



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**EMERGING THREAT TO AMERICA: NON-STATE
ENTITIES FIGHTING FOURTH GENERATION
WARFARE IN MEXICO**

by

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September 2010

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 2010	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Emerging Threat to America: Non-State Entities Fighting Fourth Generation Warfare in Mexico		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Philip Treglia		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number: N/A.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The 2007 Merida Initiative provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against the Pack Virus in Mexico. The new American-Mexican policy of combating the drug cartels, transnational gangs, and paramilitaries is a first step in creating a real U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) theater defense. The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy is a supporting effort to the U.S. defense strategy, the Mexican strategy to counter the violence, and national policies of the U.S. government. The USNORTHCOM-Mexico strategy emphasizes the U.S. and Mexican military role in collaborating to create a solid institution to be utilized in support of the Mexican government. The partnering of the two militaries creates the conditions for increasing Mexican capabilities in eight functional areas. An emphasis on intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), Mexican Special Forces, and consequence management operations are factors that would contribute to the transformation of the Mexican military into a counter insurgency force. A list of recommendations for policy makers and military leaders is provided to strengthen the gains created by the Merida Initiative. The increase in capabilities and credibility of the Mexican military benefits both the economic and security policies of Mexico and the U.S.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Mexico, fourth generation warfare (4FG), Pack Virus, USNORTHCOM strategy, spillover violence, non-state entities, Plan Columbia, U.S.-Mexico strategy, Merida Initiative, drug cartels/ drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 125
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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**EMERGING THREAT TO AMERICA: NON-STATE ENTITIES FIGHTING
FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN MEXICO**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The 2007 Merida Initiative provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against the Pack Virus in Mexico. The new American-Mexican policy of combating the drug cartels, transnational gangs, and paramilitaries is a first step in creating a real U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) theater defense.

The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy is a supporting effort to the U.S. defense strategy, the Mexican strategy to counter the violence, and national policies of the U.S. government. The USNORTHCOM-Mexico strategy emphasizes the U.S. and Mexican military role in collaborating to create a solid institution to be utilized in support of the Mexican government.

The partnering of the two militaries creates the conditions for increasing Mexican capabilities in eight functional areas. An emphasis on intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), Mexican Special Forces, and consequence management operations are factors that would contribute to the transformation of the Mexican military into a counter insurgency force.

A list of recommendations for policy makers and military leaders is provided to strengthen the gains created by the Merida Initiative. The increase in capabilities and credibility of the Mexican military benefits both the economic and security policies of Mexico and the U.S.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4 GW	Fourth generation warfare
ATF	Alcohol Tobacco Firearms
C4I	Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CBRNE	Chemical biological radioactive nuclear explosive (high yield)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CM	Consequence management
CNN	Cable news network
COIN	Counterinsurgency operations
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DIME-FIL	Diplomacy information military financial intelligence law enforcement
DoD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State—State Department
DOT	Treasury Department
DOTMILPF	Doctrine, organization, training and education, material solutions, intelligence personnel, facilities
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
DTO	Drug trafficking organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GOM	Government of Mexico
IC	Intelligence Community
IO	Information operations
ISR	Intelligence surveillance reconnaissance
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LA	Los Angeles
LE	Law enforcement
MS -13	Mara Salvatrucha

MTT	Mobile training team
MX	Mexico
NC/SJFHQ	Northern Command/Standing Joint Force Headquarters
NCO	Non-Commission Officer
NVG	Night vision goggles
PA	Public Affairs
Pack Virus	Non-state entities fighting 4GW in Mexico
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
SEDENA	Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional aka Mexican Army
SEMAR	Secretaria de Marina aka Mexican Navy
SOF	Special Operations Forces—Green Berets
SSP	Secretariat of Public Security or Secretaria de Seguridad Publica
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
TTP	Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II
Zetas	Los Zetas—Paramilitary Group for Hire by Drug Cartels

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Non-state actors or more specifically, the Pack Virus¹ are causing violence and a disruption to security and services within the U.S. due to the fourth generation warfare (4GW) occurring in Mexico. The U.S. does not have a future strategy to deal with the non-state entities engaged in fourth generation warfare within Mexico. Any U.S. strategy involving Mexico must take into account the cultural sensitivities of the Mexican people, government, and military. Specifically, the Department of Defense (DoD) through the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) must provide a strategy to support the Mexican military in dealing with this emerging threat to U.S. security.

Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is not a fight for control of the government or political boundaries, but for control of areas, terrain, and trade routes within Mexico, where laws will not be enforced. Max Manwaring describes 4GW as:

Fourth generation warfare is a gray area phenomenon where war, crime, and peace blur manifesting themselves as threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors (gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, pirates, criminal enterprises) and non-governmental processes and organizations. (2003)

The numerous drug cartels/drug trade organizations (DTOs), third generation gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), and the Zetas are all non-state organizations that are causing violence and instability though out Mexico and within areas of the U.S., specifically along the U.S./Mexico border and major metropolitan areas to include: Phoenix, Arizona; Atlanta, Georgia; and Northern Virginia (Caldwell, 2009). These non-state groups are a hybrid threat earning the term Pack Virus for its similarity to a pack of

¹ Pack Virus is my non-doctrinal term for non-state entities engaged in fourth generation warfare in Mexico due the similarities between the actions of a virus or a pack of wolves as they feed on a part of the system in order to survive.

wolves and a virus. Hybrid threats from non-state entities or groups that are interacting in the “grey area” between military and criminal acts and using 4GW tactics to achieve goals will be referred to as Pack Virus for this thesis.

The 4GW fight is not only about non-state actors of drug cartels/drug trade organizations (DTOs), transnational gangs, and international thugs for hire; it is rooted in the government of Mexico (GOM) corruption of police, prisons, local officials, and the justice system. The Pack Virus continues to exploit and increase the corruption in Mexico in order to gain and maintain core areas of operations. According to Ralph Reyes, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) chief for Mexico and Central America, the Zetas are “responsible for the majority of the homicides, the narcotic-related homicides, the beheadings, the kidnappings, the extortions that take place in Mexico” (Ware, 2009). These groups are fighting fourth generation warfare against the governments of Mexico and America in order to expand the control of illegal trafficking operations including: smuggling of drugs, weapons, money and people. These violent non-state groups are fighting among themselves and against the Mexican government for control of illegal trafficking routes along the Mexican and U.S. border. At times, forming partnerships with a common goal to disrupt law enforcement activities, these groups have the capability to overwhelm local law enforcement. Ciudad Juarez offers a horrific example of local police being corrupted and murdered by the Pack Virus in Mexico (Padgett, 2009). To limit the operational capacity of these organizations to conduct illegal trafficking operations and the flow of money, drugs, people, and weapons across the international border, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will have to confront these non-state entities within America, through the U.S. Border Patrol, local law enforcement, and with the support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In addition to DHS, DoD through USNORTHCOM, must provide a strategy to deal with the violence in Mexico.

DoD can offer unique capabilities to enhance law enforcement and homeland security in the fight against the Pack Virus. Besides increased intelligence gathering, unique equipment and robust training of law enforcement and military in Mexico and the U.S., DoD can help support the 2007 Merida Initiative. Utilizing the developing

partnerships with the Mexican military can create opportunities for DoD to provide additional support to the 2007 Merida Initiative (Renuart, 2010). If the Pack Virus can be destroyed and disrupted in Mexico, this will weaken related groups within America. Utilizing DoD to strengthen Mexico's military in the 4GW fight is within the National Defense Strategy and the 2007 Merida Initiative. The National Defense Strategy of America is about defending America against threats before they occur in the United States by having an "active layered defense" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). DoD is part of the solution to stopping the operational capabilities of the Pack Virus in Mexico and in America.

