LESSONS IN LEGITIMACY: 

by

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June 2010

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**Lessons in Legitimacy: The LTTE End-Game of 2007–2009**

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**N/A**

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LESSONS IN LEGITIMACY:  

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ABSTRACT

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were arguably one of the most feared, lethal and capable insurgent movements in the modern age. Yet despite their strength and wealth, the Sri Lankan armed forces destroyed the LTTE with a conventional army in a series of pitched battles from 2007–2009. This thesis argues that the destruction of the LTTE during the end-game of 2007–2009 was in part due to a loss of local legitimacy amongst the Sri Lankan Tamils that the movement purported to represent. This loss of local legitimacy was a product of LTTE coercion, facilitated by the enormous funding structures of the global Tamil Diaspora. As long as the Diaspora was able to provide not only funding but political legitimacy to the movement internationally, and the LTTE was able to control political space locally, this loss of legitimacy was largely irrelevant. Yet the effects of 9/11, combined with a Sri Lankan military offensive, not only highlighted the degree to which local legitimacy had disintegrated, it also showed just how important local legitimacy can be to an insurgent movement should the conditions suddenly take a turn for the worse. The loss of local legitimacy, and its importance to the LTTE during the end-game, is largely missing from most literature on the subject.
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Figure 1. Political Map of Sri Lanka
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CDN  Canadian Dollar
COIN Counterinsurgency
EU  European Union
FTO  Foreign Terrorist Organization
IPKF Indian Peacekeeping Force
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam/Tamil Tigers
PIN Personal Identification Number
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SLAF Sri Lankan Armed Forces
SMO Social Movement Organization
TRO Tamil Rehabilitation Organization
UK United Kingdom (Great Britain)
USD United States Dollar
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I. INTRODUCTION

The country of Sri Lanka is largely comprised of two competing ethnic populations, Sinhalese and Tamil. Both these populations derive their cultural roots from the greater Indian sub-continent. However, over the past several centuries, these ethnicities have grown to develop their own societal norms and values. Within Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese population is the largest group, comprising over 70% of the population. The majority of the Sri Lankan Sinhalese lives in the southern and western portions of the island. Of particular importance to Sinhalese Sri Lankans is their Buddhist tradition. In the decades following independence from Great Britain, the mobilization of Sinhalese citizens through social structures within the Buddhist faith played a central role in the eventual marginalization of Sri Lankan Tamils, leading to radicalization and militarization of Tamil groups.

The Sri Lankan Tamil people represent approximately 12–14% of the population. Members of this ethnic group reside mainly in the northern and eastern portions of the country. However, there is a small Sri Lankan Tamil community with large business holdings in Colombo. Beginning in the 17th century, Western powers from Europe began to influence the area through trading and the establishment of schools and missions. Eventually, the British Empire formally colonized the island in the 19th century. While still under control of the British Empire, the Tamil minority was at times disproportionately over-represented in the colonial administrative government along with

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the Christian/Westernized Sinhalese elite.\(^5\) As the colony of Ceylon began to gravitate toward independence, Sinhalese Sri Lankans attempted to adjust the political representation in the colonial government. Examples of this are prevalent throughout the history of the Ceylon National Congress during early 20th century. During this time, the Ceylon National Congress was formed from the Ceylonese Legislative Council, a colonial legislative body designed to assume greater degrees of political power locally. The debate over the methods to populate this body transformed over time in relation to the greater degrees of political power afforded to it. At first, the Legislative Council enjoyed communal representation, which gave Sri Lankan Tamils greater degrees of representation. However, in the later years, Sinhalese politicians began to clamor for territorial representation, leading to the Sri Lankan Sinhalese gaining greater degrees of political power.\(^6\)

In 1948, the country of Ceylon became a sovereign state when the British left South Asia. The Ceylonese adopted a unitary system of government based on a democratic vote. As a majority, the Sinhalese Buddhists asserted more power. Thirty-five years later, Ceylon, renamed Sri Lanka in 1972, became embroiled in an insurgent war. By 1983, the perception of the majority of Tamil peoples was that Sri Lanka had become so overwhelmingly anti-Tamil that the minority population had two options: either escape, or affect the government through violence. While this created a large Diaspora around the world, those remaining launched an insurgent war until May of 2009, when the Sri Lankan government was able to militarily defeat Tamil insurgent forces, known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).\(^7\) Despite the fact that Sri Lanka is a developing nation, the insurgents maintained this war through resources that came to a large extent from external sources. The aim of this thesis is to develop a


\(^{7}\) Selvarasa Pathmanathan, “TamilNet: 17.05.09 Dignity and Respect for our People is all we Ask,” http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=29389 (accessed 21JUL2009).
greater understanding of the role the Diaspora has played in this war, and the relationship between those who left Sri Lanka and those who remained on the front lines.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT

This thesis does not wish to detract from previously discussed reasons for the demise of the LTTE. In fact, it will add to previous academic works in order to develop a more holistic understanding of the LTTE’s demise, and perhaps provide a specific case study for a particular typology of insurgent group. This thesis proposes an approach to the topic of the LTTE end-game from a different perspective than has been discussed to date. I suggest that the LTTE’s initial success in tapping the power of the post-1983 Diaspora eventually sowed the seeds for its demise. As such, this thesis poses the question: “From the perspective of an external resource mobilization structure, what were the long-term impacts of the Diaspora upon the end-game of the LTTE?” In this thesis I will show a relationship between the economic and political support of the Tamil Diaspora and the legitimacy of the LTTE at the local level, that is, within the Sri Lankan Tamil communities of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The argument here is that as the Diaspora increased its support, the LTTE reduced its reliance on local Tamils for funding or justification of the campaign, reducing LTTE legitimacy locally among the Tamils.

Legitimacy will be measured qualitatively in two forms. The first is the level of coercion the LTTE leveraged upon the local Tamil communities in order to gain fighters throughout the span of the conflict. Coercion is used in this case for several reasons. First, power holders who use coercive tactics are less inclined to consider legitimacy when exercising coercion over constituents. This is because coercion is seen as a method that solely affects behavior. This is considered easier and more direct than affecting the attitude of constituents through persuasion, and then allowing for independent behavior to form as a product of popular legitimacy. Second, when power holders’ objectives are self preservation and advancement, as opposed to outward oriented, such as toward the grievances of a social group, they are more likely to use coercion as a means to achieve
Furthermore, as coercion is applied to greater and greater degrees, there is a negative effect upon the individuals or groups receiving the coercion. These groups or individuals generally attempt to leave the environments altogether, thereby forcing the coercing authority to apply more coercive tactics in order to force their targets to stay in place. Thus, by measuring the degree of coercion used by the LTTE we can begin to determine the level of legitimacy it had amongst local Tamils as well as determine whether its vision of Tamil Eelam, with an LTTE government, coincided with the values of the local population.

The second qualitative measurement of legitimacy will be the support, or lack thereof, afforded to LTTE cadre by the local population once the SLAF began to wrest away political space during the offensive and subsequent end game of 2007–2009. The type of support we will examine is the level of sanctuary provided to the LTTE from Tamil locals once the SLAF began to occupy LTTE-dominated territory. As the Sri Lankan Armed forces’ offensive struck deeper into Tamil areas previously dominated by the LTTE, the LTTE cadre should have become increasingly harder to detect and destroy. During the insurgent end game, insurgencies such as the LTTE should be able to rejoin the civilian population and remain anonymous, according to insurgent and counter-insurgent experts, such as Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School. Yet, this anonymity is real only to the degree that the civilian population is willing to play along and not inform the SLAF of the whereabouts, or true identity, of LTTE cadre. To a large degree, this willingness to play along, or protect the LTTE from detainment or death, hinges upon the popular perceptions of legitimacy toward the movement. Therefore, the final stage of the LTTE insurgency should give clues as to popular perceptions of LTTE legitimacy at the end of the conflict. If the LTTE realize

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11 Ibid., 328.
that they cannot hide amongst the population, or rely on the population for support, I argue that this is indicative of a lack of legitimacy between the Tamil people and the LTTE. If, on the other hand, the LTTE feel that they could hide amongst the population and survive the SLAF offensive, it would indicate a high degree of legitimacy. As such, a qualitative assessment of events within the LTTE end game of May 2009 should provide further insight to degrees of legitimacy.

The Diaspora’s support, in either monetary or political terms, can be measured qualitatively both before and after the international response to violent non-state groups, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). I will provide a compilation of reports circulating in the international community estimating international interdiction of Diaspora monetary support. Variance is provided in the form of international interdiction of LTTE external support structures, i.e., the Diaspora, before and after 9/11. The significance of the Diaspora and its support structures will be expanded throughout the remainder of this thesis. For present purposes, it is enough to state that the Tamil Diasporas’ wealth, position and influence within the international community allowed it to become influential when discussing LTTE activities on the ground in Sri Lanka. Interestingly enough, the evidence collected to date suggests that the greatest degree of multinational interdiction of Diaspora support structures and the SLAF offensive of 2007–2009 happened nearly concurrently. Whether this was done purposefully, or is a mere coincidence, remains to be seen.

