Middle East and Persian Gulf

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Overview. U.S. foreign, commercial, security, and defense interests have long been intertwined with the stability of the Middle East region. The collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the current delicate balance in the oil market pose grave concerns, but these developments will not be the main drivers of U.S. strategy and defense policy in the region. The key security issues that will confront the next administration in this region relate to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Iran, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Dual containment as an effective and enforceable policy has run its course.

Support for sanctions against Iraq is evaporating. Saddam Husayn is challenging the limits of postwar security and sanctions restrictions on all fronts, including the No-Fly Zones, import-export controls, weapons inspections, and oil-pricing policies and methods of payment. All the options on Iraq are difficult ones, including sanctioning, accepting, eliminating, or ignoring him. To pursue the first three options is risky enough, and we may be forced eventually to do so unilaterally. To ignore Saddam, however, would be far more perilous for the West and the United States.

Political change in Iran may come smoothly or violently, but it will not alter a defense strategy based on acquiring a nuclear capability. Regardless of the means, change is unlikely to lead to major reversals in Tehran’s foreign and security policies. We will need to shape strategies to reduce the risk once Iran acquires advanced weapons and delivery systems, including a nuclear capability, since we are unlikely to be able to stop its development. That said, there might be opportunities to develop cooperation, albeit limited, regarding Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorism, and energy-related issues.

U.S. policy in the region, including the defeat of Iraq, the liberation of Kuwait, and the successes of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors, has achieved impressive results, but it may also be a victim of its success. Ten years after Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, and 20 years after the Iranian revolution that threatened to disrupt the Gulf by exporting its revolution, the Gulf states are trying to resume the balance of power as it existed more or less before August 2, 1990. This transition paper will examine these issues and discuss options policymakers may want to consider.

Policy Context

The United States has been involved in planning and/or providing security and military support in the Middle East since the end of World War II. The U.S. emergence from the war as a dominant military and political force, the end of the British imperial role and
collapse of British military power, and the start of the Cold War ensured U.S. diplomacy, and especially military power, a secure foothold in the region.

U.S. interests in the Middle East have long been centered in the Persian Gulf region. Our primary security interests include maintaining access to stable and inexpensive energy resources (oil and gas); keeping open seas open; stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promoting stable governments that are pro-Western in policy; reducing threat levels and enhancing the regional security environment; and—where it does not conflict with our other interests—promoting democratic institutions and processes, civil society, and human rights. U.S. policies toward North Africa—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—have tended to follow and to support European interests and policies, except where Libyan threats to regional security and support for international terrorism were involved. By the same token, the United States has, in effect, helped to exclude Europe from engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, to the frustration of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in particular. U.S. support for Israel has led to accusations by Arabs, and sometimes by Europeans, that the United States follows a double standard in its Middle East policies. The United States, they say, promotes Israeli interests and security at the expense of the Arabs, demanding, for example, Iraq comply with all UN Security Council resolutions while Israel could pick those it will observe.

**Evolution of U.S. Security Commitments in the Persian Gulf**

Since their independence in the early 1960s, the six Arab Gulf governments that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have preferred, or better yet allowed, outsiders to define their security policies and needs. New to acting like states rather than tribes, not yet as wealthy from oil as some would become, and accustomed to letting tradition determine their governance and institutions of civil society, the Arab states of the Arabian (not Persian) Gulf followed first their colonial protector, Great Britain, to shelter from the Arab and Persian nationalist storms that periodically swept through the neighborhood. Iran under the Shah and Iraq under kings, military dictators, and Ba’thist republics alternately stormed through the Gulf threatening to re-take Kuwait and Bahrain and to seize islands and oilfields in the Gulf itself. When the British decided that they could no longer afford to protect the Gulf Arabs and withdrew in 1971, the United States began its gradual assumption of the British mantle.

**The Gulf Arabs’ Security Vision Then . . .** Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Arab states of the Gulf faced the hegemonic ambitions of Iran first under the secular and intensely nationalistic regime of the Shah, and then under the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran determined to export its revolution across the Gulf. In between Iranian challenges came Iraqi feints at territorial acquisition as well as influence in decisionmaking on Gulf and wider Arab political, economic, and strategic affairs. After the British withdrawal east of Suez in 1971 and concerned about possible Soviet encroachments in the Gulf, President Richard Nixon created the Twin Pillars policy, which designated Iran and Saudi Arabia as proxies for U.S. military presence in the region. With the fall of the Shah in 1979, the United States increased its presence and role in the Gulf. In November 1979, the Carter administration defined the Gulf as vital to U.S. interests and established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) as its principal tool.

U.S. military involvement increased dramatically during the Iran-Iraq War with the reflagging of commercial vessels (Operation Earnest Will). When it seemed that Tehran might succeed in defeating Baghdad and increase its ability to subvert the smaller Gulf states, Washington provided limited assistance to Baghdad. It was still a process of balance of power, with Baghdad now the short-term “protector.” The U.S. presence was still considered to be offshore and over-the-horizon, with no bases or home porting rights, except for Bahrain and Oman, where access agreements had been established to allow prepositioning of equipment.

The GCC was formed in 1981 as a means of self-protection against Iraq and Iran. Although protection from the war may have been on their minds, in reality GCC leaders use the council primarily as a sounding board for regional security issues and cooperation on economic policy. Along with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and other Middle Eastern governments, the GCC states joined the arms race, spending significantly large portions of their budgets on weapon systems,
aircraft, and training packages that they could barely absorb. Interoperability was never a key concept in defense planning in the Gulf states. All bought what they wanted in bidding wars from whomever they wanted without a serious thought to how they could be used by them in a combat situation. Arms purchases were not intended to bolster defense; rather, they were an extension of Gulf foreign policy, intended to give as many arms-merchant states as possible a stake in their survival. Kuwait, for example, bought equipment often inferior if not obsolete, from the Soviets, Eastern Europe, and China as well as from all the European sellers because it helped to ensure political alliances.

