

Europe

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Despite substantial successes, U.S.-European security relations have been surprisingly acrimonious in the past several years. Transatlantic friction is rooted in differing perceptions of power. Europeans consider U.S. power the predominant fact of the international system and the only influence able to upset a status quo beneficial to their interests. Americans consider Europe to be like the United States, whereas the European perspective is regional rather than global. U.S. policy has focused on preventing emergence of a Europe that is too assertive, whereas the more likely and damaging prospect is a Europe unwilling or unable to more equitably share the burden of our common interests.

The new administration should adopt policies more confidently based on U.S. strength and on promoting more responsibility and leadership by European allies on regional and global issues. This approach would more advantageously manage relations, especially *on the four security issues likely to be most important: the Balkans, arms control, development of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and NATO enlargement.*

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Policy Context

The difficulties in the transatlantic relationship have not resulted from major new challenges, which in fact have tended to reinforce the security partnership; NATO revitalized its mission, expanded its membership, and mustered consensus (mostly) for effective action in the Balkans. Despite these achievements, the relationship has soured because of routine irritations and disappointments: the gap between European Union (EU) rhetoric and capabilities, the condescending American “three Ds” approach to ESDP, insults traded over burdensharing and leadership in the Balkans, and the passage of legislation with sweeping impact on European interests because the administration failed to build congressional support for its policies. That the United States and Europe are economic competitors with enduring disputes over industrial competition and trade policy exacerbates this acrimonious context for solving new security problems.

European Perceptions of the United States. The critical difference that remains between the United States and Europe is in power, both actual and perceived. When French President Jacques Chirac called the United States a “hyperpower,” he intended it as a statement of fact, not an insult. The United States has an economy twice the size of the closest national competitor (Japan) and four times the size of the

most powerful European economy (Germany). The U.S. defense budget is five times the size of Russia's, and the defense budgets of France and Britain (the third and fifth largest in the world) each constitute less than 15 percent of U.S. defense spending. American English has become the world standard, and American culture is so widespread that it is perceived as a threat to nearly every other form of Western identity. U.S. abstention from key international agreements would prevent them from meaningful operation. Europeans consider the United States the determinant factor in the world, able to act unhindered by others' interests. To a much greater degree than do Americans themselves, Europeans view U.S. actions in virtually every sector of society as affecting other states and societies.

American Perceptions of Europe. If Europeans perceive the United States to be much more powerful than do Americans, Americans assess Europe (meaning the EU) to be much more capable of action than do Europeans. Americans tend to see Europe as a peer, not only because of our many shared values and close attention to European affairs, but because the EU's combined gross domestic product and population are equivalent to America's. But European states do not have the broad capabilities to shape the international environment enjoyed by the United States. Except for occasional action by Britain or France (usually confined to a colonial legacy), European states are manifestly regional in their thinking and actions. Their horizon line is Europe. To the extent that they engage beyond Europe, it is to attempt to establish internationally the norms and laws governing Europe—because the protection of institutions and laws is the best refuge of states that cannot unilaterally defend and advance their interests. European states are so far from thinking about using state power coercively that their reflexes are to use economic power for encouraging good relations with potentially hostile states.

Consequently, the United States and Europe routinely misjudge each other's actions, and the current climate of acrimony leads to misjudgments of intentions. Europeans genuinely don't understand how Americans can feel threatened by a few weak states with ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons, and they suspect the United States is recklessly endangering a status quo they perceive as stable. The United States considers ESDP an effort to push it out of Europe rather than a process for European govern-

ments to maintain their self-respect in a world so dominated by U.S. power. U.S. policies toward Europe need to be founded on a better understanding of how weak Europe feels in comparison to America, and how much Europeans resent the uncoordinated exercise of American power affecting their interests.

Why Europe?

For all the difficulties, the European states remain America's closest allies in the world and are the states with which the United States does most of its work. Importantly, globalization appears to be having similar effects in both Europe and the United States, making us more similar economically and technologically to each other than to the rest of the world. Specifically, the United States continues to have four abiding national interests in Europe:

Maintaining a Prosperous Western Europe. European firms are the primary investors in the United States, and Europe is a critical market for U.S. goods and services. American firms are similarly invested in Europe and dependent on European consumers, especially for lucrative service-intensive sectors. Our economies are so intertwined that American prosperity requires a prosperous Europe.

Preventing European States from Impeding U.S. Interests. It is unlikely that Europe would intervene with military forces in areas or ways that would damage U.S. interests. However, Europeans can use international institutions, the establishment of global norms, and multilateral political or commercial action to prevent the United States from achieving certain goals. European states have major roles in the institutions that shape the international environment (the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and International Court of Justice) and occasionally utilize them to impede U.S. policies and constrain U.S. action. European efforts have reduced the impact of U.S. sanctions against Cuba and Iran and established an International Criminal Court that will ostensibly have jurisdiction over the United States, although we are not signatories to the treaty and are increasing the political cost of U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Europeans frequently justify their actions in terms of limiting U.S. power. These efforts

not only impinge on American interests in the near term, they also negatively shape the perception of American power and intentions in the international community. The cumulative effect of such European behavior is corrosive to U.S. interests.

