normalization relations with Pyongyang.258 During the long-stalled talks with North Korea, the Bush administration had previously held to a policy that it would not offer any progress in terms of improvement of its relations with North Korea before the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs.

While the new U.S. approach to North Korea was considered, the DPRK tested missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-II missile on 5 July 2006. It was assessed to be unsuccessful. But after its nuclear explosive test in October 2006, the North Korea announced that it “successfully conducted a nuclear test at a stirring time when all people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.” 259 After several days of assessment, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosive test was nuclear, but had yielded less than one kiloton.260

The U.S. government immediately condemned the nuclear test and called for a swift international response. President Bush told reporters that Pyongyang “constitutes a threat to international peace and security” and stated that the “transfer of nuclear weapons or materials by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States.”261 But Bush reaffirmed his commitment to diplomacy.262

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260 Avery, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” 1.


262 Ibid.
The UN Security Council passed resolution 1718, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, which aimed at punishing North Korea for its nuclear explosive test by imposing economic sanctions on the Pyongyang regime on October 14, 2006.263

North Korea wanted direct bilateral talks with the United States, but Bush’s hardliners had only agreed to bilateral talks within the frame of the Six-Party process. The United States urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions, but Pyongyang wanted Washington to unfreeze $24 million in its account at the Chinese Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in return for its participation in the Six-Party Talks. U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow hinted at a slight shift in the U.S. stance on bilateral talks with North Korea, saying that there was a possibility of a face-to-face meeting between the U.S. and DPRK negotiations, if the North would also agreed to return to the Six-Party Talks.264

The 13-month-boycotted Six-Party Talks resumed in Beijing on 18-22 December 2006, but it ended without any breakthrough due to the U.S. and DPRK’s conflicting approach to the BDA issue. U.S envoy Christopher Hill insisted that the Six-Party Talks should only focus on resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue, emphasizing that “It’s very important that we not focus on those financial issues but rather on the central matter of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”265

Even though questions about the usefulness of continuing the Six-Party Talks were raised among some U.S. officials, most concluded that the slow progress at the Six-Party Talks had given the Pyongyang regime time to build up its nuclear weapons arsenal.

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Hill noted that “We are disappointed that we were unable to reach any agreement, and diplomacy is not an easy task, but like many things in life, you have to look at the alternatives.”

However, after North Korea’s explosive test, this round of the Six-Party Talks had two significant characteristics to point out. First, the Bush administration changed its hard-line policy toward the North Korea nuclear issue after the November 2006 mid-term elections, which returned both houses of Congress to Democratic control. President Bush also dismissed his hard-line Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Likely under the influence of Secretary of State Rice, President Bush approved bilateral talks with North Korea in Berlin, although he had insisted for four years that he would not allow direct bilateral talks. By showing a new flexibility in dealing with North Korea nuclear issues, the Bush administration wanted to settle the second nuclear crisis in a diplomatic manner. Second, North Korea’s explosive test had contributed to a shift in relation between the U.S. and PRC. Both countries’ strategic cooperation toward North Korea nuclear problem was now essential.

Christopher Hill met his counterpart Kim Kye Gwan in Berlin on January 16-18, 2007 to discuss the nuclear and the BDA issues. The U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks in Berlin were significant in that they were the first negotiation outside of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. The talks produced mutually satisfying progress for the next round of the Six-Party Talks—the outlines of a possible deal. Hill commented, in the midst of his talks in Berlin, that if North Korea were willing to give up its nuclear weapons programs, the United States would be willing to engage in “a bilateral process” to establish “a normal relationship.” His comment clearly signaled that the Bush administration would engage in direct bilateral talks with Pyongyang, as the Pyongyang regime had long demanded.

5. Six-Party Talks Agreement on February 13, 2007

The third session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing on February 8-13, 2007, among the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. They reached a landmark agreement titled “Initial Actions for the Implementation for the Joint Statement.” Whose contents were as follows:

I. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

- The DPRK would shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.
- The DPRK would discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
- The DPRK and the US would start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US would begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
- The DPRK and Japan would start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.
- Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) would commence within next 60 days.

