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INTRODUCTION

In convening the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, the Secretary of State outlined the scope and dimension of the security problems that confront the United States in continuing to do diplomatic business overseas as well as in providing adequate reciprocal protection for foreigners stationed or visiting the United States on diplomatic business. With the cooperation of a wide range of U.S. Government domestic and foreign affairs agencies, the Panel has examined the issues that relate to diplomatic security in the U.S and overseas.

This report addresses questions of organization within the Department, professionalism of those executing security responsibilities, international diplomacy to thwart terrorism, the protection of foreign dignitaries and missions, certain intelligence and alerting processes, physical security standards, and the substantial building program that is required.

Over the past few years, many demands have accumulated requiring more resources, both financial and human, in the area of security. Security has not traditionally been given a high priority by diplomatic establishments. The large, important, and growing security demand at home and abroad requires a competent professional organization with a sense of mission and identity legislatively defined and yet accountable to the traditional authority of management. In the matter of organization, the Panel recommends the creation of a new Bureau for Diplomatic Security, reporting to the Under Secretary for Management. Complementing the establishment of this bureau, the Panel recommends that a Diplomatic Security Service be created by legislation. A recommendation is also made that responsibility for diplomatic activities in the field of international terrorism be transferred from the current Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning (M/CTP), which reports to the Under Secretary for Management, to the Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. International diplomacy on terrorism may not produce substantive results, but an aggressive, determined effort must be undertaken and that can best be carried out from the Department's foreign policy office rather than its management office.

The other functions of the current M/CTP should be subsumed in the office of the new Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. These include two areas of heightened importance: Emergency Action Planning (EAP), which includes crisis simulation and contingency planning, and the Anti-terrorist Assistance Program (ATA).

During the Panel's deliberations, questions of system-wide security consciousness and accountability were raised. The Panel recommends that the Secretary ask for legislation that would establish a Board of Inquiry or, alternatively, using existing authorities, put in place such board to undertake investigations into major security incidents in the future. Draft legislation is attached in the event the Secretary chooses that option. The Panel believes that a formal procedure to investigate loss of life or major destruction of property, with due regard to individual rights and fair play, is an essential element in evolving a stronger process for assuring accountability for dereliction in the execution of assigned responsibilities.

The new Diplomatic Security Service must incorporate the best features and attributes of professional law enforcement in order that it will become capable of providing the level of competence that will be required in United States diplomatic and consular missions around the world in the face of the expected terrorist threat environment. Additionally, the DSS must provide the kind of professional protective services that serve as a model by which the U.S. should demand reciprocity. The necessary professionalism in the DSS can only be created if it has its own structure for personnel recruitment, advancement, and assignment. At the same time, the DSS should remain an integral part of the Department of State, to ensure responsiveness to the overall goals of American foreign policy. Individual DSS professionals should regularly be assigned to the regional bureaus and other organizational entities that need sound security advice on a daily basis.

A careful examination of the nature and frequency of terrorism, civil strife, urban violence, and comparable occurrences throughout the world has led the Panel to recommend that a large number of facilities around the world, which once may have represented the optimal site for the conduct of American diplomacy, be replaced by more physically secure sites and buildings. The Panel believes that it is essential that a substantial relocation and building program be initiated and carried out with dispatch. The alternative is to remain hostage to the likelihood of American diplomatic establishments being physically assaulted by mobs or bombed or sabotaged by terrorists. This building program should be undertaken as rapidly as possible and should be sustained until it is completed. To accomplish this, adequate, continuing, secured funding must be assured. The Panel recommends a capital budgeting system that will permit progress at the maximum feasible pace.

There are many other issues addressed in this report which vary in magnitude. No effort has been made to arrange recommendations in a priority sequence. Instead, the Panel has endeavored to offer recommendations on all problems which surfaced that are within the assigned responsibilities of the Secretary of State. For many years, the Department of State has loyally attempted to discharge growing and changing responsibilities with austere resources. The interests of the United States cannot be upheld by continuing that approach. The recommendations of the Panel will require a large commitment of resources, both human and financial, which cannot be satisfied through the shifting of existing priorities or expenditures. Taken together, the Panel believes the recommendations represent a large step forward in ensuring our ability to continue to do our diplomatic business around the world into the future and to fulfill our reciprocal obligations at home.

Not discussed in this report, even though of great importance in some instances, are a number of problems identified by the Panel that are not susceptible to unilateral solution by the Secretary of State. These issues relate to or grow out of interagency relationships, United States Government organization for foreign intelligence and counter-terrorism programs, and the problems associated with electronic and physical penetration of U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas. Separate responses on these issues have been provided to the Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Department of State currently has under way a number of improvements expected to enhance its security capabilities. The Panel fully supports those initiatives but recommends significant additional improvements in a number of areas. These will enable the Department on, State to meet the unusual security challenges it now faces and to fulfill its security responsibilities in the coming decade.

The Panel recommends a reorganization of the offices primarily responsible for security and counter-terrorism in the Department of State. If the Panel's recommendations are carried out, the diplomatic functions of the present Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning will be reassigned to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

The Panel recognizes the difficulties in generating an effective international response to terrorism and politically inspired violence against diplomats. The effort, however, is urgently needed and should be pursued vigorously and imaginatively in both bilateral and multilateral exchanges. Further attempts should be made to close loopholes in international agreements, to refine the definition of terms where necessary, and to inspire a greater sense of international community to deal more effectively with those states publicly sponsoring or supporting terrorists.

The Department's operational security activities should be consolidated into a new Bureau for Diplomatic Security. It would be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, who would represent the Department of State in the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism as well as in other such committees or groups dealing with security and counter-terrorism issues. The emergency action planning program and the Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance program, both now part of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, would be relocated to the new bureau.

The principal element of the new bureau should be the Diplomatic Security Service, a consolidation of the present Office of Security, the Diplomatic Courier Service and certain other security functions currently performed elsewhere in the Department. The Panel also recommends that the security programs of the other principal foreign affairs agencies, AID and USIA, be consolidated as soon as practicable with the Diplomatic Security Service.

The Panel recommends a number of improvements in the Department's protective intelligence, threat analysis and alerting procedures. Additional resources must be dedicated to these activities. There must be improved coordination among various offices within the Department as well as with other agencies to assure the timely acquisition, evaluation and dissemination of accurate information relating to threats against our missions and personnel abroad or against those we are responsible for protecting in the United States.

The current division of responsibility between the U. S. Secret Service and the Department of State for protection of visiting foreign dignitaries will have to remain for the present. The Panel recommends, however, that this responsibility eventually be placed entirely with the Diplomatic Security Service. To prepare the latter for this expanded role, a working group of Secret Service and State Department security officials should be established to develop standards and procedures. Arrangements should be made for the Secret Service to provide protective training for agents of the Diplomatic Security Service on a reimbursable basis. There would be a program whereby agents of the two services are exchanged for full tours of duty. The Diplomatic Security Service should also develop a high threat response capability to support dignitary protection details in areas where local authorities do not have that capability.

The Department of State should negotiate with the Treasury Department and the U.S. Secret Service to expand the latter's current protection of foreign diplomatic and consular missions in Washington, D.C. to provide appropriate protective services to threatened foreign missions elsewhere in the United States. Should this course not succeed, the Panel recommends that the Department of State form its own office of trained personnel within the Diplomatic Security service to provide these services. Finally, the Diplomatic Security Service should acquire necessary additional resources to provide appropriate protection to the persons of threatened foreign diplomats resident in this country.

The Panel recommends improvements in the Department's current programs to inform and train Foreign Service personnel and dependents to deal more effectively with the hazards of terrorist and other forms of violence they might encounter.

The Panel recommends that contingency planning at the post level be improved. The Emergency Action Manual should be revised and published as soon as possible and the crisis management simulation exercise program should be expanded significantly.

Responsibility for the local guard programs at our posts abroad should be consolidated under the general direction of the Diplomatic Security Service, performance standards should be established, manuals should be prepared, and training, both for the guards themselves and for the program managers, should be upgraded substantially.

Marine Security Guard detachments should be assigned to all highly sensitive posts and to all embassies where conditions permit.

The Panel recommends that the Diplomatic Security Service complete the revision of the physical security standards to include state-of-the-art physical security concepts. These should include appropriate standards for ancillary facilities. They should also include guidelines for residential security and for the effective use of armored vehicles and other security equipment. The standards should provide minimum requirements for all posts and enhanced requirements as threat conditions increase. The standards and guidelines should be made available to all who might have use for them.

Security survey and inspection procedures should be improved and coordinated with other agencies, as appropriate, to provide comprehensive guidance to our missions abroad.

The Panel recommends that a substantial building program be undertaken to correct the security deficiencies of office buildings of the Department of State and the other foreign affairs agencies abroad. Some may be renovated to comply with minimum standards to meet currently anticipated hazards but others will have to be relocated to more secure sites. This program should be coordinated under the direction of the Office of Foreign Buildings. The other agencies should make their unique requirements known to that office and qualified security personnel from the Diplomatic Security Service should be detailed to FBO for security support.

The rebuilding program will be a substantial effort and will require substantially increased resources, personnel as well as funds. The Panel recommends that the budgetary problems that would inevitably delay such a massive project be avoided by adoption of a capital budgeting procedure.

The Panel recommends that those responsible for the various aspects of the security program, whether in the United States or

abroad, be held to a standard of accountability. A procedure should be established by which a board of inquiry is convened in the event of a security incident involving loss of life, grievous injury or massive property destruction due to terrorist or other violence.

The Panel has made a substantial number of additional recommendations which must remain classified. Given the ongoing espionage activities directed against our missions abroad and the steadily worsening climate of terrorism, we must not provide details which would be of potential aid to adversaries in exploiting existing weaknesses and shortages in U.S. facilities, procedures and personnel. The Panel anticipates that the detailed classified findings and recommendations will be made available to the overseeing committees of the Congress, and that the classified data will be provided requisite protection within the Executive and Legislative branches of our government.

THE THREAT

History of the Threat

From the earliest times, as societies sought to communicate with one another, there evolved a tradition of receiving foreign representatives with respect. Cicero noted, the inviolability of ambassadors is protected by divine and human law; they are sacred and respected so as to be inviolable-not only when in an allied country but also whenever they happen to be in the forces of the enemy. The tradition is recognized as critical to effective relations among states and has enjoyed virtually universal acceptance. As nations developed, the requirements of diplomatic immunity were embodied in the domestic laws of most states and the few who avoided doing so simply cited the universal acceptance of the principle as excusing the need for specific legislation.

This is not to suggest there were not abuses. But any abuse or insult offered a diplomat usually was dealt with swiftly and harshly. Individuals who dared such outrages were treated as criminals who had offended not only the person of the envoy and the sovereign who sent him but also the community in which the offense occurred. Penalties often included death. When the violator was the receiving ruler himself, the matter usually became a cause for war, although there were notable exceptions which simply served to strengthen the concept. Thus, when the King of the Ammonites abused the envoys of King David, sent to offer condolences on the death of the former's father, David ordered his armies against the Ammonites and their allies. On the other hand, in 490 B.C., when Darius of Persia dispatched messengers to Athens and Sparta to demand capitulation, the Greeks killed them in defiance of a tradition of respectful treatment even in such circumstances. Two Spartan nobles, shamed at the outrage committed by their countrymen, offered their own lives in expiation. Darius' successor, Xerxes, however, declined the gesture, saying he would not repeat the offense of the Greeks, and sent them home unharmed. He then set out to defeat the Greeks at Thermopylae and went on to sack Athens. Abuse of persons on diplomatic missions, even though fairly common, was the exception to the customary law of nations, at least until recently.

As the United States joined the family of nations, it accepted the well-developed concepts of international law, including diplomatic immunity. We fulfilled our responsibilities toward foreign representatives in this country assiduously, and when our own envoys suffered insult or injury, we expected and usually received appropriate apologies and redress. Occasionally, when local authorities abroad were unable or unwilling to provide protection or to apprehend offenders, we used military force to back up our legitimate demands. On a number of occasions we used Marines to capture offenders for trial by local courts or to carry out what was known as Consign punishment.

Although American officials and premises abroad suffered occasional violence of one sort or another, there was not until recently any real pattern of politically inspired violence. The years following World War II saw a trend to large, often violent demonstrations against embassies and the beginnings of state-directed harassment, again often violent, against diplomats assigned to Eastern Europe.

In the past fifteen years or so, while the older forms of abuse continued against American officials as well as those of other nations, newer, more violent tactics and weapons began to appear. Diplomats more and more frequently were subjected to kidnapping or murder attempts and not a few lost their lives. The international community sought to restate the traditional maxims concerning the inviolability of internationally protected persons, including diplomats, - but with little practical effect.

The assaults have become bloodier and the casualty toll higher. The fabric of international consensus has been strained as rogue states have entered the conflict, waging undeclared war by sponsoring and supporting terrorism against the diplomats of nations whose policies they oppose. In sum, what we have seen in recent years is an expansion of the threat from physical violence against diplomats -- often private, incidental, even furtive -- to the beginnings of calculated terror campaigns, psychological conflict waged by nation or sub-group against nation, with an ever-broadening range of targets, weapons and tactics.

Future of the Threat

There is a consensus within the government and among private scholars that terrorism will be with us for a long time. The approach and kind of specific attacks will constantly change as defensive measures are taken to meet them. The United States will be a principal target of this assault. The evolution of terrorist groups from single issue elements -- such as the PLO, IRA and Basque Separatists -- to state-sponsored terrorism will ensure continued attacks against the United States. Terrorism is an

inexpensive form of warfare, the aggression of choice by the weak against the strong, and has the advantage that sponsors can deny any connection with the perpetrators. The success of the Beirut bombings in creating problems for United States policy in Lebanon will assure further use of such means against us.

While attacks may occur anywhere, experts expect that the most terror prone regions will continue to be Western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. Although the Europeans have made some progress against indigenous terrorist groups, they still must cope with non-Europeans using European locales to hit at their non-European enemies. Some Europeans have had a tendency to look the other way as long as the terrorists attacked other foreigners. It is expected that terrorism will increase in the United States with attacks on senior officials and public buildings. There is a good possibility that states sponsored groups could have the financial and technical support to mount such attacks, but less likely that they could develop the complete infrastructure to mount other than one time 'spectacular' operations.

Robert B. Rupperman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a study prepared for the Panel noted:

"...we must accept that the tactics of terror do not remain static. As terrible as the big bombings now appear, the United States and other governments will eventually learn to cope with them (abroad, in any event, although perhaps not at home). At that point, terrorist tactics will be adapted in order to survive both physically and in the media's eye. The next natural set of terrorist tactics does not necessarily involve threats of biological or nuclear destruction. But, we may face intermediate-level attacks against our facilities and infrastructure of electric power, natural gas, water systems, computer and-telecommunications systems."

In his paper "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma, Brian M. Jenkins of The Rand Corporation noted:

"A growing number of governments themselves are using terrorist tactics, employing terrorist groups, or exploiting terrorist incidents as a mode of surrogate warfare. These governments see in terrorism a useful capability, a Weapons system, a cheap means of waging war. Terrorists fill a need. Modern conventional war is increasingly impractical. It is too destructive. It is too expensive. World and sometimes domestic opinion imposes constraints. Terrorists offer a possible alternative to open armed conflict. For some nations unable to mount a conventional military challenge, terrorism is an 'equalizer.'

