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THESIS

**RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHE VIA LAW ENFORCEMENT
DEPLOYMENT TEAMS: A POLICY ANALYSIS**

by

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December 2008

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DEPLOYMENT TEAMS: A POLICY ANALYSIS**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a policy analysis of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Law Enforcement Deployment Team concept. The concept outlines the need to form specialized regional law enforcement teams to be deployed across the nation to stricken regions. As written, these teams are designed to provide a backfill to law enforcement agencies who require additional assistance post-natural disaster or post-terror attack. Many of the tenets in this DHS concept are derived from existing federal teams such as the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams and Urban Search and Rescue Teams.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005) and the LA Riots (1992) have provided practical examples of inadequate performance of the decentralized law enforcement structure in the United States in response to both natural and man-made disasters. The results have highlighted the inability to mass a trained, synchronized civilian force at the right place and time to provide order and security after catastrophic events. As a consequence, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Major Cities Chiefs Association have proposed a concept termed the Law Enforcement Deployment Team (LEDT) to deploy forces from other departments to fill voids in law enforcement (LE) capacity in disaster areas.

Given the array of increasing threats and the destructive level of natural disasters, the capability provided by the current organization structure of U.S. LE is questionable; specifically regarding the ability to provide an adequate response to catastrophic events that stretch across jurisdictions or to events that exceed the organic capabilities in a single jurisdiction. Given these conditions, this project will seek, first of all, to explain why the U.S. LE structure has remained unchanged despite recent events; and secondly, to consider what management structure should be applied to the newly proposed LEDT concept to ensure it can effectively fill the void of depleted law enforcement in disaster scenarios.

B. RELEVANCE

After the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina and Rita disasters, the U.S. Senate noted that as a nation, the United States has not reacted to the lessons provided by these events to form a “large, well-equipped and coordinated law enforcement response to

maintain or restore civil order after catastrophic events.”¹ Given the size of today’s population centers and the potency of terrorist and natural disaster threats that face the United States, this clearly is an area the nation should explore to determine the best way to achieve the necessary LE capability.

In the current configuration of U.S. law enforcement, there are approximately 17,000 jurisdictions, departments and agencies mostly comprised of small organizations.² In a disaster environment where the organic police force is no longer able to respond adequately. It is difficult at best to send a backup force to fill the vacuum of a depleted large department like New Orleans or Los Angeles when the backup force is geographically dispersed, small in number, lacking in resources, and capability and has been trained and equipped differently from the organization in need of relief.

There has been an ongoing debate regarding the efficiency of the structure of U.S. LE extending decades into the past. Before Hurricane Katrina, however, there had not been a watershed event large enough to lift the debate from academic and practitioner circles to one of political immediacy and necessity. Traditionally, as problems have arisen in law enforcement, tactics and procedures have changed but not the structure itself. It is important to understand despite the type of structure, centralized, decentralized or some other form, the aforementioned events would likely have occurred just as they did. However, structure does matter in facilitating the LE response to manage the aftermath in the recovery phase and may have a significant impact on lessening the actual impact of the event.

In a move to look at structures, the Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with the Major Cities Chiefs Association joined to study this problem and proposed a policy to inject LE capability into disaster areas. Their proposed solution is the LEDT. This concept is predicated upon taking a predetermined amount of personnel

¹ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2006), <https://www.hsdl.org/homesecc/docs/dhs/nps03-050506-01.pdf&code=ca2a7ac9a2c672fabcfcbba9a6c1396> (accessed February 29, 2008).

² Ronald D. Hunter, “Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police,” *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 6, no. 205 (1990), 205, <http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/4/205> (accessed February 29, 2008).

from various participating police departments, packaging them as a combined team and forward deploying them and their requisite equipment to the location of the catastrophe to augment remaining civil law enforcement capability.³ This will be the first time in the history of U.S. LE that the country may achieve a standing non-military backup force to address mass disaster situations on a national level. However, developing the management architecture to manage this force effectively on a daily basis as well as employ it in a coordinated fashion remains an unanswered question.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Practical Problem

The current U.S. law enforcement apparatus may no longer be robust enough to respond to major national disasters as evidenced by the LE response during Hurricane Katrina. To understand why the LEDT is being proposed as a solution, an understanding of the U.S. LE structure is necessary and requires a review of the debate regarding current decentralization versus centralization of the American police apparatus. This background will serve to setup the problem the LEDT concept is trying to solve by providing an explanation of why the problem of massing synchronized civilian law enforcement capability exists at all.

There are two camps regarding this structural argument within law enforcement, those who believe a centralized law enforcement structure should be avoided and those who believe decentralized law enforcement is inefficient and must be changed. Centralization versus decentralization of U.S. law enforcement has been a contentious subject for over eighty years as evidenced by the list of scholars and practitioners writing in this area. Points supporting the maintenance of a decentralized force range from doing so because it is more symbolic of a democratic system, because states reserve the right to provide their own police services under the U.S. Constitution and because a large centralized national police force runs against tradition and appears un-democratic in

³ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams* (Washington, D.C.: National Terrorism Policy Center, FEMA, 2008), 4.

nature. The merits of each of these and numerous other arguments for continued decentralization are debatable. However, the fact remains; the American police apparatus does not provide the capability to inject a large force trained in civil law enforcement techniques rapidly to backfill or replace a severely degraded or overwhelmed organic force in disaster response.⁴

America's police traditions evolved from England's village constable system and out of suspicion of a centralized police authority.⁵ As a result, the U.S. system is comprised of a network of villages where home rule has been largely protected by states' rights as outlined by the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Practitioners and scholars alike back this camp. From the law enforcement side, then Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, believed a centralization of law enforcement, brought on greater potentials for corruption and abuse of power and that cities had the means to conduct their own enforcement activities without need for a centralized force.⁶ From the legal perspective then Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:

Acts which can only be justified on the grounds that they are police regulations, must be so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, or well-being of society, or so imperatively required by public necessity, that they must be taken from the words of the constitution...⁷

Scholars such as J.P. McIver and L. Wagner placed great assurances on local control and fragmented law enforcement authority.⁸ Crank and Langworthy noted that the new Community Policing program was actually a program to maintain a decentralized

⁴ Frances Frogos Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2006), 52, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/> (accessed April 29, 2008).

⁵ John Edgar Hoover, "The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 291, New Goals in Police Management (January 1954), 39-45, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030336> (accessed April 15, 2008); Charles Reith, "Comparative Systems of Law-Enforcement," *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 31, Problems of Public and Private International Law, Transactions for the Year 1945 (1945), 156, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/743276> (accessed April 15, 2008).

⁶ Hoover, *The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement*, 40.

⁷ Glenn H. Reynolds and David B. Kopel, "The Evolving Police Power," *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly* 511, (Spring 2000), <http://davekopel.org/CJ/LawRev/EvolvingPolicePower.htm#FN;B12> (accessed April 15, 2008).

⁸ Hunter, *Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police*, 206.

status.⁹ Liebman and Polen argued that while the police structure is decentralized nationally due to private or community policing in early America, it is actually becoming centralized locally within the larger departments to obtain more capacity to act.¹⁰

The viability of the decentralized police force has been studied and questioned over the past eighty years by leading experts such as “R.B. Fosdick, 1920; the National Commission of 1931; B. Smith, 1931; the President’s Commission, 1976A/B; Sutherland and Cressey, 1970; Wilson and McLaren, 1970; Berkeley, 1976; Tafoya, 1986; and Hunter, 1989 among others.”¹¹ In his study of police forces throughout the world, David Bayley, a leading expert on police structure, notes forces are more likely to be centralized when they have a high mobilization demand or a violent resistance is expected; not unlike the response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina or the LA Riots.¹² Even practitioners have come to question the ills of decentralization as witnessed by former NYPD Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy, who wrote comments stating the small departments in the U.S. should be consolidated into larger departments as he questioned their viability as police agencies.¹³

Despite academic research, numerous policy suggestions and national catastrophic events that all point toward a need for change, the U.S. LE structure remains largely unaltered since its inception. The debate between the two camps has roots in effectiveness in basic organization structures and in political and legal culture; however, it appears through the literature more are beginning to question the viability of

⁹ Daniel E. Marks and Ivan Y. Sun, “The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development among State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23, no. 159 (2007), 163, <http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/2/159> (accessed April 15, 2008).

¹⁰ Robert Liebman and Michael Polen, “Perspectives on Policing in Nineteenth Century America,” *Social Science History* 2, no. 3 (1878), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/1171135?seq=1> (accessed April 15, 2008).

¹¹ Hunter, *Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police*, 205.

¹² David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 68.

¹³ Patrick V. Murphy and Thomas Plate, *Commissioner: A View from the Top of American Law Enforcement* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 43.

decentralized law enforcement as time goes on as evidenced in the previous paragraph. Despite the debate, the structure remains the same as no real steps have been taken to change it.

After the Department of Defense encountered problems in joint warfare throughout the 1980s, the Goldwater – Nichols Act of 1986 brought sweeping changes to military organizations and structures to increase effectiveness. Upon analysis of intelligence failures after the 9/11 attacks, organization and structure changes were brought to the intelligence community through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Post Hurricane Katrina, with the implosion of law enforcement services in New Orleans, Congress asked for a large and well equipped, coordinated law enforcement capability for the nation.¹⁴ Clearly, the United States has not seen the same sweeping changes in U.S. LE. Further debate on the structure of U.S. LE is not without merit, but is unlikely to produce a system-wide change.

2. Response

Given the mixed record of LE to respond under new demands, DHS and local law enforcement leaders set out to acquire an advanced capability to respond through an innovative approach. The proposed Law Enforcement Deployment Team (LEDT) concept is a new idea derived in 2007 in a working group of the Major Cities Chiefs Association in conjunction with the Major County Sheriff's Association, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, ATF, the National Emergency Management Association and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.¹⁵ The final proposal to DHS by this group was released in December of 2007 in the form of a single report. There is little else in literature directly regarding this concept. The crux of the information regarding the policy to be analyzed will come from the Law Enforcement Deployment Team report itself and interviews with the DHS lead for the program, Mr Charles Eaneff and Mr Rick Dinse, FEMA's Chief Law Enforcement Coordination officer, as well as members of the Major Cities Chief's Association as necessary.

¹⁴ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, 35.

¹⁵ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, V.

3. Research Question

Although one could question the efficacy of the LEDT concept itself, the purpose of this project is to answer what management structure should be applied to the newly proposed LEDT concept to ensure it can effectively fill the void of depleted law enforcement in disaster scenarios? To ensure the concept is executable and teams are able to deploy rapidly in response to a national disaster, additional work must be done to develop a management system robust enough to manage a national LEDT system.¹⁶ Correlations can be made between the LEDT concept and the existing Urban Search and Rescue Teams (US&R) and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) as well as with the U.S. military and the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) deployment concept regarding force planning, packaging, requests for forces by the field, mobilization of teams and information preparation of deployment areas. These are all areas on which the current LEDT concept is either thin or silent. Academic literature is also thin to non-existent regarding an LEDT type concept and its employment. Consequently, reliance will be on governmental documents, reports, doctrine and operating instructions to perform an analysis to develop a recommended management system.

The FEMA US&R teams are the local civilian arm of the nation's Search and Rescue program.¹⁷ They were developed in 1990 because of Hurricane Hugo and the earthquake at Loma Prieta where it was noted a national response system was necessary to provide additional search and rescue services in a major disaster area that has overwhelmed existing resources.¹⁸ These conditions are very similar to the ones resulting in the call for a national LEDT system. Before 1990, US&R teams existed throughout the nation mostly in local fire and sheriff's departments; however, there was

¹⁶ Charles Eaneff, Interview by Author, May 2, 2008.

¹⁷ U.S. Government, *National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2007), 4, [http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsarc/NSARC%20-%20Nat%20SAR%20Plan%20\(2007%20-%20Final.pdf](http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsarc/NSARC%20-%20Nat%20SAR%20Plan%20(2007%20-%20Final.pdf) (accessed May 6, 2008).

¹⁸ Fred Endikrat, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding assessing the capabilities and coordination of federal emergency response teams, May 26, 2007, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070509150915-39826.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2008).

not a national system to manage and deploy them to larger crises areas. Although the teams are still locally owned as would be the case with the LEDTs, the US&R management system located within FEMA is used for coordination, maintenance and development of teams to respond nationally when federalized.¹⁹ Detailed review and analysis of this management system is necessary to aid in developing the LEDT management system, particularly in regards to team management and tracking, standardized policy and equipping and logistics management. Additionally, lessons may be learned in the problem areas highlighted during a recent audit with this management system in areas of operational and logistics readiness, staffing, budget and team evaluation.²⁰

The National Medical Disaster System is designed to supplement state and local medical resources during disasters and major emergencies as well as provide backup support to the DoD or VA during times of war.²¹ The DMAT is but one team in this system and is composed of both public and private elements to provide a deployable local civilian medical response of the National Disaster Medical System to a national disaster event.²² Again, this concept is closely tied to the LEDT concept and review and analysis of its management system is necessary before creating a LEDT management system. In an interview with Mr David Lipin, Commander of California DMAT-6, it was further learned that state owned DMAT teams across the nation fall under a central federal management system that runs through the National Medical Disaster System.²³

¹⁹ Fred Endikrat, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding assessing the capabilities and coordination of federal emergency response teams, May 26, 2007, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070509150915-39826.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2008).

²⁰ Richard Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-54_Aug06.pdf (accessed May 6, 2008).

²¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, "The National Disaster Medical System" (Briefing Slides, Washington, D.C., 2005), <http://www.ndms.chepinc.org/presentations/2005.shtml> (accessed May 6, 2008).

²² William L. Devir, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives" (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007), <http://homeland.house.gov/sitedocuments/20070509150859-15247.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2008).

²³ David Lipin, Interview by Author, 2008.

Information is fed by state employees who work as part-time federal employees when managing the system. This is a unique concept that could have great applicability to a LEDT management system.

Another team with close structural ties to the LEDT concept is the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) team. Mr Rick Dinse, Chief Law Enforcement Coordinator for FEMA, commented during a visit at NPS on April 23, 2008 that ILEAS was a working State system from which the LEDT concept may draw valuable information. Review of this team's employment and management functions will provide a current LE example of how the LEDT management system may be designed to ensure proper deployment to national level disasters. The literature on this concept is produced by the State of Illinois and consists of concept and operations documents as well as after action reports in budget and management.²⁴ Mr. James Page, the ILEAS Executive Director, will be interviewed to fill in any gaps in information in ILEAS documentation.

Not by design, the proposed LEDT concept is structured closely along the lines of the U.S. Air Force Security Forces (USAF/SF) deployment concept. The resemblance lies in two key areas 1) tasking existing resources that have primary jobs with a secondary mission to deploy in times of crises and 2) combining disparate small teams into a single larger team to conduct contingency operations.²⁵ Study of the USAF/SF management system would be appropriate to gather lessons learned in organization, equipping, training, and operations before the LEDT management system is fielded. The Air Force Status of Resources and Training program and Status of Forces Reporting Systems also provide examples of systems to report the capability of the team training, equipment and personnel to a higher authority to maintain a catalogue of force availability.²⁶ Interviews with Lt Col Glen Christensen, Deployment Squadron commander and Lt Col James Lowe, Air Combat Command Security Forces Deployment Manager may be necessary to fill in gaps in written documentation.

²⁴ James Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System* (Springfield: State of Illinois, 2005), 9.

²⁵ Thomas Yeager, *AF Handbook 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook* (San Antonio, TX: U.S. Government, 2003), 18.

²⁶ Dennis C. Blair, *Global Status of Resources and Training System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 201), B-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3401_02.pdf (accessed May 9, 2008).

D. METHODOLOGY

Eugene Bardach's book, *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis* and his eight-fold path to more effective problem solving will be used to conduct this policy analysis.²⁷ Bardach provides a succinct and logical approach that provides the flexibility to assess this policy without the rigidity to allow the tool to become the master. The practical problem will be framed by a short historical analysis of the law enforcement structure to establish why the system is set up in its current configuration. This study will outline the history of the U.S. LE apparatus and present evidence to explain why its central tenets make it less than appealing in a wide-area multijurisdictional response and why it is unlikely to change even in the face of increasingly more potent manmade and natural disasters.

To begin answering the research question regarding what management system should the LEDT concept assume, exploration of alternative deployment teams analogous to the LEDT concept is necessary. Alternatives as previously stated are Urban Search and Rescue, Deployable Medical Assistance Teams, the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System deployment concept and Air Force Security Forces. These reviews will define the management systems of the particular teams and tease out smart practices to develop a list of alternatives to be evaluated for consideration in design of a LEDT management system that will provide the capability to ensure a coordinated deployment in times of crises. Expected evaluative criteria used to assess the alternatives include the ability to coordinate, develop shared goals, create management capacity, internal and external acceptability and structure of the system to manage and assess the status of resources on a daily basis.

Finally, evaluated alternatives will be used to make policy recommendations for the design of the appropriate organizational management system. Concepts in organizational design will be considered in recommending a model for the LEDT that go

²⁷ Eugene Bardach, *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 149.

beyond a hierarchical mechanistic model leading to an organic living network construct.²⁸ Potential applicable structures are horizontal organization design,²⁹ team based organizations,³⁰ and structured networks.³¹

Since the academic literature is thin in portions of the areas to be studied, primary sources as indicated in the literature review will be used to fill gaps in information. Other sources will consist of the operating documents for the organizations studied.