Sustaining European Military Forces. Because the United States and Europe have intertwined economies and many similar values, European states are the ones most likely to help protect and advance American interests in the world. If the United States goes to war or takes some other military action, the odds are good that some European states will help. However, defense is not a priority issue in most European states (average defense spending in NATO Europe is less than 2 percent of GDP) at a time when the United States is beginning to reap the benefits of revolutionary technologies and experimenting with organizational changes to maximize their benefits. Without American pressure, most European allies will field armies, navies, and air forces of diminishing utility to U.S. war efforts. European participation in those efforts not only spreads the burden of defending American interests, it also has enormous political value in building international support for U.S. actions. Although the United States should not plan on European participation in conflicts outside Europe, it is in American interests to keep the functional basis for coalitions to include Europeans.

Expanding Market Democracy. While there are reasons to be skeptical about the theory of democratic peace and the emphasis Clinton administration strategy placed on democratization, the United States has an interest in seeing the Western model succeed throughout the greater European area. Virtually all states of central, southern, and eastern Europe want the prosperity, rule of law, and representative government we have and (with varying resolve) are making domestic sacrifices to achieve those goals: creating institutions of democratic governance, breaking historical traditions of civil-military relations, demanding tolerance of minorities, settling disputes with neighbors, reforming economies, and tackling cross-border crime and corruption. These difficult adaptations—supported by generally complementary U.S. and EU economic and technical assistance and political and military engagement programs—are making a much greater contribution to the security of Europe than would NATO or EU membership of those same states, and at much less cost to the United States. However, these governments would have a very difficult time

sustaining these reforms without the incentive that the promise of NATO and EU membership provides.

Without economic advancement and effective representative governments in the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states, problems within and among these states are likely to trigger an array of problems inimical to our interests. Even if the United States and EU should choose not to intervene, Europe will be unable to prevent a flood of refugees into the EU area or deal effectively with other spillover effects, as the wars of Yugoslav secession demonstrated. More directly important for U.S. interests, the failure of democracy on Europe's edges would likely breed criminal or authoritarian states that cannot or will not work with the West to control crime, drugs, terrorism, and weapons transfers. In addition to impeding efforts to control transnational threats, such regimes also are more likely to conflict with one another and to seek to draw Russia and the West into competition, as Serbia has done.

Why Not Russia?

Although Russia is a major security concern, it is not included in the following discussion of key issues because the United States and Europe are largely in agreement: policies on both sides of the Atlantic seek to include Russia in the international order as much as possible, encourage reform and the rule of law, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and treat a weakened Russia with respect but (for the most part) without exaggerating its importance. Both view Russia as having very little to contribute to the existing international order. Both are concerned about the potential for Russia's becoming a more serious threat by using its marginal political, economic, and military power to blackmail the West. The United States and Europe also seem to have made the same mistakes in Russia by investing in leaders rather than institutions. As a result, there is very little friction over Russia, except in the area of arms control.

Europeans do exhibit a tendency to employ political and economic engagement rather than the confrontation more evident in U.S. policies, but there is little risk to U.S. interests of Europe's developing a special relationship with Russia, despite encouragement by the Putin government. Prime Minister Putin has stoked European concerns about U.S. national missile defense (NMD) programs and offered a vague plan for a Russian-developed European missile defense. He also

has encouraged ESDP as an alternative to NATO. However, British Prime Minister Blair's rush to meet with Putin, and confusing statements by German Chancellor Schroeder after the Russian missile defense offer (which Germans explain as both misrepresented and a reflection of Schroeder's lack of international affairs experience) are best understood as efforts to demonstrate their involvement in Europe's most pressing security challenges rather than to chart a separate course. Europeans are sufficiently concerned about further dangerous Russian decline, and they assess their ability to influence this decline as so low that they want a common policy with the United States.

The security issues that are likely to dominate the transatlantic security agenda—and would most benefit from a U.S. approach better grounded in differing perceptions of American and European power—are the Balkans, arms control, ESDP, and NATO expansion.

The Balkans

The violent collapse of Yugoslavia dominated the transatlantic security debate in the past decade and is likely to do so in the next. For Europeans, Bosnia and Kosovo cemented the lesson of America's pervasive power: our actions affected the conflict whether or not we participated, our military could operate with a degree of superiority approaching impunity, and our involvement was a choice rather than, as Europeans saw their participation, a necessity. As a result, European ambitions have been reduced from the 1991 high of asserting "this is the hour of Europe, not of the United States" to confessing in 1999 that "Europe could not have done Kosovo without the United States."¹ While it is not true that Europe could not manage a regional crisis without U.S. participation, Europeans no longer want to exclude the United States. They simply want more credit for their contribution.

All indications are that creating a sustainable peace in the former Yugoslavia is the work of at least a generation. Some argue that peace is impossible; no responsible analyst argues it is at hand. The current burdensharing arrangement has the United States largely determining the course of events although providing less than 15 percent of the forces and funding.² However, the Warner-Byrd amendment demonstrates that U.S. dissatisfaction with the Balkan missions is growing, as is the chasm between European rhetoric and the delivery of military capabilities and assistance

on the ground. NATO also lacks a working consensus on how to implement the peace in Kosovo; the French government continues to have a different approach to both the political and the military tasks. Bringing more coherence to Western policy in the Balkans at this point will require a major U.S. effort.

Why Remain Engaged? Remaining engaged in the Balkans is in American interests because, without a long-term commitment by the United States, there will be no peace in the Balkans and, therefore, less stability and prosperity in Europe. European allies will remain focused on the region to prevent the export of crime and refugees and to assuage public apprehension of "war in Europe." If the Balkans are not managed, Europeans will pay little attention to the broader security obligations the United States hopes they will undertake. NATO will cease to be involved in the main military operation in Europe, likely reducing its range to Article V responsibilities, and, with divergent planning requirements, Europeans are likely to maintain forces suitable to policing but unable to perform high-intensity combat operations in conjunction with American forces.

