

South Asia

by John C. Holzman

Overview. South Asia accounts for one-fifth of humanity but is, geographically and culturally, far from the United States—“on the backside of the world,” as one senior official commented. Perhaps because of distance and an American perception that South Asia’s large population represents strategic weakness rather than strength, it has not been an important region for U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the United States has tried to fit South Asia into larger, global strategies, rather than addressing it on its own terms.

To continue to view the subcontinent as a backwater imperils significant U.S. global and regional interests. Indo-Pakistani relations are as bitterly tense as ever, and a serious confrontation of some type is a near certainty during the next several years. The exact form of the next crisis cannot be predicted, but its consequences could be catastrophic if it were to spin out of control and result in a nuclear exchange. Research conducted by the Naval War College indicates that nuclear war between India and Pakistan could result in casualties in the millions, a breakdown in governance in both countries, and the largest humanitarian crisis in history. Pakistan’s own dubious

stability as a viable state, its growing Islamic militancy with a global reach, and an emerging competition between China and India that could take the form of an arms race, all further complicate the South Asian security scene and render it more tenuous.

These sobering realities highlight the need for the new administration to develop a strategy that will lead India and Pakistan to adopt transparent nuclear weapons postures that encourage regional stability and reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, either by intention or by inadvertence. To succeed, the strategy must accept the reality of a nuclear South Asia and address the regional dynamics that caused India and Pakistan to develop weapons of mass destruction. Achieving these goals will require greater investment in a broader and deeper Indo-U.S. security relationship that yields influence over Indian strategic thinking and action. The United States must also rebuild its relationship with Pakistan, engage the military in several areas critical to the United States, and halt the slide from friendship into outright animosity.

Policy Context

During the Cold War, as part of the policy of containing the Soviet Union, the United States supplied Pakistan with modern arms, despite Indian protests

This paper was prepared by Ambassador John C. Holzman, distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Mr. Holzman can be contacted at (202) 685-2229 or holzmanj@ndu.edu.

that U.S. weapons would be used against it and not the Soviets. India also complained that the United States ignored or acquiesced in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which came from China, while trying to restrict India's own access to dual-use technology. Even though India eventually developed its own security relationship with the Soviet Union, it bitterly resented U.S. willingness to disregard its concerns about Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan claimed to be the "most allied of U.S. allies" in the Cold War, even as it stubbornly resisted U.S. policies that it believed would impinge on its competition with India.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, U.S. South Asia policy has marched to the tune of another global containment policy—that of containing the spread of nuclear weapons. During most of the 1990s, the U.S. mantra was that India and Pakistan should "cap, reduce, and eliminate" their nuclear weapons programs. The specific policy objectives were to gain Indian and Pakistani support for global treaties banning nuclear tests and capping the production of fissile materials. This approach was consonant with U.S. support for the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but ignored the security perceptions that impelled the two nations' weapons programs, most particularly their conflict over Kashmir, Indian concerns about the role of China in the region, and Indian belief that nuclear weapons were key to acceptance as a great power. Pakistan, especially, was a target of U.S. nonproliferation policy in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, within one year of the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan, a decision that—perversely—contributed to an even greater reliance on missiles and nuclear weapons to deter India. U.S. nonproliferation policy was fundamentally challenged in May 1998 when first India, and then Pakistan, conducted underground nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear weapons states.

Indo-Pakistani Relations

While the Indian and Pakistani nuclear blasts added a new and dangerous element to an increasingly unstable region, they did not alter the fundamental conflict between the two nations. Pakistan continues to confront India in Kashmir by providing

logistical and political support for militant organizations contesting Indian control. Exchanges of artillery fire across the Line of Control (LOC) are a daily event. The violence reached a new level with the Kargil incursion, the first attempt by Pakistan to seize and to hold territory on India's side of the LOC since 1965. India counterattacked to regain lost territory while threatening to broaden the conflict. Following 6 weeks of intense fighting—and the personal intervention of President Clinton—Pakistani forces withdrew. Chief Executive Musharraf apparently initiated, planned, and implemented the Kargil operation with at least the tacit agreement of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It is not known if Pakistan calculated that its overt nuclear deterrent gave it the strategic cover to risk Kargil, but it might have been an element in the decision to go forward with the operation.