270 Ibid.
II. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

- Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
- Normalization of DPRK-US relations
- Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
- Economy and Energy Cooperation
- Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

By signing the nuclear agreement on February 13, 2007, the Bush administration was willing to embark with a new flexibility to reach an agreement. Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 due to mainly the discovery of Pyongyang’s HEU program, the United States had insisted that the Pyongyang regime should not be rewarded for violating its non-proliferation obligations and it should abandon its nuclear weapon programs before it could receive anything in return. This new stance emerged only after hard-liners in the Bush administration who had opposed engagement with North Korea, such as former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Ambassador to the United Nations John R. Bolton, and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, had left the administration. As a result, the hard-liners’ stature was relatively weakened and the pragmatists’ position represented by Condoleezza Rice was enhanced in the Bush administration.

With regard to the new U.S. flexibility, separately, the chief U.S. negotiator Hill said that the United States “will resolve within 30 days a dispute over U.S. charges that Banco Delta Asia in Macau has been laundering illicit money from North Korea.” This represented a change in the U.S. approach to North Korea, which had previously asserted that the BDA dispute should be considered separately from the North Korean nuclear issue. The Bush administration was expected to unfreeze some of North Korea’s accounts at the Banco Delta Asia in Macao. Administration officials insisted that the

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272 Ibid.
agreement was an improvement over the Agreed Framework in 1994. Under the new agreement, Pyongyang would disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility and eventually dismantle it in return for energy assistance. However, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton slammed the new agreement on February 2007 saying it offered too many compromises and sent a “bad signal” to Iran.273

In line with the February agreement, why did the Bush administration change its hard-line approach to the Pyongyang regime? After North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, initially, President Bush continued to oppose international pressure on North Korea’s “bad behavior.”274 As Joseph Cirincione argued, “there is no other foreign policy victory that the president can likely achieve in 2007. North Korea is one of the few (perhaps one of the only) possibilities.”275 President Bush may have “bowed to reality” in order to demonstrate a belief that could still garner diplomatic achievements and leave office with a successful presidential legacy.276

After the mid-term elections of 2006, the Democratic-controlled Congress had been seen by many as giving public criticism to Bush’s foreign policy on the Iraq war. As a result, the president may have changed his approach to North Korea in order to achieve diplomatic progress with North Korea and to enable his administration to remain firm on his stance in Iraq. Furthermore, Congress began to favor direct bilateral talks with North Korea.277

Lastly, by allowing Christopher Hill more diplomatic leeway than any of his predecessors, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was able to bypass the usual


government policy review procedures to take the accord directly to President Bush. He alone made the “deal or no deal” call. But the question remains: why did he decide not to listen to advice from some of the remaining neo-cons in the administration? Possibly because of the departure of Rice’s rivals and President Bush’s intent to have a settlement of the North Korean nuclear impasse before the end of his term. In the end, after top hawks left Bush’s team, Rice and her aides, those who believed that the neo-cons blocked opportunities for a diplomatic settlement, grabbed leverage to deal with North Korea.

F. NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES IN NUCLEAR TALKS WITH DPRK

The United States has confronted a series of crises over North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles during the Clinton and Bush administrations. Both administrations initially pursued a hard-line policy that brought the two countries to the brink of war, both in 1994 and 2002. The policy’s failure led both administrations to adopt an engagement policy that helped forge diplomatic agreements between the two countries. This author argues that U.S. negotiation strategies have fluctuated by not only the perceptional differences regarding North Korea, but also the specific situation that the United States faced and the flexibility that it gradually adopted.

1. The Clinton Administration’s Strategies: Modification of North Korea’s Bad Behavior and Engagement

The Clinton administration had responded to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through a series of threats and incentives in an effort to modify North Korea’s bad behavior. Specifically, the administration had attempted to induce the Pyongyang regime leaders to give up any nuclear weapons program. Many people believe that the Clinton administration adopted a more soft-line approach than his predecessor. But, the Clinton administration approach was not initially conciliatory. Even though the United States wanted to talk with North Korea, it was simultaneously ready to employ coercive approaches, including military attacks and economic sanctions.

After Clinton took office, relations between the IAEA and the DPRK continued to deteriorate, and there was no progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. Although North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT, the Korean Peninsula was soon plunged into an intense crisis. President Clinton considered the subsequent escalation the only time during his tenure when William Perry, Secretary of Defense “believed that the US was in serious danger of a major war.” The turning point of this impasse came with Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 that led to the Agreed Framework in 1994. Clinton administration officials asserted that North Korea with nuclear weapons was so dangerous that the United States must carefully engage the DPRK to induce it to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Thus, the Clinton administration perceived the engagement policy as a good approach to build trust with North Korea, reduce its insecurity, and end its nuclear threat. They used various carrots, such as economic aid, diplomatic normalization, and regime assurance in return for Kim Jong II’s abandonment of his nuclear weapons program. In this perspective, after the Agreed Framework was reached in 1994, President Clinton sent Kim Jong Il a letter of assurance and pledged to “use the full powers of his office” to adhere to the Agreed Framework and complete the light-water reactor project.