"As we began to perceive 10 years ago, we may be on the threshold of an era of armed conflict in which limited conventional warfare, classic guerrilla warfare, and international terrorism will coexist, with both government and subnational entities employing them individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously, as well as being required to combat them."

"Warfare in the future may be less destructive than that in the first half of the twentieth century, but also less coherent. Warfare will cease to be finite. The distinction between war and peace will dissolve. Armed conflict will not be confined by national frontiers. Local belligerents will mobilize foreign patrons. Terrorists will attack foreign targets both at home and abroad. The U.S. will have to develop capabilities to deal with all three modes of armed conflict."

All expert testimony available indicates that terrorism will continue to pose serious problems throughout the world in the foreseeable future. The prospects for totally preventing such attacks are not good. It also must be emphasized that no amount of money can guarantee complete protection against terrorism. If determined, well-trained and funded teams are seeking to do damage, they will eventually succeed. However, there are a number of prudent steps that can be taken to minimize the probability of a successful or damaging terrorist attack, and these are the main themes of the Panel's deliberations. Among the steps that can be explored are the following:

- motivating governments to reach agreement on actions to isolate and punish the states sponsoring terrorism;
- improving our own intelligence collection and dissemination and building effective cooperation on this level with our allies;
- improving the security of our buildings and facilities by expending additional resources; and
- finding a way to change attitudes of our personnel to promote constant vigilance. Prudence, protection and preparedness should become automatic with all personnel.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Introduction

Background

The Department's security mission and the organizations to carry it out have evolved largely in reaction to perceived threats and related needs. Actual response usually has been somewhat ahead of the institutional curve but organizational units have been established, almost on a patchwork basis, to meet at least the major hazards and added responsibilities.

The Office of Security and security officers abroad have long been involved in the protection of our buildings, classified information, and personnel against the intelligence threat and, as physical violence became more common, from that hazard as well. For years, the Office of Foreign Buildings and the Office of Communications had primary responsibilities only remotely concerned with physical security. As hazards of hostile intelligence penetration, mob violence, and civil disorder grew, each office had to give greater attention to such matters as improved physical standards for communications centers in our posts abroad, enhanced radio capabilities, especially for emergency communications, and similar needs.

In 1973, a high-level office was established to deal specifically with issues of counter-terrorism, including policy formulation. This office became the Office for Combating Terrorism in 1976, and more recently was given responsibility for emergency action planning, which for years had been lodged elsewhere in the Department. The office is now known as the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning.

In 1980, another unit was established to manage the massive Security Enhancement Program initiated that year to effect substantial physical security improvements against mob violence at our most vulnerable posts. Known as the Special Projects and Liaison Staff, it reported directly to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, while coordinating with the other organizational units dealing with such matters. That office recently was abolished as a separate unit, and its functions were absorbed into the Office of Security and the several other organizations which initially had contributed to its staff.

Between 1973 and 1984 four separate requests for funds for special security programs were approved by the Congress.

The Public Access Control Program. In response to the growing number and intensity of terrorist attacks against American Foreign Service missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a counterterrorism program was conceived and justified to Congress in 1973.- The program was intended to counter the increasing threat of Embassy takeovers, such as that by a terrorist group at Kuala Lumpur in 1975, and was programmed initially for the posts of highest risk. It was designed initially to improve public access controls at entrances, lobbies and areas where large numbers of the public transacted business at our missions, such as visa operations. During Fiscal Years 1980 through 1985, \$136.3 million was appropriated for the Public Access Control program.

The Security Enhancement Program. With the violent mob assaults on our embassies at Teheran, Islamabad and Tripoli in late 1979 and the demonstrated inability or unwillingness of some foreign governments to provide effective protection to our missions abroad, it was necessary to initiate major improvements at a number of posts to increase security against this threat. The Security Enhancement Program was established to deal with this escalating threat. The objective was to provide better protection to mission personnel, U.S. Government property, and classified information at those posts deemed most vulnerable to uncontrolled mob violence. During Fiscal Years 1980 through 1985, \$136.3 million was appropriated for this program.

The Special Projects and Liaison Staff, reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, was established to manage the program. Teams of experts on the full range of security needs were sent abroad to survey posts and to recommend the necessary improvements. The Bureau of Administration's Offices of Foreign Buildings, Communications, Security, and Foreign Affairs Information Management all participated in this effort.

The 1982 Security Supplemental. In response to a series of kidnapping and assassination attempts against United States military and diplomatic officials in Europe, the Congress, in 1982, approved a supplemental budget primarily for security improvements at the European posts. The funds, which totaled \$48.9 million, were intended to cover an additional 40 public access control projects (\$13 million); additional protective equipment for officials abroad and "flyaway" packages for rapid-response security support personnel and equipment to cope with specific security crises (\$10 million); additional radio's (\$3.5 million); additional physical security improvements administered by the Office of Foreign Buildings (\$17.7 million); and funds to contract for needed personnel investigations thus freeing as many as 32 security officers for protective security assignments (\$4.2 million).

FY-1985 Security Supplemental. In September 1984, after a series of damaging suicide vehicle bombings against United States installations in the Middle East culminated with the second attack against the Embassy at Beirut, the Department submitted a request for \$366 million and 247 additional positions. The appropriation was requested in two stages, with \$110 million immediately and the remainder to be handled as a supplemental budget request in January 1985. The funds are intended for three basic objectives: strengthening existing programs, construction of new embassies to replace those that cannot be adequately strengthened, and necessary research and development. The legislation also included funds for the first reward program for information on terrorism. The Congress has approved the \$110 million, and the President has signed it into law. The second part of the request currently is pending.

The Department's security organization today consists of almost 800 employees assigned to half a dozen different units plus an additional 1,200 Marines and 115 U.S. Navy Seabees. Substantial increases in all three categories have been requested. Most of the security responsibilities are centralized in the Department's Office of Security, an element of the Bureau of Administration and Security. Some functions, however, are entrusted to the Office of Communications, the Office of Foreign Buildings, and the Informations Systems Security Staff, all within the Bureau of Administration and Security, and, as noted above, to the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, reporting to the Under Secretary for Management. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reporting directly to the Secretary, also has responsibilities regarding terrorism. The total security budget, \$129 million in 1984, is expected to triple in the next year or so.

The somewhat haphazard growth in the Department's response to terrorism, while not unreasonable, still has not produced effective results. Moreover, the resources currently devoted to all security related functions have now reached a level that it makes sense to review where we are and where we expect to go, and then to structure an organization calculated to achieve those goals.

The Office of Security

The Office of Security, the principal organization involved in security operations, has approximately 450 professional security officers divided roughly a third each among its headquarters in Washington, nine field offices throughout the United States, and the American missions abroad. Those agents assigned to the field offices perform two major functions, protection of visiting foreign dignitaries and investigations, background investigations for security clearance as well as certain criminal investigations of primary concern to the Department of State. The officers abroad perform a full range of security services, including physical security inspections, training of mission personnel and dependents in security procedures, personnel and other investigations, contingency planning, liaison with local police and security authorities, supervision of guards, and technical penetration counter-measures programs. By formal agreement the officers abroad also perform security services for AID, USIA and most of the other foreign affairs agencies. The 150 or so officers are assigned to about 80 of the 262 foreign service posts. Most serve several posts, hence are known as Regional Security Officers. Those posts without a Regional Security Officer designate some other officer, customarily the Administrative Officer, to serve as a nonprofessional Post Security Officer.

New agents are appointed at the junior officer level, Foreign Service Specialist Class 7 (roughly equivalent to grade GS-7 in the Civil Service). They must acquire tenure within four years by earning the recommendation of an independent tenuring board. A "career ladder" concept permits administrative promotion, subject to time in class and satisfactory performance, to the grade of Foreign Service Specialist, Class 4 (about GS-11). Promotion to the journeyman level, Specialist Class 3 (about the GS-12 level), depends upon recommendation by an independent Foreign Service Selection Board. After that, promotions depend on available "headroom" and recommendation by Selection Boards using "precepts" or criteria developed by the Department's Office of Personnel.

Professional security officers begin their careers with two or three tours of duty in the United States, usually in field offices with occasional assignments to the headquarters staff, after which they are sent abroad for two or more tours. They then return to the United States. The basic career pattern is that all are expected to be completely mobile, eventually able to serve in any of the major areas of activity. Training consists of 15 weeks of instruction for new agents, given by Office of Security instructors in both Washington and at the combined Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia. A 10 week course of instruction is also offered to those officers preparing for service abroad. Other instruction consists of quarterly firearms requalification, language instruction, as appropriate, and occasional specialized seminars and refresher courses.

The Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning

The second major organization dealing with terrorism is the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning. It is headed by an officer of Ambassadorial rank who reports directly to the Under Secretary for Management. Its principal functions include developing and recommending policies to counter international terrorism as it may affect U.S. interests and personnel abroad and serving as the principal U.S. point of contact with foreign governments on terrorism matters, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Director has primary operational responsibility in the event of a terrorist incident abroad involving U.S. citizens or other interests. He chairs the National Security Council's Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and also sits on the Terrorism Incident Working Group (TIWG) chaired by a National Security Council staff member.

Although primarily a policy shaping office, its duties since its predecessor's establishment in the early 1970s have evolved over time to include more and more operational responsibilities. Currently the Office monitors intelligence reports concerning terrorism to assure that appropriate alerts are disseminated. This office manages the Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance program and recently was given responsibility for the emergency action plan program, including monitoring post compliance with contingency planning requirements. It has developed an impressive emergency action simulation exercise program. Aside from the mix of policy and operational responsibilities, the most obvious problem confronting the office is a serious lack of personnel adequate to give the various functions, such as the simulation program, the attention they deserve. The Panel understands there may have been some difficulty attracting highly qualified Foreign Service Officers to the unit due to a perception, however misguided, that such duty is not "career enhancing."

The diplomatic functions of this office essentially are of a political nature and should be carried out under the general direction of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Clearly there is an urgent need for a major and sustained diplomatic effort if this nation is to succeed in its goal of countering international terrorism. The Panel concludes that logic dictates the separation of the substantive diplomatic and policy activities from those of an operational nature. By placing each within a more compatible organizational framework, the effectiveness of each function is enhanced.

Other Departmental Offices with a Security Role

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) conducts liaison with the Intelligence Community for the Department of State, represents it on various interdepartmental intelligence groups, and directs research and analysis on terrorism as well as other matters. Additionally, in July 1984, INR established a terrorism section of the regular INR watch to maintain continuous monitoring of all terrorist activity on a worldwide basis, to ensure rapid briefing and distribution of intelligence materials, and to maintain continuous liaison on terrorism with other Intelligence Community agencies. This watch is staffed 24 hours a day by officers who maintain continuous coverage of terrorist developments and who are responsible for alerting the Office of Security, the Office for Combating Terrorism and Emergency Planning, and other offices to terrorism intelligence.

Other offices of the Department of State with a significant role in security policies and programs include the Office of Foreign Buildings with major responsibilities regarding physical security of official premises abroad, the Office of Communications which is responsible for communications security and the Diplomatic Courier Service, the five regional bureaus, and the overseas posts themselves. Each of these elements controls resources (both personnel and funding) that are used to support and carry out various security programs overseas.

Summary of Recent Studies, Inspections, and Audits

In its deliberations the Panel reviewed eight major studies of the Department's security program that were done in the past three years. They ranged from audits by the General Accounting Office to a comprehensive examination by the Department's Inspector General, and included one study by an ad hoc team of highly qualified Foreign Service Officers, one by a House subcommittee staff and two by an outside management consultant. Although some limited their attention to certain aspects of the security program, all seemed in general agreement on several points. The Panel's own interviews with various officials in Washington and at posts abroad confirm the consensus represented by the following points:

- perceptions by posts abroad, by others within the Department of State and by outside agencies that there is confusion in (1) the organizational structure intended to carry out the Department's security and counter-terrorism responsibilities, (2) funding for security needs, (3) security standards, especially when successive survey teams visiting posts abroad make contradictory recommendations, and (4) the whole intelligence analysis and alerting procedure;
- inordinate delays in effecting physical security improvements;
- unnecessary and time-consuming disagreements concerning physical security improvements;
- difficulty in tracking security costs;
- losing reasonable budget requests due to inadequate justification;
- the rather frequent recommendation that internal communications be improved, including suggestions that certain supervisors make greater efforts to communicate with their staffs;
- the perception among certain security officers that the investigative and protective functions are in hostile competition for manpower resources;
- officer "burnout" and other symptoms of inadequate attention to staffing needs, including "gyrating" recruitment cycles for new officer personnel, which place incredible strains on the recruitment and training processes;
- seriously insufficient training; and
- a narrow perception of mission, as exemplified by failure to provide timely notice of threat information relating to personnel or facilities of AID and USIA, and an apparent inability on State's part to provide adequate personal communications equipment to USIA personnel abroad (AID manages its own program).

Summary of Problems

The Panel has concluded that the principal reasons for organizational ineffectiveness in the Department's security programs are dispersion of responsibility, a dramatically increasing workload, gross understaffing with a consequent inability to train properly, and a general loss of control over resources and priorities.

The State Department's organization and the chain of command to cope with the myriad security problems, old, new, and emerging, as in the case of its physical structures, were not designed to meet threats which have evolved. As a result, the organization and chain of command have not met the test of today's problems and may not adequately cope with new problems as they emerge.

Overall organization for security activities has become complicated by the proliferation of special offices and separate budgets for specific programs. As the threat has grown, the budgets and the staffs also have grown, but never sufficiently to keep pace with the increasing clamor for material, services, and professional attention. The results have been overlapping and confusing responsibility and a series of bureaucratic battles.

Dignitary protection, which responds to workload demands largely beyond the control of the Department or the Office of Security, necessarily requires a higher priority than investigative work. The protective workload is somewhat unpredictable. While difficult, it is not impossible to anticipate protective demands and to staff for them, which the Office of Security has attempted to do. One principal problem is that the demand tends to be rather cyclical and becomes enormous at times, such as when the United Nations' annual General Assembly attracts many foreign ministers to the United States. A second major problem is a high vacancy rate among security agents. For the entire Office of Security this amounted to about twelve percent in 1984, but that figure tells only a small part of the story. The principal burden of the shortfall was felt in the field offices, which provide manpower for investigations and protection of visiting dignitaries. For several years, no new recruits were brought on board, in spite of increasing vacancy rates. As recently as the Fall of 1984, the field offices suffered roughly a 16 percent vacancy rate. The Department and the Office of Security in 1984 began to hire again but recovery will be slow. At present, the rate is about 10 percent. For a fuller appreciation of the significance of this chronic understaffing, it should be understood that the Panel believes the current field office complement of agents should be more than doubled to 395 to permit the Office of Security to meet its current protective and investigative responsibilities.

Understaffing has meant the agents have had to work longer hours with inadequate relief, enduring unusual stress and potentially compromising the safety of those they are assigned to protect.

The most significant victim of the chronic understaffing has been the training program. Training clearly is critical to an organization as dispersed geographically and functionally as the Office of Security. Inadequate training has contributed to certain operational deficiencies that evoke negative perceptions among the agencies performing comparable missions and even in the eyes of the Office's principal constituency, the Foreign Service. The value of training and experience-building career assignments should be obvious to all. Training should be considered a significant part of the work "product" and calculated directly into staffing needs.