In order to define and describe the significance of Diaspora influence upon the LTTE, this thesis will also draw on several theories and works concerning external resource mobilization structures as they pertain to Social Movement Organizations. By studying these theories, and then providing qualitative data in order to operationalize these theories, the true role and impact of the Diaspora will become clearer. Furthermore, by understanding the impact of external resource mobilization structures, it will become apparent why the end-game of the LTTE was so different than previous insurgent movements.
B. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

The following background to the LTTE insurgency depicts a historical trend in the Sri Lankan government’s dealings with the Tamil minority population since the British left. This trend began with an assertion of Sinhalese political power and concurrent marginalization of Tamil groups. This marginalization continued and worsened, ending with devastating ethnic conflict facilitated in part by the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government. The effects of this trend are a Tamil Diaspora that escaped the country under extremely violent conditions. This Diaspora not only blamed Colombo for the violence, but came to accept the LTTE as the protectors of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.

After Ceylon was granted independence from Britain, many Tamils and academics argued that the Sinhalese majority quickly asserted itself on the island and began to re-shape the political environment in its favor. There were several reasons for this political assertion. Some authors point to the Sinhalese as suffering from a “Double Minority Complex,” meaning that the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka actually considers itself a minority. This is because it perceives that the 60+ million Tamils living in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu are part of the calculation.12 Others claim that the British rulers purposefully disempowered the Buddhist Sangha, or religious order, within the Sinhalese community in order to gain political advantage, and to facilitate the establishment of favored Christian institutions. After independence, the Sangha then quickly began to mobilize the majority Sinhalese population, making up for lost time and correcting what they had believed to be the Western and/or Tamil-influenced social ills that had permeated under British rule.13

Others also assert that the political structures of Sri Lanka, especially the structures that were created directly after independence, allowed for the Sangha to


mobilize the masses so easily. These academics point to such literary works as: the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry’s *The Betrayal of Buddhism*, and its effects on the elections of 1956; The Sinhala Only Act, which banned the Tamil language from official use; and the constitutional reforms of 1972, which recognized Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka and declared Buddhism as having a primary place over other religions, as just some examples of the manifestations of Sinhalese political mobilization, and the concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil populations during the first few decades of Sri Lankan statehood. In these early days of Sinhalese political mobilization, Tamils’ counter-actions involved political rallies and peaceful protests aimed at political re-integration within the Sri Lankan state. These non-violent measures were answered by Sinhalese rioting against the Sri Lankan Tamil populations, and additional political actions that heightened tensions.

The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (or BC Pact) is one example of the Sri Lankan governments’ political reneging. This agreement was signed in July of 1957 by then Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike (a Sinhalese), and the leader of the Tamil Federal Party, CJV Chelvanayakam, in response to a proposal in 1956 by a Sinhalese majority in Parliament making Sinhala the only official language of Ceylon. The peaceful Tamil civil-disobedience measures following the proposal of the Sinhala Only Act exemplified two things. First, it showed that even in the early days of Sri Lankan statehood, the robust Sinhalese majority in Parliament could create and pass legislation

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Despite Tamil political parties’ opposition. Second, Tamil civil disobedience measures outside Parliament allowed for Tamils to mobilize in defense of their perceived rights. This smaller-scale mobilization created structures and networks that groups would utilize later, during much larger ethnic conflicts. However, the anti-Tamil ethnic rioting by Sinhalese mobs, which ensued as a product of Tamil mobilization and peaceful civil disobedience, created a sense amongst some Tamils that the Sinhalese community *writ large* was antithetical to Tamil expectations and values.\(^{18}\)

Consequently, the BC Pact was seen by both Tamils, and a select number of Sinhalese politicians (led by Prime Minister Bandaranaike), as legislation that might mitigate Tamil opposition to the Sinhala Only Act. Among other measures, the BC Pact recognized Tamil as a minority language, equal in stature and recognition as Sinhala, within the Tamil regions of the north and east. This pact also set the stage for devolution of some political power to Tamil districts. However, despite several unofficial agreements and promises to implement the BC Pact between successive Sinhalese dominated governments and the Tamil political parties, the BC Pact was never put into action.\(^{19}\) In fact, the initial abrogation of this agreement, which was announced in 1958, sparked off ethnic riots. These riots highlighted not only the political sensitivity of ethnic equality, but also indicated an increasing degree of polarization between Sinhalese and Tamil groups.\(^{20}\) However, because of the need to appease the Sinhalese majority, who were being mobilized by religious factions, Sinhalese politicians perceived that enacting any legislation with the intention of addressing Tamil parity was equivalent to political suicide. Consequently, in the short term it made more political sense for them to outperform each other by stressing more pro-Sinhalese/anti-Tamil legislation in order to get elected.\(^{21}\) As

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\(^{19}\) Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, 82–95. See also, Manor, *The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon*, 286.


more such legislation was passed in the Sri Lankan Parliament, which was answered by Tamil protests, more anti-Tamil sentiments emerged amongst the Sinhalese.

The riots of 1956 and 1958 are mentioned above; however, several others occurred in 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, and in 1981. Furthermore, a large body of evidence suggests that over time, Sri Lankan government forces instigated, participated in, or allowed these riots to take place. For example, riots in 1977 occurred after the Tamil United Liberation Front had won an overwhelming majority of Tamil votes based on a campaign pledge to achieve a separate state of Tamil Eelam within the federal structure. The TULF further articulated this stance by publishing what is known as the Vaddukoddai Resolution. Despite their stated intention to create a separate Tamil state, the TULF at the time was still willing to achieve its desired ends peacefully and institutionally. The ensuing violence, perpetrated in part by Sri Lankan police, was officially blamed on the victims by the presidentially appointed investigator. This claim by the investigator validated and condoned the ethnically charged violence exacted upon the Tamil victims by Sinhalese mobs who were being led in part by Sri Lankan police.

In 1979, the Sinhalese majority in Parliament, under the leadership of President Jayawardene, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in response to the fledgling (and not universally accepted) Tamil separatist movement that was slowly emerging in the Tamil-dominated north. The Act allowed the police and military broad powers of arrest and detainment without trial or evidence. Reports indicate that indiscriminate violence was perpetuated by the police and military against Tamil civilians.

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incarceration and torture ensued. The Act was intended to coerce this fledgling insurgent movement into demobilization yet, in reality, had the opposite effect. Furthermore, this Act allowed for police to conduct extra-judicial killings in response to attacks against police officers. These killings facilitated the next series of ethnic riots in 1981. Although the riots were caused by several factors, one stands out in particular. While responding to crowd violence during election campaign rallies in Tamil dominated areas, several Sinhalese police officers were killed. In retribution, police and Sinhalese groups throughout Sri Lanka went on a rampage, not only killing innocent Tamils and burning homes, but allegedly attempting to destroy Tamil heritage sites by burning the public library in Jaffna, which included original, and thereby irreplaceable, Tamil manuscripts. In a surprising note of candor, the Sri Lankan president fully admitted that members of his own party had instigated some of the violence committed against Tamils during these riots.

The history of the political relationship between the two communities in the post-colonial phase shows a growing trend where Sinhalese political mobilization and ethnic empowerment at the ballot box led to a concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Further, attempts over time to resolve the divisiveness by existing Tamil political groups was seen by many Tamils as futile. Tamil civil disobedience, peaceful in its intentions yet deadly in its outcome, was the result. The violent response by the state to the exercising of Tamil rights within Sri Lankan democracy further alienated many ethnic Tamils. This created a small but tight-knit youth movement that became convinced of militancy, and separation from the state, as the only way to protect Tamils. Above all, clearly, the Sri Lankan government agents had, over time, become more involved in the riots. This solidified the perception among

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27 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 124.
more and more Tamils that the Sri Lankan state was not only disingenuous, but overtly violent toward Tamils.\textsuperscript{30} The largest and most damaging riot came in 1983, which signaled not only the apex of anti-Tamil ethnic violence to date, but radicalized many Tamils against the Sri Lankan state. Furthermore, the international Tamil Diaspora, which grew because of the increasing violence and disenfranchisement, became a main player in supporting the insurgency.