B. BACKGROUND

Prior to 9/11 there was neither the U.S. political will nor interest from the Mexican government to cooperate with America's war on drugs nor focus on North American Security (Renuart, 2010). After 9/11, America began to increase the awareness for support and stability in Mexico, but few resources were dedicated to supporting Mexico. With the concerns over illegal immigrants and the porous southern border, America's post-9/11 strategic plans included strengthening Mexico's ability to stop the Pack Virus's free reign of power over select regions within Mexico. Through corruption, intimidation, and violence the Pack Virus has become embedded into towns and cities, as is the case in Juarez, Mexico. The resources dedicated to supporting the Mexican government efforts to defeat the Pack Virus that controlled the southern avenues of approaches into America, would not be increased until late 2007. Prior to the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. military provided almost no assistance to the Mexico military. On average the U.S. military budget for travel, officer exchanges, and training with Mexico averaged about three million U.S. dollars (USD) per year (Milardo, 2009).²

The 2007 Merida Initiative, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, provided a framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against the drug cartels, gangs, and paramilitary units (Pack Virus) operating in

² Mark Milardo is the senior USNORTHCOM planner for Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) for Mexico. During planning meetings in June 2009 for possible deployment to Mexico he provided insight into Mexico. This information is from the planning and working papers from the meeting. (Milardo, 2009)

Mexico (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). The 2007 Merida Initiative was intended to increase law enforcement, intelligence, and training between the government of Mexico (GOM) and the U.S. In addition, new equipment and aircraft for the Mexican military would be used to fight drug trafficking organizations and “other transnational organized crime” (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2008). Although this provides for immediate needs, there is a lack of future strategic guidance from the Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense in regard to the state of Mexico.

A search of the classified and unclassified archives at USNORTHCOM in March and April 2009 did not produce anything more than informational papers, press releases, and out-of-date plans from Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in regards to policies for dealing with Mexico.³ In the case of Mexico, only the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) papers were used as reference. The DOS issues guidance for DoD in regards to dealing with the military. For example, the DOS guidance is used in development of the theater engagement plan for other nations to include: Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In these cases, DOS is the lead federal agency in providing guidance to DoD, DHS, and other federal agencies regarding policy and interaction with other nation states. Presidential directives and executive orders along with the DOS guidance enables DoD to prepare a strategy for dealing with other nations states. Yet, in the case of Mexico, the 2007 Merida Initiative is used as the foundation for providing guidance to DoD. The DOS has failed to provide guidance and define metrics of performance or clear strategic goals as it pertains to Merida (Government Accounting Office [GAO], 2010).

As of 1 July 2010, Mexico has not declared a “state of emergency,” though it has deployed the military to fight the Pack Virus. By formally declaring a state of emergency, Mexico would create legal conditions for marital law and have legal ramifications that are outside the framework of this research. The GOM continues to use the military as police as it battles non-state entities within its borders. In June 2009, the *Los Angeles Times* reported over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police were deployed

³ Mexico was previously in SOUTHCOM area of responsibility until the creation of USNORTHCOM in 2002.

in the “war against traffickers.” In addition, “7,000 people have been killed in drug-related violence in the last 15 months, according to government and media estimates” (Ellingwood, 2009). Yet, by November 2009, news sources were increasing the estimates to 16,000 to 18,000 killed due to the drug violence within the last three years with over 6,290 killed in 2008 (Associated Press, 2010; Booth, 2009). In Juarez, the sister city of El Paso, Texas, there were approx seven killings a day or 2000 deaths since the start of the 2009 year (MSNBC, 2009; Stevenson, 2009). Juarez is about the size of Dallas, Texas with a population estimate between one and 1.5 million (Olsen, 2009). There are reports of estimates of up to a third of the residents have fled the violence (Kearney, 2009). Using the high end of population, 1.5 million, this is murder rate of 133 per 100,000 inhabitants. The murder rate for Dallas (1.3 million) is 13/ 100000 and for El Paso, one of the safest cities in America, had only 17 murders in all of 2008 or a 2/100000 rate (Olsen, 2009). Compared to living in the sister city of El Paso, it is 67 times more likely for a resident to be killed in Juarez (Olsen, 2009).

The emergence of the drug cartels with criminal elements of international gangs (MS-13) and hired thugs (los Zetas) has created a synergetic network of money, violence, and international reach that effects not only Mexico but also other areas of Central America and North America. To combat the increase in violence in Central America, the 2007 Merida Initiative included funding for other countries besides Mexico (Roberts & Walser, 2007). As of 2009, the Zetas are considered to be their own DTO by U.S. law enforcement; DTOs regularly contracted enforcement, transportation, and security operations out to other organizations and the Zetas were regularly hired by the Gulf Cartel for security and assassination operations. (Vulliamy, 2009). The Zetas, defectors from the Mexican military, were at one time hired mercenaries that were employed by the Gulf Cartel as an “armed wing” of the organization. In addition to paramilitary groups, gangs with local knowledge are hired by the Pack Virus to protect and transport illegal items across the international border. As the Zetas demonstrate, in the 4GW the Pack Virus has adapted and become more than just hired thugs. These groups partake in criminal activity of all kinds in order to increase their power and influence. In 2006, Mili

noted that “Traditional criminal activities like drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, and smuggling are rapidly becoming the main source of revenues for both terrorist groups and gangs” (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007).

The war in Mexico has created “spill over” into America according to most media reports. Since the 2007 Merida Initiative, interference of standard operations within the United States has occurred. More resources have been sent in the form of DHS personnel, equipment, and money to increase security along the southern border because of fears of “spillover” (MSNBC, 2009). Yet, there is a debate whether or not “spillover” violence can be quantified and what defines “spillover” (Longmire, 2009; Sarukhan, 2010). The spillover from the Mexican drug war cannot be identified due to reporting factors and definition of spillover.

Crime statistics are not categorized by drug offense, but by different metrics. In the case of FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) statistics, these are a combination of reported crimes by over 17000 police agencies (FBI, 2010). The FBI Web site discusses the problems with databases, collection, and provides a workbook to offer definitions and help with providing the correct data to the FBI. However, these are “reported crimes,” and most of the crimes committed by non-state entities in America, are intimidation, corruption, extortion, and kidnapping of illegal aliens or rivals. As Dr. Bruneau states, “One can begin to see how third generation gangs, drug cartels, and terrorist groups begin to blend together leveraging their skills and connections in trafficking people, weapons, and drugs across borders, particularly those of the United States” (Bruneau, 2005). These types of crimes are under reported or not reported at all in the UCR (Longmire, 2009). In addition, the murder of U.S. government employees in Mexico would not make it into the UCR. The murder of Lesley Enriquez and her husband did not happen in America, so this incident would not be part of the FBI statistics, but it does fit the definition of spill over violence (CNN, 2010). Additional research on kidnappings and murder statistics, which are reported in the U.S., could offer additional information on what crimes are being committed in the U.S. by the Pack Virus.

1. Costs of the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels

Mexico is the third largest trading partner for the United States with approximately \$385 billion trade last year (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). According to the DOS Web site, bilateral trade reached over one billion dollars a day with Mexico (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). Comparatively, all 27 countries of the European Union combined in a year would only equal a month of U.S. trade with Mexico (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). A more secure and less corrupt Mexico would conceivably increase tourism, trade, and travel between the two countries. In Juarez, Mexico, the business community has already begun to ask for more help from both the U.S. and Mexican governments. In fact, it has asked for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops to help stop the violence (Stevenson, 2009). The proximity to the U.S. border creates an international business area where 18 percent of all trade between Mexico and U.S. takes place (Chamberlin, 2007). In addition to legal commerce, the lucrative illegal smuggling trafficking routes cause Juarez to be a contested area between the GOM and the non-state entities fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes. Gun battles between law enforcement and DTOs and non-state entities have caused thousands of deaths. The gun battles are only part of the violence that has become part of the daily life. Kidnappings, extortion, intimidation, and assassinations are common occurrences within Juarez. The drug violence is bad for business. The statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau depict a downward trend in the amount of revenue for Mexico from 2007 till February 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

A vast amount of human capital is being expended to fight these organizations. Human resources of 45,000 Mexican troops, DHS force increases along the southern border, and Joint Task Force-North for DoD are all focused on supporting law enforcement to fight these non-state entities (Ellingwood, 2009; MSNBC, 2009). These resources target the illegal trafficking operations, including: drugs, weapons, money, and people exiting and entering the United States.