²⁸ Daniel Robey, *Designing Organizations: A Macro Perspective* (Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, 1982), 80.

²⁹ Frank Ostroff, *The Horizontal Organization: What the Organization of the Future Looks Like and how it Delivers Value to Customers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25.

³⁰ Susan Albers Mohrman and Allan M. Mohrman, *Designing and Leading Team-Based Organizations: A Leader's Facilitator's Guide*, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 6.

³¹ Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell, *Designing Effective Organizations, How to Create Structured Networks*, 1st ed. (Great Britain: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 24.

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II. UNDERSTANDING BARRIERS TO CHANGING THE U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

New demands on the nation's LE structure such as international terror groups operating within U.S. borders and expanding urban population centers increasingly more vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters would appear to be noteworthy factors to facilitate a reevaluation and potential restructure of the country's LE capacity. However, this reevaluation does not appear likely anytime soon. Why has there been such resistance to change in what appears to be a clear-cut problem area?

Scholars have offered various possible explanations for this lack of change in the U.S. LE apparatus outlined in broad categories such as the lack of political will and resources,³² unlikely cooperation by local governments to relinquish control of LE capability,³³ fear of the loss of liberty by citizens³⁴ and concern over potential erosion of national democratic principles to name a few.³⁵

David Bayley, a leading police scholar provides perhaps a deeper insight and potential root cause remarking that traditions place a heavy weight on the organization of policing. "In whatever form the police organization begins with and the longer this form continues the harder it is to change."³⁶ It is uncommon that one causal mechanism is enough to explain the occurrence of lack of change adequately; however, a brief review of history will show that Bayley's theory is compelling and may be the underwriting factor for the other conditional explanations scholars offer.

³² Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States*, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 1960), 3.

³³ Eric H. Monkkonen, "History of Urban Police," *Crime and Justice* 15, Modern Policing (1992), 571, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147625> (accessed July 8, 2008).

³⁴ Hung En Sung, "Structural Determinants of Police Effectiveness in Market Democracies," *Police Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2006), 5, <http://pqx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/3> (accessed July 12, 2008).

³⁵ George E. Berkley, "Centralization, Democracy, and the Police," *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 61, no. 2 (June 1970), 309, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1142225> (accessed July 12, 2008).

³⁶ Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis*, 64.

The relevance of understanding the historical root cause of the barriers to change is necessary to create a modern opportunity so practitioners and decision makers can create the opportunity to begin a meaningful evaluation and eventual redesign of U.S. LE. In the end, any new system must not only better serve the public but also must be politically acceptable and adequately address traditional concerns of better use of resources, responsiveness to local needs, and preservation of individual liberty and national democratic tenets before it has the slightest chance of being successful.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Law enforcement officials first appeared in the American colonies in the form of sheriffs and constables from a system descending directly from England. In old England, sheriffs were typically despised, as they were judges, juries and tax collectors all wrapped in one.³⁷ Furthermore, the sheriff's power was derived directly from the king, creating an additional source of friction between local citizens and police authority.

Given fresh example of these negative attributes of early British LE and governance, the newly minted American law enforcement system assumed the tenets of limited authority strictly established by law, local government control of LE, and a decentralized police organization that exists to present times.³⁸ Subsequent formation of American LE over time continued to follow the general format of a decentralized American governance system of control by the local people largely distrustful of centralized authority.

As American cities grew, the need for increased capability of crime suppression and deterrence became apparent. In furthering the tradition of local control and distrust of central authority, the urban police apparatus was born from a system where local citizens were appointed as "watchmen" to help curb crime.³⁹ Although mostly ineffective and often corrupt, this system ensured the larger police force remained weak, fragmented and locally controlled. As American government become more complex,

³⁷ Smith, *Police Systems in the United States*, 68.

³⁸ Hunter, *Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police*, 206.

³⁹ Smith, *Police Systems in the United States*, 104.

state and federal police forces formed upon the necessity to enforce laws enacted by these growing jurisdictions, in addition to and intermingled with the local jurisdictions. By 1905, a patchwork of police agencies in multiple and overlapping jurisdictions was fully in place with each police agency's duties defined by the laws of the jurisdiction they resided in and controlled by the political forces to which they were accountable. The result was a "hodgepodge of unconnected, autonomous forces created by various levels of government...."⁴⁰ In light of Bayley's theory of maintaining tradition, rather than create a new and comprehensive system of LE, the old system was gradually added onto in a building block manner with the most important goal being to maintain the traditional tenets of limited authority, local control and decentralization over and above efficiency and effectiveness of the police apparatus. This resulted in what Bruce Smith termed seventy years ago as patches upon patches to provide LE requirements versus the development of an interlocking system of policing.⁴¹

C. JURISDICTIONAL DIVIDE AND CONTROL OF POLICE

These "patches" occurred because the United States is the only country that does not have laws defining the principles of establishing a national policing system.⁴² Resultantly, U.S. LE was not constructed as a networked system but rather in piecemeal fashion, which led to 17,000 individual, overlapping, sovereign jurisdictions, thus complicating the division of responsibility, response priorities, general operations, competition for resources and the ability to interoperate effectively in times of larger crises.

American policing started out in a much simpler time when the mission to enforce laws and protect the public was restricted to the jurisdictions police forces under which they were commissioned. Simplicity was further aided by little overlap of jurisdictions due to physical separation of population centers in frontier society. The "hodgepodge" of

⁴⁰ David H. Bayley, "Police Function, Structure and Control in Western Europe and North America; Comparative and Historical Studies," *Crime and Justice* 1 (1979), 124, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147450> (accessed July 10, 2008).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 109.

U.S. LE became increasingly problematic as society progressed from living rurally on rangelands and sparsely found frontier towns to modern urban living in villages, townships, cities and expansive population centers. Further complications occurred by each local government exercising its sovereignty and legal right to form its own police force at will.

The U.S. LE system was not designed to be purposefully inefficient, but more so to be responsive to local values and preferences supported by local revenues. In light of this, Bruce Smith states, there simply was no system of LE in the United States on a whole as LE capability was grown in independent islands of population centers that eventually grew together.⁴³ This lack of design again follows Bayley's hypothesis of maintaining tradition above all else.

Not only was a decentralized organization of concern to maintain traditional freedom, so too was actual control of the police once formed.⁴⁴ Early on, the police apparatus represented the potential for restraint on freedom and was organized in order to limit unnecessary violations of personal liberty. Restraint of LE was achieved by ensuring independent and local civilian control of the police apparatus. This control originally came from legislative committees or administrative boards made up of lay people outside of the police organization.⁴⁵ Although not the most efficient way to manage a complex police organization, it achieved the larger desire to ensure the police were controlled. Today, with increasing complexity in modern policing, professional police administrators have largely assumed this role ultimately answering to city managers or elected mayors who ultimately answer to the public.⁴⁶ However, scholars and practitioners alike have also debated the legitimacy of this practice.

As recent as the 1960's, centralization and desires to increase overall efficiency and capability in U.S. LE was a hot topic. Due to the rapid proliferation of small police

⁴³ Smith, *Police Systems in the United States*, 4.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁴⁶ Bayley, *Police Function, Structure and Control in Western Europe and North America; Comparative and Historical Studies*, 131.

forces in the U.S. in the '60s, there were high-level attempts to consolidate LE capability. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) attempted a consolidation of these smaller forces but to no avail.⁴⁷ To a minor degree, consolidations have been gained via smaller departments folding into larger metropolitan county size forces and smaller departments contracting with larger county forces for protection.⁴⁸ These consolidations were largely due to fiscal constraints of the smaller jurisdictions. For the most part, villages, townships and cities and their political leaders have not been willing to part with their police forces in exchange for service from a centralized external authority.

Bayley remarked that police of Anglo-Saxon countries are more likely to be controlled by local politicians than in other countries.⁴⁹ This condition has caused many to question how true democratic control is achieved given past scandals involving police use for local political objectives such as control of immigrant populations and labor disputes.⁵⁰ Again, traditional desire to limit central authority blindly represented by police operations has been more compelling than devising modern control measures to achieve the effectiveness and efficiency the U.S. complex society now demands of such a system.

D. ANALYSIS

It should be clear through the brief historical review that American tradition and desire to be free from control by a central authority has been a compelling force in how U.S. LE formed and exists today. These traditions are also likely contributing factors in restricting discussion of any reevaluation of the system into academic circles only.

⁴⁷ David H. Bayley, "Comparative Organization of the Police in English-Speaking Countries," *Crime and Justice* 15, Modern Policing (1992), 534, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147624> (accessed July 10, 2008).

⁴⁸ Albert J. Reiss Jr., "Police Organization in the Twentieth Century," *Crime and Justice* 15, Modern Policing (1992), 66, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147617> (accessed May 5, 2008).

⁴⁹ Bayley, *Comparative Organization of the Police in English-Speaking Countries*, 531.

⁵⁰ Monkkonen, *History of Urban Police*, 581.

In the past, the United States had the luxury to operate a decentralized LE system in order to maintain these traditions; however, the nature of today's threats may no longer make this a viable option. As the role of LE expands well beyond simple crime prevention and maintenance of public order, increased capability with proper measures of efficiency and effectiveness must be considered if the police are to assume the expanding role of providing protection of U.S. citizens both pre and post major incident adequately.

It is not reasonable to believe American traditions can be discounted on the way to a new and improved LE capability; nor are they no longer important. Any rearrangement must be politically acceptable for it to work. However, concerns over centralization, control and local ownership of forces and potential loss of liberty should be reevaluated. The ghosts of simple 1780 American society can no longer be allowed to blindly dictate limitations on modern LE capability in a complex society. At a minimum, a detailed reevaluation of the U.S. system is warranted. Such reevaluations have occurred in other western nations in recent times resulting in positive changes.

Europe saw a trend in centralizing forces in Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, France and Israel in the '60s and '70s with England later reducing and consolidating many of its forces.⁵¹ These moves were made to gain effectiveness of once fragmented LE systems and have demonstrated little negative impact on individual liberty as none of these countries has become totalitarian police states.⁵² It is Berkeley's thesis that small LE organizations answerable to local politicians may in fact be less democratically controlled than under a central LE structure as police leaders locally are subject to the whims of area politicians.⁵³ Many scholars believe the European LE forces are not only more efficient overall but also are better controlled to limit violations on the liberties with which American society is most concerned. The European case should serve as an example of how changes could be pursued to achieve a new American capability.

⁵¹ Berkley, *Centralization, Democracy, and the Police*, 309.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 311.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 310.

The United States has learned from its mistakes and challenges in other emergency response areas within the past forty years. The organization structure and response capability of most of the other first responder components have undergone dramatic changes. The individual response communities realized small town and local area response might no longer be enough to answer the needs of the American people when facing the major threats posed upon U.S. society. It is not surprising that reformation of U.S. LE is last on the list of things to do in the first responder community. This change represents an emotional topic filled with mistrust of the intentions of political leaders, fear of loss of control and a general concern over the impacts such a change may have on society for all of the reasons discussed in the previous sections.

Given this situation what can and should be done? Ronald Hunter says the key to any major reform of American LE is gradual implementation.⁵⁴ Any consolidation of local departments into a more robust capable regional force will require a national level of effort. Marks and Sun found through their research that change is not likely to occur in LE unless the public demands it and funding is made available to affect the change.⁵⁵ Post-hurricane Katrina, there was an outcry by the public and a response by Congress to look at law enforcement capability in major disasters, but as everyday passes and the memories of Katrina fade, so does the opportunity to affect the necessary change.

Shortly after Katrina, DHS through the Major Cities Chiefs Association accurately assessed the consternation and unlikely major change in U.S. LE and embarked on an effort to increase response capability and general LE capability while ensuring control of LE is retained by local authorities. This proposal is the LEDT concept; a national LE response to a major crisis situation.

The remainder of this thesis will address this proposal, look into how the other first responder agencies have revised their response capabilities, what management systems they use to ensure an effective response and propose a management system to ensure the LEDT can do the same.

⁵⁴ Hunter, *Bringing Order to Chaos: A Model for American Police*, 213.

⁵⁵ Marks and Sun, *The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development among State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies*, 170.

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III. LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT TEAM CONCEPT

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States has endured its share of natural disasters in the past century ranging from the all time worst 1900 Galveston hurricane that killed 8,000, the 1906 San Francisco earthquake that killed 3,000, the 1927 Flood that displaced 700,000 people costing \$5B⁵⁶ as well as thirty six hurricanes prior to Hurricane Katrina that cost lives and destroyed property.⁵⁷ The United States has also endured significant man-made disasters such as numerous wildfires deliberately set in California, one of which caused 28,000 acres to burn and displaced 3,000 residents,⁵⁸ the LA race riots where police lost control of a portion of the city leading to 54 deaths and \$800M in damages,⁵⁹ and the terrorist attacks on 9/11 that took 2,974 lives and indirectly cost the nation \$27.2B.⁶⁰ Despite considerable, previous destruction and loss of life, none of these events called into question the structure and ability of U.S. LE like Hurricane Katrina. Why the difference since Katrina did not cause the largest death toll, nor did it impact more area than the 1927 flood?

It is possible to begin to frame the answer to this question by taking three interconnected attributes into consideration, 1) the slow and uncoordinated reaction of the emergency management system as a whole to deal with Katrina victims, 2) a break down of public order after the actual disaster causing event and, 3) the transmission of real-time

⁵⁶ John M. Barry, "The 1927 Mississippi River Flood and its Impact on U.S. Society and Flood Management Strategy," Center for Bioenvironmental Research, Tulane University, http://gsa.confex.com/gsa/2002AM/finalprogram/abstract_44272.htm (accessed July 22, 2008).

⁵⁷ Normand Forgues-Roy, "Was Katrina the Biggest, the Worst Natural Disaster in U.S. History?" <http://hnn.us/articles/17193.html> (accessed July 21, 2008).

⁵⁸ Mike Anton, "O.C. Fire Chief: 'had we had More Air Resources, we would have been Able to Control this Fire' - Los Angeles Times," LA Times, <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-ocfire24oct24,0,5242829.story?coll=la-home-center> (accessed July 21, 2008).

⁵⁹ Christopher Schnaubelt, Lt Col, "The 1992 Los Angeles Riots: Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots," *Parameters*, (Summer 1997), 89, <http://www.militarymuseum.org/LARiots1.html> (accessed July 30, 2008).

⁶⁰ Robert Looney, "CCC - the Economic Costs of 9/11," Naval Postgraduate School, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp> (accessed July 21, 2008).

tragedy onto the television screens of an entire nation. The temporal context of Katrina also further propelled the demand to reevaluate the capability of U.S. LE. Specifically, the Katrina response demonstrated a failure in the regional and national emergency management system that followed closely on the tail end of the 9/11 attacks prompting the public and members of Congress to question the ability of LE to respond to other large-scale events in the future. Before discussing DHS' response to this issue, a brief summary of how LE is currently deployed is necessary to establish an understanding of current procedures, perhaps leading to a better understanding of the current situation.

B. HOW ADDITIONAL LE ASSISTANCE IS DEPLOYED TODAY

Law Enforcement and other first responder capabilities are deployed into requesting jurisdictions via a tiered approach. All emergencies are initially presumed to be local events, although in the case of massive disasters like Katrina, this presumption may be short-lived or even pro forma. Nevertheless, response always starts locally with the city, and when the city is unable to handle the problem within organic resources, they look to outside assistance starting with requests to local private sector businesses and organizations. As these resources are exhausted, cities ask counties for support and if the support is not available or is exhausted, counties ask other counties or parishes, counties ask states and states ask other states. When assistance goes beyond the state's ability to help each other, the federal government receives the request for assistance. This system provides a tiered response that allows local governments to handle their own problems without interference from above yet provides a mechanism to obtain the right additional help when necessary.

Given today's myriad of potential threats and hazards, each jurisdiction must be prepared to deploy as a first line responder within their own jurisdiction and as a requested backup in other jurisdictions. To facilitate rapid response, jurisdictions have entered into memorandums of understanding and agreement with each other to define accurately what services can be provided in order to limit negotiations for support during the crises itself. Perhaps the premier compact between jurisdictions is the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system between states. The current EMAC system is comprised of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Guam and was ratified by Congress in 1996 as Public Law 104-321.⁶¹

The EMAC system is used by states during governor declared emergencies to request assistance from other states. The compact system is administered by the National Emergency Management Association, a 501c(3) non-profit organization, not directly linked with the federal government thus making it a state ran system.⁶² EMAC allows states to access resources from other states by either going directly to a state with an EMAC request or by putting out a broadcast for assistance to all states via the EMAC operations system.⁶³ This broadcast allows states to view requests for assistance by other states and answer with a proposal to provide assistance. One of the most attractive features of this system is it uses a pre-agreed acceptance compact by all states regarding each other's licensing and credentialing regimens, it acts as a promise to reimburse the responding state for all expenses and provides indemnity from liability for responders acting in good faith. States requesting assistance can review proposals from potential responding states, and once they accept assistance from a responding state, this acceptance acts as a legally binding contractual agreement.⁶⁴ Perhaps one of the most strenuous LE examples of EMAC in action was deployment during Hurricane Katrina of 6,880 sheriffs' deputies and police officers from thirty-five states and numerous jurisdictions.⁶⁵

The EMAC system covers states helping states. Should capability become exhausted or if states require a unique federal capability in an emergency declared by a state governor, the federal government engages by employing the National Response

⁶¹ Angela Copple, *Introduction to EMAC* (Rosslyn, VA: National Emergency Management Association, 2008), 3.

