Regional Engagement from Phase 0: A Joint Interagency Task Force for the Trans-Sahel

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For most of Africa, the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM), executes those NSS tasks which fall under the Department of Defense (DoD). General Jones, the commander, recently acknowledged Africa as EUCOM’s primary focus. However, EUCOM’s transformation strategy specifically precludes establishing a new permanent presence on the continent. European Command should create a long-standing Joint Interagency Task Force for the Sahel (JIATF-TS), modeled upon JTF-HOA but with an increased emphasis on interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) interaction. JIATF-TS is EUCOM’s operational-level answer to the goals for Africa outlined in the National Security Strategy.

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

The Bush Administration’s March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates nine essential tasks for reaching the President’s goal of “ending tyranny in our world.” Africa’s challenges, recognition of its growing strategic significance, and the impact of failing states and ungoverned areas on U.S. security are woven throughout the NSS. For most of Africa, the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM), executes those NSS tasks which fall under the Department of Defense (DoD). General Jones, the commander, recently acknowledged Africa as EUCOM’s primary focus. However, EUCOM’s transformation strategy specifically precludes establishing a new permanent presence on the continent. European Command should create a long-standing Joint Interagency Task Force for the Sahel (JIATF-TS), modeled upon JTF-HOA but with an increased emphasis on interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) interaction. JIATF-TS is EUCOM’s operational-level answer to the goals for Africa outlined in the National Security Strategy.
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by

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Signature: _____________________

16 May 2006
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002

Abstract

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The Bush Administration’s March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates nine essential tasks for reaching the President’s goal of “ending tyranny in our world.” Africa’s challenges, recognition of its growing strategic significance, and the impact of failing states and ungoverned areas on U.S. security are woven throughout the NSS. For most of Africa, the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM), executes those NSS tasks which fall under the Department of Defense (DoD). General Jones, the commander, recently acknowledged Africa as EUCOM’s primary focus. However, EUCOM’s transformation strategy specifically precludes establishing a new permanent presence on the continent. European Command should create a long-standing Joint Interagency Task Force for the Sahel (JIATF-TS), modeled upon JTF-HOA but with an increased emphasis on interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) interaction. JIATF-TS is EUCOM’s operational-level answer to the goals for Africa outlined in the National Security Strategy.
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**INTRODUCTION**

President Bush’s March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates nine essential tasks for reaching the President’s goal of “ending tyranny in our world.” Africa’s challenges, recognition of its growing strategic significance, and the impact of failing states and ungoverned areas on U.S. security are woven throughout the NSS. Six of these tasks highlight Africa; the remaining three apply to the continent.

For most of Africa, the United States European Command (EUCOM) Commander executes those NSS tasks which fall under the Department of Defense (DoD). Africa’s strategic significance, particularly with regard to the threat of transnational terrorism, is not lost on EUCOM: General Jones, the commander, recently conceded Africa is his primary focus; he sees the potential for at least a subunified command for the continent, particularly in light of the success enjoyed by Central Command’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and growing interest in Africa’s global security impact. Two efforts underway focus on Africa’s Trans-Sahel region. Both EUCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Strategy (TSCS) and its role in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) seek to address transnational threats and foster stability in the greater Sahara region.

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1 National Security Council, *National Security Strategy*, March 2006, 1. Africa is mentioned throughout the NSS, particularly in Ch. VIII, “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.” Africa holds “growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this administration.”

by boosting the region’s security. Although Africa is clearly in its spotlight, EUCOM’s transformation strategy specifically precludes a new permanent presence on the continent.

European Command should create a permanent Joint Interagency Task Force for the Sahel (JIATF-TS), modeled upon CJTF-HOA but with increased emphasis on interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement. By working closely and persistently with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, Trans-Sahel nations, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations, EUCOM can shape the environment in a critical region, establish relationships with states and organizations, and develop a capacity for planning and interoperability before a crisis demands it. JIATF-TS is EUCOM’s operational-level answer to the goals for Africa outlined in the National Security Strategy.

JIATF-TS has several catalysts for expanded interagency efforts. DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (28 November 2005), directs increasing integration NGOs; tasks the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to identify countries and areas for increased involvement in stability operations; and directs Geographic Combatant Commanders to plan for stability operations emphasizing interagency and civil-military efforts. EUCOM’s JIATF-TS, capitalizing on this new guidance, would provide an operational-level venue uniting DoD

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skills and resources with the capabilities and inroads of existent entities, furthering the Administration’s goals in a strategically significant arena.

