



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security

January 1, 1995 - December 31, 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	3
INTRODUCTION.....	4
THREATS AND CRIMINAL ACTS	5
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT	5
U.S. AIRPORT SECURITY	5
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS.....	7
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER (CASLO)	7
FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL (FAM)	7
FEDERAL SECURITY MANAGER (FSM)	7
PRINCIPAL SECURITY INSPECTOR (PSI)	7
CANINE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION.....	9
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (C&E).....	9
SCREENING CHECKPOINT TESTING.....	10
EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEM (EDS).....	12
CONTAINER HARDENING.....	12
HUMAN FACTORS.....	12
FOREIGN AIR CARRIER (FAC) SECURITY.....	13
FOREIGN AIRPORT ASSESSMENT	13
AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING.....	15
UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYSTEM (UAS).....	15
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO)	16
EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE (ECAC).....	16
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.....	17
EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEM.....	17
TRACE DETECTION PROTOCOL.....	17
UNESCORTED ACCESS PRIVILEGE RULE.....	17
NEW TEST OBJECTS	17
AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING.....	17
ASIA-PACIFIC SITUATION.....	18
COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM (CAPS).....	18
DRUG INTERDICTION.....	18
CONCLUSION.....	19
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR 1995	20

Executive Summary

The year 1995 was one of many terrorist attacks, but for civil aviation it should be recorded as a year of disasters averted. Catastrophic events in the United States, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries caused great concern to authorities responsible for protecting the public against all forms of aggression.

Of particular significance to aviation was the explosive device hidden on a **Philippine airliner** flying from Manila to Osaka, via Cebu, on **December 11, 1994**. On detonation, the device killed a Japanese student. This event turned out to have been the prelude for attempts to attack several American carrier flights in East Asia in January 1995.

To defeat the Manila-based conspiracy, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) required U.S. carriers to adopt extensive security measures overseas to protect against the threat, and additional measures were required at U.S. airports. The FAA also issued emergency security program amendments to 27 foreign air carriers operating to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region to address a specific threat in that region of the world. This action affected many Asian, as well as several European and South American air carriers. Subsequent changes to the level of threat as suspects were apprehended resulted in FAA's scaling back the original countermeasures. This was the first time

that FAA issued additional security requirements for foreign air carriers on such a broad scale with no time to go through the regular notification process. The effort required of U.S. and foreign air carriers was substantial; the crisis required 24-hour consultation and the fullest cooperation among governments and civil aviation authorities. The measures applied to aviation were successful in part because they were based on credible and timely intelligence that could be shared among governments.

On June 27, 1995, the Aviation Security Contingency (AVSEC) Plan was activated to counter a threat from the **Unabomber** to blow up an airplane. The AVSEC Plan consists of pre-arranged measures which are put in place without notice and comment because of emergency situations. Use of the plan has been highly beneficial for FAA to determine the measures and then for industry to implement them quickly.

There were several other potentially dangerous events in 1995: (a) the trial, conviction, and sentencing of Sheik Rahman, and (b) the possible extradition of Mousa Abu Marzook, a key Hamas fundraiser. In each instance, FAA analyzed the threat carefully and instituted appropriate measures from the AVSEC Plan.

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to Title 49, U.S.C., Sections 44938 and 44907 (formerly Sections 315(a), 316(b), and 1115(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended).

The FAA's aviation security mission is to protect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorist and other criminal acts. Because terrorists seek to destroy public confidence in the safety of air travel and disrupt this vital segment of the U.S. and world economies, the continued growth of commercial air transportation hinges on the effectiveness of aviation security measures. Protecting the air traffic control infrastructure--FAA facilities and equipment and the employees who operate them--is part of that same mission. The FAA also assists other agencies in the interdiction of drugs coming into the United States.

The responsibility for aviation security is a shared one and so are its costs. The FAA continuously assesses threats, assigns measures for both current and increased threat situations through regulations, and works with the aviation industry to implement those measures, using enforcement action when necessary. The aviation industry, through its managers and employees, implements those measures. Air carriers are responsible for applying security measures to passengers, service and flightcrew, baggage, and cargo--in short, everyone and everything that enters the aircraft. Airports are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and providing local law enforcement

support. The cooperation of passengers and the diligence of shippers are also needed.