⁶² Angela Copple, *EMAC Organization and Governance Structure* (Rosslyn, VA: National Emergency Management Association, 2008), 4.

⁶³ Angela Copple, *Understanding EMAC* (Rosslyn, VA: National Emergency Management Association, 2008), 15.

⁶⁴ Copple, *Introduction to EMAC*, 4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

Framework using the principles of the National Incident Management System to provide the requisite federal response. Within this framework are various levels of command nationally, regionally and embedded at state and local levels, to facilitate the application of federal resources. These federal resources are divided into fifteen emergency support functions (ESF)s managed by FEMA and deployed by the National Response Coordination Center, FEMA's 24/7 operations center.⁶⁶ The ESFs range across first responder and support functions such as transportation, communications, fire fighting, public safety and security etc. and are a bundling of federal resources and capabilities spread across government agencies, NGOs and the private sector but managed by a single point functional area expert within the federal government.⁶⁷ Resources are typed into specific capabilities as packages to standardize deployed support.

In emergency and disaster situations, ESF 13, Public Safety and Security resources may be employed as local and EMAC resources are exhausted. Main ESF 13 missions are technical assistance, public safety and security assessments, badging and credentialing, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, force protection, security for the strategic national stockpile, security surveillance and provision of specialized security resources.⁶⁸ During Hurricane Katrina, ESF 13 deployed over 3,500 federal agents from across the federal government with many aiding the New Orleans Police Department in basic LE functions.⁶⁹

Given what appears to be a robust capability to move forces under the EMAC and ESF 13 systems, why the outcry for review of U.S. LE and the follow-on DHS LEDT concept? In the Katrina example, although the EMAC system delivered a considerable amount of LE assistance into the impacted area, specific concerns arose over who deployed, how they deployed, what capability they deployed with as well as speed of the

⁶⁶ Michael Chertoff, *The National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2008), 56, <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/#> (accessed July 23, 2008).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁸ Michael Chertoff, *ESF 13, Public Safety and Security Annex, NRP* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2004), 4, <http://www.nmfi.org/natlresp/files/ESF13.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2008).

⁶⁹ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 188.

deployment.⁷⁰ These issues surfaced as various responders self deployed into the impact area unannounced. Some were not equipped to handle the environmental conditions after arriving while other responding units had problems synchronizing their efforts with LE units already on the ground. Bluntly, delivering warm bodies is not the same as delivering a proficient and synchronized capability ready to assist. All of these factors lessened the effectiveness of the LE response.

One of the greatest criticisms of ESF 13 in the Katrina case was the LE response was slower than other first responder agencies like US&R and DMAT. Given the perceived lawless condition of New Orleans, many of these rescue-oriented first responder units could not or would not deploy into the city without a LE escort.⁷¹ This condition negatively impacted the speed of the overall recovery of New Orleans. Approximately four days after landfall, 1600 federal LE officers were in New Orleans; however, the city was not declared under LE control until fourteen days after the initial landfall.⁷² Although ESF 13 clearly was successful in the physical movement of federal officers to this disaster area, it lacked in speed and coordination of forces potentially allowing the aftermath of the disaster to be worse than it should have been.⁷³ These criticisms directly tie to and perhaps provide partial explanation of why it took fourteen days to assert LE control over the city. Some may argue that grading LE assistance against a Hurricane Katrina level incident may be unrealistic or unfair. However, not knowing what the future holds makes solving these issues now an investment in our ability to better serve the public need in the future.

Solving these overarching concerns is a function of the LE community as a whole where simple indictment of the EMAC and ESF 13 systems as deployment mechanisms cannot provide complete answers. The speed of each system in support of a major regional disaster is an area for improvement that could be positively impacted by the LE community developing a new mechanism of pre-packaging deployable capability that is

⁷⁰ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 1-4.

⁷¹ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 40.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 41, 47.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 58.

already sourced to deploy and is properly synchronized into the response scheme. Such a concept would provide a new and robust LE capability without significantly altering the structure of LE throughout the country.

The existence of pre-planned and exercised teams against likely scenarios would provide the jump start to place forces on the ground without the current administrative delays, much like the U.S. military does with force packaging and war plans. This capability could assist to better position the LE community to answer the three initial attributes raised at the beginning of this chapter that seemingly made Katrina a watershed event. First, by providing a timely response of trained and synchronized forces knowledgeable of the area thus alleviating the second concern by properly occupying and managing the incident area after the disaster event to prevent additional destruction from social disorder while indirectly reducing the third concern of the media effect on the rest of the country.

In this vein, DHS recently responded to the Congressional concerns with a meeting of the Major Cities Chief's Association, select members of the Major County Sheriff's Association, the National Emergency Management Association, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and various sub offices of DHS and FEMA to discuss the way ahead. This body readily identified that lack of a national police agency or national police force to protect the public and maintain the rule of law during disasters may be a historical luxury that can no longer be maintained.⁷⁴ However, the result of their efforts did not include a recommendation to revamp the LE structure of the country, but proposed an intermediate step to build capability thus staying out of the debate regarding the efficacy of a new national LE structure. The development team proposed a concept termed the Law Enforcement Deployment Team.

C. LEDT CONCEPT DESCRIPTION

To date, the LEDT is merely a concept agreed upon in theory by the previously mentioned major organizations, but not yet operationalized. The overarching tenets

⁷⁴ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 1.

cover most of the traditional who, what, when, where, why and how of planning; however, there are key loose ends in the “how” category that require resolution prior to the concept evolving into a fielded force. These “loose ends” will be further identified and discussed in more detail in the management considerations and gaps section of this chapter.

Who/What/Why: The LEDT concept is designed to package local and state LE officers of multiple jurisdictions and on a volunteer basis into a single highly trained and likely equipped deployable team. This new team presents a homogenous capability that has not been achieved under past EMAC deployments of parts and pieces LE assistance. The former configuration of deployed LE is not a fault of the EMAC system, but is due to the previous shortsightedness of the LE community as a whole to develop a deployment capability found in the medical and US&R communities for the past eighteen years. The LEDT concept is an attempt to correct this flaw of disparate manpower with a team approach. The preponderance of forces will likely come from larger departments as they have more capacity to supply manpower, absorb larger absences and are more apt to have advanced training and experience.⁷⁵ Federal law enforcement officers were excluded as potential team members as they fall under the ESF 13 deployment mechanism.

When: LEDT assets may be deployed when states or local areas do not have enough LE capability to answer the demand within existing resources or when states cannot adequately answer the demand for LE assets through local memorandums of understanding, agreement or other intrastate compacts. By the concept, the trigger mechanism for deployment is designed to occur via a request by the state governor through the state emergency manager who will use the EMAC system to find states that have available resources.⁷⁶ This would launch the deployment of an appropriately sized and resourced LEDT to the affected area.

Where: The concept also states the LEDT will be organized along the lines of the ten existing FEMA regions and FEMA logistics centers (see Figure 1) as Urban

⁷⁵ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 7.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

Search and Rescue teams currently are. Manpower for single teams will be capped at five hundred personnel to preclude negatively impacting the ability to deploy rapidly. Teams will also be of a modular design so they may be deployed as an entire team or as modules of whole teams according to the local on-scene commander's requirements. Teams should be deployed for no longer than fourteen days and will have standardized credentials and uniforms with members selected to meet well defined minimum training, experience, equipment and performance standards.⁷⁷




Figure 1. The ten existing FEMA regions and FEMA logistics centers⁷⁸

D. OPERATIONAL TENETS

LEDTs will provide core LE service in seven areas such as patrol, crowd control, custody teams etc. They will also provide advanced and specialized skills in fourteen mission areas such as SWAT, bomb disposal, hostage negotiation, etc. Logistically, they

⁷⁷ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 11.

⁷⁸ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 16.

will arrive with all requisite equipment to operate independently for fourteen days and will report to and work for the local incident commander consistent with current national incident management and incident command system doctrine.⁷⁹ Prior to the deployment of an LEDT, the local incident commander will assess the situation and call for the necessary LEDT support through the state emergency manager and governor. A regional LEDT advance team will also be deployed to the affected area to help the incident commander determine the right mix of LEDT resources or follow-on forces to be deployed.⁸⁰

In the past, when disaster and emergency situations drove the need for additional LE capability, the National Guard, under control of the governor, has been the force of choice to provide this capability quickly. The reason is the National Guard is a vast resource within the state, directly owned and controlled by the governor or responding state's governor and is readily accessible. During Hurricane Katrina, 50,000 National Guard troops were deployed in State and Title 32 status leaving them under the direct control of the governors.⁸¹ During the LA race riots, 10,000 California National Guard forces were deployed to support the LAPD in riot control operations and other direct LE missions.⁸²

The LEDT concept does not replace the National Guard. An interview with Charles Eaneff, DHS and review of the LEDT concept paper both indicate the National Guard is a compatible force with the LEDT concept.⁸³ However, under the concept, the Guard's role would be adjusted more towards civil support and resource protection type missions, leaving the LEDT to conduct LE functions that involve more interfaces with the public as well as missions that require a higher degree of specialized LE training.⁸⁴ This takes the infantry, engineer or transportation trained National Guard troop out of the

⁷⁹ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁸¹ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 43.

⁸² Schnaubelt, *The 1992 Los Angeles Riots: Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots*, 89.

⁸³ Eaneff, *Interview by Author*.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

role of performing advanced law enforcement functions in dynamic and intense civil situations. The National Guard's assistance in other support areas such as communications, construction of facilities like holding cells, point defense of critical infrastructure and the like would allow the deployed law enforcement officer to be used more efficiently in direct law enforcement and maintenance of public order capacities.

It is envisioned the LEDT will function in two large mission areas. First, in responses to natural disasters, manmade and terrorist incidents as requested by state and local area officials, and secondly, in prevention roles such as securing high threat situations or national special security events, e.g., the Republican/Democratic National Conventions, Olympics, Super Bowl, etc. as declared by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.⁸⁵ To date there has not been any analysis regarding how often the LEDT would have been used in the past had it been available. Such analysis would be helpful to conduct a cost benefit analysis to aid in scaling the teams appropriately. Further research is required in this area; however, it will not be further addressed in this thesis project, as it is not part of the original research question.

Once the team is initially formed, it is expected they will play a large role in prevention operations around the country.⁸⁶ These operations may partially alleviate the question of how the LEDT may have been used in the past by employing it in a new and evolving prevention and protection mission area. These deployments have many benefits such as allowing team members to become accustomed to working with each other prior to deployment to more complex or austere environments. These operations would also exercise the management mechanism and allow teams to work out logistic and deployment bugs prior to moving LEDTs in crises operations.

E. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND GAPS

Operationally, there is little doubt the LEDT concept if adopted could greatly increase the projection of a highly trained, equipped and skilled LE capability into areas

⁸⁵ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 7.

⁸⁶ Eaneff, *Interview by Author*.

of need. The LEDT concept effectively describes who comprises the team, what the team will be used for, when it is likely to be deployed, what its expected capabilities will be and why the team is necessary. However, from a management perspective, the concept becomes unclear and unbalanced when outlining the tenets of who, where and how the team is managed prior to its deployment. This imbalance skirts the age-old debate of local control of LE and centralized versus decentralized capability that yet again unnecessarily complicates the delivery of effective LE capability in times of need. Creation of the LEDT itself provides only a partial operational solution to the current problems previously discussed; however, without a well-defined management system with clear roles and responsibilities, the tenets of the original debate within LE allow the problems clearly identified during Katrina to linger.

The first case of conflict occurs where the plan describes prior to deployment, “the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement would be responsible for policy, planning and management of LEDTs in close coordination with FEMA.”⁸⁷ Furthermore, during the deployment, FEMA is slated to take an operational role of coordination to ensure LEDTs operate in concert with other federal teams. This is certainly a federal-centric approach to LEDT management and employment given these are state resources traditionally owned by governors, county leaders and mayors and employed by state emergency managers. The question becomes, how do DHS and/or FEMA intend to administratively direct, track and manage these state and local resources prior to the declaration of an emergency? Ownership and execution of these management functions are potential points of contention that must be resolved by developing a coherent management plan.

To further this point, the federal government does not get involved in wide-scale local emergency responses that would involve the use of a LEDT type resource until the governor asks the president to declare an affected area as a national disaster or emergency area.⁸⁸ Upon this declaration, federal support is provided with federal assets via ESFs, not by the federal government moving and using state owned assets. States already carry

⁸⁷ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 8.

⁸⁸ Chertoff, *The National Response Framework*, 22.

out this function on their own as seen via EMAC. Additionally, EMAC owned, state sponsored National Coordinating and Regional Coordinating Teams aid to synchronize state resources in federal response scenarios in coordination with FEMA, but not by FEMA as alluded to in the LEDT concept.⁸⁹ The LEDT concept defines a condition where LEDTs are managed by DHS but moved by EMAC creating a confusing or at the least unusual command relationship between the federal, state and local governments and the LEDT. The command relationship must be solidly defined in a management plan.

Drilling further down into the same area, the concept states the EMAC system will be used to deploy the team, which implies the states are in control. State emergency managers manage state resources via databases that are not typically shared with other states or the federal government.⁹⁰ Effective EMAC deployment of these forces would require states to manage the information and systems centrally to move teams, which again runs counter to the plan for the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement to plan and manage teams centrally. Questions of precedence are bound to arise; one entity moves the teams and is the rightful owner of the resource and another entity is responsible for policy, central planning and management. Clearly, the command relationship must be identified in these areas and be properly coupled with the deployment management and delivery mechanism before the LEDT has any hope of operating effectively or efficiently.

Equally important as determining the proper command relationship is determining what management information system will be used to manage the force, where it will reside, who will operate it and what agencies will have access to the data. Supplying LE relief forces to troubled areas, not unlike a military deployment, will only work properly if the elements of that force are pre-identified by location and capability to include: manpower, equipment and training status; transportation and logistics requirements and availability to deploy. These factors must then be applied in the planning phase to create force packages against expected scenarios. These force packages will aid the deployment entity to deliver packaged forces in times of emergency and resolves who is deployed,

⁸⁹ Copple, *EMAC Organization and Governance Structure*, 14.

⁹⁰ Angela Copple, Interview by Author, July 22, 2008.

how they are deployed and provide the necessary speed to the fight, all previously identified detractors during the Hurricane Katrina response. Who actually conducts these management activities and how they are codified are also not explained in the LEDT concept and are weak spots that detract from this otherwise robust concept.⁹¹

Proper management of the LEDT concept should take the principles of war, unity of command and simplicity into account. In the current iteration of the concept, both elements are likely to be violated if one level of government executes management and reporting responsibilities while another executes deployment responsibilities. Fortunately, there are standing examples of teams at federal and state levels that have working management systems to deliver the right capability at the right place and time. Discussion and analysis of other similar first responder teams such as the DMAT, US&R, ILEAS and USAF/SF will be conducted to ferret out existing smart practices that can be used as a template to suggest options to build an effective LEDT management mechanism.

⁹¹ Eaneff, *Interview by Author*.

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IV. REVIEW OF OTHER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

A. INTRODUCTION

When creating a new organization or capability, it often appears easier to use what is already present as a model rather than starting from a blank slate. With this approach in mind, developers of the LEDT concept have specifically honed in on two existing federal response teams stating the proposed national LEDT plan should “build on the success of similar programs such as US&R and DMAT.”⁹² The plan goes on to make numerous references to these two teams as good templates and uses many of their tenets to develop the pillars of the LEDT concept. No doubt, the DMAT and US&R teams themselves have valiantly delivered crucial services to the community over the years as noted by Congress and emergency response practitioners alike.⁹³ This critical acclaim is perhaps what makes the teams attractive as a starting point for reform; however, their management systems have not received the same glowing remarks. As discussed in the previous chapter, the mere existence of teams does not make for a national response system.

With this point in mind, the salient questions become, is there a historic record of successful performance in these two team’s management systems that would indicate they may be appropriate systems to template from, or do these teams succeed despite their management mechanisms? Additionally, US&R and DMAT teams are only two of several hundred response teams that reside within the federal government. Although there is not enough time in this project to study them all, review of the management systems of other yet similar response teams is prudent to determine potential applicability and to identify other possible smart practices. Therefore, in addition to review of the DMAT and US&R management systems, a review of a state emergency response team in

⁹² Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 4.

⁹³ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, 343.

the form of the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) and a military system in the form of the U.S. Air Force Security Forces will also be conducted to gain a broader perspective of other potential management system options.

The rationale for review of these systems is to provide key insights to help answer the original research question of what management structure should be applied to the newly proposed LEDT concept to assist it better to fill the void of depleted law enforcement services effectively in disaster scenarios. The following sections will address background, deployment concepts and deployment history of the teams reviewed to demonstrate their likeness to the LEDT concept followed by a description of the management system, how they responded to crises and ending with a discussion of smart practices.

B. THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM (NDMS) AND DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS (DMAT)

1. Mission

The National Disaster Medical System is an overarching and integrated national medical response program formed in 1984 to provide support to local and state authorities during disasters and to provide support to DoD for hospitalization of troops returning from foreign battles.⁹⁴ This system is two pronged. First, it uses a commercial and government supported transport system to move civilian patients from domestic disasters and/or military patients returning from war to a network of participating hospitals. On a second front, NDMS is comprised of five categories of response teams for a total of 107 teams that can be dispatched to support the medical needs of local

⁹⁴ Henry A. Waxman, Bennie G. Thompson and Charlie Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 2005), 3, <http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051209095733-01279.pdf> (accessed August 9, 2008).

communities during disasters or in support of national events.⁹⁵ The remainder of the discussion regarding NDMS will proceed within this second front: domestic response and the associated management system used to make it work.

Within NDMS, medical response teams termed DMATs were created from local volunteer civilian medical personnel who are packaged into teams and deployed to a disaster or to an event where additional medical support is required. The concept of deploying state and local medical personnel to regional crises is nearly identical to what the LEDT proposal hopes to achieve within the law enforcement community.

NDMS itself is the management organization and mechanism that supports DMATs through the development of policy, standards, regulations and execution of deployments and logistical support. NDMS and its response teams were originally formed under the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) providing a consolidated healthcare delivery system; however, after the 9/11 attacks, this system and its teams were moved under DHS and FEMA to achieve a one stop shopping approach to emergency response.⁹⁶ After the poor federal response to areas stricken by Hurricane Katrina, NDMS and its deployment teams were moved back under DHHS in 2007. This move was to centralize medical care delivery to help correct the spotty management and deployment performance under DHS.⁹⁷

2. Team Deployment Concept

The DMAT is comprised of local, volunteer civilian doctors, nurses, and para-professionals who have agreed to form a medical response team from mostly private sector resources and personnel. DMAT members work daily as medical professionals residing in various healthcare organizations within their communities. Day-to-day, the

⁹⁵ John B. Delaney Jr., “The National Disaster Response System's Reliance on Civilian-Based Medical Response Teams in a Pandemic is Unsound,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2007), 3, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.2.1> (accessed August 9, 2008).

⁹⁶ William L. Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2006), 5, http://www.pimahealth.org/emergency/dmat/dmat_ndmsfinalreport.pdf (accessed August 9, 2008).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

DMAT is supported by a sponsor agency such as a medical center, hospital, health department or private organization.⁹⁸ The sponsor agency aids by keeping track of licensure issues and provides limited management and administrative support.

If a local or state-level emergency occurs, these members form the DMAT and can be deployed into the local community or other areas of the state by the state emergency manager. They may also be deployed under EMAC in a state-to-state response. When teams are deployed for a national mission by NDMS under Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8, they become federal employees.⁹⁹ Given the number of potential tasking agencies of DMAT manpower, it is imperative a solid tracking system is in place to monitor the status of teams so an accurate picture of the national medical response capability is fully understood should it be needed.

Teams are typically deployable within six to 12 hours, consist of 35 members and deploy for 14-day durations, but can be extended as the situation dictates.¹⁰⁰ Team readiness is defined as level I through IV depending on the number of available deployable members, how fast they can deploy and the status of the team's equipment.¹⁰¹ Teams and their equipment can be deployed via air or have organic ground transport assets to get them to the disaster location without additional outside support if necessary. Equipment is obtained through donation by sponsor agencies, provided by states and purchased with grant money from the federal government. Deployed team members when federalized are free from tort claims, are covered under workman's compensation

⁹⁸ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 3.

⁹⁹ Devir, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives*, 6.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)," <http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/ndms/teams/dmat.html> (accessed August 9, 2008).

¹⁰¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Typed Resources, Health and Medical* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 4, [http://www.nimsonline.com/resource_typing/Disaster%20Medical%20Assistance%20Team%20\(DMAT\)%2096Basic.htm](http://www.nimsonline.com/resource_typing/Disaster%20Medical%20Assistance%20Team%20(DMAT)%2096Basic.htm) (accessed August 8, 2008).

and their medical license is universally recognized in the state to which they are deployed.¹⁰² With the exception of federalizing forces, the DMAT deployment concept is nearly identical to what the LEDT concept proposes for LE deployments.

Without getting into a detailed discussion of the intricacies of each step of response and deployment defined in the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework, a brief outline of the federal response as it relates to medical deployment is as follows. When a state requires additional help during an incident, the governor requests federal assistance via the provisions of the Stafford Act. The federal support system engages by activating the appropriate ESF(s) to deploy the necessary support. In the case of an emergency requiring medical support, ESF 8 is activated and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is responsible for deployment of medical assets to the requesting states through its emergency management group housed in the DHHS secretary's operation center.¹⁰³ With regard to DMATs, the emergency management group activates NDMS to push field-level medical response to the states. Teams are contacted, given deployment orders, instructions and are dispatched to the event as federal assets. The DMAT deployment model is interesting from a resource perspective, as team personnel and a portion of their equipment are local resources; however, when called upon by NDMS, they are federalized under the national response system.

3. Deployment History

DMAT deployments began in 1989 with support to Hurricane Hugo victims and continued over the years with responses to other natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, ice storms; and to man-made disasters like air crashes and terror events. DMATs have also been pre-staged to support national-level events such as the

¹⁰² U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)*.

¹⁰³ Chertoff, *The National Response Framework*, 8-3.

Republican and Democratic National Conventions, inaugurations, the Olympics, state of the union addresses and state visits by foreign dignitaries; all missions envisioned for the LEDT.¹⁰⁴

Although the teams themselves performed well during these deployments, DMAT team members had periodically expressed concern over management support and the logistics infrastructure of the medical response management system.¹⁰⁵ Deployment to Hurricane Katrina brought these concerns to the forefront when teams were deployed to the wrong place or could not get to areas that were in critical need of their services due to mismanagement.¹⁰⁶ Of equal concern, federal management support teams (MST) deployed to help DMATs integrate into the local structure and charged with working logistics and management issues in the field, were either inexperienced or untrained causing many of the problems they were sent to resolve.¹⁰⁷ Poor FEMA-level management also caused serious problems where teams either did not have or could not get the requisite medical supplies and equipment to treat the public.¹⁰⁸ These events caused a flurry of Congressional hearings and reviews by DHS, FEMA, DHHS and DMAT team commanders alike to determine what was required to correct the management system. The result was a decision to return the management system from DHS back to DHHS with a review and reconfiguration of NDMS that continues today.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Health and Human Services, “National Disaster Medical System,” (2007), <http://www.authorstream.com/Presentation/Paolina-62733-ndmsbrf4-National-Disaster-Medical-System-NDMS-Department-Health-Human-as-Education-ppt-powerpoint/> (accessed August 9, 2008).

¹⁰⁵ United States, Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, *Mitigating Catastrophic Events through Effective Medical Response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, October 20, 2005* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2007), 23, <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS82718>; <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS82719> (accessed August 9, 2008).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁰⁷ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 5.

¹⁰⁸ Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response*, 14.

4. Management System

A local volunteer team member who is paid by the federal government to conduct DMAT management activities conducts daily management of the DMAT.¹⁰⁹ This is not a full-time position and many DMAT activities such as training and equipment management are done without compensation.¹¹⁰ Management actions and reporting of DMAT status is done locally and is transmitted to a federal coordinating function within NDMS.

NDMS management has had its share of problems. As early as 2002, when NDMS was under DHHS the first time, officials were warned that the system had major problems to include poor management practices, inadequate funding and lack of relevant doctrine and standards.¹¹¹ In the CNA Corporation's report, *Assessing NDMS Response Team Readiness: Focusing on DMATs, NMRTs and the MST*, October 2002, it noted of 70 DMATs, only 16 could meet requirements to deploy a full team to a disaster. The report also noted that teams were not deployed based upon readiness, but by how "well connected" they were in the system. Finally, NDMS lacked data and tracking systems to evaluate its own readiness. NDMS as a management system was clearly in decline in 2002; however, reports by team commanders show it may have been headed that way for some time.

When NDMS transferred to DHS in 2003, the medical response management system became even less functional. First, the \$34M budget allotted to NDMS was stripped of \$20M by DHS to pay for bio-defense projects,¹¹² and the system was organizationally buried four layers deep within FEMA where NDMS proponents could

¹⁰⁹ Lipin, *Interview by Author*, 1.

¹¹⁰ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 3.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 7.

not get the attention of management to raise issues.¹¹³ NDMS management personnel were cut from 144 to 57 personnel, which contributed to the management and operational deployment deficiencies evidenced in the Katrina report.¹¹⁴

The first operational indicator that NDMS was crippled under DHS was during the 2004 hurricane deployment season where individual DMATs incurred problems in planning, logistical support, supply and communications.¹¹⁵ Despite these indicators, few efforts were made to shore up NDMS. In 2005, during the Katrina response, there were reports of serious support breakdowns where team leaders used personal credit cards or took up collections from team members to buy medical supplies, secure truck transport and book motel rooms for team members.¹¹⁶ Unified response capability hinges on a coherent management system to operate a complex network that has a common operating picture of the problem and available resources, coupled with the span of control and authority to mobilize those resources to action. NDMS, as a management system, was clearly failing in that regard. Teams were making things happen in the field despite the management system that was supposed to support them. In one case, a prominent surgeon and member of the Massachusetts DMAT, resigned upon return from a NDMS deployment because management by NDMS failed critically in supporting his team in the field.¹¹⁷ It was also stated by this surgeon and others that there was a lack of a concept of operations, teams were deployed to staging areas and forgotten, were deployed without the infrastructure to conduct patient care, and the system lacked

¹¹³ Jeffrey A. Lowell, *Medical Readiness Responsibilities: A Strategy for Realigning and Strengthening the Federal Medical Responses* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 6, <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20051209101159-27028.pdf> (accessed August 11, 2008).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹¹⁵ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 8.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 9-17.

¹¹⁷ United States, Congress. House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, *Mitigating Catastrophic Events through Effective Medical Response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, October 20, 2005*, 23.

standardized information processing protocols.¹¹⁸ By 2005, it appears DMATs were working by the graces of good Samaritans in spite of the NDMS management system.

Based on the previous facts, it would appear the NDMS management system is ineffective and not a good candidate to consider for development of the LEDT management system. However, before condemning it completely, consideration should be given to the possibility that it was merely under-resourced rather than poorly structured. A central umbrella organization, if properly staffed and resourced, could capitalize on the principles of unity of command and effort, economy of force and simplicity, which are often hard to achieve in multi-layered organizations, particularly in emergency response scenarios where operations occur under chaotic conditions.¹¹⁹ If properly supported, such a system could employ these principles to achieve efficiencies via centralized management to facilitate a decentralized yet synchronized application of effort as will be shown in the state and military systems reviewed later in this chapter.

There are several features of the NDMS and DMAT management configurations that detract from its effectiveness and should act as warnings to the LEDT concept designers when forming the national LEDT management system. The first area of concern is the use of volunteer managers at the team level. Since full-time personnel do not fill these positions, continuity of effort may be sacrificed causing the team to be less prepared than the response system believes they are. Part-time efforts by multiple volunteer members conducting daily tracking, training of personnel and management of team equipment and logistics could cause problems in readiness as well. This point was made by Dr. Jeffrey Lowell in a report to the Secretary of Homeland Security in January of 2005 and has also been reported by DMAT team leaders.¹²⁰ Second, in order to execute a “national” response system, there must be an agency vested with the authority, resources and information to manage this capability effectively. In the case of NDMS, funding and manpower issues at the national management level did not keep pace with

¹¹⁸ Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response*, 7-10.

¹¹⁹ Thomas J. Ridge, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 2004), 1, <http://www.nimsonline.com/docs/NIMS-90-web.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2008)

¹²⁰ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 10.

the increasing demands of frequency and complexity of medical team deployments. The resulting shortfalls in policy, doctrine and logistics support at the national level cascaded to the team level as manifested by evictions from warehouses due to a lack of ability to pay the rent, absence of team protocols for operations and fragmented response capability.¹²¹ Finally, with potential tasking agencies from three different levels of government, none of whom owns the teams but all of whom impose obligations, there is a potential for loss of a common operating picture. In the end, without central management, all that remained was a loose network of teams operating on the residuals of previous training, funding and experienced personnel.

5. Smart Practices

Despite the overwhelming problems with NDMS as a management system, there are attributes that could be useful in the formation of the LEDT management system if properly supported.

The LEDT concept does not propose a single NDMS-type umbrella organization to manage its day-to-day requirements, develop and execute policy matters and conduct emergency deployments. This lack of a working central management entity is what doomed DMATs to substandard performance as disparate teams were forced to take matters into their own hands. Although NDMS did not present a positive example, some kind of centralized organization should be considered. Florence Heffron identifies these highly efficient “machine bureaucracies” as currently existing in the typical LE organization, and therefore, it should not be a foreign concept.¹²²

The current LEDT concept envisions the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement will act in the policy and management capacity but has not fully defined these responsibilities. The EMAC system is envisioned as the mechanism to move the teams in national emergency situations or in support to national events. To date, neither EMAC nor its management authority, the National Emergency Management Association,

¹²¹ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 9-11.

¹²² Florence A. Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 41.

have systems to manage LEDT resources effectively.¹²³ EMAC relies on individual state emergency managers to track and catalogue capabilities and then takes the data fed to them in the form of a request for support and facilitates the transaction between the states. This is the exact situation documented to have slowed LE, DMAT and other support to Katrina. Fragmenting the management and deployment functions between two different major organizations may not be the most efficient way to employ LEDT resources.

As the LEDT concept is designed, there are five layers and two sub-layers of management between LEDT daily operations and deployment to a disaster site: the local team leader, sponsor agency, DHS/FEMA, EMAC/NEMA and state emergency managers. This management chain could be cut down considerably by employing a one-stop NDMS-like management organization that writes policy, legislates standards, develops procedures, conducts daily status reporting, conducts budgeting and funding and executes deployments. Consolidation of these functions could reduce duplication of effort at various management levels and would provide a single voice to help reduce communication and execution issues through a unity of direction.¹²⁴ As the LEDT concept is currently designed, the traditional decentralized approach to law enforcement is fully embedded in its management design and could continue to hinder LE employment in emergency situations.

As discussed in Chapter I, there are those both in and outside the LE community that are fearful of centralization. However, a central umbrella management system does not equate to a national police force. Decentralization is maintained because resources are owned and controlled by local and state governments who retain the ability to use these resources, as they deem necessary. The management system merely provides the missing comprehensive oversight required to understand the current status of forces, equipment, training and so forth.

¹²³ Copple, *Interview by Author*.

¹²⁴ Vincent Marino, "14 Principles of Management (Henri Fayol)," http://www.12manage.com/methods_fayol_14_principles_of_management.html (accessed September 3, 2008).

If the LEDT concept is proposed to serve as a “national” law enforcement deployment program, it should be resourced and supported by a single national mechanism. When activated for a national mission, members should become federal employees who are paid and indemnified by the federal government. The requisite equipment, training, supplies and logistical tail should be largely covered under this program. This arrangement would put the LEDT on par with DMAT and US&R teams where the federal government can achieve a national response capability by compelling state-level teams to meet specific training, reporting and standardization in equipment and tactics in return for federal funding and technical support. With this arrangement, states obtain advanced LE capability and the federal government grows a national LE response system exactly as the other major first responder communities have.

As the LEDT concept is currently written, it is likely to fall short of becoming a national response system. Forming LEDTs with state resources augmented by sporadic federal grants while moving teams for national missions under the auspices of EMAC and its protocols for reimbursement and indemnification puts the brunt of action on the states and their management structures. The LEDT concept merely expands on what the planners hope teams will look like. It does not provide proper incentive to develop a unified team, a management system or for states to participate for that matter. Without the full benefits of federal resources and funding, the LE response system may be more of an array of pickup teams versus a national response system.

The LEDT concept is wrestling with a theory to stage and deliver equipment, leaning towards regional prepositioning.¹²⁵ DMAT experience shows LEDT equipment should be collocated with LEDTs as opposed to being regionally staged. DMATs with local control of their equipment have the ability to inventory, train with, and maintain their own gear, and know what they are deploying with and how to use it upon arrival. However, teams that had their supply and equipment delivered from regional areas encountered problems matching team and equipment arrival times and not all members were familiar with the equipment upon delivery leaving some teams ineffective at the

¹²⁵ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 15.

site.¹²⁶ Collocated equipment drives other logistical concerns such as the need to have trucks to move it. Trucks, in turn, provide the team the organic capability to respond without outside help and reduce the need to compete for airlift. Ground response times could be managed by deploying internal region teams and teams from adjacent regions first and airlifting others from the outer regions if more manpower is required. Finally, teams not in physical possession of their equipment are less valuable as responders to intrastate and local incidents because they are no longer properly outfitted to deploy as a specialized team.

Overall, the central management system necessary to execute a unified DMAT response fragmented and failed due to the lack of resources. This does not mean a centralized structure is inappropriate. More so, LEDT planners should be wary of fragmenting the LEDT management system in the design phase.

C. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (US&R)

1. Mission

The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System was established in 1990 after the Loma Prieta, California earthquake to provide states with the capability to rescue victims of structural collapse effectively.¹²⁷ Team members possess skills in the fields of engineering, emergency medicine, canine-handling, firefighting, law enforcement, hazardous material handling, communications and logistics.¹²⁸ The team's purpose is to deploy to a disaster area rapidly as a self-contained element to begin urban search and

¹²⁶ United States, Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, *Mitigating Catastrophic Events through Effective Medical Response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, October 20, 2005*, 11.