THE REGION North Africa’s Trans-Sahel region (Figure 1) is a largely ungoverned area faced with chronic drought, political instability, and, increasingly, the influence of Islamic fundamentalists, both home-grown and emigrated. Geographically, it is a semi-arid transition zone between the Sahara Desert to the north and the African savannahs, or grasslands, to the south, extending east to border the nations comprising the Horn of Africa.6

Three Trans-Sahel nations are among the United Nations’ (UN) top five for worst living conditions. While the region suffers from severe environmental challenges including chronic drought and insect plagues, porous borders, poor governance and political instability have been instrumental in compounding the tragedy of the Trans-Sahel.

GEO-STRATEGIC FACTORS Human security concerns alone should fix the Trans-Sahel firmly on EUCOM’s radar, but other geo-strategic factors are at work which increase the region’s significance: oil, China, and terrorism.

Nigeria is currently the fifth largest supplier of petroleum for the U.S. market.7 Although Nigeria accounts for 96 per cent of West Africa’s estimated reserves, exploratory efforts underway in other Sahelian nations8 may offer a future which includes the fruits, as

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well as the “curses” of oil: in Africa, as in other regions, oil revenues can encourage political and economic corruption, regional and internal conflict, and environmental degradation.9

Figure 1 The Trans-Sahel Region10

Increasingly, the U.S. competes for access to Africa’s petroleum with China, now the world’s second largest consumer of petroleum products. Devoid of political constraints African nations face when dealing with the U.S. and Western Europe, the Chinese enjoy an unrestrained environment in which to expand their trade and influence.11 Chinese interaction with African petroleum states fosters a climate wherein political corruption can flourish: a

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senior Chinese official notes China “tries to separate business from politics.”\textsuperscript{12} Corruption, and its impact on good governance, hinders nation-building throughout Africa’s Trans-Sahel. The continent’s growing prominence as a source of oil is but one of the reasons for its increasing strategic significance. The NSS asserts the susceptibility to exploitation by terrorists of “weak and impoverished states.” One need only look back on Osama Bin Laden’s operations in Sudan and Somalia to see that assertion borne out.

Africa’s role in hosting transnational threats is not lost on EUCOM: Maj. Gen. Gratton\textsuperscript{13} notes the return of “extremists with battlefield experience” to North Africa’s ungoverned regions from Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14} Gen Jones links efforts in the Trans-Sahel to U.S. homeland security, stressing inaction now in denying the region to terrorists could lead to “continued and repetitive U.S. intervention” as African security “increasingly and directly” affects U.S. security.\textsuperscript{15}

**THE INCUMBENTS** EUCOM should incorporate existent shaping ventures into the JIATF: African regional and sub-regional entities, other USG operations, and inter- and non-governmental organizations. This section highlights some of the efforts already underway.

Credited as the EUCOM commander’s most effective vehicle for countering terrorism, the TSCS value is in its attenuation of support to transnational terrorists.\textsuperscript{16} In Africa,

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 3.

\textsuperscript{13} EUCOM director of strategy, policy, and assessments.


EUCOM’s TSCS includes military education and training (IMET) and offers a clearinghouse for nations involved in security programs to deconflict and avoid duplicating efforts.

The Tran-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a multi-agency effort to develop internal security forces of the Greater Sahara region. It grew out of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which provided equipment and training for forces from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. TSCTI expands on PSI, adding a number of Saharan nations, and increasing efforts to detect and respond to asymmetric threats migrating throughout the region, such as transnational terrorist organizations. The TSCTI is funded by the State Department (DoS), in its role as the lead federal agency for international counterterrorism, and EUCOM provides the TSCTI trainers.

EUCOM plans to develop a regional crisis response capability, working with both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The AU is developing a regional security force; and while it is gaining recognition for its positive contributions, it remains under funded and ill-equipped.