Since Kargil, Indo-Pakistani relations have moved from one new low to the next, and they are now frozen with little or no contact at the political level. The Indian National Security Advisory Board "draft report" on nuclear doctrine, issued shortly after Kargil, could not have been reassuring to Pakistan. It declared not only a no-first-use policy but also stated that India would develop a "triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets" and that "any threat of use of nuclear weapons" would be countered. While official Indian policy on nuclear weapons is less contentious than the draft report, New Delhi has not disavowed it, leaving Pakistan to draw its own conclusions based on worst-case scenarios.

Shortly after the military coup in Pakistan, India adopted a policy that it still follows of trying to isolate Islamabad internationally, and it now refuses to deal with Pakistan's military government either bilaterally or within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. India has also stated that it will discuss Kashmir with Pakistan only when violence across the LOC has stopped. New Delhi has repeatedly called on the United States to declare Pakistan a terrorist state.

Relations hit rock bottom in December 1999 when Islamic militants of the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen—one of the major militant organizations in Kashmir—hijacked an Air India flight that eventually came to rest in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the home base of the Taliban. The hijackers demanded the release from an Indian jail of a Pakistan-born cleric and two other individuals who had been active in the Kashmiri struggle. The Taliban presided over the

negotiations, and India eventually gave in, releasing all three prisoners. The cleric immediately returned to Pakistan and publicly called for *jihad* against India and the United States. Even though Pakistan condemned the hijacking, it is widely believed in India that Islamabad was directly responsible.

The hijacking incident was emblematic of the changing complexion of the Kashmiri insurgency, which began in 1989 as an indigenous struggle against Indian rule. Pakistan quickly moved to support the insurgents, partly in hopes of taking Kashmir from India, partly to bleed India in Kashmir. Even though many, if not most, Kashmiris were no more anxious to be part of Pakistan than of India, Pakistan's moral, diplomatic, and material support was welcome. What was not realized at the time was that with Pakistani aid came growing numbers of Islamic militants, often trained in Afghanistan and bent on continuing the Afghan *jihad* in Kashmir. This was a natural development since the Inter Service Intelligence Directorate—the Pakistani military organization responsible for funneling money and equipment to the Kashmiri insurgency—had previously channeled U.S. and Saudi assistance to Islamic groups fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Militants associated with these groups now flocked to the Kashmiri cause. For years Pakistani military units have helped these *jehadis* to cross the LOC into Kashmir, and many of their organizations openly raise funds and recruit fighters in Pakistan. However, Pakistan is unable to control the actions of these groups fully, and one of their operations could easily spark a full-fledged Indo-Pakistani confrontation.

During the summer of 2000, Pakistan blocked an incipient dialogue between the Hizbul Mujahideen, a major Kashmiri insurgent group, and New Delhi. The Hizbul Mujahideen declared a unilateral cease-fire and apparently was willing to talk to India, but Pakistan would not sanction discussions from which it was excluded. Pressure from Islamabad, as well as belated Indian conditions for the talks, caused the Hizbul Mujahideen to back out and to end the cease-fire. The lesson to be drawn from the affair is that while Pakistani and Kashmiri goals may not be identical, Pakistan has the means to veto an exclusive Indo-Kashmiri dialogue. Given India's own commitment to keep Kashmir within the Indian Union, the chances for an early settlement are small.

Pakistan's Decline

Pakistan's own uncertain political and economic future is an additional and very real element of instability in the region. Since the October coup, Chief Executive Musharraf has struggled with mixed results to cope with his country's multitude of problems—a failed political system, a bankrupt economy, institutional decay, a breakdown in law and order in many areas, growing Islamic sectarianism, declining social indicators, and precarious relations with India. Musharraf's failure to carry through on several key reforms has already compromised to some degree his government's legitimacy, which rests on its ability to get things done. He has stated that he intends to hold national elections by October 2002, and Pakistani elites are calculating if he indeed will give up power or stay on. Under any circumstances, based on the results of past military interventions, Pakistani elites probably will find ways to co-opt his reforms to serve their own ends.