Aviation security is a worldwide concern. The FAA's efforts are concentrated on U.S. airports, U.S. air carriers wherever they fly, and foreign air carriers serving the United States. The FAA works closely with other governments in raising the level of security provided by all air carriers and airports, regardless of nationality. As carriers share or interchange equipment, personnel, management, and investment, global aviation increasingly requires global cooperation in security.

In carrying out its mission, the FAA:

- (1) distinguishes between baseline measures required under "normal" threat conditions and more stringent measures needed to meet increased threats in accordance with the AVSEC Plan;
- (2) concentrates the industry's measures on particularly vulnerable parts of the aviation system relative to specific threats;
- (3) seeks the optimal mix of people, equipment, and procedures, developing and incorporating advanced technologies when they offer greater effectiveness or efficiency;
- (4) involves all parties, groups, and organizations that have a stake in security in the design and application of security measures; and
- (5) tests aviation security measures to ensure that they are working and to make adjustments where necessary.

THREATS AND CRIMINAL ACTS

Criminal Acts Against Commercial Aircraft

No explosive devices detonated on board aircraft in 1995. There have been no aircraft bombing incidents in 3 of the past 4 years.

There have been no hijackings recorded either in the United States or on U.S.-registered aircraft since 1991.

Only one hijacking attempt was made on a U.S.-bound foreign-registered aircraft in the past 5 years: Air China flight from Beijing to New York's JFK Airport in December 1993.

There have been only 21 hijackings of foreign-registered aircraft on international routes in the past 5 years. Most of the overall total of 99 hijackings took place on domestic (internal) flights. Of the nine hijackings in 1995, six involved aircraft on domestic flights. In 1995, in contrast to previous years, no one country had a significantly high number of hijackings. Only one hijacking in 1995 was committed for political reasons--to protest French nuclear testing. Most hijacking incidents in 1995 were committed to improve a hijacker's personal circumstances.

The overall number of incidents can serve as a rough index of the level of criminal activity involving commercial aircraft. Because of differences in situations specific to individual countries and varying motivation among perpetrators, any generalizations must be very carefully drawn. Overall, the level of threat of criminal and terrorist acts against U.S. carriers operating in certain locations overseas (those requiring extraordinary security measures) remained at a similar

level to previous years. There was one notable exception. A plot was uncovered in Asia to place explosive devices on a number of U.S. air carriers. Investigation of the plot revealed a higher level of threat in the Asia-Pacific region than had been suspected.

There have been no significant attacks against U.S. aviation interests since 1987. The threat level, as in past years, was assessed to be low; however, an element of increasing uncertainty exists. The bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) and the uncovering of a conspiracy to bomb several other targets in New York City in 1993 has shown that foreign terrorist elements can operate in this country. An individual indicted for the WTC bombing was also indicted for the Asian plot to bomb U.S. aircraft. These events raise the possibility that additional attacks could occur.

U.S. Airport Security

On January 9, 1995, FAA received credible information that suspected Islamic extremists were operating from the Philippines. Their plan was to travel to various points in the Asia-Pacific Region and conduct multiple bombing attacks against U.S. airlines. These discoveries were subsequently linked to Ramzi Yousef, a known terrorist and alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing. Extensive U.S. carrier security measures were required overseas to protect against the threat, and additional measures were required at U.S. airports. In addition, FAA issued emergency amendments to 27 foreign air carriers operating to the United States from the Asia-Pacific Region to address the threat to aviation in that

region of the world. Asian, South American, and European air carriers were affected by this action. Changes to the level of threat as suspects were apprehended resulted in FAA's scaling back the original countermeasures. This was the first time that additional security requirements were placed on foreign carriers on such a broad scale without following standard procedures. Coordination with the host governments and onsite assistance by deployed FAA teams were essential to the successful implementation of the countermeasures by air carriers from many countries.

The Unabomber's threat to blow up airplanes at California airports on June 27, 1995, caused great concern because of his past record. FAA responded vigorously with tightened security measures at affected airports; the measures were kept in place until the threat could be dismissed as a hoax.

In August 1995, FAA imposed emergency requirements on both airports and air carriers in the United States to upgrade aviation security. At that time, U.S. airports

were directed to implement more stringent security measures due to a heightened state of alert for the Nation's transportation systems. The increased security was based on an assessment provided by Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The additional measures were ordered to prevent or deter possible criminal or terrorist acts. FAA consults with industry on both threats and measures as circumstances permit.