ECOWAS is another venue for EUCOM engagement in Africa. ECOWAS’ role has expanded from a sub-regional group focused on economic integration and development to


18 Wald, 4.


21 The AU is a pan-African IGO with goals ranging from accelerating socio-economic integration to defending member states’ sovereignty. AU forces currently operate in Darfur.

include a peacekeeping/peace enforcement role through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The group’s progress has been mixed: ECOWAS’ economic goals are stifled by bad governance, political instability, and the continuing weak economies of its members. ECOMOG, suffering from a dearth of funding and equipment, has struggled in peacekeeping roles; however, indications are the strength and validity of ECOWAS is improving. Recent funding from the AU, European Union, Japan and Canada, as well as EUCOM’s engagement with ECOWAS as a regional stability partner, may answer the two main challenges the organization faces: ineffective command and control (C2) and management, and insufficient funding and logistics.23 JIATF-TS should leverage both the AU and ECOWAS.

The DoS is the other main USG entity involved in the Trans-Sahel. In Africa, DoS performs its mission of providing a freer, more prosperous, and secure world through U.S. missions, typically embassies, which are manned by individuals from USG organizations including the Bureau of African Affairs, which advises the Secretary on sub-Saharan Africa; and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT).24 DoS provides overall foreign policy guidance to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),25 whose efforts include the West Africa Regional Program (WARP) with activities

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in economic development, health care, food security, agriculture, and peace and stability.\textsuperscript{26} Other DoS entities are involved in the region in ad hoc projects.

Statistical data about NGOs operating in Africa is imprecise at best. In 2001, the World Bank estimated between 6,000 and 30,000 NGOs were operating worldwide, including both internationally recognized efforts and smaller, national-level organizations.\textsuperscript{27} Although NGO involvement in the Trans-Sahel region is difficult to quantify accurately, a recent internet search by the author verified ongoing projects in the region by recognizable international NGOs such as OXFAM, Save the Children, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services. Local and regional NGO involvement is exemplified by the West African NGO Network, a website for national and regional Africa-based NGOs, which lists 130 organizations.\textsuperscript{28}

Regardless of the number of NGOs operating in the Trans-Sahel, their representation in the proposed JIATF is imperative. NGOs count on their interaction and support of the local populace for their security and access to beneficiaries. As such, they often have an accurate and timely grasp of the tactical level security situation in their operational areas.\textsuperscript{29} NGO personnel also bring cultural and language skills to bear. NGOs in general are recognized for


\textsuperscript{27} “Categorizing NGOs”, 1, 2 <http://docs.lib.duke.edu/igo/guides/ngo/define.htm>, [22 March 2006]. NGOs defined: World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development.” NGO (is) any non-profit organization which is independent from government. NGOs are typically value-based organizations which depend…on charitable donations and voluntary service.”


\textsuperscript{29} Telephone interview with Linda Poteat, 17 April 2006.
field-based development expertise, innovation and rapid adaptability, long-term, non-partisan commitments to an area, peoples, or situation, and cost effectiveness.30

A number of IGOs currently operate in the Trans-Sahel. In addition to a variety of United Nations subsidiary bodies, such as the World Food Programme and United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), the previously mentioned African Union and ECOWAS are both IGOs active in the region.

Finally, other nations are engaged in diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian interaction with the Trans-Sahel nations. Often, these engagements are a continuation of colonial relationships: in the Trans-Sahel, nations are identified as Francophone or Anglophone, depending on whether French or English is the principal language - a direct linkage with the nation’s colonial past.

**SIMILAR GOALS AND A NEW TASKING** National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, 7 December 2005, establishes the DoS as the lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts aimed at assisting governments in denying their territory to terrorists as safe havens. The NSPD provides an integration framework and tasks DoS and DoD to integrate their planning efforts; however, the NSPD, and the State Department’s response, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability, are geared towards nations in a continuum of conflict, not as persistent shaping instruments.31

DoD’s response, DoDD 3000.05, reinforces the import of Phase IV (stability) operations and the growing interaction between NGO and military operations arising from

30 Categorizing NGOs, 2.

the military’s increased focus on denying terrorists safe haven and defusing regional conflicts. The directive tasks high-level DoD entities, including geographic combatant commanders, with developing a framework in which the military more closely engages with other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector to conduct SSTR operations. IGOs and NGOs figure prominently in the directive, which suggests information sharing and training as integration opportunities, and even tours of duty for military personnel with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. It assumes SSTR operations will occur outside of crises and as a normal course of events.

Of significance for this paper, the NSPD and the new directive offer a foundation for experimenting in increased interagency operations outside of recognized Phase IV operations. Some experimentation is already underway on Africa’s eastern coast.