2. The Bush Administration’s Strategies: Regime Change Replaces Engagement, Followed by a Return to Engagement

Bush’s strategy toward North Korea was not always hawkish; after the policy review delivered in June 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would pursue a “comprehensive approach” toward North Korea, which would encourage progress toward the two Koreas’ reconciliation and constructive relationship between the

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281 Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” 82.
United States and North Korea. But, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration’s strategies rapidly shifted to a hard-line approach, such as regime change and hawk engagement.

The Bush administration also had a skeptical view about whether the Pyongyang regime could modify its behavior. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted that North Korea leaders are “idiotic” and warned North Korea with possibility of war and regime change. Senior Bush administration officials believed that a diplomatic approach would not work, and the real objective of the engagement with North Korea was to test its true intentions, which included not only the desire to develop nuclear weapons, but also the ultimate intention to overthrow South Korea and reunify the Korean Peninsula under communist rule. Therefore, the engagement policy would only disclose North Korea’s true nature and provide legitimacy for a punitive option. Because the Pyongyang regime was seen as part of the “axis of evil,” the United States should offer a consistent, long-term strategy that would not only deter North Korea but also will replace its brutal regime.

In Bush’s second term, the U.S. strategy toward the North Korea nuclear issue turned to engagement as markedly as had the Clinton administration. This was caused by “changes in the political context, changes in personnel, and an acceptance of the reality on the ground” and the failure of their hawkish policy. Washington was ready for bilateral talks with North Korea outside the Six-Party Talks and dramatically departed from past policy.


285 Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” 79-84.


G. CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE, ENGAGEMENT, AND ENDURING DILEMMA

U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions were mixed with deterrence and engagement to achieve its goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. During the first nuclear crisis, initially, the Clinton administration used coercive and aggressive approaches. However, as the situation escalated, Washington decided to reciprocally engage with Pyongyang to resolve the crisis and modify North Korea’s bad behavior.

After President Bush took office, the United States attempted to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-line approach. But, the long standoff between the two countries resulted in a gloomier situation toward non-proliferation in North Korea. After North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, the United States engaged again with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks framework in 2007.

U.S. strategies in nuclear talks with the DPRK have been shaped by the internal and external contexts that have been faced, such as changes in politics and personnel, and perceptions of the effectiveness of U.S. policy. The Bush administration approached the nuclear dilemma over North Korea’s nuclear programs initially with an aggressive attitude, but eventually recognized the enduring policy difficulties of dealing with the DPRK by showing a new flexibility.288

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IV. OPTIONS AFTER THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 13, 2007

A. PYONGYANG’S RECENT NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY

The Bush administration and North Korea are now negotiating to implement the February 2007 Six-Party Talks agreement. According to the CRS Report for Congress of January 21, 2008, the main features of the agreement some of which have already occurred as of this writing include the following: 289

1. Phase One

- North Korea is to freeze (“shut down and seal”) its nuclear installations at Yongbyon, including the operational five megawatt nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant.
- North Korea would “invite back” the IAEA to monitor the freeze at Yongbyon.
- As these arrangements are made, North Korea is to receive 50,000 tons of heavy oil. South Korea reportedly would finance this shipment.
- North Korea “will discuss” with the other six parties “a list of all its nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods” from the five megawatt reactor (which North Korea claims to have reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium).
- North Korea and the United States would “start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.” The United States “will begin the process of removing” North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and “advance the process of terminating” economic sanctions against North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act.

Although unstated in the agreement, a de facto component of Phase One was Christopher Hill’s pledge to resolve the issue of U.S. sanctions against Banco Delta and the freezing of North Korean accounts within 30 days of February 13, 2007.