The riots of 1983, described by one scholar as an “Orgy of Violence,”\textsuperscript{31} were implemented and organized by Sri Lankan state authorities.\textsuperscript{32} This is similar to previous rioting to date, yet far greater in scale. Most accounts describe the riots as a Sinhalese reaction to the death of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, who were killed in an ambush in northern Sri Lanka by the fledgling Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).\textsuperscript{33} From July 24–August 5, Sinhalese mobs attacked and destroyed Tamil businesses, killed Tamils and burned homes. The reported death toll varies widely dependent upon the source, with numbers anywhere from 350–2000 killed. Despite their origin in Colombo, the riots eventually spread to as far as Trincomalee. Sinhalese mobs reportedly had voter registration lists with complete addresses of Tamils’ residences, businesses and numbers of family members. Allegedly, members of the government provided these lists to the organized mobs. Another important detail of these riots was the active participation of the Sri Lankan armed forces and military. There are numerous reports that members of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and police not only directed the riots but actively participated in them.\textsuperscript{34} The after effects of the riots were also devastating. The number of refugees was estimated at 80,000–100,000 in the Colombo area alone. The formation


\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 21

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.


of camps to house the refugees created long-term suffering as these Tamils had nowhere to turn because their entire livelihoods had been destroyed.

As a direct result of these atrocities committed against Tamils throughout Sri Lanka, a large number fled the island, and established themselves in India, Australia, Canada, the United States, the UK and many other Western European countries. In fact, according to some estimates, approximately one-quarter of all Sri Lankan Tamils currently live abroad.\(^{35}\) This equates to approximately 600,000–800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils spread throughout over 40 different countries, with the largest concentrations in Canada and the UK.\(^{36}\) In Toronto alone, the Tamil population is larger than the Tamil population in any city within Sri Lanka.\(^{37}\) Although the history of ethnic rioting in post-independence Sri Lanka began as a series of legislative measures that the Tamil community perceived to be antithetical to Tamil interests, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan government reactions to Tamil grievances eventually sparked widespread violence that physically and emotionally destroyed Tamil communities. Arguably, the Diaspora has never forgotten this tragedy. Since 1983, Tamil Diaspora living in Western countries has become a political and economic force. Estimates indicate that, in recent years, the Diaspora raised and supplied 200–300 million USD annually to the Tamil insurgency.\(^{38}\) As of 2000, these funds provided the LTTE with over 80% of its annual budget.\(^{39}\)


During the insurgency, the Diaspora funds allowed the LTTE to acquire high-tech weaponry and were allegedly used to curry political favor from Western politicians.\textsuperscript{40}

Several important inferences can be made in reference to the background of the Sri Lankan conflict. First, the Diasporas’ last real memory was the widespread violence exacted upon them by the Sinhalese, and a Sri Lankan government that was, at best, incapable of stopping the violence or, at worst, contributing in the activity. Second, Tamil political organizations did not initially envision the idea of a separate state. Instead, they desired greater inclusion and enfranchisement in the early days of Sri Lanka. However, as a product of the aforementioned actions, the voices calling for the formation of Tamil Eelam espoused in the body of the militant Tamil youth organizations became louder than the ones calling for peaceful reconciliation. Of course, the activities of the Sri Lankan government perpetuated this shift. Yet, that does not mean that moderate voices were not available, they simply were drowned out by the sounds of Sinhalese mobs and the cries for war and revenge by Tamil youth.\textsuperscript{41} Interestingly enough, the perception of the conditions surrounding the plight of so many within the Diaspora allowed for the LTTE to continually rely upon Diaspora support, not only monetarily, but for political assistance as well. At the time of the 1983 riots, the LTTE had suddenly become the “avenging saviors” of disaffected Tamils.

Immediately following the 1983 riots, the LTTE had no problem finding recruits, as many Tamils who did not flee with the Diaspora volunteered after witnessing the atrocities committed against them.\textsuperscript{42} With notable exceptions, a combination of LTTE “salesmanship,” coupled with the geographic separation of the Diaspora from everyday events in northern Sri Lanka, has allowed this perception largely to remain within the

\textsuperscript{40} Munasinghe, \textit{A Soldier’s Version: An Account of the on-Going Conflict and the Origin of Terrorism in Sri Lanka}, 176. See also, Marks, “At the Front Lines of the GWOT: State Response to Terrorism in Sri Lanka,” 18MAR2010. See also, “Congressman’s Sri Lanka Trip Questioned,” \textit{UPI} August 24, 2006. See also, Winter 1999, \url{http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm77-eng.asp}.


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
Diaspora, facilitating the continual flow of funding and political support. This Diaspora left behind family members and a homeland embroiled in civil war, fought between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and many small Tamil insurgent groups. Arguably the most famous of which, and eventually the largest, was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

After the IPKF pullout in 1990, the LTTE developed into a fearsome insurgency. Using the funding provided by the Diaspora, they rose in number and notoriety. They controlled large areas in northern Sri Lanka. Subsequent operations by the Sri Lankan military during the 1990s and early 2000s were typically met with disaster as the LTTE continually outmaneuvered them on land, sea and air. Mullaitivu provides an example of such clashes in which the LTTE showed an upper hand. In the Battle of Unceasing Waves, the LTTE force of approximately 3000–4000 overran a Sri Lankan Army Brigade camp, which was supported by 122 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars. The result was at least 1520 Sri Lankan military dead; with the artillery and heavy mortars captured. The LTTE is also credited with the development and implementation of the individually-carried suicide vest, which they used to target not only political opponents such as Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan Presidents Premadasa and Kumaratunga, but also other Tamil

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resistance groups. The technology and explosives required to develop such intricate operations and deadly devices derive from the Diaspora’s funding structures.

Yet despite their successes and wealth, the LTTE eventually came to an end. In May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year military offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents as they attempted a desperate last stand, ironically enough, on the beaches in Mullaitivu. The LTTE was once a unit of over 10,000 battle-hardened guerrillas. However, the remnants that attempted this act of desperation consisted of many conscripted young children, who held civilians as human shields. Meanwhile, their core leadership made desperate calls from their makeshift bunkers for American or British protection upon surrender. Arguably, they were only a shell of what was once considered to be one of the most feared insurgent movements of the modern age. This last stand resulted in the death and capture of the last of the holdouts. As proof of the insurgency’s demise, a photo of LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran was released, with a bullet hole in his forehead. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the head of the LTTE’s international diplomatic relations committee, released the following statement: “we have already announced to the world our position to silence our


guns to save our people.”49 With that statement, the Tamil Tigers admitted to a military defeat and the longest running war in South Asia came to an end.50

In the wake of this unprecedented Sri Lankan military victory over the Tamil Tigers, the explanation as to how and why the LTTE, after nearly 26 years of guerilla warfare, allowed itself to reach such an untenable position remain ambiguous. Academicians assert a host of reasons. They range from the restructuring and refurbishment of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces; to Sri Lankan diplomatic outreach to Western countries’ governments, as well as India; to the co-option of a key LTTE leader in 2004, Colonel Karuna, thereby facilitating the pacification of the eastern portion of the island; to the post-9/11 collective international change in perception toward any non-state group that strives for political aims through violence, be they Islamic fundamentalists or Tamil separatists.51 Furthermore, Colombo now offers a training program for foreign armies to learn new counter-insurgency lessons—products from the Sri Lankan Army and their experience against the LTTE.52

As stated previously, this thesis does not detract from the aforementioned reasons for the demise of the LTTE. Instead, it offers a more holistic understanding by analyzing the role of the Diaspora throughout the conflict. As such, the remainder of this thesis is divided into the following sections. Chapter II examines existing research behind insurgent and counterinsurgent theory. In addition, it also analyzes resource mobilization structures and their role in insurgent development. Chapter III operationalizes these theories as they pertain to the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka. Chapter IV explains the significance of 9/11’s aftereffects upon this insurgency. Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis by illustrating the role of the Tamil Diaspora, as analyzed through the realization of theories behind a social movements’ dependencies upon external resource mobilization structures.

49 Pathmanathan, TamilNet: 17.05.09 Dignity and Respect for our People is all we Ask.


51 Rohan Gunaratna, Telephonic conversation with Professor Gunaratna, reference the demise of the LTTE. 21MAY2009. See also, Fair, Urban Battle Fileds of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, 12–13. See also, Arabinda Acharya, Ending the LTTE: Recipe for Counter-Terrorism? (Singapore: RSIS Commentaries, 8JUN2009).

II. THEORIES AND MODELS OF COIN (COUNTER INSURGENCY) AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

As part of their work, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, Leites and Wolf define the relationship between resources that are used to facilitate an insurgent movement. This relationship is described in terms of its sources, endogenous or exogenous, and insurgent techniques in obtaining these inputs, defined as coercion and persuasion. Here, Leities and Wolf use the relationship between these sources and techniques to describe how an insurgency acts as a system, and how the insurgent uses these inputs to create outputs, which allow the insurgency to grow in size and capability. The relationship between coercion and persuasion is particularly useful. Lietes and Wolf assert that coercive practices are beneficial to generating necessary inputs, as well as protecting the insurgency from state security forces, provided that certain conditions are met. The first is that popular perceptions of coercive practices must be predictable. Second, the population must believe that the force using coercion is omniscient and omnipotent. Third, non-compliance must be more painful on the population than the sacrifice involved for complying. And fourth, the more coercion that is used by the insurgent, the greater the requirement for constant vigilance on the part of the coercer. If the insurgent can adhere to these principles while applying coercion, they can continue to tax constituents and develop in size and strength to the point where they can eventually overcome the powers of the state, and achieve their political ends.