**TEMPLATES** U.S. Central Command stood up CJTF-HOA in 2003 to defeat transnational terrorist groups in the region by denying them safe havens, external support, and material assistance. The CJTF has a small standing headquarters (HQ) element in Djibouti, with representatives from all U.S. military branches, civilians, and coalition force personnel. The HQ provides the essential continuous presence in a critical region. Operational forces flesh out the CJTF through deployment, under the tactical control (TACon) of the CJTF commander. The Task Force also brings to bear organic assets and U.S. Central Command resources against terrorist groups, with a capability to “attack, destroy, and/or capture terrorists and support networks.”

However, the CJTF finds itself conducting its own humanitarian and development operations, providing security for USAID

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operations, and conducting a “waging peace” information operations campaign. CJTF-HOA is considered a success and should serve as a model for JIATF-TS.

Another template for the JIATF is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), a permanent advisory element of a combatant commander’s staff developing under the experimentation efforts of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The JIACG, through interagency collaboration, seeks to share information to facilitate civilian and military campaign planning for both strategic engagement and crisis planning. Comprised primarily of civilian personnel with extensive interagency experience, the JIACG builds relationships and enhances combatant commanders’ understanding of interagency operations during peacetime, which will reduce the “spin-up” time for both military and civilian planners during a crisis. USJFCOM began prototyping JIACG organizations in 2003-04 during both exercises and real world operations. Future plans include virtual collaboration to “mitigate manning challenges.” Although technology provides robust virtual communications, it typically falls short of physically collocated collaborative efforts.

Similar to the JIACG is another USJFCOM proposal, the Multinational Interagency Group, or MNIG. The MNIG, either military- or civilian-led, includes coalition forces, IGOs, and NGOs in a liaison construct to provide operational level expertise for crisis response. Flexible in representation and emphasizing reachback, the MNIG is designed with a future of complex natural disasters and asymmetric threats in mind. It was very recently

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Two organizational constructs are available for the Trans-Sahel region. As a Unified Command commander, Gen Jones may establish subordinate commands when authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has available several organizational constructs to employ in the Trans-Sahel. Two of these, the subunified command and the Joint Task Force, hold the most promise for this task. Both entities are appropriate when a significant joint force and close integration of efforts are required; the principal difference between the two is the mission’s objective or expected duration.

Although joint doctrine offers a choice of organizational constructs, for JIATF-TS, stewardship of resources and the impact of information dictate the JTF over the subunified command. U.S. military end strength is shrinking while it continues deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other operating areas, making the creation of yet another deployment tasking infeasible. The JTF footprint will likely be much smaller, which will reduce the mission’s physical plant, budgetary, and force protection requirements. If desired, the JTF can grow into a subunified or even a combatant command. Finally, in a region where defeating potential terrorists in a battle for hearts and minds is so critical, a small headquarters footprint with a larger operations footprint will be key to the mission’s success.

Figure 2 depicts a typical JTF employing a traditional staff structure. This familiar, task

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37 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2, (Washington, D.C.: 10 July 2001), V-1, V-9-10. UNAAF provides doctrine and policy for establishing a unified command, subunified command, and a Joint Task Force. Unified commands are established by the President. EUCOM, established on a geographical basis, is one of nine unified commands. Western and Sub-Saharan Africa fall into its AOR, as well as Europe and a portion of the Middle East.
organized approach would be easily recognized by other agencies interacting with JIATF-TS, and would simplify reachback to EUCOM’s similarly organized staff. However, this option minimizes the roles of other USG organizations, IGOs, and NGOs that must play a starring role in JIATF-TS. Additionally, merely staffing this model will create a sizeable military footprint, with concomitant manpower bills and force protection considerations.

Figure 2  Standard JTF Staff Organization

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Lt Col Michael G. Dana, U.S. Marine Corps, proposed an interagency-focused operations center model with his JIATF Fusion Center (Figure 3), a result of lessons learned during a nuclear incident exercise in which a JTF stood up to coordinate international relief efforts. Rather than a traditional military focus, it focused on humanitarian relief (HR) and consequence management (CM) C2 and planning.

Lt Col Dana noted drawbacks to a standard JTF structure for a HR/CM operation:

- Physical separation of JTF staff sections encourages stovepiped action.
- Centers spent too much time managing copious information flows made available through automated systems. Consequently, too little time was spent actually collaborating with others – information was managed, not shared or exploited.

