

**STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY  
THROUGH SMART POWER—  
A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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MARCH 5, 2008  
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**WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Lugar, Hagel, and Corker.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good morning to my colleagues and to our distinguished witnesses. This is an important hearing. We have two of the finest military men that have served in the time I've been here in the Senate, and I'm flattered they have come before the committee, and thank them for their good work.

The force of arms won our independence, and throughout our history, the force of arms has protected our freedom. But the very moment we declared our independence, we laid before the world the values that sat behind the revolution that we waged. And our Declaration of Independence was written by men who believed that "a decent Respect for the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the cause which impel them to engage in the Separation they were begetting."

And no less than the force of arms, a statement of principle justifying our actions was required in the minds of our Founders. Our first act as a nation embodied what we now call "smart power"—using the force of our principles and ideas to promote our interests. Neither arms nor ideas were adequate alone. But what was true then is still true today—they're both necessary.

We're here today because there's a growing concern that in recent years we have lost the balance that served us so well throughout our history. This is the first in what I plan to be—the chairman and I plan to have as a series of hearings on the issue of smart power—the skillful use of all of our resources—nonmilitary and military—to promote our national interests.

Our two witnesses bring decades of uniformed service to the country. And I wanted to begin this discussion with the people who

know firsthand what it means to be combat, and hear what they think about the role of nonmilitary resources in the pursuit of our security.

General Zinni has held many key positions, including commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command. He wrote a recent book, "The Battle for Peace," that lays out an intellectual framework for smart power and our ideas.

Admiral Smith, who we were just reminiscing, has spent probably 15 years since we saw one another overseas, when he was in command—served as commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe, and he led the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

They represent over 40 distinguished men and women who have served at the highest levels of our Armed forces, all flag officers, all of whom believe we need, in their words, "a new vision of America's engagement with the world." These men and women have given their considerable expertise, and their considerable reputations, to launch today the National Security Advisory Council, under the auspices of the Center for U.S. Global Engagement.

And as I said to them privately, I think what they're doing is a great service to the country. It's one thing for a group of diplomats, distinguished as they may be, it's one thing for a group of think-tank folks, it's one thing for a group of respected elected officials to come forward and talk about the need to use our soft power.

But two military men who have been decorated, two men who have had a lifetime of experience as warriors, coming before us, representing 40 other men and women of similar rank, to tell us that we have to do more, I think, is the best way to start this proceeding, the best way to start these series of hearings.

The message is straightforward, delivered by these men, and I quote: "We cannot rely on military power alone to make our Nation secure." I agree. And I'm anxious to hear what they have to say.

I have a much longer statement, but in the interest of time, I would ask the remainder of my statement be placed in the record as if read.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

General Zinni, Admiral Smith, welcome.

The force of arms won our independence, and throughout our history, the force of arms has protected our freedom. But the very moment we declared our independence, we laid before the world the values behind our revolution. Our Declaration of Independence was written by men who believed that "a decent Respect for the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation."

No less than force of arms, a statement of principle justifying our actions was "required." Our first act as a nation embodied what we now call "smart power"—using the force of our principles and ideas to promote our interests. Neither arms nor ideas were adequate alone. That was true then, and it is still true today.

We are here today because there is a growing concern that in recent years we have lost the balance that served us so well throughout our history.

This is the first in what I plan to be a series of hearings on the issue of smart power—the skillful use of all of our resources, nonmilitary and military—to promote our national interests.

Our two witnesses bring decades of uniformed service to our country. I wanted to begin this discussion with the people who know firsthand what it means to com-

mit to combat, and hear what they think about the role of nonmilitary resources in the pursuit of our security.

General Zinni has held many key positions, including commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command. He wrote a recent book—"The Battle for Peace"—that lays out an intellectual framework for smart-power ideas.

Admiral Smith is a retired four-star admiral in the U.S. Navy. He has served as commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe and he led the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

They represent over 40 distinguished men and women who have served at the highest levels of our Armed Forces, all of whom believe we need, in their words, "a new vision of America's engagement with the world."

These men and women have given their considerable expertise—and their considerable reputations—to launch today the National Security Advisory Council under the auspices of the Center for U.S. Global Engagement. Their message is straightforward: "We cannot rely on military power alone to make our nation secure."

I agree.

Virtually none of the challenges we face—including the rise of radical fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic divisions, economic dislocations, environmental degradation, the spread of disease or the failure of states—can be met solely or even primarily with the force of arms.

In recent years, as we have built up our military might, we have allowed the other elements of American power to atrophy.

Funding for the Department of Defense is over half a trillion dollars, but the total foreign affairs budget is less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. For every \$19 we put into the military, barely \$1 goes toward civilian foreign assistance programs.

This imbalance is producing a number of unintended consequences that are undermining our national security instead of advancing it.

First, the weakness of the muscles that surround our military might is actually sapping the strength of our Armed Forces.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, our military is spearheading reconstruction. As Secretary of Defense Gates said recently, we now have "field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils—usually in a language they don't speak."

Out of necessity, they have gotten very good at it. But it is not their job—and it takes away from the job they are trained to do, namely fight the enemy.

That's why Dick Lugar and I have been leading the effort in Congress to establish a Civilian Response Corps: A standing army of police trainers, judicial experts, engineers and administrators who can help build the capacity of countries emerging from conflict.

Second, the recent emphasis on military preemption has come at the expense of true prevention—defusing threats to America's security long before they are on the verge of exploding.

Military preemption has long been—and must remain—an option. But turning preemption into a one-size-fits-all doctrine has made the world even less secure for America.

It said to Iran and North Korea their best insurance policy against regime-change was to acquire weapons of mass destruction as quickly as possible.

It said to fault-line states like India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Russia and Chechnya, Israel and the Arab States that it is alright to use force first and ask questions later.

It required a standard of proof for intelligence that may be impossible to meet unless we cherry pick the facts, as we did before we went into Iraq.

And it has undermined our credibility around the world.

If we're smart, we'll move from military preemption to a comprehensive prevention strategy that would:

Secure loose weapons around the world . . . build the capacity of our partners to detect dangerous materials and disrupt terror networks . . . set new standards to seize suspect cargoes . . . provide security, political and economic incentives for states to forgo weapons . . . and reform the entire nonproliferation system.

Third, the emphasis on military might has come at the expense of building effective alliances and international organizations.

This administration starts from the premise that because America's military might is so much greater than anyone else's, anything that could get in the way of using that might—even an ally—must be ignored.

But consider our main security challenge: A growing network of fundamentalist groups that could tap into a spreading supply of dangerous weapons.

The best response to a network of terror is to build a network of our own, a network of like-minded countries that pools resources, information, ideas, and power. Taking on the radical fundamentalists alone isn't necessary, it isn't smart, and it won't succeed.

Fourth, an over-reliance on military might has taken resources, energy, and attention away from other strategies that can be more effective in actually advancing democracy, developing economies and preventing states from failing.

We have spent on Afghanistan's reconstruction over 6 years what we spend on military operations in Iraq every 3 weeks. Yet Afghanistan and its border region with Pakistan are where al-Qaeda plotted 9/11, where the attacks on Europe since 9/11 originated, and where al-Qaeda is now regrouping.

If we are smart, we will do much more to help them pave roads and generate electricity, build schools and train teachers, open closed economies, and empower women.

Beyond these countries, we will relieve more debt, fight poverty, and promote sustainable development. Climate change, the global rush for energy, the spread of disease—all these threaten our security as well. Left unanswered, they will be the wellsprings of future wars.

Making these our priorities will make us safer. It will help restore the moral leadership we have lost.

But it also will take time and money. It will require tradeoffs and tough choices.

I hope that our witnesses today will help us begin to think about those choices—and about what we need to do to recapture the totality of America's strength.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
Senator.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses. They are two distinguished leaders, as you have mentioned, and have advocated strength within the civilian component of our national security operations.

During the last 5 years, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has focused much attention on how we can improve our diplomatic and foreign assistance capabilities and integrate them more effectively with the military components of national power.

Since 2003, we have been advocating through hearings and legislation the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the military, devoted to post-conflict situations. We have argued for a rapidly deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with the military on stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments.

I am very pleased that the Bush administration is requesting \$248.6 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Creating and sustaining this civilian capacity is precisely the intent of the Lugar-Biden-Hagel legislation that passed the Senate in 2006, and passed this committee again last March.

In addition to meeting contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be ready for the next post-conflict mission. In 2006, I directed the Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the expanding role of the U.S. military in areas that traditionally were the province of the State Department.

The resulting report, entitled "Embassies as Command Posts in the Campaign Against Terror," documented the rise in development and humanitarian assistance that is being funneled through the Pentagon, and recommended that all security assistance, including section 1206 funding administered by the Defense Depart-



ment, be included under the Secretary of State's authority and the new coordination process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.

In 2007, the committee's staff completed a second field-based study that focused more broadly on U.S. foreign assistance efforts. The report examined assistance funded through the State Department, USAID, the Defense Department, and other agencies in more than 20 countries—in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

It recommended that a comprehensive foreign assistance strategy be linked to our actual foreign aid spending, and that the State Department's Director of Foreign Assistance be responsible for all government agencies' foreign aid programs.

We undertook these efforts because the United States Government is paying insufficient attention to fundamental questions about whether we are building the United States national security capabilities, and can address the threats and challenges we are likely to encounter.

Although our defense, foreign affairs, homeland security, intelligence, and energy budgets are carefully examined from the incremental perspective of where they were in the previous year, it is not apparent that Congress or the executive branch is adequately evaluating whether the money flowing to these areas represents the proper mix for the 21st century.

While Congress maintains generous levels of funding to our military, funding for diplomacy and foreign assistance persistently falls very short. The Bush administration deserves praise for its international affairs budgets, which have attempted to reverse the downward spiral in U.S. foreign policy capabilities that were imposed during the 1990s.

By 2001, Embassy security upgrades were behind schedule, we lacked adequate numbers of diplomats with key language skills, many important overseas posts were filled by junior Foreign Service officers, and our public diplomacy was completely inadequate for the mission in an era of global terrorism. Our diplomatic capabilities have made progress under President Bush, but obviously much work is left to be done.

Defense agencies increasingly have been granted authority to fill gaps in foreign assistance and public information programs, but the military is sometimes ill-suited to run such programs. A far more rational approach would be to give the State Department the resources it should have to achieve what clearly are civilian missions.

This view was echoed by Defense Secretary Gates in a speech last month at CSIS. He pointed out that the total foreign affairs budget request was roughly equivalent to what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. He also noted that the planned 7,000 troop increase in the Army expected for 2008 is equivalent to adding the entire U.S. Foreign Service to the Army in 1 year.