¹²⁷ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 2.

¹²⁸ Keith Bea, *Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces: Facts and Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8990:1> (accessed August 13, 2008).

rescue operations in support of the local government's needs. The US&R team concept is another federal deployment of state and local resources, and is very similar to the capability envisioned for the LEDT.

In 1992 under the *Federal Response Plan*, urban search and rescue led by FEMA was the only search and rescue mission area contained within the ESF 9 *Urban Search and Rescue Annex*.¹²⁹ After Katrina, ESF 9 was redefined in a broader context to centralize all sub-elements of the search and rescue community into one plan. With this change, ESF 9 included waterborne search and rescue, with the U.S. Coast Guard as lead; inland/wilderness search and rescue, with the Department of Interior as lead; and aeronautical search and rescue, with DoD as lead.¹³⁰ US&R as it was originally configured stayed within ESF 9 and remains the sole responsibility of FEMA.

US&R teams are of particular interest, because they are composed of state and local responders in a way that is closely aligned with the proposed LEDT concept. Additionally, because US&R teams were specifically mentioned as a model for the LEDT concept, analysis of this particular system is in order to determine its viability as a potential template for LEDT management.

2. Team Deployment Concept

A US&R team is comprised of local firemen, police officers, sheriff's deputies, engineers and medical personnel etc., who have agreed as a group to take on the task of meeting FEMA training standards and accreditation procedures in order to gain the designation as a national US&R team.¹³¹ There are 28 task forces of 70 personnel across 19 states housed in sponsor agencies such as local fire, police and sheriff departments who can be deployed anywhere in the United States and abroad within six hours of activation.¹³²

¹²⁹ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 2.

¹³⁰ Chertoff, *The National Response Framework*, 9-1-3.

¹³¹ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 4.

¹³² Michael Chertoff, "FEMA: US&R Task Force Locations," <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/locations.shtm> (accessed August 13, 2008).

In forming the national US&R concept, the federal government offered local governments specialized training and equipment for their first responders with the stipulation that local teams could be recalled and deployed by the federal government to assist in wider area events when necessary. When needed nationally, like the DMAT, US&R teams are federalized, paid by FEMA and obtain benefits and indemnification protection as federal employees.¹³³ The impetus for local governments to make their manpower available nationally was to gain specialized training and resources, which would be sustained through federal funds. From 2001 to 2005, the federal government spent \$182M for the 28 task forces or a little over \$1M a year for each team.¹³⁴ When deployed, teams are paid and reimbursed through the Disaster Relief Fund managed by FEMA. This resource sharing relationship is a win/win for both the local and federal governments.

US&R deployments are executed under the Urban Search and Rescue Response System within FEMA under the auspices of ESF 9. Unlike DMATs, national US&R teams can only be deployed outside of their jurisdictional areas under a Stafford Act declaration.¹³⁵ However, local resources may be deployed into the community by local governments or into other states with an EMAC deployment order. Teams remain under the control of the local government for purposes of command and control, pay and benefits thus combining centralized management and decentralized execution. Since there are multiple jurisdictions that can task these teams, it is important to have a solid management system that can provide an accurate picture of daily US&R status.

3. Deployment History

Since 1991, National US&R teams have been deployed to natural disasters like Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii, the Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles, earthquakes in Turkey, tornadoes in Oklahoma and hurricane locations throughout the Gulf Coast.

¹³³ David Phillips, Interview by Author, 2008, <http://www.catf5.org/public/index.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2008).

¹³⁴ Bea, *Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces: Facts and Issues*, 4-5.

¹³⁵ David Phillips, Interview by Author, 2008, <http://www.catf5.org/public/index.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2008).

Teams have also responded to man-made and terrorist events such as the DeBruce grain elevator explosion in Kansas, the Humberto Vidal building explosion in 1996, the Murrah Federal Building and the World Trade Center and Pentagon terror attacks.¹³⁶ Teams are routinely deployed or placed on standby status to support national special security events as well. Overall, since 1991, US&R teams have deployed to 28 major disasters and 12 National Special Security Events.¹³⁷ At the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 25 of 28 teams were deployed while all 28 teams were activated in response to Katrina.¹³⁸

The World Trade Center and Pentagon response led to the debate about how effective teams were in the field. At the Pentagon, US&R teams had previously worked closely with Arlington and District of Columbia first responders allowing for quick integration into the emergency operation upon arrival.¹³⁹ New York City, on the other hand, had not previously worked with US&R teams and this lack of familiarity with US&R capabilities hurt the team's overall effectiveness as they were sidelined for days in reserve or supporting status.¹⁴⁰ The New York City situation was to some extent a function of a lack of a unified command structure at the disaster site and a "go it alone" approach to New York City's emergency response.¹⁴¹ In both the World Trade Center and Pentagon responses, US&R teams arrived well prepared and in a timely manner to support the local government.

The management of US&R response to Hurricane Katrina contrasted with the 9/11 response. Although overall search and rescue was heavily criticized, it was not due to poor performance by US&R teams themselves. The problems rested in three areas. First, as was previously noted, ESF 9 did not encompass all forms of search and rescue

¹³⁶ Michael Chertoff, "FEMA: About US&R," <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/about.shtm> (accessed August 13, 2008).

¹³⁷ Endikrat, *Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding Assessing the Capabilities and Coordination of Federal Emergency Response Teams*, 4.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Manuel Torres, *Contrasting USAR Response in the WTC and Pentagon 9-11 Disasters: Trust Building, Preexisting Bonds, and Inter-Organizational Response* (New York City: Allacademic.com, 2007), 8, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/2/4/8/p182489_index.html (accessed August 13, 2008).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

required during Katrina, which hampered overall coordination. State, local, and multiple federal agencies were all conducting independent search and rescue operations for the first several days of the event.¹⁴² Despite NIMS that dictates a unified command structure, search and rescue simply was an uncoordinated effort. Second, FEMA was criticized for not adequately prepositioning US&R resources before landfall. FEMA responded that federal assistance protocol required the state to ask for a federal response before one is provided.¹⁴³ Finally, teams were pre-staged too far away from the event.¹⁴⁴ It is debatable whether these errors were due to lack of ability of the Urban Search and Rescue Response management system, or were merely poor decisions by leaders in the heat of the moment. In the end, US&R personnel did not criticize their management system as DMAT personnel did theirs after the Katrina response.

4. Management System

The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System is directly administered and executed by FEMA. As of 2006, there were eight personnel at the FEMA level to conduct day to day US&R management activities and to respond during emergencies. Of these eight full-time positions, only six were continuously filled.¹⁴⁵ A DHS IG audit concluded this number was not enough to manage the system effectively on a daily basis, much less during emergency operations. Congress funded eight additional positions to staff the management system, but FEMA was not able to fill them because they were only one-year positions.¹⁴⁶ Funding does not seem to be a central issue. From FY02 to FY04, Congress funded the US&R system with \$152M for upgrades in readiness capability.¹⁴⁷ However, because the management system was not appropriately manned,

¹⁴² Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 337.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 334.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 9.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

System program managers within FEMA did not adequately monitor or oversee the task forces' compliance with preparedness grant requirements or determine whether the task forces achieved US&R System readiness objectives and standards.¹⁴⁸

Although FEMA had an established management system to provide oversight and direction for their teams, they did not provide the necessary manpower for it to be effective. Basic oversight functions such as on-site operational visits had not been conducted up to FY04. Task force compliance with grant specifications was done via cursory desk audits and there was no standardized reporting mechanism to conduct detailed analysis of task force capabilities.¹⁴⁹ Since the management staff was also detailed to deploy during emergencies, the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 left large periods when most US&R management functions were placed on hold.¹⁵⁰

At the local team level, the Inspector General report noted several management issues that detracted from the team's effectiveness. As with the national management system, the team management function required additional manpower to make it more effective. Although grant funds were available to hire fills for four local management positions on each team, six of seven teams audited did not fill these positions.¹⁵¹ Instead, the grant money was used to execute other locally determined team goals.

Degradation of team capabilities ranged across the broad functions of operational readiness, logistical readiness and management. The audit reviewed seven teams; six of seven were below 50 percent of US&R standards for operational readiness due to shortfalls in mandatory training, medical requirements and team member availability.¹⁵² In some cases, teams did not accurately keep track of team members who were unavailable due to vacation, injury or other reasons. Maintenance of records, training and availability of canines were also problems.¹⁵³ The IG audit team found all seven should

¹⁴⁸ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 5.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

be rated below 70 percent in terms of logistics requirement and that inventory management and required performance of equipment maintenance were often not conducted.¹⁵⁴

At a minimum, if an effective management contingent were in place at the local and federal levels, most, if not all of the problems, could at least have been identified and an action plan developed to correct them. In the IG findings, these problems were not completely known by team and FEMA-level leadership. Perhaps this lack of situational awareness developed because the management mechanism did not provide relevant data to US&R leadership.

5. Smart Practices

On whole, and despite the deficiencies of its management system, US&R teams have performed brilliantly over the past 18 years. With the increase in number and complexity of deployments, however, managerial deficiencies have become more apparent. The IG audit report alludes to under-funding and a failure to grow manpower as causes of most of the current problems.¹⁵⁵ Prior to the Hurricane Katrina response and Congressional hearings that followed, few, if any public documents were available to evaluate the capability and performance of the system. Despite problems with funding and manpower that recent investigations have highlighted, however, some specific smart practices are apparent.

Coupling central US&R asset management with the administrative mechanism to federalize and deploy assets by ESF 9 provides a robust “out the door” capability of six hours. Although the LEDT concept does not define a specific response goal, this exceeds anything achieved under EMAC in the past and directly addresses problems noted with past LE sourcing and response. EMAC does not have a central catalogue defining assets available for deployment as these catalogues are maintained separately by each state.¹⁵⁶ Centrally housing resource management for the LEDT in an ESF 13 entity circumvents

¹⁵⁴ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 5.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Copple, *Interview by Author*.

the need to go to each state emergency manager to find out what is available. Also, under this management architecture, in a state to state request, ESF 13 could facilitate the flow of data to EMAC and help speed up the state response system as well. This new architecture would directly address the causal factor of slow resourcing found in the Katrina response.¹⁵⁷

As written, LEDT planners are leaning toward EMAC as the sole force deployer for both state and federal response. EMAC does not contain functional LE experts and is not manned to conduct management of functional area capabilities; they broker requests for support.¹⁵⁸ In the case of US&R and ESF 9, by centrally managing the nation's US&R response capability, they have the God's eye capability to see what resources are available along with its status. They can affect a coordinated response without waiting to see who comes on line via EMAC. A central management system within the LEDT construct would provide the same ability to provide a rapid LE response capability. This system would help place the LE community on par with other large national responders in terms of information flow and response ability. Potential benefits could include facilitation of a synchronized national response of first responders superior to what was encountered during Katrina.

A properly manned and funded central management system could also provide a clearer national common operating picture through day-to-day tracking, status reporting and deployment of assets. Strong consideration should be given to locate the LEDT management function where it can best achieve synergistic benefits from the other major national response capabilities. Using EMAC as the force deployer could dissipate the required synergy, because EMAC rotates the chair and deployment coordinator annually from state to state.¹⁵⁹ US&R teams have had no problems deploying to the field in a timely manner. Adoption of elements of their system may alleviate past response problems and build the capacity for future advanced national deployment of first responders.

¹⁵⁷ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 340.

¹⁵⁸ Copple, *Interview by Author*.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

The US&R community previously used an advisory committee in developing response system policy and procedures as well as the development of certification standards for their national teams. This committee was made up of sponsor agency chiefs, technical and emergency management experts as well as representatives from DHS and FEMA providing all stakeholders a voice in the process.¹⁶⁰ It appears that this committee disbanded as overall US&R management began to erode; however, there have been calls to bring it back as soon as possible.¹⁶¹ The development of an advisory committee within the LEDT system could be important to ensure all participants in the National LEDT system can help shape the new LEDT capability. Additional consideration should be given to formalizing a branch of this body as an accrediting authority for LEDTs and their sponsor agencies as was done with US&R teams. This would ensure standards are agreed upon and underwritten from within the community. This body would help to operationalize standardization across the teams in order to achieve a plug-and-play or building-block methodology in force-packaging and support. ILEAS is already effectively using such a committee, as will be discussed in the next section.

As also addressed in the DMAT smart practices section, the LEDT should be treated as a federal asset. As with DMAT and US&R teams, this status drives a resource and funding relationship where initial equipment caches and sustainment funds are provided by the federal government while team reimbursement for deployment comes directly via the federal disaster relief fund. Leaving the LEDT under the EMAC deployment mechanism may cloud its status as a national asset and make resourcing more difficult to establish and sustain.

The downside to this approach is that some may view these officers as federal agents or a national police force. A potential solution could be for receiving states to pre-agree to deputize these forces upon arrival or through activation agreements while

¹⁶⁰ Endikrat, *Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding Assessing the Capabilities and Coordination of Federal Emergency Response Teams*, 5.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

leaving them on the federal books for indemnity and pay purposes. A federally supported deployment of state resources under the guise of the national LEDT does not have to equate to a national police force.

Both DMAT and US&R management systems fell short during the Katrina response but so too did decentralized state and local response systems. Evaluating FEMA management systems on the Katrina response alone may not give an accurate picture of their capabilities, especially considering the successful responses these systems facilitated prior to Katrina. NDMS was a management system in decline; weak points were merely brought to light on a national scale. The US&R management system appears to have been sound up to Katrina as far as can be determined through available documentation. However, both systems failed largely because of lack of manpower and funding at the local and national levels.

D. ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT ALARM SYSTEM (ILEAS)¹⁶²

1. Mission

The Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System, a unique state response mechanism that provides a real-world illustration of central asset management, policy formulation and planning, coupled with decentralized responders who are locally owned and controlled, may throw some additional light on the question of response management.

ILEAS is a single point, state-level management system for Illinois LE that aggressively centralizes the functions of planning, management, funding, budgeting, equipping, exercising and dispatch of field response to facilitate unified action by 880 separate and jurisdictionally independent LE agencies. Under ILEAS, these 880 separate agencies constitute a synergistic state-wide police system capable of supporting stricken jurisdictions by mobilizing neighboring agencies, or rapidly deploying specially trained and equipped forces to quell civil disturbances, protect assets, or provide a special tactics response.¹⁶³ As the sole LE point of contact for the entire state, ILEAS mobilizes forces

¹⁶² This section was developed from interviews of Mr. James Page, ILEAS Executive Director

¹⁶³ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 4.

for state-to-state support under EMAC, or to support national special security events as they not only have the centralized database but are also the deployment mechanism, much like in the US&R management system.¹⁶⁴ The deployable team concept achieved by ILEAS is what is envisioned for the National LEDT system, and ILEAS represents a near exact microcosm of what the national LEDT concept is trying to achieve overall.

The origins of ILEAS can be traced back to two previous Illinois intrastate mutual aid agencies.¹⁶⁵ The first is the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) that started in the 1960s. MABAS is an EMS/fire-centric mutual aid system that was well ahead of its time. Today, all MABAS participants sign an aid agreement that directs a standardized incident command system, dictates minimum manning, and standardizes equipment and a common radio system with pre-agreed terminology.¹⁶⁶ The MABAS agreement also facilitates local mutual aid without the declaration of a statewide emergency. Under Illinois statute, responders are indemnified in a state-declared emergency, which helps to facilitate an outside response free from legal concerns.¹⁶⁷ On the federal level, a similar and less comprehensive system was not implemented until almost forty years later.

The second mutual aid system that helped form ILEAS arose from severe flooding in the Chicago area in 1982.¹⁶⁸ This event made it apparent that local LE resources were stretched too thin to cope with a major disaster. As a result, fifteen Chicago municipal area police departments joined in 1983 to form the Northern Illinois Police Alarm System (NIPAS), based on MABAS.¹⁶⁹ NIPAS is a regional intergovernmental mutual aid agreement that allows LE dispatch and support to

¹⁶⁴ James Page, Interview by Author, 2008.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶⁶ Jay Reardon and Ralph Blust, "Welcome to MABAS," <http://www.mabas.org/wimabas.asp> (accessed August 18, 2008).

¹⁶⁷ Jerry Page, Interview by Author, 2008.

¹⁶⁸ NIPAS Governing Board, "Northern Illinois Police Alarm System," <http://www.nipas.org/> (accessed August 18, 2008).