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The commander is the planning center of gravity for the traditional, military operations-focused JTF. Key to HR/CM are rapid information exchange, unity of effort, and time management. His JIATF Fusion Center allows “decentralized, but coordinated, execution and participatory, yet guided, command.” Lt Col Dana’s model includes a physical layout which facilitates information connectivity; his operations procedures prescribe informality, he de-emphasizes briefings, and he leaves report-building to “third ring players.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

JIATF-TS (Figure 4) must maintain a physical presence in the Trans-Sahel, and its structure should resemble a hybrid of the standard JTF construct and the JIATF Fusion Center, leveraging the development and experimentation ongoing for the MNIG. Rather than review standard JTF organization and tasks, this section will highlight where the proposed JIATF differs from the norm. JIATF-TS retains a standard military alignment with respect to U.S. military or civilian personnel assigned, but with a condensed staff; the JIATF must exploit the EUCOM staff through robust reachback.

Recognizing the significance of information in both denying sanctuary to terrorists and strengthening U.S. relations with Trans-Sahel nations, the JIATF’s information bureau must be robust, and the JIATF-TS commander (JIATF/CC) should expect highly synergetic efforts as the norm for the task force’s public affairs and information operators. Target audiences include not only potential transnational terrorist organizations, but the Trans-Sahel nations, the worldwide Islamic community, and the remainder of the African continent. Special

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40 Michael G. Dana, “The JIATF Fusion Center: A Next-Generation Operations Cell for Consequence Management,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 2000): 38-40. Several of his considerations have great applicability to JIATF-TS: Fusion center members are decision makers, not staff officers. Reachback is key to reducing the overall JIATF footprint and avoiding duplication of effort. For CM, U.S. military contribution is usually planning, C4I, and logistics. State-of-the-art communications capabilities, such as web pages, video-teleconferencing, and common operating picture (COP) displays, must be user-friendly and joint/interagency capable. Maximize liaison officers.
Operations Forces are notionally represented as a Special Operations Coordination Element; this critical interface should be tailored appropriately. Additionally, the JIATF should emphasize the role of intelligence, particularly human intelligence, in its mission success. The goal is increased J-2/interagency interaction, which should lead to a robust J-2 cell.

In addition to absorbing and expanding on EUCOM’s Trans-Sahel IMET activities, JIATF-TS should engage in interagency adaptive planning for the region; additional benefit comes from the “laboratory” the JIATF provides for ongoing development of the MNIG, JIACG, and other concepts. Trans-Sahel humanitarian operations, both developmental and in response to crises, should be planned and led from the JIATF-TS.

The JIATF-TS/CC should foster a collaborative environment in his relationships with other Task Force players. The proposed JIATF-TS structure at first appears similar to the
realities of military operations after the Cold War; most military personnel encounter civilians, contractors, and members of IGOs/NGOs when deployed. It has elements in common with both the JIACG and the MNIG; the JIATF-TS is not revolutionary in construct; the differences are in its focus on shaping the environment, its open-ended existence, the level of proposed interfaces between Task Force entities, and the nature of cooperation between the military and those entities. Planned events and contingencies will require additional representation from other USG agencies, coalition partners, and other civilian and private organizations; the JIATF’s operations center layout and procedures should be fluid and responsive to the ebb and flow of these contingent members.

Representatives to JIATF-TS should, to the maximum extent, be decision makers vice note-takers; the nature of missions the task force is likely to undertake, as well as its streamlined Manning construct and emphasis on Reachback, require rapid planning and execution capability. Fundamentally, the Civil-Military Operations Center, traditionally located in the JTF’s Operations section, is elevated to the JIATF/CC’s command center, with the major entities interfacing at a correspondingly higher level. As DoD does not control DoS and other regional players, the JIATF-TS proposal hinges critically on reaching favorable agreements with those entities.

New, and key to this construct, is a DoS Trans-Sahel officer. The State Department should provide a senior DoS officer, chartered to work with individual missions and authorized to make decisions, within the JIATF, affecting the entire region. Typically, DoD personnel would collaborate with DoS personnel on a country-by-country basis, as the Ambassador and the U.S. mission, the fundamental DoS elements in the field, are organized on a country construct. With JIATF-TS’s regional focus, the commander needs to engage
with an empowered voter for Task Force operations, as opposed to routinely consulting with each mission individually. The intent is not for the DoS Trans-Sahel officer to usurp the authority of the Ambassador and the mission team; rather, the new DoS officer would consult with Ambassadors regarding issues specifically affecting their assigned countries, but retains some level of decision-making for regional plans and proposed operations. Senior representatives for USAID should be included on the staff.