Because Europeans have a regional rather than a global perspective, the Balkan experience will continue to dominate European security thinking and will define EU CFSP organization and the structure of military forces. NATO's Balkan engagement has Europeans working to keep us involved, committed to an "in together, out together" policy reinforcing America's importance, participating in the "bad cop" responsibilities that hone their strategic thinking and preserve warfighting militaries, and substantially contributing to the long-term civil and military implementation tasks. It is in American interests to remain engaged in the Balkans if involvement continues to accrue these benefits, the overall cost remains this modest, and the U.S. contribution stays a disproportionately low 15–20 percent of the total.

NATO allies have the right objective in the Balkans: building tolerant societies with democratic governments and economies integrated into the wider European economic space. American interests in the Balkans are not vital, and therefore it will be difficult to justify a commitment on less meritorious grounds. In addition, the Balkans are unlikely to be peaceful unless a culture of coexistence among communities can be made to take root. Obviously, this is a long-term, oversight-intensive task; it took more than a

decade under more receptive conditions in postwar Germany and Japan. Military forces are essential to prevent a recourse to violence, but they are marginal to the real work of constructing institutions and fostering leaders vested in advancing the West's agenda.

Policy Recommendations. NATO—and therefore American—failings in the Balkans are in implementation: articulating achievable goals consistent with our interests and executing a coherent strategy that fosters long-term transatlantic cooperation. A sustainable Balkan policy that is in American interests would require five elements not currently part of U.S. policy:

- **Presidential leadership in developing, articulating, funding, and implementing a long-term strategy to create tolerant democratic societies in the Balkans.** The President has not done enough personally to educate Americans about the facts, justified America's long-term commitment, or engaged a public debate evaluating alternative courses of action. This is unsatisfactory. We are understating the costs and challenges of building leaders and institutions. The current policy undercuts prospects for success, over-emphasizes the security aspects of the problem in the former Yugoslavia, and undermines NATO credibility. The approach also has negative civil-military consequences in the United States, because our military resents being committed when the government won't follow through with the resources needed to address the full scope of the problem.
- **Substantially more attention to and better implementation of the civil and economic mandates in both Bosnia and Kosovo.** Skimping on the money and expertise needed in the Balkans not only will impede efforts to build peace in the region, it will also reduce support for future interventions. Both the United States and Europe need to redouble efforts to make the peace work in Bosnia and Kosovo. The United States spent several billion dollars and committed the Nation's premier experts to planning during military operations, but committed nowhere near that amount on assistance, training, and planning in the first year of UN operations. At issue are not only money and attention to the international institutions conducting the intervention, but also interagency coordination to produce integrated civil-military planning within the U.S. Government. Committing to the civil tasks with the same determination as the military would have facilitated Kosovar compliance, demonstrated to Serbs the benefits of behavior consistent with Western interests, and buoyed UN and EU credibility, which is important to the momentum of the operation.
- **Building a common allied implementation strategy.** Many believe the approach to Kosovo taken by the French is inconsistent with the goals NATO is espousing. The French and several other European states primarily value stability in the Balkans. If stability becomes the overriding objective, a multiethnic state is unlikely to take root over the long term. The United States needs to force the issue to resolution and build unity of purpose among the major Western states. Either a stronger consensus on implementing the current objective will need to be developed, or the United States will need to accept a less ambitious end-state, such as "peaceful coexistence" between communities. Otherwise, prospects are poor for success of the intervention or cohesion among contributors during a long-term commitment. The French have made a major contribution and deserve consideration for their positions, but if they are unwilling to join a consensus on objectives and a strategy for achieving them, the United States must either find France a role that does not impede progress or proceed without France. NATO already has a concept for operating in "coalitions of the willing"; the United States should be willing to put it into practice if the French or others cannot become part of a team.
- **Negotiating an EU-NATO register of national and institutional contributions.** Competing accusations of who is doing less in the Balkans are snatching defeat from the jaws of marginal success. The EU counts money and police committed, whether or not they have been delivered. The United States ceded the lead in the Stability Pact but continues to irritate Europeans by sniping at their performance. Both the EU and the United States need to be honest about what they are—and are not—contributing in the Balkans. Both need to engage in public education efforts to build understanding of the goals, strategy, and burden-sharing among allies. This has particular importance in the United States, where congressional and public misperceptions have slighted European contributions. Confusion could be reduced by a common base of information on equipment, personnel, financial resources committed and delivered to date, assistance of several kinds provided to the UN and Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), activities of nongovernmental organizations, and other measures of merit. This should preferably be undertaken in a forum that would standardize U.S. and EU data, such as NATO or the G-24 process.
- **Planning and organization of paramilitary forces under the EU, OSCE, or NATO to eventually replace NATO troops.** Military forces are doing the work of police in the Balkans. This is a major cause of military and congressional dissatisfaction with the mission. NATO military forces should be phased out of routine police operations in the next two years but kept tethered as over-the-horizon reserves to back up civil police units in crises. There is strong consensus that paramilitary units are needed and that their work will need to be linked as seamlessly as possible to military operations. As a priority, the EU, and possibly the OSCE and NATO, should plan for, organize, and train paramilitary or special police units to take over many of those responsibilities. Doing so in the EU would provide an ESDP force to fill an urgent security gap and give reason for autonomous planning that does not compete with NATO. NATO could further ESDP by developing training guidelines, doctrine for operations, and a command structure led by an EU ally with respected paramilitary forces (for example, France or

Italy). Similar work in the OSCE would give the organization a niche in crisis management and greater preventative capacity, but perhaps risk states' willingness to accept OSCE intervention; in NATO it might revitalize the force planning process (which is drifting toward irrelevance) while reducing the burden on active units, but at the risk of jeopardizing focus on and investment in warfighting forces. Although the United States has no *carabinieri*, Guard and Reserve units could be trained to manage the impact on deploying units, especially combat support and services units.