To avert default, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will most likely agree to a short-term bailout before the end of 2000, which will be combined with World Bank lending and another Paris Club debt rescheduling. However, Pakistan will surely be on a short leash, and any cash payments will be released in tranches, each slice conditioned on the implementation of reforms made all the more difficult by Musharraf's dwindling domestic credibility. The Fund will surely insist that Pakistan begin taxing agricultural inputs and income, policies that if implemented would directly challenge the well-being and authority of the country's powerful feudal elites. It is unlikely that Musharraf's government or its successor will be able to stay the course of an IMF stabilization program.

Even if Musharraf achieves some progress in the coming months and years, the country's problems are too deeply rooted to expect a near- or even medium-term revival in Pakistan's prospects. The next government—whether civilian or military—will certainly face huge political and economic challenges and will rely increasingly on Islam as a unifying ideology. Nawaz Sharif's government was already moving in this direction prior to the coup as it attempted to incorporate Islamic elements into the country's legal and economic systems. With the Muslim League and People's Party tainted by corruption on a grand scale, it is possible that an avowedly Islamic party such as Jamaat-I-Islami could fill the political vacuum and

have a major role in an elected government. Given this context, the struggle for Kashmir will remain at the top of the agenda of the successor government because it is the one cause around which virtually all Pakistanis will rally.

Whatever the nature of the next government, the military will retain a strong and even decisive voice in Pakistani national security policy. By tradition, temperament, and ideology, the military is fully committed to a hard line in Kashmir. Musharraf himself is a strong advocate of this point of view. Many officers are also convinced that the insurgency ties down Indian troops, who otherwise would be confronting Pakistani units across the border from Punjab, Pakistan's largest province. While Musharraf and other military leaders would not advocate trying to take Kashmir through conventional military action, they will insist on supporting and to some degree directing the insurgency against Indian rule. They may also believe that Pakistan's nuclear capability, which is intended to deter both nuclear and large conventional attacks from India, allows them to take greater risks to achieve their ends. The Kargil incursion was an example of their commitment and their potential for miscalculation.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Postures

Since the May 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have each stated their intention to maintain "a minimum, credible nuclear deterrent," and there is no reasonable prospect that either will roll back their nuclear weapons program. Both sides believe that nuclear weapons are important to their security, and in each country the programs enjoy huge popular support. In general, India has the policy initiative, and Pakistan will counterpunch in response to any Indian move but will rarely take a unilateral step on its own. Bellicose statements from India will surely cause Pakistan to pursue its own programs with even greater intensity.

Both India and Pakistan have begun to develop policies to govern their nuclear operations and management, but neither has spelt out what "a minimum, credible deterrent" means in terms of numbers and types of weapons or how they would be deployed. Both probably still store their weapons separate from their delivery systems. India has stated that its program is entirely defensive and has declared a no-first-use policy. Pakistan has declined to declare a no-first-use policy, and its program is clearly aimed at

detering a large conventional or nuclear attack from India. However, it is doubtful that Pakistan has defined under what conditions it would resort to nuclear weapons. It is possible that Pakistan might delegate authority to deploy or to launch weapons to a theater commander, raising the possibility of use by misperception or miscalculation. Neither side has fully reliable and complete intelligence about the other's programs, deployments, or intentions. Pakistan has created a combined civilian/military National Command Authority to direct its nuclear weapons program, but the military will certainly have effective authority over the country's nuclear weapons. India's weapons program is under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. It is possible that India's weapons may remain under the physical control of the official scientific community while the military controls the delivery systems.

Both countries are rightly concerned about the risk of an accidental or unintended exchange, and their Prime Ministers agreed in Lahore in 1999 to begin consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with the aim of adopting confidence-building measures. They also agreed to notify the other in advance of ballistic missile tests, to undertake national measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and to develop mechanisms for warning the other side of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident. However, in the wake of the post-Kargil freeze in relations, none of these confidence-building proposals has been implemented.

The China Factor

India and China are rising Asian heavyweights, each craving the recognition and deference that accompany great power status and each locked in a wary rivalry with the other that could dramatically alter the calculus of Asian security. China's economy is about 10–15 years ahead of India's, although Indian entrepreneurs are on the cutting edge of the information technology revolution. To India's chagrin, China occupies a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and under the NPT is legally defined in perpetuity as a "nuclear weapons state." Nehru had hoped that India and China would cooperate rather than compete, and *Hindi, Chini Bhai Bhai* (India, China Brothers) were to be the watchwords of the bilateral relationship.