Similarly, representatives from IGOs operating in the region should be encouraged to assign a senior representative, empowered to make decisions which will impact the region. Due to its prominence, United Nations IGOs are depicted separately in Figure 4.

NGOs present a challenge: most shun association with any military forces operating in the regions they service, as it may affect their key tenets of neutrality, independence, and impartiality. NGOs’ biggest concerns for association with the military are for the security of their personnel and continued access to their aid recipients. In crises where belligerents remain in the area, or when a crisis results from a natural disaster and not conflict, NGO personnel may be targeted if perceived to be collaborating with military forces.41

NGO consortia personnel offer a resolution for NGO representation in JIATF-TS. NGOs often belong to a consortium, which provide information sharing, combined political action, and collaboration, as well as establishing standards of behavior for member organizations.42 The overall effort is to increase the effectiveness of the members; however, as NGOs join


42 Linda Poteat, <LPoteat@INTERACTION.ORG>, “NGO Consortia,” [E-mail to Penny Heiniger <penny.heiniger@nwc.navy.mil>] 21 April 2006. Options for U.S.-based NGO consortia include the American Council for Voluntary International Action (INTERACTION), International Council on Voluntary Action, and Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. Internationally, leading consortia include: VOICE (the European version of InterAction), BOND, the UK’s consortium of development NGOs, Coordination Sud (French consortium of relief and development NGOs), and Australian Council for International Development.
voluntarily, the NGO consortia enforcement ability is limited. For JIATF-TS, staffing the NGO cell with consortia personnel eliminates NGO concerns of working directly with the military, yet allows the JIATF to leverage ongoing NGO operations, share important information, and collaborate on humanitarian opportunities in the Trans-Sahel.43

The nature of interaction between task force members is also new. CJTF-HOA personnel routinely engage in humanitarian operations, such as construction projects. This proposal moves that collaboration to a new level. U.S. military interactions with NGOs/IGOs in Africa have been “in addition to” or “in spite of” propositions: although the USG has provided security, medical and logistics capabilities during all manner of operations, we have not collaborated with in-place organizations to such a level that we bring only what is needed, no more, to exactly the right place, at the right time. The close, high-level collaboration suggested for JIATF-TS will allow all members to bring their best to bear for the region, without “stepping on the toes” of other regional players and without wasting limited resources. Members of the JIATF will move between “supported” and “supporting” roles as a situation demands. Additionally, early and regular interagency involvement in planning will establish relationships before a crisis ensues and reduce the often chaotic first response to a crisis. A few notional examples might illustrate these concepts.

EXECUTION This section considers three fictitious examples highlighting how JIATF-TS might operate.44 In the first scenario, several more years of drought ensue in the Trans-Sahel, further reducing crops and significantly diminishing the nomadic peoples’ herds. A


44 These examples are not derived from any EUCOM product or effort and are not meant to represent EUCOM’s complete engagement in the region.
region-wide famine ensues; news channels are blanketed with photos of emaciated Africans and long lines at food distribution points. EUCOM/CC directs JIATF-TS to present a course of action for the crisis. The JIATF, rather than reaching for a primarily military, or military-led, solution, would begin planning with the other task force members’ capabilities and limitations, information operations, and public affairs, in mind. The course of action would likely highlight transportation, communication, and logistics capabilities provided by U.S. and other willing military forces, in a “supporting” role, leaving food distribution, herd mortality mitigation, and internal migration relief to the IGO and NGO experts.

The next scenario builds upon the first. U.S. military forces are transporting aid personnel and supplies from ports and airfields to distribution centers. Due to security concerns, the dispersing NGOs have requested no additional military logistics footprint beyond the distribution center level. Suddenly, tensions flare between nomadic tribesmen and sustenance farmers as grazing lands become drier. Several NGOs report through the consortium representative they have been fired upon during food distribution in outlying areas. The consortium representative suggests the military provide security to the food convoys, and the NGOs agree. The NGOs provide details of the attacks to aid in security planning. The DoS liaison ensures country missions are kept current on the security concerns. Security forces from the Trans-Sahelian nations, trained under the IMET and TSCTI programs, begin accompanying the convoys, minimally augmented by U.S. and other military forces. Again, not revolutionary concepts, but the difference is in the collaboration done before the operation, not as it is being executed.

