American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Jerome P. Bjelopera
Analyst in Organized Crime and Terrorism

Mark A. Randol
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism

September 20, 2010
Summary

Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.

The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.

There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings, observations, and policy considerations for Congress.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 1

Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists: The Problem ........................................................................ 1
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? ................................................................. 2
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots ........................................................................ 2
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists ................................................................. 3
Preventive Policing ......................................................................................................... 3
State and Local Authorities ............................................................................................ 4
Investigative Approaches ................................................................................................. 4
Trust and Partnership ...................................................................................................... 4
Balancing Security and Liberty ....................................................................................... 4
Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................ 5

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 6

Homegrown Violent Jihadists ........................................................................................ 8
Shortcomings and Strengths ............................................................................................ 8
Radicalization and Violent Extremism .......................................................................... 11
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism ................................................................... 12
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists .......................................................... 13
Intermediaries ................................................................................................................ 14
Social Networks ............................................................................................................ 16
The Internet .................................................................................................................. 18
Jailhouse Jihadism ........................................................................................................ 20

Overview of Post 9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks .................. 22
Overarching Themes ........................................................................................................ 26
A Variety of Endgames .................................................................................................. 26
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom .................................................................... 32
The Success of Lone Wolves ....................................................................................... 33
Varied Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 33

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities ...................................... 35
Intelligence Approaches ................................................................................................. 36
Preventive Policing ........................................................................................................ 37
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement ............................................................. 42
Investigative Approaches ............................................................................................... 44
The Capone Approach .................................................................................................. 45
Agent Provocateur Cases ............................................................................................... 46

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership ......................... 50
Engagement with Communities .................................................................................... 51
Federal, State, and Local Government Activities ........................................................ 52
Muslim Community Activities ..................................................................................... 52
Risks and Challenges ..................................................................................................... 53
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities .................................. 54

Policy Considerations for Congress ............................................................................ 58
Unifying the National Effort to Combat Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism .................. 58
Past Initiatives ................................................................................................................ 60
A National Strategy for Combating Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism .......................... 61
Issues a National Strategy Could Address ................................................................. 62

Figures

Figure 1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
  Terrorist Profile and Training ................................................................................. 24
Figure 2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
  Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools .......................................................... 25
Figure 3. Counterterrorism Context .......................................................................... 36

Appendixes

Appendix A. Summary of Post 9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots .......... 65
Appendix B. Federal Engagement and Partnership Activities With Muslim-American
  Communities ............................................................................................................. 118

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................... 124
Executive Summary

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities.

The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners, such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid (December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremism inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies, environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion causes.

Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full description of each of the post 9/11 cases is provided chronologically in Appendix A of the report. Appendix B describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.

Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists: The Problem

“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.

There have been 40 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11). As part of a much-discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-2010 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists, some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may

1 Throughout this report, numerous plots involving persons indicted by the Department of Justice are discussed. This report does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending federal cases.
turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop quickly.

**How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?**

Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic. “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to become full-fledged terrorists.

Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks, virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent jihad as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.

**Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots**

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicted people involved in 40 terrorist plots and attacks since 9/11. According to Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis, these exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots.

- **Endgames:** Thirteen plots involved individuals interested in becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Eleven plots intended or used explosives or incendiary devices. Four intended to use or did use firearms. Twelve attacks and plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 40 violent plots, since 9/11, at least eleven schemes intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their jihadi brethren.

- **Suicide or Martyrdom:** According to publicly-available information, only six plots included individuals who professed interest in killing themselves while engaged in violent jihad.

- **Success of Lone Wolves:** Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11.

- **Divergent Capabilities:** Among the 40 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge greatly. Some evinced terrorist
tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced.

Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists

The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.

Preventive Policing

In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future.

In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and disrupted. At the federal level, DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool, assessments. These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The new guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians.

Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against defendants in at least twelve of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.

2 The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement efforts for this report.
State and Local Authorities

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Nine years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process of being implemented throughout the country.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism investigations. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown terrorists, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and civil libertarians.

Trust and Partnership

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab and Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim-American communities. From the community angle, several Arab-, Muslim-, Sikh- and South Asian-American community groups have formed partnerships with government officials.

Balancing Security and Liberty

Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law
enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community members to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights.

The hurdles evident in striking a balance between security and liberty in community engagement is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants—essential to many investigations. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants were used in at least 18 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

Issues for Congress

Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities; however, there is no unified strategy, plan, or framework focused on homegrown jihadist terrorism. The Obama Administration has articulated a broad National Security Strategy, and continues to operate with a counterterrorism plan developed in the George W. Bush Administration which is predominantly focused on the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. The Obama Administration’s strategy addresses the threat of violent extremism in the United States only in general terms and as part of a broad counterterrorism effort. It may be claimed that the strategy is not intended to include specifics and that fleshing out policy and coordinating efforts is best left to individual executive branch agencies cooperating with one another. However, even among the agencies, apparently no such strategy for combating homegrown jihadist terrorism exists. For many other counterterrorism and homeland security activities—disrupting terrorist travel, combating specific threats such as biological and other weapons of mass destruction, there are discrete strategies that outline specific activities and responsibilities.

Congress may opt to consider requiring that the executive branch produce a national strategy, framework, or plan to combat violent extremism domestically. In such a strategy, the following specific issues would likely need to be addressed:

- **Identifying Radicalization and Interdicting Attempts at Recruitment**: It has not been entirely settled which agencies have which responsibilities in this area.

- **Countering Radicalization**: What role is there for government, if any, in countering radicalization—particularly radical jihadist ideology which is not necessarily illegal—before it manifests itself in actual violence? Should the government be in the business of contesting radical ideology and extremist narratives within the United States?

- **Enhancing Domestic Intelligence**: According to former and current intelligence and law enforcement officials, there is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats; national domestic intelligence collection plan; nor domestic intelligence collection requirements, priorities, or coordination.
Congress may also consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.

Introduction

As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas—produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and never more than six occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ. In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is, “difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.” By contrast, a recent academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and concludes that, “Homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.” Moreover, the

---

3 We employ the terms “jihadist” and “violent jihadists” throughout this report. For our purposes, the term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. Jihadists draw on Salafi Islam—the peaceful fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and following the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. In this paper, the term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. We employ the terms “homegrown” and “domestic” as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. For more on Salafi Islam, see CRS Report RS21695, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*, by Christopher M. Blanchard. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

4 See Appendix A for a summary of publicly-available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The summary is presented in reverse chronological order. The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.


radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. More broadly, a terrorism expert notes that during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since 9/11.” Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by jihadist ideas.

But as Dr. Hoffman’s comments suggest, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, which killed thirteen, and a series of other plots and arrests in 2009 and 2010, are worrying. Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, has said that authorities are “just beginning to confront the reality that we have this issue ... and that we really don’t have a very good handle on how you prevent someone from becoming a violent extremist.” A single successful attack can incur scores of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty, frequency, or lethality, violent attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States remain a security concern.

The bulk of the 2009-2010 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer who writes about terrorism, has noted a global shift in terrorism toward decentralized, autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home countries. Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes in locations far from their bases of operation. A senior counterterrorism official told the Los Angeles Times that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are moving “away from what we are used to, which are complex, ambitious, multilayered plots.”

---

Homegrown Violent Jihadists

This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.13 These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on foreign targets. They can—but most of the 2009 and 2010 plots did not—have ties to foreign terrorist groups. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially come from either Muslim immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist conflict, such as the fighting in Somalia or Afghanistan.

Shortcomings and Strengths

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with extensive rosters and greater resources.14 Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally structured than international organizations.15 A former CIA case officer recently commented that the threat posed by self-radicalized ‘lone’ bombers lacking support networks, “even those who have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”16

These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale suicide strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai attacks of November 2008.17 Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning

---


16 Ibid.

17 On Nov. 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087, (continued...)
and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.\textsuperscript{18} Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown lone wolf terrorist plots. In March 2010, \textit{As Sahab}, Al Qaeda's media wing, released an English language video titled “A Call to Arms” featuring American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on conspirators.\textsuperscript{19} Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets, that are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance.\textsuperscript{20} In the same vein as Gadahn's video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) may have also issued the first edition of an English language propaganda magazine titled \textit{Inspire}. If it is genuine, the magazine could be an effort to recruit lone wolves such as Hasan. The magazine’s first iteration had three readable pages, and it is unclear whether its repaired, fuller version is attracting much interest in jihadist circles.\textsuperscript{21}

This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008, foiled New York City subway bomber, Najibullah Zazi, received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and co-conspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.\textsuperscript{22} U.S. authorities allege that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow plotters.\textsuperscript{23} Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned the attack.\textsuperscript{24} The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot may have actually exposed it to greater law enforcement scrutiny. Authorities likely learned of the plot while monitoring a known Al Qaeda email account.\textsuperscript{25}

(...continued)

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[19] Stewart, \textit{Jihadism}.
\item[24] Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

The conventionally-perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may actually pose some challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to terrorism analyst Steve Emerson, “The smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they are harder to detect...When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for the FBI...The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.” Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in 2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly-generated schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.

According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign countries. While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations, conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and foreign cultural contexts. English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture, society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes. Three recent cases involving alleged or actual homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate terrorist plotting:

- Colleen LaRose (AKA “Jihad Jane”) was charged in March 2010 with conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States and provide material support to terrorism. She allegedly discussed with her co-conspirators how her mainstream American physical appearance would allow her to “blend in with many people..."

- On March, 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.

- For ten years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan

---

29 Ibid.


### Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do not mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist viewpoints.\footnote{Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization.} Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific closely held ideas.\footnote{Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.} Still others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action as in this working definition by the DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”\footnote{U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereafter: Allen Testimony, Mar. 14, 2007.}

But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism” as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views, i.e., they move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially supporting, or executing terrorist activity, then the nation’s public safety and security interests are activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:

“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist, or jihadist beliefs.

“Violent extremism” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”

From Radicalization to Violent Extremism

As the terrorist threat becomes increasingly homegrown, a key way to fight it is to develop an understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent the radicalization from morphing into violent extremism.39 In 2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely circulated within the law enforcement community.

The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism. First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam.40 Next they go through self-identification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that, typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack.41 At this point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own four-stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.42

This model and the process it describes—though useful—should, however, be read with caution, according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes. Terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that

There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one’s life.43

Some experts have cautioned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,” somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.44 The NYPD report itself

40 For a discussion of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
43 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7.
44 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and (continued...)

Congressional Research Service
acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who begin this progression become terrorists. Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety of factors.

Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists

What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty, alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or terrorist activity. The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.

Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global community of Muslims (the Umma), or even waging war against it may also spur radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals. CRS analysis of the 40 plots since 9/11 suggests that 19 of them included converts to Islam (Figure 1).

As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms. Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define themselves.” Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that

(...continued)


45 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19.


48 The Qur’an uses the term, ummah, to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual communities, both great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard Hooker, World Civilizations, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM.

49 Ibid.

psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they identify with others; and they desire revenge.”

Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism. These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.

**Intermediaries**

Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face discussion groups) or in online forums. Some of the terrorist plots that came to light in 2009 and 2010 included an intermediary. In some cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover agent. Three charismatic U.S. citizens have taken especially prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can be difficult.

**Anwar al-Aulaqi** is a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles. He is a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and has been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He has also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt. However, according to publicly available sources, his exact connections to these individuals are largely unclear. Accused of propagandizing for Al Qaeda, Al-Aulaqi has been associated with the group’s Arabian Peninsula offshoot. Before his alleged November 5, 2009 gun rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan exchanged emails with al-Aulaqi. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan. After the Fort Hood shootings, al-Aulaqi issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.

The imam likely also influenced members of four other recent domestic violent jihadist plots. Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagandized online, emailed al-Aulaqi. The cleric responded twice, according to court documents. In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr., pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed al-Aulaqi’s online pronouncements and developed an “execution” hit list that included 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam.

---

54 For details on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy,* coordinated by John Rollins.
57 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation, (continued...)
According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI cooperating source to “review speeches” by al-Aulaqi.\(^{58}\) Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened to sermons by al-Aulaqi.\(^{59}\)

Other homegrown, violent jihadists possibly have been influenced by al-Aulaqi’s preaching. According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010, cited al-Aulaqi and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal, from Jamaica as key influences on him.\(^{60}\) Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an al-Aulaqi lecture.\(^{61}\)

U.S. officials believe al-Aulaqi also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. At an Aspen Security Forum in June 2010, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center said the U.S. Government believes al-Alauqi had “a direct operational role” in that attempted attack.\(^{62}\) A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s sensitivity, has told The Washington Post that al-Aulaqi has become the first U.S. citizen added to a list of suspected terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.\(^{63}\)

Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California, Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended. One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States and in another dispatch, urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a recent video, posted on June 20, 2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama describing him as, “treacherous, bloodthirsty, and narrow-minded.”\(^{64}\)

(continued...)


Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki” is originally from Daphne, Alabama. He has emerged as a key figure and international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one he instructs recruits in urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s adoption of “al-Amriki” (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee.” Somali officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. On August 5, 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment against him.65

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salfism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia pursuing violent jihad.66

Social Networks

Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well. Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal experiences.67

Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups.68

(...continued)


65 Ibid.


According to the New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani, while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s. Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain. The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when, in 2007, Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal. The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps for training in 2009.69

**Intermediaries within Networks**

Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic figures. Daniel Boyd and six other North Carolina residents were indicted on terrorism charges in 2009. In June 2010, another individual, who was living in Mitrovica, Kosovo, was charged in a criminal complaint linked to the case.70 This small social network included Dylan and Zakariya Boyd, sons of Daniel Boyd. A charismatic leader, the elder Boyd allegedly led a conspiracy from November 2006 to 2009 to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in overseas terrorism. The conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist groups. Using stories of his supposed past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.71

**Jihadi Cool**

Recent plots suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.72 Terrorist recruiters are also promoting “jihadi cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007, Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab, enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories. According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla

(...continued)


72 Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.
combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.73

“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.74 Muslim leaders from Alexandria, Virginia indicated that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.75 Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”76

The Internet

The Web may also play a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and e-mail blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers, and newsletters.77 This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.78

The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. One author asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a “self-starter” phenomenon79 and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a “de-formalized” radicalization experience.80 “Self-starters” are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from such organizations.81 However, instances of solely virtual

radicalization without face-to-face interaction seem to be rare. Most radicalization apparently requires experience with real-world social networks.82

In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct violence and face-to-face contact with hard-core terrorists. Simply, individuals interested in violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.”83 In essence, online activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.84

Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably serves in three ways to spur radicalization. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normalizes behaviors considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”85 Terrorists publish rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.86

Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.

Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist groups. Anwar al-Aulaqi circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own popular Facebook page and blog.87 The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010 in Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking Web sites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.88

Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a twenty-seven-year-old pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston, Massachusetts

86 Ibid.
suburb, was arrested on terrorism charges in October 2009.\textsuperscript{89} Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist websites.\textsuperscript{90} They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself, allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) Sam Rascoff, a former New York Police Department terrorism specialist, notes that, “there is a sense that these guys are radicalizing on their own.”\textsuperscript{91} Frank J. Cilluffo notes that the Web has supplanted mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their organizations.\textsuperscript{92}

Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers terrorists operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{93} Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot soldiers, provide training, raise funds, and communicate operational direction.\textsuperscript{94}

Jailhouse Jihadism

In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in jihadist prison radicalization.\textsuperscript{95} But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”\textsuperscript{96} Experts have sounded

\begin{footnotes}
\item[92] Murphy, Feb. 1, 2010.
\item[93] Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 56.
\item[94] Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 111-140.
\end{footnotes}
warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in U.S. jails.97

Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.98 This is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism according to a study involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional systems.99 The Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges the possibility of inmate radicalization but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.100 Based on CRS analysis of the 40 violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11, only one involved radicalization in prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom found only seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s radicalization process.101

The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as some experts may fear. One of the recent cases, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot, included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains unclear whether they radicalized behind bars, and the plot, itself, took form outside of jail.102

The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison implicated the group, Jamiiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”). Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.

According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document

titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release, Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.103 One study has pointed out that James’ radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father had been a member of the Black Panther Party.104

Overview of Post 9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks

Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.105 Another study found only broad trends among domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds of them are younger than 30 years old.106 As the above discussion may suggest generalizing about the individuals involved is problematic.

Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African-American of a happy childhood who converted to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammed; David Headley, who was born Daood Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother; with Talib Islam, who was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek Mehanna, with the Somali-American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in first- and second-generation Muslim-American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators.


105 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 8.

106 Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, p. 10.
Some plots were aspirational. Others appear to have been pushed along by government informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the cases).

**Figure 1** provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. **Figure 2** documents the specific plots and attacks including the intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), target (within/outside the United States), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.
Figure 1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Terrorist Profile and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plots and Attacks</th>
<th>Lone Wolf</th>
<th>Muslim Convert(s)</th>
<th>Suicidal or Sought Martyrdom</th>
<th>Radicalized in Prison</th>
<th>Intended or Actual Plotting or Training Abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omar Hammami</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehad Mostafa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaker Masri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachary Chesser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rockwoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessa and Almonte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Shahzad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleen LaRose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Virginia Five</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shabaab Recruiting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ft. Hood (Nidal Hasan)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Headley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarek Mehanna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosam Smadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Finton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najibullah Zazi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boyd, et al</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdulhakim Muhammad</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newburgh Four</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryant Neal Vinas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK Airport Pipeline Plot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Dix Six</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Maldonado</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derrick Shareef</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston Taliban Plot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty City Seven</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammed Tahteri-Azar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadequee and Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo, Ohio Plotters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIS Plotting in So. California</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Case (the Hayats)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 2001-April 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hasan Akbar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lackawanna Six</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Padilla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland Seven</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11.

Notes:
a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold** and *italics.*
Figure 2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plots and Attacks*</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Endgame</th>
<th>Investigation Tools*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Firearm(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Hammami</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehad Mostafa</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaker Masri</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachary Chesser</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rockwoods</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessa and Almonte</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Shahzad</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleen LaRose</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Virginia Five</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shabaab Recruiting</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Hood (Nidal Hasan)</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009-August 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Headley</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarek Mehanna</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosam Smadi</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Finton</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najibullah Zazi</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Boyd, et al</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulhakim Muhammad</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newburgh Four</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryant Neal Vinas</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK Airport Pipeline Plot</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Dix Six</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Maldonado</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derrick Shareef</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston Taliban Plot</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty City Seven</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 2001-April 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Taheri-Azor</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadequee and Ahmed</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo, Ohio Plotters</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIS Plotting in So. California</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Case (the Hayats)</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany Plot</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City Subway Plot</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lyman Faris</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Omar Abu Ali</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Jihad Network</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Akbar</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lackawanna Six</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Padilla</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland Seven</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
<td>⬜️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11.

Notes:

a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold and italics**.

b. As indicated in open-source reporting. It is possible that the use of these tools in some cases remains classified information and thus is not reflected in this figure.
Overarching Themes

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example, conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above, homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since 9/11, 23 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 15 focused on foreign ones, and two conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 24 involved intent or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 40 homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.

A Variety of Endgames

Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their brethren.

Foreign Fighters

Fifteen of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusively seeking to become foreign fighters with terrorist groups entangled in insurgency-type conflicts. Al-Shabaab-related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia are the paramount example. Other cases include the following:

- In a case mentioned elsewhere in this report, five men from Northern Virginia (Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan in December 2009. They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”

- In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. armed forces personnel serving in Iraq. On June 13, 2008, a Federal jury convicted all three.

---


of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material support to terrorists. 109

Explosives and Firearms

Seventeen of the 40 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 involved in whole or in part explosives or incendiary devices. 110 Historically, most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms. 111

The Zazi case (as mentioned elsewhere) and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square stand out as examples of plots incorporating explosive devices. On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered fireworks, clocks, wiring, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had rigged for explosion in his vehicle. 112 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the failed attack by training Shahzad and sending him $12,000 in funding. 113

Ten plots involved in whole or in part the use of firearms. Four of these intended to use firearms exclusively, including two of the successful post-9/11 attacks. The deadlier of the two attacks was the shooting at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was charged in the attack which killed thirteen and wounded or injured 43 others. 114 Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas that killed one soldier and wounded another. 115 The two other plots that centered on firearms are:

110 This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).
• Tarek Mehanna was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists on October 21, 2009. Mehanna and his co-conspirators abandoned their plans to attack a mall and target U.S. politicians because they were unable to acquire the firearms they wanted.\textsuperscript{116}

• In May 2007, six men (Fort Dix Six) were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan included attacking and killing soldiers using assault rifles and grenades, although the conspirators never purchased firearms for use in the plot. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder.\textsuperscript{117}

### Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics

Twelve attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear from the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics occurred abroad but targeted members of the U.S. armed forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4 rifle to kill two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.\textsuperscript{118} Other examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:

• Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad to engage in jihad as foreign fighters and also likely prepared to attack a domestic site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia, using firearms.\textsuperscript{119}

• Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (explosives) the Long Island railroad in New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses.\textsuperscript{120} In September 2008, as a foreign fighter he took part in a rocket attack targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{121} Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”
• Even though the plotters discussed using explosives, the four individuals tied to JIS and arrested in 2005 used firearms in robberies to generate funding for their scheme. 122


• In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen crashed his SUV into a crowd near the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously injured in the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of murder. The assailant allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were caused by the United States. 124

**Material Support**

Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support unrelated to specific violent jihadist plots. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material support charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001 and March 18, 2010. 126 CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six schemes. 127 The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al...
 Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). They included the following:

- **Rahmat Abdhir:** A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, California, Abdhir was indicted in 2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government accused Rahmat of sending to his brother more than $10,000 in supplies, including chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.\(^{128}\)

- **Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed:** According to DOJ, during a routine traffic stop in Goose Creek, South Carolina, on August 4, 2007, law enforcement officials found explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and kitty litter as well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the trunk of the Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car yielded a video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device. Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian resident of Tampa, Florida, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student visa.\(^{129}\)

- **Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent:** In an investigation stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York City jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda

(...continued)


in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend terrorist training camps. Shah, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Shah also offered his medical skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters. Brent, a Washington, D.C. cab driver, traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a Lashkar-i-Taiba training camp. A fourth individual was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material support.