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2. **Phase Two**

- North Korea is to make “a complete declaration of all nuclear programs”
- The IAEA will supervise the disablement of all existing nuclear facilities
- North Korea is to receive “economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil, including the initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil”\(^{290}\)

Pyongyang’s recent nuclear policy can be described with the terms “buying time” and “give-and-take” in the implementation of Phases One and Two. The Pyongyang regime has frequently attempted to slow the deal’s progress, possibly because there are internal conflicts. But this could also seen as bargaining strategy. There was initially little implementation of Phase One due to North Korea’s demand regarding the Banco Delta Asia affair. North Korea refused to implement its obligations in Phase One as long as this relatively small issue remained unresolved.\(^{291}\) The United States finally decided to allow North Korea to withdraw the $25 million.\(^{292}\) However, instead of withdrawing the money in cash, North Korea stalled by demanding assurances from the United States that the U.S. Treasury Department would not penalize any foreign banks that received transferred money from North Korea’s Banco Delta accounts; therefore, implementation of Phase One was delayed beyond the 60 days originally required under the February agreement. In June 2007, the United States and Russia handled the transfer through the New York Federal Reserve Bank to Russia’s central bank, which forwarded the money to a North Korea account in a private Russian bank.\(^{293}\)

Along with the missed 60-day deadline of Phase One, the December 31, 2007 deadline for the reactor’s disablement was not met. The second session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007 produced a statement of the six parties on October 3, 2007. North Korea was “to provide a complete and correct declaration of


\(^{292}\) Niskich, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” 2.

North Korea asserted that it had disclosed all of its nuclear programs on January 4, 2008, but the Bush administration insisted that it had not. The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated that North Korea had “done what it should do.” U.S. officials responded that North Korea’s declaration of November 2007 was incomplete and thus inadequate. After slowing down progress for implementation of the February agreement, creating a lag of six months on the schedule, the North Korean government finally handed over its long-awaited declaration and the side documents regarding its plutonium-based nuclear program in June 2008.

Pyongyang had nothing to gain by showing blatantly non-cooperative behavior. Therefore, it has used the so-called “buying time” strategy, which is to keep negotiations from completely failing, thereby arresting any threat of military action against North Korea and ensuring the flow of economic aid while negotiations are ongoing.

The other nuclear policy North Korea has used to its advantage is the give-and-take approach. North Korea apparently required concessions first, then let the international community dismantle its nuclear installation at Yongbyon and then released information regarding its nuclear program. Similarly, after the money in the BDA account was transferred to North Korea, North Korea invited a team from the IAEA to negotiate the return of IAEA monitors to Yongbyon in July 2007, and international inspectors verified that the Yongbyon nuclear facilities were shut down.

The United States indicated its intent to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In turn, North Korea made its nuclear declaration including


296 Ibid.


important details about its plutonium-based nuclear program and demonstrated its commitment to halt its nuclear weapons program on June 26, 2008. After just a day, North Korea destroyed the most prominent symbol of its plutonium production, a cooling tower at North Korea’s main nuclear power plant, in the presence of U.S. State Department and Energy officials, observers from the IAEA, and the U.S. media on June 27, 2008.\textsuperscript{300} In response, the United States restated that it would remove the country from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and lift some U.S. sanctions against North Korea.\textsuperscript{301} In its first reaction to the U.S. response, however, North Korea stated that “The U.S. measure should lead to a complete and all-out withdrawal of its hostile policy” toward North Korea “so that the denuclearization process can make smooth progress along its orbit.”\textsuperscript{302}

As a result of the disagreement between the two countries regarding a stringent verification protocol proposed by the United States,\textsuperscript{303} North Korea accused the United States of not fulfilling its promise to remove North Korea from the terrorism list after the end of a 45-day notification period that had begun with Bush’s announcement in June.\textsuperscript{304} From North Korea’s perspective, pressing ahead with the strict verification plan was a betrayal of the deal that had resulted in submitting a declaration of its nuclear programs and blowing up the cooling tower.\textsuperscript{305} Therefore, when the Bush administration passed the 45-day mark without any action, North Korea denounced it as “obviously a violation of


\textsuperscript{301} Christiane Amanpour, “N. Korea Destroys Nuclear Reactor Tower,” CNN, June 27, 2008.


\textsuperscript{303} The U.S. Proposal insisted on “full access upon request to any site, facility or location,” whether or not it was in the North Korean declaration, Crail, “Break the Deadlock on North Korea,” 2.

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.,” Washington Post, September 26, 2008, A20.

the principle of ‘action for action’ essential for realizing denuclearization.” Pyongyang then barred inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and began to reverse the work done to disable its key nuclear installations.

North Korea was eventually removed from the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states by the Bush administration on October 11, 2008. In return for being taken off the blacklist, North Korea used its give-and-take nuclear policy by immediately resuming disablement of its nuclear facilities. North Korea eventually gained its long-awaited demand. However, the credibility of North Korea really hinges on whether the Pyongyang regime complies with the nuclear agreement with the United States and other Six-Party Talks partners in a reliable manner or not.