Finally, a coup d’etat topples one of the Trans-Sahelian governments, weakened by political fallout from the deteriorating humanitarian situation. In this instance, the JIATF-TS
may offer traditional military courses of action, while other task force players assume a supporting role and monitor the situation.

Essentially, the primacy of a task force entity’s role depends on the situation; a high level of collaboration will build trust and improve relations between players, enabling some to willingly “take a back seat” if the event falls out of their area of expertise. The benefits to creating an environment through a JIATF include better use of sparse resources, including the nation’s treasure, improved communication between task force members and between the JIATF/CC, as EUCOM’s representative, and the Trans-Saharan nations, and most significantly, a mitigation of terrorist operations in a region growing in strategic significance.

**CHALLENGES** JIATF-TS faces challenges with resources, relationships, and real estate. Manpower, forces and equipment are primary resource constraints for JIATF-TS. Sourcing forces for the JIATF-TS are a challenge; how will forces be provided, particularly if operations requiring military personnel are not constant or ongoing? The JIATF-TS/CC must secure EUCOM’s help in ensuring other task force entities contribute appropriately to the effort, particularly with regard to effective personnel choices.

NSPD 44, DoS’ S/CRS, and DoDD 3000.05 are great catalysts for increasing interagency planning and operations for stability and reconstruction. However, it is not binding on entities outside the USG. Although DoDD 3000.05 directs information sharing with IGOs and NGOs, and even recommends tours of duty for military personnel with IGOs and NGOs, the initiative is not meeting with enthusiasm. NGOs are aware of the DoD directive and are concerned it could politicize humanitarian aid. They are also, as noted previously, concerned
for their independence and safety.\textsuperscript{45} Although NSPD 44 makes DoS the lead for SSTR through the S/CRS, the proposal of a new regional State Department position for a EUCOM-led JTF could present a challenge as it requires additional contributions from a resource-challenged agency and cuts across normal, state-based delineations of responsibility.

EUCOM currently faces problems from a lack of interaction and interoperability between countries in the region; the task force will have a significant challenge addressing relationships with and between Trans-Sahelian neighbors, particularly among the security forces of those nations.

Basing the JIATF requires careful consideration. Establishing the smallest footprint possible to allow adequate force protection and mission accomplishment should be paramount. Suitable infrastructure, particularly communications capabilities, must be available to support the physical plant, which must be accessible to task force members while maximizing force protection. The host nation considerations are also lengthy; again, relationships between Trans-Sahel neighbors must be appraised, in addition to the stability of, and relationship with, the host government. Facilities for assigned or attached forces, training facilities (for IMET, etc.), and access for IGO/NGOs must also be scrutinized.

\textbf{CONCLUSIONS}

President Bush’s March 2006 NSS recognizes the national security threat posed by failing states. The NSS recognizes the impact of globalization, the significance of defusing regional conflicts, and the geo-strategic importance of the continent of Africa in terms of both human and energy security. The Unified Command Plan places responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa on the shoulders of the Commander, United States European Command.

\textsuperscript{45} Nellie Bristol, “Military Incursions into Aid Work Anger Humanitarian Groups,” \textit{TheLancet.com}, 367, 4 February 2006, ProQuest, Ann Arbor, MI, [3 April 2006].
Meeting the NSS goals in Africa requires innovation and imagination; fortunately, Gen Jones has the thrust of several recent directives behind him as he crafts a plan for Africa: NSPD 44, the DoS plan for S/CRS, and DoD’s Directive 3000.05 all offer EUCOM frameworks within which to contend with a challenging region. The Trans-Sahel is ripe for exploiting the alignment of the NSS and these supporting directives; human security issues, a degrading environment, and exploitation by transnational terrorists make a compelling case for EUCOM’s persistent engagement in the region. Gen Jones should reevaluate his transformation strategy to include a continuous venue for Phase 0 shaping operations: a Joint Interagency Task Force for the Trans-Sahel. JIATF-TS will provide a long-standing USG presence in the region, encouraging relationship-building and leveraging the capabilities of existent organizations before they must collectively respond to a crisis.
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