There are major structural weaknesses within the Office of Security and in its relationship to other parts of the Department as well as to other agencies performing similar or related duties. Its position within the hierarchy of the Department of State has created a perception among other security and law enforcement agencies that the Department does not take its security responsibilities very seriously. This, in turn, may well account for what appears to be a lack of cooperation by those agencies with the Department's security officials. Further, the organization has little, if any, control over the resources, personnel as well as funds, needed to carry out its responsibilities and it has almost no control over the priorities relating to either.

Discussion

The Panel concluded that there must be a substantial re-alignment of the Department's security responsibilities. Accordingly, the Panel offers the following recommendations that are intended to provide a disciplined, well-informed, confident and resourceful professional corps of officers to deal with the unique challenges of the next decade. If carried through, these improvements should instill a sense of pride and esprit de corps among these officers, without insulating them from those they serve and without losing sight of the fact that sound security practices are but the means to an effective foreign policy

Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security

The Department should establish an Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. He or she will be the principal officer of a new Diplomatic Security Service and should report to the Under Secretary for Management. The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, ideally, should be of chief of mission stature and should have strong management experience. He or she should be an effective link between the new service and its principal constituencies, the Department and the Foreign Service. The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security should chair the Inter-Departmental Group on Terrorism and represent the Department on other appropriate committees. The emergency action planning program, the simulation exercise program, and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, all operational functions, should be attached to the Assistant Secretary's office.

Diplomatic Security Service

The Department should establish a Diplomatic Security Service to include the functions now performed by the Office of Security plus certain additional functions as discussed below. Principal functions should include the following:

Security operations, foreign and domestic, including those now performed by the Office of Security, plus certain operations now performed elsewhere, such as diplomatic couriers (see below). Increase emphasis on security inspections of official premises abroad (physical surveys), with greater attention to tactical vulnerabilities from an assailant's perspective, and make greater use of joint surveys with other agency security specialists where appropriate.

Engineering services, to include the present technical security programs of the Office of Security, with increased emphasis on a re-vitalized countermeasures program, plus certain functions now lodged elsewhere, such as those responsibilities of the Office of Communications dealing with the radio program for the protective security officers in the United States as well as the personal security radios used at posts abroad. The Engineering Services unit should continue to manage its other current programs, including those dealing with intrusion alarms and armored cars.

Investigations, including personnel security clearance, malfeasance, passport fraud, and other criminal investigations of concern to the Department. While the FBI or other agencies could conduct the criminal investigations, the Panel is persuaded that no agency outside the Department will give many of these cases the priority attention the Department believes is required. The Department's agents have conducted these inquiries for decades and, although additional training is warranted, they have the basic skills and authority to continue. Due to the increasingly violent nature of passport law violators, a phenomenon of recent years, the Department's agents should be granted the legal authority to serve warrants, to arrest, and to carry firearms while conducting these criminal investigations. Legislation to this end is now pending in the Congress. The agents now carry firearms only while protecting dignitaries. They have comprehensive written standards and effective training programs governing the use of firearms.

Protection and dignitaries, including the Secretary of State, visiting foreign dignitaries, and resident foreign missions. The Secret Service and the Treasury Department have indicated at this time they would strongly resist any effort to have them assume protective responsibility for foreign visitors other than Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, and others specifically designated by the President. To preserve important foreign policy interests and to assure the United States fulfills its international obligations in these matters, the Department must continue to assure the appropriate protection of all visiting foreign officials and resident diplomats. The Department currently has the statutory authority to do so but has not funded and staffed the program adequately. The level of professional expertise of its protective agents needs substantial improvement. A major effort is required to improve the quality of this program, and recommendations to this end are included elsewhere in this report.

Management services, to include personnel management, budget and fiscal, and procurement specialists, as well as an in-house automated data processing system, and an enhanced training staff. The Diplomatic Security Service must be granted more effective control over its resources, including greater flexibility in setting and controlling priorities. It should manage its own personnel system, conforming with Departmental and Federal Government personnel policies. It should prepare, justify, and defend its own budget and manage its own financial resources under the guidance of the Department's Comptroller, who must be involved in the process. It must have the ability to control the priorities of its logistical requests.

The procurement staff, whether located within the Diplomatic Security Service or in the Department's present procurement office, should be adequate in numbers and skill to handle the task. The Panel is aware that Departmental inspections in 1979, and again in 1983, recommended increases in the staff of the procurement office's contract branch. The Department should give this matter priority attention to assure that staffing deficiencies cannot impair the timely provision of critical security equipment and improvements. If the staffing needs cannot be met adequately, the Diplomatic Security Service should be granted authority to maintain its own procurement program, with technical advice provided by a procurement specialist detailed to the Diplomatic Security Service.

A program information staff must maintain data concerning workload and the use of manpower, costs, the status of such projects as security surveys, major security construction or retrofits, emergency plans, the status of investigations, and similar data required by the security managers, including those preparing and justifying budget requests. The maintenance of adequate workload data is so critical to the budget process that a senior officer of the Office of the Comptroller should be detailed to work with the Diplomatic Security Service to identify data to be maintained and to aid in developing procedures to assure that such data is acquired and used effectively.

Director of the Diplomatic Security Service

The Director of the new organization should be professionally qualified both in security or law enforcement and in management, and should be selected by the Secretary of State. The position should be open to any qualified person, including those from the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service. He or she should serve at the Secretary's pleasure.

Diplomatic Courier Service

The Diplomatic Courier Service, currently under the Office of Communications, is essentially a security service with a long and proud tradition. Always of critical importance to the integrity of the Department's non-electronic communications with the posts abroad, it has taken on added security significance in the light of increased activity by the hostile intelligence services. It should be situated in a closer relationship with the Diplomatic Security Service in order that the officers of both can benefit from the feedback in information concerning foreign intelligence penetration efforts. It is also appropriate that it be so established as to

retain its historical identity. Courier staffing should be increased to permit two couriers for each run in Eastern Europe or other high threat areas or on any run involving more than a minimum load that can be transported securely by one person.

Training

The Diplomatic Security Service must embark on a much more ambitious and consistent training program. All training requirements should be identified, including the various basic programs, language training and Security Attaché training for officers going abroad, in-service and refresher courses, and other short-term courses for all.

Allowing for variations in possible training needs, the Panel believes that as much as 12 to 15 percent of a security agent's time, on the average, should be devoted to training. Moreover, there is a substantial body of case law imposing liability on governmental agencies for the misfeasance or nonfeasance of personnel who have not been adequately trained. Training time should be factored into the calculations of staffing needs.

The Diplomatic Security Service must give much greater attention to the publication of professional materials for the training of its agents. If the concept of complete mobility of assignment is accepted, there is all the more reason that appropriate instructional material, including lessons learned the hard way, be available to all. Given the wide availability of computers and video recorders, "correspondence" type courses for those not in the Washington area should be prepared. Other forms of training should include field exercises and simulations.

Specific training requirements should be established as prerequisites for certain assignments and for promotion to certain grade levels. Instructors should be trained as such, for example, and no one should be promoted above the journeyman level without having appropriate supervisory or management training. Those aspiring to senior levels of responsibility should have extensive management training.

Managerial development

These security programs have grown so large in scope, with massive commitments of personnel and money, and requiring such extensive coordination with a multitude of other Federal agencies, that a special effort is required to impart state-of-the-art managerial skills to those now serving as division chiefs or likely to do so in the near future. Greater use should be made of the management training opportunities currently available through the Foreign Service Institute and other training programs of the Federal Government.

Staffing and recruitment

The Diplomatic Security Service should ascertain its total staffing needs, taking into consideration such factors as the need for full staffing of certain positions abroad, the availability of contractor back-up, training requirements, and the anticipated rate of departures for whatever reason, including retirements. It should then maintain a recruitment program calculated to fill its staffing needs on a steady basis, avoiding the wildly fluctuating cycles of vacancies and recruitment that have characterized the past few years.

The Diplomatic Security Service should continue the current practice of recruiting new agents through the Department's Board of Examiners, with substantial participation by the Diplomatic Security Service in both preparation of the examining process and as examiners. From time to time qualified officials of the Office of Personnel, with participation of the Diplomatic Security Service, should validate the recruitment standards and criteria to ascertain whether they, in fact, produce the qualities critical to success in the security specialty. A comprehensive validation procedure should also include "exit" interviews with agents and officers who leave the Diplomatic Security Service for whatever reason prior to retirement. These interviews should be designed to reveal any significant problems in the personnel system as applied to the Diplomatic Security Service.

Career structure

Career category

The Secretary should establish a separate career category identified as Foreign Service Special Agent. The grade structure and the retirement system should continue to conform to those of the present Foreign Service specialist category. With a few exceptions for identified specialties such as intelligence analysts, all agents and officers, including the Diplomatic Couriers, should be in this single system, whether serving in the United States or abroad. Mobility is paramount, as is the ability of the Assistant Secretary and the Director, to select their own senior officers. All management positions, i.e., division or staff chief and above, other than the administrative specialists to be assigned to the management services element of the Diplomatic Security Service, should be in this system. It is vital that substantially all officers compete within the same program.

Career Pattern

The present practice of recruiting security agents to serve initially in the dual function of dignitary protection and investigations should be retained. The officers to be assigned abroad should be drawn from the pool of domestic agents who have served two or three tours in the United States and who have met certain training and other prerequisites to be established, and who have been recommended for foreign duty by a panel convened for that purpose by the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service.

Mobility

The Diplomatic Security Service should have the authority to assign personnel, whether within the United States or abroad, as the needs of the service and the skills and qualities of the individual officers demand. Subject to the constraints of current law and Departmental policies, the Director should have the authority to break or curtail assignments for the needs of the service.

Promotions

A performance rating procedure and form specifically tailored to the needs of the security program should be developed. Even though security personnel may follow the same grade system used by other Foreign Service personnel, their journeyman, mid-level and senior levels, peak at grades and with requisite skills and qualities different from those of other functions and specialties. The recruitment criteria (known as ASAP's, a knowledge, skills, abilities and personal characteristics) designed for officers up to the journeyman, mid-level, should be reviewed and evaluated against the needs of management level security officers, and revised as needed for the higher grades.

Training and experience prerequisites should be established for various grade levels and assignments, including the tenure threshold, supervisory assignments, mid-level, and senior management positions, especially at the Class 1 level.

The tenuring process should be made a more rigorous testing procedure, and only those agents whose records demonstrate clear potential for success should be granted tenure.

Diplomatic Security Service officers detailed to other offices within the Department or to other agencies and Security Attaches abroad should be rated by those offices and agencies, following the Department's current procedures in this regard, but the Diplomatic Security Service should provide input using specially designed rating forms covering professional skills.

Eligibility for promotion to the specified grade levels should be expanded beyond the single time in class criterion used now to include these prerequisites, as appropriate.

The Diplomatic Security Service should continue to present its candidates for promotion to the independent Foreign Service selection board system, but it should make greater effort to focus on and document those skills and qualities critical to success in this function and at the particular grade level. The precepts for the selection boards considering security personnel should also be carefully tailored to the requirements of the security program and particularly to its managerial needs. The Department should include qualified public members or officials of other agencies involved in security or law enforcement on those selection boards considering security personnel.

As the Diplomatic Security Service is established, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, and the Director of the new organization should determine the allocation of positions at the Class 2 level and above. Any changes thereafter should be effected only in accord with current Departmental policies and procedures. The Diplomatic Security Service should be granted authority to determine promotional vacancies to be filled in any given year and, particularly, the positions at grades 2 and above, the heart of its management. Granting that there are valid reasons for not filling all available grade vacancies every year, it appears that the present security organization has been at considerable disadvantage in obtaining promotions into these grade levels. This has had a significant demoralizing impact on those officers who actually run the program as well as on those at lower grades who perceive a lack of opportunity to earn promotion.

Functional titles

Officers within the United States should be identified as Special Agents, as at present. Those assigned abroad, following the example of Legal Attaches and certain other specialists, should be identified functionally as Security Attaches. This is the most descriptive, least confusing functional title, at least from the point of view of foreigners and others outside the security program. Diplomatic titles should continue to be conferred in accord with current Departmental regulations.

Supervision aboard

At present the seven Associate Directors of Security assigned abroad to supervise the Regional Security Officers have no direct operational role. They inspect the security offices during periodic visits and keep themselves fully informed about all matters affecting the security of all posts in their areas. They do not channel work assignments to the security offices but do counsel the officers, as appropriate, and will step in to represent the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security in certain crisis situations. The only apparent issue raised during the present study is whether they should continue to perform and report periodic formal inspections of the security offices or whether they should merely fill an advisory role, as suggested in one of the eight studies. Apparently the feeling is that the crises encountered more and more frequently tend to interfere with an orderly schedule of inspections. It is the Panel's recommendation that the Diplomatic Security Service maintain the present system whereby the Associate Directors of Security not only counsel and train, as appropriate, but also conduct periodic inspections of the security offices in their areas. Whatever can be done to minimize the burden, consistent with continued reporting, should be attempted, such as by reducing the schedule for certain grades of officers who have already long demonstrated their competence or by reducing the reporting format, though not the scope of the inspection itself. The Associate Directors of Security cannot and should

not be placed in the direct operational chain of command.

The Diplomatic Security Service, in cooperation with appropriate Departmental officials, should develop criteria to determine whether, at a given post abroad, the Security Attaché shall report to the Administrative Officer or to the Deputy Chief of Mission. The Panel is aware that there are different schools of thought on this matter and suspects that the proponents of each position may well have specific situations in mind that logically dictated one choice over the other. As more Security Attaches are assigned abroad, particularly to smaller missions, it may be very appropriate that they report to the Administrative Officer. On the other hand, at a medium sized, high threat post, the Security Attaché, by force of circumstances, may well work much more closely with the Deputy Chief of Mission, thus making that reporting channel all the more logical.

Details and exchange assignments

To improve the overall performance of the security program, the Diplomatic Security Service should assure the broadest possible contact with agencies having related or comparable responsibilities. It would be appropriate to continue to invite representatives of the AID and USIA security offices to attend periodic staff meetings of the Service, as they are now doing, as well as officers from other appropriate agencies. Physical security specialists should be detailed to the Office of Foreign Buildings, and a representative of the Office of Foreign Buildings should be invited to those sessions of the Overseas Security Policy Group dealing with security matters affecting or affected by our facilities abroad. Billets to be staffed with officers of the Diplomatic Security Service should be established in certain functional bureaus and offices within the Department, including the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Office of the Comptroller, and all five regional bureaus. In addition, the Secretary should offer to detail liaison officers to AID and USIA pending consolidation. The Department should also explore the possibility of exchange programs with the Secret Service and other appropriate agencies, ideally at the Deputy Division Chief or Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge level.

Inspections

It is recommended that the Department invite recognized professionals from other agencies or from the public sector to participate with the Inspector General in examining certain functions of the Department's security organization. Specifically, protection, criminal investigations, training, audio countermeasures, and physical security standards, at the least, should benefit from the independent scrutiny of experts in those fields working in concert with the Inspector General. The Inspector General may now have authority to request the assistance of such outside experts but it may require legislative authority.

A second opportunity for improving a "oversight" concerns the effectiveness of inter-agency committees or groups. Many of these entities, including several dealing with security issues, perform very valuable services. It would be wise, in establishing any such group of a more or less enduring nature, to agree also on an inspection mechanism. The goal would be to improve effectiveness, and the mechanism should be constructed with that objective in mind.