B. WASHINGTON’S RECENT POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

Because of North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge an HEU program and its nuclear assistance to Syria, the North Korean nuclear talks had not yielded fruit for over a year. So the Bush administration compromised with North Korea—Pyongyang would declare how much plutonium it possessed over the years, instead of North Korea’s direct declaration of the HEU program and its assistance to Syria.

Since the Six-Party Talks agreement on February 13, 2007, the most significant move was to delist North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list on October 11, 2008. This move apparently shows the Bush administration’s policy toward the North Korean nuclear program: to act only after North Korea has shown good faith by offering enough cooperation on the broad principles for verifying its nuclear activities. This policy was undertaken, however, over the views of internal skeptics and the objections by a key U.S.

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306 Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal.”
ally, Japan. The administration made a concession, again, on the North Korean nuclear declaration in order to achieve the most important goals of the actual freezing of North Korea’s nuclear program.

This decision reflects an evolution in the Bush administration’s nuclear policy, leaning toward a more pragmatic and engagement-oriented approach to North Korea, and possibly further, to Iran and Syria. Since the North Korean nuclear explosive test in October 2006, the United States has scaled down its demands to keep talks going, along with the release of the North Korean money, which was tied to illicit activities and has minimized concerns about HEU issue and the Syria connection. With this more flexible policy toward the North Korean nuclear program, President Bush is likely to leave his successor with a more workable nuclear disablement process, rather than an overblown and unsettled crisis.

C. POLICY OPTIONS FOR SETTLEMENT THE NUCLEAR CRISIS

Which policy is the best option for achieving settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis? In the current context regarding delisting North Korea from the terrorism list and resuming disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, North Korea now faces a strategic choice about its future. If the North chooses to pursue nuclear weapons, it will be opposed not only by the United States, but also China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, as it was in 2006 after the explosive test. However, if Pyongyang chooses to clearly fulfill its pledge to “commit to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” this course will allow North Korea to achieve a secure relationship with the United States and its neighbors. All efforts to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons should focus on the fact that the regime in North Korea is the

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most secretive and isolated on earth, and intelligence is often not complete. Therefore, we must take a look at “what we have achieved and learned thus far through the six-party framework, and how much more could still be possible.”

1. **Enhance Diplomatic Tactics**

The Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea, since North Korea’s explosives test in 2006, adopted diplomatic tactics to seek a peaceful elimination of North Korea’s decades-long nuclear weapons program. President Bush’s revised diplomatic tactics have had some success and have proven to, perhaps, be the best way to achieve the goal of verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s nuclear declaration and the demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon are significant milestones in the effort by the United States and the world to denuclearize one of the world’s most dangerous regimes. North Korea is no longer freezing its plutonium nuclear facility at Yongbyon, as it did during the Clinton administration, but rather it is disabling it for complete abandonment while U.S. inspectors monitor this process on the ground in Yongbyon. But unfortunately, North Korea has already developed and tested a nuclear weapon.

At this time, Washington should enhance its diplomatic approach to yield greater payoffs in nuclear talks with Pyongyang and strive to avoid reacting under pressure from Pyongyang, such as what happened during the Taepodang missile and nuclear explosive tests in 2006 and most recently by its barring of inspectors from the Yongbyon facilities and its threaten to resume production of weapons-grade plutonium. As long as the United States remains North Korea’s foe, North Korea feels insecure and will continue to pursue nuclear weapons and missiles to deter that threat. Even if this perspective seems far from certain, the only reliable path for creating mutual credibility between the United States and DPRK is by faithfully moving through a series of reciprocal and diplomatic steps.

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314 Ibid.
The Bush administration has been successful in preventing North Korea from further production of weapons-grade plutonium under the Six-Party agreement of 2007. If the United States wants to give North Korea a higher stake in complying with the agreement, an enhanced diplomatic approach is needed, including a fundamentally new political, economic, and strategic relationship with North Korea.315

2. Pursue a Plutonium-First Policy

The central issue that has emerged in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue is whether to focus first on an already-existent plutonium program that has produced fissile material between 46 and 64 kilograms316 or to address both the known plutonium program and a suspected program for HEU, about which little is known.317 The United States should prioritize its dealing with the more real and tangible threat posed by the extant stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.