Arms Control and Proliferation

No security issue better demonstrates the divergent American and European perceptions of power than arms control. Europeans consider U.S. conventional and nuclear forces so powerful that they simply cannot fathom anyone attacking us. Despite efforts by NMD supporters and (belatedly) the Clinton administration, Europeans remain convinced that missile defenses are a cure worse than the disease of vulnerability to WMD attack. Because the Clinton administration was opposed to NMD and had slowed work on key programs, Europeans were not paying attention to the growing support for defenses in Congress and the public nor to the pace of U.S. decisionmaking toward deployment. Not even the January 1999 White House road map announcement caused concern. It took the combined effects of congressional refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the successful November 1999 ballistic missile intercept for Europeans to see the pattern.

Because European states generally are not strategic actors, they do not share U.S. concerns about balancing beneficial international norms and institutions with preserving an ability to take unilateral action. They do not believe they could achieve their objectives by unilateral political, economic, or military action, and therefore their reflexes lie in multilateral action and legal and normative constraints on unilateralism:

- requiring UN mandates to justify the use of force;
- preserving and expanding arms control regimes, such as the CTBT and Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, despite concerns about their verifiability and contribution to security;
- preferring engagement and nonmilitary means to mitigate threats;
- creating new supranational bodies, such as international tribunals and the International Criminal Court, to investigate war crimes; and
- believing that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a cornerstone of their security, although they are not signatories, and Russia already possesses a nuclear arsenal sufficient to threaten them.

Even Europeans who understand the proliferation threat are unwilling to concede that Europe might become a target. Responding to the strategic threat of WMD and long-range delivery systems would so up-end European defense priorities (*sayonara* Helsinki Headline Goal), and they are so uncertain of their ability to manage the problem and its cost, that they are assuming it away. They are committed to preserving the Cold War nonproliferation regimes, even though the emerging threat demonstrates the erosion of those regimes.

Europeans are unlikely to support a U.S. national missile defense in the near term, even if they come to acknowledge the threat to the United States and tacitly accept the principle that defense is preferable to retaliation. Yet, we need active participation by the UK and Denmark in order to use and upgrade radars at Fylingdales and Thule critical to early functioning of an NMD (subsequent configurations could employ spacebased or seabased platforms). It will be a difficult decision for both governments. France is setting this up as the acid test of Britain's European vocation, and Denmark has to contend with secessionist sentiment in Greenland. However, both governments are likely to accede to use of their radar sites if the United States keeps them informed and engaged and holds off on asking publicly until the system is ready for deployment.

Policy Recommendations. Even if the essential minimum for NMD can be assured, it is in U.S. interests to build a stronger foundation of European support for America developing and deploying defenses. The United States wants to minimize the degree to which European allies consider American defenses in conflict with their interests, prevent European allies from increasing the difficulty of the unilateral actions that may be necessary to deploy NMD, and reduce Russian and Chinese leverage on negotiations. In order to achieve these objectives in the areas of arms control and defenses, the United States will need to:

- **Reduce European resistance by making NMD seem inevitable.** As even Europeans admit, the United States tends to lead the alliance best when it knows what it needs to do and offers European states the choice of joining in coalition. Both the Gulf War and European reaction to the 1993 Christopher trip to discuss Bosnia policy demonstrate that Europeans want their concerns about U.S. policies addressed, but do not want to be full policymaking partners. The United States is unlikely to be dissuaded from

eventual NMD deployment by European concerns, so, while it should consult frequently (particularly to address the concerns of the UK and Denmark), it should make clear to Europeans that we will proceed with NMD as soon as technically feasible, irrespective of international reactions. This will focus European attention on consequences rather than on preventing deployment. It will reduce the pressure on the UK and Denmark to prevent their radars from being upgraded if the Russians and European opponents know that the United States will build an autonomous system based on spacebased or seabased assets.