While some of the additional measures were visible to many passengers, they did not cause significant flight delays at airports across the country. The support and cooperation of industry and the traveling public greatly assisted in the transition to the heightened security posture. These measures will be adjusted by the FAA as the U.S. Government's assessment of the situation changes.

There was considerable tension surrounding the trial of Sheik Rahman for his role in the World Trade Center tragedy. He was found guilty in September and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Summary Of Programs

Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officer (CASLO)

CASLO's, in all but two instances, are located overseas. There are currently 18 CASLO's who report directly to the Office of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. They are the primary FAA contact with U.S. Embassies and host governments on civil aviation security matters. Primary responsibilities include assisting U.S. and foreign air carriers to implement FAA security requirements, the exchange of threat information, and onsite FAA coordination during aviation security incidents. (See page 8 for CASLO's locations.)

Federal Air Marshal (FAM)

The FAM program provides specially trained, armed teams of civil aviation security specialists for rapid deployment worldwide on U.S. air carrier flights. The overall goal is to protect the traveling public, passengers, and flightcrews on U.S. air carriers by deterring criminal and terrorist acts which target civil aviation.

FAM's undergo sophisticated and realistic initial and recurrent training, and prior to every deployment, complete "standardized deployment preparations." All FAM volunteers pass initial screening which includes physical fitness standards.

During 1995, FAM's provided in-flight security on flights of all major U.S. air carriers to and from 69 cities and 16 countries. They also opened their national training support facility at the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

Federal Security Manager (FSM)

FSM's represent the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at 19 major U.S. airports. FSM's were created by law and have been deployed by FAA since October 1, 1991. As FAA's designated security representatives at major U.S. airports, they maintain direct communication with key airport officials, airline managers, and law enforcement authorities. Their principal task is coordination and oversight of all operational security activities.

Principal Security Inspector (PSI)

PSI's are assigned to each certificated U.S. air carrier required to adopt a security program under 14 CFR part 108 and to each foreign air carrier subject to 14 CFR part 129. The PSI serves as a liaison between the FAA and the air carrier's corporate security office, representing the Associate Administrator and all FAA security field elements. The PSI works closely with the Federal security managers and the civil aviation security liaison officers to ensure the carrier's compliance with FAA requirements and to address areas of concern with the carrier's corporate security representatives. The PSI is responsible for approving and issuing amendments to the air carrier's individual security program, as well as providing FAA policy guidance to the air carrier when regulations are developed or revised. The PSI also approves and monitors the air carrier's security training curriculum.

CASLO's are stationed in 16 locations and cover the areas as shown in the table below.

CASLO	Locations Covered
Paris	France, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Vienna	Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia/Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovak Republic
Rome	Italy, Greece, Israel, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon
Copenhagen	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Frankfurt	Germany
London	United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland
Madrid	Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde
Brussels	Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Netherlands, Czech Republic
Brussels	Russia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Poland
Dakar	All nations in Africa except for those specifically stated and covered by CASLO's in Paris, Madrid, and Manama
Manama	Bahrain, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Sydney	Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Micronesia, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa
Bangkok	Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Macau
Singapore	Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines
Tokyo	Japan, China, South Korea
Buenos Aires	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay
Miami	Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Caribbean Nations, Suriname

Canine Explosives Detection

The FAA canine explosives detection program helps prevent the introduction of improvised explosive devices and other explosive materials into the civil aviation transportation system. In 1995, 30 airport authorities and local law enforcement agencies participated in this program with over 100 teams located at major U.S. airports. A canine team consists of a specially trained dog and handler.

Canine teams are trained to rigid military standards, certified annually, and must pass a comprehensive evaluation. Each team is trained to search aircraft properly (widebody and narrowbody), motor vehicles, terminals, freight facilities (cargo), and passenger luggage. The FAA provides initial and refresher training for all handlers and single purpose explosive detector dogs.

Compliance and Enforcement (C&E)

Federal Aviation Regulations require the implementation of security programs by airports and air carriers. These security programs contain procedures to prevent or deter aircraft hijackings, sabotage, and other criminal acts. The FAA and the aviation industry constantly review the procedures to ensure their effectiveness in countering threats to civil aviation. Compliance with the FAR is accomplished through FAA inspections and enforcement actions.