North Korea’s plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon are being disabled by international effort now. If the disablement is extensive and thorough, the next step would be to dismantle the Yongbyon facilities and eliminate its plutonium stock. This step would mean no more nuclear bombs and less likelihood of nuclear proliferation.318 This is a good opportunity to eliminate the immediate threat of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal before it is expanded and more tests are conducted to perfect its nuclear weapon design. After the dismantlement success, the policy should focus on the HEU issue and Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation policies.

However, dismantlement of the North Korean plutonium program was postponed by the United States to resolve the North Korean HEU issue, the North Korean-Syrian

connection, and the terrorist sponsor list issue. Taking a hard stance again by walking away from the talks or allowing North Korea to slowly disable its plutonium program would now be fruitless. Instead, in the Bush administration’s remaining months and the new U.S. administration’s initial months, the United States must focus on eliminating North Korea’s plutonium production capabilities. Only after the termination of this real and immediate risk from Pyongyang, and by building trust through gradual and mutual concessions, can the United States handle concerns such as resolving the question of uranium enrichment, getting answers about the Syria connection, achieving stability and peace in Northeast Asia, as well as normalization of relations between the two countries.

3. **Enhance the Six-Party Talks Framework**

The current political environment among the Six-Party Talks partners has been uncertain because of several factors: North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s health problem; the new South Korean administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea; the unsolved abductees issue between Japan and North Korea; and disagreement between the United States and Japan regarding delisting North Korea from the U.S. terrorist sponsors list.

In light of these circumstances, it is clear that a diplomatic option through the Six-Party Talks framework is the only workable choice at present. The objective toward the North Korean nuclear issue is clearly to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the associated program, while simultaneously eliminating a threat to the international community. However, this objective will take time to achieve. As long as the current regime in Pyongyang continues to rule North Korea, the Six-Party Talks partners look upon Pyongyang’s commitment to giving up its nuclear weapons with skepticism. Patience from all partners will be critical.

From the perspective of the North Korean leadership, security guarantees should be assured by not only the United States but the other four countries as well and include the following comprehensive approaches: a promise that the United States will not unilaterally use a military option to attack North Korea; real efforts to normalize
diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea; measures to improve economic and energy assistance; and joint efforts to secure a permanently peaceful Korean Peninsula.

Even if North Korea attempts to slow the process of denuclearization with various excuses, delaying measures, and attempts to entirely roll back what has been done, Tanaka argues that there are two reasons for continuing the diplomatic option through the enhanced Six-Party Talks framework.319 First, there is no other reasonable option for freezing North Korean nuclear weapons. Second, a diplomatic process could yield payoffs in consideration of North Korea’s circumstances in the future. North Korea’s national power is continually declining as a result of its economic difficulties, and the Pyongyang regime will not be able to survive without foreign assistance. Additionally, whether or not rumors about Kim Jong Il’s illness are true, the regime remains uncertain and cannot sustain itself forever.320

The international community should recognize that a diplomatic approach to North Korea will not produce success without a mixture of “dialogue and pressure.”321 Toward this objective, it is essential that the five Six-Party Talks partners make more enhanced and united efforts. In the long term, the Six-Party Talks framework could serve the goal of full denuclearization of North Korea. Furthermore, it could play an important role in producing permanent cooperation among the six nations.322

4. Apply the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Model to North Korea

Early in the Obama administration, Washington should be expected to make a high-level statement that the United States is ready to normalize relations with the DPRK and sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War along with elimination of North Korea’s nuclear and dismantlement of its nuclear facilities.

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320 Tanaka, “Revisiting the North Korea Issue,” 2.
321 Ibid., 3.
322 Ibid.
To clearly achieve North Korea’s denuclearization and settlement of the problem on the Korean Peninsula, cooperative threat reduction (CTR) should be a significant part of this effort, along the lines of U.S. programs to deal with WMD in the former Soviet Union, plus other options. It is a favorable time for international society to develop and apply a North Korean Threat Reduction (NKTR) program because the G-8 countries seek to spend $20 billion on such efforts by 2011; U.S. legislation approved spending of threat reduction funds outside the former Soviet states, and Obama’s Korean policy team is also interested in developing a program for the DPRK similar to the CTR program.

In terms of objectives and performance of CTR-type programs, the United States recognized that former Soviet states’ uncontrolled strategic weapons marked a considerable threat by early 1991. Cosponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Dick Lugar (R-IN) in 1991, CTR programs were established by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which set forth the following objectives.