Clarification of organizational responsibilities

Once the foregoing restructuring has been effected, the Department should issue an updated comprehensive instruction defining responsibilities of all organizational elements having any security or counter-terrorism responsibilities at home or abroad. This should also include the Chief of Mission or Principal Officer, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Administrative Officer and the Security Attaché at posts abroad, and the Associate Directors of Security. As appropriate, specific requirements for intra-Departmental coordination should be identified, as should the functions of internal and interagency standing committees dealing with security matters. This publication will be an important element of the Department's effort to inspire a heightened sense of accountability.

Consolidation of security Programs of Foreign Affairs agencies

The Panel is of the firm opinion that consolidation of the security programs of the major foreign affairs agencies, notably the Department of State, AID, and USIA, is logical and in the national interest. Such a consolidation would assure a uniform approach to security standards and criteria, allowing for the unique requirements of each agency, and would be more cost-effective. The Panel recognizes, however, that the development of the new Diplomatic Security Service and the implementation of other recommendations offered in this report will take time and considerable energy to effect. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security establish a working group with appropriate officials of State and the other agencies to develop a plan for the consolidation as rapidly as practicable of the security services of the foreign affairs agencies. The group should identify goals and objectives, performance standards, resources available and required, and the mechanics of consolidation, including legislative needs, if any.

The Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program

This program, currently located in the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, has a logical compatibility with either the diplomatic function or with the more operational, depending upon whether the foreign officials involved are at the ministerial level or at the tactical level. The principal long term benefits can be expected to accrue at our embassies abroad at both the political and the operational levels. The most effective resolution would seem to be to establish a joint working group to coordinate these training programs in such a way as to offer the best possible training for foreign officials in the United States as well as to gain maximum continuing liaison abroad with both political leaders and working level officials. The Assistant

Secretary for Diplomatic Security should manage the program, coordinating closely with the office responsible for diplomatic action against international terrorism.

Resource implications

Estimating the numbers of additional personnel these recommendations might require is complicated by the fact that the Department of State currently is in the midst of justifying increases in both positions and funds to accomplish security objectives set independently of the Panel's recommendations, but which, in some respects, dovetail with them. Certain of the functions to be merged into the Diplomatic Security Service, such as the Courier Service, the personal security radio program and some of the management support functions, will bring positions, personnel and budgets with them, with no significant increase.

The principal increases due solely to these recommendations relate to staffing the domestic field offices properly and to training. The Panel estimates the Diplomatic Security Service must just about double its present complement of field office agents to meet its currently anticipated obligations to protect visiting foreign dignitaries and to carry out its other responsibilities. Training, which has been very sadly neglected, must be increased dramatically for all security personnel. The Panel estimates that the new Diplomatic Security Service will require 1,156 officers at home and abroad to carry out all of the recommendations in this report. The proposed increases are not as large as they seem, however. The Department is already seeking something more than 100 new positions and 110 currently exist elsewhere and would merely be moved with their functions into the new organization.

The net effect of the Panel's organizational recommendations, therefore, is for 375 additional officer positions, all but 20 for the Diplomatic Security Service. The estimated cost for all is in the range of \$30 million.

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Secretary of State's Advisory Panel Report on Overseas Security

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF RISK

Accountability

Examples in which a known mechanism and procedure exist to deal with systemic or individual failures resulting in loss of life or property damage indicate the desirability of such defined procedures. In the law-enforcement community, the armed forces, and such institutions as the National Transportation Safety Board, clear-cut established procedures are helpful in permitting a fair, orderly, expeditious analysis of the facts and circumstances.

On an interim basis, the Panel recommended that Foreign Service Regulations be promulgated to require the Secretary of State to convene a Board of Inquiry with powers of establishing accountability in all cases involving terrorism or security related attacks that result in significant damage and/or casualties to United States personnel or property..

The Panel is pleased to note that the Secretary of State accepted that recommendation.

However, on further consideration, the Panel believes this issue to be of sufficient importance that a statutory basis for accountability should be considered. The Panel, therefore, has included in its report to the Secretary a draft bill that combines the grievance procedure with the accountability requirement in such a way as to protect the individual while serving the Department's broader interests.

Acceptance of Risk

The Department of State has developed programs designed to inform all personnel about the hazards posed by terrorism and other forms of physical violence, including criminal activities, and to train them in ways to protect themselves. From the recruiting brochure, which makes passing reference to the fact that Overseas service may involve security risks to personnel and their families to a full day orientation program devoted solely to security considerations, continual efforts are made to prepare personnel for the hazards they may face abroad. In addition, security concerns, guidelines for personal awareness and conduct, contingency planning and similar matters are discussed in some detail where appropriate in the many training courses offered by the Department's Foreign Service Institute. These include orientation and training programs for Chiefs of Mission, for Deputy Chiefs of Mission, for Administrative Officers, the Basic and Mid-Level Officer training courses, emergency action simulations, and a variety of orientation programs.

The results so far, however, seem to be mixed. While most personnel take the situation seriously and conduct themselves accordingly, there is reason to believe some seem to think "It can't happen to me". Too many employees assigned abroad, aware that political violence is endemic in some parts of the world, seem to disregard it as a personal hazard, especially if they are not posted to one of the crisis areas.

The Panel recognizes that it is extremely difficult to inspire and to sustain a high degree of security awareness and sensitivity, particularly when most of us are seldom if ever directly exposed to violence. Yet, in view of the increasing incidence of terrorism and, more significantly, the increasingly grave impact of such events on our foreign policy objectives, the Department must increase its efforts to sensitize all personnel to this problem. Recruitment literature, for example, such as the brochure, Foreign

Service Careers, should include a more graphic description of the hazards of political violence to our personnel abroad and of the significant additional responsibilities and stresses this places on them.

Orientation of Personnel

The Department of State's Foreign Service Institute offers a one day seminar on "Coping with Violence". The program is mandatory for all employees of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency. It is also open on a voluntary basis to their dependents as well as to employees and dependents of other agencies. Some spouses and adult dependents not resident in the Washington, D.C., area do not benefit from this program, however. The spouses of the Regional Marine Officers, the Marine Non-Commissioned Officers-in-Charge and the Navy Seabees, for example, do not always travel to this area for training. Given the importance of the matter, the Department should arrange to offer the Coping with Violence seminar and appropriate area orientation to all such dependents and at Departmental expense.

The program in Washington is but one part of a series of presentations on this general subject, the second major part being a "post-specific" orientation given all personnel after their arrival at post. As noted above, the subject is also covered in somewhat lesser detail in various other training and orientation programs but these two are the principal vehicles for this particular training.

Recent observation of the Washington portion of the program found it to be generally well presented and well received. The audience came away better prepared for the hazards of various forms of violence, including terrorism, which they and their families may experience abroad. There were a few minor gaps in the presentation and the observer's comments were passed on to the Foreign Service Institute and to the Office of Security.

The Washington portion of this training should be expanded at least by an additional half day. Further, the Panel recommends that all U.S. Government employees being assigned to diplomatic missions abroad and their adult dependents be required to attend, unless their own agencies offer comparable programs. It is also recommended that personnel destined for high threat posts be offered the Hands on. training in firearms and evasive driving that was given in the past. Finally, all personnel involved in this program as instructors should be given appropriate training in instructional techniques.

Psychological Preparation

The Panel believes that the Department should provide the Foreign Service an adequate level of psychological preparation for overseas situations.

The Office of the Medical Adviser has a small staff of psychiatrists, including a few assigned abroad on a regional basis. They are available for a variety of professional functions, including counseling those who have experienced terrorist violence. They could provide an essential preventive service as well but are woefully few in number. They constitute a superb reservoir of skill, knowledge, experience and credibility that is quite able to play a major role in preparing the Foreign Service to cope with terrorist violence. The trouble is there are not enough of them.

Acceptance of Risk by Foreign Service National Employees

As a group the members of the Foreign Service, Americans as well as foreign national employees at our missions abroad, have demonstrated uncommon courage in serving this nation's interests in spite of increasing personal hazard. The Federal Government provides supplementary benefits to compensate American personnel, at least in part, for medical and other personal costs incident to violence directed against them by virtue of their employment. A major gap, however, is that such benefits are not now available to our Foreign Service National employees, except as the Secretary may waive regulatory restrictions or otherwise provide a measure of recompense. The Panel recommends strong support for pending legislation (H.R. 2019) to correct this deficiency.

Training of Post Security Officers

The training of "non-professional" security officers, the post Security Officers assigned to those posts which, for what ever reason, do not have a Regional Security Officer, is a matter of some concern. Even though these posts more often than not are rather small, at least some have significant security problems, many have Marine Security Guard detachments, and most have some of the increasingly sophisticated and complex security equipment the Department of State is now using. The Panel understands that, although the security training for these officers had been only two hours, it has recently been expanded to five hours. Moreover, the Mobile Training Teams that will be sent abroad in the near future will include specialized training for Post Security Officers as well as for others having security responsibilities.

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

Diplomatic efforts to develop broad international cooperation are essential to an effective anti-terrorism program. The United States has actively pressed for a consensus on joint actions to combat terrorism. This has not been easy, but there have been successes. Clearly, there is widespread revulsion with terrorist violence, but each country's reaction is colored by attitudes toward the perpetrators; i.e., the Basque Separatists, IRA, and PLO, all of which have their supporters who rationalize that violence is the

only way these groups can make their political statements.

Some countries look on terrorism as a law-enforcement problem best left to the police. Other countries take pride in their reputation as a haven for political exiles and are reluctant to extradite terrorists who do not commit acts of violence on their territory. There are also voices which caution against "overreacting" to the threat. Legal systems in each country differ on rights of the accused and other issues. The result has been that action has been more limited than one might expect. Stern action has been taken against aircraft hijackers because this is widely accepted as a crime against innocent passengers; the incidents play out on television, the terrorists are identified, and there is a strong organized group demanding counter-action, i.e., the airline pilots.

The U.S. Government has been active diplomatically in combating terrorism since the late 1960's. Relations with other governments on this issue involve diplomatic initiatives and police-level exchanges. U.S. law enforcement authorities and the Department of State have tried to work, especially with the Europeans, on what might be termed a service-to-service level. This has not been entirely satisfactory since some police officials have been reluctant to work closely with the United States for fear that information would leak. Until recently, terrorism was treated by the Europeans as a domestic police matter with some exchange of information, but fundamental differences in attitudes stultified the effort. There has been some improvement in recent months.

On the diplomatic level, the United States has been active and effective in developing concerted action to deter aircraft hijacking. As a result of strong U.S. pressure, the Montreal convention of 1977 and the Hague agreement of 1971 were negotiated and ratified. These agreements provide that states would prosecute or extradite persons who sabotaged aircraft or navigational equipment (Montreal) or hijacked aircraft (The Hague).

At the meeting of the Summit Seven in Bonn in 1978, an anti-hijacking declaration was issued in which the participating states agreed to cut off civil aviation relations with countries that refused either to try hijackers or to extradite them. This understanding was activated at the Ottawa Summit in 1981 when the members notified Afghanistan it was subject to the sanctions when it refused to extradite Pakistani hijackers. The U.S. did not have civil air relations with Afghanistan at the time, but several European states cut off air service to that country.

As a result of persistent effort by the United States over the past years, and after the April 1984 shooting incident in front of the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London, the Summit Seven agreed in June 1984 to a declaration recognizing the special dangers posed by state supported terrorism. It included references to the involvement of terrorists in drug trafficking; the acquisition by terrorists of weapons, explosives, training, and funds and to other state supported terrorist activities, such as the misuse of diplomatic missions and immunities. This Declaration was especially important because it recognized for the first time the broad political nature of the problem as opposed to earlier declarations on specific types of incidents.

The United States has been active in promoting regional agreements to counter terrorism. A 1971 Organization of American States (OAS) convention to prevent and punish certain acts of terrorism received strong United States support and was ratified by the United States in 1976. Subsequently, the United States has worked to obtain the support of OAS member states to deal with various forms of terrorism. While not a party to other regional agreements, the United States has voiced its support for such conventions, including the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and other Council of Europe statements.

Efforts at the United Nations have not produced major results. It was possible to establish the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973, entered into force in 1977) and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1980), and the International Atomic Energy Agency's 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Multilateral diplomacy to combat terrorism has serious limitations. The most terror prone regions are Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. In the latter case, the terrorists tend to be indigenous to the country or narcotics traffickers seeking revenge on American officials. The bilateral approach is most natural. The Middle East poses unique problems. In East Asia, Japan participates more or less passively but that area has been much less dangerous in recent years. The Europeans have been the most willing to talk about the issues. The subject have been discussed at several economic summits. These annual meetings provide an excellent opportunity to let our closest international associates know the seriousness with which the U.S. addresses the terrorism phenomenon. However, the Seven do not constitute an operational entity and each participant merely agrees that actions will be guided by the agreed positions. The Department of State has expended much effort in this area, however, in practical terms, the most effective diplomatic efforts have been on a bilateral basis with the countries that are most ready to cooperate. Progress will come slowly but the United States must resist discouragement. Unremitting diplomatic pressure must be maintained.

The Department of State has worked consistently and diligently to deal with the specifics of combating terrorism. Good and useful work is being accomplished, but slowly and without any dramatic flair. There has been a noticeable increase in the willingness of Europeans to consult since the recent assassinations in France and Germany plus the attacks in Belgium on NATO related installations over the past several months. The earlier European attitude that terrorism was a domestic affair is changing under the pressure of the proclaimed unity movement among terrorists to operate internationally.

In 1984 the United States initiated the Anti-Terrorist Assistance program (ATA), a training program to teach law enforcement officers from friendly foreign nations to deal with specific types of terrorist acts. The proposal was first presented to the Congress in April 1982 and was finally approved in October 1983. It contemplates an annual appropriation of \$5 million with from 750 to 1,000 trainees annually. The program is under the management of the Department of State with the actual training provided by United States law enforcement and security agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State's Office of Security.

A strong political impulse will be needed to make progress in mustering international forces against terrorism and a new organization will be necessary to make sure the decisions are carried out. The Panel suggests that it would be useful to establish an International Anti-Terrorist Committee (IATC). The IATC would deal at the government and police levels. The Summit Seven countries plus Benelux and perhaps a few others could be charter members. A small secretariat might be set up with delegates attached to embassies. The committee would meet once or twice a month to cover an agenda dealing with concrete problems. This would create a political/technical interface which would provide public focus to the anti-terrorist campaign.

Improved extradition treaties can facilitate bringing terrorists to justice. The Department should assign additional lawyers to the project to update existing treaties and the promotion of agreements which can be useful in combating terrorism.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

In a world where all diplomatic personnel face some degree of threat, vulnerability is partly a function of numbers. There is a need for a timely and orderly mechanism for the reduction of functions and staff levels at posts faced with serious threat to life and limb. This is not to suggest that the Department of State simply close shop at the first sign of hazard, but there are situations in which serious consideration must be given to whether the U.S. Government's best overall interests are really well served by continuing Business as usual. In evaluating the functions at any given post at risk, consideration should be given to those that can be suspended temporarily or transferred to a nearby post or even to the United States.