While striving to achieve compliance through cooperation, the FAA must ensure that the personnel of air carriers, airports, and other organizations properly comply with the FAR and applicable security programs. FAA civil aviation security special agents inspect the aviation industry's security operations at regular intervals and at unscheduled times. During the inspections,

weaknesses and deficiencies are corrected, security violations are identified, and, if necessary, enforcement action is initiated. Enforcement may take the form of administrative actions (warnings or letters of correction), civil penalties, certificate revocation, or criminal prosecution.

In 1995, 163 U.S.-scheduled or charter air carriers were required to follow FAA-approved security programs. Each of these U.S. air carriers has adopted the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) developed by the FAA in consultation with the industry. The program requires each air carrier to implement standard security procedures. The FAA has the authority to amend the ACSSP when safety and the public interest require it, after providing air carriers a period of time to review and comment on the proposed amendment. In addition, the FAA may issue an emergency amendment to the ACSSP, effective upon receipt, if immediate action is required.

In 1995, 185 foreign-scheduled and charter air carriers serving airports in the United States were required to follow FAA-approved security programs. U.S. regulations require foreign air carriers to submit security programs to the FAA for review and acceptance.


U.S. and foreign-scheduled charter air carriers serve 501 airports within the United States and are regulated under 14 CFR part 107. Each airport is also required to adopt and use a security program to provide a secure operating environment for the air carriers. Of the 501 regulated airports, 19 are designated as Category X or high risk, based on passenger traffic, complexity, and other special considerations.

Screening Checkpoint Testing

This section of the report discusses the effectiveness of screening procedures of all passengers and property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation.

In 1987, the FAA amended the ACSSP to require carriers to detect FAA weapons and simulated explosive devices. The agency began taking enforcement action for each carrier's failure to detect an FAA test object.

The 1994 drop in detection rate resulted from the introduction of more challenging test objects.



Screeners should not be trained merely to detect FAA test objects; the FAA requires that they be trained to detect actual weapons, firearms, and explosive devices. But because they are tested with a small number of approved "test objects," an unintended consequence is that screeners specifically look for those test objects. New and more challenging test objects have been developed and phased into the training and testing process to portray more realistically the

explosives and techniques used by terrorist groups.

New test objects have been developed and are provided in the modular bomb set (MBS). MBS configurations realistically simulate a reasonable range of improvised explosive devices (IED). The components of the MBS can be arranged into 48 different configurations.

In 1994, the FAA started evaluations at U.S. airports to determine the effectiveness of the MBS as a training tool and to expose screeners to more sophisticated simulated IED's. Several air carriers have expressed interest in purchasing the MBS for training, although there is no regulatory requirement to do so.

The FAA continued these evaluations into 1995 assessing the effectiveness of screeners in detecting a variety of MBS configurations in carry-on and checked baggage. The primary goal during the latter part of 1995 and early 1996 has been to assess the effectiveness of the MBS evaluations for improving screening. Interaction between FAA security special agents as advisors and security screening personnel indicates that increased training, which uses the simulated IED assembled out of the components of the MBS, resulted in a better understanding of how to identify the more sophisticated IED components.

Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results
1991 -1995

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Persons Screened (In Millions)	1015.1	1110.8	1150.0	1261.3	1263.0
WEAPONS DETECTED:					
Firearms	1644	2608	2798	2994	2390
Handguns	1597	2503	2707	2860	2230
Long guns	47	105	91	134	160
Explosive/Incendiary Devices*	94	167	251	505	631
Other Dangerous Articles**	275	**2341	3867	6051	4414
PERSONS ARRESTED:					
Carriage of firearms/explosives	893	1282	1354	1433	1194
Giving false information	28	13	31	35	68

*From 1992 through 1994, the method of counting “explosive/incendiary devices” deviated so as to inflate numbers in this category. Individual items were counted rather than packages (i.e., one box of firecrackers counted as 20 firecrackers; one box of ammunition counted as 50 cartridges).

**Since 1992 “other dangerous articles” have included stunning devices (stun gun, Taser, electronic/shocking brief case), chemical agents (tear gas, mace, Oleo Capsicum spray), martial arts equipment, knives, bludgeons, and certain other designated items.

Explosives Detection System (EDS)

FAR Part 108.20 (14 CFR part 108) requires air carriers to use an explosives detection system approved by the FAA to screen checked baggage on international flights when the Administrator so requires. Section 44913, Title 49, Transportation, mandates that prior to a requirement for widespread deployment of EDS, the Administrator must certify, based on tests using test protocols developed in consultation with expert scientists, that EDS performance meets performance criteria in detecting the "amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material which would likely be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft." The industry has raised concerns about the purchase, installation, cost, and operational impact of EDS deployment.