- **Ronald Grecula:** In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.

- **Ilyas Ali:** In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with anti-aircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.

- **Cedric Carpenter** and **Lamont Ranson:** In February 2005, the duo from New Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.

Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ’s list covering the period between 9/11 and March 18, 2010, several material support cases have come to light recently. It is unclear what accounts for this recent flurry of arrests. It may be a parallel to the uptick in violent jihadist plotting.

- **Barry Bujol:** Arrested on May 30, 2010, Bujol, a U.S. citizen living in Texas, allegedly attempted to provide money, pre-paid telephone calling cards, and global positioning system receivers (among other items), to Al Qaeda in the

---


American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Arabian Peninsula after he had communicated with radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi.  

- **Khalid Quazzani:** On May 19, 2010, Ouazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Morocco and living in Kansas City, Missouri, pled guilty to participating in a material support scheme that provided more than $23,000 to Al Qaeda.  

- **Syed Hashmi:** A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos, sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned the individual $300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan to deliver the goods.  

- **Raja Lahrasib Khan:** On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money) to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted $1,000 from an undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase weapons and possibly other supplies.  

- Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens **Wesam El-Hanafi** and **Sabirhan Hasanoff** allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things, provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al Qaeda.  

**Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom**

Few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or martyrdom overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements. Najibullah Zazi and his associates planned their attack on New York’s subways as suicide missions. Also, at least one American recruited into al-Shabaab has committed a suicide attack. On October 29, 2008, al-

---


Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed who became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.\textsuperscript{142} Reportedly, the FBI is also investigating whether a Seattle man was responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 17, 2009 that killed 21 peacekeepers and himself.\textsuperscript{143}

Four others expressed a willingness to perform a suicide mission. Daniel Maldonado told authorities that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.\textsuperscript{144} Al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen, Bryant Neal Vinas, agreed to become a suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.\textsuperscript{145} In emails intercepted by law enforcement authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that she was prepared to be a martyr. And, in recordings of his conversations with an informant, Shaker Masri stated that he would be willing to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and blow himself up as a martyr.\textsuperscript{146}

**The Success of Lone Wolves**

Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed Taheri-Azar) have conducted the four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. The remaining disrupted or failed plots have involved two or more participants in a group or network of one type or another. Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms and they targeted U.S. military personnel.

It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored groups involved in fourteen of the plots.

**Varied Capabilities**

Among the 40 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced. For instance, long before Derrick Shareef was apprehended in 2006, he likely


intended to commit terrorist acts. However, he appears not to have possessed the capability to do so on his own until he was approached by an undercover FBI informant.

Shareef, a Muslim convert and 22 years old at the time of his arrest, plotted to set off hand grenades at a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. FBI informant William “Jamaal” Chrisman played a central part in the plot. At the behest of authorities, Chrisman befriended Shareef in September 2006 while the latter was working in a video store and had nowhere to live. Chrisman invited the young man to move in with him and began reporting to his law enforcement handlers regarding Shareef’s jihadist tendencies. Shareef was unaware that Chrisman secretly recorded their conversations. The duo talked about violent jihad against civilians, public buildings, and a judge in DeKalb, Illinois. They concocted a plan to attack a local shopping mall. Chrisman told the young jihadist of a friend who could procure weapons for them. Unknown to Shareef, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent. On December 6, 2006, the duo met the undercover FBI agent in the mall’s parking lot where Shareef attempted to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades and was arrested. Shareef, who pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, was sentenced in September 30, 2008 to 35 years in prison.

Conversely, two of the homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability their plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as:

one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, it could have been devastating. This attempted attack on our homeland was real, it was in motion, and it would have been deadly. We were able to thwart this plot because of careful analysis by our intelligence agents and prompt actions by law enforcement.

While a complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process is not publicly available, some details regarding his plot have emerged. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi, an imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in the same Queens building. Regardless, Zazi pled guilty on February 22, 2010, to a number of terrorism charges. As mentioned above, the young man admitted to receiving Al Qaeda training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2008. There, he learned about explosives and discussed specific targets with Al Qaeda members. He returned to the United


States in January 2009 and moved to Denver. He also traveled to New York to discuss the timing for the attacks with a network of conspirators. In July and early September in Denver, he gathered materials for detonator components and assembled them based on the detailed training he had received in Afghanistan. Zazi admitted to bringing the explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) into New York on Thursday September 10, 2009. He intended to finish bomb construction over the weekend and planned to target New York’s subway lines early the next week.\(^{154}\)

On March 18, 2010, David Headley pled guilty to terrorism charges. He admitted that he helped plan two plots for the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET)—the November 2008 Mumbai attack and an un-executed conspiracy targeting a Danish newspaper. He received training from LeT and claimed membership in the organization. Headley attended the group’s training camps five times between 2002 and 2005. These stints in Pakistan provided him with weapons training, indoctrination in jihad as well as instruction in close combat, survival skills, and counter-surveillance, among other things.

Between 2005 and 2008, he received extensive direction from LeT members and engaged in reconnaissance for the group in preparation for its Mumbai attack. To provide cover for his surveillance activity, Headley encouraged a co-conspirator in Chicago, who owned an immigration services business, to open a satellite office in Mumbai. Headley conducted video surveillance of potential Mumbai targets for LeT, and using a global positioning system device, he pinpointed landing sites for a waterborne assault. At the behest of LeT, Headley also conducted reconnaissance of the offices of the Danish newspaper *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*. Representatives of both LeT and Al Qaeda schemed with him to strike the newspaper after it had published unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.\(^{155}\)

### Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities

The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-world version of hide-and-seek.

The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (Figure 3). The success of terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular

----

\(^{154}\) Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and a provision of material support to a terrorist organization. See DOJ Press Release, Feb. 22, 2010. For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”

option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist recruits.

**Figure 3. Counterterrorism Context**

![Diagram showing the marketplace of ideas and secretive realm with categories such as radicalization, self-identification/exploration, indoctrination, adoption of violent Jihadist ideas, violent extremism, recruitment, planning, and execution of attack, and community engagement, including Muslim community organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other government agencies.]

Source: CRS

**Intelligence Approaches**

A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies, identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.” The DOJ and FBI operate 106 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—71 created since 9/11. These interagency entities include 4,433 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.” As this suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.

JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of

---

156 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate: The Country Still Lacks A Coherent National Domestic Intelligence-Collection Effort, Notes prepared by Brian Michael Jenkins, acting chair of a group of unofficial, non-partisan acting and former senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and terrorism analysts devoted to intelligence issues. The group serves without compensation or political agenda and does not seek to influence government, although its observations are circulated among government officials. Hereafter: America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.

top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009.\textsuperscript{158}

A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists.\textsuperscript{159} A growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it harder for police to identify actual terrorists.

Preventive Policing

Since the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice Department’s aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as

the only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—prosecutions.\textsuperscript{160}

One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal activities …It focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at some future date.”\textsuperscript{161}

The FBI and DOJ emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008 revision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations which they claim “make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.”\textsuperscript{162} This revision went into effect on December 1, 2008. In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal,
counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.\textsuperscript{163} As FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni stated in congressional testimony:

We believe that this will allow the FBI to take additional necessary steps to becoming a more proactive organization. One of the key issues that we think the FBI needs to be able to do is assess potential risks and vulnerabilities. Having these additional techniques available at the assessment level, we think, will be key to the FBI’s ability to efficiently and effectively answer those questions and assess risks.\textsuperscript{164}

The most prominent changes to the guidelines concern “assessments” that agents and analysts may now use outside of investigations. Investigations require some level of factual predication,\textsuperscript{165} while an assessment does not.\textsuperscript{166} However, assessments are to follow a specifically articulated purpose. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes:\textsuperscript{167}

- check leads on individuals or activities,
- check leads on groups or organizations,
- collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities,
- gather information for intelligence analysis or planning,
- vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and
- collect foreign intelligence.

Assessments are not to be based on “arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity,


\textsuperscript{166} According to the DIOG, “Although difficult to define, ‘no particular factual predication’ is less than ‘information or allegation’ as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For example, an assessment may be conducted when there is a basis to know: (i) whether more information or facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the other. Regardless of whether specific approval or specific documentation is required, an FBI employee should be able to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI employees who conduct assessments are responsible for assuring that assessments are not pursued for frivolous or improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject of the assessment.” DIOG, redacted, p. 39.

national origin or religion of the subject.”168 Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate conspiracies.169

Civil libertarians and Muslim community organizations have voiced broad concerns about the new guidelines. According to media reporting, Farhad Khra, executive director of the nonprofit Muslim Advocates, has suggested that the Attorney General Guidelines are invasive and based on “generalized suspicion and fear on the part of law enforcement, not on individualized evidence of criminal activity.”170 Under the Freedom of Information Act, in late July 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) requested information from the FBI regarding the agency’s amassing of racial and ethnic data based on the new guidelines.171 As written, the guidelines allow for the collection of information about ethnic or racial communities and justify the gathering of such information for proactive purposes. The guidelines state that it should be done if it “will reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”172

Detecting the Shift from Radical to Violent Jihadist

A major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence.173 Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement also faces the task of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.

Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet use from Internet Service Providers.174 In addition, according to an internal Justice Department document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target’s friends or relatives, and browse private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.175 The Obama Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records related to the context of emails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining a

168 DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
172 DIOG, redacted, p. 32.
warrant from a judge. “The proposal would add ‘electronic communication transaction records’—like email addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited—to a list of the categories of information that FBI agents can demand.”

A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveal that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against defendants in at least twelve of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.

The case involving 24-year-old Mohamed Alessa and 20-year-old Carlos Almonte highlights the complexities in detecting transitions from radicalization to violent extremism. Investigators arrested the duo on June 5, 2010 at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in New York as they allegedly tried to fly to Egypt. They hoped to eventually link up with the Somali terrorist organization, al-Shabaab.

> [e]very time [Alessa and Almonte] access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist videos about the Islam holy [sic] war and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible things ... . They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than Islamic followers are their enemies ... and they all must be killed.

This statement suggests that in 2006, the two young men engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites and discussing terrorist activity.

Between 2006 and 2010, investigators monitored the duo’s actions as their beliefs arguably morphed into something more dangerous. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. In 2006 and 2007, investigators debated the level of threat posed by Alessa and Almonte. A key shift occurred when law enforcement discovered after the fact that the duo had travelled to Jordan in 2007 but failed to get recruited as mujahedeen fighters. This helped convince authorities of the two plotters’ actual intent to do harm. By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.

The U.S. government’s criminal complaint against Alessa and Almonte lays out the alleged overt activities marking the duo’s change from radicals to terrorist suspects worthy of arrest. Back in New Jersey, Alessa and Almonte supposedly trained for jihad by lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns. The government claims that they gathered equipment,

---


including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots. The pair also purportedly saved over $7,000 to fund their foreign violent jihad. The criminal complaint describes how the two discussed violent jihad and downloaded jihadist rhetoric. For example, Almonte is said to have kept a lecture by radical imam Anwar al-Aulaqi on his cell phone. The U.S. government contends that Alessa viewed a video including scenes of Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn praising Nidal Hasan, the alleged Ft. Hood shooter. Also, according to the criminal complaint, Almonte possessed computer files of violent jihadist documents authored by Osama Bin Ladin and his second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. For the government, Alessa and Almonte’s transformation from radicals to terrorists likely culminated when the two allegedly booked reservations for separate flights to Egypt scheduled for June 5, 2010.\footnote{181 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.}

Two other successful plots emphasize the difficulty inherent in discerning when radicals become terrorist threats. Even if a suspect comes to the attention of law enforcement, evaluating the person’s intent and capability remains challenging. Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, over the course of several months, Nidal Hasan sent a number of emails to radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi (who replied to only two of them). The email exchange was assessed by JTTF investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus, presumably protected speech.\footnote{182 David Tarrant, “Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI’s Radar, But Only One Was Taken Down,” \textit{The Dallas Morning News}, Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/112209dmentlonewolf.450512f.html Hereafter: Tarrant, Nov. 22, 2009; Ann Scott Tyson and Dana Priest, “Army Sought Ways to Channel Hasan’s Absorption with Islam,” \textit{The Washington Post}, Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111128106.html} In retrospect it appears Hasan’s intentions were far more menacing.

The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement

A terrorist attack in the United States, whether committed by homegrown or foreign terrorists, will occur in a community within a state or tribal area. Since the plotting and preparation for domestic terrorist attacks (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities, preventing such attacks is not only a federal responsibility but also a state, local, and tribal one. In 2010 testimony to Congress, Brian Michael Jenkins says that

The diffuse nature of today’s terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal authorities, who will then share this information with state and local authorities. It is just as likely—perhaps more likely—that local law enforcement could be the first to pick up clues of future conspiracies.\(^{187}\)

Every day, officers at over 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies collect and document information regarding behaviors, incidents, and other suspicious activity associated with crime including terrorism.\(^ {188}\) A joint study by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and senior law enforcement officials concluded that “[t]he gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity is critical to preventing crimes, including those associated with domestic and international terrorism.”\(^ {189}\) A former police chief observed that

On the beat or mobile, cops are sensitive to things that do not look right or do not sound right ... [r]emember, it was a rookie cop on a routine check that resulted in the arrest of Eric Robert Rudolph in North Carolina despite the enormous commitment of federal resources.\(^ {190}\)

Another example is the case of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. He was arrested after a traffic stop when Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger noticed that McVeigh’s yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis had no license plate.\(^ {191}\) Using his home state as an example, a former U.S.

---


\(^{188}\) Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project, Final Draft, June 2008, p. 6. The SAR Support and Implementation Project was a joint effort of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance; the Major Cities Chiefs Association, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, and DHS to develop recommendations to be used by law enforcement agencies to improve identification and reporting of suspicious activity and the sharing of that information with fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. See pp. 1-2. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mccarecommendation-06132008.pdf.

\(^{189}\) Ibid, p. 2.


\(^{191}\) Trooper Hanger had no reason to suspect a connection between McVeigh and the bombing in Oklahoma City. But, the trooper’s suspicions were raised when the driver looked at his bumper when told why he had been pulled over. Says Trooper Hanger: “I thought if he knew he didn’t have a tag, why did he look at the back of the car like that? It just didn’t seem right.” In addition, McVeigh was unable to provide proof of insurance and a bill of sale for the vehicle and then disclosed that he had a firearm. Trooper Hanger arrested McVeigh for five misdemeanors and took him into custody. McVeigh was awaiting arraignment when the FBI connected him to the bombing. See National Law (continued...)
Attorney maintains that “... evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal enterprise is far more likely to be found in the incidental contact with the 10,000 police officers in the state of Washington than by the less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field Division.”

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important considering the challenges noted elsewhere in this report in detecting terrorist lone wolves. The four successful homegrown jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred since 9/11 were all committed by lone wolves. Jenkins believes that preventing future terrorist attacks requires effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local authorities.

Integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. After the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence, i.e., “connecting the dots,” as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks several efforts were made to improve the sharing of terrorism information between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies:

- States and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers. Congress has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity; ...” At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.

- In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (commonly known as the “ISE”) to provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, state, local, and tribal enforcement agencies.

(...continued)


195 For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group, published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008.


197 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; Nov. 4, 2009.

entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.\textsuperscript{199}

- Congress made information sharing a priority of the new DHS intelligence organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.”\textsuperscript{200}

- Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).\textsuperscript{201} DHS supports these centers through its State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and intelligence officers and analysts.\textsuperscript{202}

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI)\textsuperscript{203} is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Specifically, it is a framework to support the reporting of suspicious activity—from the point of initial observation to the point where the information is available in the information sharing environment.\textsuperscript{204} It is a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.\textsuperscript{205} The intent is for this locally-generated suspicious activity reporting to be combined in a systematic way with other sources of intelligence at the federal level to uncover criminal activity, including terrorism.

### Investigative Approaches

As suggested, timing is everything. To preemptively stop terrorists, law enforcement requires accurate and timely intelligence. To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”\textsuperscript{206} The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations.

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146.


\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(b) and (c).

\textsuperscript{203} For details on the NSI, see CRS Report R40901, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by Mark A. Randol.

\textsuperscript{204} NSI Project Overview Briefing by Russ Porter, Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.


In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around Mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities.

The Capone Approach

As mentioned, the Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. This approach fits within a preventative mode of counterterrorism prosecution and has received media scrutiny. Experts have noted that immediately after 9/11, DOJ often leveled lesser charges against terrorist suspects to preemptively squelch potential attacks. However, according to the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law, DOJ has moved toward trying suspected terrorists as terrorists instead of leaning heavily on lesser charges. In 2001 and 2002, 8% of defendants labeled as terrorists in the media were charged under terrorism statutes, this figure rose to 47% in 2006 and 2007. Regardless, the Capone approach is still used in terrorism cases.

Lying to an FBI Special Agent is one of the violations that falls under the Capone approach. A recent example stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case. By early 2010, while living in King Salmon, Alaska, Paul Rockwood had developed a list of 15 people he planned to kill, believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had also researched explosives and shared with others ideas about mail bombs or using firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors could not pursue a case based on more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a threat—someone apparently preparing to kill people—by using the Capone approach.

The utility of this preventative technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by the FBI in its case against Najibullah Zazi. As mentioned above, Zazi arrived in New York on September 10, 2009 with explosive material and plans to detonate bombs in New York’s subway system. Zazi feared authorities had caught up to him and returned to Denver on September 12th. Between September 10th and 19th, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also agreed to interviews with the FBI in Denver. On September 19, Special Agents first arrested Zazi in Aurora, Colorado for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this was done because he

might flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more substantive one-count indictment against him on weapons of mass destruction charges.\(^{210}\)

DOJ used similar charges against Ahmad Wais Afzali, an imam from Queens. He was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI’s investigation. On March 4, 2010, Afzali pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He admitted that he warned Zazi that the FBI had asked about him. Afzali also stated that during the phone conversation he simply cautioned Zazi not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.”\(^{217}\) He stated in court that he misled the FBI about a telephone conversation he had with Zazi. Afzali claimed that by lying to investigators he had hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York City investigators in the past.\(^{212}\)

In another instance of the Capone approach, in 2008 the federal government charged Tarek Mehanna for lying to FBI agents regarding his relationship to Daniel Maldonado, subsequently convicted and jailed for terrorism-related offenses. Mehanna’s 2008 arrest occurred at Boston’s Logan International Airport as he was preparing to leave the country, according to news reports. He was subsequently released on bail. His defense attorney claimed that the FBI wanted Mehanna to become an informant, and his refusal precipitated his 2009 indictment and re-arrest on terrorism charges.\(^{213}\)

**Agent Provocateur Cases**

Agent provocateur cases rely on expert determination by law enforcement that a specific individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk and engage in violent jihad. The ultimate goal is to catch a suspect committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial trigger but on a dud weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad evidence against suspects.

As mentioned above, FBI undercover employees or informants played central roles in twelve terrorist plots since 9/11. Two recent FBI investigations exemplify the utility of this approach. On September 24, 2009, 19-year-old Jordanian immigrant Hosam Smadi was arrested for attempting to detonate what he thought was a car bomb in the parking lot of a 60-story skyscraper in Dallas, Texas. On May 26, 2010, he pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.\(^{214}\) Smadi’s apprehension resulted from an FBI operation including at least three undercover employees. The operation duped Smadi into believing he was planning an attack with Al Qaeda operatives. It ended with Smadi driving a truck he believed to contain a live bomb into the underground garage of 60-story Fountain Place in Dallas, Texas. He used a cell phone to try

---


and trigger the dud.215 The same day of Smadi’s arrest, the FBI apprehended Michael C. Finton in Springfield, Illinois on similar but unrelated charges. Finton’s case also relied heavily on undercover FBI personnel. Allegedly they supplied him with a van Finton believed contained almost one ton of high explosives. According to the DOJ, he drove and parked the van near the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield. FBI Special Agents arrested Finton after he tried to detonate the bogus bomb using a cell phone.216

Initially the FBI appears to have just tracked the activities of both Finton and Smadi. However, both investigations likely reached tipping points encouraging the Bureau to initiate much more proactive agent provocateur-type operations. Finton had converted to Islam while in prison on aggravated robbery and battery charges. According to court documents, he was released in 2006 but in 2007 was re-arrested and returned to prison because of a parole violation. At the time, a search of Finton’s vehicle revealed passages he wrote that championed martyrdom as well as attempted correspondence with John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen who pled guilty in federal court to serving in the Taliban army and carrying weapons. In 2008, after Finton was released from prison for his parole violation, members of the FBI’s Springfield JTTF interviewed him. The JTTF also used an informant to monitor Finton, who engaged in radical rhetoric after his release. In January 2009, the informant reported that Finton planned to travel to the Gaza strip to fight Israelis. At this juncture in the investigation, the FBI allegedly initiated its agent provocateur strategy to nab Finton.217

The tipping point in the Smadi investigation is a little less specific. He allegedly had come to the agency’s attention because the jihadist sentiment he displayed among an online group of extremists supposedly “stood out.”218 As a result, an FBI undercover employee communicated with Smadi. More than ten exchanges between the two emphasized Smadi’s desire to conduct violent jihad on behalf of Al Qaeda. Thus, the FBI determined he was a “legitimate threat,” introduced him to another undercover employee who posed as a senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell, and ostensibly set the sting in motion.219

Affidavits in the Smadi and Finton cases allege that FBI undercover employees tested both suspects to ascertain the depth of their intent to do harm. In each case, the suspects received reassurances that if they quit the schemes, they would face no repercussions from their fellow (sham) plotters. FBI undercover operatives repeatedly tried to discourage Smadi’s violent jihadist sentiments. In July 2009, an undercover employee (the fictitious senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell), offered Smadi a way out of the plot. The mock Al Qaeda operative counseled Smadi


219 Ibid.
by saying that different types of jihad existed, and he did not have to follow through on the plot if he was uncomfortable with it. He reassured Smadi by stressing that if he backed out, he would remain part of Al Qaeda’s “brotherhood.” Regardless, Smadi steadfastly believed in the plot and refused to quit.  