The Department of State and the posts abroad, with the cooperation of affected agencies, have developed guidelines and specific post plans to cope with various contingencies. These plans enable Washington to understand how the post intends to react in certain situations and, in an actual crisis, provide specific information needed to guide and to support the post's responses. A primary benefit of the post plan is that it requires responsible officials to anticipate the kinds of problems they might experience, from natural disasters to political violence, that might pose a hazard to the safety of American citizens or facilities. They then work through the options available to them, noting logistical or procedural requirements, and eventually reduce their operational plans to paper. These plans are excellent jumping off points for post drills and simulation exercises.

The Panel has voiced concern that there is no existing formal mechanism for monitoring conditions at our overseas posts and determining, based on a set of objective criteria or "tripwires", when a personnel drawdown or evacuation should be started. The Panel believes that in all crisis situations where a post is considering a drawdown or an evacuation, including the decision on when the post shall return to normal status, the Secretary of State should participate directly in the decision making process. The Panel also believes that only the Secretary should authorize a post to return to normal staffing when the crisis is considered past.

Tripwire Mechanisms

The decision on reducing staff and functions at a U.S. mission is easily reached when the threat is real and perceived by all elements. Unfortunately, danger is not always obvious and resistance to reductions can be formidable when the crisis may appear to some observers to be some time in the future. The Panel sought to identify "tripwires" which could be used to trigger automatic actions to reduce functions at a post in times of severe threat. Conditions vary so much in each situation that it is not possible to establish universally valid "crisis points" for each country. Instead, the Panel recommends that several current Washington based programs be straightened in order to improve post preparedness and responsiveness to crisis situations.

There are two extremely useful programs now consolidated in the Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning (M/CTP) that enable posts to plan for and practice their specific responses to crises, including personnel reductions. These are the emergency action plans (EAPs) and the crisis management exercises. Under the EAP program, each post is required to complete a post-specific emergency action plan that describes in detail how post personnel will respond in the event of a threatening incident whether security-related or a natural disaster and the responsibilities of each major participant. Each EAP also includes detailed guidance on how to undertake a personnel drawdown or evacuation from that post. M/CTP reviews and approves all new and revised EAPs, assuring that they conform to the central guidelines included in the Emergency Action Manual, and maintains a file in Washington of all post EAPs. This is a valuable program since the EAP is the basic document for preparing post personnel for their specific roles and activities during a life threatening incident.

As was discussed previously, the Panel has concluded that developing a standard list of "tripwires" for application at all posts is impractical. Conditions vary too widely from country to country, and events that may be ominous or threatening in one country may simply be part of daily life in other countries. However, the EAP process presents a definite opportunity for developing post-specific tripwires. The EAP could be modified to include the listing of a series of such locally derived tripwires that represent the

post's best judgment of the possible local events that could signal the need to consider defensive actions, including a personnel drawdown or evacuation.

Under the Crisis Management Exercise Program, a control team from M/CTP visits a post, develops a post specific sequence of hypothetical events leading to an emergency situation, and presents a two day simulation of these events to the post emergency action committee. The primary goal of this exercise is to test the ability of post personnel to implement the EAP effectively in a simulated crisis situation. The control team closely monitors the decisions and actions of the committee and prepares a detailed debriefing on the results. Participants have universally found this program to be a valuable means of testing their abilities to respond to crisis situations and of discovering and correcting weaknesses in their preparations, including the EAP .

The combination of Emergency Action Plans and the Crisis Management Exercise Program has the potential to improve the effectiveness and raise the consciousness of foreign affairs community personnel in the area of security. Over a period of time, Foreign Service employees would become familiar with the EAP and simulation processes at more than one post. Thus, at a given post, the staff would eventually be composed of officers who had experienced the EAP and gaming process in a wide variety of environments. As it undergoes repeated testing, the mission would be able to refine the EAP and its responses to the situations covered in the simulation process.

Each post will establish a list of functions to be suspended and numbers of personnel to be drawn down in an emergency. This list will be formally accepted by all agencies represented at the post. Such a list will enable the mission and the Department to consider the possible reduction of functions and personnel at the post on a phased basis before a crisis actually erupts. The Panel wishes to emphasize that, while either the Secretary or the Ambassador can initiate a drawdown of personnel, only the Secretary should authorize a post to return to normal staffing.

Drawdown Decision-Making

The decision on whether to conduct a personnel reduction at a threatened post has traditionally been left primarily to the post and its regional bureau in Washington. This is in keeping with the general Department of State precept of leaving most decision-making that directly affects individual posts to the substantive offices and bureaus most directly involved in the day-to-day operations of those posts. As a consequence, there is no central office charged with responsibility for monitoring the specific situation at overseas posts for the purpose of assuring that defensive actions are taken, or at least considered, when a serious threat develops, and for reporting such situations to the Secretary of State for his review.

The security threat confronting us now is so serious and potentially deadly that all resources, technical as well as analytical, must be used. To guarantee that any dispute among bureaus and offices will receive immediate high-level review and resolution, the monitoring function should be lodged in the Office of the undersecretary for Management. Finally, Chiefs of Mission or regional bureaus may not be in the best position to weigh all the elements in a situation, particularly when security is directly involved. A formal means of raising the issue to a higher level would assure that the question is not ignored.

COUNTER TERRORISM COORDINATION

Inter-Agency Coordination

The Federal Government's principal mechanism for interagency coordination of policies and programs to deal with terrorism is the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T). It operates under the aegis of the National Security Council and is chaired by the Department of State's Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning (M/CTP), an official of assistant secretary rank. Although as many as 30 or more Federal agencies might be involved with the group in one situation or another, the principal members include the following:

- The Department of State is the lead agency in handling terrorist incidents abroad involving United States interests. It participates in appropriate analysis and dissemination of intelligence; manages security programs for non-military U. S. Government facilities abroad; coordinates emergency planning and crisis management for United States missions abroad; and generally develops and implements policies to deal with international terrorism, including international conventions and bilateral agreements.
- The Department of Justice advises on legal aspects of dealing with terrorism and coordinates legislative proposals.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead agency in handling most domestic terrorist incidents, including intelligence collection and investigation of criminal acts of terrorism.
- The Federal Aviation Administration is the lead agency in handling terrorist incidents involving aircraft in flight or under flight conditions and also coordinates with other governments in all matters relating to flight security. The FAA and the FBI have a memorandum of understanding to clarify possibly overlapping responsibilities and to foster close cooperation.

- The Central Intelligence Agency represents the other agencies in the Intelligence Community when they are not direct participants: manages systems for collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence relating to terrorist threats; maintains intelligence liaison with other governments; participates in incident management support teams as appropriate; and performs other functions.
- The Department of Defense performs substantial services in support of emergency planning for posts abroad and plays a lead role in executing such plans; provides expertise regarding terrorist weapons of all types, including nuclear and CBR; participates in collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence regarding terrorist plans and activities; provides special units that might be called upon to intervene in terrorist episodes abroad; and generally manages security programs for military facilities abroad.
- The Department of the Treasury has several bureaus involved in anti-terrorism. The Secret Service is responsible for, among other duties, protection of Heads of State or Heads of Government visiting the United States; the Bureau of Customs is involved in controlling international movements of weapons; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has legal responsibilities and expertise concerning illegal weapons and explosives.
- The Department of Energy has responsibilities and expertise regarding nuclear weapons.
- The National Security Council chairs the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), which coordinates agency responses to specific terrorist incidents, including the use of military forces.
- The Office of the Vice President supports the Vice President in his role as chief crisis manager for the President.

The Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism is intended to coordinate policies of the U. S. Government concerning terrorism, whether domestic or international in character, and to assure that the various operational programs to deal with terrorist attempts, including intelligence and incident management, are effective. Although primarily a policy-shaping group, its basic focus is essentially on counter-terrorism operations.

The Departmental Context

Within the Department of State, the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning has been designated as the coordinator for policy and operational programs to counter terrorism as it may affect United States interests abroad. A major function of this office is to manage diplomatic initiatives on a multilateral or bilateral basis with other nations to coordinate international responses to terrorism. The office recently has been given added responsibility for certain operational functions, such as the emergency planning program to assist American missions abroad to cope with hazards they might expect to face. The Panel sees these added responsibilities as tending to interfere with the office's primary responsibility and, in the section of this report dealing with organization, recommends a realignment of the operational functions.

The second major organization within the Department of State dealing with measures to counter terrorism is the Office of Security. Its mission is to protect the premises and personnel of the Department and our missions abroad against all hazards, whether intelligence penetration, mob violence or terrorist assault. Its role is primarily operational and the Panel recommends that those operational functions now lodged in the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning be transferred to the Office of Security, which is to be restructured as the Diplomatic Security Service. The new security organization is to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, and the Panel recommends that this officer chair the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and represent the Department in other existing interagency groups dealing with counter-terrorism operational matters.

The Office of Security has a Threat Analysis Group that maintains liaison with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as well as with other agencies. Its principal interest is with tactical intelligence relating to potential hazards to the personnel or premises of the Department of State, the American missions abroad or visiting foreign dignitaries under Department of State protection.

The third element of the Department of State directly involved with terrorism is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It is the principal point of contact between the Department and the rest of the Intelligence Community and directs research and analysis on terrorism and intelligence activities.

Role of Intelligence

The collection of intelligence from a wide variety of sources is critical to an effective defense against terrorist attack. The Panel has discerned no significant failure of intelligence as a factor contributing to the success of the many recent assaults against our missions abroad. Having said this, however, the Panel must add that intelligence is an imperfect tool and that it would be foolhardy to make security decisions on the basis of an expectation of advance warning of peril.

The many characteristics of those who would attempt hostile actions against United States missions or personnel abroad or against visiting foreign dignitaries are so varied and, in some cases, so unique as to offer a formidable challenge to American

intelligence capabilities. Whether a psychotic loner or a small and tightly knit group bound by familial or other deep rooted ties, whether a loose confederation of extremists from different nations or a clandestine unit, military or otherwise, directed by a hostile state, today's terrorist presents certain difficulties as well as certain opportunities for intelligence collection.

It is vital that those having security responsibilities maintain a realistic appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence and that they understand that, in some situations, there will be no advance warning of specific threat. Common sense requires that American missions and personnel abroad and those with protective responsibilities in the United States constantly maintain a high state of preparedness to counter terrorist initiatives.

Intelligence Analysis

As noted above, there are at least three organizations within the Department of State responsible for analyzing threat information. This is due in part to the fact that each has broader responsibilities of which an awareness of terrorist threat is but a part. The Panel has recommended certain changes to improve the coordination among these offices, including a suggestion that the Threat Analysis Group be physically co-located with the Watch Group of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The Panel has also recommended improvements to enhance the numbers and professional skills of the analysts.

Alerting Procedures

The procedures to pass terrorist threat alerts to our overseas posts have been hampered in the past by the division of responsibility in the Department of State. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that some other agencies with an overseas presence, such as the Department of Defense, have their own channels of communication and thus their own threat alerting capability. Until recently, the only office in the Department of State that was allowed to draft threat messages to posts was the Office of Security's Threat Analysis Group (which is not a 24 hour office). The Department has recently implemented a new system for passing to posts threat warnings derived from intelligence materials and for integrating intelligence generally into the counter-terrorism process. After considerable negotiation, the remainder of the Intelligence Community has now been included in this system. The new alerting procedure appears to be functioning well but there remain a few corrections and adjustments to be made, which the Panel has brought to the Department's attention.

To improve coordination at the posts abroad, the Panel recommends that a Counter-terrorism Reporting Officer be designated at each mission and that the Emergency Action Committee at each post be formally designated as the forum for coordinated threat analysis and dissemination locally.

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIGNITARIES AND MISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The United States has the responsibility under international law to protect visiting foreign dignitaries and resident foreign diplomats in this country. There is an equally serious obligation to protect foreign missions in Washington, New York, and other cities in the United States. Unlike some other nations that use a single protective force, visiting foreign dignitaries/diplomats and foreign missions in the United States are protected by a wide variety of local, state, and federal organizations. In Washington, foreign missions are protected by the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service with support from the Metropolitan Police Department. The premises of foreign missions in New York and consulates in various cities are normally protected by the municipal police departments. Traveling foreign dignitaries are usually protected by the Secret Service or Department of State, and some defense officials may be protected by one of the services in the Department of Defense. Other federal agencies infrequently protect a visiting foreign official, either at the request of the Department of State or of their own volition. Resident foreign diplomats may receive protective services from the Department of State, local police authorities, or private security firms.

The Panel is disturbed by the diffusion of protective responsibility within our government that is perhaps best exemplified by the inexplicable current practice in which the Secret Service protects a visiting Head of State or Government while the Department of State's Security protects that individual's family and/or the accompanying foreign minister. Often both protective details take place simultaneously. In order to fulfill our international obligations, we must provide for a safe and secure environment for those officials visiting our country. As we raise the level of professionalism of our services, we can demand greater support and security for our own personnel overseas.

Protecting officials from harm today no longer means just having a Bodyguard nor is it a simple task of physically shielding the individual from attack. Days or weeks are spent in preparation for a single visit. Thus, the agencies recruit qualified personnel and expend months of training to teach these individuals the complicated concepts, methods, and techniques of protective security. The same concepts that apply to protecting our diplomats and residential areas abroad apply to protecting visiting foreign officials and their residences in the United States.

The Panel recommends a significant increase in the funding and resources dedicated to the protection of foreign dignitaries and missions in the United States than currently budgeted or anticipated. The Panel believes that the resources expended for the protection of foreign officials and missions in this country have been largely insufficient in the past. Demands for protective services continue to rise as more nations and officials are subjected to the threat of terrorist acts. The issue of reciprocity demands

that we provide comparable protection to that which we expect overseas.

Protection of Visiting Foreign Officials

The authority for the protection of visiting foreign dignitaries is currently divided between the Department of State's Office of Security and the United States Secret Service, and to a much lesser extent, other federal agencies (including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense). Both the Secret Service and the Office of Security have legal authority for the protection of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government.

The legislation contained in 18 United States Code 3056 outlining the Secret Service powers states that subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secret Service is authorized to protect the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad. Thus, the Secret Service routinely provides protective services to every visiting Chief of State or Head of Government unless that person declines the services in writing. The only other officials protected by the Secret Service are those whom the President specifically directs the Service to protect. Therefore, when the Department of State began receiving protective requests from foreign governments for a number of officials such as Presidents-elect, former Presidents and Prime Ministers, Cabinet level ministers, opposition leaders and other important dignitaries, the Secret Service pointed out its lack of authority for protecting these officials whom it was not Presidentially directed to protect and it refused to assume the additional responsibilities. Therefore, commencing in the mid 1970's, the Office of Security again was tasked with providing protective security to all dignitaries other than current Chiefs of State or Heads of Government.

The Office of Security has applied its broad authority primarily to the protection of certain cabinet level officials, primary family members of Chiefs of State/Heads of Government and persons of royalty. Often this protection was and is based on the principle of reciprocity and not solely on the presence of a specific threat. The role of local or state law enforcement agencies in the protection of visiting foreign officials (as opposed to resident diplomats is generally that of a supportive nature to the federal agencies involved.

The Panel concentrated its study on the two agencies that provide the bulk of the dignitary protection in this country; the Secret Service and the Department of State's Office of Security. Although the Panel has been informed of sporadic successful cooperative efforts between the two agencies, the successes have been the result of individual efforts and not because of an institutional sense of cooperation or agreed-upon standards.