The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 shattered those dreams. China went on to develop a security relationship with Pakistan, transferring nuclear weapons, missile technology, and equipment to the latter with the clear intent of checking India and tying it down in South Asia. The United States, seeking to normalize and to improve relations with China, did not take firm action against the transfers. To the contrary, the Pressler Amendment was passed in 1985 to allow U.S. shipments of conventional weapons to Pakistan to continue even as China assisted Pakistan's nuclear program. During the 1990s, the United States refused to apply its law fully to the Chinese sale of nuclear-capable M-11 missiles to Pakistan. India's security relationship with the Soviet Union was partially aimed at China, and in justifying its 1998 nuclear tests and ballistic missile programs, India pointed to China as its major long-term security concern. China is now embarking on a military modernization program to strengthen its nuclear deterrent, possibly including the introduction of mobile, solid fuel, multiple-warhead long-range missiles. Such a Chinese move could spur India to apply more resources to its programs, which, in turn, would cause Pakistan to react as well.

Indo-U.S. Relations Rising

Indo-U.S. relations improved markedly over the past decade, culminating in President Clinton's visit to India and Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the United States. The visits acknowledged a qualitative change in each nation's perception of the other: India recognizes that U.S. predominance in the post-Cold War world and that improved bilateral ties are to its advantage. The United States recognizes that India has the potential to join China and Japan as a major Asian power. Both leaders have committed their governments to regular and high-level political dialogue and consultations. The United States has also begun consulting with India on Afghanistan, a major symbolic step since the United States and Pakistan were allies during the war in Afghanistan, while India backed the Soviet Union. The United States and India have also formed a working group on terrorism, a key development given India's accusations against Pakistan.

While the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation continues to cast a deep shadow across the relationship, it is no longer the central element in the U.S.

approach to India. In his speech to the Indian Parliament, President Clinton acknowledged India's security perceptions and stated clearly the U.S. belief that India's nuclear weapons program was a mistake; he has also slowly—but steadily—waived sanctions imposed immediately after the nuclear tests. For his part, Prime Minister Vajpayee has committed not to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from coming into force and not to conduct further nuclear tests. Given the U.S. Senate's own rejection of the CTBT, this promise is all that can be reasonably expected, even though at a rhetorical level the Clinton administration continues to make Indian accession to the test ban treaty the touchstone of its South Asian policy. The relaxing sanctions regime, however, indicates that the two countries may finally be nearing the point of agreeing to disagree.

In the critical area of security relations, the two nations have begun to discuss a resumption of military cooperation, although for now such activities would be limited to dialogue and joint exercises on peacekeeping, environmental security, search and rescue, and humanitarian disaster relief. There is also a robust and rapidly growing international military education and training (IMET) program in which India is an enthusiastic participant—a sharp break with past Indian policy. India has suggested a revival of the moribund Defense Policy Group, but the United States demurred—at least for now. Some nuclear sanctions remain in place (for example, restrictions on sales or transfers of dual-use equipment or technology to companies or organizations that make a material contribution to India's nuclear program). There are also restrictions on transfers of conventional military technology and equipment. India is keenly interested in acquiring U.S. technology.

U.S.-Pakistan Relations Sinking

With the passing of the Cold War, the United States has taken a much tougher line with Pakistan and its policies in the region than it ever had previously, and bilateral relations have deteriorated steadily and dangerously as a consequence. U.S. credibility and influence in Pakistan are now at an all-time low, the product of 10 years of U.S. nuclear sanctions, opposition to Pakistan's support for or links to Islamic terrorist organizations, and strong disapproval of a military government. Pakistan regards the layers of U.S. sanctions as a betrayal, an example of U.S.

willingness to use and to discard a friend. Visibly improving Indo-U.S. relations exacerbate Pakistan's bitterness toward the United States and probably induce the Pakistan leadership to feel even more embattled and isolated. Virtually all U.S. sanctions against Pakistan remain in force, although some are now the result of the military takeover or substantial arrears on debts owed to the United States. Military-to-military contacts are infrequent, especially at the policy level, because the United States does not wish to appear to condone the overthrow of an elected government. The administration may well abstain on the upcoming IMF bailout package.