Loss of control within regions of Mexico has already occurred. Retired U.S. Army General, McCaffrey and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

Admiral Hayden commented to *USA Today* that Mexico "...ranked with Iran as a top security risk to the United States" (Hawley, 2009). The dislocation of Mexicans from areas has not occurred yet, but the concern is that the U.S. would have to deal with thousands of displaced persons if the violence escalated out of control. As the fourth generation fight continues, areas of Mexico are not being controlled by any level of Mexican government. Yet, the Pack Virus does not control areas with a shadow government or pose a political challenge to the Mexican government. Instead, areas within Mexico are controlled by the Pack Virus through fear and intimidation after one group establishes domination of the area over rival non-state entities (Vulliamy, 2009). It is in the absence of effective GOM control that the Pack Virus operates unmolested and fights for control of regions from other Pack Virus groups.

The spread and growth of the 4GW phenomenon into America could cause areas to be ungoverned and corrupted by the influence of drug profits and violence. In June 2010, reports of areas along the U.S. border were considered to be off limits to U.S. persons as it was deemed to be dangerous to enter due to the threat from the Pack Virus (Miller, 2010). Currently, the violence has spread beyond the southern border states. Police in Atlanta and Phoenix, both major drug transit points, have attributed a wave of kidnappings on the spreading turf war among the cartels. Drug-related violence has become ever more brazen and frequent, including a rise in attacks on Border Patrol agents (Hawley, 2009). In addition, the cartels are targeting people within America. Los Zetas has sent young boys (13 years old) to assassinate rivals in the United States (Ware, 2009).

The violence of Mexico's fourth generation warfare fight is resulting in kidnappings, death, and violence in cities within America, where the Pack Virus has already infiltrated into and is conducting operations. Alicia Caldwell writes in the *Huffington Post*, "U.S. authorities are reporting a spike in killings, kidnappings and home invasions connected to Mexico's murderous cartels. And to some policymakers' surprise, much of the violence is happening not in towns along the border, where it was assumed the bloodshed would spread, but a considerable distance away, in places such as Phoenix and Atlanta" (2009). Unlike terrorist organizations, which are motivated and at times

constrained by political or ideological objectives, these non-state entities have no limitations about utilizing violence to achieve goals in Mexico. Yet, within America, the DTO's use a "bad for business" philosophy, which seems to constrain the violence (Sanchez, March 2010).⁴ Lawmakers and policy advisors must correctly define this emerging threat, which these non-state organizations are to the security within the United States. These non-state organizations are more than just organized crime or criminal gangs, yet not defined as international terrorist organizations. Labeled as narco terrorist groups, Pack Virus, or transnational drug gangs these groups are clearly blurring the lines between criminal action and combat operations.

In the *Armed Forces Journal*, Hoffman defines a hybrid threat as "Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives" (Hoffman, 2009). The non-state organization destroys part of the host in order to thrive and reproduce, similar to virus as it kills and spreads throughout the body. In addition, these non-state entities are similar to a pack of wolves which feed on the weak and reproduce until killed through hunting or the environment change is too hostile to survive. The Pack Virus has many common characteristics: transnational, networks of people, no limitations in utilizing violence to achieve goals, and a threat to U.S. security.

2. Conclusion

Studying this 4GW battle and assisting Mexico in its fight will enable America to have a better understanding of the Pack Virus threat. In addition, disruption and defeat of the Pack Virus in Mexico will provide a more secure international border between Mexico and the U.S. A proactive approach to defeating non-state entities within Mexico would enable the entire spectrum of U.S. national power to focus on the security threat prior to greater escalation of violence within the U.S. In addition, until the Pack Virus is

⁴ LtCol Sanchez is the senior JAG officer at JTF [spell out first time use]North and advises the commander of JTF North on legal policy and constraints. During a USNORTHCOM planning conference in February 2010, LtCol Sanchez explained the legality of intelligence oversight, targeting of DTOs, and the modus operands of the DTOs operating in America (Sanchez, March 2010).

defeated within Mexico, DoD will have to refocus on the southern international border and increase support to the Mexican military. Focusing on the problem in Mexico will mean utilizing indirect approach to support the Mexican military. As Admiral Olson, the commanding officer of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) states, “The indirect approach includes enabling partners to combat violent extremist organizations by contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of technology, and operational support” (Olson, 2009). Yet, “military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace” (U.S. Army, 2008). A whole-of-government approach and strategy is needed to defeat the Pack Virus.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Questions

- How can the U.S. influence the warfare in Mexico so the Mexican government can prevail?
- What role can DoD play to help the Mexican military win this fight?

2. Secondary Questions

- Will examining Plan Colombia as a case study lead to insight to help deal with the Pack Virus in Mexico?
 - How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative for the military?
 - Did the level of security within the state [of? Columbia? State.]increase or decrease after the U.S. involvement?
 - How long did the increase in violence last?
 - Did the non-state entities increase or decrease operational capacity?
- Does the DoD strategy support the Mexican strategy of countering fourth generation warfare?

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis will create awareness and a better understanding of the emerging threat of non-state entities, specifically the Pack Virus, in the security of the U.S. From

this awareness, USNORTHCOM can develop a U.S. military strategy to support the 2007 Merida Initiative and make recommendations for future U.S. military aid to Mexico.

In addition, the USNORTHCOM strategy can be used in future development of homeland security and defense operation plans. The development of operation plans requires the input from interagency partners including: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, law enforcement, Department of Treasury, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Therefore, the awareness and knowledge of the threat from the Pack Virus will benefit many of the partners in homeland security.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Non-state actors are influencing more regions throughout the world through violence and intimidation. In Mexico, these entities are creating violence, which is challenging the sovereignty and security of regions throughout Mexico, but more importantly along the U.S./Mexico border. As these groups interact with and against each other and the Mexican military, examples of fourth generation warfare (4GW) emerge. What is 4GW and what are the capabilities of these groups engaged in 4GW as it pertains to the security of the United States? After identifying non-state actors, 4GW, and the problems caused by these groups, then possible solutions to these dynamic and growing threats will be discussed.

A. HISTORY AND DEFINITIONS OF FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

War has evolved from tribes fighting each other for resources to mobile lines of men opposing each other funded by kings and governments. Through technology and innovation, war has evolved into modern networks of people (non-state actors) exploiting others in order to make gains with disregard for the lives of those not within their networks. This is a brief summary of the evolution of warfare from first generation to fourth generation warfare.

Max Manwaring describes and defines 4GW as:

...a gray area phenomenon where war, crime, and peace blur manifesting themselves as threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors (gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, pirates, criminal enterprises) and non-governmental processes and organizations. (2003)

Though the U.S. military has not defined fourth generation warfare in any doctrinal publication as to date, the concept has been discussed for over 20 years (U.S. Army, 2008).

Author William Lind champions the 4GW concept in his blog, *On War*, in numerous books, and articles. Writing and blogging about his hypothesis on the

evolution of warfare, Lind bases his thinking on the foundation of Martin van Creveld and Boyd writings (2004). Lind (2004) portrays all current fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of 4GW. According to Lind, nation states have lost the “monopoly on war and...many different entities, not states, are fighting war” (2004). Fourth generation warfare redefines the conventional definition of who the enemy is and what the enemy fights for. The American Army has only categorized this type of fighting as “irregular warfare” in the doctrine to adapt to this emerging threat (Department of the Army , 2006(b)).