The end of the Cold War meant an end to regional military brinkmanship in the Middle East. No longer, it seemed, would countries such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria be able to play off East versus West to obtain cheap arms and aid packages. The collapse of the Russian economy and Moscow’s insistence on cash sales only meant cash- and oil-poor governments could not get easy loans or weapons on credit from Moscow. This should have meant the end of the arms race in the region and lowered expenditures on weapon systems. Instead, governments in the Middle East continued a spending spree begun in the late 1980s with new acquisitions to include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems and the long-range ballistic missiles necessary for delivery. By the early 1990s, Iraq and Iran had experimented with biological and chemical weapons—against each other in their 8-year war and Iraq against its Kurdish population. Egypt, Libya, and Syria had chemical intentions and missile systems.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait shattered the myth of self-protection by arms sales, GCC solidarity, and U.S. over-the-horizon presence. It exposed the Arabs to their inability to prevent their large, powerful, and angry neighbors—now Iraq, then Iran—from taking out their wrath or seeking succor in the oilfields of Kuwait and the Gulf at large. And, to the relief of the rulers and the concern of the ruled, it brought the U.S. military into the region with reshaped strategic doctrine and security perceptions. For a while after the war, it seemed as if the United States would continue to maintain a significantly large footprint and the GCC would stay under a U.S. security umbrella to protect the regimes, their oil, and sealanes from hegemonic threats from Iraq and/or Iran.

...And Now. Today, the security preference of the Gulf governments is to reestablish the kind of balance of power in the Gulf that they once felt comfortable under—a balance maintained by de facto partnership with Iran and backed up by a more distant United States. Washington remains committed to defend its friends from external aggression and to maintain freedom of seas in the Gulf. Training exercises are held by the GCC, most of them bilateral ones with the United States, and occasionally some members raise the prospect of a 100,000-man GCC military force.

The GCC states have been especially supportive of the UNSCOM efforts to detect, inspect, and destroy Iraqi NBC capabilities. They are much more complacent about similar potential threats from Iran. Hopeful that President Khatami’s election presaged changes in Iran’s Islamic militancy toward them, they have welcomed all signs of moderation in Iran and rejected any suggestion that Tehran supports terrorism or intends to threaten them once it has developed the technology for and tested new, more sophisticated long-range missiles that could carry biological or chemical warheads. Similarly, the GCC states have shrugged off dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Good feelings about the U.S. presence did not survive the end of the war for the liberation of Kuwait. While the Gulf Arabs acknowledged the need for U.S. protection and monitoring of the uneasy set of relationships between the Gulf states and Iraq and Iran, those governments that were pro-Western or pro-American in orientation began to feel uneasy about life with only one superpower. They welcomed a U.S.-created and sustained coalition when Iraq invaded Kuwait for its ability to provide protection against real and potential aggressors and to help the Gulf return to a stable and more peaceful region. U.S. support for weapons inspections in Iraq by UNSCOM was especially welcomed. But Gulf governments, in particular the Saudi ruling family, began to come under domestic criticism for hosting the U.S. military presence and for spending hard-earned oil riyals on expensive military hardware while the government remained unable to defend the country.

The United States, as a result of the defeat of Iraq and the discoveries by the UNSCOM inspectors, may be a victim of its success. Except for Kuwait, Iraq’s Gulf neighbors appear to believe that the war and
sanctions have eroded Iraqi military capabilities to the point that they perceive little immediate threat. Long accustomed to depending on foreign—usually Western—governments for their security needs, the Gulf states are weak on long-term strategic planning. As critical as they are of U.S. policies—including dual containment and sanctions on Iraq—they are moving cautiously in developing ties with Iran. Those ties, for now and for the foreseeable future, will be limited to cooperation on trade, commerce, police matters, and sharing of intelligence on drugs and narcotics trafficking. They are not likely to conclude any significant security pact whose terms would include a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the region. Gulf governments prefer to avoid antagonizing their larger and dangerous neighbors, but they also realize that the U.S. commitment to their security and a presence, however invisible they may pretend it is, allow them the freedom to negotiate with former enemy Iran and, at some point in the future, current enemy Iraq.

**Iraq: Are There Any Good Options?**

As policy choices, the options for dealing with Saddam Husayn are few and simple: sanction him, ignore him, accept him as the ultimate survivor, eliminate him, or pray someone will. Sanctioning him and seeking to eliminate him as the ruler of Iraq are options the United States has been willing to pursue. Ignoring Saddam or accepting him, while preferable to some governments, remain unacceptable choices for the United States. Whatever the option, Saddam and the country that he rules cannot be ignored, accepted, or eliminated without great risk.

**Option 1: Sanctioning Saddam.** Sanctions initially were seen as a way to influence, shape, or modify the behavior of a wayward state much the same way parents deal with a wayward child—you will not develop and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), you will not frighten or invade your neighbor, you will not terrorize or oppress your people or any other people. Two kinds of sanctions were applied to Baghdad in 1990: economic sanctions, which could be lifted when Iraq was found by the UN Security Council to be in compliance with the resolutions calling for elimination of its NBC weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. The second set of sanctions prohibits acquisition of military hardware and must be removed by a separate UN Security Council vote.

In 1993 the Clinton administration enshrined sanctions in its policy of dual containment. Dual containment was meant to force the rogue states of Iran and Iraq to modify their behavior and to abide by international norms and UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). For Iran, this meant abandoning support for international terrorism, ending its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and ending its quest for weapons of mass destruction. For Iraq, it meant forcing Saddam to comply with UNSCRs dictating Iraq surrender for destruction all WMD programs, stockpiles, and sites; to return to Kuwait all prisoners of war and stolen property; and to pay reparations to those harmed by his military occupation and near destruction of Kuwait. Saddam was also to end persecution of Iraq’s so-called minorities—so-called because the “minority” of Shia Muslim Arabs comprises nearly 60 percent of the population of Iraq, and the Kurds comprise approximately 20 percent.

To enforce sanctions on Iraq, the United States refined its containment strategy. It soon became containment plus military operations, plus WMD inspections by UNSCOM, plus efforts to overthrow Saddam. In early 1993, shortly after his inauguration, President Clinton authorized military operations against Iraq as punishment for plotting the assassination in Kuwait of former President George Bush. Military operations could be authorized when Iraq was found to be “in breach” of UN Security Council resolutions—the term is included in UNSCR 687 and was to be applied when Saddam banned or otherwise obstructed UNSCOM in its inspection activities.