We must adjust our civilian foreign policy capabilities to deal with a dynamic world where national security threats are increasingly based on nonmilitary factors. I would underscore that although military and civilian capabilities are severely out of balance, the United States must do more than add funds to the foreign affairs account. We must build our diplomatic capabilities in

the areas of greatest consequence, paying particular attention to international, economic, and energy policy.

It is difficult to overstate the role of energy in contemporary foreign policy calculations. Russian foreign policy is now largely based on maximizing the political leverage and financial earnings of its energy supplies, and dominating the transport of energy to Eurasia. This is so critical to Russian strategy that Vladimir Putin has personally negotiated oil and gas deals with Central Asian leaders.

In January, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, traveled throughout the Middle East promoting French sales of civilian nuclear powerplants that could have an enormous impact on proliferation calculations. Meanwhile, the Chinese are pursuing relationships with almost everyone who promises them a reliable supply of oil.

States, such as Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan, have used their energy wealth to support aggressive policies and insulate themselves from outside pressures. Important rivals are exercising power in ways that circumvent traditional military or diplomatic levers, and we have to ask whether the State Department and other Federal agencies have the resources and expertise to effectively function in a world where power is being wielded through energy relationships and other rapidly evolving economic mechanisms, such as sovereign wealth funds.

I appreciate, especially, the opportunity to discuss this broad range of issues today. I thank the chairman for calling this series of hearings, and we look forward to the insights of our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I want to note, which I always do, and it's worth repeating, that you contacted me years ago, some years ago, when you—three, four, I don't know how many—about whether I'd participate in putting together a group of serious people from former administrations—Democrats, Republicans, State Department, Defense Department, budget people—and I just want the record to show that you were ahead of the curve, as you usually are, on this whole issue.

And when we spend, you know, every \$19 that we spend to the military, we spend \$1 toward civilian foreign assistance programs, something's a little out of whack. But I want to compliment you for your leadership—

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And including laggards, like Hagel and me, in the effort. But at any rate, gentlemen, as I said before, I can't emphasize too strongly how important your presence here is today. And hopefully, this is the beginning of not just a series of hearings, but a change in attitude—literally, a change in attitude. A mindset change.

Because I think it's the single most fundamental change that has to take place in American foreign policy and its conduct of its national security policy. So thank you for being here.

And, General, why don't you begin? And then, we'll go to the Admiral. Okay?

**STATEMENT OF GEN ANTHONY ZINNI, USMC (RET.), FORMER  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, WASH-  
INGTON, DC**

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have a statement we will submit for the record, and we will each give some very brief opening remarks.

We represent now 52 retired generals and admirals that are part of the National Security Advisory Council with the Center for U.S. Global Engagement.

We feel that this is an important project, and that we're expressing from the military side the criticality of having partners on today's battlefield that have as robust a capability as our men and women in uniform bring. I just talked to my son 2 days ago. He's in Iraq. He's a Marine officer, and Infantry officer, with an Infantry Battalion on Anbar Province.

He comes home shortly. He's been in Afghanistan and several other tours. I asked my son, "What's the most significant thing your Infantry Battalion did while you were there?" He said, "We rehabilitated and reopened the oil refinery." And he didn't tell me about insurgents or security operations, which I'm sure I'll hear about when he comes back.

But, for him, that young captain, to understand the importance of doing something that bettered the life of those people, gave them hope, and improved their economic status, and led more to a solution than simply the security operations was heartening to me. He gets it.

And we all need to get it. We've heard our generals in Iraq say, "There are no military solutions." Obviously, our military can and will always give the right kind of security environment, provide it so that other things go on that resolve the problem, that create the resolution of whatever the issue is. And what the military can do is provide the logistic support, the capacity, the security environment. What it can't do is resolve political issues, economic issues, social issues, humanitarian issues.

We desperately need partners on these battlefields that have the same robust capabilities as we have. Both Admiral Smith and I, in our careers, have been involved in operations in the Balkans, in Africa, in the Middle East, and many other places, strange battlefields that we weren't prepared for, that didn't represent the kind of conventional, traditional warfare that our respective services prepared us for as officers, and later on as senior commanders.

We found ourselves with strange bedfellows—nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, international agencies on the ground. We found ourselves with our counterparts from the other agencies of government here—USAID, State Department, and many, many others.

What I think we walked away from these experiences with is the idea that their capacity was far, far less than what we brought to the battlefield; but, in many respects, far, far more important. And so we're here representing these 52 generals and admirals to say that we want help for our partners. We need a more robust structure. They need the resources to put the numbers and the kinds of people with the experience and training on these battlefields that complement what we do.

We need to have the kinds of forces that will match our brigades and squadrons and fleets when we arrive on the battlefield, with prepared, well-planned organizations that can pull their weight, especially in these areas that are nonmilitary, and that we can't be stuck with in the military.

We face now a world that is increasingly becoming unstable. In my view, and in my definition, instability occurs when a society can't cope with the hostile environment it's faced with. Its institutions are not viable or nonexistent. The way the problem gets resolved is you build capacity. You build the institutions.

We certainly can help building those security institutions, but there has to be somebody joining us to build the political, the economic, the social institutions, to build the capacity for rule of law, to deal with the health issues and the humanitarian issues that are faced.

We also need the capability to lead in this area. This is not—we are not making the case for the United States as the world's policemen or the world's dole-out of all the requirements needed to stabilize societies. But we can lead partnerships and relationships. We can create special relationships with those nongovernmental organizations we find on this battlefield.

I spent three tours of duty in Somalia. There were 120 NGOs in Somalia with us. We didn't know how quite to interact, to partner, and to coordinate. We found ourselves in northern Iraq, both Admiral Smith and I, taking care of the Kurds with over 60 NGOs, working with an embassy in Turkey that was doing yeoman's service, and trying to provide the political coordination, the political connections, the political structure, and the political policy that we needed to make decisions day to day.

And so, we come from a wealth of experience in saying that we need partnerships out there, international and regional, partnerships that go across governmental and nongovernmental lines, in order for us to deal with these problems in the holistic manner that's required.

Thank you very much, and I appreciate very much this hearing, and our opportunity to express our views. I'll now turn it over to my good Navy buddy, Admiral Smith.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral. Welcome.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL LEIGHTON W. SMITH, JR., USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES EUROPE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Admiral SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. I'm delighted to be here with my pal and my former workmate, Tony Zinni. We worked together in Europe in 1991, and we had some very interesting times.

But that's not our purpose here today. Our purpose here today is, again, to join the 52 flag and general officers who support a more balanced approach to our Nation's national security, to strengthen the nonmilitary tools that are used around the world for global engagement.

I was trained as a Navy pilot. I know what situational awareness is all about, the understanding of what's going on around you in three dimensions. And what we're asking is that we take a new

look at this description, this situational awareness, to understand the situation that's evolving around the world.

We know that our enemies that we face today are actually conditions and attitudes—ancient hatreds, political turmoil, and corruption—which mark nations who do not care for their own, who do not care or cannot address the poverty, health, environmental, and energy problems facing their people. I saw this in Bosnia in spades, and I'll talk about that a little bit more later.

The complexity of these problems, some age-old and some newly emergent, calls for a fresh approach—Mr. Chairman, in your words, “a mindset” that elevates diplomacy and development assistance, while integrating them with our defense and intelligence activities. We need a new way of thinking about our national power and how to use it for global good, as well as for our own security.

I use the term “smart targeting”; smart targeting of our resources and our influence to be most effective in the world arena. The use of force, hard power or the kinetic phase in a conflict, cannot bring about peace in and of itself. It sets the stage. It attempts to provide the security so that the tools of diplomacy and development can be brought to bear effectively.

My time in peacekeeping operations, as well as in direct conflict, has made it clear to me that the value of diplomacy and development, it is in long-term personal relationships, the exchange of ideas, the demonstrations of human goodwill and support that can change the dynamics that we face in the field.

General Zinni and I saw that in Iraq in spades. The thing that—he talked about his son and his oil refinery experience. The thing that I remember most about northern Iraq—and, by the way, the mission that he and I were given on a Friday night at 8 o'clock, and we got it while we were eating dinner in an Italian restaurant, was “stop the dying.” Stop the dying in northern Iraq of the Kurds who had been pushed up there, trying to escape Iraq.

They were dying, I think, Tony, at about 700 a week or something like that. And we were told, “Stop the dying.” We called in Special Forces, and in a matter of 10 days—actually, in a matter of about 36 hours—we were distributing food.

But the thing that struck them the most was when we went in with engineers, and we dug wells for water. We gave them materials for tents. We rebuilt hospitals. We built weigh stations along the road. We worked very closely, as he said, with the Embassy in Turkey, and we worked very closely with the United Nations.

And the military, quite frankly, was going about it the wrong way. We were able, through discussions with United Nations as an example, to understand, “You don't want to build refugee camps for the Turks or the Kurds in northern Iraq. What you want to do is resettle them back to their homes.” And they told us how to do that. And we worked with them to make that happen. So that's the kind of influence that I think these things can bring to bear.

My own experience in Bosnia convinced me that the task we were assigned required the military to work hand-in-glove with our diplomats, as well as development and humanitarian groups. There were over 200 NGOs and PFEOS in Bosnia when I went in on the 20th of December in 1995.

The things that we did in Bosnia, aside from establishing a peaceful or secure environment in which the political process could work, the things that we did that made a difference was we built miles and miles of road. We repaired railroads so they could get things moving. We repaired bridges, built new bridges, repaired old ones, we did that, and we opened three airports.

Our No. 1 goal when we went in, aside from assure that we separated the parties, the warring factions, was to make sure that our presence did not disrupt the distribution of humanitarian aid. And we knew what roads we had to repair. We knew what bridges had to be repaired. We knew what railroads had to be put back in place. And we also knew that we had to have airfields.

We need smart power to keep America safe, and to demonstrate our moral leadership. For the United States to be an effective world leader, we have to balance all three tools of our Nation's state grid—defense, diplomacy, and development. This is what we refer to as “smart power.”

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned, in my words—economic, education, health issues, all of those—smart power. We believe that the next President and the Congress must work together to ensure that America projects the strength of our values in the world, our actions and programs that inspire and assist the world's most vulnerable groups.

As a recent RAM study argues, to diffuse the terrorist appeal, governments must meet the needs of their people. The United States can lead in assisting governments and groups to meet those needs.