In 1994, the FAA approved the InVision CTX 5000 as the first certified EDS.

To help bring it about, FAA awarded grants to three air carriers to demonstrate, starting in the fall of 1995, EDS in integrated operation to develop practical guidance for industry. In addition to the EDS demonstrations, the FAA initiated development of an extensive EDS operational cost model. After airport demonstrations and modeling, the FAA will consider the scope and timing of EDS deployment for international flights. The FAA will carefully weigh the costs and potential benefits of deploying equipment, especially with regard to acquisition costs, size, and weight.

The last Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) devices were decommissioned in the fall of 1994. The final report on the testing program was delivered to FAA by the

contractor in June 1995, providing data useful in planning future EDS deployment.

Container Hardening

To complement the R&D efforts in explosives detection, an aircraft hardening program is being conducted by the FAA's Technical Center's Aviation Security Research and Development Service.

The specific goal of the program is to reduce the vulnerability of commercial aircraft to terrorist threats by: (1) determining the minimum size of explosive that must be detected; (2) identifying what can be done to the current and future fleet of commercial airliners to make them less susceptible to explosive sabotage; (3) hardening aircraft cargo and baggage containers to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to explosive devices; and (4) determining the threat to aircraft from projected energy and/or other electromagnetic-based terrorist acts.

The FAA is performing a congressionally mandated study on the tradeoffs among explosives detection levels, blast management, blast containment techniques, structural enhancements, and the investment levels required. An operational demonstration of prototype containers will be completed in FY-97.

Human Factors

The FAA's primary objective in this area is to find ways to enhance human performance in security. The FAA is focusing on improving performance at the screening checkpoint. The screener proficiency evaluation and reporting system (SPEARS) is being developed to improve screening through improvements in selection, training, certification, and operational performance assessment of a screener.

Human factors research will also be applied to other security programs throughout the system, such as the explosives detection systems program and passenger profiling.

Foreign Air Carrier (FAC) Security

The FAA is required by Title 49, U.S.C. 44906, to ensure that passengers are provided a level of protection when flying to or from the United States on foreign air carriers (FAC) similar to that provided when flying on U.S. air carriers from those same airports. Federal Aviation Regulations Part 129 (14 CFR part 129) requires FAC's operating to the United States to submit security programs to the FAA for acceptance for their operations to and from the United States. FAC's may adopt the model security program (MSP) prepared by the FAA, submit their own security programs for review, or refer the FAA to a foreign government that performs security procedures at a last point of departure to the United States.

At the end of 1995, there were 185 FAC's operating to and from the United States who were required to have security programs acceptable to the Administrator. All FAC's have been required since September 1992 to adopt the FAA's MSP when operating from the United States. The FAC's have adopted either the FAA's MSP, both for flights from and to the United States, or have submitted an acceptable program that meets the performance standards contained in the MSP.

Sixteen of the seventeen foreign carriers, for which FAA's analysis shows a need for additional security measures, have had their security programs amended. These strengthened security measures have been a result of negotiations with the host government's civil aviation authority, the air

carrier's corporate offices and, where necessary, the civil aviation authority of the country which is the last point of departure to the United States. The FAA continuously assesses threats against all foreign air carriers and will not hesitate to discuss and, if necessary, impose additional security measures to meet any threat.

The threat to civil aviation in the Asia-Pacific region in early 1995 is a good example. FAA determined that the threat to U.S. air carriers could result in threat transfer to foreign air carriers operating to the United States. As a result, 27 foreign air carriers had their security programs amended to carry out additional security measures until the threat was neutralized. Also, on June 28, FAA imposed additional security measures on 53 foreign air carriers operating from airports in California in response to the Unabomber threat. In both of these cases, foreign air carriers from Asia, Europe, and South America implemented the measures because they understood the seriousness of the threat and that the measures imposed were tailored to counter the threat.

Foreign Airport Assessment

As mandated by Title 49, U.S.C. 44907, the FAA performs scheduled, onsite formal evaluations of foreign airports served by U.S. carriers, from which foreign air carriers serve the United States, which pose a high risk of introducing danger to international travel, and such other airports as the Secretary of Transportation may deem appropriate. The purpose of the assessments is to determine the extent to which foreign aeronautical authorities effectively maintain and carry out security measures. In 1995, approximately 233 foreign airports qualified for assessment under the law.