In 2000, Clinton administration officials restated the U.S. policy of containing Iraq. Several senior Clinton administration officials asserted that Saddam, who would not relinquish his WMD arsenal or live in peace with his neighbors, remained a threat to regional peace. Iraq under Saddam, they insisted, “cannot be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations.” U.S. policy remained committed to containing the regime, alleviating the suffering of the people of Iraq, and supporting Iraqis who seek a new government. New redlines for U.S. military operations were also defined—if Saddam deployed weapons of mass destruction, if he threatened his neighbors, or if he attacked the Kurds. To underscore its commitments, the Clinton administration took several measures:
It released money to support the INDICT campaign—war crimes charges against Saddam and a dozen senior regime officials—and began providing nonmilitary training and equipment to elements of the Iraqi opposition (primarily the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmad Chalabi in exile in London).

It eased sanctions to allow Iraq to import chemicals and equipment for water purification and spare parts for repair of oil industry equipment. Dual use items—those having military as well as civilian application—are still banned.

It supported a British resolution in the UN Security Council—UNSCR 1284—that would suspend economic sanctions temporarily if Baghdad agreed to allow a new UN arms inspection team under Hans Blix to resume full and unfettered inspections for Iraq’s weapons programs as required by previous UN resolutions.

It allowed a cut in the amount Iraq must put into the reparations fund in exchange for payment of the Kuwait Petroleum Company’s damage claim.

Sanctions have worked in denying Saddam sovereignty and unfettered use of Iraqi oil revenues, in weakening his military, and in denying him the ability to acquire components necessary to rebuild his weapons systems or reconstitute wholesale WMD programs easily. Nor has Saddam been able to threaten his neighbors, although there have been military feints and rhetorical warnings against Kuwait and other governments allowing the United States access to military facilities. Saddam accepted the first oil-for-food resolution, UNSCR 986, which allowed Iraq to sell $1.8 billion in oil every 6 months in 1996, 5 years after it was first proposed. He almost certainly did so because he was unable to supply his loyal support base in the military and security services. By 1999, the amount of oil Iraq could sell had risen to $5.2 billion every 6 months and then to virtually whatever it could sell.

The additional income should have allowed Saddam to provide much-needed goods for Iraqis suffering under sanctions. It did not. The result of 10 years of sanctions and mostly desultory airstrikes has been the impoverishment of Iraq’s traditional middle class of bureaucrats, technocrats, intellectuals, professionals, and civil servants; and higher mortality rates for the old, the weak, the children, and those otherwise undervalued or dispossessed by the regime (Shiah areas of southern Iraq that had engaged in the 1991 rebellion, for example). While Iraq provides the only statistics available and therefore not independently verifiable, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that infant mortality has doubled since sanctions were imposed in 1990. Conditions are worse in central and southern Iraq where the death rate for children under 5 rose from 56 per 1,000 live births in the period 1984–1989 to 131 per 1,000 in 1994–1999. In the predominantly Kurdish north, however, where Iraqis are not in charge of food and humanitarian aid distribution, deaths of children under 5 have dropped from 80 per 1,000 live births in 1984–1989 to 72 per 1,000 in 1994–1999. UNICEF reports that young children are chronically malnourished and that diarrhea is the major killer of the young.

Option 2: Ending Sanctions. Many Americans believe that sanctions at some point have to work, that Saddam will be forced to comply to alleviate the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, or that Iraqis will be so frustrated by hardship as well as by their political, economic, and diplomatic isolation from the outside that they will overthrow Saddam. When these factors were coupled with the application of sanctions on the military, Saddam, it was assumed, would have to comply with UNSCRs to save Iraq. But sanctions have not modified Saddam’s behavior; neither have they changed his aggressive nature, the brutality of his regime, nor his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Their singular success was due to the consensus in the international community that sanctions were the proper tactic to apply until Saddam complied with UN resolutions.

Two problems have arisen with sanctions as policy: Saddam has changed tactics, and international consensus is fading. Saddam has been able to divert international attention away from his internal policies of punishing potential opponents by withholding access to food and medicine and hoarding imported goods for his supporters. Instead, he blames the West—and specifically the United States and the United Kingdom—for the deaths of Iraqi children, for the increased incidence of malnutrition and disease, and for the impoverishment of the Iraqi middle class. Iraq’s neighbors, members of the UN Security Council, and many other governments have come to similar conclusions regarding the inefficacy of sanctions if not the culpability of the United States.

International support for a containment strategy on Iraq is waning. Many European and Asian nations—including our coalition partners France, Russia, and Italy—agree that Iraq has not complied with UNSCRs on weapons inspections and that Baghdad must not threaten its neighbors again. They argue, however, against sanctions without end and without
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Nearly all the Arab and Muslim states oppose sanctions. The Arab street and Islamist critics of Arab regimes sympathize with the Iraqi people, and Arab governments in increasing numbers are seeking ways to join the public consensus without openly forgiving Saddam. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom are exceptions to the waning of interest in sanctions, but dissent to the policy and sympathy for Iraq’s people is growing even in Riyadh and Kuwait City, bringing with it the risk of criticism of the regimes for maintaining the embargo at the expense of Saudi and Arab self-interest. As of October 10, 2000, 10 countries, including France, Jordan, Morocco, Russia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, had flaunted the embargo to fly people and humanitarian goods directly into Baghdad.

These regimes, which have been supportive of other U.S. regional policies, including the Middle East peace process, now feel even more vulnerable as the peace process collapses and violence in Jerusalem and its environs increases. The risk of a new war with Israel could unite the Arab world as opposition to our sanctions policy has not. Battling Israel for the sake of Jerusalem has a resonance among all Arabs and Muslims that supercedes saving the Iraqi people, and Baghdad will return to the Arab fold under the guise of opposing Israel.

Two issues dominate the discussion: What is the endgame of sanctions, and how do we get there from here? Opinions vary on what Iraq must do to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. There is disagreement on which resolutions Iraq must comply with—all the resolutions, as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Kuwait insist? Or is the only operative resolution UNSCR 687 and its Paragraph 22, which says that sanctions can be removed when Iraq has satisfied the UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency that it no longer possesses NBC weapons or the ballistic missiles to deliver them?