- Reducing the risk that WMD might end up in the hand of sub-national groups
- Preventing the spread of these weapons to new countries
- Supplementing verification regimes by bolstering transparency
- Establishing beachheads of cooperation that can spill over into other issues

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326 Wit, Wolfsthal, and Oh, “The Six Party Talks and Beyond, 7.
The United States cooperates with the former Soviet states to eliminate strategic weapons and delivery systems and is currently investing an estimated $1.5 billion in FY2008, combining funds managed by the Department of State, Energy, and Defense. Other countries also involved, included the European Union, Japan, and Canada.\(^{327}\)

The results of CTR programs have been successful. As of September 2008, 7,292 nuclear warheads have been removed from military stockpiles, more than 496 long-range missile silos have been eliminated, and over 1,400 strategic missiles and strategic bombers have been destroyed.\(^{328}\) Furthermore, CTR programs have provided over 50,000 nuclear weapons scientists with civilian research work and with jobs that allow for the improvement of the economies of their countries.\(^{329}\)

Recently, these programs have been applied to the non-former Soviet states to eliminate chemical weapons in Libya, as well as to convert the Libyan IRT nuclear research reactors for the use only with low-enriched, non-weapon-grade fuel. Also, Libyan nuclear scientists are receiving support.\(^{330}\)

The denuclearization of North Korea is likely to involve thousands of people, including employing scientists, and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Without outside assistance, these tasks may be beyond North Korea’s technical and economic capacities. Thus, a multilateral effort with Six-Party Talks partners will allow political and financial burden-sharing so that a NKTR program in the DPRK could achieve its long-awaited objective. Additionally, participants with different skills and resources would be necessary to develop an effective NKTR program. For example, the United States and


\(^{328}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{329}\) Wit, Wolfsthal, and Oh, “The Six Party Talks and Beyond, 8.

\(^{330}\) Ibid.
Russia have shared previous experience and the technical skills to carry out these programs. But, China, Japan, and South Korea’s contribution in the CTR program will be indispensible in getting the job done.331

Even though North Korea would seem to be reluctant to abandon its nuclear weapon program as long as it has hostile relations with the United States and also remains the world’s most secretive states, North Korea will commit to dismantling parts or its entire nuclear program through multilateral and integrated CTR programs that might provide North Korea with political, economic, and security benefits.

A CTR program that included a verification regime for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula requires a mechanism for enlisting North Korea’s full cooperation in order to produce success. In this sense, politically, there will have to be a six-nation declaration of peaceful coexistence, bilateral talks (US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK) to normalize relations, and North Korean participation in international conferences and institutions.332 In the security approach to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program, U.S. and international security guarantees, bilateral and multilateral military security seminars and exercises, and reciprocal adjustments of military forces on the Korean Peninsula will be required. Additionally, in terms of proposals, it requires including international consortia and other investments in industries and in infrastructure, as well as assistance to the development of commercially competitive enterprises and establishment of modern financial and budgetary systems.333

The Six-Party Talks framework represents the initiation of a program aimed at building trust. A NKTR program would significantly contribute toward the creation of nuclear-free and peaceful Korean Peninsula.

A NKTR program could be established with the following specific features.

331 Wit, Wolfsthal, and Oh, “The Six Party Talks and Beyond, 31.
• The participants would be the United States, ROK, Japan, China, and Russia

• G-8 members and ROK would mainly provide funding for all of NKTR program-related activities

• This program would initially eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons, weapon-grade plutonium stockpile and long-range missiles, along with the IAEA’s non-proliferation activities

• It would develop the necessary nuclear safety infrastructure, including regulations and inspection capabilities, site safeguards, and security programs in North Korea

• It would proceed with military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), which are already identified in the Basic Agreement of 1991 between the two Koreas. Specific examples would be as follows.

  • Establishment of “mutual DMZ monitoring” by representatives of a NKTR program in order to have an early-warning system for the movement and enforcement of both sides’ troops

  • Participation in international military seminars and conferences

  • Reestablishment of a South-North military hotline.

  • The sharing of information regarding military maneuvers

• The DPRK would receive political and economic incentives, such as diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan, a security guarantee from the United States, foreign investment to overcome economic difficulties, and energy and food assistance

Verification of North Korea’s nuclear program is centered on the current impasse between the United States and DPRK. In consideration of a NKTR program, a new approach to verification, involving five Six-Party Talks members will be required for overcoming the deadlock of North Korean nuclear problems. According to John Olsen of Sandia National Laboratories “a regional verification regime” for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula will contribute to not only eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons


program, but also preventing a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. It could emphasize nuclear issues as well as missiles and conventional forces. This regional regime could address South Korean, Japanese, Chinese and U.S. Security concerns.336

V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF BOTH COUNTRIES’ INTERACTIONS

North Korea has a unique historical and cultural background and has continuously faced an unfavorable external environment, economic failure, and insecurity. The DPRK has pursued a nuclear weapon program both as a security mechanism and as a diplomatic tool to help overcome its economic difficulties. While bilateral negotiations and agreements contributed to the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in the first and second nuclear crises, the nuclear material stockpile of North Korea is believed to have grown.