The United States has deep misgivings about Pakistani support for the Taliban, a movement that tramples on the human rights of a large percentage of Afghanistan's population, especially women, and allows terrorists and narcotics traffickers to operate from its soil. Pakistan was the first country to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan and is their chief international backer, providing the logistical support, weapons, military advisors, and perhaps some troops who fight with the Taliban in their effort to conquer all of Afghanistan. Pakistan is also the principal logistical base and gateway to the world for landlocked Afghanistan. The Taliban have open access to Pakistan's transportation, communication, and financial links to the international economy, and they freely recruit fighters in Pakistan.

The United States is especially frustrated by Pakistani unwillingness to use its leverage to convince the Taliban to give up Osama bin Laden—the mastermind of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa—and to expel other militants from Afghanistan. Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders argue that they have tried their best and that the United States exaggerates their influence over the Taliban. There may be some truth in this contention, but it is difficult to imagine Musharraf's government actively assisting in the extradition of bin Laden—a hero to many Muslims—to the United States to stand trial for murder. If the attack on the *USS Cole* is linked to bin Laden or other militant groups based in Afghanistan, the United States will almost certainly retaliate in some way, placing even greater stress on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Elements of a New Strategy

War in South Asia is a real possibility, but now with potentially more devastating consequences given Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities. Neither side is prepared at this time to make the compromises necessary for a settlement in Kashmir, which remains the most likely flashpoint. The military government in Pakistan and its successor will continue to support the Kashmiri insurgency because it is the one policy that unifies all Pakistanis. The activities of Islamic militant groups, which Pakistan assists but cannot control, render the situation all the more unpredictably volatile. No Indian government, especially a coalition government with a Hindu nationalist party at its head, will agree to negotiate with Pakistan so long as the latter fuels the insurgency in Kashmir. Under these conditions, the key ingredients of a new strategy should be:

Aiming Low. At this point, the best that can be expected is medium- to long-term crisis management (namely, improving the prospects for regional stability by fostering an atmosphere whereby India and Pakistan can better manage their differences and avoid conflict). The first goal should be to convince India to abandon its shortsighted and counterproductive policy of isolating Pakistan. Regular political level contacts are essential to regional stability and are in both countries' interests. Pakistan should understand that if it insists on including Kashmir as a precondition for progress on other issues, it risks a resumption of the policy of isolation, especially if cross-border violence continues unabated.

Accepting the Reality of a Nuclear South Asia. Encouraging the development of a regional restraint regime based on confidence-building measures and arms control should be the bellwether of our policy. Both countries have only begun to define their nuclear doctrines and postures and may well be open to ideas that induce greater safety, stability, and clarity.

- The United States should cooperate separately with India and with Pakistan to encourage both countries to adopt practices that reduce the risk of nuclear war. These could include sharing technology on installing safety, arming, firing, and fusing systems on weapons to assure that they will not be detonated accidentally.

- The United States should encourage India and Pakistan to resuscitate the three confidence-building measures agreed to at Lahore, which were an excellent start, as soon as bilateral contacts are reestablished.

- The United States should engage Indians and Pakistanis, separately or together, in gaming exercises to induce greater clarity and mutual understanding of their respective security perceptions and nuclear postures.

Developing a Good Relationship with India. India is the regional hegemon, and India—not the United States—is the country with the greatest ability to influence security perceptions and actions in the subcontinent directly. U.S. efforts to deter Pakistan from pursuing a nuclear weapons program failed because Pakistan was motivated by its fear of India. Hence, the best way for the United States to encourage South Asian security is through New Delhi—a difficult undertaking under any circumstances. Nonetheless, it is only in the context of a strong, confident relationship with India that the United States can influence New Delhi’s regional policies.

In fact, Indo-U.S. relations are as strong as they have ever been since the early 1960s.

- Maintaining this bilateral momentum—taking India seriously—is crucial, and the next administration should follow through on agreements to have the President and the Prime Minister be in regular touch, to hold high-level foreign policy consultations and economic discussions, and to continue the nonproliferation and security dialogue begun by Deputy Secretary Talbott. These exchanges will not be easy, as there are significant differences between the American and Indian worldviews.
- Continuing to expand military-to-military exchanges, including regular counterpart visits, joint exercises, and possibly a supply relationship that would not threaten regional stability. The Indo-U.S. security dialogue should also focus on China and its intentions in the region.