If the endgame is to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, then Saddam’s rule is not at issue. For Washington, however, Saddam is the issue. He is seen as the prime threat to regional security. U.S. policymakers assume that his objectives and behavior are unlikely to change while he in power. They link his fate to that of sanctions and say that only his removal will offer some prospect for change. In contrast, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow have concluded that regime change is unlikely and, if it were to occur, would produce no shift in policy. They are unwilling to support efforts to change the regime and argue instead that policy change could occur under Saddam. They say that they are willing to deal with him, although with considerable reserve.

The second issue involves tactics. What tactics are likely to work to get Saddam to comply with the UNSCRs? Will isolation or engagement work, punishment or incentives?

- European, Russian, and most Arab leaders argue that engagement and not isolation or punishment by military attack is the key to defusing crises with Baghdad. The most recent oil-for-food resolution, UNSCR 1284, is deliberately ambiguous in offering Baghdad temporary relief from economic sanctions if it complies with weapons inspections. The resolution in theory combines a newly designed UN weapons inspection team—called UNMOVIC, or the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Mission—with the freedom of action (full, unfettered access to sites) accorded UNSCOM and a grace period for a compliant Iraq. France and Russia want to lower the threshold even more by creating “UNSCOM Lite” inspection teams—ones that would operate under the tighter restrictions long demanded by Baghdad—and would include a timetable for ending economic sanctions.

- Others advocate a controlled opening—gradual sanctions relief, modest diplomatic engagement, opening cultural centers, and unfreezing assets. They recommend incentives, such as closing the files on Iraqi nuclear and ballistic missile programs, to encourage Iraqi good behavior.

- None believe Baghdad is close to complying on biological or chemical weapons programs, and all agree on the need to monitor Iraq closely for signs of new programs. No one—except possibly China—appears to envision a dramatic or sudden removal of sanctions, but no one appears willing to agree to any new sanctions. UNSCR 1284 was kept deliberately vague to woo support from France and Russia. The Iraqi government rejects any compliance with the resolution, and Iraq remains uninspected since October 1998.4

Iraqis will benefit little from lifting sanctions. Lifting sanctions will not mean overnight recovery for the country or its long-suffering people. Under the best of circumstances and highest of oil prices, it will take a long time to rebuild Iraq. Iraq will have a desperate need for development assistance, for water purification plants, sewage treatment facilities, adequately staffed and supplied health care centers not controlled by the regime. The question is how can this be turned to U.S. advantage. If recognizing Saddam means more outside experts and observers get into Iraq to work on project aid and more Iraqis can leave Iraq, then it may be worth it.
Option 3: If We Ignore or Forgive Saddam, What Then? A key question must be answered by those who would ease or eliminate sanctions while Saddam remains in power and unrepentant. Can Iraq be held accountable for compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, including those on monitoring its WMD programs, without sanctions in place? The simple answer is no. Without sanctions, Iraq has no reason to fear or to abide by UN resolutions. Saddam effectively ended the UNSCOM monitoring and inspection regime by denying inspectors access to sites. He probably will do the same with UNMOVIC when or if it attempts to enter Iraq. Perceived disarray in the UN Security Council and higher oil revenues earned this year with a barrel of oil at more than $30 give Saddam additional incentive to stonewall the UN as an institution while Baghdad courts energy-deprived Europe and Asia.5

Without sanctions, what is at risk? Verification of WMD programs—including monitoring, identification, and elimination of WMD programs with no new development as required under UNSCR 687—would be impossible. Independent activities of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations in monitoring equitable food and humanitarian aid distribution would not be permitted. Efforts to get Iraq to acknowledge and to return Kuwaiti prisoners of war or property or to pay reparations would be over. Baghdad is likely to challenge the Kuwait-Iraq boundary settlement and the peacekeeping activities of the UN border commission, UNIKOM. Saddam warned Iraqis in a speech in August not to “pay those to whom you are under no obligation more than their due.” While this statement may be only a subtle hint at his unwillingness to continue to pay reparations, it came at the same time that the Kuwait Petroleum Company presented its reparations claims. Payment into the compensation fund would become debt repayment to “friends.” Money would be spent on domestic recovery, but few believe that Saddam would delay military reconstruction for civilian redevelopment. While claiming Iraqis are starving, Baghdad has been caught trying to export baby food and medicine.

Would Saddam be a good neighbor in the region? In a speech commemorating the end of the Iraq-Iran War, Saddam accused Turkey and the Gulf Arabs of “treachery and disgrace” for harboring the planes that kill the men, women, and children of Iraq. He criticized “those rulers and kings who have sold out their souls and appointed [the occupying foreigner] to rule over everything that is dear and precious in the values and wealth of their people.” Would he seek revenge? Saddam warned Iraqis “not to provoke a snake before you make up your mind and muster up the ability to cut its head,” and in vintage Saddam style, he warned Iraqis, “Do not give your enemy any chance to get the upper hand of you…. Do not exaggerate a promise you cannot fulfill or a threat your ability cannot support…. Keep your eyes on your enemy. Be ahead of him but do not let him be far behind your back.”

In September 2000, Baghdad probed U.S. and UN resolve further. It inexplicably continued media campaigns against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At a time when world sympathy seemed to be moving toward Iraq and when Russia and France resumed civilian flights to Baghdad, Iraq accused Kuwait of oil theft. In tones reminiscent of the prelude to the invasion in 1990, Baghdad claimed Kuwait was once again digging wells and stealing oil from the oil fields that border the two countries. Saddam, his son Quasay, and senior officials joined the Iraqi press in calling once again for the armed overthrow of the Gulf regimes. The charges came days after Iraq had overflown the southern No-Fly Zone and, apparently for the first time since the Gulf War, penetrated Saudi air space. And Saddam has reiterated his threats to attack Israel and called for aid to the Palestinians since the latest confrontation between Palestinians and Israel began in October. Again, the threats are similar to those issued in the spring of 1990 when Iraq warned Israel it would face “incendiary weapons.”