Mr. Chairman, my own military experience leads me to support programs that improve the way the developing countries govern, programs that train teachers and doctors, create an infrastructure for health care, provide loans for small businesses, strengthen international lines just to save lives, and promote global development. These and other actions that produce the development and meet humanitarian needs express the values of our Nation, and that's what's important.

I certainly support the hard work being done by this committee on these issues. The studies done by the committee—most recently, Senator Lugar's staff study on how embassies grapple to provide foreign aid—are excellent starting points, as well as your work, sir, as General Zinni mentioned, on the Emergency Response Corps.

As I said in the beginning of my statement, sir, General Zinni and I represent a growing number of leaders in the military who support a new approach, a smarter approach to our Nation's national security, one which calls for a new national triad—defense, diplomacy, and development—to meet the challenges facing this country today.

We stand ready as a team. Not just General Zinni and myself, but our members, to support this committee in making those a reality.

I thank you very much, sir.

[The joint prepared statement of General Zinni and Admiral Smith follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND ADM LEIGHTON W. SMITH, JR., USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES EUROPE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. It is a privilege to be here today with you. This committee, under your leadership, is the guardian of our country's foreign policy, a beacon to those who want to work together to protect and support this great Nation.

Our presence here today may surprise some. Why would a Marine and a former Navy attack pilot come to this committee to support the budget for the State Department, for USAID, and the civilian activities of our Government that impact the lives of people around the world?

We are here because from our time on the front line of America's presence in the world, we know that the United States cannot rely on military power alone to keep us safe from terrorism, infectious disease, and other global threats that recognize no borders.

We are here representing a group of over 50 retired flag and general officers who share a concern about the future of our country and our ability to lead effectively.

We have witnessed the tough security and global challenges that burden the world today. We have been in nations that have failed to provide the most basic services to their citizens; territories where tribal and clan divisions threaten unbelievable violence to the innocent. We have seen despair, anger, resentment, and the consequences of poverty that result in desperation. Some respond with slow surrender to this hardship, some look for conspiracies, and some twist religious ideology to explain a life of frustration.

And when that frustration spills over into armed conflict, the alarms go off and often our military is rushed into action. As this committee knows so well, the military is a blunt instrument. We have our strengths: In times of humanitarian crisis, we can provide the logistics and organization to get help fast to those in need. No other organization on this earth can respond as well as the U.S. military. We can break aggression, restore order, and maintain security. But we cannot reform a government, improve a struggling nation's economic problems, or redress political grievances.

To be clear, all that our military instruments can do in conflict is to create the conditions that would allow the other tools of statecraft—especially our diplomatic and development tools—to be successful. But when those other tools are underfunded, understaffed, and underappreciated, the courageous sacrifice of the men and women in uniform is often wasted.

For the United States to be an effective world leader, it must strategically balance all three aspects of its power—defense, diplomacy, and development. This is what we refer to as using "smart power": The integration and appropriate application of all the tools of statecraft.

We have come to this committee today acknowledging that while the United States has done many good things in the area of foreign assistance, we still have much work to do ahead. We urgently need a new and vibrant strategic direction for our national security and foreign policy. We need strong U.S. leadership to enhance global security, strengthen democratic governance, alleviate poverty, and foster global economic growth. This is not only the right thing to do, but it is squarely in our national interest.

Mr. Chairman, there are powerful and creative forces for change in this country which reflect the vitality of our democratic system. Calls for reform, for this new concept of smart power, come from across the political spectrum, from corporations and think tanks, to faith-based and humanitarian organizations. Even from old warriors such as ourselves. In addition to the group of distinguished flag and general officers we are proud to represent, we are also here as part of a broader coalition with the Center for U.S. Global Engagement, a nonpartisan organization whose allies include companies ranging from Boeing to Caterpillar to Microsoft; private voluntary groups such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and World Vision. Despite our diversity of experiences, we share a common belief that America is underinvesting in the very tools that are vital to our national security, our economic prosperity, and our moral leadership as a nation.

We know that it is time to act. We are part of a growing movement for change, a new constituency to support you, on this committee, as you make the hard choices and help forge a bipartisan strategy using smart power.

For this is an issue that transcends partisanship. We are talking about the future of our Nation and our ability to address the most complex and perplexing global problems of our day. Shifting the emphasis of U.S. foreign policy from one that re-

lies heavily on military might to one that elevates the value of diplomacy and development will, indeed, take strong political leadership, a decisive strategy to guide us, and ample resources and personnel to ensure we are successful.

Such leadership and shift in strategy is not without precedent. As World War II ended, the Nation faced a new challenge on the horizon. Leaders from the State Department, the military and Congress came together to first analyze the problem at hand, develop a strategy to address this problem, and then design and resource the institutions and policies to implement that strategy. Thus within a few short years, we had a strategy of containment, a National Security Act of 1947 to create a new national security architecture, and the Marshall Plan to address the specific economic challenges of a destroyed Europe. Later the Truman policy to provide aid to Greece and Turkey expanded the task of foreign assistance.

Over the years, this committee wrote the major foreign assistance legislation for our Nation and supported the State Department, USAID, and the other departments concerned with foreign relations. You and your predecessors authorized a wide number of programs to address the world's problems.

In the over 50 years that our Nation has been at this growing task, U.S. foreign assistance has:

- Saved millions of lives each year through vaccinations and access to basic health care, access to potable water, and sanitary food preparation education;
- Given hundreds of thousands of HIV/AIDS patients access to life-saving antiretroviral treatments.
- Created the capacity for millions of people to feed their families through agricultural breakthroughs in crop production and soil conservation;
- Nearly eradicated river blindness, polio, and smallpox;
- Helped war-torn nations rebound from civil and ethnic conflict; and
- Stimulated economic growth in countries around the world.

While these are remarkable achievements, emerging challenges call us to come together again, with the same careful process that we practiced 50 years ago. We must analyze the problems at hand, develop a new strategy, and design and resource the institutions and policies to implement that strategy. We must work with other great nations who share our values and strengthen our alliances for peace. We cannot take on this mighty task alone.

Mr. Chairman, some call this grand strategy, but we have to get down to basics if we are to succeed. We cannot skip the first step—to analyze the problems at hand. What is the strategic threat facing the Nation today?

When we entered service to our country, the answer to that question was easy. The enemy was an aggressive nation-state, with a history of insecurity and authoritarian rule, and an economic ideology that threatened our way of life. The world divided along philosophical lines; the Soviet Union and the West each had a grouping of developing nations under their wings. We did not concern ourselves with the problems facing nations in the Communist camp. That was Moscow's responsibility.

Now the cold war is over, but the problems facing vast regions of the world persist. We know that the "enemies" in the world today are actually conditions—poverty, infectious disease, political turmoil and corruption, environmental and energy challenges. All nations face these challenges, but why do some governments fail at their tasks to meet their citizens' needs?

We must first study the core problems. If we can understand why struggling nations do not care for their own, we may better understand the appeal of extremists groups and beliefs that rationalize this failure. What is the mix of culture and history, religion and resentment, change and tradition that results in what we term a "failed state"? This failure infects the global community as surely as pandemics of contagion or natural disasters. We cannot draw a protective curtain around ourselves or inoculate our Nation from this failure. We must address it head on, study, listen, learn, and provide that support to make development a reality.

This is a puzzle which continues to confound. We know there are aspects of culture and tradition which make personal and communal relationships more important than objective and impartial bureaucratic procedures. We know that certain economic models lend themselves to income disparity, great divides between wealth and poverty, low-tax regimes and resultant corruption among public servants and business alike. We know that tribal, clan, and ethnic conflicts persist in regions where revenge trumps growth, where there is no trust in government and no sense of protection for minority concerns.

The consequences of these factors are plain to see: Disease, hunger, violence, hatreds, environmental destruction, political turmoil and economic stagnation.

In retrospect, designing a strategy to contain the Soviet Union, with all its weapons and resources, was simple compared to the challenges ahead.



As we study this problem and design a new strategy, we know that armed force alone cannot solve these challenges. There is no “pure” military solution to terrorism. If we are determined to reduce the strain on our troops, respond to the threat of global and political and cultural insurgency, and protect America, we must be prepared to make bold changes. We must provide a national security tool chest that has been enhanced with a wide variety of capabilities which would flow from the integration of our Nation’s “soft” power.

We must match our military might with a mature diplomatic and development effort worthy of the task ahead. We have to take some of the burden off the shoulders of our troops and shift it to those with core competencies in diplomacy and development. Our military mission has continued to expand as funding for the State Department and development agencies has been inadequate to the tasks they have been asked to perform. They have been forced to make do, with fewer personnel, more responsibility, but without the resources to match their assignments. This has not developed overnight. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, warned years ago, “What we are doing to our diplomatic capabilities is criminal. By slashing them, we are less able to avoid disasters such as Somalia or Kosovo and therefore we will be obliged to use military force still more often.”

While we acknowledge and are heartened by the fact that the President has asked for an increase of 8.5 percent in the International Affairs Budget, we agree with Secretary of Defense Gates that these times call for a “dramatic increase” in funding for our “civilian instruments of national security”: That is, programs and departments under this committee’s jurisdiction. We support his call for a “new benchmark” for how much we invest in diplomacy and development.

This is striking enough to reiterate: The head of our Defense Department has called for an increase in funding for the State Department and development agencies. As Secretary Gates said, “We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond our brave soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.”

That means rethinking the current balance between defense, diplomacy, and development. The International Affairs Budget represents only 6.6 percent of the overall National Security Budget, which includes defense and homeland security. The entire current International Affairs Budget is roughly equal to the requested increase in the Defense Department budget. Particularly worrisome is that despite this request and recent increases, our funding is still 11 percent less in real terms.

Mr. Chairman, it is time, past time, for a new strategic triad—diplomacy and development, as well as defense—to prepare us for the challenges ahead. We note that the President’s budget calls for significant investments in USAID personnel, and the creation of a Civilian Response Corps, which you and Senator Lugar have championed. These are important first steps.

And they dovetail with a number of broader efforts underway to address a new national security architecture. There is much discussion these days about using the ideas of the Goldwater-Nichols act for the interagency process, a “whole of government” approach to policy formation and implementation, a new National Security act. Washington is alive with good people working on these topics. We want to acknowledge the work of this committee, most recently Senator Lugar’s report on how “Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid,” as an important contribution to this effort.

It is clear to us that we need to bring our military and diplomatic structures into better alignment. We need complementary regional structures that allow our personnel to develop deep experience and expertise in specific regions, to develop expert language skills and cultural understanding, and sustain that knowledge over their careers. We need to tap the talent we already have at the State Department and our development agencies as well as our NGOs. The insight and real life experience they bring to the table has too often been ignored in the policy process.