- **Engage NATO in NMD planning.** NATO has been the venue for U.S. briefings on the proliferation threat, but Europeans have largely resisted U.S. efforts since 1991 to make managing proliferation a central NATO mission. Sharing information has had little effect on European attitudes toward NMD; allies prefer to rely on diplomacy, trade, and nonproliferation regimes that the United States considers insufficient, rather than take serious military preparations. The United States should engage Europeans in exploring the negative consequences it envisions resulting from NMD deployments. This would get NATO into the business of addressing both U.S. and European concerns without requiring a common threat perception. Demonstrating a willingness to consider European fears and exploring the possible consequences of U.S. national decisions would reassure Europeans and reinforce NATO's role as the arena for transatlantic arbitration and may even produce useful compromises. It would also force Europeans to engage the problem of proliferation at the strategic level on which the United States is engaged, reducing the likelihood of a fundamental divergence over arms control.
- **Encourage development of European strategic intelligence.** European allies lack the strategic intelligence networks to make transparent the progression of nuclear and long-range missile programs or the daisy chain of proliferation among states (for example, China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran). They don't see it for themselves and don't believe us when we show it to them. Improving their intelligence gathering and, perhaps even more importantly, assessment will help validate U.S. threat assessments and support European advocates of more assertive policies. Europeans are so suspicious that the United States would "turn off the spigot" of government or commercial U.S. systems that they are unlikely to utilize the more cost-effective routes available through transatlantic cooperation. The United States should seek to maintain interoperability with European intelligence systems where possible, but encourage Europeans to improve their intelligence collection and assessment.
- **Demonstrate willingness to further reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals through multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral means.** Europeans are concerned that NMD is a reckless decision likely to increase nuclear stockpiles rather than promote disarmament. Traditional arms control is lagging, in part because we have not succeeded in conjuring the tools relevant to effectively constraining

the weapons and practices of concern. Serious study should be given to parallel mutual declarations of restraint on the development of offensive nuclear forces, both to advance the issue and to reassure Europeans that we are willing to constrain our own force and are putting energy and effort into arms reduction.

- **Engage China, India, and Pakistan on strategic issues to reduce the likelihood of an arms race in South Asia.** The strongest argument against missile defenses is that it could precipitate arms races in unstable regions, such as South Asia. The nuclear programs are strongly driven by regional dynamics, but even an unrelated U.S. action could trigger a Chinese buildup, with ripple effects on nuclear choices by India and Pakistan and any countries supplied with technology or systems by these three. Taking a leadership role in bilateral or multilateral discussions to understand the national plans of these countries and the dynamic among them, and exploring ways to manage security at reduced levels of armaments would reduce concern about the unintended consequences of U.S. national missile defense.
- **Outline a positive vision of U.S. support for and participation in multilateral institutions.** Europeans consider the NMD program symptomatic of a broader rejection of multilateralism. American unwillingness to pay full UN dues and accept the necessity of a Security Council mandate for the use of force, and U.S. efforts to restrict the UN operational role in conflicts have created concern that the United States prefers unilateral action. American concerns about verification of multilateral treaties (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention) and the application of global norms to U.S. practices (Land Mines Convention, International Criminal Court) accentuated the belief that the United States is unwilling to be bound by any restriction. Identifying the terms under which the United States could actively and positively shape multilateral institutions (besides NATO) and broad international practices would demonstrate that the United States is committed to managing problems through multilateral norms and institutions, where possible.

European Security and Defense Policy

ESDP is the main item on Europe's foreign policy and security agenda. Current U.S. policy emphasizes prioritizing improvements to military capabilities through NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (which, magically, is not supposed to require increased European defense spending), "preventing unnecessary duplication" of NATO, establishing transparency between NATO and the EU, and enforcing the rights of non-EU states (especially Turkey) to participate in EU defense decisions. These practical policies are an improvement over earlier formulations, but they miss the fundamental point: the wellspring of momentum for ESDP is a desire for more latitude and more credit relative to the United States, not for

better forces or a stronger NATO. A U.S. template for building a European security and defense policy defeats the purpose of Europe's undertaking it.

Instead of drawing red lines beyond which Europe goes at its peril, or threatening Europeans that their ambitions will lead to American withdrawal from Europe, the United States should encourage any efforts by the EU to improve its forces, organize its decisions, and shoulder more of the burden in defending our common interests. It is unquestionably in our interest that Europe become much more capable; in fact, sustaining American interest in European security requires it. The alternative trajectory of a European course without ESDP is for NATO allies to become self-satisfied, law-promulgating states with regional aspirations and marginal military capability, more intent on preventing than facilitating American interests.

America's message should unequivocally be, "come on in, the water's fine;" the United States wants an ambitious Europe and will help it succeed. This approach would place responsibility for ESDP success solely on the Europeans themselves. It would get the United States out of the penalty box for seeming to prevent Europe from becoming a full partner—which is what the French flatter ESDP to suggest. The United States also needs to be much more willing to allow our initiatives to rebound to the credit of our European allies. Secretary Albright's "indispensable nation" rhetoric may be true, but it is bad alliance management. Instead, we should be setting our European allies up to lead and succeed with initiatives we develop together.

The United States should be much more confident in its long-term relevance to Europe. We bring the political influence, economic resources, and military might of a hyperpower. As long as the EU has to go to NATO for the political attention and military contribution of the United States, the alliance will remain central to European security. The EU cannot afford to replicate the 13,000 staff members in NATO commands who ensure that alliance military forces can work together. The only way European militaries can have the ability to fight in effective multinational coalitions—both with the United States and among themselves—is through U.S.-led NATO integration efforts.