Finally, would Saddam pursue weapons of mass destruction? He has done so while UNSCOM inspectors were operating in Iraq. It is possible to read Saddam’s intentions in his more recent speeches. For example, on eliminating weapons systems, Saddam told officials of the Military Industrial Organization in June 2000 that he was willing to limit weapons on condition that Israel did so first. The evidence lies in what Baghdad has been doing in the two years that it has gone uninspected. In early July 2000, the U.S. Government announced that Iraq had test-fired a short-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missile—the Al-Samoud (“resistance” in Arabic)—that could carry conventional explosives or the chemical or biological weapons that Iraq is still suspected of hiding.7 U.S. officials said the tests are evidence that Iraq is working
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Option 4: Eliminating Saddam. This option could include both overt and covert methods, neither of which has held much promise so far. Overt methods include the use of sanctions and a containment strategy that employs random military operations, diplomatic isolation, and support for anti-regime opponents abroad. The use of sanctions is discussed above; diplomatic isolation is failing as more countries allow commercial overflights and send emissaries to Baghdad. Saddam is not exactly in the box envisioned in 1990 when sanctions were first applied, and recent events in Israel—the violence between Palestinians and Israelis and the potential collapse of the peace process—could have the unintended consequence of restoring Iraq and Saddam to respectability in the Arab world.

The remaining part of this option is the opposition, but there is confusion on what it is and how to deal with it. The U.S. Government has been dealing with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) since its inception as an umbrella opposition group in 1993. The results have been mixed. While many opponents of Saddam’s regime living in exile have come out in support of efforts to remove him, they are not coalescing under the banner of the INC. Leadership rivalries and disagreements over tactics—should we accept U.S. money, should we plan a military response to fight Saddam, should we meet on Iraqi soil—keep the camps at odds. There is not one Iraqi opposition—there are several oppositions based in London, Damascus, Paris, Amman, Washington, and elsewhere in Europe. Where they are not is Iraq. It is impossible to evaluate their claims to have connections to or supporters in Iraq. Indeed, with the exception of a few representatives of well-known traditional families (Adnan Pachachi and Hatim Mukhlis are examples of Arab Sunnis with impeccable credentials as Iraqi Sunni and Arab nationalists), few are known or respected in Iraq.

The key elements missing to make a credible opposition with the INC are the Kurds and the Shia. The two major Kurdish factions—the Kurdish Democratic Party led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani—remain outside the INC, although they both have representatives on the executive board. The major Shia opposition group—the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—is led by an Iraqi Arab cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, and is based in Iran. SCIRI is not part of the INC, although a representative in London attends some meetings. The Kurds and the Shiahs are the warfighters of the Iraqi opposition; without them operating against the regime in Iraq, there is no Iraqi Liberation Army.

Policy Recommendations

- The United States should remain committed to keeping sanctions in place, returning weapons inspectors to Iraq, and protecting Iraq’s people. It is irrelevant how much oil Iraq pumps or how much money it earns from oil sales. It is important that Saddam be denied access to those revenues, that food and medicine be distributed equitably throughout Iraq, and that Baghdad not be allowed to rebuild forbidden weapons programs. Operations Northern and Southern Watch are important politically to demonstrate to Saddam and Iraqis the limits of Saddam’s authority and Western intention to monitor his activities. The costs include a disgruntled U.S. military and the commitment of U.S. assets perhaps needed elsewhere, but the benefits include enhanced and obvious security protection for Iraqis and their neighbors, who have valued coalition efforts to monitor Iraqi military operations and detection of weapons of mass destruction.

- The new administration should review what the Iraqi “opposition” is or needs to be if it is to confront Saddam effectively.

Several key issues need to be resolved. What actions by Saddam will trigger a U.S. military response? Saddam is certain to test the new administration. He may try a feint into Kurdish territory or toward Kuwaiti and Saudi borders. He always challenges the No-Fly Zones to tempt U.S. aircraft into an act of reckless endangerment—his goal is to shoot something down or, short of that, trick the U.S. or British pilots into doing major damage to civilians. He will continue to refuse the UN access to Iraq—be it inspections by UNMOVIC or surveys of needs by humanitarian groups. He is well on the way to “disarming” the No-Fly Zones. He senses dissenion within the Security Council and will try to exploit this by encouraging the international community to ignore the embargo, fly to Baghdad, implement contracts and understandings, and open full diplomatic relations.
What should our response be? Will we punish him for crossing into the No-Fly Zones or feinting toward Kuwaiti or Saudi territory? To ignore these infractions is to encourage him, unless we intend to alter our redlines. The coalition that opposed Saddam for much of the 1990s is no more. If the remaining governments supporting U.S. operations—the United Kingdom, Kuwait, and occasionally Saudi Arabia—withdraw their support, then do we go it alone? Today, only the United States and the United Kingdom fly the missions over the No-Fly Zones in northern and southern Iraq. The Clinton administration may have been considering this possibility when it had one senior official warn that “While multilateral sanctions were preferable, [we] should not abjure ourselves of the use of more unilateral methods when diplomacy cannot bring about the result we want.”

**Supporting Saddam’s Opponents.** There are several major difficulties in determining who to support, and how, in the struggle against Saddam.

- **Who should be supported?** There is not one united Iraqi opposition, and there probably never will be. Once loosely bound in the INC headed by UK-based dissident Ahmad Chalabi, many key elements have left the umbrella group. Most complain about the domineering role of Chalabi, resenting his assumption of authority and control over organizational infrastructure. The Kurdish and Shia opposition groups—both of whom are the warfighters of the opposition movement and vital to its credibility—refuse to recognize Chalabi as sole leader and have withdrawn from active participation in the INC. Regardless of the status of opposition politics, it is rare in history that any revolution has been made by outside elements.

- **How much, if any, military assistance is to be given to an Iraqi Liberation Army that does not yet exist?** Without raising the specter of a Bay of Pigs if an Iraqi Liberation Army is trained and sent into Iraq to do battle with the still-effective Republican Guard, the United States could not abandon it to a slaughter. Yet, no administration, including that of President George H. W. Bush, has been willing to commit U.S. forces to fight inside Iraq to overthrow Saddam.