In after-action reports and strategy exercises conducted by the various commands around the world, there is a constant theme. We need civilians who know the area, speak the language, bring needed expertise, and most importantly, have long-standing personal relationships with local decisionmakers. These are not skills and assets that can be developed overnight. And they should not be abandoned after a short-term assignment.

We need to get serious about our business. We need longer tours, in depth knowledge, language ability, and cultural understanding to do our jobs well. We need to give the brave men and women of both our military and the diplomatic and development communities the resources they need.

If we are able to do all of this, we will be able to secure a better, safer world where America’s values and interests are supported. Going forward with a national

security strategy that balances our military strength with a stronger diplomatic agenda, it is our view that our engagement with the world will more closely align with our traditional strengths.

Mr. Chairman, in this Presidential primary season, in the excitement of the campaign, there has been a lot of talk about foreign policy and defense, Iraq and Afghanistan. There is talk about victory and defeat. But as Anthony Cordesman from CSIS notes, freshly back from the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq, "Meaningful victory can come only if tactical military victories end in ideological and political victories and in successful governance and development."

Recent reports from RAND, the 9-11 Commission, the HELP Commission, the CSIS Smart Power Commission study and the Center for U.S. Global Engagement's own "Smart Power" policy framework—all very bipartisan efforts—all point in the same direction. Across these documents, a range of options on both funding and modernizing our foreign assistance and national security apparatus have been placed on the table that Congress—and our candidates for President—should be considering now. A new President has a remarkable opportunity, and a security imperative, to make this a priority early in the first term.

In closing, it is time to rethink and rebalance our investments to create a better, safer world. It is time to deploy smart power, and increase our support for global health, development, and diplomacy. We and our military colleagues stand ready to support you in this effort. We look forward to the day when both the Senate and the House come together with the President and his/her administration to see the Defense authorization, the State Department authorization and the Foreign Assistance Act as three equally vital components of a new strategic triad for our country's leadership in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. I'll begin the questioning by making a couple of observations I'd like you to comment on.

Whether it was 12 years ago in Burchco, watching a young captain take—convince his commanding officer to let him put a trailer out in the middle of what we would call here a housing development, about three—I don't know how many houses—300, 400 houses, you know, they're about 3,000 square foot, in neat boxes, red roofs, tiled roofs, nice, clear, laid-out development that had been cleansed, and watching him as a group of, it turns out, Serbs walking down this street in this abandoned neighborhood, carrying pitchforks, clubs, and—literally pitchforks, clubs, and an axe, heading to a house on the corner that was occupied at that moment by a Croat family, and him literally walking down the street, engaging the Serbs family a half-a-block away, because the Croats now occupied his home.

And watching him negotiate that and work it out, my standing right there, with a guy from the United Nations, watching this kid do this, he came back and I said, "What'd you say, Captain?" He said, "I told them I'd have them out in—tomorrow. When they came back, they could have their house back." I said, "What are you going to do?" He said, I went and told the Croats that I'll move them to a house down the block here, but they're going to end up having to make a choice. We'll give them the new house, we'll build them a new house—"because that's what the United Nations has agreed to do through this funding mechanism.

The point was, here's a kid who was—I don't think he was—my son's a captain, you know. I don't think he was—he was 28 years old, maybe. And he's doing on the ground what no one seemed to be able to do diplomatically.

We just got back from a trip—Senator Kerry, myself, and Senator Hagel. We went out to this forward bases—two forward operating bases in Afghanistan, right up, tucked up in the border near the—on the Pakistani border, over the mountains there. Relatively small group of military listened to a young Navy commander who

headed up this operation, and explaining to us knowing the nuances of every tribe in the area, not just whether they were—what their religious background was, but knowing the tribes, and knowing all about them, and watching this kid negotiate.

Dick Lugar and I sat in a—when we went into—we were the—I think the first group to go in after the statue of Saddam was pulled out. And remember, Dick, we went out, and Chuck was along—we were all three together.

We went out to a—again, it looked like a gymnasium. It looked like a school theater. And sitting up on the stage were what we were told used to be the school board, if I remember correctly, in the audience, where a whole group of people, varying in degrees from wearing Western garb to wearing traditional garb, and I think it was a captain, a young captain standing before this group of several hundred people, negotiating where the PCV pipe would go, whether it would cross a particular street into another neighborhood, and how that would happen, and when they'd get this done. And here he was. He was essentially the mayor. He was the mayor, negotiating what was a very volatile situation.

And here's the reason I tell you this. I know you know all this. But every place that I've gone, whether the dozen trips into the Balkans before and during the war, whether it's the 8 or 10 trips into Iraq and Afghanistan, I am absolutely blown away by the amount of authority we give to young women and men who are lieutenants and captains making critical decisions that affect not only the lives of their command or the people—the group that's there with, but also the conflicted parties in the region, and how well they do it. How well they do it.

The reason I mention this is not to, you know, pay homage to their capacity, but it seems as though, in my observation the last 15 years, the only folks who know how to get anything done quickly are the military. Get things done in the nonmilitary arena.

We were in—I went into Afghanistan. I guess it was literally right after the Taliban fell. I remember sitting down. We had just opened the Embassy. And I'm sitting there. There's 80 young marines living in the bottom of that Embassy.

And the Ambassador, it was then Crocker, went over. And he brought together some of these young soldiers. They're all excited. Do you know what they're so excited about? They're excited about they were able to go out on the black market and buy a part that they, on their own, they passed a hat, they bought a part that allowed them to fix an old Russian boiler to get heat to a local hospital.

And they were ecstatic. You would've thought they'd just won the Battle of Waterloo. I mean, you know, it was—they were ecstatic.

And the last one—example I'll give you, one of your colleagues, who I admire a great deal, Chiarelli, commander of the 1st Cavalry—well, at least, the first time I saw him when he was in Iraq. He said something very fascinating to me. He said, "Senator, if I ever criticize a bureaucrat again, smack me." He said, "There is no bureaucracy here in Iraq that functions."

And he gave an example. He said, "There's—" and I'm going to be embarrassed. I'm not going to know the exact pest. But there's a pest equivalent of a boll weevil for the date palm trees. And

every 5 years, these trees have to be sprayed, and they're the national fruit of Iraq.

And he said, "I went to the Department of Agriculture. I went to the State Department. I said, 'What are you guys going to do about this?' They fudged around. They didn't know anything. The guys who—in the Iraqi Department of Agriculture is, essentially, it's a hollow organization."

And he says, "You know what I did? I took my helicopters and I did what Saddam did. I sprayed the trees." And then, he said, "And then I laid out—I had our guys lay out for the Iraqi Department of Agriculture what they have to do in the future, what they have to stockpile to do this."

It all leads to a simple, but I think pretty profound, question. And that is that it is—are the biggest constraints here the lack of resources of the civilian agencies, or is the lack of capacity? Is it a deeper issue? Even if they had the resources, do they have the capacity?

Because we provided some considerable resources in Iraq, and initially—or now, to the State Department, and I find their ability to use them with any degree of efficacy astoundingly short. And I've become a great supporter of these Serb funds. I'd rather give the commanding officer in the region money in his pocket to deal with these things, at this moment, than I would dealing with the bureaucracy.

So I realize I've taken deliberately 8 of the 10 minutes I have here to lay out what I see as I go around the world visiting these spots. So the question I have here is—what is it? What is it we have to do beyond supplying the money?

I'll never forget Dick Lugar saying to a—the Defense Department and State Department witnesses here on Iraq about 5 years or 4 years ago, and you may remember this, Dick. You said, "You know what we really need is? We need probably 300 mayors or some version of that with walking-around money to go to Iraq, to actually put together these cities and towns, to actually do things that the only person I see doing are the military right now."

So talk to me about capacity, as well as the financial constraints that the civilian side has. What do we have to build? And the more specific you can be—giving me anecdotal examples will be more understandable, I think, to our colleagues, to me, and to anyone who's listening to this hearing.

Thank you. My time's up.

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll take it first, and pass it to Admiral Smith.

I think it involves a number of things. It has to all begin with a strategy and a set of policies and programs that puts us all on the same sheet of music. You can have your military, your regional commanders, developing one policy, one approach, to the region. Our Department of State is—

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me stop you there.

General ZINNI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that completely. But mechanically, how do we do that? Do we have a new Department? Do we have someone sitting in the White House, coordinating this? Do we—I mean, you have been involved in a number of complicated cross-ju-

risisdictional deals that are important, from your assignment to the Middle East to when you were CENTCOM Commander.

How—give us some practical ideas of how you do that coordination.

General ZINNI. First, sir, let me begin by saying it begins with coordinated, integrated planning. When I was the commander of U.S. Central Command, I had 13 war plans that I was responsible for. Those war plans did not have a companion piece or an integrated piece that dealt with the political issues, the economic issues, the humanitarian issues. The wartime mission was well thought out, well-planned, based on strategies and policies that were well-understood.

When we arrived on that battlefield, let's say that battlefield is in the Far East or the Middle East or wherever it might be, the companion plans, the so-called now Phase Four—and I think right there we have a problem. We begin to think these things are sequential when they're not.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction stabilization begins when that first boot crosses the line of departure. But if you haven't been with me in the planning, if we haven't structured a means of having integrated staffs through this work, if we're not basing this on a consistent and understood and integrated set of policies and strategies that begin here in this town, then what we do in the battlefield is going to be uncoordinated, and you're going to see the results we've seen recently.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my time's up. But look, your colleague, General Joulwan, testifying here before we went in, when some of this in this committee—I think all of us in this committee, at least the four sitting up here—were saying, “Hey, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. You ain't ready to go in.” He sat and said, “Look, all the military—”

He sat where you're sitting, and I think—I'm quite sure it was Joulwan—and he said, “Senator, all of the military is in place. We are ready. The military is ready to do whatever the Commander in Chief asks as it relates to Iraq.” But he said, “You know, we need an equally robust civilian and police side of this equation.”

And they came up with this proposal where 5,900 gendarmes, basically, paramilitary police, should be moving in at the same time. What is going to happen with regard to civilian infrastructure? And he said, “None of that's going on. None of that's going on.”

So, not now, but I would like to, with any of my colleagues who would like to join, I'd like to, over the next month or so, maybe sit down with a core group of you guys and actually get into the—really get into the weeds about how, in fact, you would propose that being done.