Like Smadi, Finton was given at least one opportunity to abandon his scheme. He allegedly understood that, “anytime he felt uncomfortable, he could walk out the door and still be a brother.”

The “Bind” for Law Enforcement

Not all agent provocateur cases appear as thorough in their efforts to reveal the harmful intent of suspects. Some cases have raised controversy about the extent to which government informants or agents have entrapped suspects and/or supported or pushed along terrorist plots. These instances illustrate what Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and author, Stephan Salisbury, describes as the “bind” the FBI finds itself in. “On one hand it is being charged by the Justice Department to go out and stop this stuff [terrorism] before it happens. But on the other, it is getting criticized for the techniques it is using to do that.”  

The 2008 Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations address the same competing forces, and as mentioned their implementation has spurred concerns among civil liberties groups.

Investigations of the so-called Newburgh Four and Liberty City Seven plots illustrate this bind. In each, law enforcement has been criticized for its use of undercover informants. To counter this, in both cases, officials emphasized the importance of prevention—neutralizing threats posed by the groups involved. For example, in a press conference related to the Newburgh plot, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg reassured the public by stating that the plotters did not have ties to a larger terrorist organization. However, he went on to stress the preemptive aspects of the case, “I’ve always thought of our police department’s primary job, not as first responders but as first preventers.”

Cognizant of criticisms that the Liberty City men neither were competent nor their plotting viable, former Attorney General Gonzalez cautioned that our philosophy here is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we don’t know what we don’t know about a terrorist plot ... it’s dangerous for us to make an evaluation case by case ... well, this is a really dangerous group, this is really not a dangerous group. And we felt that the combination of the planning and the overt acts taken were sufficient to support this prosecution.

Newburgh Four

The Newburgh Four case has kindled controversy regarding the use of an agent provocateur. In the investigation, an FBI informant allegedly offered plotters $250,000 and a luxury car, among other inducements to trigger explosives near a synagogue and to shoot down military aircraft.

---

220 Ibid.
221 U.S. v. Finton, Affidavit.
224 Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”
On June 14, 2010, the federal judge hearing the trial delayed its start, because prosecutors may have failed to provide to defense attorneys relevant case information. Days earlier the defense received an FBI document suggesting that the lead plotter, James Cromitie, was not a threat. News accounts suggest the plotters may have been heavily influenced by the FBI’s informant. They have also raised questions about the informant in the case, alleged to be a man named Shahed Hussain. According to the Village Voice, Hussain duped the Newburgh Four into their plot. The Voice suggested that the quartet of smalltime felons had no grand terrorist ambitions, and Hussain had plied them with cash and suggestions.

The Newburgh Four were arrested in May 2009. They purportedly had attempted to detonate explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx in New York City. The federal government asserts the plotters also planned to shoot down military airplanes at the New York Air National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York. Hussain allegedly passed himself off as a member of a Pakistani terrorist organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and provided the four suspects with inert C-4 explosives and an inactive Stinger surface-to-air missile.

According to other news reports, Hussain, a Pakistani immigrant, became an FBI informant in 2002 to win leniency and avoid deportation on fraud charges. They stemmed from when he worked as a translator for the New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Hussain pled guilty to production and transfer of false government identification documents—illegally helping immigrants obtain licenses. He had also served as the key informant in the 2003 and 2004 FBI sting operation implicating Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref in a plot to launder money related to the sham sale of surface to air missiles to terrorists.

(...continued)
Liberty City Seven

Like the Newburgh Four case, the Liberty City Seven investigation also generated questions regarding informant use by the FBI. Seven Miami-area men were arrested in 2006 for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower (now called Willis Tower) in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Defense attorneys called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming that the men had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes. An FBI informant posing as an Al Qaeda member in the case, offered the men $50,000 as part of their plot. He also obtained warehouse space for the group’s activities, led a ceremony in which the conspirators swore allegiance to Al Qaeda, gave the group video cameras for surveillance activities, and suggested targeting Miami’s FBI offices.

One of the two FBI informants in the investigation, Abbas al-Saidi, was jailed after reportedly having extorted $7,000 from a friend who raped his girlfriend and then, after accepting the money, beat her up. The other informant, Elie Assad, also had a domestic battery charge on his record. According to FBI agents, Assad failed a polygraph test administered while he was working for them on a previous case in Chicago. A 35-year veteran of the FBI, who was hired as an expert witness by the Liberty City defense team, stated that Assad never should have been authorized to work on the Liberty City case at all. However, at trial, the former FBI agent was not allowed to testify nor did the judge permit the testimony about Assad's failed polygraph test. After juries in the first two trials failed to reach a verdict, six of the seven Liberty City men were convicted at a third trial and sentenced to long prison sentences.

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab and Sikh communities. “Embedded within these communities,” notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, “are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups.”

234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{237}

Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be accepted.\textsuperscript{238} Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance community perceptions of legitimacy.

Engagement with Communities

The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990’s. The Justice Department defined community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”\textsuperscript{239} One of its key features is the establishment of collaborative partnerships between law enforcement agencies and individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.\textsuperscript{240}

A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that “[c]ommunity policing has been applied with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States.”\textsuperscript{241} A Homeland Advisory Council (HSAC) working group\textsuperscript{242} chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley found that Community-Oriented Policing works:

(...continued)

PFP_Executive_Summary__cover.pdf.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid
\textsuperscript{241} Rosemary Lark (Task Lead), Richard Rowe, and John Markey, Community Policing Within Muslim Communities: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature, Homeland Security Institute, Dec. 27, 2006, p. iii. This study, prepared for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, sought to identify the literature that examined community policing initiatives underway within Muslim Communities in the U.S., and the extent to which they were successful in achieving the objectives of (1) inclusiveness, promoting integration, and potentially minimize the disaffection that can lead to radicalization, particularly among Muslim youth; (2) serve as early warning to identify incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and (3) open a new channel of communication with individuals who can navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam, providing needed context to inform intelligence analysis, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/hsireports/Task_06-99_Community_Policing_within_Muslim_Communities.pdf.
\textsuperscript{242} The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The chair of the council is Judge William Webster, former Director of the CIA and Director of the FBI. Other members include leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia. The Countering Violent Extremism Working Group originated from a tasking by Secretary Napolitano to the HSAC in Feb. 2010 to work with state and local law enforcement and relevant community groups to develop and provide recommendations on how DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically. See Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 2.
“Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-solving, and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect against and respond to violent criminal activity—including that which may be motivated by ideological objectives.”

Federal, State, and Local Government Activities

Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim-American communities. For a summary of these activities, see Appendix B. In addition to federal engagement efforts, state and local governments also have active programs. Just one example is the Muslim Community Affairs unit of the Los Angeles Sheriff Department. This unit was established in August 2007 under the direction of Sheriff Lee Baca with the purpose of developing an outreach program for the Muslim Community in Los Angeles County. It has grown to include a training program for the Muslim community on law enforcement issues such as hate crimes, domestic violence, gangs and identity theft. A Young Muslim American Leaders Group engages with and provides education for the young Muslim professionals in the Los Angeles area. It meets on a monthly basis to discuss issues that concern the Muslim youth and young professionals. In addition to training and engaging with the community, the Muslim Community Affairs unit also trains department members about Islam and Muslims along with their culture, customs, and beliefs.

Muslim Community Activities

As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated publicly, “Members of the American Muslim community have been—and continue to be—strong partners in fighting this emerging threat [of terrorism]. They have regularly denounced terrorist acts and those who carry them out. And they have provided critical assistance to law enforcement in helping to disrupt terrorist plots and combat radicalization.”

“One of the most important benefits of trusted partnerships,” says Alejandro Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, “is the ability of community members to feel comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent any crime, including terrorism.” In a May 2010 background paper, he documents 16 terrorist plots disrupted with Muslim community assistance, nine of which involved homegrown jihadist cases.

A partial list of other community initiatives to tackle the problem of violent extremism includes the following:

- Muflehun. Describing itself as an “independent think-and-do tank, Muflehun seeks to use faith-based values for empowerment and continued integration of the

---

244 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, “About the Muslim Community Affairs Unit,” http://la-sheriff.org/sites/muslimoutreach/about.html.
247 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
Muslim community within the larger society. It focuses on two main research areas: radicalization prevention in the United States, and horizon scanning for emerging trends within the Muslim American community.

- The Straight Path Initiative. Founded by The Muslim American Society, the initiative seeks to engage all components of the Muslim American community, with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. It seeks to pinpoint the roots of extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to address these challenges, including an honest and open dialogue about radicalization and extremism in Muslim American communities; research to pinpoint the root causes of radicalization and extremism among Muslim American youth in particular; engagement with the Muslim American community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on vulnerable members of the community.

- National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism. An initiative of The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), it seeks to: (1) [raise] religious awareness and education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to be considered as a form of struggle in Islam; (2) control the inter-mosque environment and activities to prevent intruders and unauthorized, unknown persons from exploiting the open environment of [mosques]; and (3) acquire skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.

Risks and Challenges

Although there is considerable support among public officials for community engagement, some experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in Arab-American communities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example, highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between U.S. Arabs (Christian and Muslim) and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status and fears of deportation.”

Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like everyone else. He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only...

---

252 Discussion with CRS, Apr. 7, 2010.
interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”253

Mohamed Elhibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a Muslim community group based in Carrollton, Texas has told Congress that “while the government has publicly claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of concern.”254 He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim-American communities would be counterproductive.

Outreach may be most effective when U.S. Muslim communities initiate it and community-government contact revolves around countering the extremist messages popular among homegrown violent jihadists.255 Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans,256 an activity in which the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.257

The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities

A further challenge to efforts to build trust and partnership are law enforcement investigative activities and tactics that are perceived to unfairly target law-abiding members of the community or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. The HSAC Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group found that

There can be tension between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime. Community policing can be impeded if other enforcement tactics are perceived as conflicting with community partnership efforts.258

This challenge is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants. One Muslim community leader who has published widely on domestic terrorism, states that “many Muslim Americans fear that paid FBI informants specifically target impressionable youth and that law enforcement agents coerce community members to become informants themselves to avoid complications with immigration procedures.”259

---

253 Ibid.
256 Discussion with CRS, Apr. 7, 2010.
Community leaders report numerous attempts by the FBI to recruit Muslims as informers. In virtually all cases, the Muslims in question had immigration and other legal problems or were applying for green cards according to Shakeel Syed of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, an umbrella organization of 68 area mosques. Syed said the FBI told Muslims, “We will make your problems vanish if you cooperate.” He goes on to say that “For some individuals who have refused recruitment, there is startling evidence that the FBI has actually retaliated against them.”

Two cases that are often cited to support these allegations are those of Foad Farahi and Yassine Ouassif. Farahi is an imam at a mosque in North Miami Beach, Florida who has lived in the United States since 1993. Although an Iranian citizen, he does not speak Farsi because he grew up as a Sunni Muslim in Kuwait speaking Arabic. He applied for political asylum in the United States in 2002 after it was determined that he could be removed from the country because he had failed to maintain his student status. He sought asylum based upon a fear of persecution if deported to Iran because he is a Sunni Muslim and Iran is overwhelmingly Shia.

In 2004, when he was first approached by the FBI, Farahi said he told them that he was willing to work with them, but the relationship would need to be public. He claimed the FBI wanted him to be a secret informant instead and promised him residency and money for school. But Farahi declined saying “People trust you as a religious figure, and you’re trying to kind of deceive them. That’s where the problem is.”

In the summer of 2007, Farahi declined a second request from the FBI to become a secret informant. The consequences for this followed later that year at a hearing on his asylum case. Four Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, armed and wearing bullet proof vests, followed him into the Miami Immigration Court. They allegedly told his attorney they had a file with evidence that he was supporting or involved in terrorist groups and gave him an ultimatum: Drop the asylum case and leave the United States voluntarily or be charged as a terrorist. Farahi reported that these threats led to the involuntary and coerced withdrawal of his asylum application before the Immigration Court.

According to Farahi’s attorneys, the government has never shared any information or evidence that he was involved in terrorism, nor has the government charged him for any terrorist offenses. He has appealed the withdrawal of his asylum application to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Farahi believes that “People have two choices. Either they end up working with the FBI or they leave the country on their own. It’s just sometimes when you’re in that situation, not many people are strong enough to stand up and resist and fight—to reject their offers.”

Farahi’s assertion that the government tried to coerce him to become an informant cannot be verified independently because the FBI won’t comment on his case. When asked by a journalist

---


262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.
who has written on the case, a Miami FBI Special Agent stated: “It is a matter of policy that we do not confirm or deny who we have asked to be a source.”

In a case reported by The Wall Street Journal, a 24-year-old Moroccan, Yassine Ouassif, was stopped in November 2005 and questioned for several hours by immigration officials as he crossed into New York from Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and he was told to contact an individual when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied with the immigration officials’ instructions and the individual he contacted turned out to be an FBI agent. The agent told him that he had been monitoring Ouassif and his friends for many months.

According to Ouassif, the FBI agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing. In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his education, bring his Moroccan wife to America, and pursue his dream of buying a car, moving to Sacramento and becoming an engineer. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif soon after the meeting, the FBI agent told him, “I will work hard to deport you to Morocco as soon as possible.”

According to the Los Angeles Times, “this account of Ouassif’s ordeal is based largely on interviews with him and his lawyer, as well as his own written chronicle. Immigration officials declined to comment, since no formal action was taken against Ouassif. FBI officials also declined to discuss the investigation, saying it is classified.”

Another case has roiled the Muslim-American community in Southern California. The FBI employed a convicted con man, Craig Monteilh, as an informant in an investigation called “Operation Flex.” Monteilh claimed in interviews and court documents that he served the FBI as a paid informant from July 2006 to October 2007 and used concealed audio and video equipment to record thousands of hours of conversations with Muslims in homes, restaurants and mosques in Irvine, Tustin, Mission Viejo and elsewhere.

Posing as a new convert, Monteilh arrived at the Irvine Islamic Center in 2006 wearing robes and a long beard, using the name Farouk Aziz. Monteilh had a criminal record that included serving 16 months in state prison on two grand theft charges. Members of the Islamic Center of Irvine were reportedly alarmed about Monteilh and his talk of jihad and plans for a terrorist attack. The

267 Ibid.
local chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported him to the Irvine police and obtained a three-year restraining order against him.271

Monteilh’s role as an FBI informant came out in a bail hearing for Ahmadullah Niazi, a U.S. citizen born in Afghanistan, who was accused of lying about ties to terrorist groups on immigration applications, because he is alleged to have failed to disclose that his brother-in-law was Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and that he traveled to Pakistan in 2005 where he allegedly met bin Laden. However, Hussam Ayloush, executive director of the Los Angeles chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, has a different view. He said Niazi, who had been under FBI surveillance since 2006, had come to him because the FBI was attempting to recruit Niazi as an informant. Ayloush suggested the case against Niazi may have been brought in retaliation for his refusal to cooperate.272

An editorial in the Orange County Register, the largest circulation newspaper in the Southern California county where Monteilh’s activities occurred, made the following points:

Everyone understands the need for legitimate undercover activities in response to credible evidence. But we cannot fathom the justification for fishing expeditions and entrapment …Muslims are afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within their mosques or even among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover agents…there should not be a presumption of guilt among an entire community…”273

The use of informants can be a controversial issue, especially those with criminal records who may be working on behalf of authorities in exchange for reduced jail time. According to open source reports, confidential informants were used in 18 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. The use of informants poses the following risks:

Informants do not merely observe and collect data. They make things happen…Informants can cause confusion and dissatisfaction among members of groups and communities they infiltrate, discrediting leaders, and fostering factionalism as people wonder if any of their colleagues are spies. Their handlers’ structure of incentives—raises, promotions, transfers, financial rewards, waived jail time—creates a system where informants consciously or subconsciously create and then destroy terrorist threats that would not otherwise exist. These pressures can push them from passive observer to aggressive actor, with serious consequences for constitutionally protected free speech. Another unplanned result: government loses legitimacy and support in the eyes of targeted communities, if they feel they have been manipulated.274

Acknowledging the challenge, FBI Director Robert Mueller said in 2009, “Oftentimes, the communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these communities that we ... must redouble our efforts.”275 Then-FBI spokesman, John Miller, has said


274 Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques.”

275 Quoted in Matthai Kuruvila, “U.S. Muslims Debate How Much to Help FBI,” San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 6, (continued...)
the agency values its relationships with Muslims and has worked hard on outreach efforts that range from town hall meetings to diversity training for FBI agents.\textsuperscript{276} Miller said there is no factual basis for claims the FBI infiltrates mosques or conducts blanket surveillance of Muslim leaders. “Based on information of a threat of violence or a crime, we investigate individuals, and those investigations may take us to the places those individual go.”\textsuperscript{277}

Former FBI agents and federal prosecutors note that informants are “…still one of the government’s best weapons to thwart terrorists and that the benefit to national security is likely to far outweigh any embarrassment to the agency.” They claim that “although the law places almost no constraints on the use of informants, the agency takes sending an informant into a mosque very seriously and imposes a higher threshold for such requests.”\textsuperscript{278} Former FBI counterterrorism chief Robert Blitzer, states that “What matters to the FBI is preventing a massive attack that might be planned by some people … using the mosque or church as a shield because they believe they’re safe there. That is what the American people want the FBI to do. They don’t want some type of attack happening on U.S. soil because the FBI didn't act on information.”\textsuperscript{279}

Maher Hathout from the Muslim Public Affairs Council counters by saying that “People cannot be suspects and partners at the same time. Unless the FBI’s style changes, the partnership with the Muslim community will not be fruitful.”\textsuperscript{280} The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group also cautions that “Law enforcement should be sensitive to the fact that perceptions regarding enforcement actions and intelligence gathering can impact community-oriented policing goals.”\textsuperscript{281}

In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a choice in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

**Policy Considerations for Congress**

**Unifying the National Effort to Combat Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism**

Since 9/11, there have been only four homegrown jihadist attacks in the United States and one “near-miss.” Fortunately, none of the attacks were close to the scale of destruction experienced on


\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{279} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{280} Watanabe and Esquivel, Mar. 1, 2009.

\textsuperscript{281} HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 6.
that tragic day in 2001. Yet, in spite of this overall record, the increase of arrests in the past 15 months suggests that homegrown jihadist terrorism remains a danger. “The United States has made great strides,” says one federal counterterrorism official, “in what might be called tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, and disrupting cells and their operations…an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond this…(to address) the threat of violent extremism.”

U.S. Government efforts to combat violent extremism include investigative, prosecution, and intelligence activities as well as engagement with communities to build trust and enhance collaboration. Many also believe that combating violent extremism must include efforts to counter the extremist radicalization that fuels hatred and violence in an effort to “prevent young American Muslims from embracing extremist ideas in the first place.” Asra Nomani, author of *Standing Alone in Mecca: An American Woman’s Struggle for the Soul of Islam*, writes that “we have to fundamentally challenge the interpretations of Islam that are claiming our youth…if that’s not part of our strategy, we are dead in the water…..” Thus, such a strategy should include “efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas in the public domain.”

Should any of these activities be included in a national effort to combat homegrown violent extremism? How should these activities be unified into a coherent national effort? Although many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities, there is currently no unified strategy, plan, or framework specifically focused on violent extremism as it manifests itself in homegrown jihadist terrorism. The Obama Administration has articulated a broad *National Security Strategy*, and continues to operate with a counterterrorism strategy and plan developed in the last Administration predominantly focused on the foreign terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the homeland and abroad.

---


287 Vidino, 2009.


289 The strategy, National Security Presidential Directive-46 / Homeland Security Directive-15, “U.S. Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror,” Mar. 6, 2006; and the associated plan, “National Implementation Plan” (NIP), (2nd version, 2008), are both classified documents. According to an unclassified Sep. 2006 Fact Sheet, the NIP coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes all instruments of national power for fighting the War on Terror. It is focused around four strategic goals: (1) Protecting and Defending the United States and Its Interests; (2) Attacking Terrorists and Their Capability to Operate Effectively in the US and Abroad; (3) Countering Violent Extremism; (4) Preventing Terrorist Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Plan assigns direct responsibility and identifies specific tasks to be accomplished by specific agencies and departments of the U.S. Government.
The May 2010 National Security Strategy addresses the threat of violent extremism in the United States, but only in general terms and as part of a broad counterterrorism effort:

Empowering Communities to Counter Radicalization: Several recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions. The Federal Government will invest in intelligence to understand this threat and expand community engagement and development programs to empower local communities.290

Engage with Communities and Citizens: We will emphasize individual and community preparedness and resilience through frequent engagement that provides clear and reliable risk and emergency information to the public. A key part of this effort is providing practical steps that all Americans can take to protect themselves, their families, and their neighbors.291

Prevent Attacks on and in the Homeland: To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. We will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have the capability to share classified information; establish a nationwide framework for reporting suspicious activity; and implement an integrated approach to our counterterrorism information systems to ensure that the analysts, agents, and officers who protect us have access to all relevant intelligence throughout the government. We are improving information sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate Federal, state, and local capabilities to seamlessly exchange messages and information, conduct searches, and collaborate.292

The National Security Strategy is a broad outline of the priorities and goals of the nation’s national security effort. It may be claimed that it is not intended to include specifics about the roles of individual government agencies and how they will coordinate, integrate, and harmonize their activities. But for many other counterterrorism and homeland security activities—disrupting terrorist travel, combating specific threats such as those from biological and other weapons of mass destruction, securing the homeland, and sharing terrorism-related information, there are discreet strategies that outline specific activities and responsibilities.293 However, there is no such strategy for combating the homegrown jihadist terrorism threat.

Past Initiatives

A department-level effort to develop a strategy to counter domestic radicalization was attempted by DHS in 2008. A fully-coordinated draft of the strategy was completed but not adopted before the change of administrations. That strategy defined ‘radicalization’ as the process of adopting

291 Ibid.
an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.” It included four strategic goals:

- Enhance the capacity of the Department and its partners to counter and respond to domestic radicalization.
- Conduct outreach and engage with key communities.
- Facilitate communication and promote public awareness and public participation in countering radicalization.
- Continue to advance the Department’s understanding of radicalization.

It has been reported that DHS has resumed an effort to develop a framework for a DHS Radicalization Strategy through its Directorate of Policy.