This number fluctuates as changes in air carrier service occur. In recent years, the total has slowly risen as more airports seek to meet international travel demands, and as more air carriers, both foreign and U.S., expand their international routes. The number of FAA assessments at each foreign airport is based on reviews and analyses of current resources and threat conditions.

In January 1995, the FAA determined from reliable reports that a credible threat existed from the Asia-Pacific region against U.S. air carriers operating through specific airports. To facilitate increased security procedures and cooperation between the U.S. air carriers and the affected host governments, the FAA deployed 78 security specialists to 13 airports in eight countries. This focused response to a specific threat diverted the available work force from routine security assessments.

Despite these intensive efforts, the FAA conducted 82 foreign airport assessments in 1995. As a result of these assessments, the FAA made 251 security recommendations to foreign governments. Recommendations were made in the areas of access control, airport administration, screening, airport emergency planning, national administration, baggage and cargo security controls, and law enforcement support.

On October 8, 1992, an assessment of the airport in Lagos, Nigeria, resulted in an immediate public notification without the usual 90-day notice. As a result of the public notice, FAA provided technical assistance and security training for 9 months to the Nigerian Government. In July 1993, a second assessment was conducted in Lagos. On August 11, 1993, the Secretary suspended air service between the United States and Lagos citing the failure of cognizant authorities to correct deficiencies

satisfactorily. Another assessment was conducted in April 1994 and the Secretary determined that the suspension should remain in effect. An interagency team returned to Lagos in November 1995 to determine if satisfactory progress had been achieved regarding eliminating the adverse impact of corruption on aviation security. As of the end of 1995, the Secretary's suspension order remained in place.

On July 28, 1995, an assessment of the airport in Manila, Philippines, resulted in a public notification that the government of the Philippines was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures there. As a result of the public notice, the FAA provided technical assistance and security training for 6 months with the Philippine Government. Steady progress in correcting the airport's deficiencies was reported and was ongoing at the end of the calendar year.

On August 28, 1995, an assessment of the airport in Bogota, Colombia, resulted in a public notification that the government of Colombia was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures there. As a result of the public notice, the FAA established a period of 6 months to help the government of Colombia to accomplish the corrective actions to which it has committed. This technical assistance and security training for the government of Colombia were ongoing at the end of the calendar year.

Aviation Security Training

The FAA develops and manages an extensive training program for FAA and non-FAA domestic and foreign personnel involved in civil aviation security.

Technical training courses are conducted at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and at field locations. Interagency training sources for other specialized training such as communication and information security, criminal investigations, physical security, etc., are delivered to FAA personnel at various locations throughout the country.

Upon request, special interest seminars are developed and delivered to local law enforcement officers, airport and air carrier managers, foreign airport managers, and aviation officials at various sites throughout the United States.

The FAA provides aviation security training to foreign airport managers from developing countries and countries where U.S. air carriers are establishing service for the first time. Although training is usually provided via a resident course at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, in 1995, the FAA delivered technical assistance and training in Palau and at two airport sites each in the Philippines and Vietnam with translators.

The FAA is a partner with other Government agencies via the Department of State (DOS) Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). This program provides technical assistance to foreign countries in the form of security surveys of foreign airports and subsequent security training, and/or technical support necessary to bring the airport into compliance with criteria established by the International Civil Aviation Organization and FAA airport security minimum standards. This

cooperative effort ensures that state-of-the-art security concepts and techniques are applied worldwide to enhance aviation safety and airport security.

Universal Access System (UAS)

A UAS will permit flightcrews and other transient airline employees to carry a single computerized ID/access media for use nationwide. Congress designated \$2 million to fund the development and initial implementation of UAS for transient flightcrews. The UAS standards and test program were developed jointly with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC).

Access portals have been installed at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW) and Miami International Airport (MIA) for use by crews of Northwest Airlines and Delta Air Lines that have rebadged to the UAS standard. FAA is using the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to manage the project with Mei Technologies as the contractor.

The test program will run for 6 months in at least three phases beginning with a stand-alone data base at DTW, adding Delta's centralized data base in Atlanta, and then integrating the centralized data base with MIA's access control system. Operational testing of the UAS was initiated on December 4, 1995. USAir is also interested in participating and has initiated its own UAS test system at the Charlotte International Airport.