If you were sitting in the White House, what would you be doing? How would you mechanically be organizing this, coordinating this operational approach? And it seems—as we both know, the exact opposite happened. The distaste the former Secretary of Defense had for the civilian side, the distaste that the Vice President had for this side, including intelligence, caused an incredible concentration of all that power within the Defense Department.

And we've got to figure out how to unwind that, and I'd really like to be able to, literally just sitting around a table, with your

staff and ours, just work through mechanically what it is you would propose. Am I making any sense?

General ZINNI. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm not articulating it very well.

General ZINNI. Yes, sir. I think we would be happy to give our ideas on structure—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General ZINNI [continuing]. That's necessary, and where that structure should be, and how it should be deployed, implemented, and be integrated in with the military structure.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. I'm sorry. I've gone over 3 minutes. I apologize.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the timing of these hearings because they may be helpful, both from the testimony of our witnesses, and likewise committee interest, to the next administration and the next President.

I approach in that way, just following your questioning, Senator Biden, because you've asked "how do we do this?" And General Zinni said we need to write on the same page. And then, the question is—who puts the page out there? Who's writing on the page?

General Zinni said there were 13 specific war plans you had to deal with, but these didn't really deal with the civilian problems or the infrastructure or so forth. And we've been through this, back and forth, throughout several years of time, without making visible process.

This is in part not just because the executive branch has problems in which people have guarded the Defense Department or the rights of the State Department, or whatever the NSC was supposed to do or so forth, but because congressional committees have become sort of ingrained in that process.

The Armed Services Committee is opposed to Foreign Relations or the counterparts in the House, all having some vested interest, and somehow husbanding funds or responsibilities in their situation. We come along in the Foreign Relations Committee and point out how poverty-stricken foreign assistance is, or the State Department's low budget, or how few diplomats we have. We ask why this is taken almost as a given. Incrementally, foreign affairs may get a little bit more money next year, or may, in fact, be cut.

Now, I hope that the administration does have an interest in a plan, whether it be for Iraq or Afghanistan, because as Senator Biden has pointed out, our small observations, people do step up and take these responsibilities.

And I found as remarkable as he did the young military officers playing roles of school board presidents or mayors or commissioners of the streets or so forth. And they are terrific. But nevertheless, there are some risks in improvising in this way, in which whoever the commanding officer says, "Lieutenant, why don't you try out for size governing this neighborhood in Baghdad?" That's the only way you handle it. There are no other alternatives. There is no page.

No one has really coordinated or even thought about it, and even after 5 years of this, it's not really clear anybody is thinking about it all that carefully. So now we finally got a civilian corps, 50 peo-

ple in the State Department, this is a victory. At least, we have 12 offices in which four people are crammed in each one, perhaps, and even here it's not clear. It might be 50 the next year, it might be 25. And precisely what these people do, they are the first beachhead of sorts.

But this is not—to denigrate all their efforts. This is why this hearing is important, why the thinking you and flag officers are doing is important, from your experience, because perhaps because of that experience and your prestige, you may be heard. And we always hope that we might be heard, at least in a way.

The CHAIRMAN. Your chances are better.

Senator LUGAR. Now, if in fact we are heard, just describe, for example, how this single page or what have you could ever be written. Who would be sitting around the table, or who would be putting input, who would coordinate the plan? The President can't do this all by himself each day, taking notes and so forth, but how—if we were to reorganize our government from the start, or the President was to delegate authority, what would he do?

Can you give us any guidance? And specifically, the next President guidance as to how we get to this single page?

General ZINNI. If I could, Senator, go back to my point about integrated planning. That's the heart and soul of success on any battlefield. As General Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing. Planning is everything."

Senator LUGAR. Who would be a part of the integration?

General ZINNI. Well, obviously, the agencies of government. We would have to have state representation, USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster assistance, the Defense Department, Treasury—I mean, we could see that the plans require the full capability that allows us to deal with the issues of political reconstruction, economic, humanitarian, social, informational, you know, so that we have one capability of planning to implement the policies and strategies as they're laid out.

People often talk in this town about a Goldwater-Nichols act for the interagency, and I think if you look at our government structure, I happen to think that it is an archaic structure. I'm a businessman now. You could not do business with this blackened wire hierarchy of layered bureaucracy we have in the government.

Senator LUGAR. No.

General ZINNI. It's not streamlined enough. No military could operate like this. We've moved away from that now, in this era of improved communications and technology.

But I would begin by establishing a structure that integrated the planning, so if I have a war plan for Iraq there is a reconstruction plan that all the elements of government, and one that can reach out and create the international partnerships and partnerships with nongovernmental agencies, so that when we go onto that battlefield, we have the basic planning and understanding that everyone has in common.

Second, and as you mentioned, I appreciate the 50. It makes a wonderful platoon. But we need a more robust capability on the field. The anecdotes tell us we have innovative, creative young people. But we can't institutionalize their innovations and their creativity.

So we see while their tour exists in a little spot in Anbar Province, somebody's making a difference which will go away as soon as the new unit comes in, or he disappears, or someone doesn't follow up on it. If it's not institutionalized from top down, from Baghdad out to Ramadi, it isn't going to work. It can't just be done on a spotty principle from the bottom up.

And so, when we go onto that ground, and you have General Petraeus, and you have all the commanders out there, they need counterparts, counterpart teams working at the local level, but netted and in a consistent plan with the highest levels on how this political reconstruction is going to go, how this economic reconstruction is going to go. Look at the mistakes we made, and this is not to be critical. Believe me, that's not the effort of this group. But we disbanded the Iraqi Army. We closed down state-owned factories and put people out of work. We debathified to ensure we would create hostility.

Every single one of those problems, we foresaw. We foresaw. We foresaw them in CENTCOM. But 90 percent of the problems we foresaw, we had no control over resolving them. I could resolve the military problems. I could take out the Republican Guard in 3 weeks. I could take the statue down. I could remove the regime. The question is—and then what? And where is the structure to handle “and then what”?

Senator LUGAR. Let me just interject, because my time will run out. But essentially, I think maybe both of you have spoken to this issue, there becomes almost a fundamental issue now of how so-called war against terrorism should be fought, or how we really deal with most of the threats that are directed at our country.

And there are people who say, “With overwhelming force.” Maybe, on very few occasions. But what we're really talking about with smart power is how, with a very few military people, we are able to do some things with societies. I'm still at loss as to would we pass all the legislation here mandating that the President and his people do this? Or whether a President comes along who is bright enough to sort of see the whole business?

I would just say, Chairman, I share the frustration of virtually endless hearings before the Iraq war, during the first days, during the next year, in which all of the planning, the reconstructions, where we discussed endlessly, and there was just days stonewalling on the part of all who had any authority, a dismissal of all of this as almost irrelevant.

So this is why this is a very serious subject today, and you are very seriously into it. But we're going to have to think how, physically, do we restructure our government and our own planning process?

General ZINNI. Senator, we have a model. The 1947 National Security Act. We have a model when we had thinkers like Marshall and Kenen and Vandenberg and others.

We have a model when we decided to create alliances for the first time in our history. NATO, significant military alliances. We have a model in the Marshall Plan that was well thought out, developed, and we convinced the American people it was the right thing to do, and we reconstructed a very unstable set of societies that were causing the chronic problems of the 20th century.



The models are there. We can't provide prescriptions. There are plenty of people in this town that are providing the studies on the way we should structure things, how we should train people, the qualifications we should look for, and I would offer to you that those are worth this committee's attention.

But I think we have a past history of examining the conditions in the world, and then—and deciding what we want to do, the policy and the strategy, and deciding on the structure, the legislation that we have had. And I think we need to place a value on examining those kinds of strategic thinkers, and those kinds of ideas, that could present themselves now.

We don't understand this world. This world started to change with the collapse of the Soviet Union almost two decades ago. It unleashed the powers of globalization, the asperse of migrations, changes in the way we do business literally, it has changed the way people view the world, it has made the world shrink, or "flatten" as Tom Friedman said.

We have not done the basic thing that was done by both political parties, because it was a Republican Congress and a Democratic administration that remarkably did the work to prepare us for the cold war and a new world that we faced. That's where the beginning has to come. Here. And I can't think of two finer members to lead this. I mean, I think the next Biden-Lugar bill or Lugar-Biden bill should be the basis for this. It would be the 2008 National Security Act.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I know it sounds—that is literally the goal. I mean, whether—whatever the name of it is. I mean, what I am determined to do as I am chairman and share—essentially, we share this chairmanship, and it's not—I'm not being gracious. I mean, this is genuinely true.

I hope we can, with the help of you and others in this town and in this country, literally—not figuratively, but literally—come up with essentially a 2009 National Security Act, because it is that fundamental. And so, that's why we're going to be calling on you.

And I was corrected by staff. I knew it was a tough, broad-shouldered military man who told us that we should go in with a civilian counterpart. It was you that was testifying before the committee. It wasn't Joulwan. I have great respect for General Joulwan, and he parroted, and he came up with independent notions himself.

But I stand corrected. You were very gracious to let me give credit to Joulwan, when I was pointed out by staff you were the one who testified before this committee, warning us of what we weren't going in with.

So at any rate, I look forward to working with you.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General and Admiral, welcome. I'm glad to be here with you, and thank you for your thoughts on this important issue.

With all respect to what you were saying, and what everybody in this committee is saying, this is not new. I mean, this is almost as old as warfare. And frankly, colonialism taught us something about it. The British have left remnants of infrastructure and institutions in countries around the world, and others have, as well.

I was recently in South Africa. I might add, it's beginning to crumble there a little bit, because of the dysfunctionality that's entering into some of their choices. But, you know, with the Marshall Plan, we've marched in after the war to rebuild a country. I mean, we've always understood it.

The problem is, it's exacerbated now by this complicated dynamic on the ground that you've described, General, and the changed post-cold-war world. It was easier in a bipolar East/West sort of nuclear standoff. It is not as easy in a religious/ideological kind of context, with an economic transformation with the United States, I might add.

Our leverage, and not to mention the ability to be able to fashion coalitions as easily and rapidly as we did before, has been greatly changed by the actions of this administration. So we're playing a very different hand. But the fundamentals of going in and rebuilding something, and of winning hearts and minds, go back to a long time ago where that phrase gained a certain notoriety.

The question, really, is why isn't it happening? I mean, it's so obvious. It really is so obvious. Why isn't this happening? And I'd like you to hit that hard here. I mean, obviously there's an absence of leadership. But even when you get the absence of leadership, somebody decrees, as President Kennedy did, "I want to get rid of these missiles," and they never were gotten rid of, because people down the line just didn't do it.