Policy Recommendations. A program of policies better suited to harnessing Europe to our common interests would include:

- **Give European allies more visibility bilaterally and through NATO.** This would reduce the friction associated with the subject of ESDP by giving Europeans more of the political credit the initiative is designed to produce, while reducing their need for separate (that is, non-American) structures.
- **Make the EU responsible for maintaining links to NATO.** Europeans need and want U.S. and NATO involvement but are not accountable for producing it. Since EU states are seeking something different from the current arrangement, the onus should be on them to find terms fostering a willingness to provide the support the EU will need. This approach would also push from NATO into the EU the divisive debate over structuring the EU's defense activities in ways that will ensure U.S. support, freeing up NATO to work on issues of greater strategic importance.
- **Ignore French efforts to create confrontation between the United States and the EU.** France cannot carry an EU consensus on its agenda. Responding to every insult or exclusionary proposal increases France's stature in the EU; indifference is the best retaliation. Other EU members adroitly rejected French efforts to create duplicative EU planning capabilities at the Nice EU Summit.
- **Coordinate bilaterally and multilaterally with non-EU NATO and Partnership for Peace (PFP) members.** This will reduce their sense of isolation and offer the benefit of U.S. consultations when the EU denies them access.
- **Advocate new EU force structures available to NATO that give incentives for improvements in areas of key capability.** This will anchor the forces of European allies on the high end of the conflict spectrum: a stand-off strike force, sea/land/air transportation, ground surveillance/theater missile defense, and combat search and rescue.
- **Support constructive duplication.** Intelligence, transportation, communications, and strike forces are just four of the areas in which more European capability would be welcomed by U.S. military commanders. Instead of using NATO to press Europeans to buy systems the United States already uses, we should encourage any improvement and make NATO the place where interoperability gets figured out.
- **Set a positive agenda in NATO of issues central to U.S. security.** The United States has allowed NATO to become too involved in the inside baseball of the EU, to the detriment of addressing issues more important to the U.S. agenda, such as managing proliferation and improving interoperability. For Europe to expand its strategic horizons, the United States will need to focus on issues beyond the ESDP agenda.
- **Ensure NATO's primacy by making it the place to which the EU must go for U.S. discussion of crises and decisions on assistance to EU operations.**

NATO Enlargement

The 2002 NATO Summit will address enlargement. Political, geostrategic, and technical factors will frame the policy options on enlargement, though the shifting weight among the three will likely influence the final decision. Four potential policy options exist, each with a different impact on the alliance objective of enhancing stability and security beyond NATO borders and in building a Europe whole and undivided.

If NATO extended no invitation, its Article 10 credibility would be called into question. If it invited one or more countries for accession negotiations, NATO would maintain momentum but would find it difficult to demonstrate sufficient development to the excluded Membership Action Plan (MAP) Partners. If it invited all nine aspirants, NATO might temporarily remove unpleasant political pressure, but at political and geostrategic costs. Barring radical political or geostrategic upheavals, the United States should support a 2002 Summit policy announcing that the alliance will invite one or more new members at a future summit, perhaps in 2005 or 2006.

Since the revolutions of 1989–90 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has emerged as the backbone of European security architecture. In response to the demands of outsiders for collaboration, NATO has consistently adhered to a strategy of inclusion, with the aim of creating a Europe whole and undivided.

The next NATO summit scheduled for 2002 will have enlargement on its agenda, not just because the April 1999 Washington Summit stated that the next summit would “review the (enlargement) process,” but also because the nine MAP foreign ministers launched a political initiative on May 18–19, 2000 in Vilnius to remind the member states of NATO “to fulfill the promise of the Washington Summit to build a Europe whole and free . . . [and] at the next NATO Summit in 2002 to invite our democracies to join NATO.” This political initiative is to be followed by another gathering of the nine MAP defense ministers in Sofia and foreign ministers in Bucharest in October 2000. In sum, although alliance internal conditions may not yet be sufficiently ripe for consensus on enlargement, NATO will be faced with increasing political pressures from the nine MAP aspirants, and a new U.S. administration will need to develop a policy on this issue well before 2002.

Framing Enlargement Policy

Political Factors. The guiding principle behind all NATO activities with the MAP partners who desire membership is that all enlargement decisions remain political. Although this principle will remain a cornerstone of our policy, we need to recognize that as NATO moves down the MAP road we are slowly embedding ourselves in an implicit contractual relationship with the nine aspirants that will increasingly limit our future political choices. In other words, as we encourage MAP aspirants to implement political, economic, and defense reforms, NATO increases its obligation to choose invitees (or at least to justify their rejection) on fulfillment of these necessary criteria. This will limit our political choices in that it will prove difficult for NATO not to invite a MAP partner that has clearly succeeded in implementing serious reforms, and also difficult to invite a partner that has not fulfilled them. If NATO were to disregard these criteria, it would undermine NATO credibility and the legitimacy of the MAP for those partners (probably the majority) that did implement defense reforms but were not invited, hence destabilizing the process.

The alliance has always said, however, that enlargement will not be based purely on technical progress in defense or success at democratic and market reforms. Enlargement decisions will also be influenced by the domestic politics in member states, intra-alliance politics, and international developments. Thus, there will have to be consensus within and among current member states that adding a new member will contribute to overall alliance security, not just technical realization of the NATO *acqui*.³ This is not easy to game out and will clearly be influenced by a range of issues difficult to predict, including economic trends, the EU enlargement process, and developments in Russia.

Geostrategic Factors. Since the end of the Cold War, the influence of geostrategic factors on membership decisions has been changing, because the probability of NATO’s operating under an Article 5 defense has shifted to the more likely contingency of participating in an Article 4 operation, which carries different obligations for alliance members.

Geostrategic factors were dominant during the Cold War, when execution of main defense actions and support to reception and onward movement of heavy defense forces were at the forefront of membership criteria. The 1995 principles on enlargement

made clear that membership should be based on a number of considerations, not just on ability to contribute to alliance security.