Martin van Creveld (1991) has also written about 4GW and has written numerous books on the subject of low intensity conflict. What is important about van Creveld’s work is that in 1991, it gave an alternative thinking to Clausewitz on why nations fight war. Clausewitz wrote *On War* and explained that war is an extension of politics by nation states (1873). Van Creveld hypothesizes that war is more than an extension of politics (1991). Van Creveld writes that fourth generation warfare has changed the who, why, and how warfare is fought (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007). Thus, in 4GW the Pack Virus will not fight to conquer Mexico with armies in order to impose their will on the people of Mexico. Instead, it will employ corruption of politicians, threats and intimidation of the populace, and destruction of law enforcement to carve out geographical areas within Mexico to further its illegal trafficking operations. Within the areas that the Pack Virus controls, the GOM is unable to establish the rule of law or provide security to the people of the region. Law enforcement and the Mexican judicial system is ineffective at containing the Pack Virus within the areas where the Pack Virus has operational control.

Thomas X. Hammes and Lind (2004) write about 4GW occurring on the modern battlefield. They agree that the small non-state group can counter the nation state by utilizing the advantages of insurgent warfare and use of asymmetric tactics (Hammes, 2004). Yet, Hammes concentrates more non-state entities that are fighting proxy wars for other states such as Hezbollah being supported by Iran. Hammes uses the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan as his basis of 4GW as a concept vice an evolution of warfare as Lind advocates.

Similar to the definition of terrorism, there are numerous definitions of fourth generation warfare. The weakness in using 4GW model to explain the violence in Mexico is that, 4GW is a “concept” not a recognized generation of warfare by DoD. At times, 4GW has been a model where a nation state (Iran) controls the non-state actor as in the 2006 Hezbollah/Israel War according to Hammes. At other times, the Mexican drug war is considered fifth generation warfare, since there is not a nation state supporting the conflict and there are no political objectives to be gained by the Pack Virus (Moreno, 2010).⁵ Even Admiral Olson, the commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in a recent speech described warfare of today without using the term fourth generation warfare, when he said, “Regardless of the name we use—special warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, irregular warfare, hybrid warfare—one thing is certain: it characterizes the nature of warfare we are experiencing, and will experience, for the foreseeable future” (2009(b)).

B. HOW 4GW GROUPS OPERATE

Pack Virus have many characteristics in common with terrorist organizations. These characteristics include: transnational, networks of people, no limitations in utilizing violence to achieve goals, and threats to American security. Pack Virus groups operating in Mexico include: drug cartels or drug trade organizations (DTOs), “3rd Generation Street Gangs” (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007) and paramilitary organizations like the Zetas. These groups are similar to terrorist organizations, but they do not want political change of the countries in which they operate, therefore these groups do not fit the Hoffman (2009) definition of hybrid threats. Examples of transnational terrorist groups and other hybrid threats are Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which do desire political change. Nor does the Pack Virus fight as a proxy for other states such as Hezbollah does for Iran.

At times, the Zetas and the DTOs control areas where the Mexican government is “powerless to intervene” (Brands, 2009). This causes the disruption of security and lack

⁵ Colonel Moreno is the senior USNORTHCOM military expert on Mexico. After the Dr Grayson lectures at USNORTHCOM in February 2010, he continued to talk with other attendees about Mexico issues and possible solutions (Moreno, 2010).

of control of sovereign areas within a state. The state, therefore, loses twice in the inability to control regions and institute the rule of law within their boundaries. The loss of security and sovereignty by the government is an example of fourth generation warfare concept being employed by the Zetas. The Pack Virus employs tactics of an insurgency in areas to gain influence on the people.

The Pack Virus controls areas or safe havens where the state is powerless to intervene. It is in these areas where the violence is less apparent. Where there are numerous incidents of violence the Pack Virus is actively fighting 4GW. Utilizing intimidation, corruption, murder, and criminal acts to influence the populace and the GOM, the non-state entities operate in core areas without influence from the state of Mexico. The present warfare in Juarez, Mexico contrasts with the “peaceful” cities of Ciudad Acuña and Piedras Negras controlled by the Zetas who demonstrate 4GW tactics (Vulliamy, 2009). Within the cities of Acuna and Piedra Negras where one Pack Virus (the Zetas) has effective control of these limited geographic areas, the GOM is unable to provide effective security. The Pack Virus controls the local population through intimidation and has effectively defeated any rivals for control of the area, therefore the level of violence is not as high as other contested areas. For example in Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana, different groups are fighting for control of the illegal trafficking corridors and logistical staging areas, thus the level of violence is much higher.

C MILITARY VS. LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDING TO 4GW

Frank G. Hoffman, who uses the term “hybrid threat” to describe the use of violence by non-state entities (Hoffman, 2007). As Hoffman writes, “institutions are slow to adjust” and that this new form of warfare is already occurring. In addition, he concludes that it is a “fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular warfare, and terrorism, as well as subversion” (Hoffman, 2007). Hoffman describes continuum of violence from criminal acts to acts of war. This blurring of the lines is where the violent acts of these non-state entities act in the grey area between war-like

violence and criminal behavior. Figure 1 illustrates the continuum of war to criminal act as depicted by USNORTHCOM. As stated in the NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept:

In the middle is a “seam” of ambiguity where threats are neither clearly military wartime threats (requiring a military [DoD] response capability) nor clearly criminal type threats (requiring a non-military response capability from DHS, DOJ, or other agency). (USNORTHCOM, 2007)




Figure 1. Threats to the Homeland: Grey Area and Operational Seam of the Pack Virus (From U.S. Northern Command, 2007)

It is within this continuum of violence in the area between war and criminal acts where the Pack Virus operates, blurring the lines between law enforcement and military force response. It is in the red and grey areas that the U.S. military must use strategy to strengthen the Mexican military in the fight against the Pack Virus. Within this area, the U.S. military will be in support of the policies set by DOS within the framework of the 2007 Merida Initiative. In this supported/supporting relationship between DOS and DoD,

the U.S. military is in a supporting role to DOS. More importantly, through the 2007 Merida Initiative, DoD can provide indirect support to the Mexican military in order to support efforts to fight the Pack Virus.

D. USE OF 4GW TACTICS BY GANGS IN THE U.S.

A basic understanding of what 4GW is and who fights 4GW is important to understanding possible solutions. Until 2005, there was not much written about the subject of criminal gangs within America fighting 4GW against American society. Perhaps influenced by the FBI's numerous national level operations against MS-13 (Maras) in order to disrupt its activities, various authors began writing about MS-13 operations in America.

Sullivan and Wilson wrote extensively about third generation gangs and terrorism (2007). Both the Zetas and MS-13 are considered to be third generation gangs according to Sullivan (2008). Sullivan offers a description of the operations of third generation gangs and notes that all gangs are not identical in structure or organization. For example, while the Zetas are a trained, paramilitary organization with a command structure, the Maras are a large affiliation of poor gang members throughout numerous countries. Sullivan states that third generation gangs, like the Zetas and Maras, "reside at the intersection between crime and war" (2008). His documentation of the small non-state entities controlling neighborhoods, towns, and regions across Central America are examples of groups waging 4GW against governments which are weaker than Mexico or the United States. Sullivan and Wilson base their writings on van Creveld (1991) in *On Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism*. They describe how some gangs operate in the grey area between criminal activities and insurgency utilizing terrorism, drug trafficking, and violence to control territory (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007).

Sullivan and Bruneau (2005) write about the emergence of criminal elements and non-state actors that have the potential and the capability to destroy the societies in which they operate. Bruneau describes how non-state entities can "leverage skills" to conduct illegal trafficking operations into America from Mexico (2005). Bruneau describes the

current state of affairs in Mexico prior to the 2007 Merida Initiative. His observation of the different groups working together in order to benefit from the illegal trafficking operations was ominous and valid (Kimery, 2009).

Sullivan and Wilson (2007), in *On Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism*, discuss the interactions of third generation street gangs with the evolving 4GW model. Throughout this book, the authors describe with details the events of gangs and paramilitaries of Central America—similar to the tactics of Mexican 4GW occurring presently. As in Central America, corruption of local officials and violence resembling terrorist activities are tactics used by the Pack Virus in Mexico. With gangs and Pack Virus currently operating in America and Mexico, there is foreshadowing of what is to come in regards to America's security.