The Panel sought the views of both the Office of Security and the Secret Service. The organizations have differing viewpoints. The Office of Security is willing to take on protective responsibility for all foreign officials provided that it is given additional resources and authority. The Secret Service insists that additional responsibilities would dilute its primary mission of protecting the President of the United States, and it firmly indicated its opposition to the assumption of additional responsibilities. This served as a catalyst in leading the Panel to recommend the creation of a Diplomatic Security Service within the Department of State. The Panel believes that the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Diplomatic Security Service should ultimately be responsible for the protection of all visiting foreign officials and resident diplomats/missions when a sufficient level of professionalism has been established.

The Panel believes that the staffing and training levels of protective personnel must be significantly improved before any added protective responsibilities are placed in the Department of State. The reorganization of the security functions into the Diplomatic Security Service will be difficult. For these reasons, it is important that responsibility for the protection of Chiefs of State/Heads of Government be delayed until this new organization is prepared to absorb the responsibility in an orderly and professional manner, taking into consideration adequate staffing levels and training programs. The Panel recommends that after thorough review from both an interagency working group and training personnel, the Department and new Diplomatic Security Service determine its long range goals in the area of dignitary protection. It should fully identify its resource and equipment needs and then comprehensively budget for them.

The Panel notes that most of the further recommendations listed in this section deal with short term "fixes" -- not long term solutions. However, there are a number of ways to improve the coordination efforts of the Department of State and the Secret Service that will result in a better quality of protective services provided.

The first step in improving the services provided is the identification of the problems and solutions. Thus, the Panel believes that the Department of State and the Secret Service could benefit from the establishment of a formal working group comprised of knowledgeable members of both services. The group should set acceptable standards after studying a broad array of topics involving protective security requirements.

The Panel believes that training is one of the most vital elements of any professional program. Recent court decisions are making clear that an organization can be liable for actions of an employee who has been either improperly trained or has not been afforded the training necessary to carry out his or her job. The Panel understands that the Department has not had the resources

available to devote to training but the problem is critical and requires immediate attention. Therefore, the Department of State should contract with the Department of Treasury for the Secret Service to undertake comprehensive protective training for the agents of the Department of State. The training should consider the unique problems in protecting our officials and facilities overseas.

The Panel has already noted the overlapping responsibilities of the Secret Service and Office of Security. Yet, it appears to the Panel that there has been a lack of communication and information exchange between the two agencies in the past. Professional respect is the key to future progress. An exchange program between the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service could foster better cooperation and understanding.

Protecting officials sometimes involves long and strenuous hours that not everyone can maintain. An exhausted or physically incapable person may be more of a danger than an asset. Protective techniques are evolving in sophistication as terrorists continue to target those highly placed, visible officials. A set of standards outlining the level of physical and mental preparedness required is necessary and should be developed and implemented.

Often, a prominent official who is subject to threats requires a large and comprehensive protective detail. The ability to respond to a terrorist attack is part and parcel of comprehensive protective coverage. Not all local police agencies have highly trained response or counter assault teams. The Diplomatic Security Service should form and use its own response team when the threat against a protected official warrants this type of coverage and an adequate team cannot be provided by supporting agencies.

One way to ensure continued support for any United States Government protective detail assigned overseas is to offer relevant training to friendly foreign governments. The Panel notes that the Department of State is offering, with the help of other agencies, training for foreign civilian agencies in the Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program and it welcomes the effort. The Panel recommends that the Department of State seek to expand its training program with the goal of providing regular in-service training of its own personnel, training in protective techniques to local and state law enforcement agencies, and limited training of friendly foreign nations' police agencies (now currently in the Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program).

A well-rounded agent must have the opportunity to do other investigative and law-enforcement work that helps to hone professional skills and that provides a change of pace from the demands of protective security. The Panel believes that in order to insure the development of a professional, experienced, and well-rounded protective agent as well as a balanced career path, the Department of State should continue to rotate its agents from its investigative units to the protective area as necessary. It should continue to investigate criminal matters under its jurisdiction and appropriately staff its field offices to perform investigative, protective, and liaison duties.

The Panel believes that those blends of investigative and protective skills and functions should be combined with an aggressive program for acquiring, analyzing, and pursuing to a conclusion all forms of intelligence that appear relevant to its protective mission. This use of intelligence should be part of a system that includes proactive investigations of possibly dangerous individuals and of sources of threat information.

The Panel has noted that the Office of Security relies upon a small cadre of capable but overworked threat analysts in Washington and upon other agencies. Since terrorism is becoming more of an international phenomenon, an aggressive protective intelligence program will not only assist in the safeguarding of visiting foreign officials but it may also protect the lives of our own personnel abroad. Therefore, the Panel believes that the Department should look at the numbers and use of its intelligence resources and plan for a comprehensive protective intelligence program. The Department should then seek an appropriate number of new positions for this function.

Traditionally, Interpol has not had an active role in counterterrorism activities because of a prohibition in its by-laws. The charter has been amended and a special terrorism working group has been established. The Department of State has no representatives on Interpol. The Panel believes that the new Diplomatic Security Service, with its expanded mandate, should seek membership and devote resources to Interpol.

An important part of the provision of a safe environment is the application of state-of-the-art technology. The Panel notes that the Office of Security has skilled technical experts involved in countermeasures, armoring of cars, and developing equipment such as alarms and CC TVs. However, this small office is largely devoted to the overseas effort and the domestic protection program is suffering. A protective program must necessarily involve application of technology, and therefore, a protective technical staff is needed within the existing Office of Engineering Services.

The protective program of the Office of Security traditionally has been supported by the Office of Communications for its tactical communications needs. In order to run a professional protective program with appropriate priorities, the Panel believes that it is necessary for the Diplomatic Security Service to control all of its resources to include funds, equipment and positions. Thus, the Diplomatic Security Service should assume responsibility for its own protective communications needs to include the transfer of appropriate positions from the Office of Communications.

Protection of Foreign Missions and Resident Diplomats

The organization of the United States Government to protect foreign missions and resident foreign diplomats is shared between the Department of State, the Secret Service, and local police agencies. Although the ultimate responsibility for American obligations, as a signatory to the Vienna Conventions, belongs to the Federal Government, state and local authorities also have an obligation to assure equal protection of the law to every person within their jurisdiction.

The Panel notes that the protection afforded to diplomatic missions is typically a function of police activity as exemplified by post standing, uniformed presence, roving patrols, and marked police vehicles. The facility itself receives the protection, not individuals. For the protection of foreign missions, the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service (a federal police agency under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury) provides protective services to those missions only in the Washington, D.C. area. This protection is based upon a request by the Department of State, by a foreign government, and in conjunction with a viable threat assessment conducted by the Secret Service. The protection of foreign missions for the rest of the country is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, who has contracting and reimbursement authority, but no resources of his own to provide such protective services. Thus, even though the Secretary of State may contract with a local police agency or private firm for the provision of "extraordinary" protective services, there remain questions of timeliness, funding, and oversight of this program.

The Panel believes that the United States Government's response to the need for protection of certain diplomatic premises has been inadequate and inconsistent. The logical and most professional course of action would be the placement of the nationwide responsibility of diplomatic premise protection into one agency with broad authority and sufficient resources. The Department of State should be able to ensure a professional response to any threatened foreign mission. The personnel assigned to protect a consulate in Los Angeles should be as effective as those assigned to an embassy in Washington, D.C. Thus, the Panel supports a broadening of authority and resources of the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service for the protection of all foreign missions in the United States. If this course of action is not possible, then the Department of State should recruit and train its own personnel, as a separate office of the Diplomatic Security Service for the purpose of protecting all threatened foreign missions. If this course is followed in the near term, consideration should eventually be given to consolidating all uniformed protection personnel within the DSS.

The Uniformed Division of the Secret Service does not provide personal protective services to resident diplomats. Although the Department of State does have the authority to provide the personal protective services to threatened diplomats, it traditionally has used its own agents for limited personal protective services to a few accredited ambassadors and other diplomats. The Department sometimes contracts with local police or private firms for the provision of "extraordinary" protective services (those services not typically performed by law enforcement agencies) for the few highly threatened resident diplomats. The Panel believes that the goal of the USG should be to provide adequate general coverage of resident diplomats except in those few extreme occasions when a diplomat is truly threatened.

The Panel recognizes the difficulties inherent in hiring local contractors to perform protective duties in the United States, regardless of competency. Some private companies are unable to obtain weapon permits from certain states. There are many restrictions regarding interstate travel by persons carrying weapons who are not sworn law enforcement officers. Contract employees can make arrests only when acting as private citizens. There are complex legal issues involved. Some law enforcement agencies will not cooperate with or impart information to local contractors. Yet, many police agencies have their own limitations including jurisdictional restrictions and inadequate resources. There are questions regarding the meaning of "extraordinary" protection. The problem is still evolving and the Panel believes that protective requests may increase in the future. Thus, it is the Panel's desire to see the Department itself ultimately apply its own resources to the protection of threatened foreign Chiefs of Missions as the need arises. The Department of State should review its current and future expectations of protective requests for threatened foreign diplomats and justify resources as necessary.

The Panel recognizes that until the basic responsibility for protection of foreign missions and resident diplomats is clarified and streamlined, the Department must seek the assistance of local police agencies and contract guard companies. The Department of State now has authorization and funds under the Foreign Missions Act to reimburse local or state authorities nationwide for "extraordinary" protective services performed at the behest and under the supervision of the Department of State. The Department has not yet issued formal guidelines for reimbursement. This "extraordinary protection" constitutes both personal and facility protection. In those instances in which state and local authorities cannot provide the protection required, this authorization permits the Department to employ the services of licensed and responsible private security firms to perform the duties. However, Congress limited the amount of the funds available to any one state to 20% of the allotted total. Yet, some states have no diplomatic representation while other states, such as New York and California, have an extraordinary number of foreign missions. Many local police agencies cannot or will not provide continuous, extraordinary protective services for a resident diplomat either because of resource drain or because this is not a function typically performed by municipal police.

The Department should seek an amendment to the existing legislation contained in the Foreign Missions Act. The modifications should permit full payment to those agencies requested by the Department to provide more extraordinary protective services to foreign missions or resident diplomats than is currently stipulated by the 20% limitation. Further, the Department should immediately issue uniform guidelines for reimbursement.

The Panel believes that if the Department continues to rely heavily upon local police agencies and private contractors for resources to provide "extraordinary". protective requests, it is important that the level of service provided by any agency or company adhere to acceptable standards of performance. The Department of State should insure that acceptable levels of competence, performance and training are provided to any organization acting on the Department's behalf.

The Protective Liaison Division currently within the Office of Security performs a vital function. It coordinates information received overseas and domestically with local, state, and federal agencies. It appears to the Panel that this office is critically understaffed. This office does much more than coordinate protective activities: at times it serves as the only link between other agencies on a broad array of issues. The office should be expanded to contain personnel from all divisions that need representation and it should have appropriate exchanges and liaison personnel with a number of departments and offices and local law enforcement agencies.

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Secretary of State's Advisory Panel Report on Overseas Security

GUARD FORCES

International law and custom hold the host government responsible for the protection of diplomatic missions. However, the United States and other nations often supplement security forces provided by the host government. The United States uses Marine Security Guards and local contract guards for this purpose. This program is particularly important in those numerous cases where the host is unable, or unwilling, to provide our overseas posts with adequate security. In this section of the report, the Panel provides comments and recommendations concerning local guard forces and Marine Security Guard Detachments.

The Panel studied individual post assessments of the foreign contract guard forces that are assigned to perimeter security duties at missions overseas. The picture that emerged from the post assessments is that the Department of State's guard force program is lacking in several areas. There is no consistency in the quality of the local guard force programs from post to post, even within the same country. The Panel found no correlation between the quality, training and preparedness of the guard force at a post and the level of threat.

The Department of State's Regional Bureaus allocate varying sums for contract guard forces to the posts. Also, widely varying pay scales for contract guards exist. Regional or post security officers are responsible for supervising the contract guard force. However, the level of training they receive does not appear to be adequate. Many of the problems cited by the posts, including illiteracy, lack of standardized equipment, and inadequate training, can be attributed in part to the fact that the Department of State has not published a guard force manual establishing minimum but precise standards. It is increasingly important, considering some of our posts in highly threatened environs, that the Department explore new and aggressive means of upgrading and standardizing the guard force program. In summary, the Panel believes that broad reforms are necessary in the guard force program.

Local Guard Forces

The local guard forces or contract guards at each mission are supervised by either a professional security officer (RSO) or by the Post Security Officer (usually an administrative officer), who, among his other duties, is responsible for the security of the post. The functions of the guards vary. Some are used as unarmed 'watchmen, gatekeepers or receptionists while others are armed police or military officials who are expected to deter unauthorized entry. The local guard forces are used for perimeter control at missions and residences, sometimes for internal control of our buildings, and sometimes for personal protection of the key members of the missions. By and large, the local guard forces serve as the first line of defense in the protection of our missions and personnel. Inadequacies in the guard forces can translate quickly into casualties in the event of an attack.

The Panel has seen the Department's 1983 Latin American Contract Guard Force Survey Report and believes that this report is a comprehensive and useful document that should be used as a guide for similar studies. The Panel also notes that the Department has entered into a contract to conduct a study of the guard forces and to prepare a procedural manual. It recommends that the 1983 Latin American Contract Guard Force Survey Report be provided to the contractors as a means of expediting their work in establishing a professional worldwide local guard force program. The Panel believes that the study should include a breakdown by geographical region of the types and use of guards, the cost, the trends, the contractual arrangements, the training, the equipment used, and the effectiveness of the guards.

The Panel recognizes the difficulty in standardizing guard forces world wide. The Department's Bureau of African Affairs stated Due to variations in local, political, economic and social conditions, we tend to believe that standardization may be feasible only on a geographic bureau basis.. The Panel agrees with this assessment, yet encourages a policy of professionalizing -- as much as possible -- all guard forces.

The Panel believes that the Department and its contractors should publish a procedural guard force manual that establishes policies and procedures for local guard forces on a regional bureau basis. The appropriate version of this manual should be distributed to all posts as well as to all concerned foreign affairs agencies. It should a) address standards for selection, background checks and training of the guard forces, b) address equipment to be used such as firearms, uniforms, and vehicles, c) identify the contractual arrangements that should be standardized as much as possible, d) outline legal ramifications of the use of force or liability for negligence on the part of the guards, e) clarify the funding as well as the types and levels of supervision to be exercised, and most importantly, f) clearly outline procedural guidelines and management techniques to be used by the security officer in charge of the supervision of the guard forces.

The largest contingent under the RSO's supervision is usually the contract guard force. Indeed, the annual cost to the Department of State to fund contract guard forces is estimated to be 50 to 60 million dollars. Yet, the training given to Regional Security Officers for the management of the contract guard forces appears to be inadequate. The Panel recommends that the Department of State provide comprehensive training to special agents in the Regional Security Officer training course on the subject of managing the guard forces. The instruction and detailed briefings should be provided on a regional basis with emphasis given to the unique aspects of particular posts. Similar training should also be given to Post Security Officers before they are sent to posts with local guard forces.

The Office of Security has placed renewed emphasis on the training of guard forces. This involves sending Mobile Training Teams to various posts for the purpose of training post personnel, host government forces assigned to the mission and contract guard forces. The Mobile Training Teams are comprised of special agents who have received extensive training in the United States. A limited number of teams are now scheduled to travel to some posts. It would appear beneficial for the Department of State to continue expanding the Mobile Training Team concept so that guard force training can be provided both routinely and on an emergency basis to all posts. Continuous, updated training for guard forces will improve their competence and thus improve the safety of our personnel.