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

communities from outside the stricken jurisdiction. The system is based on a series of alarm conditions from one to ten, which determines how many people will respond to which pre-arranged rally point within the requesting jurisdiction.¹⁷⁰

2. Team Deployment Concept

After 9/11, the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police became interested in developing a statewide LE mutual aid system based upon the tenets of these earlier mutual aid organizations.¹⁷¹ The result, stood up in 2002, is ILEAS, which is a management organization and not a tactical team. It manages the state's LE mutual aid compact, and is comprised of 880 local governments including all 102 sheriffs and 778 police departments throughout the state.¹⁷² The mechanics of an ILEAS deployment are simple. Each LE agency has their own web page that links them into the central system. The emergency response plan for each jurisdiction is loaded into the web-based system and can be viewed by responders statewide and by the central ILEAS dispatch center. Plans are standardized and include rally points, maps, contact information for prearranged out-of-area responders, radio frequencies, contingency actions and so forth. When a request for assistance is made, the ILEAS central dispatcher pulls up the requesting agency's emergency plan and starts to execute it by immediately feeding data to responding agencies. If the local jurisdiction's pre-plan does not provide enough pre-arranged resources for the type of problem encountered, the ILEAS dispatcher expands the resource pool by dispatching from outlying areas.¹⁷³

Deploying packages of individual officers from one jurisdiction to another is the most basic tenet of mutual aid. The next level of assistance involves dispatching actual teams with advanced capabilities that bring specialized skills, equipment and training to bear against larger problems. With this in mind, jurisdictions under ILEAS have formed 16 multi-jurisdictional teams of 30 to 60 officers with specialized skills in SWAT, WMD

¹⁷⁰ NIPAS Governing Board, "Northern Illinois Police Alarm System," <http://www.nipas.org/> (accessed August 18, 2008).

¹⁷¹ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 17.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5.

response and crowd control.¹⁷⁴ The ILEAS management system helps formalize these specialized team's abilities by directing standardized training, exercising, equipping and operational policy.¹⁷⁵

ILEAS provides centralized equipment and resource management, a concept LEDT planners are attempting to define. Under the compact, agencies are required to submit a list of their equipment and supply resources. This list is visible to both the ILEAS dispatch center and participating agencies, which can search for specific pieces of equipment by zip code. System-retrieved information provides locations, contact names and phone numbers.¹⁷⁶ Agencies can search for needed resources statewide thus leveraging specialized equipment purchased with state and federal money by making it available to all; Peoria has the same access to resources as Chicago.

3. Deployment History

ILEAS dispatches about 70 state activations a year and also dispatched a total of 300 officers in support of the Hurricane Katrina response. One hundred and fifty officers from 113 local and state agencies were prepared to deploy to Louisiana within 72 hours.¹⁷⁷ Since all training, equipping, uniforms and command structure are identical, officers can be pulled from across the state in small numbers so not to over-tax any one department and still provide a coherent external response capability.¹⁷⁸ As officers dispatched within the ILEAS system were trained together and equipped in a like fashion, they presented a professional and well-organized force that was lauded by officials in Louisiana and attracted attention from law enforcement planners at the national level.¹⁷⁹ ILEAS support has not only been used for mutual aid and EMAC response to emergencies, but is also used to support national special security events. Recently,

¹⁷⁴ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 4.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

Illinois was asked by the state of Minnesota to support the Republican National Convention because ILEAS is known for its professional regional-level response capability.¹⁸⁰

4. Management System

ILEAS functions much as NDMS does for the medical community. ILEAS is a grant management and coordination organization that centrally manages statewide LE mutual aid within Illinois and also performs central planning, team standards determination, shipment of contingency supplies, exercise management and acts as the primary contact for EMAC requests for LE assistance outside the state.¹⁸¹

A staff of seven full-time and 20 part-time contractors, who are posted throughout the state, mans the management systems.¹⁸² The ILEAS staff is larger than the entire staff for the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System and about half the size of the entire National Disaster Medical System staff during the Katrina period. The ILEAS also has a governing board comprised of five elected executive officers all sitting Illinois police chiefs or sheriffs, 16 regional co-chairs from departments within the eight Illinois regions, and representatives from the Illinois State Police, Chicago Police Department, as well as the Illinois Sheriff's and Police Chiefs Associations.¹⁸³ This body effectively extends the ILEAS staff from 20 to 41 members all with intimate knowledge of Illinois law enforcement needs. This inclusive system allows Illinois LE agencies down to the department level to have a voice in how ILEAS operates. It is perhaps this inclusiveness that has been the strength of ILEAS as delivery of LE services comes from a single coordinated agency across the state versus delivery by a patchwork of fiefdoms.

ILEAS works to give Illinois LE a single voice in other important areas. First, it is the sole voice and face of LE to the Illinois Terrorism Task Force. It works with other state emergency responder communities to develop a single integrated response plan

¹⁸⁰ James Page, Interview by Author, 2008.

¹⁸¹ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 3.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

supported by state budget allocations.¹⁸⁴ If support is requested for response outside of the state, ILEAS has the single common operating picture of Illinois LE, which allows it to respond in a uniquely rapid and deliberate fashion.

The ILEAS management system is a good candidate to serve as a template for the National LEDT management system because Illinois is effectively executing all of the central tenets the LEDT concept paper addresses. However, the Achilles heal of ILEAS is funding. ILEAS is funded by federal *State Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grants* to the tune of \$60M, and by the State of Illinois at \$125K and from member dues at \$40K.¹⁸⁵ If there is a drop in federal funding, the conclusion is easy, ILEAS may cease to exist.¹⁸⁶

5. Smart Practices

A review of two major smart practices of the ILEAS management system partially explains why this response concept has been so successful and may aid in developing a robust LEDT management system.

From the operational perspective, a key strength of ILEAS is complete participation by all Illinois LE agencies, which breaks down independent jurisdictional islands and fuses them into a consolidated statewide effort. However, ILEAS is not a monolithic governmental management system that issues orders to lower echelons. ILEAS consists of a federation of participants who have been elected regionally by member departments.¹⁸⁷ It is through this governing board that independent LE agencies retain their voice and can directly impact the decision process. Once ILEAS management decisions are agreed on, each agency is expected to execute them. While management activities are centralized, jurisdictions retain control of their LE agencies.

¹⁸⁴ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 3.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁸⁶ Page, *Interview by Author*, 1.

¹⁸⁷ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 2.

From the management and logistics perspective, statewide buy-in allows for a centralized approach towards major parts of LE operations, including local mutual aid dispatch and external emergency response. Like DMAT and US&R, ILEAS uses central funding as a carrot for participation and enforcement of mutually agreed standards. Efficiencies in this central approach can be seen in several areas. For example, ILEAS has centralized the purchase of standardized gas masks for every LE responder using state and federal funds and also purchased the same radio system for all.¹⁸⁸ ILEAS staff and the management committee determine what capabilities they believe Illinois LE agencies require. They then purchase and distribute equipment to support these central goals.

In the old decentralized management system, each department would receive their proportional part of overall funding and pursue independent, non-linked goals. Purchases that require a great deal of knowledge or experience may be especially difficult to execute properly in smaller jurisdictions. In a central system, larger blocks of funds expand the range of what can be purchased while larger staffs of experts have the knowledge to purchase more robust systems so that local departments receive better products that are also integrated with equipment in neighboring jurisdictions. This methodology is repeated across the other core team development areas such as training, planning and operational tactics.

Towns or regions that can afford to often form SWAT or similar tactical teams to provide an advanced LE capability. These teams typically have different training and equipping standards, different levels of experience and varying policies and procedures in how they operate. When such teams are meshed into a joint operation, serious problems can occur. ILEAS solves this problem by establishing standardized operational policy, identical training and equipping standards and by convening statewide team commander meetings to facilitate collaboration.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 3.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

ILEAS, as a LE management system, has effectively centralized planning, programming, budgeting, equipping and training support to facilitate standardized and rapid dispatch of LE resources throughout the state of Illinois and beyond. The keys to its success are adequate funding, appropriate staffing, a total and inclusive governing board and strategic planning and execution of support functions. The tactical teams functioning under ILEAS are virtually identical to what is envisioned in the LEDT concept paper. To develop a national capability properly, LEDT planners should closely study the ILEAS management system and adapt its methods to the national level as appropriate.

E. U.S. AIR FORCE SECURITY FORCES¹⁹⁰

1. Mission

The U.S. Air Force Security Forces originated in 1947 as the Air Police to provide law enforcement, security and corrections services to the Air Force. In 1997, the name of the career field changed to Security Forces (SF) to recognize the expeditionary or deployment culture of the career field. There are approximately 40,000 SF members today assigned to SF squadrons and groups throughout the world. These units range from 100 to 600 personnel each. SF units are structured much like any other police department across America. They also protect critical assets such as weapons platforms, people and key military operations through security patrols, advanced weapons systems, sophisticated monitoring capabilities and other security aids.

Air Force SF units regularly move special teams from their fixed units and bases to expeditionary locations not only in time of need but during normal rotations of personnel, to either bolster existing units or to form new units to protect forward air bases and special missions. This concept of force employment is very similar to what is envisioned in the LEDT, which will deploy packages of officers from the cities or units

¹⁹⁰ The author has been a Security Forces member for 26 years and has extensive knowledge of the career field and its planning and deployment mechanisms both from headquarters and unit levels.

who own them to areas that require additional manpower. Given the expertise SF has amassed over the past 48 years, LEDT concept planners could benefit from studying this system.

2. Team Deployment Concept

In order to provide a measured and accurate response to likely crises, war planners study probable scenarios and develop appropriate manpower and logistics requirements to answer the call. Once scenario X occurs, leaders take the plan off the shelf, make adjustments for the current situation and deploy force packages based upon previous deliberate planning. This is a concept captured to some extent by ILEAS through its web-based security plans and predesigned lateral response options. However, neither EMAC nor the current LEDT concept use prepackaged forces against expected and preplanned scenarios.

In the deliberate planning phase, war planners fill the entire manpower requirement of all prepackaged plans by assigning deployment taskings to every SF unit in the Air Force.¹⁹¹ Care is taken to ensure these units can continue to perform their primary mission on the home base once the deployed manpower is removed. SF units traditionally have a standing deployment mission or tasking to provide a particular capability, such as a security flight of 44 personnel, a law enforcement squad of 13 personnel, K-9 units, or heavy weapons teams. Since deployed security squadrons are formed from parts of various fixed units, it is imperative that disparate parts be similarly trained, equipped, uniformed and certified in their positions and that they operate under the same doctrine.¹⁹² This is another concept used by ILEAS and is no different from what the LEDT concept envisions.

¹⁹¹ Gary T. McCoy, *AFI 10-401, Deployment Planning and Execution* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 2008), 51, <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI10-403.pdf> (accessed August 24, 2008).

¹⁹² Yeager, *AF Handbook 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook*, 49.

3. Deployment History

Since the Korean War, and through the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Security Forces have been deployed to protect forward air bases. Missions have ranged from protecting the confines of the forward air base to exterior operations such as convoy security and reconnaissance patrols. Today, approximately 4,000 Air Force SF members are deployed to 200 locations worldwide.¹⁹³

Although SF deployments may be more frequent or in larger numbers than a typical DMAT, US&R or ILEAS deployment, the basics are the same; moving people out of various permanent organizations to form a single deployable expeditionary capability to conduct operations in austere and chaotic environments.

4. Management System

The Air Force's central management system is used to plan and move all Air Force resources including SF. This highly complex system is a module of the overall DoD system which allows for an integrated deployment of forces across the services. Adoption of a similar system in civilian response planning could be valuable in integrating medical, fire and law enforcement teams in a domestic response in the future. The Air Force system can be boiled down to a few parts relevant to managing and deploying civilian LE.

a. Resource Typing

All deployable manpower and logistics capabilities of Air Force SF are packaged into hundreds of standardized capability sets or unit type codes (UTCs) such as a 13 person LE team, a 44 person security team, a LE equipment package etc.¹⁹⁴ Each UTC has training requirements and other specific standards that make one 13 man team identical to the other. The entire deployable capability of SF is broken down into these capability sets and placed into a mobilization plan or catalogue for planners to use to fill

¹⁹³ James Alves, Interview by Author, 2008.

¹⁹⁴ Yeager, *AF Handbook 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook*, 18.

the requirements of preset plans.¹⁹⁵ This is not unlike the resource-typing concept explained in the LEDT concept. However, SF resources are typed to be used in support of pre-identified plans. There are few preset or prepackaged plans in civilian response that detail-resourcing requirements to the degree military plans do. As written, the LEDT model merely details a loose catalogue of desired capabilities based upon volunteer participants.

b. Preset Mission Plans

Preset Plans termed operational plans (OPLAN) are developed for a range of expected scenarios. For example, in the civilian case, there could be an OPLAN for a hurricane with specific chapters for each state and annexes for specific cities within the states detailing the response requirements for each level. With the military, these OPLANs detail a raw list of overall manpower and logistics necessary to execute the mission requirements for the given scenario, without designating from where this manpower and logistics come; it is simply the defined requirement to do the job.¹⁹⁶

c. Matching Requirements to Resources

Once the manpower requirement is defined in the OPLAN, planners then match the raw resource requirements listed in the OPLANS from the list of overall available resources in the mobilization plan. These documents are called time phased force deployment documents and detail specifically who is going to fill each UTC requirement in the OPLAN, what the cargo requirements are, how it is going to get to the scene and any other details to employ the resources for the mission.¹⁹⁷ Having learned the lessons of Katrina, FEMA recently released the 2008 FEMA Hurricane Contingency Plan that identifies resource considerations and is on the edge of military-level deliberate planning though it does not go so far as to pre-package teams.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ McCoy, *AFI 10-401, Deployment Planning and Execution*, 53.

¹⁹⁶ Yeager, *AF Handbook 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook*, 24-26.

¹⁹⁷ McCoy, *AFI 10-401, Deployment Planning and Execution*, 52.

¹⁹⁸ Michael Chertoff, *2008 FEMA Hurricane Contingency Plan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2008).

d. Tracking Resources

After resources are matched to requirements, units are issued a mission document statement that details what UTCs they are required to provide along with detailed instructions of what they must be capable of performing.¹⁹⁹ This allows units to execute training plans and other sustainment activities to ensure they can deploy these capabilities within the directed timeframe.

Unit commanders are required to submit a monthly report that outlines the health of UTC capabilities.²⁰⁰ If there are conditions where the capability cannot be deployed within the specified requirements such as not enough people, missing equipment, or lack of training, this information is immediately reported along with when the condition will be fixed.²⁰¹ Force planners are then able to see the daily status of available forces and equipment and make tasking adjustments based upon the reporting.

e. Deployment Execution

When resources are called up based on the time phased force deployment listing associated with an OPLAN, units are notified by a warning order to prepare to deploy, the logistics plan to move the units and equipment are readied and units are notified to deploy via an execution order. All of these actions are conducted by the Air Expeditionary Forces Center. This center acts as the NDMS or ILEAS of the Air Force because they have knowledge of all Air Force resources, their locations, daily status and readiness.

¹⁹⁹ Marke Gibson, *AFI 31-244, Reporting of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 2005), 13.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ William Holland, *AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System* (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force, 2006), 9, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed September 2, 2008).

This is a simplistic description of the deployment process, but is presented to demonstrate that a deliberate process is helpful to provide a calculated and measured response in times of crisis. This deliberate planning precludes the need to send an EMAC-like broadcast to see whom or what is available. Such capability is simply not found to this degree in civilian emergency response plans, but perhaps it should.

5. Smart Practices

An appropriately funded and staffed, central planning and management system support Air Force Security Forces with the ability to develop detailed contingency plans and closely monitor teams to surge forces in response to crises. Such planning takes the panic out of response, as units know what they are tasked to do, have trained for the mission, are equipped to execute this support and know how they are getting to the incident before it occurs. No one unit is slated to handle the entire problem. An integrated approach executed by various units with a range of capabilities is synchronized to act as a single task force to accomplish the overall objective. This level of synchronization is not found in civilian response despite the best intentions of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS unifies command by providing an integrated command structure, but the incident commander does not typically know beforehand who is going to respond and with what capabilities. In the civilian community, available forces usually have not trained together, nor have they synchronized the individual roles within the combined operation as was noted with the New York Fire and Police Departments.²⁰²

Within the civilian scheme, response plans are typically developed within the individual first responder lanes. Responders are deployed by unconnected agencies and their execution of operations on the ground continues to be stove-piped by function, thus complicating requirement to coordinate actions on the scene.²⁰³ This condition was seen

²⁰² Donald F. Kettl, "Contingent Coordination: Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security," *The American Review of Public Administration* 33, no. 3 (2003), 255, <http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/3/253> (accessed August 7, 2008).

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 260.

during the Katrina response particularly within the search and rescue community.²⁰⁴ The LEDT capability, once captured under a single management system, should be further leveraged through deliberate planning and force packaging by scenario. Such exercises could eventually facilitate a synchronized response with other first responder communities.

Within the homeland, reactive response to large scale crises almost always begin by mobilizing expanding rings of support from disconnected state and local jurisdictions during which valuable time is consumed until it becomes apparent a federal response is necessary. This two-stage process makes it even more critical that the federal response is swift, deliberate, accurately measured and efficient when it hits the ground. Without robust management of resources and deliberate planning, it is much more difficult to deliver the proper response. A good example of a defined response was the most recent deployment in support of Hurricane Gustav in 2008. The federal government did not wait for local governments to exhaust resources and ask for help; many supplies, teams and equipment were prepositioned well in advance.²⁰⁵ A coherent pre-response was executed based on lessons learned from Katrina and may be the first indication of changes in planning considerations.

There is no need to start from scratch in developing the National LEDT management system. Other FEMA management systems as well as ILEAS and military deliberate planning models provide many examples both good and bad from which much can be learned. Development of a central management system coupled with a military-style deliberate planning model could help LE planners develop the necessary national LEDT capability to meet anticipated homeland security dilemmas, understand the exact status of this capability on a daily basis, and provide robust prearranged delivery platforms to get the force to the fight.