Although Lietes and Wolfs’ theoretical arguments provide insight into insurgency growth, a further analysis of insurgent and COIN theory will provide greater understanding in order to form a baseline to compare to the LTTE insurgency.

In his work, *How the Weak Win Wars*, Ivan Arrequin-Toft argues that an insurgent force’s victory is implied for “weak actors” that use “indirect strategies” against

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54 Ibid., 98, 101–9.
strong actors who use “direct strategies” to defeat the weak actor.\textsuperscript{55} Arrequin-Toft defines direct and indirect strategies as follows:

Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight: Toward this end, a GWS [Guerilla War Strategy] targets enemy soldiers, and barbarism [products of direct action strategies] targets enemy noncombatants.\textsuperscript{56}

Arrequin-Toft goes on to argue that by adopting an indirect strategy, the weak actor can defeat the strong actor, provided the strong actor uses a direct strategy. This is because the tactics used by strong actors, or the state, who incorporate direct strategies will tend to target non-combatants in an effort to destroy the insurgent and, hence, galvanize the remainder of the population against the strong actor. Of course, Arrequin-Toft also states that this trend will continue as long as the weak actor, or the insurgent, retains access to sanctuary and social support.\textsuperscript{57} Yet research provided by McCormick et al. provides further resolution on just how an insurgency can grow to a point where it does ultimately defeat a strong actor, not just outlast a strong actors’ political will, as Arrequin-Toft suggests. In this sense, McCormick adds to the Lietes and Wolf model of insurgent growth by describing the process of insurgent growth in further detail. In his work, \textit{Things Come Together; Symbolic Violence and Guerilla Mobilization}, McCormick and Giordano define the mobilization process of an insurgency. Here, as a combination of the impacts of the Arrequin-Toft direct/indirect strategy, combined with an astute manipulation or balance of rational actor models, popular perceptions and resource control, insurgencies can grow to a point where they reach the “insurrection point,” and are capable of taking on the state and winning in direct confrontation.\textsuperscript{58} However, McCormick and Giordano admit that this balance is difficult to achieve and, because of

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 105.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 106.
this, most insurgencies do not last. To clarify this process of dissolution, McCormick et al. go on to describe the insurgent end game in their work *Things Fall Apart, The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars*. In this work, McCormick et al. describe in detail how both the state and the insurgency lose internal conflicts. The inspiration for this work was to describe what the end game looks like, both for insurgent groups and state agencies, within the context of "internal wars" of which an insurgent movement is a part; and to describe these scenarios in order to glean useful information. While defining the insurgent loss, McCormick describes what is termed the "insurgent break point." Here, the state has reduced the size and capability of the insurgency to the degree that the insurgent is no longer capable of "posing an organized threat." The insurgency loses to this degree, yet, according to McCormick: "they can simply return to the civilian landscape at will and live to fight another day." As such, insurgent movements become harder to defeat as state agencies further attrite insurgent numbers. This is because there are fewer of them to find, which requires a greater resilience and increased presence on behalf of the state as the end game draws nearer for the insurgent.

As stated previously, the intention of this thesis is to add to existing research in an effort to come to a conclusion about the demise of the LTTE. The LTTE did not fade into the local background as the state closed in. Instead, they held a desperate last stand on an isolated beach and, at gunpoint, attempted to use the Tamil civilians that they purported to represent as human shields. In the end, the LTTE were destroyed to the last in this manner. This contradicts the gradual decline of the insurgent end game as described by McCormick. The reasons for this contradiction are argued below. The LTTE came to rely on increasing amounts of coercion in order to continue recouping for battlefield losses in fighting cadre. What are arguably absent from the aforementioned arguments are the overall interpretations of increased levels of coercion by insurgent


61 Ibid., 326.

62 Ibid., 334–5.
groups upon constituents in order to garner support for the movement. In other words, if an insurgency such as the LTTE has to rely upon increasing levels of coercion, what does that mean in relation to the populations’ perception of legitimacy toward the insurgency? As previously mentioned, forces that use increased levels of coercion generally are not interested in identifying themselves with constituents, thereby indicating reduced popular perceptions of legitimacy. However, the short answer, according to these theorists, is that the meaning of increased coercion may not matter, provided certain conditions are met.

Yet, in a departure from previous scholarship, I assert that if those conditions suddenly do change, this degraded level of legitimacy matters a great deal. Furthermore, lost legitimacy, which suddenly became so important, will not be quickly restored. In addition, the greater the degree to which the insurgency has been relying on increased coercion in order to generate inputs from constituents, the greater the loss of legitimacy that will be incurred. And to the degree that this loss of legitimacy has been incurred, the greater the importance this loss of legitimacy will become if the environmental situation suddenly changes. For example, if the population perceives that punishment for non-compliance no longer outweighs the benefits for compliance, due to the insurgents’ control over political space having been suddenly wrested away. Or, if the population has the perception that the insurgency no longer is able to carry out said punishment. In such circumstances, the insurgent will have to immediately rely upon legitimacy in order to continue receiving the necessary inputs for protecting itself and carrying out further operations.

In relation to the endogenous and exogenous sources of inputs, Leites and Wolf assume that the sources providing these inputs have complete goal alignment. What if they do not? As mentioned earlier, the specific case of the LTTE highlights that much of the needed support came from the Diaspora, living outside the political space that the LTTE controlled. Although the historical record clearly states that before 1983 this was not the case; the two different sources that came into being are personnel from the Sri Lankan Tamil populations that reside within the political space controlled by the LTTE, and nearly everything else gained from outside the country. The question then remains: what is the effect upon an organization that relies upon this type of support network? To
give a brief preview of things to come, resource mobilization theory suggests that when such a disparity exists between endogenous and exogenous sources, the movement in question will be naturally drawn to, and become goal aligned with, the source providing the greater share of resources.

In their work, *Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory*, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald discuss a series of hypotheses that describe the role and impacts of a varying range of resource mobilization structures upon social movement organizations (SMO). Within their work, several of their hypotheses not only apply to the LTTE case study, they also assist in filling the aforementioned gaps in the existing research concerning insurgencies. The first hypothesis states:

An SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence solidarity incentives is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict… If a SMO favors one over the other it risks legitimacy with the group that falls out of favor.

In order to better understand this hypothesis, a clear definition of terms is warranted. Here, “conscience constituents” are supporters of a social movement organization, in this case the LTTE, but do not directly benefit from the LTTE accomplishing its stated goal of Tamil Eelam. This is due to the fact that they are removed from the situation at hand. This situation describes the Tamil Diaspora perfectly, as they are living in various Western countries, yet their goal is for a separatist state in a third country, to which they have ethnic and familial ties. “Beneficiary constituents,” on the other hand, stand to “benefit” from the LTTE accomplishing its stated goal, meaning that they will directly experience the impacts. Here, the beneficiary constituents represent the Sri Lankan Tamil citizens living in LTTE-controlled areas. Despite the funding and international political support coming from outside the country, it is the local Tamils who will eventually be subjected to Tamil

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64 Ibid., 33.
65 Ibid., 23.
Eelam, which will be run by the LTTE. According to Zald and McCarthy, when a social movement organization, such as the LTTE, attempts to link the two constituents in an attempt at solidarity, or to align interests, there is a high degree of tension. Hence, the SMO inevitably favors one over the other. Consequently, when this happens, the SMO loses legitimacy with the constituent that falls out of favor. Here an important distinction is made. Unlike the previously mentioned research conducted on insurgent movements, Zald and McCarthy do not assume that the endogenous and exogenous sources of necessary insurgent inputs have aligned interests. This hypothesis then attempts to explain what happens when the two structures’ interests bifurcate. Inevitably, the SMO must choose one over the other at risk to its perception of legitimacy with the disaffected group.

The next hypothesis attempts to determine just what source is to be favored. Here Zald and McCarthy assert: “The more dependent an SMO is upon isolated constituents, the greater the share of its resources that will be allocated to advertising.”66 Zald and McCarthy raise an interesting point. Considering that isolated constituents do not exist within the political space controlled by the insurgent, a greater amount of outreach is needed in order to elicit maximum support. The term “advertising” by the authors is an ambiguous term, yet some references can be made for the sake of describing the LTTE and its true motivations behind its interests or goals. The term advertising has been defined in this thesis as the activities that the LTTE has over time conducted to stabilize and/or increase the funding lines or structures. Therefore, by determining the degree of advertising, one can then ascertain what support structure, internal or external, is favored by the insurgent. By determining this, one can further conclude where the insurgency risks a loss of legitimacy, from the individuals within the controlled political space, or outside this political space. This loss of legitimacy can then be applied both before and after the SLAF offensive of 2007–2009 and the effects of 9/11 upon the Diasporas’ resource mobilization structures.