In 2007, the House of Representatives passed the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 (H.Res. 1955). Among actions that would have been required in the act was the establishment of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism. This commission would be tasked to examine and report on facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States; and build upon, bring together, and avoid unnecessary duplication of related work done by other entities toward such goal. It would have also required the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a survey of methodologies implemented by foreign nations to prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism. The Senate did not, however, vote on the bill.

A National Strategy for Combating Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism

Congress may wish to consider another approach to unifying U.S. Government efforts to combat homegrown jihadist terrorism. It could legislatively mandate a strategy, framework, or plan for this effort. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that

> Achieving meaningful results in many national security–related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among various actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given the number of agencies involved in U.S. government national security efforts, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies...Strategies can help agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures for implementing those strategies.

A clearly-articulated national strategy or framework can prioritize activities, assign responsibility for specific tasks among departments and agencies at the Federal level, and harmonize those

---

efforts. Consider one challenging issue described elsewhere in this report and by a working group of the Homeland Security Advisory Council that is advising the Secretary of Homeland Security. “There can be an inherent tension between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent crime. While this tension may be healthy or unhealthy, it must be managed by senior officials.” A strategy that clearly articulates long-term objectives, priorities, and ‘lanes in the road’ can go a long way to managing this tension.

Since combating violent extremism is not only a federal responsibility, a national strategy can also clarify the roles of state, local, tribal, and non-governmental organizations. It is consistent with the National Security Strategy’s call for a “Whole of Government Approach” which reminds us that “work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy… reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.”

Participants at a conference hosted by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to assess whether elements of the United Kingdom’s counterradicalization strategy could be used in the United States, agreed that “a coherent, coordinated strategy that cuts across government departments and agencies is needed to facilitate cooperation and limit redundancy or efforts.”

Not everyone, however, supports the idea of a national strategy to combat violent extremism (CVE). Mohamed Elibiary, a Texas Muslim community leader who has partnered with U.S. Government agencies on domestic terrorism issues, testified that Congress should not legislate a comprehensive CVE strategy, because that would surely ‘securitize the relationship.’” Instead, he calls for the establishment of “coordinated micro-strategies.” But he does say that DHS should establish its own CVE strategy.

### Issues a National Strategy Could Address

Should a decision be reached to produce a national strategy, a model to consider is the Administration’s 2010 National Framework for Strategic Communication. In succinct terms, this framework defines terms, outlines strategy, assigns roles and responsibilities, establishes a mechanism for determining the allocation of resources, and identifies methods for measuring success. In a national strategy to combat violent extremism domestically, there are specific issues that could be addressed—regardless of the policy vehicle. These include the following:

#### Identifying Radicalization and Interdicting Attempts at Recruitment

It has not been entirely settled which agencies have which responsibilities in this area. The terrorism scholar, Professor Bruce Hoffman, asks if these tasks are best done by federal law enforcement (e.g., the FBI), or state and local jurisdictions working closely with federal

---

298 HSAC CVE Working Group, p. 17.
authorities? Is it a core mission for a modernized, post-9/11 FBI? Or for DHS? Can it be done by NCTC? What is the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in home-grown terrorism and recruitment and radicalization?303

**Countering Radicalization**

What role is there for government, if any, in countering radicalization before it manifests itself in violence? In a report published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a group of scholars and former counterterrorism and intelligence officials called for the United States to “Explicitly recognize the impact of ideology as a key driver framing, motivating, and justifying violent extremism….and [m]obilize government to counter this impact.”304

Should the government be in the business of contesting the radical ideology and extremist narratives? If so, what is the appropriate role for the federal government? Is there a role for state and local governments? Alternatively, is this strictly an activity for the American Muslim community? If this is an appropriate role for the government, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy study group points out that “this will require a more explicit expression of the ideological challenge that individual agencies and offices are trying to tackle. Otherwise the unity of purpose and whole-of-government integration essential to counter radicalization will prove elusive.”305

**Enhancing Domestic Intelligence**

The production of timely and actionable intelligence is essential to the effort to combat violent extremism and could also be addressed within or concurrent with a national strategy. This is important if one considers the concerns of a group of terrorism experts and former and current intelligence and law enforcement officials:

Despite the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the proliferation of fusion centers, the United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence collection effort. There is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats. Creating one could admittedly be a politically perilous undertaking, but without all parts of the federal government having a common understanding of the threat, domestic intelligence efforts will continue to flounder. There is no national, as opposed to local or regional, domestic intelligence-collection plan, no national domestic intelligence collection requirements, no priorities, no national or regional coordination. A national domestic intelligence effort seems unlikely to emerge in the absence of some central direction.306

These experts believe that local police are in the best position to collect domestic intelligence and so their role in the national effort—as well as that of federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS—needs to be carefully delineated. The results they say would be “a more coordinated, better

---


304 Carpenter, et.al., *Fighting the Ideological Battle*, p. 10.

305 Ibid.

306 *America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate*, June 2010.
connected national domestic intelligence effort [that] would better protect the nation against a
continuously morphing jihadist foe, possible surges in terrorist capabilities, and potential future
domestic terrorist threats from other directions."\textsuperscript{307}

Congress, therefore, may also wish to consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to
examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part
of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.

In Appendix A that follows, details about each of the 40 post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and
attacks are provided in chronological order. Appendix B summarizes engagement and partnership
activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid.
Appendix A. Summary of Post 9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots

Omar Hammami—al-Shabaab Figure—August 2010

In an indictment unsealed in August 2010, Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Daphne, Alabama, was accused of supporting al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization. According to public reports, Hammami has appeared in several propaganda videos on behalf of al-Shabaab that have been distributed worldwide. One shows him allegedly instructing recruits in urban warfare. Somali officials believe he is involved with al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy and financial management. He is also believed to be a ranking member of the al-Shabaab organization with operational responsibilities.

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his American mother and the Muslim beliefs of his Syrian-born father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada where the American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the web for information on jihad. While in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia in pursuit of violent jihad.

Jehad Mostafa—Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight—August 2010

Few details are publicly available about Jehad Mostafa, a 28-year-old U.S. citizen who grew up in San Diego, California, and allegedly left the United States to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Notes:
308 Appendix A is based on unsealed Department of Justice (DOJ) indictments and other open source reporting.
310 Al-Shabaab is a group on the Department of State’s list of designated terrorist organizations. It is waging an insurgency in Somalia.
312 Ibid.
The indictment in Mostafa’s case mentions little specifically about his alleged terrorist activity but ties him to al-Shabaab between March 2008 and June 2009. News sources suggest that he left the United States in December 2005.\textsuperscript{313}

**Shaker Masri—Attempted Travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to Fight—July 2010**

Shaker Masri, a 26-year-old U.S. citizen born in Alabama but raised abroad, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 3, 2010, just before he was allegedly planning to travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to join either al-Shabaab or Al Qaeda. The FBI used a cooperating source who met Masri in November 2008 and subsequently consensually recorded conversations with him for the investigation. According to court documents,\textsuperscript{314} Masri encouraged the cooperating source to “review speeches” by Anwar al-Aulaqi.

**Zachary Chesser—Attempted Travel to Somali to Fight—July 2010**

Twenty-year-old U.S. citizen Zachary Chesser was arrested on terrorism-related charges on July 21, 2010. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), Chesser told FBI agents that twice, he tried to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. In his last attempt, Chesser allegedly brought his infant son with him to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City to potentially disguise his intentions.\textsuperscript{315}

According to the DOJ affidavit, Chesser first showed interest in Islam in 2008 and developed a fascination with extremist views, sending Anwar al-Aulaqi emails and receiving two replies from the radical cleric. He also started his own YouTube.com account and operated his own blog where he promoted violent jihad.\textsuperscript{316}

**Paul Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Rockwood—Plot to Kill People on a Hit List—July 2010**

On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI in connection with a terrorism investigation. On the same day, Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case.


\textsuperscript{316} U.S. v. Chesser, Affidavit.
According to DOJ, Paul Rockwood, Jr. converted to Islam in late 2001 or early 2002 while living in Virginia and followed the teachings of radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqui. They allege that after he moved to Alaska in 2006, he visited websites to research explosive components, construction of remote triggering devices, such as cell phones, and construction of bombs to be delivered by common mail carriers. Authorities also said that in late 2009, he began discussing using mail bombs and possibly killing targets by gunshot to the head. They said that by early this year, he had formalized his list of targets for execution.

Paul Rockwood received the maximum sentence of eight years in prison, consistent with his plea agreement. His 36-year-old wife, who is five months pregnant, will be allowed to return to the United Kingdom and serve five years of probation there and may not return to the United States without prior approval.

**Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte—Attempted Travel to Somalia To Fight—June 2010**

On June 5, 2010, two New Jersey residents—24-year-old Mohamed Alessa (a U.S. citizen from a Palestinian-American family) and 20-year-old Carlos Almonte (a Dominican-American and Muslim convert)—were arrested at JFK in New York prior to boarding separate flights to Egypt. Authorities allege the two had hoped to eventually link up with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The following day, they were charged with conspiracy to kill Americans abroad. They are alleged to have vowed to “slice up” troops in “a thousand pieces,” according to the criminal complaint which cites conversations secretly-recorded by a New York Police Department (NYPD) undercover officer. The two face life in prison if convicted.

Law enforcement interest in Alessa and Almonte began when an email tip was received by the FBI on October 9, 2006. It suggested that the two young men were engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites, and discussing terrorist activity. They were then monitored by authorities for the next four years. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. However, in 2007, the two traveled to Jordan where they wanted to be recruited to fight in Iraq, but were rejected and “were upset at the

---

individuals who failed to recruit them.”323 By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.324

Since January 2010, according to the criminal complaint, the two allegedly participated in several activities that had officials concerned that they were moving further from radicalization to violent extremism. This included lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns, and gathering equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots, among other things.325 According to officials, when they booked separate flights in June 2010 to Egypt, they were arrested because they were preparing to leave the country to fight overseas.326

Faisal Shahzad—Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square, New York City—May 1, 2010

On May 1, 2010, 30-year-old, Faisal Shahzad—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan—parked his Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicle (SUV) containing a crude incendiary device along West 45th Street near Times Square in New York City. A t-shirt vendor in the area observed smoke coming from the vehicle and alerted police. The device within the SUV did not explode or ignite and was subsequently rendered safe by the New York City Police bomb squad.327

Shahzad was arrested three days later at JFK after he had boarded an Emirates Air flight bound for Dubai. At a news conference to announce the arrest, Attorney General Eric Holder stated “[i]t was clear that the intent behind this terrorist act was to kill Americans.” Law enforcement officials reported that the information that led to Shahzad’s arrest centered on evidence gathered about the sale of the Nissan Pathfinder that was used in the attempted attack. Police discovered that Shahzad had purchased the vehicle through an Internet listing. Although he gave the seller a false name, police were able to trace back to him a disposable cell phone number that he also gave the seller.328

On June 21, 2010, Shahzad pled guilty to ten terrorism charges that were contained in a superseding indictment handed down by a grand jury in New York and which added five additional counts to the original May 5, 2010 indictment.329 He was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, use of a destructive device in connection with criminal violence, transporting and receiving explosives, and damaging and destroying property by means of fire.330 Since his arrest, DOJ reports that

323 Ibid.
326 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2020.
Shahzad has not only admitted his role in the plot, but continued to cooperate with authorities, and provided valuable intelligence.331

Shortly after the failed attack, the Pakistan Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility in a message on an audiotape posted on the Internet.332 Days later, U.S. officials said that investigators had developed evidence to support the TTP claim.333 Pakistani authorities have arrested or detained at least 13 people in Pakistan in connection with the case. One of those arrested was reported to have provided an “independent stream” of evidence that the Pakistani Taliban was behind the attempt and has admitted to helping Faisal Shahzad travel into Pakistan's tribal belt for bomb training.334

In the courtroom where he pled guilty, Shahzad admitted to having received explosives training from the TTP at a camp in Pakistan's Waziristan region.335 However the device found inside the Nissan Pathfinder was crudely constructed. It consisted of three 20-gallon propane tanks, 152 M-88 (consumer-grade) fireworks, one 4-foot by 2-foot metal gun locker filled with 250 pounds of urea-based fertilizer, and two alarm clocks connected by wires.336 The fertilizer was inert and not usable as an explosive. Had the device been viable, police say it could have produced a “significant fireball” and sprayed shrapnel with enough force to kill pedestrians and knock out windows in the crowded theater district in midtown Manhattan.337

It has been reported that no plea deal in exchange for Shahzad’s guilty plea was made by the U.S. Government in the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York released a letter sent to Shahzad’s attorneys making it clear that there was no plea deal and that their client would face a mandatory life term, the maximum sentence in this case. Shahzad is scheduled to be sentenced in October 2010.338

Another individual indicted in this terrorist plot was Mohammad Younis, 44, of Long Island, New York. On September 15, 2010, Younis was arrested and accused of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business which provided funds to Faisal Shahzad. There are no allegations, however, that Younis was aware of the intended use of the money. In the indictment, he was charged with operating an unlicensed money transfer business between the United States and

338 Weiser, June 21, 2010.
Pakistan and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transfer business. If convicted, Younis faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison on each of the charges.339

Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”)—Conspiracy to Kill and Material Support to Terrorism—March 2010

On March 4, 2010, a Pennsylvania woman, Colleen LaRose, was charged with providing material support to terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States, lying to Federal agents, and transferring a U.S. passport for the purposes of facilitating a terrorist act. 340 LaRose was arrested in October 2009, but her case was kept under seal. She is alleged to have used the Internet to recruit others to “wage violent jihad” where she was known by the aliases, “Jihad Jane” and “Fatima LaRose.” She has also been tied to a plot to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who depicted the prophet Muhammad atop the body of a dog.341 LaRose is believed to be cooperating with Federal authorities.342

A Colorado woman has also been charged in the case. Jamie Paulin-Ramirez pled not guilty on April 8, 2010 to a charge of conspiracy to support terrorists. According to the indictment, LaRose recruited Paulin-Ramirez, 31, to join the plot to kill the Swedish cartoonist and invited her to Europe to attend a “training camp.”

Five Northern Virginian Men Convicted of Terrorism Offenses in Pakistan—December 2009

Five men from Northern Virginia were convicted of terrorism charges on June 24, 2010 by a special Pakistani anti-terrorism court and sentenced to ten years in prison.343 They were arrested in Sarghoda (near Lahore), Pakistan in December 2009, where they are alleged to have traveled hoping to work with jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Prosecutors say they were in the planning stages of attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant, an air base, and other targets in Afghanistan as well as “territories of the United States.”344 Police reportedly recovered jihadist literature, laptop computers, and maps of parts of Pakistan when the men were arrested near Lahore. The maps included areas where the Taliban train.


The story of the five men from the Alexander, Virginia area—Uman Chaudhry, 24; Ramy Zamzam, 22; Ahmad A. Minni, 20; Waqar Khan, 22; and Aman Hassan Yemer, 18—became public when the Council on American-Islamic Relations got their families in touch with the FBI after the five left the United States without telling their families. The men were arrested at the home of Chaudhry's father, Khalid Farooq Chaudhry, and the terror allegations began immediately.

Attorneys for the men mounted an aggressive defense contending that the five were tortured by Pakistani jailers. In addition, they allege that police in Pakistan fabricated incriminating evidence. They have appealed the convictions to the Lahore High Court.

The motives for the group’s trip to Pakistan are unclear. Zamzam claimed in a Pakistani court that the young men were in the country for jihad, not terrorism and wanted to provide medical and financial assistance to Afghan Muslims. The group reportedly met with representatives from two militant organizations, Jaish-e-Muhammad (tied to Al Qaeda) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. They were arrested in a house allegedly tied to Jaish-e-Muhammad in Sargodha, Pakistan after failing to link up with any terrorists. It has been reported that the two groups they approached rejected them because they lacked references from other trusted terrorists. According to a news report citing Pakistani investigators, the five communicated online and visited Web sites that included footage of reputed terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Families, neighbors, and friends of the five young men are reported to have had difficulty believing that the five had tried to link up with terrorist groups.

Al-Shabaab Minnesota Recruits—2007-2010

As of August 5, 2010, the DOJ had charged nineteen individuals in an ongoing investigation of al-Shabaab-related recruitment of individuals in Minnesota—the Minneapolis, Minnesota area has the largest community of Somali-Americans in the United States. Reportedly, some of the indicted individuals began their terrorism-related activities in 2007, around the time al-Shabaab stepped up its insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters.

345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

The Minnesota recruits who traveled to Somalia received weapons training alongside individuals from other countries, including Britain, Australia, Sweden and Canada. The indicted American recruits face a variety of accusations including recruiting and raising funds for the trips, engaging in terrorist acts in Somalia, and perjury. Nine individuals have been arrested by U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Five defendants have pled guilty to charges.

Documents associated with the ongoing federal investigation into the recruitment of these individuals from the Minneapolis area reveal the importance of a local al-Shabaab support network that provided the organization financing and foot soldiers. It included older individuals who helped in the radicalization process and aided in supplying the young men with equipment and money to go to Somalia. At least five individuals appear to have played important roles:

- Two women, Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan, allegedly helped raise money for al-Shabaab by soliciting funds door-to-door and via teleconferences. According to DOJ, in some instances, Ali raised money by misleading donors into believing the funds were destined for "the poor and needy." Ali, age 33, and Hassan, age 63, are both naturalized U.S. citizens from Somalia.

- Mohamud Said Omar is a Somali citizen who was granted permanent U.S. resident status in 1994. He is accused of providing money to young men to travel from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab. He also allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe house and provided hundreds of dollars to fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the men. Omar has been held in a high-security Dutch prison since his arrest at the request of the U.S. government in November 2009. On May 31, 2010, a Rotterdam District Court ruled that Omar may be extradited to the United States. His attorney, who says that his client never intended to help terrorists, will appeal the extradition ruling to the Dutch Supreme Court, a process that could take many months.

- Abdiweli Yassin Isse is a legal resident of the United States. An October 9, 2009 criminal complaint charged Isse with encouraging others to travel to Somalia to fight Ethiopians. At a gathering of co-conspirators, he purportedly described his plans to wage jihad against Ethiopians. He also raised money to buy airplane tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose. In raising that

357 Ibid.
money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking they were contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the Koran.\footnote{DOJ Press Release, Nov. 23, 2009.}

- **Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax** is a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. An affidavit filed in support of an October 9, 2009 criminal complaint states that in the fall of 2007, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a jihad in Somalia.\footnote{Ibid.} He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.\footnote{Criminal Complaint, *U.S. v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse*, (D. Minn. 2009). See also Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” National Public Radio, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001.}


**Nidal Malik Hasan—Fort Hood, Texas Shooting—November 5, 2009**

A mass shooting took place on November 5, 2009, at the Soldier Readiness Center at the U.S. Army’s Fort Hood, located outside Killeen, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured.\footnote{Department of Defense (DOD), Report of the DOD Independent Review, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood,* January 2010, p. 1.}

The accused perpetrator is Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major who was serving as a psychiatrist. He is reported to have fired 100 rounds at soldiers processing through cubicles in the Center. He was seriously wounded in an exchange of gunfire during the incident. Hasan was
armed with an FN Five-seveN® 5.7 millimeter pistol and an older model Smith and Wesson .357 revolver. However, law enforcement officials do not believe the latter gun was fired by Hasan. He has been charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He may face additional charges at court martial.

Hasan is the son of Palestinian immigrants and was born and grew up in Virginia. He is reported to have expressed radical beliefs on several occasions during his Army career. In a 2007 presentation to Walter Reed physicians, Hasan said that the Army should allow Muslim soldiers to claim conscientious objector status to forgo fighting other Muslims. However, there is no record of disciplinary action having been taken by the U.S. Army nor did they ever consider him unfit for duty or a security threat. A Pentagon review found that officers failed to comply with applicable policies in Hasan’s career evaluations.

Two Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) discovered email correspondence between Hasan and Anwar al-Aulaqi, a radical Imam accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda. Over the course of several months, Hasan sent 16 emails to al-Aulaqi (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The email exchange was assessed by the FBI to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Defense Department analyst on one of the JTTFs assessed the email correspondence as innocent and in line with Hasan’s research interests. After the Fort Hood shootings, al-Aulaqi issued a statement dubbing him a hero but denying that he had incited Hasan.

David Headley—Plots to Attack Offices of Newspaper in Copenhagen and Support Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—October 2009

On March 18, 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty to numerous criminal charges including a plot to attack employees of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark; helping plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack; and providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a militant Pakistani Islamist group. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors would not pursue the death penalty against him if he cooperates with law enforcement and intelligence officials.

---

368 The FN Five-seveN® single-action autoloading pistol is designed and manufactured in Belgium by FN Herstal. It fires the low-recoil 5.7x28mm cartridge.
The 49-year old Headley was born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington D.C. to a Pakistani father and an American mother. He reportedly changed his Muslim name to a Judeo-Christian name to hide his Muslim identity. Arrested in October 2009, Headley allegedly attended LeT terrorism training camps in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 and also conducted extensive surveillance for both the Copenhagen and Mumbai plots. In late 2005 a LeT handler and another LeT-linked individual conspired with Headley to have him perform advanced surveillance and scouting for the Mumbai attacks. The LeT personnel discussed the idea of opening an immigration office in Mumbai as cover for his scouting activities. Using the sham office as cover, between September 2006 and July 2008, Headley made five trips to the city, photographed and videotaped potential targets following the instructions of LeT. He also received an additional $3,000 and a GPS device from LeT. In November 2008, LeT attacked Mumbai targets killing 164 individuals.376

Headley was also involved in a plot to attack the facilities of Danish newspaper, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten. The plot involved attacking an editor and a cartoonist involved in the publication of controversial editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad which sparked protests throughout the Muslim world. Headley met with an LeT member in Pakistan in 2008 to discuss surveillance of the newspaper. In January 2009 he cased the newspaper and met with its representatives. In July and August 2009, he met in Europe with contacts of Ilyas Kashmiri, a member of a terrorist organization in Pakistan, to conduct additional surveillance.377

Three others alleged to have collaborated with Headley have been charged by U.S. authorities in the Mumbai and Copenhagen plots:

- **Tahawwur Hussain Rana** is a 49-year-old Canadian citizen who immigrated from Pakistan, was trained as a physician, and resided in Chicago until his arrest in October 2009. He was allegedly involved in both the Danish plot and the Mumbai attacks, but has pled not guilty to the charges claiming he was duped by Headley. However, according to Headley’s plea agreement, he shared with Rana details of his trips to Pakistan and his association with LeT. In turn, according to media reporting, Rana extensively helped him carry out the attacks in Mumbai.378

- **Ilyas Kashmiri** is an alleged leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami a terrorist organization in Pakistan and is believed to be in contact with Al Qaeda leaders. In February 2009, he met with Headley in Waziristan. He reviewed Headley’s Denmark surveillance footage and suggested the use of a truck bomb. He met with Headley again in May 2009 and directed him to link up with his operatives in Europe. He also advised cutting out LeT from the operation. LeT reportedly agreed.379 Kashmiri has been charged in the plots but is not in U.S. custody.