Some have focused on geographic position as a key criterion. Yet, even during the Cold War, when Article 5 operations were more plausible and defense requirements were greater, NATO lived with “islands” (Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom) that required reinforcement. Today, many potential candidates are discussed in geostrategic terms with Article 5 obligations in mind. For example, Slovakia and Slovenia are seen as providing a land bridge to the NATO island of Hungary, while membership by Romania and Bulgaria has been cast as a way to contain Serbia and stabilize Macedonia while linking Hungary to Greece (and Turkey).

It can also be argued that having the states of southeastern Europe in NATO would have geostrategic value in the context of any future Balkan crisis and with respect to advancing and protecting alliance interests in Caspian Basin energy developments and even in the Middle East. But the importance of such geostrategic factors in the post-Cold War world may be overstated.

Now, though, when Article 4 actions are more likely, geostrategic factors remain important, but in a different way. For example, in NATO’s first Article 4 post-Cold War campaign, in return for their wartime support in Kosovo, NATO extended a limited (in space and time) Article 5 guarantee to non-NATO members—Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Macedonia—threatened by Belgrade. Hence, formal accession was unnecessary for the alliance to gain compliance of and access to a MAP (or PFP) partner. (Correspondingly, formal membership does not necessarily guarantee the new member’s compliance nor alliance access to its territory during a non-Article 5 contingency; in fact, it might actually *diminish* alliance leverage.⁴)

In sum, while geostrategic factors probably will remain important in the post-Cold War world, they play a different role in the more likely non-Article 5 contingencies that will challenge NATO, and extending formal membership to MAP partners in southeast or northeast Europe may not provide the necessary solution that many adherents claim.

Technical Factors. When NATO adopted PFP at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, few had any notion of how important the PFP program would become, and many aspiring NATO members were disappointed, perceiving PFP as a “policy for postponement.” In response to persistent partner pressures to

join, in September 1995 NATO produced a *Study on NATO Enlargement* that stressed that the goal of enlargement was to “render obsolete the idea of ‘dividing lines’ in Europe” and outlined alliance expectations of new members.

In its Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO introduced the MAP, in part to convince the remaining nine aspirants that Article 10 and the Open Door policy were not hollow and to assist the aspirants in developing forces and capabilities that could operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). The MAP went further than the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* in defining what the aspirants needed to accomplish on the path to membership. It was designed to incorporate lessons learned in the accession discussions with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The comprehensive MAP program has created the necessary NATO *acqui* with which the alliance can assess the nine MAP partners’ technical preparations and capacities and to judge readiness for membership. At the same time the process is reinforcing and deepening the nine MAP partners’ expectations of NATO reciprocation.

NATO’s Four Policy Options

From the perspective of the shifting weight among political, geostrategic, and technical factors, each of the following four 2002 Summit enlargement policy options can be assessed. Each option solves one set of problems and results in different challenges.

Option 1. Assert NATO’s Article 10 commitment to remain open, but invite no new member.

If the alliance simply reiterates its commitment to remain open and invites no new member, the key challenge will be to maintain NATO credibility among the nine MAP partners and to keep them engaged in the MAP process to maintain its stabilizing role. Although this option has the advantage of not undermining alliance efforts to further develop cooperative relations with Russia and Ukraine and of eliminating the need to justify why partners did not receive an invitation, MAP partners will expect more than this. Some are likely to perceive an alliance brush-off, make claims that NATO is pursuing a new “Yalta-2” policy, and argue that a divided Europe is emerging. In sum, the alliance will probably find this option difficult to implement and justify, particularly in the face of MAP partner pressures and in light of its objective of maintaining a Europe free and whole.

Option 2. Invite one or more aspirants to begin accession negotiations.

Inviting one or more aspirants to begin accession negotiations maintains political momentum and demonstrates and reinforces NATO credibility on Article 10, but it raises the challenge of dealing with the uninvited MAP partners. NATO would need to persuasively demonstrate to the excluded MAP partners that the invited MAP partner(s) had actually achieved reforms sufficiently differentiating it (them) from the excluded. If the NATO argument were not credible, it would be difficult to sell the invited candidate(s) to the U.S. Senate,⁵ and some MAP partners would conclude that they would never get an invitation and might disengage from further cooperation.

In the fall of 1998, the North Atlantic Assembly (Roth) report suggested that NATO invite Slovenia at the April 1999 Washington Summit to demonstrate the credibility of NATO Article 10. The alliance did not adopt this proposal, in part because consensus did not yet exist and because Slovenia simply had not shown sufficient effort in the development of its defense capabilities and structures compared to other aspirant partners. The political argument for maintaining enlargement momentum in order to demonstrate alliance credibility and the geostrategic argument for a NATO land bridge are gradually becoming *less* persuasive as a result of the Kosovo conflict experience and the changes in MAP since its launch. The net effect is a slow shift toward *increasing* the weight of technical performance at the expense of political and geostrategic factors.

Inviting a new member for accession talks in 2002 presents more of a challenge to NATO now, because the alliance has acquired additional (and less than exemplary)⁶ performance experience with the three new members and has a more finely-tuned and developed MAP process in place. Whereas previous summits—the 1994 Brussels Summit, 1997 Madrid Summit, and 1999 Washington Summit—were able to develop new programs (the PFP, the enhanced PFP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the MAP, respectively) to maintain credibility, future programmatic options are becoming more limited. NATO has installed the MAP and needs to use the process and its technical criteria to justify an invitation. Unfortunately, all nine MAP partners have very limited technical capacities at the present time, and making a

credible case for any of them on NATO *acqui* grounds is not yet possible.