- **Should the same protections guaranteed the Kurds in northern Iraq be extended to the south and the Shia?** Unlike the territory above the 36th parallel, southern Iraq below the 33rd parallel is not a No-Drive Zone, and Iraqi forces are not warned against operations in the south as they are against those in the north. This disparity is an important one to Iraqi Shia militants, who see discrimination and lack of U.S. resolve in this. If the United States does make the south a No-Drive Zone, it could stimulate attacks on Iraqi forces that would occasion broader U.S. military involvement in the zone.

**Should the United States be prepared to recognize a son of Saddam in the event of Saddam’s death or removal?** This is an important issue. Does U.S. policy change if Saddam is gone? U.S. policy choices could be determined by the way in which Saddam “goes.” If he dies because of illness—rumors that he has cancer have been circulating for months—or old age, then he will have had time to arrange a succession of his choice. One cannot learn many lessons in transferal of power in Iraq by observing the process in Syria. Bashar al-Assad was a relative political unknown with a reputation for opposing corruption and favoring technocrats and modernization. Oldest son Uday cannot be transformed from a figure of fear and loathing into one of sympathy, education, and strength. Second son Qusay, who has traditionally been the less visible but equally lethal of the sons, lately has surfaced not just as head of Saddam’s multiple and redundant security forces, but has begun speaking out publicly on political matters. If there is time to plan the transition, then Qusay will be able to place loyalists in positions of power and authority and to eliminate any immediate challengers, including his brother. This might ensure a relatively stable succession process.

If Qusay is the successor, then the United States will have to decide whether it can deal with a son of the regime it has declared rogue. Qusay appears to be much like his father—a cunning and suspicious figure who trusts no one and places survival of the regime above Iraqi security and well-being. He may be willing to offer vague concepts of reform, broaden the base of government, accept some limits on Iraqi actions, but he will not compromise on Iraqi independence, territorial sovereignty, or right to defend Iraqi national interest, however he may define it.

A coup by military or political factions that removed Saddam might be more tolerable for U.S. policymakers. It would certainly be welcomed by Iraq’s neighbors and by European and Asian governments longing to deal with Baghdad again. Their rush to approve could preempt the impact of a U.S. decision to recognize or not to recognize or delay recognition to influence Baghdad’s new government. If Saddam is Overthrown by a revolt, then it is likely that blood revenge against the family—as well among the family’s rival cousins and clans—would eliminate Uday, Qusay, and others from the more disreputable side of the family. Iraq’s neighbors would hope that by quick recognition of the successor government, they
would shore up a sufficiently strong successor who could hold the country together. They would have little interest in the form of government to be reconstructed in Iraq, so long as it were led by a Sunni Arab military figure with little interest in sharing power with the Shiah or extending autonomy to the Kurds.

**Going It Alone**

Pursuit of a foreign policy dominated by an Iraq agenda could have serious consequences for other U.S. policies and interests. What is the price Washington is willing to pay to ensure international—or P–5—solidarity on maintaining sanctions and Iraq’s status as a rogue state? Do we offer Russia concessions on NATO enlargement, missile defense, or loans? Do we offer China concessions on Taiwan to get Beijing to back the UN resolutions? Perhaps we ease up on other sanctioned states, such as Iran and Cuba, in return for European support for our Iraq policy. In the short term, we probably will continue to have support from the United Kingdom and France on upholding the UN Security Council resolutions. But Paris and Moscow will also push for easing restrictions, allowing trade, and opening Iraq to development and investment.

The United States may in the longer term have to “go it alone.” With or without the support of other governments, it will be much more difficult to maintain sanctions if and when Saddam is gone. The United States needs to have policies now for the time when change comes to Iraq, for it will come unannounced and undeterred by outside events. The United States will have to decide whether it can deal with any successor and whether it is prepared to offer an end to economic sanctions in return for a promise of stability, lessened tensions with neighbors, and an end to the persecution of Iraq’s people. Washington will need to remind the Kurds of their commitment to remain within Iraq and that it is not prepared to support a Kurdish entity independent of Baghdad. It will need to remind the neighbors—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey—of their commitments to respect the integrity of Iraq and warn them not to interfere as Iraq’s ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and institutional factions determine the make-up of a post-Saddam Iraq.

If Saddam remains in power for the indefinite future—he is only 63—then the United States needs to follow a consistent and coherent policy toward Iraq. Declaring redlines and then ignoring violations by Baghdad encourages Saddam to act more aggressively toward both his neighbors and Iraqis in pursuit of his goals. Several policy guidelines seem appropriate:

- Don’t declare “redlines” unless we mean to defend them.
- Don’t declare as our objective goals that are impossible to accomplish (such as claiming military operations are intended to eliminate all WMD stocks, programs, and facilities).
- Don’t arm an opposition that is not a credible threat or support an opposition just to annoy Saddam; they aren’t and he isn’t.
- Don’t link ending sanctions to regime change; this could have the effect of pulling Iraqis toward Saddam and not the desired consequence of turning them away from him.
- Decide now what kind of successor we are willing to accept and be prepared to follow through as events unfold. This assumes that policymakers must decide how important it is to U.S. interests and regional stability to keep Iraq stable rather than to see it slip into chaos or civil war.

Finally, the United States must be prepared to maintain its commitments to regional security and to the GCC states. We should be able to encourage rapprochement with Iran while calibrating Iraq’s reentry into the international community.

**Iran: Hidden Risks and Opportunities**

Shiah Islam, the religion of 90 percent of Iran’s population, has a custom born of repression and life as a minority culture. The custom is called taqiyah and is sometimes defined as deception; it is a way of denying publicly to the dominant political culture (usually Sunni) what is practiced or acknowledged privately (Shi’ism). In a sense, trying to divine Iran’s official view of reestablishing relations with the United States and to calculate what gestures to make falls under a similar definition. What we see in public discourse is not what we may hear in private conversation.

We assume that Iran’s leaders under Khatami—if he and the reformists survive the conservatives’ onslaught—will continue their uneven but determined pursuit of improving ties with the West and the United States. In terms of Department of Defense interests, our military in the Persian Gulf, especially the Navy, has daily, low-level contacts with Iranian counterparts that have been friendly and positive. These contacts are helped by transparency in our military operations. Iranian scholars have also participated in military-to-military conferences on regional
security issues hosted the Arms Control Agency at the State Department and an academic contractor, despite the risk such activities could pose if they were to be widely known in Iran.