So who's going to lead this? When you have a State Department function, and a military function, and the military is on the ground, which department is going to be in charge? And where does the leadership have to come here that puts this structure together, that makes it function? And why isn't it happening now, when it is so obvious?

Admiral SMITH. Well, sir, that's a pretty difficult question to answer, because you've mentioned that the dynamics have changed, the scene has changed, the enemies are different now than they were before.

It was a hell of a lot easier—pardon me. It was a lot easier, sir, in the cold war, because we knew how many weapons they had, and how many people they had, and we had to go against those, and so we knew what the force ratio was, and we built forces and strategies to deal with that, and we established alliances to deal with it.

Establishing alliances to deal with—and this—the Emergency Response Corps. I keep going back to that with all of your questions, because it seems to me that that's the beginning of what we're talking about, this new mindset.

Senator KERRY. Well, I understand that. But leave aside the alliances, and even a strategy, which I realize has to be differentiated for different regions and different countries. Why isn't the fundamental concept and structure being pushed at the highest levels and with urgency? What's the matter here?

Admiral SMITH. Maybe the right voices haven't been loud enough in support of this kind of a view. The military, for years, quite frankly, you know, the worst news I could get was we got some more civilians coming in to deal with, because generally they wanted to come take my support structure and use it, and they didn't

feel like that they were beholden to me to be accountable for anything.

But I think the—what the military today has seen is an environment in which these kinds of assets, these kinds of experiences, can be very, very valuable. And we learned the hard way, because we got in situations when we did not use them. Now, you've asked about the structure, and again, I'll go back to the Emergency Response Corps, because that's the structure that I'm going to—that I'll use.

But if we're serious about something like this, we need to understand that it's not something that's going to occur overnight. The references that chairman talked about—the young captains in the field, the young Navy commander over in Afghanistan and other places like that—that took years, and years, and years, and years of training.

And he's supported by an incredible staff, both below and above. He's got sharp training, trained sergeants or petty officers. He's got young lieutenants who work for him. And he's been given a mission, and he's been given responsibility, and he's been empowered to do that mission. And if he messes it up, we don't kill him.

Senator KERRY. But right now, he is empowered by the military.

Admiral SMITH. Absolutely, sir.

Senator KERRY. And the military is entirely responsible in initiating the particular target.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. But this envisions a State Department and USAID and a whole bunch of other players. Who's going to convene, call a shot, say, "OK. This is the mission"?

Admiral SMITH. Well, it may be the military commander. There may be a time when this civilian corps works for the military commander, and that might be a transition once a certain status has been achieved. And that's the fuzzy part. Who's in charge? What's the mission? Who do I report to?

Senator KERRY. That's the fight General Zinni referred to a few minutes ago.

Admiral SMITH. Exactly.

Senator KERRY. The State Department and the turf fight. We've got to resolve that.

Admiral SMITH. Well, I completely agree. And I don't want to pick a fight with anybody here, but my time in Bosnia decided—we dealt with, from our State Department and the assets that were made available, frankly, I never spoke to them. They were right next door to me in the Embassy.

I invited people to come and, "Let's work together," but the procedures and processes that had to be used for our USAID—

Senator KERRY. Yes. But that's one of the reasons it moves so slowly right now. It is sort of by consensus within an embassy or by consensus within the camp. That's part of the problem in Afghanistan. Nobody's in charge. You've got NATO in the South. There's no one person running the show. There are different rules, different rules of engagement; it's a bureaucratic mess.

We do not want to create a bureaucratic mess here.

Admiral SMITH. Well, I—

Senator KERRY. We need clarity. General, what do you think?

General ZINNI. Sir, let me answer the first part of your question and get to that. Why is it so difficult now? My view.

You know, in modern times, we've had five reorderings of this world. And four came at the end of catastrophic wars. We had one—the last reordering took place when one of the bipolar powers just fizzled. It was unique in modern times. We weren't used to a change where you didn't see the significant cataclysmic end so clearly.

And we began, if you remember, talking about peace dividends and talking about new world orders, but not doing much about restructuring it or contributing to its restructuring. If you believe in the Chaos Theory, everything orders itself eventually.

And this has been a mess. And what we find now—I've mentioned globalization, the rise of new powers, access to new technologies, the information age—we are now an urbanized species. There are more people living in cities today than live in rural areas. We destroy the environment at a rate in a way that affects the entire planet, and not just your local region. We are a mobile species. We travel and move, legally, illegally, documented, undocumented, that confound the problems.

We also have to deal with nonstate entities now. We're so used to all the interactions between humans being based on the issues of sovereignty and statehood. That's collapsing and changing, or at least there are those that are on the rise. We find ourselves now with small areas in Godforsaken places that impact directly on us.

If that farmer in Afghanistan grows poppies, it's going to be heroin on our street. If it's cocoa leaves in Columbia, it's crack on our street. If the rainforest is torn down, we're going to see the effects. If somebody can't make a living and decides to pack up and move the family, they're coming here.

And we haven't made a basic assessment of this new world. That's the first part of the problem. The second part of the problem is exactly what was faced by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation—four services that didn't cooperate or work together very well.

And it created an innovative structure that allowed those services who fought the Goldwater-Nichols act desperately fear that we would create a class of mandarins making decisions that were the prerogative of those services. And what it did instead is create a remarkably innovative, integrated structure where the services, the stakeholders, had representation, had a sense of ownership, and a sense of participation in the decisionmaking.

So if you look at the structure that brings this all together, to get the last part of your question, Senator, it needs to be one that takes these—this stovepipe bureaucracy that is our government and finds a way to restructure it into a way that integrates planning and execution.

Goldwater-Nichols did it for the military, and the 9/11 Commission tried to tell us these were the problems in intelligence, and the congressional committee about homeland security. The way we solved it in those two cases, though, was to create more bureaucracy instead of less and integrated bureaucracy. And I think there-in lies the course for a solution.

Senator KERRY. Let me try to sort of wind that up in a—with a greater level of specificity, if I can. Within the military, the Sec-

retary of Defense still remained the prime and final arbiter. And so, you had the military branches reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Here, we're talking about relationships between a group of agencies, several of which sit at the Cabinet table, including, may I add, Treasury and others. Treasury because of ATF, and you can have the FBI, you can have Justice, you can have a lot of different entities involved in this.

In my judgment, because of the types of decisions being made, it's going to be a hard pill for some to swallow, and you're going to have to work out some kind of a veto methodology or appeal, I suppose, and the appeal is obviously always to the President of the United States.

But the Secretary of State probably ought to be first among equals in this, and the reason is that whatever decisions you're making about where you put a footprint of the military is going to have to be first and foremost in the context of geopolitics, and it's going to have to be in the context of larger kinds of goals that may have to do with refugee management or aid management or failed stateism or a host of other issues.

And the military piece will remain always the military piece, and I know commanders will chafe significantly. That's part of the resistance. I think the bottom line here is this is turf, and big turf, and we're going to have to break through that if we're going to make this thing work somehow, because that is a crucial factor to fight an effective war on terror—even the term is sort of problematical, in my judgment.

This is a much larger struggle against extremism and poverty and all the kinds of things that have been wrapped up in why this is necessary—for years we've been talking about it. So my hope is that you will get more specific, that we're going to get specific, and offer more leadership on this structure, and these hurdles that we've got to get over, because I'm sort of tired of the talk about it.

Secretary Gates just gave a big speech out in Kansas where he talked about how we've got to use all the tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, you know, blah, blah, blah. And that's what it's become—blah, blah, blah. It's got to get translated, and it's got to get translated rapidly.

I want to thank you, both of you—and I want to thank you, General Zinni, personally, for the help you've offered me in a lot of different ways in the last months on these issues, and we appreciate working with you. And I hope we can get through these specifics, because that's really the essence of leadership is to break down those barriers and make it happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. General, Admiral, thank you for your continuing service to our country.

General Zinni, please give young Captain Zinni our regards and thanks for his service, and his fellow Marines, and all the men and women in uniform who he serves with. General Zinni, I also appreciated the opportunity to work with you on the CSIS Smart Power Commission. I think that product was worthy of the effort—and I note in a piece of paper handed to me a little bit ago that the Pen-

tagon is circulating that as a top priority must-read for commanders all the way up and down the line. And for your leadership in that endeavor, thank you.

Admiral, you have been very actively involved over the years in these efforts, so I want to go to a point that you made in your comments when you said, “Our enemies today are conditions, attitudes, history.”

When we were in Central Asia and Turkey—Senators Biden, Kerry, and I—over the last 2 weeks, in our last stop at Turkey, we spent some time with the Prime Minister and President of Turkey. The Prime Minister of Turkey said that poverty and despair are the kindling for extremists.

And as what Senator Kerry just noted, poverty, the issues of the human condition, there is where we’re going to have to apply, I believe, as much of our resource base and our leadership and our ingenuity and our structure as anything. We will never be able to field enough Marines and enough ships—and you know this, the two of you, better than almost anyone—until we pay attention to that dynamic, the human condition.

Now, we’re not going to solve that in 1 year or 10 years or in a generation. We understand that. But that really seems to me to be the larger context of what we’re dealing with here. The specifics of how we deal with it, and structures, and governmental identifications and integrations obviously are critically important as the components of implementing whatever that strategic context and policy is, and we understand that.

But the 21st century challenges and threat—and I think technologies, human conditions, uncontrollables have now so overtaken our government structures, our government structures’ ability to deal with these issues. And you said something, General Zinni, a few minutes ago that I have thought about and addressed in speeches over the years, that it’s going to take, what I’ve said, a 21st century frame of reference to deal with these issues.

And you noted that after World War II, what Eisenhower and Marshall and Vandenberg and Kenenon and others put in place, essentially a structure that was very successful for dealing with the great threats of mankind over a 50-, 60-year period. We’ve outlived that now. We’ve gone beyond that now. That’s the bigger issue here, it seems to me, that we are going to have to get at.

You said something else, too, that I believe has been a critical part of our success in the world the last 60 years, and that was during the those days after World War II, those great leaders, those visionaries, formed coalitions of common interest. And you mentioned NATO, the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which is now WTO, dozens of multilateral development banks and institutions where there is not a zero-sum game in this business.

And we defined our relationships on commonality, common interest. And that way, it gave us a foundation to work toward the differences. We didn’t define our relationships based on our differences, which I think we’ve done today, for a lot of reasons, and a lot of us are to blame for that, and everybody who’s been in policymaking over the last 20 years has to take some responsibility for

that. We're going to have to reverse that in a spectacularly major way, or it'll be too late, I believe.