North Korean nuclear policy has been to seek nuclear weapons as the best bargaining mechanism to solve threats posed by the United States and to extract concessions from the United States and its allies. Obviously, Kim Jong Il possesses enough nuclear material for additional nuclear weapons tests. Even so, he continues to pursue negotiations with Washington because the regime does not want greater isolation and a worsened relationship with the United States.

Pyongyang may face future limits on use of its trademark negotiation strategy of brinkmanship. During the second nuclear crisis, North Korea dealt with U.S. approaches by supporting its own economic interests instead of unilateralism and brinkmanship. This shows that the North Korean strategy has changed from traditional brinkmanship, crisis diplomacy, ideology and guerilla tactics toward the United States to more pragmatic approaches. Examples would include freezing the Yongbyon plutonium program after the 2007 Six-Party Talks, providing nuclear activities information to Chinese officials in Beijing on June 26, 2008, and blowing up the Yongbyon cooling tower on June 27, 2008. These events signal the limits on North Korea’s brinkmanship and may represent a change to a more cooperative nuclear policy.

When it comes to U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, these were a mixture of deterrence and engagement to achieve its goal of denuclearization in North
Korea. During the first nuclear crisis, initially, the Clinton administration used coercive and aggressive approaches. However, as the situation escalated, Washington decided to reciprocally engage with Pyongyang to resolve the crisis and modify North Korea’s bad behavior.

By contrast, during the Bush administration period, the United States attempted to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-line approach. But, the long deadlock between the two sides resulted in a gloomier situation toward non-proliferation in North Korea. After North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, the United States engaged again and reached an agreement with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks framework in 2007.

U.S. reactions in nuclear talks with the DPRK have mainly been shaped by the internal and external contexts that have been faced, such as changes in politics and personnel, and perceptions of the effectiveness of U.S. policy. In sum, the United States approached the nuclear dilemma over North Korea’s nuclear programs initially with a hawkish attitude, but eventually recognized the enduring policy difficulties of dealing with the DPRK by adopting a more cooperative approach.

**B. ARGUMENTS FOR AN IMPROVED POLICY OPTION**

As this author argued earlier, North Korea may show more predictable behavior in the nuclear talks and be open to eliminating its nuclear weapons and facilities, if its political and economic demands are met. The United States currently shows more flexibility and uses a multilateral framework to handle the North Korean nuclear problem.

In the political context of the North Korean nuclear issue, all Six-Party Talks members should consider how they could utilize a cooperative threat reduction-type program in the DPRK. These discussions could eventually develop into a North Korea Threat Reduction (NKTR) program that would peacefully eliminate and convert critical parts of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and infrastructure into peaceful use. The best opportunity for successful denuclearization in North Korea involves CTR-type programs that provide political and economic incentives including a regime security guarantee and more energy and food aid for Pyongyang to comply.
The elimination of the North Korea nuclear threats will require a series of diplomatic agreements that lead to the building of common ground for denuclearization in North Korea, which may stretch out over the next decade at a high cost.\footnote{Wit, Wolfsthal, and Oh, “The Six Party Talks and Beyond, 82.}

In terms of theoretical issues, the neo-realist approach helps to explain the motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Thus, North Korea’s nuclear developments can be explained by the security model and defensive realism during the Cold War and immediately thereafter. As this author discussed in regard to North Korean nuclear policy-related theories earlier, the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons not only to enhance its security, but also for leverage in the service of its bargaining strategy: “proliferation through negotiation.” As time has passed, North Korea’s theoretical paradigm regarding nuclear weapons has changed from neo-realism and defensive realism toward neo-liberal engagement with the United States and its Northeast Asian neighbors due to its continued economic difficulties and the problems posed by its political isolation from the international community.

If North Korea’s demands related nuclear problem were to be met, the Pyongyang regime would likely show good faith and eliminate its nuclear weapons. In this sense, an integrated and multilateral NKTR program could address the interests of North Korea as well as all of contributors in those activities.


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