This section concentrates on Iran’s perceptions of threats to its security, how it intends to meet those threats, and the options for U.S. security policy should Iran continue its drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear.

**Iranian Security Perceptions**

The Shah’s views of Iran’s role in regional affairs, perceptions of security threats, and visions of Persian national destiny were shaped by the same factors and threats that shape the security vision of his successors, the leaders of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s leaders see their country as encircled by real and potential enemies—Iraq, which used chemical weapons against Tehran in the 8-year war; the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which host the U.S. military presence and repress their Shia communities; Pakistan, which is occasionally involved in hostile skirmishes with Iran on their mutual border and encourages anti-Iranian activity in Afghanistan; and Central Asia, once pro-Soviet, now a source of economic opportunity and sectarian risk. Above all, the United States and Israel are viewed as enemies, with Washington seen as keen to place a pro-U.S. regime in Baghdad and militarize Central Asia, while Israel is a nuclear-armed power determined to control Muslim holy places.

Iran’s leaders—whether moderate Persian nationalist or conservative Islamist—view the world with trepidation. Regardless of where they stand on the political spectrum, we believe that they share a common view of the threats to the security of the Iranian homeland and of the kinds of measures necessary to protect Iran. This consensus includes agreement that at some point they will fight Iraq again and alone—just as they did from 1980 to 1988—and that Iran must be able to defend itself. Several factors shape Iran’s strategic and military thinking:

- **Independence and self-sufficiency in strategic and tactical terms.** If Iraq or Israel has NBC capabilities, then so too must Iran. Iran must build its own military industries, reconstitute a modern military force, and have minimum reliance on foreign suppliers. This includes acquiring nuclear weapons to compensate for military weakness and relative strategic isolation.

- **Reassertion of Iran’s traditional role of regional hegemon in the Gulf and beyond.** Iran’s clerical leaders believe that it is Iran’s natural right and destiny to dominate the region as well as to lead the world’s Muslims.

- **Enhanced capability to defend Iran against any threat of military aggression.** While Tehran is almost certainly grateful for the success of UNSCOM in uncovering Iraq’s multiple NBC programs, it nevertheless assumes that Baghdad will rebuild those capabilities once sanctions are removed and regardless of who rules Iraq. It also probably views nuclear weapon systems as the only way to reach a strategic parity with Israel or the United States, a balance it could not achieve through a reliance on a conventional arms buildup.

Iran began its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear capability, under the Shah in the 1970s, at roughly the same time Iraq embarked on its NBC acquisition efforts. Iran’s acquisitions include Russian and North Korean-designed Scud missiles and chemical and biological weapons. Russia is building at least one and possibly as many as three nuclear power plants at Busheyr and is providing nuclear training and technology to Iranian scientists. Its newest missile—the Shahab-3—has a range of 1,200 kilometers, putting targets in Israel, Iraq, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf within its reach.9

U.S. policy has tried to dissuade, if not prevent, suppliers—Russia, China, and North Korea in particular—from providing Iran with training and technology; we have used sanctions, threats of secondary boycotts of suppliers who have U.S.-based investments, and other forms of sanction. None have worked and, at best, U.S. efforts have delayed but not denied Iran the technology and material necessary for the development of a nuclear capability. The key will be acquisition of fissile material.

**U.S. Policy Options toward Iran**

There is little the United States can do to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, a change in Iranian leadership is unlikely to change suspicions of U.S. behavior. Several factors might influence how far it goes and how it chooses to cross that nuclear threshold.

**Option 1: Containment.** U.S. containment policy toward Iran was intended to modify its behavior to stop supporting international terrorism, stop opposing the Middle East peace process, and stop seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The sanctions include a trade embargo and sanctions on those who provide investment and development assistance to
Strategic Challenges for the Bush Administration

Iran. Scholars and analysts disagree on the impact of sanctions, but one thing is clear: sanctions, including the arms embargo and efforts to block foreign loans to and investment in Iran, have delayed but not denied Iran the ability to acquire unconventional weapons capabilities. Spending on conventional military reconstruction did not reach the levels U.S. Government experts estimated that they would reach in the early 1990s. At the same time, demands for domestic spending on subsidies, job creation, and economic infrastructure in years of low oil prices did not preclude spending on acquisition of NBC technology. In fact, low oil prices and domestic economic woes probably did more damage to the Iranian economy than sanctions. Sanctions have delayed but not denied Iranian efforts to procure the expertise, technology, and material for unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy has eroded relations with Europe, whose preferred policy has been engagement and not containment, critical dialogue and not isolation. Until Khatami became president of Iran, with an agenda to re-open relations with the West, critical dialogue also failed to influence Iranian behavior. Our recommendations, therefore, are to:

- **Drop economic sanctions.** Instead, encourage foreign investment in Iranian domestic and economic infrastructure.
- **Maintain military sanctions.** The new administration will need to be more selective with the controls that it will probably try to maintain on technology transfer, especially where dual-use technology is involved.

Option 2: Transparency. Iranian leaders, for the most part, assume that the United States maintains a large military force in the Gulf to monitor Iran, not Iraq. They also assume that we are intent on militarizing Central Asia (where our military-to-military relationships with the new republics of the former Soviet Union are highly visible). To prevent Iran from misinterpreting U.S. intentions and activities, especially in the Persian Gulf, U.S. military moves should be as transparent as possible. Three measures could help in this regard:

- **Confidence-building measures**, such as help in de-mining, an incidents-at-sea agreement, and joint-rescue exercises;
- **The gradual inclusion of Iran in regional security discussions.** This would not amount to a security pact or Iran’s inclusion in a GCC- or NATO-style arrangement; it could mean a new venue where tensions could be reduced without risk of military confrontation (similar to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations model).