I mean, if you'll just look at the demographics in the world today, a global community of 6.5 billion people, almost 40 percent of those 6.5 billion are under the age of 19 years old. We'll lose the next generation of the world. And if we do that, my junior and freshman high school children will inherit the most dangerous world we've ever known, because if we're not—there is no margin of error.

Essentially, there's no margin of error left, whether it's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or anything else. Here's my question to both of you.

Picking up on your point, General, about alliances, we need to come up with a new 21st century alliance structure. We can't do it ourselves. Obviously, we've got to pay attention to what has been discussed here. How do we integrate all our resources and our leadership in a strategic context?

But this is so much bigger than the United States. This is so much bigger than one nation. So it seems to me, just as these great leaders after World War II, we must recognize that. And how do we form these new alliances? How do we strengthen existing alliances or new alliances? NATO is a good example that you brought up.

We all know that it's hanging by a thread, and we deferred the tough decisions—and you're exactly right—after the 1989, the implosion of the Soviet Union, what was the role of NATO? Why do we need NATO? There's no threat. So we allowed the vacuum there to be filled by, well, let's just add new members.

And when we did that, that kind of took away the tough question that was still hanging there, and it's still hanging there now. We have essentially three classes of members in NATO. Now, how do we deal with that?

But I'd like you both to focus on alliances, what you envision is going to be required for the next 25 years to deal with these great problems that we are dealing with right now—and they're going to get more complicated—in the way of using alliances.

Thank you.

General ZINNI. Thank you, Senator. I think we need to think more creatively about relationships. There are certainly the classical alliances, like NATO, or military alliances. When I first took over Central Command, and I was visiting leaders in the Gulf Region and the Middle East, I remember several of the leaders lamenting that after World War II we didn't create an alliance there.

They thought many of the security problems would not exist had we done it the way we did it in Europe and Western Europe and in the Pacific. And I think there's still a place for types of alliances. Certainly, we need to create security communities and build alliances.

I think they may not all be shaped the same way. You know, where we all have sort of equal status. We may want to take regional alliances that are fledgling—a good example is Africa. Political and regional alliances proliferate the continent—and may want to say that maybe we, Europeans, and others enter this organization in a supporting role. That we will provide the capacity-building, we will aid, they will do the execution of what's necessary—

peacekeeping, humanitarian missions or whatever. I think we need to think more creatively about alliances that aren't basically nation state to nation state related.

I mentioned alliances with nongovernmental organizations. We have a coalition of NGOs in this city, interaction which is representative of American NGOs, for example. I constantly have worked with them to try to figure out how we cooperate and coordinate more. Very difficult. I mean, two entirely different cultures from a government organization, particularly a military, and nongovernment, that may be faith-based or can't be seen as—must be seen as neutral.

How do we craft the kind of relationships we need on the ground with these entities? I think we need to rethink how we do business in the United Nations and elsewhere. We complain about the United Nations. We're a leader in the world. If the United Nations needs reform and change and rehabilitation, and probably since this is a new world, that may be necessary—should be necessary.

We should reflect the world, and not the world as it was half a century ago. I think we ought to create relationships and partnerships with the private sector. I think we neglect one of the most powerful elements that we have, that's based on our principal of free market economy. We've created this very powerful private sector and business sector that we haven't tapped into, and that we haven't created the kind of relationships.

We need regional relationships. We need regional security relationships, political relationships, economic relationships. Some can be based on that traditional structure; others, we need to be more innovative in establishing them, in my view.

Senator HAGEL. Admiral, would you like to add anything?

Admiral SMITH. I'm not sure I can add much to that, sir, except I remember a—I think it was a quote that the chairman's article had in it, and it had to do with our dealings with Pakistan, and that is that we have to—when we form alliances, we need to take into account their concerns, not necessarily just ours.

And we don't always have to be the boss. I like what Tony said about maybe we want to be almost like the silent partner. That we find alliances that will help us gain the moral high ground, and perhaps we do—we fund it. But we let them do the hard work. I think that's all I would add to that, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing at a critical time. While our military has been bogged down in Iraq, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have gained strength in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, causing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of National Intelligence, and others to issue stern warnings.

This administration's misguided, open-ended Iraq policy has undermined our national security by taking away resources from the fight against al-Qaeda, and by fueling anti-American sentiment in a crucial part of the world. We need a comprehensive global strategy to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.



And it will not be accomplished by leaving 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, nor are periodic military strikes, like the one a few days ago in Somalia, a substitute for a long-term approach to eradicating terrorists' safe havens.

I'm, of course, pleased that we are hearing from two very distinguished witnesses about the importance of broadening our global engagement to include a more balanced use of diplomatic development and intelligence assets. By adequately developing and then integrating all of these assets, we can help best ensure a secure and strong America.

And I'd like to start off by sort of following up with what the General was at least alluding to in a context specifically of Africa. For me, AFRICOM may be the most immediate and important example of our challenges to develop smart power. On the African Continent, there are many examples of weak and failing states with ungoverned regions, systemic challenges in health and economic development, strategically important regions and resources, and an historic and ongoing al-Qaeda presence.

Clearly, there is reason to have military reach and capability in the region, but it seems to me that we need a much more sophisticated combination of tools and efforts to address our total security interests in the region, and it can be counterproductive for our presence and interest to be presented with an exclusively military face.

To start off with the General, how would you characterize the right smart power role for AFRICOM in that region?

General ZINNI. Sir, I'd begin by saying that AFRICOM is being structured in a way that brings all these issues that we on the military side have seen, and are the subject of this hearing. African Command is going to look different than the region—any other regional command. If we fulfill the design that's being proposed, we would have the diplomatic, economic, humanitarian representation in that command for the planning, for the execution on the ground. It's not going to be a purely military command.

I would also say that if you look at Southern Command, Admiral Stavridis who's—Jim Stavridis—who's one of the, I think, the most brilliant commanders we have, he has already restructured his command for the southern part of this hemisphere. And if you look at it, you won't see the typical military structure. You will see organizations in his command that deal with engagement, deal with political interaction, economic interaction, developmental interaction.

And I think that's the sign of the future, these two commands, especially Africa. We have, for the first time, an ambassador from the African Union to the United States. We now have the attention of the world. The European Union is now focusing more on Africa. We certainly are. We recently had the presidential visit out there. We have the creation of African Command.

If you look at the work we've done in Liberia, which was remarkable—it's still a work-in-progress, but look at what Liberia was just a short time ago and how we've been able to change it by engaging across the board in what we're able to do.

There's something very unique about Africa. If you look down the continent, you will see all these sort of subregional organizations—

SADC, ECOWA, SECOMOG—I mean, it's an alphabet soup. They tend to want to work regionally to resolve their problems, and even subregionally.

In my experience, when East Africa, the Horn was part of Central Command's responsibility. We found that these subregional entities were coming to us, asking for assistance. They were not asking for us to do their work. They were asking for the wherewithal to help build the capacity so they could handle their own problems.

When we began the African Center for Strategic Studies, when that was first initiated, I went through the first conference in the synagogue in Dakar. And the founder, the director, Nancy Walker at the time, began the opening event by saying to the African representatives there, military and governmental, that "This is your center. Tell us what you want to get out of this center."

They were almost in visible shock. Afterward, I met with some of the leaders from the region that I was responsible for. They said, "That's the first time that anybody has come from the West here, created something, and instead of telling us what to do, asked us to participate and voice our views and express our needs."

You know, so these are all great beginnings, but they have to be put together in some sort of coherent way. I think there's some great starts here. Africa Command is a great idea. We have split that continent amongst other regional commands that had central focus elsewhere. So I think we're onto something here, but we've got to pull it all together.

Senator FEINGOLD. Admiral, your comments on the right approach and use of Africa.

Admiral SMITH. I don't know as much about it as Tony does, but I do recall that when we were together in Stuttgart, at the European Command, I was the Director for Operations and Tony was the Deputy, Africa was kind of an "oh, by the way" and yet there was just horrible things occurring down there. They were festering at that point.

Later, when I was in Europe and Naples, as the Allied Forces Southern Europe, I didn't have that much to do with the European Command insofar as Africa, but there were even more problems. And it was always dealt with as something sort of separate. It wasn't the same as the rest of the thing.

I was looking through my book to see if I could find an article that was in here on AFRICOM, but I do recall being extraordinarily pleased when I saw that one of the deputies is a civilian. And as I understand it, that's the first time that's ever occurred. And if—I would say that based on what Tony has said, and his knowledge, again, is much more specific than mine, and what I have read, I would say that's a pretty good start in how we organize to make the best use of smart power, because we have two people.

He's going to have—AFRICOM is going to be a military person, I assume, or is. And there are two deputy commanders. One is a military and one is not. And they will—the commander will have the benefit of both of those voices all the time, because they will and should have access to him at any point in time.

The best advice that we got in Command of Operations that were not traditionally military were from the people that are political

advisors. Marc Grossman was a star when we were operating in northern Iraq. I mean, he came down there and just made things happen. Ambassador Bronowich was most helpful.

It was the input from that side, I think, that made our operations so very successful in such a very short period of time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, these are useful comments, and of course, you are military men, and I can see from your comments that you look at it as, “How does a military organization properly convey a message that it also has a civilian side?”

What I’m getting at here, in addition to that, because I think it’s very important, is how do we overall make sure that AFRICOM does not present a primarily military face in these contexts? And you’re getting at that. Let me just give you the example. I discussed it with the Secretary of State—actually, I had a chance to discuss it with the President. He was kind enough to ask some of us to come up to the White House and get a briefing on his trip.

Just the example I witnessed in Ethiopia, in a place called Dire Dawa, not far from Somalia. Terrific thing that our people, our military, did, coming in and bringing in these tents after a community had been flooded. It was not a place of conflict, but it was just a humanitarian act that was a big deal. But I’ve said maybe too many times. I remember, you know, walking around and having a sense that these people were seeing us as a military. Even though there were other people around, they weren’t recognizable, dressed in civilian clothes and so on.

I wonder, even in these contexts of other humanitarian efforts, such as the tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan, how do we make sure that we don’t convey the message that when the United States acts, it acts first and foremost as a military as opposed to a more coordinated message that I think is part of the issue. It’s not just the reality of what we do; it’s also the message of “What is America?” that they receive.

Admiral SMITH. Well, that’s a very hard question, because I don’t think a structure exists to support that kind of an effort, except the military. But the good side of that, sir, is that the Africans who are the beneficiaries of these activities, the people who the—the victims of the tsunami, they see the American military in a different light. We’re not guys that run around with a big stick and beat the living daylights out of folks; we are there and can and do help people.