377 Ibid.


Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed is a retired major in the Pakistani military and is alleged to have coordinated Headley’s travel to Denmark and helped plan the attack. He connected Headley with Kashmiri.\(^{380}\) Like Kashmiri, Syed has been charged in the plot but is not in U.S. custody.

Apparently Headley’s life swung widely between the strictures of conservative Islam and the wide-open excesses of the West. Born in 1960 in Washington, D.C., he is the son of a Pakistani father, Syed Saleem Gilani, who worked at the Pakistani Embassy. Headley’s mother, Serrill Headley, a Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania native, also worked at the embassy. Soon after David/Daood was born, the family moved to Pakistan. But Serrill left Syed and Pakistan in 1968, because she could not abide by their conservative views of married women. She returned to Philadelphia in the early 1970s and opened up a bar called Khyber Pass.

In 1977, after Pakistan suffered a military coup, Headley’s mother brought David/Daood back to the United States. He struggled to fit in, at times espousing extremist views while developing a heroin habit. In 1985, his mother made him manager of the bar she owned. He reportedly failed at this role and his mother was forced to sell the bar. That same year, he married a bartender whom he divorced in 1987 because of cultural differences. His wife at that time said that David/Daood was torn between two cultures—calling Indians “infidels,” for example. A Khyber Pass employee remembered him discussing infidels and Islam taking over the world. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nabbed him twice (1988 and 1997) on heroin smuggling charges, and he worked as an informant for them and served prison sentences.\(^{381}\)

Tarek Mehanna—Plot to Assassinate Politicians and Attack Shopping Malls—October 2009

Tarek Mehanna, a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen,\(^{382}\) from the Boston suburb of Sudbury, Massachusetts, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on charges that he plotted to kill two prominent U.S. politicians and shoot people at American shopping malls. He was accused of conspiring with two other men—Ahmad Abousamra, a friend from childhood who authorities say is now in Syria, and an unnamed man who is reported to be cooperating with authorities.

Mehanna graduated from the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy in 2008 where his father is a professor. Mehanna and his co-conspirators were said to have found inspiration in the 2002 Washington D.C. sniper attacks.\(^{383}\) Mehanna taught math and religion at a Muslim school in Worcester, MA.\(^{384}\)

\(^{380}\) Ibid.


\(^{384}\) Denise Lavoie, Oct. 21, 2009.
Abousamra is the son of a physician who worked at Massachusetts General Hospital for 21 years and was president of the Islamic Center of New England before moving to the Detroit area in 2007. Abousamra was named in an FBI affidavit filed on October 21, 2009, in federal court in Boston as a conspirator with Mehanna, but was not charged. He allegedly fled to Syria three years ago after being questioned by the FBI. The FBI affidavit alleges Abousamra tried to join a terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, but was rejected by the Taliban because of a “lack of experience.”

Much of the case against Mehanna involves material support to terrorism. According to DOJ, “Beginning in or about 2001, and continuing until in or about May 2008, Mehanna conspired with Ahmad Abousamra, and others to provide material support and resources for use in carrying out a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country and extraterritorial homicide of a U.S. national.” Specifically, the complaint affidavit alleges that Mehanna and co-conspirators discussed their desire to participate in violent jihad against American interests and that they would talk about fighting jihad and their desire to die on the battlefield. The complaint further alleges that the coconspirators attempted to radicalize others and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and distributing jihadi videos.

At the time of his arrest Mehanna was free on bail from an earlier arrest, in November 2008, at Logan International Airport in Boston, when he was charged with lying to federal investigators in a 2006 interview about his ties to Daniel Maldonado, who subsequently pled guilty to participating in terrorism training in Somalia. Maldonado is serving a 10-year prison sentence on that charge.

“According to the complaint affidavit, Mehanna and the coconspirators had multiple conversations about obtaining automatic weapons and randomly shooting people in a shopping mall, and that the conversations went so far as to discuss the logistics of a mall attack, including coordination, weapons needed and the possibility of attacking emergency responders. It is alleged that the plan was ultimately abandoned, because of their inability to obtain the automatic weapons they deemed necessary to effectively carry out the attacks.”

Hosam Smadi—Plot to Bomb a Dallas, Texas Skyscraper—September 2009

On September 24, 2009, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian citizen who is reported to have remained in the United States illegally for one year after his visa expired, parked an SUV packed with what he thought were explosives outside Fountain Place, a 60-story office building in downtown Dallas, and began writing a letter to his father. The FBI quickly moved in and arrested Smadi, who told them, “I’m the terrorist.”


386 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2339A. For more information on this statute, see CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.


388 Ibid.


390 Ibid.
tower at Ross Avenue and Field Street in Dallas, Texas. When Smadi dialed a cellphone that he thought would detonate the “truck bomb,” he was arrested by undercover FBI agents who had been posing as fellow anti-American terrorists.

The arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after an agent, monitoring an online extremist website, discovered Smadi espousing jihad against the United States. Smadi was charged on October 7, 2009, with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. On May 26, 2010, Smadi pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Smadi faces 30 years in prison when he is sentenced in October 2010.

After Smadi was indicted, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, reported that “The Criminal complaint alleges that Hosam Smadi sought and attempted to bomb the Fountain Place office tower, but a coordinated undercover law enforcement action was able to thwart his efforts and ensure no one was harmed.” Smadi made clear his intention to serve as a soldier for Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and to conduct violent jihad. Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of an Al Qaeda “sleeper’ cell” were introduced to Smadi, who repeatedly indicated to them that he came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of committing “Jihad for the sake of God.” Smadi clarified that he was interested in ‘self-jihad’ because it was “the best type of jihad.” The investigation determined Smadi was not associated with other terrorist organizations.

DOJ also claims that “undercover FBI agents repeatedly encouraged Smadi to reevaluate his interpretation of jihad, counseling him that the obligation of jihad can be satisfied in many ways. Every time this interaction occurred, Smadi aggressively responded that he was going to commit significant, conspicuous acts of violence as his jihad.”

In late August 2009, while meeting with one of the undercover FBI agents in Dallas, authorities allege that

Smadi discussed the logistics and timing of the bombing, stating that he would have preferred to do the attack on “11 September,” but decided to wait until after the month of Ramadan, which ended on September 20, 2009. At the conclusion of the meeting, Smadi decided that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) would be placed at the foundation of the Fountain Place office tower. Unbeknownst to Smadi, the FBI ensured the VBIED contained only an inert/inactive explosive device which contained no explosive materials.

Dallas Mayor Tom Leppert said local authorities were notified of the operation before it happened. “We were clearly communicated to that there was not going to be danger to anybody,” he said.

392 Ibid
393 Ibid
394 Ibid
Michael Finton—Plot to Bomb the Springfield, Illinois Federal Building—September 2009

On September 23, 2009, Michael C. Finton, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to Talib Islam, was arrested after he was alleged to have driven a van he thought was loaded with explosives—but was actually provided to him by the FBI—to the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, Illinois. Prosecutors say he parked and locked the vehicle, then moved a few blocks away before twice making cell phone calls he believed would trigger a blast that would kill or injure people inside the building. He was charged with attempted murder of federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) in connection with a plot to detonate a vehicle bomb at the federal building in Springfield, Illinois.396

Finton reportedly had converted to the Islamic faith while in an Illinois prison from 2001 to 2006, serving a sentence for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery. He came to the attention of federal authorities in August 2007 when a search of his vehicle turned up a letter about his dreams of being a shahid, or martyr.

According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, “after his arrest it was discovered that Finton had written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American who was captured fighting for the Taliban and is imprisoned on terrorism violations. In a January 2008 interview with the FBI after his release from prison on a parole violation, Finton allegedly explained that he idolized Lindh. The affidavit further alleges that, in March 2008, Finton received funds from an individual in Saudi Arabia that he used to travel to Saudi Arabia the following month. He returned to the United States in May 2008.”397

In February 2009, Finton was introduced to an undercover FBI special agent posing as a low-level Al Qaeda operative. Finton expressed his desire to receive military training at a camp and to fight in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia or other locations. The undercover agent told Finton several times that it was Finton’s decision and that he could walk away from the decision anytime. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated that he was excited and had no second thoughts about attending a camp.”398

In the ensuing months, the affidavit alleges that Finton discussed possibly targeting locations in the United States and ultimately suggested the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield as a primary target. He conducted surveillance of the building and proposed a remotely-detoned car bomb for the attack. Further, according to the affidavit, Finton observed that U.S. Congressman Aaron Schock’s office, located at the corner of East Monroe and 6th Streets, would be a secondary target.”399

On Sept. 1, 2009, Finton met with the undercover FBI officer and was told the vehicle for the attack would be carrying close to one ton of explosives. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated an awareness that the bomb would cause civilian casualties, but expressed his view that

397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
such casualties were justified. Unbeknownst to him, the FBI ensured that the vehicle for the attack contained no actual explosive materials.400

Najibullah Zazi—Plot to Bomb the New York City Subway—September 2009

Twenty-four year old, Najibullah Zazi, a citizen of Afghanistan and a legal resident of the United States, has admitted that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in September 2009. Zazi told investigators that he and two friends planned to strap explosives to their bodies, board trains at the Grand Central and Times Square stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and explode their bombs during the crowded rush hour.401

On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. There is no complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process, but there are details regarding his plot. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi—an Imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in the same Queens building.402 Zazi has admitted that he and others agreed to travel to Afghanistan to join Taliban forces. In August 2008, he and others flew from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, and instead of training with the Taliban, Al Qaeda recruited and trained them in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked Zazi and his companions to return to the United States and engage in suicide operations.403

While training, Zazi received instruction on explosives, discussed specific targets, and took detailed notes. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Colorado, taking a job driving a shuttle bus at Denver International Airport. Between July and early September, he and others purchased chemicals at beauty supply stores in Denver. Investigators suggest that Zazi used the same hotel suite twice to try and produce bomb-making chemicals using handwritten bomb making notes developed while in Pakistan to guide his production of triacetone triperoxide (TATP).404 He even supposedly called an individual for production guidance. In the hotel’s ventilation system, the FBI gathered residue from the chemicals Zazi had heated. Beauty store

400 Ibid.


403 Ibid.

404 TATP (also known as acetone peroxide) has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, as a detonator by the thwarted “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, and as the explosive in the July 7, 2005 London public transport system bombings. TATP is relatively easy to make compared to other explosives. Although it is highly susceptible to heat, friction, and shock, it can be prepared in a basement lab using commercially-available materials obtained from hardware stores, pharmacies, or stores selling cosmetics. See GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm, and Philippe Naughton, “TATP is suicide bombers’ weapon of choice,” Times Online (London), July 15, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article544334.ece.
surveillance footage also recorded Zazi’s activities. He also searched the website of a Queens store that carried muriatic acid which can be used to develop TATP.

On September 8, 2009, Zazi rented a car and departed for New York the next day. Upon arriving in New York City on September 10, Zazi’s car was stopped by Port Authority of New York Police at the behest of the FBI as he crossed the George Washington Bridge. It has been reported that to avoid tipping him off, the police pretended the stop was a random drug checkpoint. Authorities initially stated that they found nothing incriminating. However, court papers indicated that law enforcement subsequently found a laptop in the car containing an image of nine pages of handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs. When FBI agents interviewed Zazi, he claimed that he drove to New York from Aurora, Colorado to deal with an issue involving a coffee cart business his family operated in Manhattan. He then falsely stated he had never seen the notes. Zazi has subsequently admitted that he planned to finish bomb construction over the September 12-13 weekend, and then target New York’s subway lines on September 14, 15, or 16. However when he suspected that the police were on to him, he claimed he shut down the operation.

During this time, the NYPD was showing Zazi’s photograph to people in his old neighborhoods in Queens and, at one point, the police towed Zazi’s car. The New York Times reported that with their interest exposed, “law enforcement agents feared that some part of a plot they had not yet uncovered might be aborted and evidence destroyed. They moved fast, raiding four homes in Queens beginning late in the night on Sept. 20.” Zazi was arrested and charged on September 24, with one count of conspiring with others to use weapons of mass destruction, including bombs or other explosives.

Others arrested in this case are:

- **Mohammed Wali Zazi**, 54, Zazi’s father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested in the Fall of 2009 for lying to investigators. On February 1, 2010, he was indicted for conspiring to dispose of his son's bomb-making materials and chemicals. He has subsequently been released on bail and allowed to return to his home in Colorado where he is under house arrest and must wear an electronic bracelet.

- **Ahmad Wais Afzali**, a Queens Imam, was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI investigation. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New

---


408 Ibid.


410 Ibid. Zazi was originally arrested on the charge of making false statements to the FBI.

York City investigators in the past. On March 4, 2010, Afzali, pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He stated in court that he lied about a conversation he had with Zazi tipping him off to FBI’s investigation. Afzali hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali claimed that during his phone conversation with Zazi, he simply cautioned him not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.” During sentencing on April 15, 2010, Afzali told the Judge, “Honest to God, it was never my intention to help those idiots for what they do in the name of Islam.” On July 5, 2010, he left the United States as specified in his plea agreement. He may not return without special permission.

- **Naqib Jaji**, 38, Zazi’s uncle, was secretly arrested in the case. Mr. Jaji, who in his public remarks had indicated some antipathy toward Mr. Zazi, but also said it was “impossible” that he was a terrorist, was arraigned on January 14, 2010 in a sealed federal courtroom in Brooklyn. *The New York Times* reports that Court and federal prison records and interviews with a family member indicate Mr. Jaji was indicted on a felony charge, which remains sealed. The court docket on the case lists him as “John Doe,” a standard practice in cases where a defendant is cooperating.

- **Zarein Ahmedzay** and **Adis Medunjanin**, who were classmates of Zazi’s at Flushing High School in Queens, New York, were also indicted in the case. They allegedly accompanied Zazi on a flight from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan in late August 2008 where it is claimed they received military-style training from Al Qaeda. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin, both U.S. citizens, were charged in a five-count superseding indictment unsealed on February 25, 2010, with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States. Specifically, they are charged with conspiring with Zazi to conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines that would take place on Sept. 14, 15, or 16, 2009. On April 23, 2010, Ahmedzay pled guilty to the charges and faces a sentence of up to life in prison. On August 6, 2010, Medunjanin pled not guilty to charges in the plot and an additional charge of “trying to take out another car in a desperate suicide bid on the Whitestone Expressway when authorities tried to arrest him in January 2010.”

---


• On April 13, 2010, it was reported that Pakistani authorities are holding another suspect in the case. U.S. prosecutors have disclosed previously in court proceedings that the man, whose identity was not disclosed, has been in custody for months. It is unknown whether he will be turned over to American authorities.419

On July 7, 2010, DOJ announced the indictments of five additional men in the plot and revealed that it was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was related to a scheme by al-Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United Kingdom.420 The superseding indictment charged\textbf{Adnan El Shukrijumah, Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer; Tariq Ur Rehman; and a fifth defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib” or “Zahid” with several terrorism offenses.}

It is alleged that the plot was organized by el-Shukrijumah and two others—\textbf{Saleh al-Somali} and \textbf{Rashid Rauf}, who were described as leaders of Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries.421 The Saudi-born, El-Shukrijumah, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has been sought for several years by U.S. authorities who have offered $5 million for information leading to his capture.422 Specifically he is alleged to have recruited Zazi and Zazi’s co-conspirators, Adis Nedunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. Al-Somali and Rauf are believed to have been killed in U.S. drone attacks. 423

Abid Naseer, a British citizen, is alleged to have exchanged coded emails with the same account that “Ahmad,” was using to communicate with the Zazi cell. He and Rehman were arrested in Britain in April 2009. A search of their residences yielded large amounts of flour and oil in addition to surveillance photos and maps of public areas of Manchester, England.424 Naseer is in custody in Britain and federal authorities say they will seek his extradition.425 Rehman is no longer in custody.

\textbf{Daniel Boyd and others—Plot to Attack Quantico Marine Base and Conspiracy to Commit Murder Abroad—July 2009}

In two separate indictments in 2009, Daniel Patrick Boyd, members of his family, and others residing in North Carolina have been charged with plotting to attack the U.S. Marine base at Quantico, Virginia and for providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder persons abroad.


421 Ibid.


425 DOJ Press Release, July 7, 2010.}
On July 22, 2009, a Federal grand jury in North Carolina returned a seven-count indictment against the following seven individuals charging them with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad:

- **Daniel Patrick Boyd**, 39, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
- **Hysen Sherifi**, 24, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident located in North Carolina
- **Anes Subasic**, 33, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
- **Zakariya Boyd**, 20, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
- **Dylan Boyd**, 22, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
- **Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan**, 22, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
- **Ziyad Yaghi**, 21, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina

The indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd is a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan who, over the past three years, has conspired with others to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to kill.426

According to the indictment, during the period from 1989 through 1992, Daniel Boyd traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received military-style training in terrorist training camps for the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in Afghanistan. From roughly November 2006 through at least July 2009, the indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd and the other defendants conspired to provide material support and resources to terrorists, including currency, training, transportation and personnel. The defendants also conspired to murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons abroad during this period. The object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping or maiming persons abroad.427 The indictment also alleges that Daniel Boyd obtained a variety of weapons in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder persons overseas and provide material support to terrorists.

In a superseding indictment unsealed on September 24, 2009, additional charges were made against Boyd, his son Zakariya, and Hysen Sherifi. They are accused in a plot to attack the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia. Charges included conspiracy to murder U.S. military personnel, possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence, and providing weapons to a convicted felon. The superseding indictment alleges, among other things, that as part of the conspiracy, Boyd undertook reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, and obtained maps of the base in order to plan an attack. It also alleges that Boyd possessed armor piercing ammunition, stating it was “to attack the Americans.”428

---

427 Ibid.
In an April 19, 2010 criminal complaint unsealed in June 2010, a ninth person, Bajram Asilani, was charged with being a member of the conspiracy involving the above defendants. He was arrested by authorities in Kosovo on June 17, 2010, at the request of the United States which sought his extradition to Raleigh, North Carolina to stand trial. However, a Judge of the European Union Rule of Law Mission denied the extradition request, ruling that Kosovo does not have an extradition treaty with the United States.

Abulhakim Muhammad—Shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas Military Recruiting Center—June 1, 2009

On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad was arrested in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas, that killed one soldier and wounded another. The police recovered from Muhammad's sport utility vehicle (SUV) a Mossberg rifle with a scope and rifle sight, an SKS assault rifle, and a Lorcin L380 semiautomatic handgun.

The 24-year-old Little Rock resident and Muslim convert who changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe, was charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and ten counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm. Prosecutors have said they will seek the death penalty on the capital murder charge.

Abdulhakim Muhammad called the June 1, 2009 shooting another “Jihadi Attack.” “I wasn’t insane or post traumatic nor was I forced to do this Act,” he stated in a January 12, 2010 handwritten note to the presiding judge in his court case. In the letter, he claimed ties to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and dubbed himself a soldier for them. His father is a Memphis businessman who doubts that his son had ties to AQAP but could have been radicalized in Yemen. His sister, who was stunned by the shooting, has stated publicly that a week before the shooting he seemed upbeat. In press reporting, his family has described Muhammad as a “happy-go-lucky” teen who had become a “deeply observant Muslim in college.”

Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While he was in the country, he married a woman from South Yemen. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic while there. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay, and he also

431 The Russian-designed Simonov SKS (Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova) is a gas operated, self-loading, semi-automatic rifle that fires the 7.62 mm cartridge.
434 Ibid.
supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa. According to law enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary inquiry by the FBI and other American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was inconclusive reportedly leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or place him under surveillance.

On April 26, 2010, Muhammad was also charged with aggravated assault and making terroristic threats for allegedly trying to stab one jail deputy and threatening to kill another during his incarceration awaiting trial on the murder charge.

The Newburgh Four—Plot to Bomb Bronx, New York Synagogue and Jewish Center, and Attack Stewart Air National Guard Base—May 2009

On May 20, 2009, the FBI and the NYPD arrested four men for plotting to blow up a Bronx synagogue and Jewish Center while simultaneously shooting a plane out of the sky. The men allegedly parked car bombs wired to cell phones outside the Riverdale Temple and nearby Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. They were also heading to Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, New York. However, the explosives in the car bombs and Stinger missile they intended to use in the attack were phony. The explosives had been supplied by undercover agents posing as Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda. The four “were petty criminals who appeared to be acting alone, not in concert with any terrorist organization,” according to the New York City Police Commissioner.

The suspects were three U.S.-born citizens—James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams (no relation to David); and one Haitian immigrant, Laguerre Payen. At least three of the four were said to be jailhouse converts to Islam and were reportedly angry about the deaths of Muslims in Afghanistan.

---

436 Ibid.  
An FBI cooperating witness played a key role in the quartet’s efforts to obtain the explosives and missile components for the planned attacks. According to the indictment in the case, the four defendants met with the cooperating witness repeatedly beginning in October 2008 and discussed attacking military aircraft at the Air National Guard base. Starting in April 2009, the four selected the synagogue, the Jewish community center, and the air base as targets. They cased their targets, taking photographs and developing plans. Together with the cooperating witness, they purchased cell phones and a handgun for the operation. The cooperating witness also helped them obtain three improvised explosive devices (IED) containing fake C-4 explosives and gave the group an inactive stinger missile, informing them that it came from Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group.