- **Greater transparency in U.S. military operations** in the Greater Middle East/Central Asian region. The more predictable and transparent the United States is in its military operations in the Gulf and the more continuity before and after Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, the less value there will be to Iran in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Option 3: Leverage the Suppliers. If preventing the proliferation of WMD is a top policy priority, then U.S. policy should look for ways to prevent the suppliers from making, or encouraging them not to make, the material and training available. What price are we willing to pay to prevent Russia, China, and North Korea from aiding Iran? There is no evidence to suggest leveraging proliferation stops proliferators. There is, however, the distinct danger that we will pay and that they will continue to provide the proscribed goods and services.

Option 4: Broaden security commitments and upgrade presence to include theater missile defense. If or when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, then its neighbors will be faced with some difficult choices. Saudi Arabia and its partners in the GCC could choose to do nothing, join someone’s nuclear umbrella, or acquire their own nuclear-armed weapon systems. The GCC states are consumers of security, vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful neighbors if provoked. Thus far, the Gulf states have chosen, for the most part, to ignore threats to their security and to seek arms and commitments from external powers. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait should be a sufficient reminder that threatening neighbors cannot be ignored, but memories fade fast in this region, and there is an overwhelming desire on the part of most Arabs in the region to return to the policies of a simpler, distant era—before Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait.

What could the United States do? There are several options, each with its negative side.

- **Provide new or additional military aid to the Gulf Arab governments.** This carries risks. Israel is certain to oppose any Gulf Arab requests of the United States for weapons upgrades, new fighter aircraft, or nuclear-armed long-range missiles, believing—incorrectly—that any new systems would be targeted on Israel and/or turned over to the Palestinians or Syrians for use against Israel. Force protection is an obvious concern, especially given the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf will be required for some time; the desire to reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced against the political and deterrent value of a visible U.S. military presence in the Gulf. If friends and enemies no longer see U.S. forces and operations, they may conclude that the United States is less
likely to defend its interests and honor its security commitments in the region. Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a nuclear power would also add to the incentives for proliferation by suggesting that the United States will reduce its presence in response to governments acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

**Construct a nuclear missile defense system**, perhaps, as jointly controlled projects with the host nation. However, that would give Riyadh or Muscat or Abu Dhabi or Kuwait a veto on U.S. usage of the equipment. The Gulf Arabs over the past decade have rejected our demarches and intelligence warnings regarding the growing military capabilities of Iran or the dangers inherent in Iraqi military maneuvers. What evidence would they need to permit U.S. military action against Iran or Iraq? Finally, would the United States be comfortable with a nuclear-capable Gulf? Unlike India, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, these countries have no indigenous manpower base to construct, operate, deploy, maintain, or protect the systems.

**Be prepared to offer expanded security guarantees and a smaller presence.** In the face of a nuclear-armed Iran, or a rearmed Iraq, the Gulf Arabs are likely to seek expanded U.S. guarantees of enhanced protection and promises to defend them if a confrontation is imminent. They are not likely, however, to support a U.S. policy of preemptive strikes to lessen their Iran problem. Like the Europeans, they prefer engagement to isolation and negotiations to military operations. They will not join Iran in a security arrangement that would preclude a U.S presence in the Gulf. They are almost certainly aware that it is the U.S. military presence—visible and active—which allows them to improve relations with Tehran now and Baghdad some day. At the same time, the Gulf regimes are weary of closer ties to the United States, fearing popular protest to the costs, presence, and dependence on the United States for protection their governments should be able to provide.

**Option 5: Engage Iran.** A more effective course for U.S. policy would be to continue to seek dialogue with Iran and, at the same time, minimize the value of acquiring nuclear weapons. U.S. sanctions policy has inhibited some countries and companies from doing business in and providing loans to Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of other governments’ engagement with Iran is diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking engagement with Iran would seem more productive than trying to sustain alone the current containment policy.

**Stop vilifying Iran as a rogue state.** Recognizing Iran’s security perception and giving it a voice in a regional forum would allow Iran the political, economic, and strategic interaction it seeks, but would also set the agenda and terms of engagement on the basis of Iranian behavior before it tries to make demands based on its nuclear status.

**Work on topics of shared concern.** Washington and Tehran view the Taliban of Afghanistan, with their penchant to support terrorism and drug trafficking, as a serious threat to the security and stability of the Middle East and Central Asia. We sit with Iranians on the UN committee to monitor Afghanistan.

**End the sanctions that preclude economic investment in Iran.** Acquiescence to a pipeline project to carry Central Asian gas and oil would be an important signal of U.S. awareness of Iran’s economic needs. It could also defuse potential Iranian dependence on Chinese investment in the energy sector of its economy.

Notes

1 The United States first entered the Gulf with a small naval presence—the 5th Fleet—in 1949 in Bahrain; U.S. policy encouraged a balance of power that allowed the Shah to dominate the region.

2 The RDJTF became the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983; its mission was to “deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion and, if necessary, defend against it.”

3 This has been a favorite suggestion of Oman, with no further specifications known.

4 After meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in mid-September, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine warned Iraq not to expect any weakening of UN Security Council determination to return weapons inspectors to Baghdad. He concluded that Iraq had no intention to comply with the UN.

5 U.S. Government officials estimate that Iraq will earn $18 billion in oil revenue this year because of high prices and the tight market. This is more than Iraq was earning in 1990, on the eve of the Kuwait invasion. Although the revenues go to the escrow account at the UN, the additional money gives Saddam more bargaining room with contractors and energy consumers.

6 The range of the missile was less than 150 kilometers (95 miles) and not in violation of UN Security Council resolutions that ban missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

7 In a letter to his father sent on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the occupation of Kuwait, Qusay applauded the “decisive role” of the Republican Guard, which he heads, in the “liberation” of Kuwait. Iraqi opposition sources may be overinterpreting Qusay’s motives, but he could be making a bid for a more open political role to rival his brother’s election to the parliament last spring by 99 percent of the vote.

8 As a religious concept, taqiyyah allows a Shi‘ah Muslim to disseminate to save his life, but the concept also feeds into a broader cultural pattern of 2,000 years of court politics, where one conceals true motives to preserve one’s options.

9 This section draws on a study by the Institute for National Strategic Studies on Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, to be published shortly. Information on the current status of Iran’s NBC programs is best obtained from official sources.