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III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENT DEFINED AND OPERATIONALIZED

In this section, I define the theoretical argument and operationalize the theories on resource mobilization structures in order to develop a clearer understanding of the LTTE’s demise. Also, by providing empirical evidence, I validate claims made in this thesis, and answer our aforementioned research question on the role played, and the effect facilitated, by the Tamil Diaspora’s external resource mobilization structures upon the LTTE from 2007–2009. First, I will illustrate a greater degree of goal alignment between the LTTE and the Diaspora, vis a vis the LTTE and the local Tamil communities. In accordance with Zald and McCarthy’s arguments, this will show a greater LTTE attraction toward the Tamil Diaspora, and a greater distancing of the LTTE from the local Tamil communities. Second, I will show an increased level of coercion exacted upon Tamil communities living in Sri Lanka by the LTTE, in order to garner necessary inputs for the insurgency. Furthermore, there also will be proof of bifurcated interests between the Diaspora/LTTE, and the Sri Lankan Tamil communities that live within LTTE-controlled areas. This will corroborate that as the LTTE became more famous internationally, among the Tamil Diaspora, they became more infamous domestically, amongst a greater number of local Sri Lankan Tamils. The increase of these factors and occurrences from 1983 illustrate a parallel decrease in legitimacy for the LTTE, thereby facilitating the cataclysmic crash of the organization in 2009.

A. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE DIASPORA AND LTTE COERCIVE PRACTICES

The Tamil Diaspora began largely as a by-product of the 1983 riots. At this time, perceptions of the LTTE as a fighting unit, capable of besting the Sri Lankan state, were high. The faith in LTTE capabilities combines with a general displeasure amongst the Tamil Diaspora toward the Sri Lankan state, and served as the foundation for Diaspora/LTTE connectivity.\(^\text{67}\) Initially, however, the Diaspora was not significant.

As a result, the LTTE had to rely upon internal sources in order to fund its campaign. This was largely conducted by robbing the state banks that were in the local area. By robbing these banks, the LTTE gained funding for their operations in the early days, and gained notoriety by attacking the state systems that had disenfranchised Tamil populations. As a result, Sri Lankan (and largely Sinhalese) state agencies that were charged with bringing these bank robbers to justice discovered an uncooperative Tamil community. The capabilities of the LTTE in these early years were arguably limited. In 1983, for example, despite evidence of training in Tamil Nadu, the weapons of the LTTE consisted of small arms; rifles, pistols and shotguns. But once the Diaspora became a force unto itself, the external resources began to pour in. In fact: “by 1991, the LTTE is said to have been supported by about 90% of the Tamil expatriate community.” In addition: “by 1991, the LTTE had established around 30 overseas offices manned by full time activists and helpers.” Coincidentally, it was also during this time that the LTTE began to establish its territory. After the IPKF debacle of 1987–1990 precipitated a complete unilateral pullout of Indian forces, the LTTE quickly filled the void of state absence, especially in the north and northeastern areas. Separate state functions were set up to collect donations for the cause, as well as to process the volunteers who came to join the LTTE. In fact, during these early days, the LTTE had little trouble finding recruits; neither is there evidence of the LTTE coercively pressing Tamils into service. In addition, the LTTE began to brutally execute rival Tamil separatist groups as well as alleged Tamil traitors to the cause. As a result, the LTTE declared itself to be the sole representative of the Tamil people to

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70 Ibid., 47.

71 Ibid., 48.

the Diaspora, as it had eliminated all rivals. It also established a reputation as a brutal organization; a threat to anyone who dared to disagree with its cause.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{B. INDICATORS OF LOST LEGITIMACY—THE INCREASE OF LTTE INTEGRATION WITH THE DIASPORA AND DOMESTIC COERCION}

By 1998, the LTTE was able to collect approximately 24–36 million USD from the Tamil Diaspora, and this increased annually.\textsuperscript{74} In 2000, it was estimated that the Diaspora provided 80% of the LTTE annual operating budget, which in turn was estimated at 82 million USD.\textsuperscript{75} In a later report dated 2007, the estimated revenue provided to the LTTE by the Diaspora was 200–300 million USD annually. An estimated 30–40% of weapons were coming from the Diaspora funding structures and external sources, either set up, or controlled, by the LTTE.\textsuperscript{76} This represents an increase over time from virtually no capability in 1983, to an output of 200–300 million USD annually by 2007. In order to ensure that this funding was maintained and gradually increased, LTTE ties to the Diaspora were further developed. I am relating the term ties not only with advertising, in accordance with Zald and McCarthy’s theory of external resource mobilization structures, but also with interconnectivity. Identifying greater ties to these resource mobilization structures indicates that the LTTE identified more with these structures than they did with local Sri Lankan Tamils.

Although there is evidence that some members of the Tamil Diaspora were coerced into providing funds, political space was not controlled and hence fund raising was in part subject to local law enforcement. To the degree that the LTTE could control political space, they could rely upon extortion and coercion to extract funding and other necessary


\textsuperscript{75} Gunaratna, \textit{Bankrupting the Terror Business}, 10DEC2009.

\textsuperscript{76} Tan and Solomon, \textit{Feeding the Tiger—how Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund their War}, 10DEC2009. See also, Anthony Davis, “Tamil Tigers Continue Procurement,” \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review} (19APR2002).
resources. In large areas of northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s rule was uncontested by the SLAF. However, on the streets of Toronto, London and Paris, LTTE fund raisers had to restrain overtly coercive practices for fear of interdiction by local police. Therefore, it can be concluded that advertising campaigns were used to a greater degree in order to persuade the Tamil Diaspora to provide funds. Reports indicate that as the Diaspora formed and organized, Tamils began to form community associations abroad. The LTTE quickly began to co-opt these organizations. An example of LTTE connectivity with the Diaspora was the alleged infiltration of LTTE agents into the immigration agencies of Diaspora countries. If a Tamil wanted to gain access to the Diaspora, he or she had to go through the LTTE in order to do so. This undoubtedly came at a cost. The LTTE also began to develop front organizations globally in order to siphon funds. In fact: “the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in 2000 that at least eight non-profit organizations and five companies were operating in Canada as fronts for the LTTE.” The LTTE has used many methods to infuse itself to the Tamil Diaspora. Beginning in the 1990s, the LTTE front offices overseas began to use computer files to track and encourage monthly donations from people within the Diaspora.

As of 1998, the LTTE had information and procurement offices in at least 54 countries. As technology developed, this eventually evolved into automatic deposits on a monthly basis from bank accounts. Beginning around 2005, these front offices began using PINs in order to track individuals and donation information. The information on these PINs was sent to LTTE offices in Sri Lanka. This established a central information base for when members of the Diaspora went visiting family members in LTTE-controlled territory. These individuals were also “taxed” the equivalent of 1 USD/CDN/Euro, per day, that the individual in the Diaspora had spent away from the country. Upon arrival, the Diaspora member surrendered his passport or personal

77 Human Rights Watch, Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, 11.
78 International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, 5.
79 Human Rights Watch, Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, 11.
80 Chalk, Commentary no. 77: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and Operations—A Preliminary Analysis.
information to the local LTTE office. The LTTE office would access the information stored in the database to determine the tax owed. Subsequently, the Diaspora member would not be permitted to leave the area until this tax was paid. Additionally, the LTTE co-opted Hindu temples in many Diaspora countries, thereby controlling information through existing social structures and resources.

Information flows were controlled as well. Dissenting opinions to LTTE were considered as antithetical to LTTE objectives, and were therefore subdued. Meanwhile, the LTTE began to set up information venues. These included the Tamil Television Network, Tamilnet.com and various postings on shared media sites such as YouTube.com. These sites, or the imbedded information therein, are considered by many to be the propaganda of the LTTE. Therefore, while there were virtually no links between the LTTE and the Diaspora in 1983, by at least 2007, there were several connections that gave the Diaspora access to information on the situation in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, since these links were allegedly controlled by the LTTE, the information provided to the Diaspora was in complete support of LTTE goals and activities. Because of this, many members of the Tamil Diaspora openly and genuinely supported the LTTE. Even the contentious Human Rights watch report on LTTE coercion within the Diaspora admits:

Many [Tamils in the Diaspora] are active supporters of the LTTE, and perceive the Tigers as an important and effective representative of the Tamil people and their interests. They believe in the LTTE military struggle for independence in the North and East and willingly provide financial support for ‘the cause.’