Sullivan and Wilson (2007) expand on the ideas about “Netwar” by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 1996). Arquilla and Ronfeldt write asymmetric warfare of small groups can counter “bureaucratic-nation-state actors” by utilizing networks (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 1996). This is the current state of affairs that is occurring in Mexico, where the government of Mexico (GOM) is slow to react and has not adapted to the dynamic conditions presented by the Pack Virus, which operates as a network. The Pack Virus is more than a network of drug trafficking organizations; it has demonstrated the ability to become more efficient at killing, corrupting, intimidating, and illegal trafficking operations due to the deadly competition and their quest for profits.

E. MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO THE 4GW

As stated in the USNORTHCOM Joint concept paper, DoD will be a supporting element to the other tenants of national power following the DOS strategy for Mexico (USNORTHCOM, 2007). There is no military only solution to defeating the Pack Virus. Neither set of authors, Sullivan and Bruneau nor Arquilla and Rondfeldt (1996) have documented possible solutions to confront the emerging threat from these organizations through the use of military means alone. Arquilla and Rondfeldt offer a solution of countering a terrorist network by using another network to defeat it, instead of a large

traditional military force. This is similar to the military saying, that the best weapon platform to engage and successfully defeat an enemy sniper is another sniper team.

While Lind (2007) offers politically incorrect solutions to winning 4GW in his blogs, Richards (n.d.), in a paper presented to first responders, offers little insights into “winning” with the military. Lind writes of military options, including total war against insurgents and employing flame weapons to crush the will of the people, as did Genghis Kahn in the thirteenth century. Richards argues that winning fourth generation warfare is not the same as winning against terrorists. He writes that winning against a 4GW adversary requires patience and longevity until the non-state actors are more criminal vice war like (Richards, n.d.). Thus, Richards view is that once the behavior of the Pack Virus gravitates only into the criminal area, it becomes a law enforcement issue and there is no need for the military. Lind differs on his opinions on how to win 4GW, such as by utilizing strong border controls and deporting illegal aliens.

The military strategy needed to “win” against a 4GW opponent is most similar to a counter-insurgency operations (COIN) strategy. Though each conflict demands a different strategy to defeat the specific threat there are many techniques, tactics, and procedures that can be used against a Pack Virus which is similar to fighting an insurgency (U.S. Army, 2008). As in a COIN operation, the Pack Virus must be separated from the local populace in order for the state to defeat it.

The *2009 Counterinsurgency Guide* offers “whole-of-government approaches” to develop solutions to counter insurgencies, but these can be applied to non-state actors as well (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010). The guide offers specific guidance to separate parts of the U.S. government and how to work in collaboration to mitigate insurgencies. Though designed from practical experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, these approaches are most similar to operations which could affect the outcome in the Mexican fight. More importantly, it offers areas where the U.S. military can support other parts of DIME-FIL⁶ and the 2007 Merida Initiative.

⁶ Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) are means to achieve national objectives. Each are the individual segments of national strategy when combined together create synergy to provide for a plan to achieve national objectives.

1. The 2007 Merida Initiative

The 2007 Merida Initiative, signed by Presidents Bush and Calderon, provided a framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against the drug cartels in Mexico (Selee, 2008). The 2007 Merida Initiative was intended to increase law enforcement, intelligence, and training between Mexico and America (Sarukhan, 2008). In addition, new equipment and aircraft for the Mexican military would be purchased to fight drug trafficking organizations and “other transnational organized crime” (U.S. Embassy Mexico, 2010).

Prior to 9/11, there was neither the U.S. political will nor interest from the Mexican government to cooperate with America’s war on drugs nor focus on North American security (Renuart, 2010). After 9/11, America began to increase the awareness for support and stability in Mexico, but few resources were dedicated to supporting Mexico specifically. With the concerns over illegal immigrants and the porous southern border, America’s new strategic plans included strengthening Mexico’s ability to stop the drug cartels’ free reign of power over select regions within Mexico. The resources dedicated to supporting the Mexican government efforts to defeat the drug cartels as the cartels that controlled the southern avenues of approaches into America would not be increased until 2008 (Selee, 2008).

The main focus of funding for the Merida Initiative are the DOS programs created to strengthen the Mexican criminal justice system. This includes training of the Secretariat of Public Security or Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP), which contains numerous federal police agencies. The majority of funding from the Merida Initiative (1.1 of 1.4 billion dollars) is designated to support the police, prisons, and justice system within Mexico (U.S. Embassy Mexico, 2010).

2. Plan Colombia

Plan Colombia is the generic term for the U.S. funding given to the Colombian government in support of counter drug and counter insurgency operations in Colombia. The “plan” was originally an idea of President Andres Pastrana in 1998. He envisioned

funding in support of economic development and humanitarian aid that would set conditions to help Colombia end the insurgency. This idea morphed into the controversial Plan Colombia that has been funded through legislation from U.S. Congress from 1996 to 2006. Plan Colombia developed by DoD increased the militarization of the Colombia through providing 500 U.S. military personnel to train the Colombian military and purchasing helicopters and equipment for the Colombians (Bailey, 2009).

Plan Colombia contained provisions to fund the military and law enforcement forces to fight the drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Bailey, 2009). Controversial parts of the plan are that limited funding was dedicated to the economic development of the Colombian government and the spraying of coca fields (Ungerman, 2003). The eradication of coca fields through chemicals has been the most recognizable rallying cry of critics of Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia funded by the U.S. Congress morphed into something different from what was envisioned by the Colombians or the U.S. Congress. By 2003, the limited use of equipment for counter drug operations had been ignored in order to fight the FARC. In addition, the budget from 2000–2008 reflected over 1.3 billion USD going to five programs in addition to the Colombian military (Wienberg, 2007). Alternative development, internally displaced persons, demobilization and reintegration, democracy and human rights, and promote the rule of law are five U.S. Department of State initiatives which have contributed to the expenditures of Plan Colombia (U.S. Department of State, 2000).

In *A Slow Road to Victory: Counterinsurgency and Strategic Innovation in Colombia*, Ortiz and Iriarte (2006) discuss the time and strategy needed to dismantle the cultivation of coca and production of cocaine. They write about how Plan Colombia provided the long-term conditions needed for stabilization and defeat of the FARC. The critical lesson learned is that counterinsurgency warfare takes time and resources to defeat the insurgent. In 2008, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) provided testimony to Congress about the limited success of Plan Colombia, which included: “(1) reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in six years and (2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups” (GAO, 2008).

3. Relevance

The 2007 Merida Initiative is most similar to Plan Colombia in the number of programs funded to fight non-state entities. In addition, the DTOs and non-state entities operating in Colombia are similar to those operating in Mexico in that they utilize violence to influence the population and to increase the share of illegal trafficking operations. Studying Plan Colombia can offer best practice solutions to the problems presented by the non-state entities operating in Mexico. More importantly, Plan Colombia created the expectation that the similar missions would take considerable time and resources to implement. This leads to the assumption that the 2007 Merida Initiative will take years to show success, similar to Plan Colombia (GAO, 2000).

Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative are similar in that critics claim these plans militarize Mexico. Each plan has similar counter narcotic goals of supporting the central governments fight against the drug trade organizations and reduce the violence in these countries. A major difference in the two programs is which federal agency developed the two plans. Plan Colombia, though led by DOS, was developed by DoD as an eradication plan with a heavy emphasis on military defeat of the FARC insurgency. DOS developed the 2007 Merida Initiative, where DOJ and supporting the Mexican police (SSP) is the focus of funding (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009; Moreno, 2010).