Option 3. Extend an invitation to all nine aspirants, with the caveat that actual accession will occur only after the specific five MAP chapters of NATO *acqui* have been completed.

This so-called Big Bang proposal to invite all nine MAP members gained political momentum with the Vilnius Statement in May 2000 and likely will be followed by additional political efforts. The argument of the nine MAP members is that a NATO accession invitation would permit them to stop politicking to join (and thereby also remove a political burden from NATO) and would give their governments political ammunition to build domestic social support to carry through defense reforms and justify continued participation in the MAP. The argument that such an invitation would remove political pressure from NATO, though, is questionable. Many of the same MAP partners who have been designated future EU members are continuing to express impatience and vent frustration, arguing that the EU is stalling or delaying the date of accession. In addition, an invitation to the nine would not necessarily help them build social support for defense programs or for NATO. On the contrary, since accession, the three new members have been unable to generate additional social support for defense budgets or for NATO.⁷

Offsetting the potential benefits that the nine believe would accrue from an invitation are potentially substantial political and geostrategic costs. First, this option would mark a distinct shift in NATO post-Cold War policy, in that the (unintended) result would be a *perception* that NATO had drawn lines, that Europe was once again divided. To countries like Croatia and Moldova (perhaps less so for Austria, Sweden, and Finland) it would signal they were outside the NATO membership circle, stretching the credibility of Article 10. Second, Ukraine, a fragile non-MAP PFP partner with a population of 52 million, is delicately balancing internal forces pushing toward the West and pulling toward Moscow and would find its strategic position challenged. A NATO move to invite nine could tilt that balance, driving Ukraine outside the line. Third, such a policy would make it very difficult (if not impossible) for Russia to maintain a cooperative relationship with NATO. This

policy would push Russia to become more competitive and to draw a line, perhaps with reverberations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In sum, an invitation to nine MAP partners at the next Summit would probably remove temporarily some unpleasant political pressure from the alliance, but incur substantial political and geostrategic costs.

Option 4. Announce that the alliance will invite one or more new members at some future summit, perhaps in 2005 or 2006.

Announcing the intention to invite one or more new members at a future Summit in 2005 or 2006 represents a variation of the December 1996 formulation that committed the alliance to invite “one or more” at the July 1997 Madrid Summit. Politically, this differs from Option 1 in that it would demonstrate and reinforce NATO credibility on enlargement while remaining consistent with the strategy of building an undivided Europe. Technically, the option provides the (hopefully sufficient) 3–4 years necessary to permit germination and maturation of some MAP partners’ technical capacities in fulfilling NATO *acqui*. Geostrategically, it would provide necessary time to see how Russia evolves under Vladimir Putin, as well as to observe the reform efforts in Ukraine. Whether cooperative or competitive relations evolve in Russia or Ukraine will be the result of their internal evolution, not the result of NATO’s push.

Success will be defined if the MAP process succeeds in “growing” one or more MAP partners who could be invited to accede to the alliance on NATO *acqui* grounds—partners whose reforms will be credible enough to the excluded partners that the latter will want to remain engaged in the MAP program. Hence, enlargement of NATO will result not in the inclusion of weak “consumer” partners for the sake of political momentum, but in a stronger NATO with “producers” of security, and in continued stabilization of MAP and PFP partners. For these reasons, barring radical political and/or geostrategic upheavals, the United States should support a 2002 Summit policy announcing that the alliance will invite one or more new members at a future (2005 or 2006) summit.

Coda

One rightfully could ask regarding enlargement, to what end? Do limits exist? Does the alliance have

boundaries beyond which it should not trespass? The answer, of course, is yes, but these limits are not yet perceptible, because the geographic space of the common Euro-Atlantic values that define that area cannot yet be drawn with clarity. While many PFP and MAP partners espouse those values, their rhetoric masks the difficulty of transforming stated intentions into reality. With the MAP, NATO sketches the path and provides the tools. It remains to be seen who among the PFP and MAP partners has the will and capability to travel that path.

Notes

¹ Quotes are from Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos and NATO Military Committee Chairman Admiral Venturoni, respectively.

² Burdensharing breaks down as follows:

Category	U.S.	EU	Europe
Troops	13% of total	63%	80% of total
Civilian police	18%	24%	40%
Nonmilitary aid	900M*	2,976M**	
UNMIK funding	13%	74%	n/a

Source: EU Presidency and EU Delegation, 4 April 2000.

* The United States has delivered on funding commitments at a faster pace than the EU.

** EU figures were originally denominated in Euro and have been converted to dollars.

³ Just as the European Union has developed volumes of rules and regulations known as *acqui communautaire*, NATO has developed principles for accession that might be called “NATO *acqui*.”

⁴ For example, during the Kosovo conflict NATO found it difficult to contain the independent diplomatic efforts of the Greek and Czech foreign ministers.

⁵ Although the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly supported the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, it did go on record noting that next time it expected guarantees that additional new members would be “producers” and not “consumers” of security. The experiences thus far of the new members will only make this more salient in the next enlargement round.

⁶ Since accession on 12 March 1999, all three new NATO members have implemented so-called strategic reviews and lowered the force goal commitments. Over the next 6 years, Poland will reduce its forces to 150,000, the Czech Republic probably to 40,000, and Hungary to 37,500. One could argue that these reviews are the result of defense planning failures in all three countries.

⁷ After becoming a member, Hungary revised downward its pre-accession commitments to raise defense expenditures 0.1 percent per year.