Some posts have employed unsuitable or incompetent guard forces partly because of the perception that there is no other alternative available within a specific country. Yet, other posts imaginatively have hired -- where permitted -- third country nationals to fulfill guard duties. The Panel recommends that the Department of State immediately seek alternatives to the use of local contract guard companies who do not meet even minimal standards necessary for the protection of our personnel or facilities. The use of American private guard companies or third country nationals must be pursued when the host government and legality permit.

Different terms sometimes are used to describe a guard. The term "watchman" commonly refers to a contract employee who is unarmed and fulfills a passive security role. The term "guard" normally refers to an armed individual who possesses training and skills similar to those of a police officer. Posts employ watchmen because of host government regulations prohibiting arming contract guards, because of cost and competency considerations, or because post personnel neither want nor see the need for armed guards. However, the employment of unarmed watchmen who cannot effectively repel criminals, terrorists or unauthorized persons from entry to an American facility or residential compound, is neither serious nor effective physical deterrence. In addition, at several posts there have been recent instances of our unarmed watchmen being seriously injured or killed by armed robbers. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Department train and appropriately arm all guards who serve in the role of providing physical deterrence, particularly at threatened posts. In those countries where the host government is unwilling to permit the use of armed contract guards, the host should be persuaded to supply its own forces for the protection of our missions and personnel.

The Panel has been advised that the Department has moved to consolidate funding for guard forces within the Office of Security. As stated earlier, this funding was included in the regional bureaus' budgets. Completion of the consolidation of the funding for contract guard forces within the Diplomatic Security Service will ensure it centralized management of the world-wide guard force program.

The 1983 Contract Guard Survey of Latin America recommends, for cost reasons, that the post request resources from the host government for personal bodyguard services prior to hiring their own guards. The Panel readily agrees that the United States Government should not relieve the host government of responsibility to protect diplomats under international law; however, the requests should be fully coordinated with the Department of State. The United States provides bodyguard coverage to only a few resident foreign diplomats in the United States, yet we are increasingly demanding more coverage from foreign governments for our personnel. Foreign Chiefs of Mission accredited to this country are senior officials and often have very strong ties to the leaders of their countries. Thus, reciprocity is becoming a political issue with some nations. The issue of cost must be considered in totality; in other words, although it may cost the post less to have host government guard forces protect the mission and

residences, the United States Government will be required to pay reciprocally for the protective services that are afforded the foreign government in the United States. Thus, the Department of State should weigh carefully its requests to host governments for protection on a case by case basis, particularly when those requests require a large number of resources and when the United States Government is unwilling or unable to provide reciprocal measures. If political concerns and reciprocity are serious issues, the Department should provide its own funding for contract guards when warranted.

Technical surveillance systems that can be used to supplement a post's guard force, such as closed circuit television with motion detection and time lapse recording options, are available today. These systems are particularly useful where sufficient numbers of qualified personnel are not available. For example, a technical observation system, operated by a well trained person who can initiate appropriate response measures, can contribute towards cost-effective and efficient building and perimeter security. The Department of State should continue to acquire the most cost-effective and efficient state-of-the-art systems which can be used to supplement guard force operations and contribute towards a reduction in long-term recurring guard costs.

Marine Security Guard Detachments

The use of Marine Security Guard Detachments (MSG) at some United States overseas missions is a long-standing tradition. The Department of State appreciates the positive role that the Marines perform while the Marine Corps finds the program equally rewarding. There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the United States Marine Corps which outlines MSG duties, utilization and support, and the limitations on their use outside of official premises.

The primary mission of the Marine Security Guard is to provide internal security guard services to diplomatic and consular missions. Marine Guards are also used to protect some offices of other agencies such as U.S.I.A. and A.I.D. These services include protection of personnel, property, and classified and administratively controlled material and equipment within these premises. The scope of their responsibility is generally considered to include only the interior of the premises including the area contained between the outer perimeter wall and the buildings. MSG's are not normally posted near, on or outside of the premise perimeter. This is because the protection of the mission is primarily the responsibility of the host government. Further, many countries would object to the posting of military personnel on their soil.

The MSG's carry out their primary mission by a) operating access controls and stationary and patrol coverage of classified facilities and operations, b) conducting inspections and patrols to ensure proper procedures for handling and storage of classified material within the premises, c) writing notices of security violations as Department of State security regulations direct, d) effecting and supervising destruction of classified waste, e) providing control of buildings and portions of buildings during construction or renovation of areas, f) providing special guard services for U.S. delegation offices for regional or international conferences at which classified information is kept, g) assisting in guarding the temporary overseas residences of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and other ranking dignitaries as required, and h) providing internal security guard coverage on a temporary basis of the Principal Officer's residence when the life or safety of the protected official is in danger. The latter duty is rarely conducted by the Marines and it is subject to written orders and approval. Further, the assignment must be in response to a threat situation, and the MSG's must be armed and in uniform. The MSG's may also provide special guard services in the execution of interagency plans for dealing with emergency situations.

The MSG Detachments are operationally supervised by the Regional Security Officer (RSO) or the Post Security Officer (PSO). The RSO or PSO provides the guard orders, directions and instructions for the operations of the Marines at the post and ensures that they are properly housed and supported. The Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) is the senior member of the MSG Detachment and he supervises and administratively controls the Marines. He reports through the RSO or PSO to the Chief of Mission.

As described above, the MSG role is essentially defensive in nature. They serve as an in-house deterrent to limited acts of violence, as well as a defense mechanism to large scale riots. The Marines are expected to delay entry by hostile elements long enough to permit destruction of classified material and to assist in protecting lives of the mission staff until host government forces arrive. They are authorized, under the command of the senior Foreign Service officer present, to use weapons to protect their own lives or mission staff from direct and immediate danger. The specific use of force is outlined in the MSG post guard orders.

The Company Commanders (Regional Marine Officers or RMO's), who are appointed by Headquarters Marine Corps to major geographical areas receive little or no training in Department of State security programs. The Panel believes that this can result in misunderstandings and confusion on the part of the RMO as to his mission to be performed, the Department of State role, and his relationship to the posts in his region. Further, there is a lack of training for Post Security Officers (vis-a-vis Regional Security Officers) about managing the MSG Detachments. This is equally undesirable.

Not all embassies or consulates are assigned Marine Guards; in fact, less than one-half or only 126 of our foreign posts are protected internally by the U.S. Marines. The Department of State has requested substantially more Marines over the next three years. The Panel urges the Department to consider an MSG Detachment at most foreign posts throughout the world. At those very small posts with few Americans, and where it is not practical to supplement the post with at least six Marines, the Panel

recommends that the Department reduce or eliminate the amount of classified or sensitive equipment and material at these posts. Further, the Panel believes that the Marines should be used only for purposes approved in the Memorandum of Understanding and all MSGs should be armed.

The Panel understands that the Department of State's increasing demands place a substantial strain on the Marine Corps for manpower resources. The Panel recommends that the Department of State cooperate with the Marine Corps in supporting its manpower needs and it should ensure that professional security officers provide regular guidance to the detachments, particularly at those posts where there is no resident RSO.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Some of the problems encountered in protecting personnel and facilities overseas can be attributed to a lack of uniform security standards and procedural guidance. Of the major foreign affairs agencies, only the Department of State has published a set of standards. Those standards were developed several years ago to impede forced entry into the Department's buildings and to protect personnel against acts of terrorism and mob violence. The standards do not address security measures for ancillary buildings.

The format, limited distribution, and apparent need for revision dilute the potential effectiveness of the Department of State standards. The standards are distributed to security officers and specialists. Posts without security officers may not have the standards available. Furthermore, the standards are subject to interpretation. For example, there is no direct relationship between the threat category of a post and the security measures that may be required. Lacking specificity in this vital area, the standards imply that every post requires the same level of protection.

The Department of State standards do not adequately address the need to employ interim measures to cope with fast-developing, threatening situations. Failure to use a truck to block the Beirut Embassy driveway on 20 September 1984 was cited by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the most significant contributing factor to the bombing.

The Department of State standards provide reasonable guidance for office building security, including public access controls and safe havens. However, perimeter security --including walls, gates, guards, and vehicle barriers -- is not addressed adequately.

The Department of State acknowledged a need to adopt uniform standards, and stated that the requirement will be addressed in future meetings of the Overseas Security Policy Group. The Department of State also acknowledged that the distribution of the standards should be widened and that the Foreign Affairs Manual would be an appropriate method for doing this. The Panel has been advised that the Department of State is pursuing an aggressive Research and Development effort in its attempt to acquire equipment and establish procedures and standards for improved perimeter security. The Department of State is sharing this information with the other foreign affairs agencies.

Physical Security of Other Foreign Affairs Agencies

The other foreign affairs agencies have not published their own physical security standards except for certain specific functions. AID and USIA are normally located in separate facilities overseas, and while they have not published their own standards, they have adopted, and follow to varying degrees, the Department of State standards. With the inadequacies of the Department's standards in mind, the complexities and resource implications of protecting all foreign affairs facilities and personnel create a problem of enormous proportions that requires immediate attention. For example, AID will receive approximately 5 million dollars of the Department of State's 1985 supplemental security funding; however, that amount is not sufficient to meet AID's total requirement to retrofit many inadequate facilities or acquire new office spaces. Furthermore, the 5 million dollars cannot be used for additional security specialists or support personnel needed to administer the Agency's security enhancement program.

The Panel believes that it would be ideal, from a management point of view, to establish one set of physical security standards for all foreign affairs agencies, but recognizes the difficulties this proposal would create for some agencies such as AID and USIA. One of the major arguments against a single set of standards is the reality that these agencies operate overseas for indefinite periods which often require that their operations be directed from temporary, leased facilities. In many cases, and for a number of operational needs, those facilities cannot be located within the Chancery or Embassy compound. For example, the USIA operates bi-national centers and libraries outside the capital of many countries in order to reach selected audiences. Voice of America radio sites must often be located in remote areas in order to reach their broadcast audiences.

Regardless of their location, however, the Panel is convinced that the agencies must follow a set of current physical security standards. While our Embassies will continue to be the primary targets for acts of terrorism, hardening them will surely highlight the vulnerability of AID, USIA, and other agencies' facilities to future terrorist attacks.

The Panel has learned recently that USIA has initiated appropriate action to develop physical security standards for its facilities overseas. AID has advised the Panel that the development of physical security standards was one of that Agency's highest priorities.

The Department of Commerce expressed to the Panel its concern for "the increased threat of terrorist attack to US government offices in leased facilities away from the embassy chancery, as well as to US business interests overseas, that will occur as the present embassy security-enhancement program progresses." To cope with its perception of the threat to approximately 30 commercially leased Foreign Commercial Service facilities, as well as US companies abroad, "The US and Foreign Commercial Service is presently establishing systematic inspection procedures for all its installations, domestic as well as foreign." The Commerce Department has requested that the Department of State, through its Regional Security Officers, provide assistance in the conduct of the inspections. The adequacy of security standards will be examined during the inspections. In examining its overall security requirements, the Commerce Department is evaluating its 1981 Overseas Security Support Agreement with the Department of State to determine how well it is meeting the needs of the US and Foreign Commercial Service. The Commerce Department also expressed its desire to become an active participant in the deliberations of the American Private Sector Overseas Security Advisory Council, the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, and the Overseas Security Policy Group. The Panel commends the Department of Commerce for its initiative and aggressive efforts to improve the safety of its personnel and facilities overseas.

Physical Security Procedures Guide

The Department of State has not published a procedural guide to assist posts, particularly those without security officers, in maintaining effective physical security measures after a security system has been installed. The Panel believes that posts without professional security officers may be vulnerable because they may not fully appreciate the capabilities and/or limiting factors of their security systems.

The Department of State has reviewed the need to establish a physical security procedural guide to assist posts in maintaining effective security. It has determined that such a guide is needed and has initiated appropriate action to develop one. The guide will be a supplement to the revised physical security standards and outline the correct procedures that should be followed in the use of a security system. According to the Department of State, the manual will include "procedural considerations, typical operational scenarios, and general guidelines for security planning."

New Threat Category List

The Department of State and some of the other foreign affairs agencies indicated that the current Post Threat Category Listing, produced quarterly by the Department of State's Threat Analysis Group, is used as one means of establishing priorities to allocate resources and develop security measures. While the current listing has been of value to consumers in identifying threat levels for the short term, it has not proven to be of similar value when addressing long term threats. Security professionals and post officials experience difficulties with establishing priorities and developing long range plans because of the frequent changes in the posts' threat categories. Furthermore, agencies such as USIA and AID which use the listing are not afforded an opportunity to provide input during its production. Thus, the Panel concludes that a requirement exists to establish a Special Threat Category Listing to address long-term threat projections. This new listing would not replace the current listing but would serve as an additional planning tool for management.

Residential and Personal Security

Although the United States has increased the level of resources to cope with the threats of terrorism and mob violence directed against diplomatic personnel and facilities, crime involving United States employees and their families overseas continues to be a serious problem that has not been adequately addressed by the Department of State and other foreign affairs agencies. The lack of a uniform personal and residential security program has caused morale problems because of employee perceptions of unequal treatment, in terms of security services, which is provided by the agencies.

The Panel believes that the Department of State and the other foreign affairs agencies need to focus additional attention, particularly in the area of resources, on residential and personal security overseas. While the Panel notes the recent efforts of the foreign affairs agencies in developing new standards through its members on the Overseas Security Policy Group, the Panel is concerned because the publication of those standards has been delayed by the Department of State. As the last agency to clear the standards for release, the Department of State has taken several months to clear the standards. The Panel is convinced that the Department of State must expedite the publication of the standards.

Overseas Security Policy Group

To remedy some of the inconsistencies in the level of security afforded to facilities, personnel, and homes overseas by the foreign affairs agencies, the Department of State took the lead and established an interagency working group entitled the Overseas Security Policy Group. The group is chaired by the Secretary of State's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security and includes the directors of security from the other foreign affairs agencies.

The Panel expressed some concern for the informal status of the group because its membership and proposed activities were not defined in a formal charter. The Department of State has instituted appropriate procedures to formalize the establishment of the group. The duties of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, as chairman of the group, have been added to the Foreign Affairs Manual. Furthermore, the Office of Security is working with the Office of Legal Affairs and the other members of the group to develop a formal charter.

The Panel supports the concept of the Overseas Security Policy Group and believes that a coordinated approach by the foreign affairs agencies will improve the security of our personnel and facilities overseas.

Armored Vehicle Program

The Panel is satisfied that the technical standards established for the armored vehicle program, including light and fully armored vehicles, are reasonable. However, the Panel is concerned with the new Department of State armored vehicle policy statement that was released recently. While the Panel concurs with the new policy, it noted that a vital link was omitted from the policy statement. Specifically, the armored car policy statement does not contain procedures governing the use of the vehicles. The Department of State has assumed that posts are already aware of the correct procedures and use of armored vehicles.

Procurement of Foreign-Made Official Vehicles

In October, 1984 the Department of State revised its policy for the acquisition (purchase and lease) of official motor vehicles by authorizing posts to procure foreign-made vehicles to provide greater flexibility and more economical vehicle operations overseas. While it has been a policy of the Department of State to procure US manufactured vehicles for official purposes, the Department of State reassessed its policy in light of:

- tighter operating budgets and increasing costs;
- the automobile market has become more internationalized and improved levels of maintenance and service are available overseas;
- costs to maintain American-made cars or modify them to meet local requirements have increased; and
- the growing concern for personal security with the use and identification of U.S.-made vehicles.