Some have questioned whether the Newburgh Four were actually capable of pulling off the terrorist plot without the involvement of the cooperating witness, a Pakistani man named Shahed Hussain, who agreed to work for the FBI to obtain leniency after he was arrested in 2002 for fraud. One commentator has described the Newburgh Four as a group of struggling, disaffected petty criminals, who bonded at a Newburgh mosque over having spent time in prison and were taken in by a Pakistani immigrant looking to win leniency for a crime of his own. “There's little doubt the bumbling would-be bombers went far enough with the plot to demonstrate that they had the intention to commit terror, and for that they'll pay the price. But the whole tale comes off perhaps more as a sad glimpse into the lives of a loose group of aimless and obscurely embittered Americans than as a dire illustration of the threat of home-grown terrorism.”

Graham Ravman, writing in the Village Voice, suggests that the Newburgh Four were smalltime felons who had no grand terrorist ambitions until Hussain plied them with cash and suggestions. Moreover, this was not the first time [Hussain] went undercover to help the government. “He played a similar role four years ago in an Albany case, in which he helped the FBI arrest a man named Mohammed Hossain, a cash-poor pizzeria owner, and his Imam, Yassin Aref, after persuading them to launder $50,000 in a made-up plot to bring a missile to the United States and assassinate a Pakistani prime minister [the target of the invented plot was actually against the Pakistani United Nations Representative]...In both cases, it is claimed that [Hussain] did not stumble upon active terror cells planning to bring destruction on American soil [rather he] needed long periods of time to recruit his Muslim contacts, spin elaborate tales about his terror contacts, and develop solid plans of action, all the while providing the defendants with large amounts of resources and cash incentives.”

The trial of the four began on August 24, 2010. It had been delayed earlier in the summer by the federal judge in the case saying prosecutors had failed to turn over information that should have been given to the defense. In June 2010, prosecutors turned over to defense attorneys a 2008 memorandum from the FBI written by the lead agent on the case. The agent reportedly wrote that

---

447 Ravman, July 8, 2009.
he had told officials at Stewart Airport that James Cromitie, the alleged leader of the Newburgh Four, would be looking over the airport for a potential attack but that he would pose no danger without the assistance of the informant. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said the memorandum should have been turned over to the defense months earlier.448

Bryant Neal Vinas—Plot to Bomb Long Island Railroad, Rocket Attack on U.S. Base in Afghanistan—September 2008

In a November 22, 2008 sealed indictment449 (unsealed on July 22, 2009), Bryant Vinas, a 26-year-old American Muslim convert who grew up on Long Island, New York, was charged with conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to Al Qaeda, and receiving military-type training from Al Qaeda. He pled guilty to all three counts on January 28, 2009.450 He faces life in prison on the charges.

The charges stem from Vinas’ activities in Pakistan from his arrival in the Fall of 2007 until his arrest by Pakistani police in November 2008 following a tip provided by U.S. authorities. Vinas was subsequently extradited to the United States and has cooperated extensively with counterterrorism officials.451 Vinas has admitted that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses focused on weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.452 In September 2008, he took part in firing rockets at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. He told officials, “Although we intended to hit the military base and kill American soldiers, I was informed the rockets missed and the attack failed.”453 Vinas also testified in court, “I consulted with a senior Al Qaeda leader and provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Railroad system,” which I knew because I had ridden the railroad on so many occasions...The purpose of providing information was to help plan a bomb attack on the Long Island Railroad system.”454 This led U.S. officials to issue a security alert in November 2008 and beefed up security on the New York area commuter rail system.455

The arrest of Vinas was kept secret until his indictment was unsealed in July 2009 probably because of the significance of the information he has provided to U.S. counterterrorism authorities. That information has reportedly helped U.S. forces target Al Qaeda camps with drone

453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
attacks as well as information about how Al Qaeda provides its members with training in assassinations, poison, kidnappings, forgery, and advanced bomb-making. Vinas has also submitted a witness statement that was entered into evidence in the trial of an alleged Belgian Al Qaeda cell in Brussels.

Vinas is the son of immigrants from Peru and Argentina, who was raised as a Catholic and loved to play baseball. After 9/11, he joined the Army but was discharged before completing basic training. Reportedly dispirited after returning to Long Island, he met the relative of a friend who was a Muslim convert. Shortly thereafter, Vinas also converted. He eventually began visiting extremist websites and was reported to have become increasingly influenced by another religiously-conservative acquaintance. One of the websites led Vinas to the Islamic Thinkers Society, an extremist group in New York reportedly supportive of Al Qaeda. His deeply religious acquaintance was already a member and Vinas began to move within its circles.

Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the NYPD, has expressed the belief that “there has been an acceleration in radicalization in the United States.” He notes that “Vinas is almost a poster child for the process, the unremarkable nature of the people who might go through this process and frankly the potential to link up with Al Qaeda and the danger that presents.”

Plot to Bomb Jet Fuel Artery at Kennedy International Airport in New York—June 2007

On June 2, 2007, authorities announced they had broken up a plot by four men to blow up a jet fuel artery that runs through residential neighborhoods to the JFK Airport in New York. Russell Defreitas, a U.S. citizen originally from Guyana, was arrested as the ring leader of the plot. The 63-year-old Defreitas had worked as a cargo handler at JFK until 1995, but was described as hapless and episodically homeless and whom friends say supported himself by selling incense on street corners and collecting welfare. According to court documents filed on January 5, 2010, Defreitas allegedly admitted to being the “brain of everything.”

The others charged in the plot are Abdul Kadir, a citizen of Guyana and former member of its parliament, Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago; and Abdel Nur, a citizen of Guyana. The latter three were arrested in Trinidad and eventually extradited to the United States in June 2008. All four were indicted with conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury and extensive destruction.
The FBI said the alleged plot never got beyond the planning stages\(^{464}\) and there is some dispute over how serious any attack against the 40-mile pipeline would have been. The pipeline originates in Linden, New Jersey, crosses Staten Island, and goes underwater to Brooklyn traveling mostly along the Long Island Rail Road right-of-way to the airport. Because of their thickness and safeguards, such pipelines are difficult to damage, an official said.\(^{465}\)

However, at a news conference announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney, Roslynn Mauskopf called it “one of the most chilling plots imaginable. Had the plot been carried out, it could have resulted in unfathomable damage, deaths and destruction.” But safety experts have criticized the government’s description of the plot’s danger. John Goglia, a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a ‘fantasy’ saying “You could definitely reach the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going to get ... this is virtually impossible to do.”\(^{466}\)

*The Washington Post* reported that the alleged conspirators were initially detected via information gathered by the CIA in South America and the Caribbean. That led federal and local authorities in the New York region to launch a 16-month sting operation focused on the activities of Defreitas. According to the complaint filed in the case, Defreitas conducted surveillance of the airport four times in January, focusing on fuel tanks, noting security precautions and reviewing an escape plan.\(^{467}\)

Defreitas was apparently unaware that one of the plotters with him much of the time was a law enforcement informant who recorded much of what he said. It has been reported that Defreitas said in one recorded conversation, “Any time you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the United States....To hit John F. Kennedy, wow ... they love John F. Kennedy like he's the man ... if you hit that, this whole country will be mourning. You can kill the man twice.”

According to *The Smoking Gun*, which obtained and posted on its website a copy of the criminal complaint in the case, a paid “confidential source” was credited with infiltrating the terror cell and gathering critical information on the alleged plot—via tape recordings, documents, videos, and photographs. The government informant is a longtime New York City drug trafficker who began cooperating with federal investigators after NYPD detectives arrested him on a Bronx street and charged him with possession of about $2 million in cocaine. A footnote in the criminal complaint notes that the source had two prior drug convictions and was, through his cooperation, seeking leniency in sentencing on the drug trafficking charge.\(^{468}\)

On June 29, 2010, one of the defendants, Abdel Nur, pled guilty to a separate charge of material support to terrorism and faces up to 15 years in prison. His lawyer said he will not testify against...


the other defendants. A second man accused in the case, Kareem Ibrahim, is to be tried separately due to health reasons.469

In opening arguments in the July 2010 at the trial of the remaining two defendants—Defreitas and Kadir—Defreitas’ attorney accused prosecutors of being “overzealous.” The government, he said, took a “poor lonely, bitter old man that talked big game,” and, through an informant, nudged him into incriminating himself. “Without the government, Russell Defreitas is nothing. His words were ‘all sizzle and no steak.’”470 After five days of deliberation, however, the jury convicted both men of five counts of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism. They face possible life sentences in prison when they are sentenced in December 2010.471

Plot to Attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey—May 2007

Six men were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan included attacking and killing soldiers using assault rifles and grenades. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder. Four received life sentences without parole and the other received a 33-year sentence. A sixth man pled guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. As far as is known, the group had no connection to any foreign terrorist organization.

The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began in January 2006 with a tip from an electronics store clerk in Mount Laurel, Pennsylvania. Two men dropped off an 8-millimeter tape and wanted it converted to a DVD. The tape showed the defendants firing rifles and shouting Islamic battle cries. The clerk called police. FBI agents and two paid informants who had criminal records spent the next 15 months shadowing the suspects, recording conversations and searching their computers. During the investigation, authorities recorded hundreds of conversations with the defendants with help from the two informants.472

The plotters and verdicts in their cases:

- **Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer**, a U.S. citizen born in Jordan. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.473

---


- **Dritan “Tony” Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^474\)

- **Eljvir Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^475\)

- **Shain Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^476\)

- **Serdar Tatar**, a Turkish-born legal permanent resident of the United States. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel and not guilty of attempted murder. Sentenced to 33 years in prison.\(^477\)

- **Agron Abdullahu**, a Kosovo-Albanian who arrived with his family as a refugee from Kosovo (ironically, first arriving in the United States at a refugee center at Fort Dix). He was charged with letting the brothers Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka shoot various weapons at a firing range in Pennsylvania. The indictment states that the weapons used were an SKS semi automatic rifle, a Baretta Storm semi automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-gauge pump and a 9mm Baretta handgun. These were all firearms that Abdullahu owned legally. However, it is a crime to allow illegal immigrants like the Duka brothers to possess guns. He pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced March 31, 2008, to 20 months in prison.\(^478\)

**Daniel Maldonado—Training with Al Qaeda in Somalia—February 2007**

An indictment unsealed on February 14, 2007 charged Daniel Joseph Maldonado, then 28, with receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside the United States. According to a Justice Department official, “This case represents the

\(^{474}\) Ibid.

\(^{475}\) Ibid.

\(^{476}\) Ibid.


first criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist fighters in Somalia.\(^{479}\)

Maldonado had been captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007 as he fled into Kenya to avoid Ethiopian and Somali forces. He was turned over to American authorities the following month. On April 19, 2007, Maldonado pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization in exchange for prosecutors agreeing not to file any more federal charges against him.\(^{480}\) In June 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to ten years in prison.\(^{481}\)

According to DOJ, Maldonado admitted that in November 2005 he had traveled from Houston, Texas, to Africa eventually making it to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)\(^{482}\) and elements of Al Qaeda to fight “jihad” against the Somali Transitional Federal Government. While in Somalia, authorities say Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present at the training camps. The ICU and Al Qaeda worked together to train fighters in the camps to fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.\(^{483}\)

The criminal complaint in the case alleges that Maldonado admitted that while training at camps in Somalia, he watched and learned techniques for manufacturing small explosive devices. He also admitted to participating in the interrogation of a spy who was later killed—a flight attendant who had a cell phone camera and was observed taking pictures of jihadis as they arrived by airplane in Kismaayo, Somalia. Maldonado also admitted that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.\(^{484}\)

**Derrick Shareef—Plot to Attack Shopping Mall in Rockford, Illinois—December 2006**

On December 6, 2006, Derrick Shareef, a 22-year-old American Muslim convert, was arrested in Rockford, Illinois after he attempted to swap two stereo speakers for four (non-functioning) hand


\(^{482}\) Following the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990’s, a group of Sharia Courts functioned as quasi-governmental entities. In the late 1990’s, they united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2006, they lost several battles and were driven from Mogadishu by Somali forces supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian army which intervened to support the TFG against the ICU. Hardline Islamists broke ranks from the ICU and formed other militant groups, such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, to continue the war against the government. The less-militant members of the ICU went into exile.


grenades, a 9mm handgun, and several rounds of (non-functioning) ammunition with an undercover FBI agent posing as a weapons dealer. Prior to his arrest, Shareef had plotted to set off hand grenades in a garbage can at the Cherry Vale Shopping Mall near Rockford on the Friday before Christmas 2006. Shareef was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons and property and with attempting to maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire and an explosive, a building and real and personal property used in interstate commerce.485

The case began in September 2006, when the FBI assigned a cooperating witness, William “Jamaal” Chrisman, to befriend Shareef. Chrisman had converted to Islam in prison where he served time for armed robbery and car theft convictions.486 Chrisman claimed that he decided to help the government because “after 9/11 Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said that it was incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists.”487 They met at the video store where Shareef was working and hours later moved into Chrisman’s home. According to Chrisman, “He was supposed to move in with his manager. I told him he was better off staying with me, a Muslim staying with a Muslim.”488

Shareef was unaware that Chrisman was secretly recording their conversations which included his confiding to Chrisman that he wanted to commit acts of violent jihad against civilians. Shareef also discussed shooting a judge in DeKalb, Illinois, and attacking local buildings including city hall, the federal courthouse and the shopping center.489 Shareef also told Chrisman that he wanted to obtain weapons to commit violent jihad. Chrisman said he had a friend who could do so and would introduce them. However, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.490

On November 30, and December 1, 2006, Shareef and Chrisman cased the Cherry Vale mall and allegedly plotted a grenade attack. The following day, Shareef and Chrisman made video tapes that included a last will and testament for each. On the video, Shareef again mentioned jihad and said, “This is a warning to those who disbelieve, that we are here for you and I am ready to give my life.”491 On December 6, 2006, Shareef and the undercover agent met in the mall parking lot to exchange the speakers for four dud grenades and the handgun and ammunition. After the exchange, Shareef was arrested.

During an FBI interview on December 7, 2006, Shareef told FBI agents that he had been “pushing himself to conduct the attack on the mall” and that “no one could have stopped” him, “not even his mother.” He believed “it was the right jihad.” But he also told the agents that he

488 Ibid.
491 Thomas and Ryan, Dec. 8, 2006.
“viewed his arrest by the FBI as a blessing from Allah because the FBI stopped him from doing something that Allah would have chastised him for.” Aware that “he does not have the authority to speak on behalf of Islam,” Shareef asserted that he would “rather spend the rest of his life in jail than live with the torment of having killed innocent people and having acted against Allah’s desires.”

On November 28, 2007, Shareef pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced on September 30, 2008 to 35 years in prison.

Houston Taliban Plot—November 2006

In November 2006, the government alleged that four men—Kobie Diallo Williams, an American Muslim convert; and three foreign national students, Adnan Baber Mirza, Syed Maaz Shah, and Shiraz Syed Qazi—conspired to support the Taliban, unlawfully possess firearms, and to train with firearms to prepare to join the Taliban “to engage in battlefield jihad.” Specifically they were accused of meeting at shooting ranges and camp sites in Texas on at least eight occasions in 2005 and 2006 “for the purpose of conducting firearms and paramilitary training to hone their skills with weapons and to assist fighters engaging United States forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.” They were also accused of making a contribution of goods and services to the Taliban.

The government used two informants to build the case against the four. One of the informants told federal agents he was concerned that some of the men were preparing for armed conflict overseas. A 2005 camping trip was part of a government setup using the informants to catch the men.

- **Kobie Diallo Williams**, a former University of Houston student, pled guilty soon after his arrest to conspiring to unlawfully possess firearms and supporting the Taliban. On August 7, 2009, he was sentenced to 4-1/2 years in prison.

- **Syed Maaz Shah**, a Pakistani national studying at the University of Texas, Dallas, was convicted on May 24, 2007 on firearms charges and was sentenced to six years in prison and will be deported after he has served his sentence.

- **Shiraz Syed Qazi**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College, was convicted on January 21, 2007 on a firearms charge.

---


496 Ibid.

and sentenced to 10 months in prison. He was released in September 2007 after credit for time served.  

- **Adnan Baber Mirza**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College but had overstayed his student visa, was convicted on May 27, 2010, of two conspiracy counts and seven firearms violations. He faces up to five years in prison on each conspiracy count and 10 years on the weapons counts when he is sentenced.

### The Liberty City Seven—Plot to Bomb Sears Tower in Chicago—June 2006

On June 22, 2006, seven men—**Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine**—were arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Five of the men are U.S. citizens, Abraham is a legal permanent resident from Haiti, and Lemorin is a Haitian national illegally present in the United States. Each were charged with four counts: conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, namely Al Qaeda; conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to maliciously damage and destroy buildings by means of an explosive device; and conspiracy to levy war against the government of the United States.

The indictment alleges that Batiste intended to recruit and supervise individuals to organize and train for a mission of war against the United States, which included a plot to destroy by explosives the Sears Tower in Chicago, Illinois. It also alleges that Batiste and his co-conspirators attempted to obtain the support of Al Qaeda for their plot. The indictment further alleges that Batiste detailed (to an FBI informant posing as an ‘Al Qaeda representative’) “his mission to wage a ‘full ground war’ against the United States in order to ‘kill all the devils we can,’ in a mission that would ‘be just as good or better than 9/11,’ beginning with the destruction of the Sears Tower.”

The arrests resulted from an investigation involving two FBI informants and recordings and videotapes of the conspirators discussing their plot. *The Washington Post* cites court papers that indicate that one of the informants took a key role in the plotting. “Not only did government informants provide money and a meeting place for Batiste and his followers, but they also gave them video cameras for conducting surveillance, as well as cell phones, and suggested that their

---


502 Ibid, p.4.

503 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
first target be a Miami FBI office ... 504 Both informants were paid for their services and one was given approval of his petition for political asylum in the United States. 505

Defense attorneys for the Liberty City Seven men called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming they had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes. 506 In 2007, the jury in the first trial of the defendants acquitted Lyglenson Lemorin of all charges, but could not reach a verdict on the others. Lemorin was subsequently taken into immigration custody and was ordered deported in 2009. A second trial was held in 2008 and again the jury failed to reach verdicts against the six remaining defendants.

A third trial was held in 2009. The jury in that trial acquitted Naudimar Herrera of all charges, but convicted alleged ringleader Narseal Batiste on all four counts; Patrick Abraham on three counts; and Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rotschild Augustine on two counts each. 507 In November 2009, Narseal Batiste was sentenced to 13-1/2 years in prison. Burson Augustin and Rotschild Augustine were sentenced to six and seven years, respectively. Stanley Phanor and Patrick Abraham were sentenced to eight and nine years, respectively.


Two men living in Atlanta, Georgia—Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, were charged in April 2006 with conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and lying to the FBI. Prosecutors alleged that in 2005, when Ahmed and Sadequee were age 18 and 20 respectively, they discussed violent jihad on several web forums which later grew into an active conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, they were accused of traveling to Canada to discuss potential terrorist targets with members of the “Toronto 18,” 508 a group alleged by the Government of Canada to be members of an Islamic terrorist cell that had plotted a series of attacks against targets in Ontario until their arrests in June 2006. 509

According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service informant, the two Americans also discussed with the group whether they would be able to hide in Canada if they were to carry out attacks in the United States. 510 Sadequee and Ahmed were also alleged to have videotaped potential targets in the Washington, D.C. area including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank

headquarters, the Masonic Temple, and a fuel farm. Later, Sadequee sent several of the videos to Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda and Asbid Hussein Khan, a facilitator for Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom are serving prison sentences in Great Britain for terrorism-related offenses.511

The two men pled not guilty to the charges, but were convicted in separate trials in August 2009. In December, Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years and Ahmed to 13 years in prison.

Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar—Attempted Vehicular Murder at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—March 2006

On March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck several people although none were injured seriously. Taheri-Azar was charged the next day with nine counts of attempted murder.

It was reported that police found a letter in Taheri-Azar’s apartment that said he wanted revenge for the deaths of Muslims overseas that he said were caused by the United States. He said he rented a Jeep Cherokee because it was better equipped for what he planned to do.512 The chief of the University’s police department confirmed that Taheri-Azar told investigators that he wanted to “avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.”513

Taheri-Azar pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. On August 26, 2008, he was sentenced to 33 years in prison.514

Toledo, Ohio Plotters—Travel Abroad to Kill Americans—February 2006

On February 21, 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim I. Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon, were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. armed forces personnel serving in Iraq.515 The indictment alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. These acts included meeting another individual called “the trainer” (who was actually an undercover informant) to discuss and plan violent jihadist training. Following those meetings, the informant engaged in an instructional session on the construction and use of improvised

512 Ibid.
explosive devices and timing devices, sought explosives, and participated in weapons training and practiced target shooting on several occasions."  

During a news conference announcing the charges, the Cleveland FBI Director credited the Muslim- and Arab-American community for passing along the information that ultimately lead to the arrest of the three. He said individuals within Toledo's Muslim community contacted the FBI about what he termed the “violent and radical views” the suspects were articulating.

On June 13, 2008, a Federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material support to terrorists. On October 21, 2009, Amawi was sentenced to 20 years in prison, El-Hindi to 12 years in prison, and Mazloum to eight years, four months in prison.

Two cousins from Illinois, Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed, who had connections to the three Toledo men, pled guilty on January 15, 2009, to one count of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to terrorists. It was alleged that Marwan Othman El-Hindi introduced the two men to the undercover informant known as “the trainer.” During this meeting, the cousins allegedly discussed sniper tactics and surveillance techniques, and said they were willing to travel abroad to carry out terror attacks. In 2004, both had traveled to Cairo hoping to eventually go to Afghanistan or Iraq, but returned home after Zubair’s father, Haris Ahmed, learned of their intentions. On July 12, 2010, Zubair Ahmed was sentenced to ten years in prison while Khaleel Ahmed received an eight-year, four-month sentence.

**Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Plot to Attack Targets in Southern California—August 2005**

Kevin James, Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, and Hammad Riaz Samana, were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their involvement in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport, U.S. military recruiting offices and military bases.

- **Kevin James**, the apparent leader of the terror cell, pled guilty to conspiring to levy war against the United States and was sentenced on March 6, 2009 to 16 years in prison.

- **Levar Washington** pled guilty to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 22 years in prison. He was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison on August 25, 2008, on related robbery and weapons charges.