According to Bailey, “Colombia is a case of a complicated internal war in which drug production and trafficking play a significant role; Mexico is a case of hyper-violent criminal organizations that use terrorist-like methods to challenge the government and society” (2009). Bailey compares both the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia in terms of lessons learned for the U.S. and advocated that the Merida Initiative benefits from the lessons of Plan Colombia. In addition, Bailey recognizes that “the Barak Obama administration has yet to define its policies toward the region” (2009). Bailey creates a simple comparison of the two policies with a comparison chart which is in Table 2.

Table 1. Bailey's Contexts and Characteristics of Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative (After Bailey, 2009)

	Plan Colombia	Merida Initiative
Country context	Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. sq. km.; GDP=US\$250B* (2008); GDP/cap=US\$5,174; budget expend=US\$65B; unitary, with significant decentralization; 32 departments, 1,100 counties	Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.; GDP=US\$1,142B (2008); GDP/cap=US\$10,747; budget expend=US\$227B; federal, with 32 states, 1,400 counties
Problem profile	Major guerrilla insurgencies; generalized violence; major producer & trafficker of illicit drugs; limited central government presence; corruption in police-justice system	Minor regional rebellion; producer & major trafficker of illicit drugs; rapid upsurge in trafficking violence; localized challenges to government presence; acute corruption in police-justice system
Policy origins	1999-2000; U.S. proactive in policy design	2007-2008; U.S. reactive in policy design
Policy scope: goals & countries	Internal security & anti-trafficking; social justice; development. Primary=Colombia; secondary=Peru & Ecuador	Internal security; law enforcement & justice admin.; Primary=Mexico; secondary=Central America & Caribbean
Policy targets	Insurgency (FARC; ELN); self-defense organizations; drug crop eradication; criminal justice system; economic development (e.g., crop substitution)	Counter-drug; counter-terror; border security; public security & law enforcement; institution-building & rule of law
Time commitment	2000-2006; succeeded by similar follow-on policies	Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010, with indications of extension
U.S. financial commitment	US\$4.5B; U.S. currently seeks reduced commitment	US\$1.5 B announced; approx. 10% program costs; --- appropriated in 2008; negotiations expected in Congress in 2009.
U.S. commitments for internal policy	Reduce drug demand	"Genuine partnership"; Reduce drug demand; halt: weapons trafficking, precursor chemicals, money laundering

F. CURRENT THREAT TO US

There are fundamental truths throughout the evolution of warfare as supported by the writings of Clausewitz (1873), Sun Zsu (2009), and Lind (2004). The principles of war mass, security, surprise, and simplicity remain consistent throughout the ages, types, or evolutions in technology. Most theorists agree that preparing for battle in the future is not as predictable as preparing for the last war. Historically, the United States prepares well for the last war; however, the United States should prepare for warfare based on future threats.

The future threat for America is currently being fought using 4GW in Mexico. The U.S. needs a military strategy to address this threat in Mexico, which is in line with the National Defense Strategy and the 2007 Merida Initiative. The Mexican fight is not only with non-state actors of drug cartels/drug trade organizations, transnational gangs, and international thugs for hire, but rooted in Mexico's own corruption. The Pack Virus continues to exploit and increase the corruption in Mexico in order to gain and maintain core areas of operations.

The violence in Mexico is impacting security in America. The "hornet's nest" disturbed by the government of Mexico (GOM), through President Calderon confronting the drug cartels has caused numerous deaths in Mexico and increased violence in America (Padgett, 2009). "Spillover" of violence from the Mexican government intervention into illegal trafficking operations is occurring. The Pack Virus is amplifying violence in Mexico in order to increase its share in illegal trafficking operations to include: drugs, weapons, money, and people. The violence caused by the Pack Virus in Mexico is not just contained within Mexico. These groups conduct operations in America that effect the security of America and cause violence in America.

G. EVIDENCE

News reports, reported kidnappings, and murders in the southern U.S. states are due to the cartels fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes (Ware, 2009; Caldwell, 2009). However, there is limited statistical data on "spillover" due the metrics used to

report crimes in the U.S. Yet, the FBI has documented that there are over 200 cells of MS-13 operating in America (FBI, 2010). DTOs have infiltrated into every major city in America (Hawley, 2009). These groups are already established within America and only need to be employed by other nations to create the most dangerous course of action for American security. There is nothing culturally from preventing terrorist groups and the Pack Virus from working together (Bruneau, 2005). Bruneau is one of a few, along with Kimery (2010) and the editors of *Nightwatch*, who are the dissenting opinions as most literature argues that terrorist groups conduct criminal activity, but very few criminal groups conduct terrorist activities. In 2009, Kimery writes about the “marriage of convenience” between terrorist groups and the Pack Virus (Kimery, 2009). In addition, as recently as July 2010, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) intelligence reports and OpenSource.gov detailed an article from Kuwait that described the arrest of a Hezbollah terrorist in Tijuana who was working to set up operational cells (NightWatch, 2010; Open Source, 2010).

The non-state entities may engage in 4GW in America in order to defeat other Pack Virus organizations and to increase profits. According to numerous news reports, criminal activity is already occurring with kidnappings and abductions. Allowing the Pack Virus to remain in control of the illegal trafficking operations permits an avenue for terrorist organizations to exploit.

Illegal trafficking operations from Mexico to America are controlled by non-state entities (i.e., Pack Virus), which are engaged in 4GW against the government of Mexico (GOM). The emerging threat of the Pack Virus with known terrorist groups creates the conditions for terrorists to easily infiltrate into America. Though the ties between the organizations are “marriages of convenience” at this time, the emergence of non-state groups operating in collaboration with terrorists who are sponsored by nation states offers a great threat to American security (Kimery, 2009). Fourth generation warfare in America is a battle that DoD is not prepared to fight.

H. CONCLUSION

There is a significant body of literature regarding strategy to win war and the 4GW model. What is well understood is that non-state actors are defeating and marginalizing militaries in many places throughout the world. In addition, techniques and tactics to fight these elements have been discussed and documented during COIN operations. However, there is limited research documenting the defeat of a non-state actor by military means alone. Utilizing COIN tactics and procedures to defeat insurgencies, the military is only successful in about seven percent of the time (Jones, 2010). Yet, a military strategy is needed to help defeat and marginalize the Pack Virus operating and conducting fourth generation warfare in Mexico.

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III. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for studying the U.S. policy in support of the GOM strategy for degrading the capabilities of the Pack Virus will utilize a comparison case study of Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative. Two primary questions will be answered utilizing the current and historical data from each case study, to determine if the American intervention enabled the state to prevail over the non-state entities.

1. How can America influence the warfare in Mexico so the Mexican government can prevail?
2. What role can DoD play to help the Mexican military win this fight?

The non-state entities in Mexico fighting fourth generation warfare (4GW) have similarities to the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia. Both groups are heavily involved in illegal trafficking operations, carve out regional areas where the national government is powerless to intervene, and cause violence among the population. Studying Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative can offer possible solutions to the problems presented by the non-state entities fighting fourth generation warfare (4GW) in Mexico. Analyzing what policies are being applied in the 2007 Merida Initiative can create recommendations for the fight against the Pack Virus operating in Mexico. The comparative analysis of the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia will include six metrics:

1. How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and 2007 Merida Initiative?
2. What areas were funded in Plan Colombia compared to 2007 Merida Initiative?
3. Did the level of security within the state increase or decrease after the U.S. involvement?
4. How long did the violence last?
5. Did the non-state entities increase or decrease operational capacity?

6. Lead federal agency in developing the plan for Plan Colombia and 2007 Merida Initiative.

In addition, the comparison between DoD support to the military for each plan will be compared.

1. Number of U.S. military advisors in Mexico? In Colombia?
2. Amount of U.S. equipment to Mexico? To Colombia?

Through these metrics the causality of increased money and military equipment to decrease violence caused by the non-state entities within the supported state will be tested.

The weakness of this comparison case study is that the quantitative data for the 2007 Merida Initiative is not complete. The two situations are different for Colombia and Mexico, in that Colombia fought an insurgency against both terrorists groups and non-state entities, involved in the drug trade, is different than the transnational drug cartel problems in Mexico. In addition, the results of Plan Colombia could be argued to be atypical and the conclusions drawn from the initial data from the 2007 Merida Initiative are not solidified as historical record. Yet, the strength of this comparison case study is that the current policy can be modified in order to increase the likelihood of successful support to Mexico.