While all three sites have experienced difficulties in initiating their systems, the FAA is keeping a detailed account for future analysis. At the conclusion of the test, installation and operational results will be reported to the ASAC, which will modify

the standards as necessary and proceed to develop a plan for voluntary implementation of UAS at participating airports. Additionally, language will be included in the access control standards adopted by the RTCA that will ensure compatibility with UAS standards.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that was established by the Chicago Convention in December 1944.

ICAO establishes international aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) for its 183 member states. Three pertinent conventions (Tokyo-Hague-Montreal) provide the foundation for these SARP's. The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security works closely with ICAO to strengthen these standards and to ensure compliance with them throughout the international aviation system.

Aviation security was once again declared by the ICAO Assembly to be a high priority. The Aviation Security Panel, composed of representatives from 15 states and a number of industry observers, met in June to review the adequacy of the existing SARP's contained in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention. A number of recommendations were developed and have now been sent to all member states for comment. Absent any emergency meetings, the Panel was scheduled to hold its next meeting in the first quarter of FY-97.

Recognizing the importance of aviation security in ICAO and the needs of the expanded aviation security office, the United States continues to provide two FAA security specialists for ICAO at no expense to the organization. These specialists are used by ICAO to conduct security surveys and training for countries in need throughout the world.

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

The ECAC is an intergovernmental consultative organization that was established in 1955 by the Council of Europe with the active support of ICAO. ECAC's objectives are to encourage the safe and orderly development of civil aviation to, from, and within Europe. The Conference in 1995 expanded to 33 member states.

In the field of security, ECAC's objective is to ensure the maximum level of security possible within ECAC and with its partners serving its airports. ECAC member states apply ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices. In addition, supplementary measures, appropriate to the conditions pertaining to Europe are promulgated by ECAC through its frequently revised security manual. While the aviation security measures contained in the manual are not mandatory, the expectation within ECAC is that all member states will comply. The United States (FAA), Canada, and Israel have been granted permanent observer status on the ECAC Security Committee.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The following is a brief summary of accomplishments achieved by the FAA in aviation security in 1995.

Explosives Detection System

The FAA Technical Center awarded three grants to U.S. airlines to install and demonstrate the first certified explosives detection system, the InVision CTX 5000, at domestic and overseas airports. These demonstrations will provide the airport operational experience and accurate cost data essential for future decisions on widespread EDS deployment. The first EDS demonstration site at San Francisco International Airport became operational in November 1995.

Trace Detection Protocol

FAA Security hosted and chaired the Third Workshop of the ICAO Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the detection of explosives at the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City. Scientists and security specialists from a dozen countries and as many Federal agencies discussed trace explosive detection approaches and exercised a protocol for screening electronics using trace detectors.

Unescorted Access Privilege Rule

The Unescorted Access Privilege Rule was issued October 3, 1995, and became effective January 31, 1996. Publication of this final rule enhances the effectiveness of the U.S. civil aviation security system by ensuring that individuals applying for unescorted access privileges do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the security of the aviation system. This rule implements the employment investigation

provisions of Section 105 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. The investigation will be a two-stage process. Applicants must provide an employment history for the last 10 years. The most recent 5 years would be verified by the hiring employer. The rule provides three "triggers" for an employer to proceed to a criminal records check via FBI fingerprint records.

New Test Objects

A baseline study was completed to evaluate the capability of airport screeners to detect improvised explosive devices in passenger carry-on baggage using black/white computer-based x-ray image presentations. The baseline will be used to identify performance improvements as new screener training technology and procedures are developed.

Aviation Security Training

The FAA developed a "Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed Training Program." Instructor and student handouts were printed and distributed to Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The package includes criteria for "need" to fly while armed and information for aircrew. It promotes understanding of differences among air carriers' corporate policy and provides guidelines for transportation of prisoners. This training program was implemented in anticipation of requirements in the revision of FAR 108 (14 CFR part 108).

From January to December 1995, the FAA trained:

- 532 FAA students in basic and advanced aviation security and internal programs;
- 409 non-FAA students in special interest aviation security seminars at local sites;
- 25 international students from Albania, Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Chechnya, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Latvia, Mexico, Romania, Thailand, and Trinidad attended the International Airport Security Course in Oklahoma City;
- International students from Palau, Philippines, and Vietnam attended 11 civil aviation security technical assistance seminars at local airports; and
- International students from Argentina, Cyprus, Georgia, Hungary, India, Paraguay, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Uruguay attended courses sponsored by the DOS ATAP. In addition to training, the FAA's role in ATAP also included training needs surveys for Argentina, Hungary, India, Paraguay, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Uruguay.