And that, in and of itself, is a pretty powerful message.

Senator FEINGOLD. I can see that’s a valuable thing.

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. But what happens if that’s the only impression they have of America. In other words, the only contact they have with America. If we don’t have diplomats, let’s say in Madon and in the Banda Ache Region, where it’s a terribly important area, but we don’t have—until recently, we haven’t had a lot of diplomatic presence, for example.

Admiral SMITH. That’s where the very difficult problem comes in of understanding that situational awareness, as I talked about in my statement, that Tony and I have talked about, where we do smart targeting. We go in areas where there are potential prob-

lems, and we try to employ the civilian force, if you will, before it is required—before we are required to use the military.

But we don't, in my own—in my understanding, we don't have that capacity or capability right now. And if we are going to develop and really take advantage of this concept of smart power, we are going to have to develop some sort of a civilian corps that can do exactly as you said.

Senator FEINGOLD. Absolutely.

General.

General ZINNI. I would just make one comment, Senator. I remember when we landed in Somalia, and we began to provide the security network for the distribution of food. And actually, we had our first meeting with General Aideed.

And Aideed's advice, strangely enough, a strange source, said, "If you want to—all these people see are armed gangs and militias. If you want to be different, show up with food, show up with hope and promise." When we went out to regions and began to stretch our security blanket, it was led by Ambassador Bob Oakley. And with him was Phil Johnston, the President of CARE, that was running the humanitarian mission. We brought NGOs with us.

So when they saw the American soldier, or the American marine, they saw something different. Not just his weapons and not just his security, but mixed in with him was the humanitarian need, was the connection to the leadership that wanted to work with their tribal leaders, their clan leaders.

I negotiated with Achanese in Banda Ache, and also in Mindanao with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, in attempt at conflict resolution. In Mindanao, for example, Pacific Commands there are training Philippine forces on counterterrorism actions. USAID is there with remarkable programs—Arms to Farms, you turn in your weapons, we give you the equipment, the farming, the tools, the training on farming practices they've never used before. It's highly successful. The recidivism rate is very low.

You see also our Government involved in trying to mediate it. Working with President Orero and her government, the U.S. Institute of Peace, funded by this body but a nongovernmental organization. And so, the thing that struck me is that none of this was coordinated, unfortunately, and that's, I think, one of the issues here.

But the fact that we have pieces out there, that if we weave them together, going to your point, Senator, then the military in its provision of security and interaction is also viewed in the larger frame of these other efforts that are going on. And that would separate us from others.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks to both of you.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I, too, want to thank you for having this hearing. I do hope that you and others will pursue with your leadership position a new security act that focuses on this. I think this is very timely, very necessary, and as Senator Lugar mentioned, I hope it will help frame the way whoever our new President is goes about this type of activity.

And I think we all know that in Iraq today, in spite of some of the many, many, many mistakes that have occurred, that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker work side by side, and don't hardly go to a meeting without each of them being present and

working together in this way. And I think they certainly acknowledge that. And I want to thank you for your testimony today. I think it's been outstanding, and certainly your leadership on this issue.

I appreciate, General Zinni, you bringing up the issue of some of the private sector efforts or relationships that exist. I was in Colombia over the weekend, and it's just incredible to me that we will not ratify a Free Trade Agreement with our friend there who is under, today, security issues. And we understand how having these business relationships and employed people and raising the standard of living is a national security issue.

And I hope that we will talk more about that, and not in a way that is fear mongering, but I do think that trade certainly and those business relationships are a big part of our national security, and should be framed in that way.

And then, Senator Feingold's comments about AFRICOM I think are dead-on. I do wonder, Mr. Chairman, as I listened to this sort of ambiguous stuffola, if you will, that you're trying to work through, and these gentlemen actually are having a hard time answering in a very clairvoyant way as to how we move ahead, I do wonder whether we don't surgically focus legislation initially on AFRICOM itself, since we haven't yet messed that up, and we could actually start with a cleaner slate.

I do wonder if that's not some way of actually moving ahead, where you focus on it, and have the appropriate relationships, and then move toward something that's even bigger. With all those comments, I would like to follow up on Senator Hagel's questioning. I thought that was very good as it relates to United Nations and NATO.

I know that we have limited resources. But I have to tell you, as I watch NATO, and I was just in Afghanistan as these gentlemen were, and watch all the limitations that exist there, and then I—you meet with the Secretary General of the United Nations about issues in Africa, and I wonder sometimes whether we actually shouldn't bring some of those activities in-house, to be a little bit more surgical.

And I wonder if our reliance on these organizations which are not functioning at appropriate levels has actually hurt us, if you will, as it relates to soft power. And I wonder if you might comment on that.

General ZINNI. Well, I—an alliance, of course, is difficult to manage. Believe me, I've commanded combined task forces. In one case, 26 nations; in another case, 13 nations. We sort of have a saying in the military, "You get swimmers and nonswimmers. And some are there to provide a flag, which there is some value in that, and in many cases not provide much else." As a matter of fact, to actually converting your logistics and others for their support.

NATO should be above all that, Senator. I'll be honest with you. I'm disappointed in NATO. I think this is a defining moment in Afghanistan. The NATO Charter says, "An attack on one is an attack on all." The last time I checked, London, Madrid, and other places were either attacked or an attack was averted. And so, this is a common problem.

And I don't think we can have bifurcated alliances where some parties have to stand up to the fight, and others get away with, "Well, provide a little bit of humanitarian reconstruction support." That's not the way alliances work. Within your capacity and in your capability, you should be able and willing to share the risk and the responsibility.

And I think this is the serious dialog that needs to go on with our NATO allies, if this is to continue on. We've exploded the size of NATO without really defining its mission, its purpose, in a very clear way, and also the demands that each member has to pony up at the table.

And I think that moment has come for NATO.

Senator CORKER. Admiral.

Admiral SMITH. Sir, when I commanded the forces in Bosnia, we had 54,000 troops from 34 different nations. And I used to say that I had command, but not control. I actually had NATO countries defy my orders, refuse to carry orders out, despite the fact that they were clearly within the rules of engagement.

I remember one Defense Chief came to see me. He was brand new, and he was going to assign a new officer to my staff. And he said, "Admiral, I'm sending you someone this time that will work, not someone that will watch and report back on what you do."

It's an interesting alliance, but there are a lot of different—as Tony said, we have sort of let it get away from us, when we have supposedly an alliance that can go somewhere and fight, and yet some of them will go somewhere, but they specifically will not fight. They will not bear arms. They will not follow, and they will not sign up for the same rules of engagement as everyone else.

That makes life very difficult for the commander, and it makes the military commander's job almost impossible, unless everything just goes very, very well. Now, in Afghanistan—and I'm not an expert on Afghanistan, I've not been there, I haven't followed the intricacies of the operations there, but I do speak frequently with people who do go there—and it does seem to me that this situation that General Zinni described where some will and some won't is having a tremendous effect on our ability to carry out our mission in Afghanistan.

And that simply is wrong.

Senator CORKER. I thought your comment about the alliances outside of the normal structures is interesting. I look at the United Nations, and it's so conflicted. I mean, every move it makes, it can't make this move because of this, and it can't make this move because of that, and I do wonder, as we look at a potential new arrangement, as we shouldn't look directly out instead of up and out, directly out to some of these organizations that might help us in other countries through humanitarian efforts and economic efforts.

I thought that was a good comment. I will say that something that is disheartening—and this is not meant to be in any way critical. I have tremendous admiration for both of you, and I thank you so much for your focus. But the fact that you two gentlemen, who have been highly involved in this activity, cannot just say—and you're retired, by the way. You don't have a dog in the hunt anymore. There's nobody that's going to penalize you for your comments.

The fact that you can't just say this is, you know, Senator Kerry pursued it, Senator Biden pursued it, several people before me have pursued it, the fact that you can't just say, "One, two, three, four, this is what we need to do to make this work," makes me wonder whether this body of 100 folks and another body of 435 and the State Department and everybody else involved has any chance of making this happen.

And I just wonder why you can't just say, "This is what ought to happen," even if you might be erring on the side of making a mistake, but at least be bold about talking about how it should occur.

General ZINNI. Senator, I'll give you a copy of my book, and I've described how to make it happen. But I would caution you to take it with a grain of salt. It's one person's idea. I think what this group is intending to do is not give a prescription. We have 52 members; we have 52 ideas.

I think this is so important that what we would want to do is ask that serious study be done. There are organizations in this town that are studying the reorganization of the government, to be more integrated, to be more responsive, to do better planning, to execute better on the ground.

And the studies are as many as there are think tanks in this town. I think this body, much like occurred in 1947, ought to weigh all those, ought to ensure there's the depth of thought, creativity, and analysis that goes into them. And don't take a two-page solution from any of us. What we're doing is sounding the call.

If you want specific ideas, we're certainly here to do it. But I think to offer the ultimate solution and portray it as that by any of us would do a disservice to this body.

Senator CORKER. Well, I appreciate that response. I certainly thank you for your wonderful testimony and service. And I want to say to the chairman, again, I think this is an excellent hearing. The timing is excellent. And I want you to know that myself and my staff certainly would like to work with you toward any solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we need the help. This is going to be a collegial operation here. As General Zinni pointed out, there's a lot of ideas and we really haven't—we've talked about, each of us—well, I'll speak for myself, and I know Senator Lugar, because I've read it.

We've talked over the last decade about the need to reorganize the government, basically. You've made the point, General, that our fathers and mothers made some pretty profound judgments in a world they recognized that had changed fundamentally after 1946. And it held us in pretty good stead for about 40 years. But the world's changed.

My colleagues are tired of me quoting Irish poets all the time, but there's a great line from a poet who wrote about the first rising in Ireland in 1916. It was called Easter Sunday 1916, and it says—there's a line in it that says, "The world has changed. It has changed utterly. A terrible beauty has been born."

I think it could've been written today, and be viewed as novel and insightful if it were written by a poet today. But we've got a lot of work to do, and it's not very glamorous work. It's just hard slogging here, and I assure you this committee is committed to

playing its part in doing that. And we're going to be coming back and talking to you guys.

Now, Senator Barrasso was here, and his patience was exemplary, but he got called to the Energy Committee on which he serves, and his State of Wyoming has a little interest in, in order to make a quorum. So he apologized. With your permission—I know you're doing this on your own nickel, so we don't want to make extra work for you—but if he has any questions in writing, I hope we can submit them to you, so you could respond. OK?

Well, gentlemen and your staffs, thank you very much for your good work. This is just the beginning, I hope.

[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