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81 Human Rights Watch, Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, 11–12 and 35–40.
82 Ibid., 21–4.
83 Ibid., 14–21.
85 Human Rights Watch, Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, 30.
Evidence of open support and attempts to appeal to foreign governments on behalf of the LTTE are present as well. In the United States, the LTTE continually relied on the generous donations from individuals who gave willingly: “out of belief that the efforts of the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy and security for the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.”\textsuperscript{86} The overt support that the Diaspora displays was extreme at times. In February 2009, a British Tamil doused himself in gasoline and lit himself on fire in front of the United Nations in Geneva. The individual left behind a note, which read in part: “The flames over my body will be a torch to guide you through the liberation path.” In fact, this individual was one of seven Diaspora Tamils in the month of February 2009 to have done this. Another Tamil in London tried the same thing, but he was arrested before he could actually light himself on fire.\textsuperscript{87} From the evidence provided above, we can see a definite trend. As the Diaspora grew in size and funding capability, the LTTE grew its global tentacles in order to co-opt these funding lines. Over time, whether through coercion, advertising, or information campaigns, the goals and objectives of the Diaspora and the LTTE became one. This was certainly not true for all Tamils living in the Diaspora. However, a recent report of Diaspora structures suggests that the majority of Tamils within the Diaspora not only supports the LTTE, but a separate Tamil Eelam as well. And they are willing to continue to support the struggle even after the destruction of the LTTE. Such aspirations have become antithetical to the desires of local Sri Lankan Tamils living in northeastern Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{88} Perhaps the statement is a little “tongue in cheek.” However, this sentiment among the Diaspora may have prompted Velupillai Prabhakaran, the now-deceased leader of the LTTE, to admit to the press in a rare 2002 interview that: “his followers would not allow him to renounce this demand [for independent Tamil Eelam] even if he wanted to.”\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{86} Fair, Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements, 125–156, 140–1.


\textsuperscript{88} International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, 19, 23.

\textsuperscript{89} Paul Harris, “Sinhalese Fears Mount as the Partition of Sri Lanka Looms,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 14, no. 5 (MAY2002), 24–27 (accessed 23MAR2010).
As the Diaspora and the LTTE became more intertwined abroad, LTTE recruitment locally became more coercive. This coercion did not happen overnight. Yet reports indicate that over time the LTTE went from having to vet potential candidates from a pool of willing Tamils in the late 80s and early 90s, to having to entrap Tamils in controlled areas.\textsuperscript{90} In the mid–1990s, “social entrapments” were used to impress fighting cadre. A Tamil would be asked to serve in the LTTE civil service; yet, after reporting for work, it was discovered that the LTTE had released information to the Sri Lankan government of the individuals’ affiliation with the LTTE. This act had the effect of virtual imprisonment, as the individual risked incarceration should they ever leave the LTTE-controlled territory again.\textsuperscript{91} By 2006, the families were required to provide one member per household to join the movement. In the later stages of the conflict, this coercion became more pronounced. In fact, one study of LTTE coercion within controlled areas concluded that the LTTE believed that: “what the entrapment mechanisms imply is that attitudinal support [amongst the population] for the rebels no longer is necessary, and that attitudinal support and behavioral support can be separated.”\textsuperscript{92} Attitudinal support is synonymous with popular legitimacy, or the popular identification with LTTE objectives. Behavioral support is simply the act of compliance, regardless of any popular identification with the cause.

As the situation progressed in northern Sri Lanka, the coercion became more pronounced. In 2002, LTTE groups in eastern Sri Lanka were reported to have forcibly abducted children for fighting cadre. If the parents attempted to resist the abduction, they risked having property taken away or incarceration.\textsuperscript{93} By 2007, the LTTE had declared that all Tamil families had to give up more than one child to serve as fighters. Further reports in 1998 include rape being used against individuals not wishing to serve. They also include LTTE commanders being bribed by wealthy or influential Tamils to not


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 315.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 320.

impress certain children; and LTTE cadres forcibly impressing children, by physically pulling them from school or homes to serve. Toward the end in 2009, the LTTE increased its coercion. On 17 March 2009, the LTTE were reported to have shot the parents of a child that they were trying to forcibly recruit; the LTTE then shot the child. “This incident sparked violent protests by the civilians, who forced the [LTTE] cadres to retreat.” Furthermore, in order to protect themselves and perhaps have informational ammunition to feed to the Diaspora, the LTTE cadres forcibly held Tamil civilians in the battle zone, presumably to be used as human shields. By forcing the Tamil civilians to stay, the LTTE hoped that these civilians would become collateral damage incurred by the SLAF offensive. Stories like this give the LTTE leverage over the Diaspora to attract more funding and support. On 13 February 2009, for example:

US Embassy Colombo received a report from a foreign government that the LTTE killed 60 civilians who were fleeing by boat at night. According to reports received by an organization, the LTTE then promised to arrest and detain, rather than shoot, those who sought to escape in the future in order to ease tensions between the LTTE and the civilian population.

The reports of LTTE forcible coercion measures to impress fighting cadres, and killing of civilians who wished to leave the fighting in 2009 are too numerous to recite in this thesis. Yet, a clear trend exists where the LTTE moved from an organization that exhibited high standards, and had a robust group of volunteers, to an organization that committed human rights abuses to replenish its ranks with children in an attempt to survive. Consider also that there isn’t any indication that the SLAF had changed its tactics in order to control the amount of collateral damage inflicted on Tamils from the time of the initial 1983 riots to the LTTE end game of 2009. The U.S. Department of State Report to Congress entails a long and extensive list of intentional SLAF targeting of

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96 Ibid., 23.
Tamil civilians during the end game of 2009. In 1983, these same abuses by the SLAF once pushed the Tamil civilian populations to the LTTE recruiters’ doorstep. Yet by 2009, the LTTE had to gradually increase its coercive practices in order to get cadre. This is a clear indicator of an insurgency that lost local legitimacy.

By looking at the growing trends in LTTE practices and its increasing reliance on the Diaspora, we can see a loss of local legitimacy for the LTTE. The three necessary inputs for an insurgency to grow and achieve political goals are “people, guns and money.” As such, the LTTE, like any other insurgency, is left with the problem of collecting and processing these necessary inputs. And as the level of Diaspora funding grew in size, the LTTE ties to it increased in order to accumulate resource flows, or necessary inputs, to provide for the movement. As these ties to the Diaspora increased, the LTTE reliance on local communities for money, guns and legitimacy decreased. This leaves people as the only necessary commodity left domestically. And as the LTTE reliance on the local communities for everything except people decreased, ties to local grievances decreased. As the LTTE became less tied to local grievances, they relied on greater degrees of coercion in order to garner human capital to fill LTTE ranks, leading to spiral of decreased legitimacy. This relationship is circular, and forms what has been referred to as a “reinforcing causal loop.” In this relationship, the situation progressively gets worse or better, depending on perspective, but not indefinitely. Eventually, the situation will deteriorate or the system will wear out until such a time when a plateau is reached and a reversal begins. I assert that while the aforementioned trend exists, increased LTTE coercion and loss of resonance within local Tamil communities is acceptable as long as the Diaspora continue to maintain such a significant

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flow of resources, and the LTTE is able to control political space, thereby allowing for coercive practices to be effective. However, once these two necessities begin to unravel, they undermine the reinforcing causal loop, and the system will crash as local legitimacy is no longer ensured.

C. BIFURCATION OF INTERESTS AND GOALS: THE LTTE/DIASPORA VS. LOCAL TAMIL CIVILIANS OF NORTHERN AND EASTERN SRI LANKA

Once firmly in power after 1990, the LTTE had little to gain from realizing reintegration in the Sri Lankan government and much to gain economically and politically from the struggle to gain an independent Tamil Eelam. Yet, it was not clear that the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils, still living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, shared this dream of an LTTE-controlled independent Tamil state. This can be seen in the actions that the LTTE took while governing their own political space for about 20 years. As described above, the LTTE’s ties to local grievances over time separated from those of the Sri Lankan Tamil’s within the LTTE-controlled areas, as indicated by the increasing reliance on coercion within LTTE political space to affect behavior. Further evidence will continue to illustrate this trend.

In 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami killed about 37,000 people in Sri Lanka, mostly in LTTE areas. Destruction from the Tsunami was not only limited to Tamil lives but of local infrastructure and livelihood as well. International aid in the form of NGO support was readily available to the LTTE to be used to alleviate human suffering. Yet instead of allowing these organizations to administer the aid directly, the LTTE refused aid from any individual or group that did not funnel all donations through the Tamil


103 Ibid., 634.

104 Ibid., 638.
Relief Organization, which was an LTTE-controlled NGO. There are even reports that the Sri Lankan Army offered to donate drinking water to those affected, but the LTTE turned it away. Further reports indicate that the LTTE had entered into the IDP camps, created to care for survivors of the Tsunami, and forced the children into their fighting cadre ranks. An analysis of LTTE reactions to the Tsunami concluded: “The international response to the Tsunami presented a challenge to the LTTE. The potential for an influx of international civil society organizations would threaten its preeminence and legitimacy as the guardians of the Tamil people.”