Reengaging with Pakistan. The sanctions, condemnations, and accusations of the past decade—a policy of “tough love”—have succeeded only in alienating Pakistan and reducing U.S. influence. Continuing on this course will contribute to Pakistan’s decline and may help usher in an era of radical Islamic government. Musharraf’s stated goal is to restore economic growth and a democratic polity; he has also promised to hold national elections by October 2002. The United States should give him the room to succeed or to fail within that timeframe but help him during the interim rather than stand aloof. The United States should also bear in mind that the military will continue to control Pakistan’s national security policy in general and its nuclear weapons program in particular. Even though the United States does not accept the South Asian zero-sum-game mentality, Pakistan and India both do; therefore, reengaging with Pakistan

will introduce greater balance into our policy and encourage regional stability.

These are all good reasons for the next administration to reexamine the layers of sanctions that now encumber our policy toward Pakistan. Our approach should encompass both military-to-military engagement and several steps outside the defense realm that would advance U.S. security interests in Pakistan. All of these steps should serve as tangible indicators that the United States believes that Pakistan is a country with a future. Many of the sanctions against Pakistan emanate from the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits aid to military regimes that have deposed elected governments. Hence, reengagement with Pakistan will require extensive consultations with Congress and possibly legislation. The United States should take these steps:

- Broadening military-to-military exchanges and theater engagement activities, including exercises focused on peacekeeping where Pakistan has been an important troop contributor; funding a substantial IMET program to begin to rebuild relationships with the Pakistan military; and regular high-level exchanges.
- Substantial funding for a nongovernmental organization program aimed at strengthening the institutions of civil society (for example, the press, a chapter of Transparency International, think tanks focused on domestic policy).
- Substantial funding for primary education in Pakistan as a tangible indicator that the United States does believe that Pakistan is a country with a future and as a counterweight to fundamentalist Islamic schools.
- Encouraging the international financial institutions to continue to work with Pakistan to revive the economy.

What To Do About Pakistan and Terrorism. Pakistani support for militant Islamic groups’ operations in Kashmir and for attacks against India elsewhere in the region is a manifestation of the low-level warfare that prevails between India and Pakistan. It is also an outgrowth of increasingly powerful Islamic and sectarian radicalism inside Pakistan. Pakistan is not alone in its support for groups that attack civilians. India, too, is reported to have had links to terrorist bombings in Pakistan and to some violent, subversive groups, such as the Mohajir Quami Movement in Karachi. The United States should continue not to allow either side to use our legislation on terrorism as a propaganda weapon against the other. This is surely India’s aim when it urges the United States to name Pakistan as a state supporter of terrorism. Such a step would only destroy any remnants of U.S. influence in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan has been useful to the United States in fighting terrorism. The Pakistani

authorities sent both Ramzi Youssef and Mir Aimal Kansi to the United States and helped to break up a group with links to Osama bin Laden that was operating in Jordan. The United States should take the following steps:

- Draw a clear line between attacks on U.S. citizens and attacks against Indian or Pakistani citizens, which are not directly of our concern.
- Explain to the Pakistani leadership that the United States will take actions (unspecified) against the interests of Pakistan if it is found to be supporting or assisting groups that attack or harm U.S. citizens, either intentionally or inadvertently. Therefore, Pakistan should use its influence with those groups that it supports to ensure that there are no such attacks.
- Explain to the Pakistani leadership that while the United States understands the limits of their influence with the Taliban, we would appreciate assistance in apprehending Osama bin Laden. If Pakistan is not cooperative, we will find other ways to take appropriate action to protect U.S. citizens. The United States would not understand any action by Pakistan to hinder our efforts to this end.
- Offer to consult regularly with Pakistan, including in military-to-military channels, about the issue of terrorism in the region. Such consultations should not be a forum for attacking India or a means of assisting India in applying pressure on Pakistan. Pakistan should understand that the United States would continue to consult with India on terrorism, which is a threat to Pakistani interests in the broader region and in Pakistan itself.