516 Ibid, p. 4.
• **Gregory Patterson** pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

• **Hammad Samana**, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, conducted Internet-based research of the targets and was the getaway driver for at least one of the gas station robberies (see below), according to a U.S. federal judge. He was later convicted and sentenced in August 2009 to 70 months in prison.

In 1997, James founded Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Arabic for Assembly of Authentic Islam—a group based on his interpretation of Islam, according to court documents. James' views are apparent in several documents he wrote in prison, including a 104-page document titled the JIS Protocol. In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the U.S. and describes “Jihad [as] the only true 'anti-terrorist action'[,] a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.”521 The document also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims.

James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at Los Angeles International Airport, and a fourth defendant, Hammad Riaz Samana, at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.522

According to the indictment, in July 2005, the men engaged in firearms training and physical training at a park in Los Angeles in preparation for the attacks. In addition, the defendants purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist conspiracy and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that eleven times beginning on May 30, 2005, the defendants—armed with shotguns - robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in the several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista and Fullerton.523

Part of the funds obtained in these robberies was directly linked by the FBI to Patterson's purchase of a .223 caliber rifle. The men were arrested by the Torrance police after Patterson dropped his cell phone at the scene of one of the robberies in July 2005. Police were able to connect the robberies to the larger terror plot after authorities searched Washington and Patterson's apartment and discovered various Jihadist documents.524

---


522 Ibid.


Lodi, California Case—The Hayats—Travel to Terrorist Training Camp—June 2005

In Lodi, California, **Umer Hayat** and **Hamid Hayat**, a Pakistani immigrant and his American son, were arrested on June 5, 2005 after allegedly lying to the FBI about the son's attendance at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat, age 23, was found guilty on April 25, 2006, of one count of providing material support or resources to terrorists, and three counts of making false statements to the FBI in matters related to international/domestic terrorism.

Prosecutors alleged that between October 2003 and November, 2004, Hayat attended a jihadi training camp in Pakistan and ultimately returned to the United States with the intent to wage violent jihad upon receipt of orders.\(^{525}\) Hayat confessed to FBI agents that he had attended a terrorist training camp but his attorneys later argued that his admissions were fabrications intended to appease the federal agents he hoped would let him go home. The nine-week trial was reported to rely on that contested confession and conversations secretly taped by an FBI informant who had been paid $200,000 to infiltrate Lodi's large Muslim community after the 9/11 attacks.\(^{526}\)

DOJ issued a press release stating:

> According to evidence adduced at trial, between March, 2003 and August, 2003, defendant Hayat, during the course of numerous recorded conversations with a cooperating witness, pledged his belief in [violent] jihad, indicated that jihad was the duty of every Muslim, indicated that he had knowledge of jihadi camps including Jaish-e-Muhammed camps in the Balakot/Mansehar area, pledged to go to a jihadi training camp, and indicated that he, in fact, was going to jihadi training after Ramadan in 2003 (which was to occur at the end of November, 2003).\(^{527}\)

In his closing comments to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated: “Hamid Hayat had a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind.”\(^{528}\) In interviews, several jurors said Hayat's confession and evidence of what the jury foreman called “un-Americanism” convinced them that he posed a danger.\(^{529}\) In September 2006, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years in prison.

Umer Hayat, age 49, Hamid's father, was tried by a separate federal jury in early 2006 for two counts of making false statements to the FBI about having first-hand knowledge of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and that his son had attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. That proceeding ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Umer Hayat later pled guilty to making a false statement to the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection about his attempt to carry $28,000 into Pakistan. He was sentenced to time served.\(^{530}\)

---


529 Ibid.

Albany, New York Mosque Plot—August 2004

Two Albany, New York residents, Yassin M. Aref, an Imam at the Masjid As Salam mosque in the city, and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, a pizzeria owner, were convicted of conspiring to aid a terrorist group and provide support for a weapon of mass destruction, as well as money-laundering and supporting a foreign terrorist organization. They were sentenced to 15 years in prison. Aref is a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan and Hossain is an immigrant from Bangladesh who has lived in the United States for over two decades.

The case was the result of a sting operation by the FBI which had been watching the Masjid As Salam mosque since 2002 after one of its founders had been deported following the 9/11 attacks. The FBI had an undercover informant befriend Hossain, a member of the mosque who was reported to be having financial problems with his pizza business. The informant was a Pakistani immigrant facing a long prison sentence and deportation after he had pled guilty to one felony count of engaging in the production and transfer of false government identification documents. After a period of time, Hossain asked the informant for a loan. The informant proposed a scheme to launder through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan's United Nation’s envoy.531

According to court records, the Kurdish Imam, Yassan Aref, was not approached by the informant. Rather, Aref was enlisted by Hossain to witness the transactions under Muslim tradition.532 However, Federal authorities admitted that Aref was the “ultimate target” of the sting operation. Two months after the sting began, American military forces found Aref’s name and phone number in a notebook at a bombed out encampment in Iraq that the government contended was occupied by “terrorists.” The notebook was said to contain a reference in the Kurdish language to Aref as “commander” which led prosecutors to believe that Aref might be connected to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. It was also cited by the judge in the case as grounds for denying bail to the defendants.533

Later, however, Federal prosecutors admitted to making an error and acknowledged that the word in question could be translated as “brother,” rather than “commander.” The U.S. attorney for the Northern District of New York, was quoted as saying that the translation discrepancy was not terribly significant. He said the heart of the case had to do with Mr. Aref’s and Mr. Hossain’s failure to turn away from the fake plot even after they knew the intentions of the government informer.534

534 Ibid.
Aref and Hossain were arrested on August 5, 2004, on a 19-count indictment charging them with money laundering. The government subsequently added more charges, including allegations the men conspired to provide material support to a Pakistani terrorist group.535

The case was not without controversy. Aref and Hossain maintained their innocence throughout their trials. Defense attorneys claimed the two were entrapped. Pakistan angrily protested to Washington over the FBI sting operation describing it as “a bizarre mission.” Albania’s two main daily newspapers—the Albany Times Union and the Schenectady Daily Gazette—ran editorials at the time of the sentencing asking for extreme leniency.536 Two of the columnists who had followed the trial closely were also very critical of the prosecution.537 And several inmates at the Rensselaer County Jail, where Aref and Hossain were being held, wrote letters to the judge in the case vouching for the defendants’ good character and benign influence.538

After the indictment, an article in The New York Times quoted government officials as saying that Aref’s case resulted from evidence gathered by the warrantless National Security Agency domestic wiretapping program. On January 5, 2006, defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment as the fruit of illegal surveillance.539 The district court denied that motion in a sealed ex parte opinion based on a sealed ex parte submission by the government. In July 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed the district court’s ruling.

Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay—Plot to Bomb Herald Square Subway Station in New York City—August 2004

Days before the 2004 Republican National Convention, which was held in New York City, James Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, and Shahawar Matin Siraj, a Pakistani immigrant, were arrested for plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station in New York City. The station, near Madison Square Garden, is the third busiest in the city’s transit system. The investigation was largely conducted by the NYPD’s Intelligence Division which used a paid informant, Osama Eldawoody, a 50-year-old Egyptian-born nuclear engineer. Eldawoody testified that he volunteered to troll the city’s mosques and Muslim communities out of patriotism and a desire to show that violent extremists are the exception rather than the rule in Islam.540 Prosecutors at the Siraj’s trial played tapes secretly-recorded by Eldawoody in which Siraj discusses the plot to bomb the subway station “at length and with great zeal.”541


536 The FBI responded by running an op-ed piece in the Daily Gazette upholding the sting operation as legitimate.


James Elshafay, who was 19 years old when he was arrested, immediately agreed to cooperate with the government and pled guilty to involvement in the plot. Elshafay testified against Siraj at the latter’s trial. He acknowledged taking medication for depression and schizophrenia and described the delusions that landed him in a psychiatric ward just months before he conspired with Siraj to bomb the subway station. Elshafay was sentenced to five years in prison.

Siraj, who was 22 years old when he was arrested, rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. His attorneys argued that he was entrapped by the police informant, Osama Eldawoody. They also attacked the credibility of the informant on the grounds that he was paid a total of $100,000 by the police. However, prosecutors called an undercover detective who testified that he had had frequent conversations with Siraj long before he met Eldawoody. “The conversations, the detective said, were filled with Mr. Siraj’s approval of suicide bombings and Osama bin Laden.” The jury rejected the defense argument of entrapment and convicted Siraj on four counts of conspiracy, including plotting to bomb a public transportation system. He was sentenced in January 2007 to 30 years in prison.

Iyman Faris—Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge—June 2003

Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir, Pakistan and living in Columbus, Ohio, pled guilty on May 1, 2003, to casing the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City for Al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to Al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets. According to DOJ, “Faris admitted that in April 2002, he researched “gas cutters”—the equipment for severing bridge suspension cables—and the New York City bridge on the Internet. Between April 2002 and March 2003, he sent several coded messages indicating he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the necessary equipment. Faris admitted to traveling to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and said he concluded that the plot to destroy the bridge by severing cables was unlikely to succeed because of the bridge’s security and structure. In early 2003, he sent a message that “the weather is too hot”—a coded message indicating that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.” He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

TIME magazine reports that government officials were led to Faris by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the high-ranking Al Qaeda operative and alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks who is in U.S. custody. Reportedly, after Mohammed’s capture in Pakistan, agents discovered the coded, “the weather is too hot” e-mail sent from the U.S. to one of his associates. The e-mail was one of the factors that helped investigators pull Faris’ name out of Mohammed during his interrogations by U.S. authorities. Faris was then secretly detained two weeks later. Faris acknowledged that he wrote the e-mail and was referring to the impossibility of an Al Qaeda plot to bring down the sturdy, well-guarded Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its suspension cables.

Sometime in March 2003, according to DOJ officials, FBI agents persuaded Faris to cooperate with the government. TIME quotes law-enforcement officials who say that he was brought to a

542 Ibid.
safe house in Virginia. “Faris sent messages to his bosses via cell phone and e-mail. ‘He was sitting in the safe house making calls for us,’ says a senior Administration official. ‘It was a huge triumph for law enforcement.’”

Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—Plot to Assassinate President Bush—June 2003

Abu Ali, an American-born Muslim raised in Northern Virginia, was convicted on November 22, 2005 on nine terrorism charges, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W. Bush, conspiracy to commit air piracy, and providing material support to Al Qaeda. Ali was originally arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities in June 2003, while he was studying at the Islamic University of Medina. The arrest came one month after an Al Qaeda attack on three residential compounds in Riyadh had killed 27 foreign workers. He was held in Saudi custody for 20 months without charges or access to an attorney. U.S. officials did not request extradition; however, FBI agents participated in some of the interrogations.

In the summer of 2004, Abu Ali’s family brought a civil suit in U.S. District Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. While that suit was pending, Abu Ali was returned to the United States and on February 22, 2005, an indictment was unsealed charging him with six terrorism counts. Later, a superseding indictment added additional charges.

The government’s case against Abu Ali was based primarily on evidence gathered by Saudi authorities which included a videotaped confession. Although the assassination and hijacking plots never got past the talking stage, it was alleged that between September 2002 and June 2003, Abu Ali had met with several unnamed co-conspirators, two of whom were later revealed to be leaders of an Al Qaeda cell in Medina—Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani, and Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faq’asi al-Ghamdi. Among the discussions with the co-conspirators were “... options for assassinating President Bush: (1) an operation in which Abu Ali would get close enough to the President to shoot him on the street, and (2) an operation in which Abu Ali would detonate a car bomb.” At trial, Abu Ali’s attorneys countered that while in Saudi custody their client had been beaten and whipped repeatedly until he agreed to confess. But, the judge, jury, and appellate court rejected that argument. A juror said after the trial that Abu Ali’s videotaped confession was “chilling” and showed no sign of coercion.

546 Ibid.
552 Abramson, NPR, Nov. 22, 2005.
Abu Ali was originally sentenced to 30 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction and sent the case back for resentencing. The U.S. District judge increased the sentence to life in prison which he is serving at the Federal “Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado.

Virginia “Jihad” Network—June 2003

Eleven men from Northern Virginia were charged on June 27, 2003, with a variety of offenses including weapons counts, providing material support to terrorist groups, and for violating the Neutrality Act of 1939\(^{554}\) which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. The men were accused of being part of a jihadist network whose objective was to wage holy war against nations deemed hostile to Islam. They were dubbed by some in the media as the “Paintball” terrorists because they were alleged to have used paintball games in the woods near Fredericksburg, Virginia in 2000 and 2001 as military training.\(^{555}\)

After the indictment, four of the eleven men pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In a superseding indictment on September 25, 2003, additional charges were levied against the seven remaining defendants, including conspiracy to support terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) a Kashmiri-based group that has been designated by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization.\(^{556}\) Two of these remaining defendants pled guilty in January 2004.

In 2004 and 2005, charges were brought against two additional Northern Virginia residents. The alleged spiritual leader of the group, Ali al-Timimi, was indicted in September 2004 for counseling and inducing several of the other defendants to conspire to levy war against the United States along with other charges. He was found guilty on April 26, 2005 on ten counts and sentenced to life in prison.\(^{557}\)

The Washington Post reported that the heart of the government’s evidence against al-Timimi was a meeting he attended in Fairfax, Virginia five days after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Timimi told his followers that ‘the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan,’ according to court papers.\(^{558}\) Defense lawyers claimed his rhetoric merely reflected his right to free speech. After seven days of deliberation, the jury rejected that argument. At sentencing, the judge said she was satisfied that the case did not violate any of al-Timimi’s First Amendment rights. This is not a case about speech. This is a case about intent.”

---


On September 15, 2005, prosecutors also charged Ali Asad Chandia as part of the Virginia Jihad Network conspiracy. Chandia, a former teacher at a Muslim school in Maryland, was accused of assisting a LeT operative, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, in procuring military-purpose equipment for use against India. Evidence was presented at trial that Chandia made a three-month trip to Pakistan in 2001-2002 where he met and allied with Khan who is currently serving a nine-year sentence in Britain for his terrorist activities. Chandia was convicted on June 6, 2006 and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

The following is a summary of the disposition of all of the accused defendants:

- **Ali Al-Timimi**—an Iraqi-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on April 26, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison for soliciting treason, counseling and inducing others to wage war against the United States, and using firearms and explosives in furtherance of those offenses.

- **Ali Asad Chandia**—a Pakistani-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on June 6, 2006, and sentenced to 15 years, for providing material support to the LeT.

- **Masaud Khan**—a Pakistani-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to wage war against the United States, providing material support to LeT, and using automatic weapons in furtherance of crimes of violence.

- **Seifullah Chapman**—a U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to 85 years (later reduced to 65 years) in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT, violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, using firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence, and using an automatic weapon in furtherance of crimes of violence.

- **Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem**—a U.S. citizen, was acquitted of all charges on February 20, 2004.

- **Randall Royer**—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in January 2004 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and of aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony.

- **Ibrahim Al-Hamdi**—a Yemeni national, pled guilty in January 2004, and was sentenced to 17 years in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive—specifically, a rocket-propelled grenade—during the commission of a crime.

- **Yong Ki Kwon**—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Korea, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, six months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, and transferring a firearm for use in a crime of violence.


Sabri Benkhala, a U.S. citizen, was acquitted in March 2004 of charges related to the original June 2003 indictment. He was then granted statutory immunity and testified twice before the grand jury, and submitted to interviews with the FBI. He was subsequently convicted in February 2007 of making materially false statements in 2004, both in his grand jury appearances and to the FBI. He was sentenced to 10 years, one month in prison.

Khwaja Mahmood Hasan—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, three months in prison for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.

Muhammed Aatique—a legal resident from Pakistan, pled guilty in September 2003, and was sentenced to 10 years, two months, for aiding others in commencing a military expedition against a friendly nation and using and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.

Hammad Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen (and no relation to acquitted defendant Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem), was convicted on March 4, 2004, and was sentenced to 52 months in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT and violating the Neutrality Act of 1939.

Donald Thomas Surratt—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to three years, 10 months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with reason to know a felony would be committed with it.


On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Akbar shut off the generator that lit the camp, then tossed grenades into three tents where officers were asleep or preparing for bed. He is reported to have yelled, “We are under attack.” As men rushed outside, he then opened fire with an M-4 automatic rifle.

Akbar was born Mark Fidel Kools in 1971. His mother said she changed his name to Hasan Akbar after she remarried when he was a young boy. The family into which she married were members of the Nation of Islam. In 1988, Akbar enrolled at the University of California, Davis, with a double major in aeronautical and mechanical engineering. He graduated nine years later with a bachelor's degree and joined the Army in 1998.

The attacks have been attributed to various motivations. Military criminal investigators reported that Akbar had been recently reprimanded for insubordination and was told he would not join his

unit's push into Iraq. An Army spokesman said Akbar had been having “an attitude problem.” Another spokesman stated that the motive in the attack “most likely was resentment.”

At his April 2005 court martial, Akbar’s attorney argued that Akbar was concerned the invasion of Iraq would result in the deaths of Muslims and that U.S. soldiers would rape Iraqi women. He said the prosecution's depiction of Akbar as a cold-blooded killer ignored that the defendant was sufficiently mentally ill—though not insane—to be confused and fearful about the impending invasion of Iraq. \(^{563}\)

But writing of his fellow soldiers in a diary entry dated February 4, 2003:

I suppose they want to punk me or just humiliate me. Perhaps they feel that I will not do anything about that. They are right about that. I am not going to do anything about it as long as I stay here. But as soon as I am in Iraq, I am going to try and kill as many of them as possible.

I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle buddies. I am hoping to get into a position so I don't have to take any crap from anyone anymore. \(^{564}\)

On April 22, 2005, after two and one-half hours deliberation, a military jury at Fort Bragg convicted Akbar of two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted premeditated murder. He was sentenced to death one week later. Akbar is the first American since the Vietnam era to be prosecuted on charges of murdering a fellow soldier during wartime. His case is currently under automatic appeal.

**Lackawanna Six – Training at Al Qaeda Camp – September 2002**

Six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested on September 13, 2002 and later charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization. The press dubbed the six suspects—**Sahim Alwan**, 29; **Yahya Goba**, 25; **Shafal Mosed**, 24; **Yasein Taher**, 24; **Faysal Galab**, 26; and **Mukhtar al-Bakri**, 22—the “Lackawanna Six” (also the “Buffalo Six” or “Buffalo Cell”) because five of them were born and raised in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, New York.

Prosecutors alleged that in the Spring of 2001, the men traveled to Afghanistan where they attended Al Farooq training camp. Three of the men—Taher, Galab, and Mosed—traveled in one group in April 2001, going from Canada to Pakistan via London and the United Arab Emirates. The four others—Alwan, Goba, al-Bakri, and Elbaneh—allegedly traveled from New York to Pakistan in May 2001. Once in Pakistan, they allegedly crossed over the border in Afghanistan to attend the training camp. The men stayed for five to six weeks, except for Alwan, who left after 10 days. \(^{565}\) The men later admitted to authorities that while at Al Farooq camp they were trained

---

\(^{563}\) Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Apr. 22, 2005.


in the use of automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and explosives. They also met Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{566}

The Lackawanna Six first came to the attention of authorities in the Spring of 2001 when the FBI received an anonymous, handwritten letter apparently from someone in Lackawanna's Yemeni community. The letter said that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for training.”\textsuperscript{567} Subsequently, the FBI interviewed one of the men, Sahim Alwan, when he returned from abroad. Alwan, however, told the FBI that he only traveled to Pakistan for religious training.

Another member, Mukhtar Al-Bakri, came under increased surveillance after the U.S. government reviewed and analyzed an e-mail he sent while traveling in Saudi Arabia. The e-mail referred to an upcoming “big meal” that authorities interpreted as a code for an impending terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{568} Additional intelligence information was later received that suggested the Lackawanna suspects were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation.\textsuperscript{569} In the tense atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks, this led to concerns that the group may be a sleeper cell.\textsuperscript{570}

When the FBI learned that al-Bakri had traveled to Bahrain to get married, they asked authorities there to detain him. During an interview with an Arabic-speaking FBI agent, a-Bakri admitted to having attended Al Farooq camp and named the other members of the Lackawanna Six, who were then subsequently arrested on September 13, 2002.

In their joint report, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,”\textsuperscript{571} The New York Times and Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Frontline summarized the disposition of the Lackawanna Six and others associated with the case:

- **Sahim Alwan** was a college-educated, married man with three children. After he arrived at Al Farooq camp, Alwan claimed he quickly had a change of heart and begged the camp authorities to let him return home. He was allowed to leave, but first was taken to a personal meeting with bin Laden, in which Al Qaeda’s leader asked about the status of Muslims in the U.S. He was also asked by a bin Laden associate to deliver two copies of a videotape showing the bombing of the USS Cole to a contact in Pakistan which he did. After being confronted with information obtained from the arrest and interrogation of Mukhtar al-Bakri, Alwan confessed to the FBI and in April 2003, pled guilty to material support of terrorism. He was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison.

- **Yahya Goba** did not grow up in Lackawanna. He was born in The Bronx, was raised for a while in Yemen, and moved to Western New York in the late 1996. In his March 2003 guilty plea, Goba admitted having trained to use firearms.


\textsuperscript{568} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{569} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{571} PBS, Oct. 16, 2003.
including a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, as well as explosives. He also said that Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp of men “willing to become martyrs for the cause.” In December 2003, Goba was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

- **Shafal Mosed** pled guilty in March 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

- **Yasein Taher** pled guilty in May 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

- **Faysal Galab** was the first of the Lackawanna Six to pled guilty to material support of terrorism in January 2003. In his plea, he admitted to traveling to the camp, knowing that the trip was illegal, and receiving weapons training. He also acknowledged Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.

- **Mukhtar al-Bakri** was arrested on his wedding night in a hotel room in Manama, Bahrain. During his FBI interview, he was the first to admit that the group had not attended religious training in Pakistan, but rather traveled to the terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. His confession paved the way for the FBI to bring charges against the Lackwanna men. He also admitted that he trained in the use of weapons and explosives at an Al Qaeda camp. In June 2003, he was the last of the six to pled guilty to material support and was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Three other men were also implicated in the Lackawanna Six case. Authorities believe the three played roles in the recruitment of the Lackwanna Six:

- **Kemal Derwish** was born in Buffalo and raised in Saudi Arabia. He reportedly had trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought with Muslims in Bosnia. U.S. intelligence sources say the Saudi government deported Derwish in 1997 for alleged extremist activities. He spent a year in Yemen before heading back to his hometown of Lackawanna in 1998 where he began giving informal talks at a local mosque. The group met in his apartment, where he reportedly told them that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to defend their Muslim brothers. Authorities believe that the trip by the group to Afghanistan grew out of religious discussions led by Derwish. He was reportedly killed in 2002 by a CIA Predator drone that was tracking Qaed Salim Sinan al Harethi, known as “Abu Ali,” and believed to be one of the planners of the USS Cole bombing.  