A. USNORTHCOM STRATEGY

From these metrics, a future DoD strategy can be developed by USNORTHCOM. The USNORTHCOM strategy must involve the restraints and constraints of funding, political acceptability, and the legal authority of the 2007 Merida Initiative. The USNORTHCOM strategy should be applied to eight functional areas identified through the 2007 Merida Initiative and the best practices from Plan Colombia. The eight functional areas include: air and maritime surveillance; intelligence collection; command and control network hardware and software; improve interdiction capabilities; consequence management; special operations; institutional development; and military to military exchanges. The proposed USNORTHCOM strategy should focus on two

important aspects. First, the indirect support to the Mexican military will increase the operational abilities and capabilities of the Mexican military. Second, the U.S. military strategy must be a supporting effort to the “whole-of-government approach” as outlined in the *2009 Counterinsurgency Guide* and 2007 Merida Initiative (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010).

B. JUAREZ AND GOM STRATEGY

The debate about the GOM strategy to end the violence from the Mexican drug war can be highlighted by studying the Mexican military deployment to Juarez. Observations of the Mexican military operations in Juarez provide specific areas where the USNORTHCOM strategy can support the GOM efforts. More importantly, the primary question of what is the GOM strategy to decrease the violence from the Pack Virus in Mexico can be addressed.

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IV. A LACK OF MEXICAN STRATEGY

The violence in Mexico caused by the Pack Virus has created areas where Mexican police are incapable or reluctant to confront these illegal operations. Currently, the Mexican military is being deployed to areas where police are unable to stop the increase in violence. Reports of local police and the Mexican military fighting each other can be contributed to the Pack Virus's efficiency at corrupting local officials (Sullivan, 2009). Through the use of the Mexican military, the GOM is attempting to stop the violence and restore order to these areas. The Mexican military has a tradition of being used in an internal role to disrupt civil unrest and to assist recovery efforts after major disasters. The presumed goal of the GOM strategy is for the military to create conditions acceptable for the local police to operate.

This chapter provides a perspective of the Mexican military as an institution of the GOM to be employed against the Pack Virus. First, the likely Mexican strategy for dealing with the Pack Virus will be presented. Second, the historical perspective of the Mexican military depicts how the GOM chose the current strategy of utilizing the military as police. Third, the two major threats of corruption and the Pack Virus will be discussed in order to give the reader the background for what the Mexican military faces. Fourth, the Juarez case study and the DOTMILPF⁷ (doctrine, organization, training and education, material solutions, intelligence, leadership, personnel, facilities) process will be used to dissect the separate parts of the Mexican military. These sections will present the reader with an operational view of the lacking GOM strategy which neglects a whole-of-government approach against the Pack Virus.

A. MEXICO NATIONAL STRATEGY

Mexico has deployed federal law enforcement, (the Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP), and the military to respond to the increase of violence within Mexico. This is a tactic and not a strategy. Effective national strategy comprises more than just

⁷ DOTMILPF is doctrine, organization, training, material solutions, leadership, personnel, facilities from FM1 (U.S. Army, 2005). I have added the term intelligence.

the military. It should utilize all the power of government including: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL). These are the means to achieve the national objectives as outlined from a U.S. perspective. Within this framework of resources government can effectively counter national security threats. Currently, the focus of GOM is on military and law enforcement operations to counter the non-state entities (Whitney, 2010). The narrow focus of GOM, human rights abuses by the military, and the mass murder of numerous teenagers in Juarez by a DTO have increased the criticism of this Mexican strategy (Wilkinson, 2010). Focusing on the military response of the GOM strategy provides points for analysis. More importantly, it highlights that national strategy must work with a unity of effort with all parts in order to be successful in countering non-state entities. The history of Mexico, and the Mexican military as an institution, creates an understating of how the GOM chose this course of action.

B. HISTORICAL MEXICAN MILITARY PERSPECTIVE SINCE WWII

Only once during WWII did the Mexican military cooperate with the American military. The Mexican Air Force flew in support of the U.S. military in the Philippines in 1945. This small, but very valiant support by the Mexican military in WWII should be used to gain additional support for combined operations. Lenchek writes about the coordinated efforts of the U.S. and Mexican military, “Mexican pilots received additional training in the United States and in 1945 fought valiantly in the air war in the Philippines” (Lenchek, 2001). There is a historic foundation for the Mexican military to train and fight with the U.S. military against a common enemy.

Now, the Mexican military is organized into two main forces: the Army (SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR).⁸ The Mexican Air Force is now organized under SEDENA. Unlike the U.S. military, there is no civilian leadership like the Secretaries of Army or Navy. The two services are independent and report to the President of Mexico for orders and direction.

⁸ SEDENA is the common Spanish acronym which is from Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional and SEMAR is the acronym from Secretaria de Marina.

As Mexico transformed through the 1960s and 1970s to a more democratic perspective and a nationalized industrial nation, the Mexican military remained focused on internal threats. As Wager writes:

With the exception of World War II, Mexico's foreign policy, guided mainly by the principles of nonintervention, respect for self-determination, and a general disdain for military solutions to international problems, has virtually eliminated foreign military involvement or membership in alliance systems. Not surprisingly, therefore, the army primarily has focused on preserving internal security. (1994)

In 1968, the Mexican military and police were used to stop student protests in Mexico City. During protests on 2 October 1968, Army forces killed numerous students by shooting into the crowd of protestors, but the number remains in dispute (Schugurensky, 2005). This over reaction by the GOM security forces, to the Mexican students' protests in Mexico City, created a culture of animosity between cultural elites in the academic and political world and the Mexican Army. This is similar to what happened following the Kent State shootings in America (Moreno, 2010). Later, during the oil boom years of the 1970s, the modernization of the Mexican military continued with a focus on mobile forces that could respond within Mexico to crisis (Wager, 1994).

In the aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake in 1985, the military deployed over 3000 troops to conduct relief and security operations (Wager, 1994). Conducting civil actions or consequence management (CM) operations is one of the three main missions of the Mexican military.⁹ Consequence management operations “constitute actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster” (Lewis, Rowe, & Taylor, 1999). Though the GOM was criticized for its response, the Mexican military gained support and more institutional credibility in the eyes of the Mexican people (Wager, 1994). With more confidence in the military by the political elite, the military was deployed to southern Mexico (Chiapas) to intervene in the uprisings against the GOM in the early 1990s. The Mexican military was not well trained in conducting counter insurgency operations and

⁹ The three missions of the Mexican military are civil action (consequence management), internal defense and maintain the Constitution and its laws (Wager, 1994).

did not perform well in Chiapas (Doyle, 2004). The legacy of the Mexican military is that of an institution struggling against organized resistance.

Traditionally, performing consequence management operations and possessing urban search and rescue capabilities, the Mexican military is considered a first responder for events in Mexico. The tragedy of hurricane Katrina created conditions that enabled political support for the Mexican military to deploy forces to New Orleans in order to assist in relief operations. Both SEDENA and SEMAR deployed forces to support the U.S. military and relief efforts. (Renuart, 2010). This was the first time since WWII that the Mexican military participated in operations outside of Mexico.

Yet, this is not the only incident where SEMAR supported operations outside of Mexico. SEMAR provided relief supplies for the massive hurricanes that hit Haiti in 2008. During Operation Unified Response in 2010, SEMAR supported relief operations after the major 7.0 earthquake that occurred in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (SOUTHCOM, 2010). Leveraging the traditional consequence management operations and the partnering of Mexican and United States military in recent operations creates opportunities for the two allies to work together on other issues.