Asia-Pacific Situation

In January, Philippine police discovered a terrorist safe house in Manila. Operational plans to place bombs on as many as 11 U.S. air carrier flights originating in Asia were discovered. This was an unprecedented event in civil aviation history. In response, the FAA immediately required U.S. carriers departing from the seven Asian airports

listed in the operational plan to search aircraft at transit stops to ensure that an IED was not hidden in the life vest or elsewhere on the aircraft, and to open and search carry-on bags of all originating passengers. The resources required of U.S. and foreign air carriers were substantial; the crisis required 24-hour consultation and the fullest cooperation among governments and civil aviation authorities.

Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening Program (CAPS)

Initial test and evaluation was completed on the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening program. This research evaluated the feasibility of using data stored in an airline computerized reservation system to enhance the ability of security personnel to assess accurately threats associated with particular passengers on domestic and international flights from U.S. airports.

Drug Interdiction

Investigations conducted by special agents in the Drug Investigations Support Program (DISP) resulted in numerous airmen certificate revocations in FY-95. These revocations are due to the success of the FAA/Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Probation and Parole match programs in which inmate, probation, and parole records are matched against the Airmen Registry. Airmen found convicted for drug smuggling are subject to certificate action.

Conclusion

Several events in 1995 have led to a thorough re-examination of the terrorist threat in the United States and our response to these new threats.

On January 9, 1995, FAA received credible information that suspected Islamic extremists were operating from the Philippines. They were believed to be responsible for the small bomb that had exploded on Philippine Airlines (PAL) flight 434 on December 11, 1994. Their plan was to travel to various points in the Asia-Pacific region and conduct multiple bombing attacks against

U.S. airlines. These discoveries were subsequently linked to Ramzi Yousef, a known terrorist and alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing. He was later apprehended in Pakistan and turned over to the United States for trial.

The Unabomber's threat to blow up airplanes at California airports on June 27, 1995, caused great concern because of his past record. FAA responded with tightened security measures at affected airports and measures were kept in place until the threat could be dismissed as a hoax.

There was considerable tension surrounding the trial of Sheik Rahman for his role in the World Trade Center tragedy. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.

As is made clear by the events of 1995, the threat to civil aviation is subject to sudden change. Specifically, with respect to civil aviation in the United States, the general

threat level (i.e., the potential for a terrorist attack) is almost certainly higher than in years past.

On October 3, 1995, a new rule (Unescorted Access Privilege) effective January 31, 1996, mandated by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Title 49, U.S.C. 44936) sets forth requirements for individuals to be granted unescorted access to a security identification display area (SIDA). Companies who contract with air carriers and airport operators to provide various services, such as catering and cleaning, will also be affected by this rule.

Research and development has progressed during the year in several areas. A baggage container has been tested that is capable of mitigating the blast from a size bomb which might be contained in checked baggage. FAA has approved the InVision CTX 5000 as the first certified EDS. Demonstrations are currently in progress with three airlines. The demonstrations will be used to develop guidance for the industry, especially with regard to acquisition, operational costs, and reliability.

FAA's Civil Aviation Security organization, in concert with all of the security-related organizations in the United States and around the world, will concentrate on improving the baseline of security. Our goal is to increase the capability of all nations to respond to such threats separately or as a unified force. These efforts are essential to stopping the threat of violence to the flying public.

Significant Events for 1995

January	FAA determined that a credible threat existed in Asia-Pacific region against U.S. air carriers operating through specific airports. FAA deployed 78 security specialists to 13 airports in 8 countries.
April	Ramzi Yousef arraigned in U.S. Federal Court for conspiracy and attempting to bomb U.S. commercial airlines serving East Asia.
June	AVSEC plan activated to counter Unabomber threat.
July	Assessment of Manila Airport resulted in public notification that government was unable to maintain effective security measures.
August	Assessment of airport in Bogota, Colombia, resulted in public notification that government was unable to maintain effective security measures.
October	FAA imposed emergency requirements on airports and air carriers in the United States to upgrade aviation security practices. Conviction of Sheik Rahman and nine other defendants. Unescorted Access Privilege Rule published in <u>Federal Register</u> to become effective January 31, 1996.
November	First EDS demonstration site at San Francisco International Airport became operational.