²⁰⁴ Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned*, 38.

²⁰⁵ Mike Hasten, "FEMA Prepared for Gustav, Unlike Katrina; Jindal Says State Continues to Prepare Thenevstar.Com | the News Star," <http://www.thenewsstar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080828/UPDATES01/80828061> (accessed August 5, 2008).

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V. EVALUATED ALTERNATIVES AND PROJECTED OUTCOMES

A. INTRODUCTION

The 911 Commission Report warns that a failure in imagination may be the leading cause of the country's poor response to the September 2001 attacks.²⁰⁶ Author Donald Kettle warns that looking back in order to devise strategies to combat asymmetric problems may doom us to failure.²⁰⁷ Charles Wise's research indicates "when technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates uncertainty, organizations are often modeled on other organizations."²⁰⁸ LEDT planners should consider these warnings when developing the LEDT management system as the current concept heavily favors tenets of DMAT and US&R legacy programs whose management systems have proven less than capable at times.

Given these warnings, a "more of the same" strategy may not be the best approach to develop the LEDT management system; however, it remains prudent to learn from history by evaluating the current models capitalizing on their smart practices while exposing practices to avoid. Any "bold new" approach to LEDT management would also benefit from this methodology. With both points in mind, the intent of this work is to use the reviewed management systems as starting points versus end points.

Before reviewing potential LEDT management system options, certain evaluative criteria must be selected to help analyze current program capabilities. A survey of the

²⁰⁶ Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, *The 911 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2004), <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS51934>; <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0621/2004356401-b.html>; <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0621/2004356401-d.html>; <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0621/2004356401-t.html> (accessed Sept 16, 2008).

²⁰⁷ Donald F. Kettle, "Is the Worst Yet to Come?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604, no. 1 (March 2006), 274, <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/604/1/273> (accessed September 16, 2008).

²⁰⁸ Charles R. Wise, "Organizing for Homeland Security," *Public Administration Review* 62, no. 2 (March - April 2002), 132, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3109897> (accessed Sept 18, 2008).

literature on emergency response illuminated prominent elements experts believe exacerbate conditions of poor response management. These elements will be used as the evaluative measures when reviewing the alternative management systems.

Numerous authors have given their evaluation of why the U.S. response system has not worked properly in the past. Kettle among others says coordination is the root of the problem and is also the method to fix it.²⁰⁹ Louise Comfort emphasizes that organizations require a shared goal while noting that tensions between public safety and individual rights are still of concern.²¹⁰ William Waugh blames the federal structure itself for slow response to requests for help.²¹¹ Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus among others note the extreme difficulty in integrating multiple agencies and jurisdictions in a chaotic environment and suggest regional response.²¹² Brian Gerber, David Cohen, Brian Cannon, Dennis Patterson and Kendra Stewart reveal agencies often lack administrative and management capacity for effective policies and actions.²¹³

How a proposed management system addresses these areas may be an indication of its potential success. Additionally, assessment of two other factors, resistance of the LE community to the new system and potential political objections could be telling as to the likelihood of the new system's acceptance by internal and external audiences. Without conducting on-site studies or extensive interviews, value judgments of these evaluative elements will be made based upon the research of others revealed in the previous chapter's case studies.

²⁰⁹ Donald F. Kettl, "Contingent Coordination: Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security," *The American Review of Public Administration* 33, no. 3 (2003), 254, <http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/3/253> (accessed August 10, 2008).

²¹⁰ Louise K. Comfort, "Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events," *Public Administration Review* 62, Special Issue (2002), 100, 105, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110179> (accessed September 8, 2008).

²¹¹ William L. Waugh, Jr., "The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604, no. 1 (March 2006), 10, <http://ann.sage.pub.com/cgi/content/abstract/604/1/10> (accessed September 10, 2008).

²¹² Kiki Caruson and Susan A. Macmanus, "Disaster Vulnerabilities: How Strong a Push Toward Regionalism and Intergovernmental Cooperation?" *The American Review of Public Administration* 38, no. 3 (2008), 286, <http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/3/286> (accessed September 11, 2008).

²¹³ Brian J. Gerber and others, "On the Front Line: American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness," *Urban Affairs Review* 41, no. 2 (2005), 183, [Http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/41/2/182](http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/41/2/182) (accessed September 9, 2008).

B. ALTERNATIVE ONE: A FEDERAL CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

1. Evaluative Criteria

The LEDT concept largely employs both DMAT and US&R tenets. Review of the evaluative criteria will provide insight to what could be expected if the LEDT were served by this style of management system.

a. Coordination

Under the federal structure, coordination between response teams and their management systems have proven weak during both emergency conditions and day-to-day activities. When tested by response to catastrophic events, NDMS was not in sync with the teams it was designed to serve. During Hurricane Katrina, there were coordination disconnects between responding forces, the deployment system and personnel requesting forces, resulting in teams not being effectively employed.²¹⁴ Additionally, there were large gaps in coordination that left teams without equipment, transport or direction. Prior to 2002, team leaders warned that the lack of common operating documents necessary for coordinated actions were not available for DMAT leaders.²¹⁵

US&R management also showed an inability to coordinate day-to-day activities as status reports were not being sent up the chain, management personnel did not have the ability to assess team readiness levels, and managers did not review team performance reports due to a lack of standardized processes.²¹⁶ It was assessed by the DHS IG that these coordination problems could significantly; negatively impact the team's ability to respond.

²¹⁴ Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response*, 8.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

²¹⁶ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 7.

The literature reveals ineffective coordination is the leading problem in emergency management; but why? An overarching explanation with regard to the federal central management system is poor organization structure. As designed, locally owned and controlled teams “answer” to a federal management activity that has no authority over the resources it manages. James Carroll comments that terrorism cuts across distinctions between foreign, domestic, public, and private; and one could also add federal and state. This “mismatch results in disconnect between jurisdictions, capability and threat and ultimately who is responsible for what.”²¹⁷ This is a dilemma best solved through organizational redesign to enhance coordination. Additional detractors found in the federal system that inhibited it from executing its general coordination responsibilities were severe under-manning and under-funding.

b. Shared Goals

The centrally shared goal between response teams and their federal management system is to facilitate a response to local communities who lack the organic capability or capacity to respond. Without shared goals, there is not anything to coordinate as jurisdictions would be left to their own disparate activities. There is little debate this central shared goal between the two levels of government drive common actions; however, the bond is only loosely driven by its desire to serve the community versus being driven by a unifying organizational design or command and control structure. The National Incident Management System integrates actions during the emergency. However, before the emergency, there are no formal chains of command to drive these goals nor are there formal or informal structures such as stakeholder attended steering groups or governing and advisory committees to compel member actions. As federalism is designed, states and local authorities respond to local events supported as necessary by a resource-coordinating effort from the federal management system. In the inter-period between emergency response and day-to-day operations, interactions between the federal government and local governments are based on a relationship of

²¹⁷ Thomas H. Stanton, *Meeting the Challenge of 911: Blueprints for More Effective Government* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 75, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip069/2006005559.html> (accessed October 7, 2008).

resource requirements. From the federal perspective, shared goals are coerced through the promise of grant money; whereas states and local jurisdictions participate in these goals to the degree they need the federal assistance. This loose structure of activity driven by resource needs does not provide the necessary framework to coordinate strategic efforts, develop common strategy or guide tactical actions effectively.

c. Structure of the System

The federal management system is structured in the U.S. federalist tradition: loose federal coordination with decentralized response by state, local and private entities. When states request help through federal coordination they are bolstered by external assistance, mostly by responders who are also state, local and private entities. Although federalism is maintained under this approach, debate has raged as to its continued effectiveness. Kettl points out that while Arlington and New York performed brilliantly during 9/11, other jurisdictions may not have fared as well.²¹⁸ Should the country's emergency response be based upon pockets of excellence engineered by personalities or should a formal organizational structure be designed to achieve a robust and more standardized approach?

NIMS attempts to provide some standardization but through fragmented jurisdictions and loose structures where the county option is still the norm. The loose federal management of response teams facilitates the delivery of forces but it is not strong enough to dictate the level of capability of these forces beyond the hold it has through grant money as was repetitively shown in the DMAT and US&R systems. Florence Heffron says "centralization is both a virtue and a vice in the hierarchy of American political values."²¹⁹ The question becomes: given the normal organizational costs associated with decentralized management (redundancy, limited specialization, problematic command and control, etc.) can such methods adequately serve the emergency response community given the scale of the perils it confronts? To which may be added a second question: are these well-recognized elements of weakness really

²¹⁸ Kettl, *Contingent Coordination: Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security*, 261.

²¹⁹ Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection*, 33.

conductive to the preservation of American liberties? To the extent that the answer to either question is “No,” more thought should be put into stronger centralized management while maintaining decentralized execution.

d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident

The federal management system performed well in achieving operational capabilities that had not existed in the past as illustrated by the development of specialized DMAT and US&R teams. This was largely accomplished through resource agreements based on the attainment of minimum performance standards. The real test, however, is deployment and integration of these teams into a unified response. Once teams are formed, how effective is the management system in integrating the capability throughout the specialized function, and within the larger national response system?

Although teams are guided by standardized requirements laid out by the management activity, not all teams are equally capable. Differences in capability and readiness have generally been driven by two overarching factors: manning/funding and individual personalities. In the case of US&R, although the management system directed particular manning levels and provided the resources, individual teams chose how they wanted to expend funding and standardized regimens were not followed.²²⁰ Similar problems were found with DMATs. NDMS lacked standardized protocols and roles, responsibilities and authority were not understood causing a loose confederation of members rather than an integrated and standardized response capability.²²¹ Overall, the management system lacked the ability to integrate standard capabilities throughout the function.

The larger problem of the management system has been integration of these teams in a national response. Once deployed, additional management teams are also deployed to integrate DMAT and US&R capabilities into local response structures. However, these integration teams have proven to be ineffective because the right

²²⁰ Skinner, *Audit of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System*, 5-10.

²²¹ Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response*, 8.

personnel have not always been used and local structures take precedent in authority.²²² The President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and Chairman of the National Troopers Association believe federally mandated regionalism could fix this problem by pooling blocks of resources and forcing collaboration.²²³ Under this concept, the players remain the same but a regional structure is installed to increase effectiveness in coordination and integration of resources before the emergency occurs.

e. Administrative and Management Capacity

The DMAT and US&R management systems showed serious problems in administrative and management capacity. In NDMS, most of the capacity was hobbled by reduced funding made by conscious decisions to funnel resources to other areas.²²⁴ Manpower was also stripped down to one third of its previous amount. These actions depleted NDMS' ability to coordinate actions within the DMAT protocols and negatively impacted its ability to integrate teams into the local structures after deployment.

The DHS IG report illustrated serious problems in administration and management capacity with the US&R response system. Like NDMS, US&R suffered from improper manning of their positions both locally and nationally and from improper funding. The IG report indicates these elements were the chief culprits in a host of management, funding and operational miscues.

Without a commitment by DHS and FEMA, who were undergoing their own challenges, it was unlikely NDMS or US&R could put together a coherent program for effective team management. As stated by Waugh, "the federal system itself acts to inhibit coherent and comprehensive disaster preparedness efforts because of conflicting

²²² Devir, *Report on the National Disaster Medical System 2005 Hurricane Response*, 8.

²²³ Caruson and Macmanus, *Disaster Vulnerabilities: How Strong a Push Toward Regionalism and Intergovernmental Cooperation?*, 291.

²²⁴ Waxman, Thompson and Melancon, *The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System*, 2.

incentives of management, coordination and uneven resources.”²²⁵ Again, new structures and resource allocation should be considered to increase administration and management capacity.

f. Acceptance by the LE Community

In an interview of several unnamed LEDT planners, the LE community is least likely to accept a central DHS or FEMA management system that simply issues directives and tasks local LE resources from Washington, no matter how effective this system promises to be. Without significant state control of teams, or at a minimum a management committee of locally or regionally elected stakeholders intimately involved in the National LEDT management system, this option is not likely to be accepted by the internal LE community.

g. Political Objections

Political objection to centralizing LE is rooted in the American tradition of federalism to protect individual freedom and liberty first. Local control of LE has always been the desire of local political leaders as well. This premise goes back to the debate illustrated in Chapter I. If a central federal management option were pursued, an information campaign would be required to illustrate that such a system would not impact decentralized ownership or control of local LE forces.

2. Projected Outcome

Simply adopting a central DHS/FEMA style management system could be considered a failure in imagination as this is the status quo option of emergency response management altered only by adding LE in the equation. Without injection of a solid budget and management staff, it is unlikely to yield any different results than NDMS or the US&R Response System provided from 2002 to 2006. Finally, without a common

²²⁵ Gerber and others, *On the Front Line: American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness*, 185.

structure that clearly delineates authority and shared responsibility, the elements of coordination, integration of forces and management capacity remain limiting factors to efficiency and effectiveness.

C. ALTERNATIVE TWO: ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT ALARM SYSTEM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM²²⁶

1. Evaluative Criteria

ILEAS is a statewide LE management system that provides the foundation for LE mutual aid across Illinois. It also underwrites deployable tactical response team capability and performance by directing minimum standards through mutually agreed upon regulations as well as training and equipping criteria. This system addresses the major areas of concerns in the LEDT concept.

a. Coordination

Coordination is the bedrock of ILEAS and is perhaps the key to its success. Coordination under ILEAS smartly ties together the remaining evaluative criteria in the following sections to provide a consolidated system of management for effective execution of both management and emergency response objectives. Resource management, policy development and strategic planning are centrally coordinated efforts under ILEAS, not unlike what is found in a military structure. ILEAS is made up of a central management organization with a clearly delineated coordination chain to speed decision making and policy implementation from the management organization down to individual departments for decentralized execution.

Illinois is divided into eight emergency management regions. Each of the 880 departments within these regions is represented first by a regional board of ILEAS officers who coordinate regional LE issues. Next, each region has two representatives that sit on the ILEAS central governing board. This design ensures an avenue for

²²⁶ Basis of this analysis derived from interview of Mr. James Page, ILEAS Executive Director and the ILEAS Handbook also authored by Mr. Page

coordination up and down the chain as well as for representation of all stakeholders; an element lacking in the current federal structure. ILEAS smartly breaks the barriers of an “us and them” management relationship through employment of a participative management structure.

Coordination of the emergency response itself occurs smoothly as ILEAS provides a tactical command and control web to ensure near-instant dispatch of unified forces across the state via an inclusive information architecture. Mutual aid relies on effective pre-coordination to preclude trading business cards at the scene of the emergency. ILEAS circumvents this condition by requiring jurisdictions to coordinate with each other through the creation of a formal web accessible emergency mutual aid plan. This plan can be seen by all 880 jurisdictions and provides the expected needs of the jurisdiction prior to an emergency while linking neighboring jurisdictions, jurisdictions to regions and regions to each other.²²⁷ This web of plans provides coordination to unify the state’s emergency response from the smallest department and jurisdiction to the largest.

b. Shared Goals

Shared goals between response agencies are what cement the possibility of a unified response. The overarching shared goal amongst all Illinois LE agencies is to provide public safety for the state. This goal starts with the building block of each law enforcement agency providing public safety services to their own constituents as seen in other states. However, ILEAS takes the process a step further as these building blocks are interlaced with each other up to and through regional relationships via the emergency mutual aid plans. Each LE agency is reliant on the others for response or provision of resources. This reliance relationship pervades the system’s structure.

²²⁷ Page, *Interview by Author*.

One could make similar claims regarding other states as most states have intra-state mutual aid agreements. However, few if any, are as robust as Illinois' and none go the next step with an ILEAS management organization that provides a common architecture for planning, policy and resource management and allocation.²²⁸

c. Structure of the System

Louise Comfort identifies a major detractor to effective emergency response by claiming “little attention has been given to structuring inter-organizational response to events on regional levels.”²²⁹ Her solution is premised upon organizational capacity to respond based upon adaptive processes, which go back to Stuart Kauffman and evolution theory. She says “self organization or the ability to reallocate resources and action to meet changing demands from the environment” is a key component to success in this policy area.²³⁰

ILEAS was designed to address this exact dilemma. The ILEAS management organization resources individual jurisdictions to act beyond the role of an individual node by providing unified plans, policy and integrated resources to enable a networked regional response. As the elements of the emergency change, these pre-coordinated response plans are adaptive and scalable allowing the dispatcher to adjust deployment of forces by including additional jurisdictions until enough forces and resources are on-scene to handle the problem. The dispatcher has the authority to execute the initial response plan without verification from any higher authority.²³¹ Follow-on forces are deployed as long as the responsible LE agency in the stricken jurisdiction requests them. This is the basic concept of all mutual aid and responses by state and local resources...rings of response that expand from the stricken jurisdiction up to federal assistance if necessary. The difference with ILEAS is the mutual aid is pre-arranged, can

²²⁸ Page, *Interview by Author*.

²²⁹ Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” *Publius* 32, no. 4, *The State of American Federalism, 2001-2002* (Autumn 2002), 32, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331025> (accessed October 10, 2008).