This notoriety as the sole guardians of the Tamil people was not intended for the benefit of local Tamil civilians affected by the Tsunami. It was meant to affect the Tamil Diaspora, in order to continue to provide resources and political leverage in support of LTTE agendas. Therefore, the LTTE could not afford to have outside groups assisting Sri Lankan Tamils. These activities would completely undermine the ongoing theme of sole representatives and protectors that the LTTE had been presenting to the Tamil Diaspora. In the mind of the LTTE, undermining the theme meant undermining the resource flows. As such, the interests of the LTTE were to eliminate rivals and ensure the conflict continues in order to secure resources from the Tamil Diaspora, not to reflect local norms, values and address local grievances. Allowing outside activity that would have cared for Sri Lankan Tamils after the Tsunami would have cost the LTTE money, and hence became antithetical to the LTTE agenda. Furthermore, since the LTTE controlled information both into and out of their territory, they could shape the suffering of Sri Lankan Tamils to meet their needs. This opportunity resulted in increased resource flows to LTTE front organizations abroad.

105 Beardsley and McQuinn, Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, 624.


108 Beardsley and McQuinn, Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, 624.

109 Ibid., 639.
The second piece of evidence deals with the Presidential elections of 2005. Here the incumbent, President Wickremesinghe, ran against Mahinda Rajapaske, a hardliner, and advocate of the military solution to the conflict. President Wickremesinghe, on the other hand, had been far more conciliatory toward the Sri Lankan Tamils, and their expectations for a better quality of life. Reports on the issue suggest that President Wickremesinghe offered hope for Tamils and, concurrently, a challenge to the LTTE. This is because an extended peace process affects funding from the Diaspora. War, however, allows the LTTE the legitimacy needed to appropriate more funding from the Diaspora. Tamil groups antithetical to the LTTE, and claiming to be the watchdogs for Tamil rights, also released reports indicating that although President Wickremesinghe was no angel when it came to Sri Lankan Tamils, he had a better track record than the campaign promises of Mahinda Rajapaske. Thus, Wickremesinghe was seen as an opening to negotiations with the state. Officially, the LTTE stated that the election was a Sinhalese affair and that all Tamils in Sri Lanka are forbidden to vote. This restriction on Tamils highlights the LTTEs’ aversion to allowing Tamils freedom of movement in accordance to their own wishes. Tamils who refused to accept the ultimate ascendancy of the LTTE were forcibly denied the right to cast a ballot, and improve their position in life. Furthermore, many argue that this restriction ensured the election of President Rajapaske, who, true to his word, executed the war to its final outcome just short of four years after the election.

In Chapter II, insurgent/counter-insurgent theorists argued that increased coercion, resulting in a loss of popular legitimacy at the local level, may not matter, provided certain conditions are met. Yet, I asserted, that if those conditions suddenly do change, this degraded level of legitimacy will matter a great deal. Furthermore, this loss


of legitimacy, which suddenly became so important, will not be quickly restored. I further argued that to the degree which the insurgency has been relying on increased coercion in order to generate inputs from constituents, the greater the loss of legitimacy that will be incurred. And to the degree that this loss of legitimacy has been incurred, the greater the importance this loss of legitimacy will become if the environmental situation suddenly changes.

The qualitative analysis thus far has demonstrated that, from roughly 1983 up until the final end game of 2007–09, the LTTE could control its own political space and continually develop in strength through the use of coercion at the local level to gain recruits. Furthermore, during this span, they continued to gain required inputs from the international community in the form of political legitimacy, weapons and money to continually fund and resource campaigns. Yet what continued to result was an increasing dependence on the global Diaspora as well as an increasing loss of legitimacy at the local level. What is needed now is an event that provides us with a variance to assist us in developing not only a relationship between the Diaspora resources and local legitimacy, but also provides us with a clearer picture of the cause for the organizations’ demise.
IV. THE CATACLYSMIC EVENT—9/11

The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) ushered a change in U.S. foreign and domestic policy, and also a change in how international actors view and operate against all terrorist groups globally.\(^{114}\) However, this change did not happen overnight, nor is it complete. It is an interdiction of degrees that reached an apex around 2006–2007. In the end, the Diaspora was just as desperate to save the LTTE from annihilation as the LTTE was in being saved by them. However, respective governments, after witnessing LTTE activities and feeling the effects of the 9/11 attacks, were no longer interested in helping any non-state group that engaged in terrorism.\(^{115}\) The following information is pieced together from a host of wide ranging sources in order to develop an understanding of the gradual interdiction of the Diaspora, both temporally and spatially.

Before 9/11, only two countries declared the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), India in 1992, and the United States in 1997.\(^{116}\) Rohan Gunaratna, in a report from 2000 states that: “Overall, the domestic and international response aimed at combating terrorist infrastructures, including financial networks has been weak or non-existent.”\(^{117}\) For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE gained funding, political favor, held rallies, and enjoyed being viewed as a legitimate freedom movement. This was due to the efforts of the Tamil Diaspora that saw the LTTE as an extension of their desires for justice in Sri Lanka.\(^{118}\) It was only after the events of 9/11 that other countries with large

\(^{114}\) Fair, *Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements*, 125–156, 144–5.


\(^{118}\) Byman and others, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, 47.
Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora populations took any action against curtailing the fundraising activities of the group. However, once started, these activities increased in number. In 2001, Great Britain and Australia designated the LTTE as a FTO. The Patriot Act of 2001 and subsequent Anti-Terrorist Financing Act affected the LTTE in the US, the UK and Canada. Originally, this act did not label the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Consequently, funds were not tracked and frozen like the various Islamic terror groups the act had intentionally targeted. However, in an effort to gain support for the Global War On Terrorism internationally, the United States added unrelated terrorist groups, and in October 2001 froze LTTE assets. Britain and Canada also began freezing LTTE assets in February and November of 2001, respectively.

In addition, many Tamils declined to provide funds to the LTTE for fear of legal action. Law enforcement authorities also began to mobilize and interdict various elements of the Tamil Diaspora and the associated LTTE foreign offices. The LTTE occasionally used Tamil youth gangs in order to collect funds or deter Tamils antithetical to the cause. In October 2001, Canadian Police arrested 40 Tamil gang members in a series of raids in Toronto. In 2003, the Thai authorities arrested and imprisoned three Tamil LTTE operatives attempting to buy weapons in Thailand. This marked the first

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119 Ibid. See also, Fair, Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements, 125–156. See also, Gunaratna, Bankrupting the Terror Business, 10DEC2009.
123 Fair, Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements, 125–156, 145.
124 Jayasekara, LTTE Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations.
time Thai authorities had interdicted Tamil weapons procurement in their country.\cite{125} In 2005, the British Charity Commission delisted the TROs’ UK office as a charitable organization.\cite{126} In 2006, Canada proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, making it illegal to support or conduct fundraising on the groups’ behalf.\cite{127} In April 2006, the RCMP conducted a raid on the World Tamil Movement’s headquarters in Montreal.\cite{128} In the United States, a combined FBI/RCMP operation netted several LTTE-associated Tamils who were trying to bribe State Department officials, and purchase shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.\cite{129} In 2006, the EU proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.\cite{130} In 2007, Intelsat Ltd., a Washington D.C.-based company, banned the Tamil Television Network from using its system. The network then moved to Paris, and began televising its LTTE propaganda again. However, in May 2007, French authorities shut it down, under the new provisions of the FTO designation that the EU adopted the previous year.\cite{131}

In April 2007, the leader of the LTTEs’ office in Paris, and 13 others, were arrested on charges of “financing terrorism” and “criminal associations with a terrorist enterprise.” The LTTE then sent a replacement to France, to oversee operations. He was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \cite{125} Anthony Davis and Andy Webb-Vidal, “Lords of War—Running the Arms Trafficking Industry,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (18APR2008).
  \item \cite{126} Jayasekara, LTTE Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations.
  \item \cite{127} Stewart Bell, “Exclusive Tamil Tigers Outlawed: Group Added to Canada’s Terror List,” National Post, sec. NEWS, April 8, 2006 (accessed 24MAR2010).
  \item \cite{128} Stewart Bell, “Police Raid Tamil Group’s Office,” National Post (Canada), sec. NEWS, 17April2006 (accessed 25MAR2010).
  \item \cite{130} “Sri Lanka Urges EU to Add Tamil Tigers to List of Terrorists,” BBC Monitoring South Asia24APR2006 (accessed 24MAR2010).
  \item \cite{131} Tamil Television Network (TTN) Shut Down Today Afternoon. See also, Jayasekara, LTTE Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations. See also, Singh, Targeting LTTE’s Global Network. See also, Sri Lanka Thanks Foreign Help for Curbing Terrorism.
\end{itemize}
in turn arrested in September 2007 by French authorities.\textsuperscript{132} In April 2007, Karunakaran Kandasamy, the head of the LTTE office in the United States was arrested by the FBI. Evidence collected from the arrest alluded to a front organization, the World Tamil Coordinating Committee having raised millions for the LTTE.\textsuperscript{133} In May of 2007, Australian authorities arrested two LTTE Tamils who were involved in a fraudulent campaign to collect money for Tsunami relief victims. The relief organization was actually an LTTE front, and authorities seized over 520,000 USD in assets.\textsuperscript{134} In June 2007, the president of the British Tamil Association, Arunachalam Chrishanthakumar, was arrested by British authorities, for violating laws under the British Terrorism Act. A British court later froze all of his assets, worth four billion pounds sterling.\textsuperscript{135}