- **Juma Al Dosari** is described as a Muslim fighter and itinerant Imam from Saudi Arabia, who is believed to have fought with Derwish in Bosnia. Upon his arrival in Lackawanna, the reportedly charismatic Al Dosari gave a sermon railing against Arab governments who do nothing while Muslims die on a daily basis. According to people in the community, the leaders of the Lackawanna mosque were so troubled by Al Dosari's militant tone that he was not invited back. Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Al Dosari left Lackawanna to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was captured sometime in the fall of 2001 and declared an enemy combatant. He was subsequently sent to the special prison camp at the

---

572 Ibid.
U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His interrogation there led to the information that the Lackawanna Six were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation. In 2007, after five years of the detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he was released to Saudi Arabia, with no charges against him.\textsuperscript{573}

- **Jaber A. Elbaneh**, a Yemeni-American also attended Al Farooq training camp with al-Bakri, Alwan and Goba. At the camp, Elbaneh told Alwan that he wanted to fight with the Taliban and was willing to become a martyr. He never returned to the U.S. after his trip to Afghanistan and eventually fled to Yemen. In May 2003, the U.S. government unsealed an indictment charging him with providing material support to Al Qaeda. The FBI also put him on its list of world's most wanted terrorism suspects.\textsuperscript{574} It has been reported that he is in Yemeni custody, but because there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Yemen, it is not clear whether he will be returned for trial.\textsuperscript{575}

**Jose Padilla—Alleged “Dirty Bomb” Plot—May 2002**

Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and convert to Islam, was arrested on May 8, 2002, at O'Hare Airport in Chicago for suspicion of planning to explode a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb” (an explosive containing radioactive material) in the United States. A month later, he would become the first American citizen arrested on U.S. soil to be declared an “enemy combatant,” and then was held indefinitely without trial or charging him with a crime. This led to a legal confrontation between the Bush Administration and Padilla’s attorneys as well as various civil liberties groups that lasted several years and reached all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The constitutional issues involved the extent to which the President, as commander-in-chief has the authority to take extraordinary measures for the security of Americans even if those measures infringe on an accused citizen’s access to legal counsel and relief from unlawful detention (\textit{habeas corpus}).\textsuperscript{576}

The government’s initial suspicions about Padilla were based on information provided to interrogators by **Abu Zubaydah**, a senior official of Al Qaeda who was in American custody at an undisclosed location overseas. He did not name Mr. Padilla but described him physically and referred to him as a Latin American man who went by a Muslim name. Intelligence agents then were able to link the name given by Abu Zubaydah to “an Arab alias not mentioned by the detainee.” That “alias” led the agent to Mr. Padilla’s Florida driver’s license. The photo on that license was shown to “a detainee,” presumed to be Abu Zubaydah, who confirmed that Mr. Padilla was the “Latin American” he had been describing.\textsuperscript{577}

Padilla remained in custody for one month after his arrest in May 2002 on a material witness warrant. But, Justice Department officials faced a deadline to release him pursuant to laws that

\textsuperscript{573} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid.
protect U.S. citizens from indefinite detention. They were also confronted with the challenge of making a case against Padilla that would stand up in court without bringing Abu Zubaydah or other captured Al Qaeda officials into an American courtroom. Instead, on June 9, 2002, President George W. Bush approved Padilla's reclassification as an “enemy combatant,” which would not entitle him to trial in civilian courts. He was transferred after midnight to the brig of a South Carolina naval base where he was held incommunicado, not even allowed visits from his attorney, for over 3-1/2 years, most of which was spent in solitary confinement.

In announcing Padilla’s May arrest, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced at a June 10, 2002, news conference, “We have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb.” He added that the government’s suspicions about Padilla’s plans came from “multiple, independent, corroborating sources.”

But shortly thereafter, CBS News reported that FBI sources were “backing off” Ashcroft’s assertion that there was a specific, developed and real plan to use a “dirty bomb” in the U.S. According to one law enforcement official speaking on condition of anonymity, “FBI’s investigation has produced no evidence that Padilla had begun preparations for an attack and little reason to believe he had any support from Al Qaeda to direct such a plot.”

Dale Watson, who was then FBI’s executive assistant director for counterterrorism, read the complete file on Padilla and later said, “My recollection was that this was a rather weak case. There was some information, but it needed a lot more work on the investigative side to flesh out all the facts.”

On June 1, 2004, DOJ responded to a written request by Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “asking the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense to supply whatever information [they] could about American citizens being held as enemy combatants here in the United States.” In addition, then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey held a news conference where he laid out a detailed summary of the government’s case against Padilla. The case was largely derived from statements made by Padilla himself while he was interrogated in military custody, but which Comey claimed was substantiated by other sources. At the news conference, Comey traced Padilla’s travel through Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He identified Al Qaeda officials he met, which included not only Abu Zubaydah, but Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He also described the training Padilla received and terrorist plots discussed including one to blow up apartment buildings in the United States using natural gas as well as an attack using a dirty bomb.

---


581 Ibid.


583 Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.

584 Ibid.
Comey also noted that the government could not make a case against Padilla through the criminal justice system when he was originally arrested two years before “without jeopardizing intelligence sources.” But, he went on to say that the questioning of Padilla was not undertaken to try and make a criminal case against him. “It was done to find out the truth about what he knew about Al Qaeda and threats to the United States.”

Soon after Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, his appointed counsel filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the wrong court. In 2004, Padilla’s counsel filed a new habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina. The District Court ruled that Padilla’s detention had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore unlawful. The government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the president was authorized to detain enemy combatants under the Authorization of Use of Military Force passed by Congress in the wake of September 11. Padilla then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

In November 2005, while the Supreme Court was considering Padilla's petition for review, the Bush Administration suddenly announced that criminal charges had been filed against him in federal court in Miami. The new indictment made no mention of the dirty bomb or most of the other original charges. Instead, Padilla was charged with being part of a “North American support cell” that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from 1993 to 2001.

The government then asked the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its decision upholding Padilla's confinement. The 4th Circuit refused to vacate its order or approve of Padilla's transfer from military to civilian custody. In an opinion by Judge J. Michael Luttig, the 4th Circuit worried about “an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.” Judge Luttig also “chastised the administration for using one set of facts to justify holding Padilla without charges and another set to persuade a grand jury in Florida to indict him.”

Padilla’s attorneys, in the meantime, sought to have the criminal charges against him dismissed on the grounds that the psychological damage he suffered during his confinement from abuse and extreme isolation had left him incompetent to stand trial. The judge in the case denied the motion,

---

585 Ibid.
586 Ibid.
587 Certiorari is the name given to certain appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior appeals court.
590 For more information on this case, see CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
without ruling on the merits of the defense accusations of abuse. The criminal trial began in September 2006.593

Padilla was convicted on Aug. 16, 2007, along with two co-defendants, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi, of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a foreign country. In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years and four months in prison while his co-defendants were given shorter sentences. Padilla is serving his sentence at the Federal “Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado.594

**Portland Seven—Attempted Travel to Afghanistan to Support the Taliban—October 2001**

In the days following the 9/11 attacks, six men reportedly met at various times in the Portland, Oregon area where they made plans to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the armed forces of the United States. They also conducted weapons training on two occasions at a gravel pit in Washougal, Washington. A seventh person, October Martinique Lewis, admitted that she transferred funds for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband who was one of the conspirators. The group, who came to be known as the “Portland Seven”—called themselves, *Katibat al Mawt*—“The Squad of Death.” They were:595

- **Habis Abdulla Al Saoub**, 36, a Jordanian-born man and reputed militant jihadist, was considered to be the *de facto* leader of the group.
- **Patrice Lumumba Ford**, 30, is a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam during a trip to China. He has been described as an intelligent, gentle, exemplary young man, well-known in Portland's African-American community. But prior to the events of 9/11, was so upset by this country's Middle Eastern policy that he sent an email to Portland Mayor Vera Katz's office that was troubling enough in its anti-Semitism to be forwarded to the police.
- **Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal**, 25, and **Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal**, 22, are American-born brothers of Saudi descent.
- **Jeffrey Leon Battle**, 32, is a former cosmetics salesman who moved to the Portland area from Houston.
- **Maher “Mike” Hawash**, is a 38-year-old software engineer and naturalized American citizen from the West Bank who grew up in Kuwait.
- **October Martinique Lewis**, 25, Battle’s ex-wife, who moved with him from Houston.

Al Saoub, Ford, and Battle first came to the attention of law enforcement authorities on September 29, 2001, after they were seen engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit in Skamania County, Washington, near Washougal. The group was discovered by a Deputy Sheriff who was

594 Ibid.
acting on a tip from a neighbor who had heard gunfire in the pit. Deputy Mercer let the men go after taking their names and reported the incident to the FBI.  

Sometime after February 2002, the FBI reportedly linked a confidential informant with a member of the group, Jeffrey Battle. The informant was reported to be Khalid Mustafa, a small-time criminal who agreed to become a confidential FBI informant after being charged with drug and weapons offenses. Mustafa befriended Battle at the mosque where he prayed and then secretly-recorded numerous conversations with Battle that included details about the group’s trip to China. Battle is also recorded on tape talking about retaliating against Jews in Portland, “So if every time they hurt or harm a Muslim over there, you go into that synagogue and hurt one over here.”

Hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and other members of the Portland Seven provided further evidence of the conspiracy. The e-mails were reportedly obtained through provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that allow prosecutors access to the data files of Internet service providers. In court documents, prosecutors acknowledged having taped at least 271 conversations and obtained 31 separate orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.

In October 2002, five of the men were indicted on multiple charges of aiding or attempting to join Al Qaeda. Maher Hawash was arrested in March 2003, on a material witness warrant and initially held without charges. He was subsequently charged with conspiring with the others to travel to China and join the Taliban. Lewis, the ex-wife of co-defendant Jeffrey Battle, was charged with money laundering.

Hawash pled guilty on Sept. 6, 2003 to conspiracy to provide material support to the Taliban and agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors. At his sentencing in February 2004, he said, “I do not blame anyone else but myself. This action was done by me, based on a misguided judgment at the time, a high emotional time for me in my life.” He was sentenced to seven years in prison and was released in early 2009.

Muhammad and Ahmed Bilal, pled guilty on September 18, 2003 to conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban, as well as federal weapons charges. They received eight and ten year sentences respectively.

October Martinique Lewis pled guilty on September 26, 2003, to six counts of money laundering for transferring money from the United States to a place outside of the country for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband, Jeffrey Battle, in willfully supplying services to the Taliban. She received a three-year sentence.

596 Ibid.
597 Howlett, July 24, 2005.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
Jeffrey Battle and Patrice Lumumba Ford pled guilty on Oct. 16, 2003, to the first of a 15-count indictment, a charge of conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Both defendants admitted that they and the other defendants flew to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry into Pakistan, en route to Afghanistan. They also admitted in their plea that the purpose of the conspiracy was to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban against American and allied forces. They were each sentenced to 18-year prison terms.602

Habis al Saoub reportedly joined an Al Qaeda cell and was killed by Pakistani forces in Afghanistan in October 2003.

Appendix B. Federal Engagement and Partnership Activities With Muslim-American Communities

Several U.S. Government departments and agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim-, Arab-, Sikh-, and South Asian-American communities over issues relating to civil rights, civil liberties, and domestic terrorism issues. A summary of the activities of principal organizations is listed below.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

DHS has stated that public outreach and engagement initiatives with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, Somali, Middle Eastern, and other ethnic and religious communities play major roles in the department’s mission. Engagement activities are centered in its Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) whose mission impacts counterterrorism but is broader. The office is also responsible for:

- Advising Department leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and civil liberties issues.
- Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by Department activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the Department to their experiences and concerns.
- Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public.

CRCL has established an engagement team currently active in eight metropolitan areas: Boston, Chicago, Columbus (and other metropolitan areas of Ohio), Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Washington, D.C. Their major outreach and engagement initiatives include the following:

- Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT). This team provides a venue for government officials and community leaders to work together to exchange information and resolve issues immediately after terrorist attacks or other significant incidents. ICCT members include officials from DHS, the Departments of State and Justice, the FBI; and leaders of the Arab-, Muslim-, Sikh-, Middle Eastern-, Somali-, and South Asian-American communities. When an incident occurs, the ICCT is assembled via conference call. It has been activated numerous times since its establishment including after the Fort Hood incident in November 2009 and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight #253 in December 2009.

---


604 The mission of the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is outlined in 6 U.S.C. 345, see http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0481.shtm.

• Community and youth roundtables in key cities that serve as a point of inquiry and redress for individuals concerned about their rights as Americans.

• Cultural competency training for DHS personnel.

• Promoting diversity hiring and critical language skills within the department and at job fairs, conferences, and in media outlets serving ethnic and religious communities promotion. The National Security Internship Program, a partnership between the FBI and the Department, seeks to bring Arabic speakers into public service positions within federal intelligence and security agencies.

Department of Justice (DOJ)

According to its website, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Civil Rights Division of DOJ has placed a priority on prosecuting bias crimes and incidents of discrimination against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent, as well as persons perceived to be members of these groups. The Division has also engaged in extensive outreach efforts to these communities to educate people about their rights and available government services.606

This outreach has included meetings of senior Civil Rights Division officials with community leaders to address backlash-related civil rights issues, providing speakers and information booths at national and regional conventions and other community events, and hosting a bi-monthly meeting that brings together leaders from these communities with officials from a variety of federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the Department of Transportation, and others, to address civil rights issues in a comprehensive way.607

The Justice Department’s Community Relations Service has held more than 250 town and community meetings around the country addressing backlash-related issues.608 In addition, the Community Relations Service:609

• Provided technical assistance and targeted training efforts towards establishing dialogue between government officials and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities in the United States.

• Developed the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Program for law enforcement officials, and have provided this training to well over 500 law enforcement departments and agencies across the country.

• Conducts Train-the-Trainer programs, often in conjunction with the Cultural Awareness Program, to train volunteers from the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities. These volunteers then conduct trainings for law enforcement officials and first responders, providing them with an understanding of Arab,

---


607 Ibid.

608 Ibid.

Muslim, and Sikh cultures that will enable them to more effectively work in these communities.

- The Community Relations Service provides training to law enforcement officials on racial profiling to identify best practices to prevent illegal discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs and to improve daily contact and strengthen mutual trust and effective policing practices in these communities.

- Developed two films for law enforcement officers that can be downloaded from its website: The First Three to Five Seconds - Law Enforcement Roll Call Training Video on Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness, and On Common Ground - Law Enforcement Training Video on Sikhism.610

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

There is limited information in open sources about FBI engagement activities in Muslim-American communities, the objectives of those activities, or how they are harmonized with its other counterterrorism efforts. The FBI has suggested that since 9/11, it has been formulating an “extensive program” to bolster its relationship with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities in the United States.611 Also, in March 2010, Brett Hovington, the Chief of the Community Relations Unit of FBI’s Office of Public Affairs, told Congress that the primary purpose of the agency’s outreach program was “to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI.”612 This involves fostering a positive image of law enforcement among U.S. organizations that have condemned terrorism and violent radicalization.

Hovington suggested that the FBI relies on general programs at the field office level to foster interaction with a wide variety of local groups. In 2003, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) established one such program, the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council (AMSAC) to create transparency and stronger communication between its office and multiple religious communities. According to the WFO, on a quarterly basis its officials and AMSAC executives share cultural, linguistic, and contextual expertise and work to prevent hate crimes by building relationships with community members who are not afraid to come forward with information.613 In his testimony, Hovington equated jihadist-inspired terrorism with gangs or groups like the Ku Klux Klan and underscored that FBI counterterrorism-related community engagement had to be decentralized:

It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities, because terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms and fashion depending on what environment that you’re—that you’re looking at. So whether you’re talking about gang activity, whether you’re talking about Klan activity, the bottom

610 Ibid
line—it’s terrorism. And that’s one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the various communities. And it—I would say it’s a customized outreach program. What I mean by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this country, and they have to tailor their outreach efforts based on the demographics of the area of responsibilities that they serve. That’s the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits all.614

An outreach program developed by the Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters is the Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT). It is described as an effort to, “engage communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law enforcement exist.” The SCOT was piloted with Somali-American communities in Minneapolis; Denver; Columbus, Ohio; San Diego; Seattle; and Washington, DC.615 This effort helped the FBI address a Somali-linked threat to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration and, in this instance, SCOT outreach in Columbus facilitated FBI investigative work.616

Aside from the FBI’s inclusion of Muslim Americans in outreach programs devised for all types of local constituencies,617 some FBI field offices have formally interacted with local Muslim communities regarding specific cases. One case involved the agency’s top official at the New York Field Office meeting with 40 community leaders regarding Najibullah Zazi, who has confessed to plotting to bomb subway trains in New York City. Other field offices have held town hall meetings to interact with the communities.618 At the national level, the FBI headquarters representatives have engaged in liaison with Arab and Muslim American advocacy groups and have regular issue-focused conference calls with community leaders.619 The FBI is also a member of the Incident Coordination Communications Team managed by DHS CRCL. Finally, CRS discussions with Muslim community leaders revealed that the FBI has partnered with community members in specific cases where the FBI has detected radicalization in an effort to prevent those individuals from transitioning to acts of violent extremism.620

**Department of the Treasury (Treasury)**

As part of its counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. Government seeks to identify, disrupt, and dismantle illicit financial networks that support terrorists and terrorist groups. This is one of the core missions of Treasury. The department has identified cases where terrorist organizations have established or infiltrated the charitable sector and exploited charitable funds and well-intentioned donors in order to provide cover or support terrorist activities or agendas. Section 1702 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223) and Executive Order (E.O.)

615 Ibid.
619 Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.
620 Discussions with CRS held on May 12 and 18, 2010.
provide the executive branch with tools to investigate and disrupt terrorist networks by
designating them and blocking their assets. Since 2001, Treasury has designated eight charities
under E.O. 13224.622

“Though Treasury actions with respect to Muslim charities have been relatively infrequent, and
none have occurred for three years,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Daniel Glaser,
told Congress in May 2010, these actions, “…have had the unfortunate and unintended
consequence of causing a chilling effect on well-intentioned donor activity within Muslim-
American communities.”623 This is a particularly important issue for Muslims due to their
religious obligation of zakāt. 624 In his speech in Cairo in 2009, President Obama recognized the
challenge, when he said, “…in the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder
for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation. That’s why I’m committed to working with
American Muslims to ensure that they can fulfill zakāt.”625

Treasury maintains that overcoming the challenges noted above requires a strong partnership with
the charitable sector and frames its efforts to (1) conduct outreach, (2) issue guidance, and (3)
develop a partnership with the charitable sector. Treasury meets frequently and collaborates on
projects with specific communities and organizations, including Muslim- American communities,
as well as with representatives from the broader charitable sector. It also participates in
interagency outreach events with DHS, DOJ, and the FBI.626 Finally, Glaser notes that guidance
has been developed to assist the charitable sector in adopting protective measures against terrorist
abuse of charities, including its “Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices
for U.S.-Based Charities.”627

In an effort to protect and promote charitable activity in places where terrorist organizations are
particularly active, Treasury has also discussed with Muslim communities the feasibility of
developing alternative relief mechanisms. One example is the American Charities for Palestine
(ACP) founded in June 2007 for the purpose of creating a secure mechanism for distributing
contributions that improve the quality of life for Palestinians living in the West Bank. In August
2008, ACP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) ensuring that all recipients of ACP donations in Palestine are
fully vetted and approved by USAID to ensure that funds will be distributed in compliance with
U.S. law.628

---

621 Executive Order 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf.

622 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Anti-
Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities, Testimony of Daniel L. Glaser,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes), 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26,

623 Ibid., p. 2.

624 Zakāt or “alms giving,” is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. It consists of giving a small percentage of one's
possessions to charity, usually the poor or otherwise needy.


626 Ibid., pp. 8-10.

627 For a list of all these documents, go to: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/index.shtml.

628 See Glaser Testimony, May 26, 2010, pp. 12-13; and American Charities for Palestine website at
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

NCTC is the primary U.S. Government organization for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism). Through its Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, it is also the executive branch lead agency for counterterrorism planning.

Within NCTC, there is a Global Engagement Group that engages with Muslim-American communities within the United States and counterpart agencies abroad, but there is limited information in open sources about those activities. According to the 2010 National Framework for Strategic Communication, the Global Engagement Group "coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes United States Government efforts to counter violent extremism and deny terrorists the next generation of recruits." However it is not clear what the Group’s responsibilities are within the domestic domain or how they are distinguished from those of other agencies. In a March 2009 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the NCTC Deputy Director for Intelligence testified:

To coordinate Federal, State, and local engagement efforts within Somali-American communities, the NCTC Global Engagement Group chairs the Somali Community Outreach Forum. This working group includes representatives from the FBI Community Relations Unit; the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Department of Justice Civil Rights and National Security Divisions; and the Department of the Treasury. This working group provides a forum to coordinate community outreach meetings in Columbus, Ohio and Minneapolis, Minnesota and other venues, and serves as a central point for collaboration that is designed to increase the effectiveness and coordination of activities...

The Deputy Director also stated that “NCTC last year produced a ‘best practices primer’ for state and local law enforcement officials that addresses cultural sensitivity issues and lessons learned in government outreach to American Muslim communities.” These activities suggest that this intelligence agency element has an important role in the domestic aspects of the countering violent extremism mission.


630 NCTC declined a request from CRS to discuss the activities of the Global Engagement Group and did not respond to written questions about it.


633 Ibid., p. 6.
Author Contact Information

Jerome P. Bjelopera  
Analyst in Organized Crime and Terrorism  
jbjelopera@crs.loc.gov, 7-0622

Mark A. Randol  
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism  
mrandol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2393