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

²³¹ Page, *Interview by Author*.

be called for by patrol-level personnel and once initiated is auto-adaptive to the required resources without bureaucratic halts for review, permission, or authorization. The web-based system makes it easy for departments, jurisdictions and regions to coordinate their needs and understand the neighboring jurisdictions requirements prior to the crises. Plans can be updated in real-time on the web as the environment changes or departments adjust to lessons learned.²³²

ILEAS is also auto-adaptive in its general management structure. The ILEAS governing board allows for unified and coordinated LE action across Illinois as each department is represented. Each has a voice to support, adjust and oppose policy, plans and resource management decisions. This board is what ties each department to the management direction of the consortium allowing for timely adjustments to individual department needs.

d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident

As previously stated, ILEAS consists of a strong central management organization linked by clear lines of communication to a network of decentralized executors. These executors are linked to each other via emergency mutual aid plans, linked data information systems, a common communication package and a central ILEAS dispatch agency. Agencies exercise response to stricken neighboring jurisdictions and are not strangers to one another before the emergency occurs.²³³

ILEAS also underwrites specialized tactical deployment teams designed to provide special response capability to requesting jurisdictions. These regional teams provide a platform to integrate departments as its team members are drawn from agencies throughout the region.²³⁴ As such, these team members bring the ideas and cultures of their departments with them and provide another avenue for inter-agency cooperation through mutual goals and understanding. Although jurisdictions maintain autonomy, they are linked by numerous venues allowing them to perform in a networked fashion.

²³² Page, *Interview by Author*.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

e. Administrative and Management Capacity

The staff of ILEAS consists of seven full-time and twenty part-time personnel coupled with a governing board of twenty-one personnel. The capacity of this management organization is leveraged by multiple integrated resource management tools that reach down to the jurisdiction level, a governing board and regional representatives that execute programs in the field along-side the departments they directly support. An important element not found in NDMS or the US&R response system is that ILEAS has been given the authority to execute its mission. NDMS and US&R achieve informal power or authority through the promise of resources; however, participating teams can opt out if it is in their best interest or their sponsoring organizations direct them to exit. Under the federal structure, there is division as the management system is operated by one organization and another owns the teams. ILEAS' informal authority is derived from participation by the 880 constituent departments all under one agreement brought together by equal representation. Formal authority is derived from the Illinois Constitution, which designates ILEAS as a semi-government body.²³⁵

f. Acceptance by the LE Community

If ILEAS is such a good program, why have other states not developed a system like it? The explanation may be a simple one: timing. Executive Director of ILEAS, James Page, illustrates this point best. The Illinois Association of Chief's of Police and the Illinois Terrorism Task Force were interested in LE mutual aid and statewide response prior to 9/11 but could not get any traction on the idea.²³⁶ However, the events of 9/11 opened a window of opportunity within the state where all LE agencies were willing to cooperate as a single entity; thus, the enactment of ILEAS in 2002. John Kingdon points out these policy windows do not open often and do not remain open long.

²³⁵ Page, *Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System*, 1.

²³⁶ Page, *Interview by Author*, 1.

Typically, an idea has to have time to “ripen” and when the policy window opens, the idea can be transformed and enacted into public policy.²³⁷ In near textbook fashion, this is exactly what the Illinois LE community did with ILEAS.

Other states have shown an interest in ILEAS; however, many may simply be on the wrong side of the policy window to do anything about it. From the national perspective, the LEDT concept paper appears remarkably like the initial National Law Enforcement Rapid Response Team proposal written by Mr. Page, which is based upon the current ILEAS concept. The LEDT concept has been accepted by all the major stakeholders within the U.S. LE community; if enacted, its roots will be solidly in ILEAS.

g. Political Objections

There does not appear to be any political objection to ILEAS in Illinois. ILEAS does not own LE forces nor does it initiate or dictate LE deployment on its own. This arrangement allows ILEAS to stay out of the debate regarding public safety versus private liberties. ILEAS is a facilitator of the rules these organizations each agreed to and under which they operate. The ILEAS management system is central in nature; however, all law enforcement actions are decentralized. Since its creation in 2002, ILEAS still represents all sheriffs and police departments across the state. If there were serious political objection, these organizations would likely have voted with their feet by now.

2. Projected Outcome

ILEAS is a superior LE management system for the state of Illinois. If implemented at the national level, it would require execution of four key attributes in order to obtain the same level of success. First, it would have to devise a national advisory and governing board to maintain its inclusiveness and representation. Second, it would require a central management agency to consolidate and coordinate actions. FEMA would be the logical choice, as the central management agency, as it is resourced

²³⁷ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995), 166.

for all-hazards emergency response and could eventually link other first responders in a unified national response. Third, a common information management system would be required to tie local jurisdictions with regions and states to other states. Like ILEAS, this system should include resource catalogues as well as emergency mutual aid plans tying jurisdictions to one another for prearranged and integrated response. Finally, the national system should develop deployable LE response teams with specialized capability for response to regional disasters. However, if local jurisdictions are completely tied across the nation and integrated by emergency mutual aid response plans, there should be a reduction in the number of national specialized teams required as regions would be more capable of providing an internal response to solve their own problems. An organization structure such as this would provide a national response system versus mere management capacity to deploy teams.

D. ALTERNATIVE THREE: MILITARY DELIBERATE PLANNING MODEL

1. Evaluative Criteria

Without much doubt, the military management system is a classic machine bureaucracy: hierarchical, centrally driven, with a strict chain of command. However, it does not necessarily display many of the standard negative attributes of a machine bureaucracy, “destructive to the spirit of employees, overly rigid, inflexible, unable to adapt to change and a constant source of frustration to members of the public who deal with them.”²³⁸ In many respects, the military system acts opposite of these conditions perhaps due to its all-volunteer status. As such, it is a beacon of admiration for how it operates, particularly in austere and fluid environments, similar to what the LEDT would experience.

²³⁸ Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection*, 40.

After Hurricane Katrina, proposals were made by the President to use the military as the primary response element to catastrophic disasters.²³⁹ Given the sensitivity to maintain federalism and home rule, why would such a proposal be made? A review of the following evaluative criteria may shed some light on this bold statement.

a. *Coordination*

The civilian community by far has more critical infrastructure and resources than the military; however, it is the military's unique ability to coordinate and rapidly consolidate that makes it a more powerful organization. The military operates an excellent coordination system through its highly developed chains of command, reporting protocols and sophisticated command and control mechanisms. It is the hierarchical structure itself that ties otherwise disparate units together to mass resources effectively in order to provide a unified response.

b. *Shared Goals*

Military goals are determined and facilitated by a series of connected activities. The President and the national command authority determine strategy and objectives for the nation. Heads of the military services develop doctrine, strategy, objectives and goals to support accomplishment of the national strategy directly. The directions of the military service chiefs cascade down to each successive organizational level that also develops strategy, objectives and goals dovetailing into the mission of the next higher organization. It is through this system of cascading strategic planning that each unit within the military shares supporting goals from top to bottom. However, overarching changes in national missions require time before shared goals are inculcated throughout the system. Until this point is reached, missions are accomplished through disciplined adherence to the chain of command.

²³⁹ Waugh, *The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters*, 12.

c. Structure of the System

The military is hierarchical in nature and is arranged by functions, which allows for specific chains of command, specialization, standardization, use of standard operating procedures based upon formal rules and regulations and professionalization of employees.²⁴⁰ The military uses this form of organization structure to manage a geographically dispersed capability to deliver unified actions in crises environments. There are numerous experts in organizational design that believe organization by function is archaic, inflexible and obsolete such as Harold Seidman, John Carroll and Fredrick Kaiser to name a very few.²⁴¹ However, for the military, it is this very structure that makes it a world-class responder.

d. Integration of Agencies Prior to Incident

Formal doctrine determines what branches of service or organization is responsible for specific mission areas. This is followed by integration of supporting units through cascading strategy, objectives and goals facilitated by the chain of command. This system provides an advantage the civilian community does not enjoy, as civilian organizations must rely more on informal relationships and wills and desires of independent jurisdictions who have competing goals and interests.

e. Administrative and Management Capacity

The Department of Defense is the largest agency in the government. The sheer size of the department drives formal protocols for planning, managing and administration. The DoD's administrative and management capacity allow and indeed require it to develop intricate operational plans and synchronized force packages to impose the nation's will across the globe. No state, local or private entity commands remotely similar resources and to this extent, the DoD's unique scale may limit its value as a model for other organizations.

²⁴⁰ Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection*, 22-26.

²⁴¹ Stanton, *Meeting the Challenge of 911: Blueprints for More Effective Government*, 2-8.

f. Acceptance by the LE Community

Like the military, the LE community is organized by function as seen by the establishment of patrol divisions, investigation branches, SWAT and corrections functions within the departments. The LE community also relies on chains of command, specialization, standardization, use of standard operating procedures, formal rules/regulations and professionalization of employees. LE agencies are often thought of as para-military agencies for these reasons. However, one of the main differences between the military and police departments is that the latter lacks a single central management system to tie geographically disperse departments together across the nation as the DoD does with its military branches and bases.

Even with all the successes of this system and similarities between the military and LE community, there is little support for a national police force among LE practitioners and citizens as depicted in the on-going debate between public safety and personal liberty. Additionally, the LE community enjoys and expects the autonomy to operate within their own jurisdictions. However, based upon acceptance of the LEDT concept by major LE stakeholders, there appears to be a desire to change the current response structure starting with consolidating resources and development of policies and procedures to create a more structured and unified regional emergency response capability.

g. Political Objections

Despite the success of the U.S. military and its structures, nationalization of the civilian police force is a nonviable alternative in the United States. Additionally there is significant debate amongst organizational design experts as to the efficacy of central and hierarchical structures versus networked and decentralized structures. The development of a centralized approach to manage deployable teams is a delicate proposition. State and local jurisdictions may view such a move as an attempt to control their resources.

2. Projected Outcome

The military management system has great applicability to U.S. law enforcement. However, such a system adopted in total would have a negative impact on the ideals of American federalism and would be unlikely to work as it could never be dominantly controlled to the degree the DoD does to ensure its success. Any allowance for county option or arbitrary participation would defeat the purpose and ability of such a system.

There are individual components of the military management system, if adopted, could markedly improve response capability. The first is deliberate planning against most likely threats coupled with pre-assigned force packaging to increase the speed and quality of a regional LE response. The second is a standard command and control architecture linking the deployment authority to departments such as the ILEAS dispatch center as it does for Illinois coupled with a shared information management system to tie resources together.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

There are two overarching principles that must be taken into consideration when formulating LEDT management options. First, the U.S. system of government employs some forms of inefficiency to protect against abuse from a central power. During a lecture at Colombia University in 1959, President Harry S. Truman said, “Whenever you have an efficient government you have a dictatorship.”²⁴² This outlook has also proven to be the crux of problems affecting emergency response. Given today’s threats and increased complexity of response, how inefficient can the United States afford the government to be in exchange for this protection? Should the inefficiency apply equally across the board and to the same degree in all government programs? Second, the public’s willingness to adjust or trade civil liberties for centralized efficiency is likely to be formed on a sliding scale based upon recent events. Immediately after 9/11, Americans were much more willing to stand in long airport lines, endure questioning and physical searches in trade for increased security.²⁴³ With the passage of time, however, citizens become less willing to give up or adjust their liberties. Narrowing of the policy window is a significant factor that will shape available options to form the National LEDT program.

Overall, a balance must be found within the dilemma of checking governmental power and effective delivery of public service. As a policy proposal, the National LEDT system must answer effectiveness and efficiency concerns while staying within the bounds of the American federalist construct in order to be acceptable.

²⁴² Harry S. Truman, “Colombia University Speech,” Quotation Page, <http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?Search=government&startsearch=Sear> (accessed September 2008).

²⁴³ Donald F. Kettl, *System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), 18, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0413/2004001913.html> (accessed October 15, 2008).

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Law enforcement planners clearly indicate, through the LEDT concept, their desire to increase the capacity to bolster stricken jurisdictions by deployment of outside LE resources. However, the ability to achieve this desire goes beyond simply massing people and resources to be transported to the disaster area. The larger issue is the development of a structure capable of managing such a force daily to ensure readiness and effective employment of teams when needed.

The LEDT concept paper extensively cites tenets of both DMAT and US&R teams. There is no indication LEDT planners reviewed the viability of these management systems. The LEDT proposal's design is, in fact, more decentralized than both NDMS and US&R Response systems.²⁴⁴ As history and the evaluative criteria show, these systems lacked the ability to coordinate, struggled with shared goals and lacked the administrative and management capacity to manage teams effectively under their purview. The current LEDT proposal appears to ignore the lessons of NDMS and the US&R Response System, if these lessons were known at all.

Complex policy problems rarely lend themselves to simple solutions. None of the evaluated alternative management systems reviewed in this thesis provides a stand-alone template for formation of the LEDT management system. However, the smart practices and obstacles outlined in Chapter IV should act as guideposts in formation of the LEDT management system.

As Florence Heffron points out, "...values intrinsic to democratic political theory require government to be responsive, representative and responsible."²⁴⁵ By following Heffron's edicts and the previously identified guideposts, LE planners may design a system that works both in the field and is acceptable to the LE community and the public. The following are general propositions for consideration.

²⁴⁴ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Law Enforcement Deployment Teams*, 8.

²⁴⁵ Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection*, 62.

1. Achieving Responsiveness

The LEDT management system should be centrally housed in FEMA rather than straddle three different management agencies. This structure would shorten coordination lanes between deployable stakeholders while streamlining the number of steps and organizations involved with deployment management. This structure directly answers key complaints regarding coordination after Katrina.

To further increase responsiveness, a planning cell should be developed to “war plan” major incidents against target cities by category of size to develop response templates as is done under the military model. These templates should be further refined by the cities themselves to add the requisite details and coordination points. Like ILEAS, these templates would act as the mandatory emergency mutual aid plans and would provide the basis for rapid LEDT deployment and efficient and effective use of resources upon arrival.

2. Achieving Representative Status

A governing board comprised of regional representatives should be developed to guide FEMA’s management of these teams. FEMA does not own the responding agencies; therefore, a power equalization strategy of shared power would be more acceptable and more likely to affect the necessary change than a top-down approach.²⁴⁶ ILEAS provides a successful example of this management strategy and should be studied further for potential implementation.

3. Achieving Responsibility

As found in NDMS and US&R management systems, obtaining program compliance without authority is problematic. Housing the proposed LEDT management system within FEMA alone does not give it legal authority over deployable LE elements. However, the provision of funding and resourcing coupled with inclusion in the management process through the regional governing board concept could prove valuable

²⁴⁶ Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection*, 158.

in gaining compliance with shared goals. ILEAS provides a working example of this construct and it proves this approach can be very effective. A standardization and evaluation panel comprised of LEDT managers, subject matter experts and FEMA representatives should be formed to ensure teams comply with program standards. This team would aid considerably in achieving shared responsibility. The US&R management committee proved to be an effective model in this regard.

4. LEDT Management

LEDT management will only be as effective as the information systems it employs. Again, ILEAS provides a positive example of how information systems can be used not only to manage and maintain status of teams but also to form response plans, provide access to shared resource databases, and standardize training and operations information. The LEDT management system must not become a pedestal headquarters function that only pulls information. It must push information and facilitate collaboration between participating departments in order for it to be successful in a landscape where it has no legal authority and does not physically own the assets.

These recommendations provide the beginning of a structure to employ Henry Fayol's time-tested principles of management: centralization, unity of command, unity of effort, division of work and order.²⁴⁷ The proposals also maintain the tenet of American federalism though decentralized execution by state and local jurisdictions facilitated by representation via the governing board and the information management and resource sharing systems.

C. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION

The largest obstacle to implementation may come from within the LE community itself. Inability to agree on an approach that would provide the required autonomy and authority to marshal and manage regional resources effectively is likely given the historical decentralized structure of LE.

²⁴⁷ Marino, *14 Principles of Management (Henri Fayol)*.

Additionally, time is not on the side of LE planners. The further removed from the events of 9/11 and Katrina, the smaller the policy window is for implementation of a methodology to transform the current response structure. It is likely, as more time passes; that LE practitioners and their political leaders will feel less threatened by the potential of a catastrophic event occurring in their jurisdiction, and therefore, will be less likely to embrace a transformational change particularly if they perceive any loss of autonomy.²⁴⁸ Congress for its part is likely to become increasingly concerned about the efficacy and cost of such a program.

D. IMPLICATIONS

Status quo is not a viable option given past response problems. LE reform should not be hobbled by old fears or outdated paradigms and structures. The proposed smart practices and guideposts present adjustments to form a robust system to ensure delivery of LE capability to stricken areas. Furthermore, the proposals maintain the traditions of states' rights and home rule. Failure to move in a new direction will require the LE community to attempt to squeeze effectiveness and efficiency out of outdated approaches, a recipe for diminishing returns going forward.

E. WAY AHEAD

Law enforcement planners are merely scratching the surface of a larger problem in the United States; lack of a synchronized response. The Incident Command System and the National Incident Management System work to unify command and control once teams arrive; however, before that point teams are managed and deployed within their functional stovepipes. Simply, there is not a synchronized national response of the various first response capabilities.

²⁴⁸ Kettl, *System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics*, 36.

Follow-on research should be conducted to facilitate revamping the nation's disparate emergency response system to consolidate and network a civil defense configuration capable of facilitating integrated response from all first responder communities. The template for such research exists in the military's combined arms doctrine operationalized via the joint multiagency task force.

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