This list does not encompass all interdiction efforts. There are hundreds of examples of international law enforcement crackdowns on LTTE and Diaspora funding structures. The vast majority of them happened after 9/11, and the vast majority of these efforts occurred only after 2006. Interestingly enough, it is also during this time in Sri Lanka that President Rajapakse was preparing for an all-out final solution to the LTTE through military means. Arguably, just when the LTTE needed them most, the Diaspora had been interdicted to the degree that it was unable to assist. The culmination of this change of international attitudes was the Diasporas’ response when the annihilation of the LTTE seemed most imminent, and their respective governments’ response seemed aloof. In several cities where the Diaspora lived, Tamil groups held rallies for their governments to intervene on behalf of the LTTE. These rallies were received with deaf ears as most of these countries had already proscribed the LTTE a terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{136} Today, the

\begin{footnotes}
\item 132 Ibid. See also, Singh, \textit{Targeting LTTE’s Global Network}.
\item 134 Ibid. See also, Singh, \textit{Targeting LTTE’s Global Network}.
\item 135 Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Tamil Diaspora has largely adopted new forms ofpressuring not only their respective governments but the government of Sri Lanka as well. These new forms are in the political arena. However, the Diaspora still clings to its goal of an independent Tamil Eelam. In reference to this persistent goal, the most recent International Crisis Group report states: “Even these activities are out of step with the wishes and needs of Tamils in Sri Lanka.”137

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137 International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, 23.
V. CONCLUSION

There was a time in the history of Sri Lanka when the Army dared not enter the Wanni jungles for fear of being swallowed up by massed LTTE assaults, and the Navy dared not to encroach upon the territorial waters of the LTTE for fear of being attacked by swarms of fast-attack gunboats and suicide bombers. Yet in the final hours of the life of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, he sat in all that was left of his once vast territory—a makeshift bunker on a stretch of lonely beach. Surrounded by the same Sri Lankan forces that he used to attack with impunity, the Sri Lankan army to his front, the ocean and the Sri Lankan navy to his rear, and accompanied by what was left of his organization: mostly child soldiers and a few hundred civilians whom he had forced at gunpoint to join him. In this surreal setting, one can almost hear Prabhakarans’ thoughts: “how in the world did it come to this…?”

At the beginning of this thesis, I posed the following question: “from the perspective of an external resource mobilization structure, what were the long-term impacts of the Diaspora upon the end-game of the LTTE?” This thesis has laid out evidence from a plethora of sources in order to answer this question. I asserted that the capabilities of the Diaspora provided an exorbitant amount of funding and political legitimacy to the LTTE. Furthermore, the goals of the Tamil Diaspora and the goals of local Sri Lankan Tamils, still living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, bifurcated over time. This bifurcation was a product of geographical separation from the conflict area, Diaspora ecology, LTTE co-option of Diaspora structures, and persistent information campaigns provided to the Diaspora from LTTE controlled media after the exodus from the homeland. The LTTE then became more inexorably linked to the Diaspora than to Tamil grievances at the local level. By increasing the linkages to the Diaspora, the LTTE risked the loss of legitimacy with the local Tamils. As legitimacy was lost so was attitudinal support. This loss in attitudinal support was then replaced by LTTE reliance upon coercion to ensure behavioral support of local Tamils. The result was an ever-increasing use of coercion locally in order to gain the amount of recruits necessary to continue operations in Sri Lanka. As such, the LTTE became less concerned in actually
representing local Tamil interests and more concerned in selling the perception of being the sole representative of the Tamil struggle to the vast Diaspora. Over time, it purported itself as the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and champion of Tamil Eelam not to win a war of succession, but to facilitate the continual flow of monetary support to its coffers. The actual plight of local Tamils became less and less of a concern to the LTTE.

However, with relative sovereignty achieved, meaning that the LTTE controlled its own political space (due in large part to the Diasporas’ funding and political relationships with Western governments), they were able to administrate over their own political space as they saw fit. The effect of legitimacy loss was negligible. If local behavior was antithetical to their struggle (for example, local reluctance to provide children for fighting cadre), they could simply increase the coercion and alter the behavior. Local loss of legitimacy was a matter of degree, and not entirely complete. However, this loss of legitimacy became very important to the LTTE when their political environment changed. Beginning in 2007, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces began to remove political space from the LTTE, and the entire system came crashing down. The loss of legitimacy became instantly apparent as the LTTE could not simply “melt” into the social landscape of the Tamil peoples, many of whom no longer saw the LTTE as their saviors, but as usurpers. The LTTE had one option left, coerce locals into helping the cause by providing fighters or stand in as human shields, fight the Sri Lankan Armed Forces as long as possible, and rely upon the Diaspora to come to their aid. However, the events of 9/11 adversely affected the international communities’ perception of violent groups. Thus, the desperate last stand on the isolated beach in Mullaitivu, the desperate calls for help to Western countries, the Diasporas’ parades and rallies to save what was left of their avenging angels, all resulting in the termination of the once feared Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

A. IMPACT ON FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis also provides a useful case study for a certain typology of insurgent organization. I have argued that the LTTEs’ single greatest asset, the large external
resource mobilization structure embodied by the Tamil Diaspora, also proved to be a curse. As such, we can learn valuable lessons from an insurgent typology that resembles this same funding source.

This thesis essentially analyzes a case study, yet determines the effect of an external resource structure upon an insurgent group. Arguably, the LTTE presented an extreme typology, where they had become almost entirely dependent upon the Diaspora. Because of their dependence on this external resource structure, as well as their firm control over areas of northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE may be representative of other movements that become unevenly dependent upon one source of inputs over another. What happened to the LTTE may therefore inadvertently happen to other insurgent groups with the same style support structure. Insurgents who depend heavily upon outside support structures that are not goal aligned with local expectations and values in order to receive the necessary inputs for conducting insurgent operations will also be dependent on a high degree of control over their own political space. Consequently, they may also be vulnerable to local losses of legitimacy. Therefore, if both external resource structures were interdicted to a certain degree, and control over political space was wrested away, even temporarily, the insurgent movement would inevitably crash. Adversely, the opposite may also be true. In this case, an insurgent movement that does not rely upon external resource structures may not be reliant upon control over political space. Consequently, they may become tied to local expectations and values out of sheer necessity, and hence not susceptible to local losses of legitimacy. Therefore, large conventional pitched battles to wrest away political space, coupled with attempts to interdict respective external resource structures will have no effect upon the insurgent organization. To a degree, this lesson seems to be absent from many works that catalog the contributing factors of the LTTEs’ demise. The most recent publication of Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center lists seven contributing factors for the demise of the LTTE:
1) Generating political will on the part of Colombo and the Karuna split were decisive.

2) Securing the Eastern Front first before attacking the north. Largely done with the assistance of Karuna.

3) Conducting tactically sound operations that destroyed LTTE defenses. The Sri Lankan Armed forces used conventional fire and maneuver, at times employing Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to soften LTTE positions.

4) Newly professionalized and rapidly expanded force greatly outnumbered the LTTE.

5) Securing the rear guard from LTTE attacks and infiltrating LTTE areas with special commando units.

6) Creating a pocket with multiple coordinated division size attacks in order to safeguard against escape and channel the LTTE into one area.

7) Diplomatic outreach to countries that historically had been friends to the LTTE, especially India.\textsuperscript{138}

I am not attempting to discount these conclusions. The improvements made by the SLAF, as well as the political will of Colombo and its improved diplomatic outreach, certainly assisted in defeating the LTTE. However, consider if the LTTE in this environment had retained a high degree of local legitimacy. I argue that if this were the case, they simply would have vanished into the civilian landscape once the SLAF began their large conventional push. Furthermore, the conventional fire and maneuver of the

SLAF would have only succeeded in inflaming local Tamils, who suffered greatly from the application of overwhelming SLAF firepower. Finally, it is highly doubtful that any infiltration of SLAF commando units would have remained for long had the social conditions not been in their favor to a certain degree. A civilian population that remained completely loyal to the LTTE would not have tolerated infiltration units trying to destroy their beloved Tigers in their backyards for very long. Finally, the repressive actions of the Sri Lankan government toward the Tamil populations are well documented. Without the detrimental effects of 9/11 upon the international community to supplement the Sri Lankan diplomatic missions, I argue that these efforts would not have been as successful. Finally, I assert that legitimacy matters. Despite efforts to diminish legitimacy’s importance and replace it with the supremacy of behavioral support; a legitimate movement in the eyes of the local population pays countless benefits should the campaign suddenly and unexpectedly take a turn for the worse. The final days of Prabhakaran and the LTTE provide an excellent example of the necessity of legitimacy, and what happens to movements that forget this lesson.
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