Some posts expressed their concerns about driving large American cars in overseas locations that are better suited, in terms of maneuverability, to smaller foreign cars. Furthermore, the conspicuousness of driving a large American car, they argue correctly, runs counter to the security philosophy of maintaining a low profile in high threat areas. Given a reasonable period of time for implementation, the revised vehicle procurement policy should eventually allay these concerns and result in an improved level of personal security. The policy contains a reasonable degree of flexibility to address "unexpected and urgent need(s), or to enhance a security situation".

Security Inspections and Surveys

Acquisition of new buildings, installation of sophisticated and expensive security systems, and the publication of physical security standards are vital ingredients in an effective post security program. However, without effective program monitoring, the Panel concludes that the "back to business as usual" attitude will return to threaten the effectiveness of our domestic and overseas security programs. Therefore, the Panel believes that an efficient and effective program of security inspections and surveys can serve as an important monitoring tool for security program directors.

The Panel is aware that the foreign affairs agencies now conduct security inspections and surveys of their facilities within the United States and overseas to ensure compliance with security policies. For example, the Regional Security Officer assigned to a post is required to conduct a comprehensive security survey every two years. The survey addresses all aspects of security and covers all agencies in the Mission. In addition to the surveys, the Regional Security Officer conducts a number of other security inspections including residential security inspections to determine the adequacy of security for employees' homes.

In addition to the inspections and surveys done at post by the Regional Security Officer, a host of other security inspections are conducted by the other foreign affairs agencies. At a minimum these inspections are done annually, and it is not uncommon for a post to host concurrently several agency security officers. At many high threat posts, these inspections are conducted more frequently.

The Panel is also aware of numerous complaints voiced by several posts for the flurry of visiting security officers to posts before, during, and particularly after a threat situation. While the purposes of the visits are not questioned, the demonstrated lack of coordination between agencies has resulted often in confusion, conflicting recommendations between agencies on appropriate security requirements, and on at least one occasion, embarrassment to two Departments.

The Panel is convinced that the subject of security inspections and surveys should be placed on the agenda of the Overseas Security Policy Group in order to identify the cause of existing difficulties and to develop appropriate solutions. The whole range of issues related to the need for so many inspections and surveys should also be examined. When and where appropriate, the group should attempt to reduce the number of separate agency inspections with a goal of promoting joint inspections.

BUILDING PROGRAM

Unlike most U.S. Government organizations, the foreign affairs agencies are required by the nature of their missions to locate their facilities in overseas environments over which the U.S. can exert only limited control and which thus make our presence highly vulnerable to a number of potential threats. Non-Americans must also be granted a substantial measure of access to these facilities to transact legitimate business encompassing the entire range of U.S. foreign policy interests, including such areas as consular and travel matters, business and commercial affairs, cultural and information exchange, and foreign assistance programs. Thus, circumstances dictate that only limited options exist in selecting sites for, and establishing access to, our offices in foreign countries.

Within these constraints, however, there does exist room for valid and appropriate security concerns to be taken fully into account in managing our overseas activities. The history of attacks and assaults against our facilities has enabled us to draw some conclusions and act on them. We have increased the number and quality of protective methods such as Public Access Controls, protective film on windows, closed-circuit television and improved perimeter defenses. The use of explosive-laden vehicles has, however, proven to be a particularly devastating weapon, and major new efforts to defend against this form of attack have been taken.

Unfortunately, perimeter defenses against incursions of a suicide vehicle are effective only when there is sufficient space to prevent the vehicle from gaining close access to a building. In many cases, embassies and other buildings are located directly along busy public roads and streets that cannot be closed or changed. In other cases, embassies are tenants in buildings they occupy exclusively or, in some cases, share with others. In still other cases, the buildings embassies occupy, whether owned or leased, do not lend themselves to modern security defense techniques because of their age or architecture. And finally, there are cases where our chanceries are rented from landlords who do not permit structural or other permanent security-related changes to be made to their buildings.

The process of obtaining new buildings abroad (whether through construction or purchase) or renovating existing ones is excessively complex, time consuming and has been inadequately funded. This has meant that we have fallen further and further behind on capital projects.

The threat of technical penetration of United States diplomatic facilities has been of major concern since World War II. The techniques used by hostile governments have shown a steady increase in sophistication and subtlety. The threat is greater now than it has ever been and United States missions are at risk in many parts of the world. While the greatest risk to United States diplomatic facilities is within the Soviet Union, technical attacks have occurred in a number of other facilities worldwide.

From the foregoing the Panel has drawn some general conclusions:

- The United States must control the buildings in which it does business overseas.
- Location is the paramount consideration in the avoidance of assault and penetration of every kind. Being on the busiest or most fashionable street or corner may have been an asset in earlier days; today it is a liability.
- Co-location with occupants whom the United States neither chooses nor controls presents a substantial risk for assault and penetration.
- Proximity is a vital concern when other buildings abut or are so close that modern electronic and audio techniques can make it extremely difficult to safeguard national security information.
- Age, architecture, and design are crucial to the ability to defend against penetration and assault. Many buildings simply cannot be upgraded to the standards that are necessary today.
- Adequate funding and a new approach to overseas construction are essential. The old, business-as-usual approach cannot meet the new requirements.

The Department of State's Office of Foreign Buildings and the Central Intelligence Agency recently prepared two separate analyses of the condition and location of the chanceries and principal offices of the Department's 262 overseas posts. In particular, each building was assessed for three security characteristics: (1) whether it met the Department's current minimum physical security standards for construction quality and distance from the external perimeter barriers; (2) whether it shared a 'common wall' with adjacent structures; and (3) whether the Department shared the structure with other non-U.S. Government tenants, and thus did not completely control the building. These three characteristics represent a significant security threat by terrorist and/or hostile intelligence access and targeting of our facilities. Each one presents a valid reason for either relocating from the current space into improved facilities, or undertaking extensive and usually very expensive renovations of the property to improve basic security.

The Panel has concluded that 126 of the posts require replacement for one, two or (in two cases) all three of the reasons cited above. In some cases, at least at the present time, the amount of risk from any of the threatening categories would be marginal. However, another lesson the Department of State has learned in the past twenty years is that things change. The peaceful neighborhood, city, or country of yesterday can be a hotbed of terrorism, insurgency, or violence tomorrow. Buildings that were designed, located, and constructed most carefully in the past may now be unacceptable from a security standpoint.

The Panel believes that this situation cannot be allowed to continue unchanged. As shown by the bombings and takeovers of our embassy buildings in the Middle East in recent years, as well as by the levels of electronic and other eavesdropping activities by our adversaries, there are simply too many risks to our diplomatic personnel and activities at posts with these vulnerabilities to allow these buildings to remain potential targets for such threats.

There is no prescription that will guarantee the safety and integrity of every workplace overseas, but it is possible to reduce known and foreseen risks by embarking on a deliberate effort to modify those buildings that do not meet the location criteria, and by relocating and moving from those buildings that do not.

The Department's Office of Foreign Buildings has recently completed a detailed analysis of the requirements for undertaking a Building Program of this size. The 126 posts could be replaced or renovated within a seven year time frame, given the requisite resources along with certain proposed legislative changes in the Department's basic authorities in the areas of budgeting, personnel recruitment and procurement. The program would require an estimated 1,013 personnel and a total of nearly \$3.5 billion over five budget years, as well as the application of a number of new procedural and organizational methods.

The Panel strongly recommends that the Department of State embark on this long-range plan to renovate or replace its office buildings at those 126 listed posts in order to minimize the potential for future security-related incidents that could lead to significant damage, loss of life, or compromise of national security information.

The Department of State is not the sole U.S. civilian agency having a large number of vulnerable office facilities overseas. The United States Information Agency (USIA), Department of Commerce Foreign Commercial Service, and Agency for International Development (AID) also have a number of vulnerable facilities located outside of Department of State compounds throughout the world.

USIA identified 121 separate overseas facilities that did not meet these physical security standards and that were candidates for relocation or upgrading. The Foreign Commercial Service does not at this point know which of its 34 separate overseas facilities need specific security improvements. These facilities will be surveyed to gather this data in the near future. AID identified 40 of its major separate installations as not meeting minimum physical security standards and requiring replacement or major renovation. Relatively minor security upgrades are suggested for an additional 15 smaller AID facilities.

Thus, a total of at least 210 separate USIA, Foreign Commercial Service and AID offices are candidates for inclusion in the Building Program. It is extremely important that these facilities be included in this program because they could also become the target for terrorist or other security threats, particularly as the State Department compounds are increasingly made less vulnerable. In addition, several thousand U.S. Government employees, American as well as Foreign Service National (FSN), work in these buildings.

Given the magnitude and the technical nature of this work effort, the Office of Foreign Buildings should take the lead in managing this program on behalf of these agencies, particularly when a construction or renovation project is called for. In fact, it would be best if the program were developed and presented to the Congress as a coordinated joint effort involving the Department of State, USIA, Foreign Commercial Service, AID and all other agencies affected by it.

The development of this Building Program will require a great deal of preparation and analysis. The specific security-related environment and conditions at each facility must be carefully reviewed. Not all buildings will need the same treatment. In some cases, it may be possible to effect the necessary improvements through providing specific equipment or undertaking various levels of building renovation. At other posts leased facilities could be relocated to better buildings and sites. A number of current facilities will undoubtedly need to be replaced by new construction projects. In each case, priorities for the extent and timing of the work will need to be established. These priorities should be based on a number of important criteria, such as the threat level, condition and location of the building; the site itself and the adequacy of perimeter barriers; and comparative cost.

The Department has learned much about managing and administering large-scale, world wide security activities as a result of recent efforts, such as the 1980 Security Enhancement Program and the 1982 European Security Supplemental. These programs have clearly demonstrated the necessity of assuring that the administrative and logistical offices that support these security activities receive adequate levels of additional resources. Without these resources, they cannot effectively perform their important support functions, and the result will be missed deadlines and unfinished projects. Among these key support activities are the Office of Foreign Buildings, the Executive Office of the Bureau of Administration, the Office of Operations, the Office of Personnel, and the Comptroller's Office. The Department should assure that adequate administrative and logistical support

resources, in terms of personnel, funding and systems and procedures, are available to these offices to support the significantly increased level of security and construction activity that will be required to meet future security threats.

The two Department of State areas that will be most immediately involved in the planning and execution of the recommended Building Program are the Physical Security Division of the Office of Security and the Office of Foreign Buildings. The technical and managerial expertise in the fields of construction and security renovations are concentrated in these two staffs, which currently work closely together on a wide range of projects. In order to clarify the roles of these two offices in the new office building program, the security personnel necessary to support these projects should report directly to the Office of Foreign Buildings. It would also be appropriate for the related support personnel in the communications and automated systems fields to report directly to the Office of Foreign Buildings, for purposes of maintaining more centralized control over this program. The expanded application of two managerial techniques currently in use is also encouraged. These techniques are the "turn-key" project concept in which a single contractor is given total responsibility for a project from start to finish under the Department's general overview, and the "critical path" technique of managing a project by identifying and monitoring key points at which bottlenecks and delays could develop.

As part of the recent FY 1985 Security Supplemental request, the Department was given special authorities to contract directly with suppliers for needed goods and service, and to enter into personal services contracts with U.S. citizens overseas. Unfortunately, the implementation of these measures has been hindered by ambiguities in the extent of this authority and possible legal considerations. In order to maximize the benefits flowing from these special authorities and to permit rapid response to security requirements, these ambiguities should be clarified.

The Department could also benefit from improvements in the automated data processing (ADP) and word processing (WP) systems and procedures currently applied to security activities. In particular, the Department lacks an effective data base management system that can provide senior management with rapid, comprehensive and accurate status reports on both individual security projects and the overall security function. At the present time, such information is assembled from a number of sources in a time-consuming process. As a result, it is difficult to guarantee that the Department is making the best use of its resources, or that it is even possible to monitor security activities on a day-by-day basis. The Department should develop and implement a comprehensive, centralized data-base management system that will be updated regularly. This system would permit regular reports on the status of all security- and construction-related projects to both management and operational personnel in the Department.

A final consideration in planning the buildings program concerns the future use of Foreign Service National (FSN) employees by the foreign affairs community. Currently, over 11,000 FSN's are employed in a wide range of positions at virtually all overseas posts. It is a well- and long-known fact that there are security-related drawbacks to employing FSN's. However, there are measures that would do much to minimize the potential dangers to our national security posed by the use of FSN's. In particular, the new Building Program provides the opportunity to include separate sensitive and non-sensitive work areas in the planning process for all future facilities. As a policy, Foreign Service National employees should be restricted from access to the sensitive work areas.

CAPITAL BUDGETING PROPOSAL

The sheer size and complexity of the Building Program proposed in this Report represents a startling deviation from the workloads and priorities that have been previously applied to overseas building activities. Over 344 offices in as many as 130 countries may be involved in one way or another in this work effort over the coming decade or longer. As such, new methods are called for to assure that this program can be implemented effectively. New methods for budgeting and funding the process must be installed since the present method clearly would not suffice.

The current budgeting procedures used by the Department of State for its foreign buildings activities have several disadvantages. These procedures lead to delays and stretch-outs in the amount of time required to complete a building project. They can cause decisions on priorities and funding to be based on project costs rather than on security or other operational criteria. They can force building projects, which are essentially capital investments, to compete for funding against other non-investment programs in the budget. Finally, they do not permit flexible responses to short-term real estate opportunities that regularly arise overseas.

Given the indisputable requirement for these new facilities, and the magnitude of the resources and overall workload involved, the Panel believes that a new funding approach is needed to assure that these projects will be funded adequately and accomplished expeditiously. This new approach, termed the Capital Budgeting system, will permit significantly greater flexibility and will enable decisions on buildings to be made outside of a situation, such as the present one, that unjustly forces capital investments to compete for funding against day-to-day operations. The Department of State should seek the approval of Congress to implement this new Capital Budgeting system for planning and funding the office buildings required to minimize the security-related threats to our overseas facilities.

SECURITY OF NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS ABROAD

American citizens living or traveling abroad as well as American business people and installations have been the targets of terrorist attacks in many parts of the world. Incidents such as kidnapping of newsmen and academics in Lebanon, missionaries in Africa, and businessmen in Latin America, and the killing of Rockwell employees in Iran are examples of the threat faced by non-official Americans abroad.

The United States Government does not have a direct responsibility for providing a secure environment in which non-official overseas Americans can work, live, or travel. There is, however, a moral obligation to provide assistance, advice, guidance, and information that can enable citizens, businesses, or other organizations to enhance their own protection.

In most cases non-official Americans are served by the nearest United States Embassy or Consulate. Americans resident in foreign countries are always urged to register with the Embassy or Consulate and to be in touch during a time of crisis or unrest. In addition, an important step has been taken to enhance the security coordination between the overseas private Americans and the United States Government.

The Department of State has established a formal organization, the American Private Sector Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) To promote coordination between American overseas business and private sector interest and Department of State overseas security programs..

The Council, which has a full-time staff, is located in Washington and plans to conduct its first meeting on July 1, 1985.

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