Partnering with the Mexican military as it transitions into a new institution enables USNORTHCOM to support our southern ally with a robust theater support engagement plan. The development of the theater support plan should help the Mexican military address two main problems that it faces today: corruption and the violence caused by the non-state groups. The Mexican military must confront these two major challenges at the strategic level in order for the GOM to prevail against the Pack Virus.

C. CHALLENGES OF CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE

Currently the Pack Virus and corruption are the two greatest challenges to the Mexican military. As Henson writes:

Corruption occurs in Mexico more because of intimidation than some inherent weakness in the national character. Plata o Plomo—Silver or Lead—is the choice facing both local and federal officials, and the threat of a bullet is no joke. It doesn't matter who you are, the government can't protect you. (2008)

President Calderon has begun the difficult process of weeding out corruption, but many Mexican officials have conflicted loyalties. Grillo writes, “The army and federal police have taken over police stations in several border cities this month, seizing the local force's guns while they root out corrupt officers” (2008). The Mexican military is identified as one of the least corrupt organizations in Mexico and the people of Mexico respect them as an institution. The last seven years of research shows increasing levels of professionalism for the Mexican military when compared to 34 other federal institutions. A chart from Transparent Mexico, the local chapter of the non-government organization (NGO) Transparency International places the Mexican military fourth compared to local police at the bottom of the list (the thirty-fourth place) for corruption (Transparent Mexico, 2005). Though the Mexican military is considered not to be as corrupt as other national institutions in Mexico, there is corruption within their ranks as the notorious Zetas demonstrate. The corruption creates animosity between SEMAR and SEDENA in addition to security concerns for the theater security cooperation plan for both the U.S. and Mexico. Partners, who cannot be trusted, are ineffective against the Pack Virus since collaboration and sharing information will be limited between organizations.

1. Non-State Violence

Mexico continues to show an increase in violence caused by the conflict between non-state entities to include drug trafficking organizations (DTO's), transnational organized gangs (MS 13, Aztec Barrios), and paramilitary groups (los Zetas) as they fight among themselves and the GOM for control of illegal trafficking routes. In June 2009, the LA Times reported over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police were deployed in the “war against traffickers.” By November 2009, news sources were increasing the estimates to over 16,000 killed due to the drug violence within the last three years with over 6,290 killed in 2008. (Booth, 2009) By April of 2010, reports estimated that over 22,700 people were killed due to the fighting. (Castillo, 2010) The violence caused by the Pack Virus is increasing as more Mexican troops are deploying to support law enforcement operations.

2. 4GW Tactics Have Marginalized the Mexican Military

The non-state entities operating in Mexico are not considered terrorist groups as they do not possess the political goal of changing the Mexican government. Yet, the DTOs are classified as narco-terrorists by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Holmberg, 2009). The non-state entities operate similarly to terrorist groups in that they operate with a clandestine transnational nature, utilizing a network framework to conduct tactical and operational control of illegal trafficking operations and utilize violent tactics to intimidate the local leaders and law enforcement. As discussed in the literature review, Sullivan writes, “These groups while vastly different do rely on networks and in fact share several common characteristics. They have a propensity for indiscriminate violence, intimidation, coercion, transcending borders, and targeting nation-states” (Sullivan, 2007).

These non-state groups are utilizing fourth generation warfare to marginalize the Mexican military. Fourth generation warfare uses tactics that operate within the “grey area” between the division of law enforcement and the military. Corruption, beheadings, intimidation, systematically murdering police, and coordinated attacks on the military area are all tactics of 4GW. The Pack Virus in Mexico has used these tactics along with “swarm tactics” or small coordinated infantry attacks and IEDs to fight the police and the military. One effective technique that the Pack Virus employs is signs with phone numbers to call in order to join their organization (Ware, 2009). Not only can the Pack Virus recruit new members, but this sends an information operations (IO) message that these groups are so powerful that the GOM cannot even stop the Pack Virus from openly advertising in public for Mexican soldiers to join their organizations. Using these tactics has also caused a strategic problem for the GOM. The GOM strategy of employing the military as law enforcement without applying other forms of state power has created a condition of increasing violence and additional troop deployments. The correlation of more troops with more violence produces a dual strategic communications message that the Mexican military is failing against the Pack Virus and that the security threat appears to be growing.

D. MEXICO AND U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST

There are numerous issues that distinguish these non-state groups as a national security priority to both Mexico and the U.S. The growing and emerging security threat of Mexico to American national security was noted by Joint Forces Command. Johnson writes, “In November, the Defense Department’s Joint Forces Command named Mexico as one of two countries, along with Pakistan, at the highest risk of “rapid collapse.” Such a collapse, it said, “would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone” (2009). In addition, former CIA director Hayden noted, “that Mexico was second only to Iran as a national threat to U.S. security” (Johnson, 2009). Mexico is within the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility.¹⁰ The Commander of USNORTHCOM delegated Joint Task Force-North located in El Paso, Texas as the lead DoD unit supporting counter drug operations in Mexico. Due to the threat from DTOs and illegal trafficking operations from Juarez, Joint Task Force-North is in a strategic location to observe the operational and tactical level effects of the Mexican military against the Pack Virus.

It was the change in policy of President Calderon of the PAN (Mexico political party elected into the Office of the President of Mexico in 2000, though President Calderon was elected in 2006) that created the violence in Mexico (Grayson, 2010). Prior to 9/11, the U.S. and Mexico did not have the same goals concerning theater cooperation and security. Transnational non-state entities like the DTOs or Los Zetas or MS-13 were not confronted by the GOM under the PRI (political party that controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000) in a systematic or unified effort (Grayson, 2010). President Calderon change in policy created two distinct actions. First, he has confronted the corruption within the government of Mexico which has caused the status quo of allowing drug trafficking organizations to operate within Mexico to change. Second, as he directly confronted the numerous drug cartels within Mexico, these organizations have increased the violence throughout Mexico in order to control illegal trafficking routes from other

¹⁰ Mexico, Canada, U.S., and Bahamas are the countries within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility along with a few small islands off the coast of Nova Scotia that are still governed by the United Kingdom.

disrupted organizations. In addition to the change in GOM national policy, the financial disruption from 9/11 and common security threats have created conditions which are high priorities for both Mexico and the United States governments to cooperate. This cooperation and collaboration on shared security concerns increases the security within North America.

E. MERIDA INITIATIVE SUPPORT TO THE MEXICAN MILITARY

The current American/Mexican policy of combating the drug cartels is called the 2007 Merida Initiative. This was a critical first step in creating a real theater defense of North America. The Merida Initiative, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico in support of the fight against the drug cartels in Mexico. Ambassador Garza, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico stated:

The Merida Initiative represents a new era of cooperation which will amplify and strengthen existing law enforcement cooperation, intelligence sharing, and training programs. It will also provide new equipment for Mexican forces to use to better confront the common threat of drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime. (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2008)

It is through the 2007 Merida Initiative that the U.S. military is able to provide indirect support to the Mexican military. Indirect support includes enhanced military to military exchanges, exchanges of information through conferences, liaison officers, and training exercises. Admiral Olson of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) testified that the use of indirect support to other militaries is critical in the fight against “violent extremist organizations” (Olson, 2009). Disrupting non-state entities in Mexico is similar to disrupting transnational terrorist organizations and is now part of the theater engagement plan for NORTHCOM (Milardo, 2009).

The U.S. provides intelligence, military, interagency partnering, and finance assistance to GOM in order to confront the DTOs (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). With the support from the U.S., the GOM has changed the laissez faire policy of allowing drug trade organizations to operate uncontested in Mexico. Through corruption and

intimidation the drug cartels have firmly established themselves as power brokers in specific areas of Mexico. The change in policy of President Felipe Calderon to confront the powerful drug cartels and to begin the process of accountability among the government to help eliminate corruption are two major factors in the rise of violence between the non-state entities.

F. JUAREZ

The study for the battle of Juarez between the Mexican military and the Pack Virus highlights some of the strategic, operational, and tactical problems associated with sending military forces into cities to perform law enforcement operations. Though there is no published Mexican strategy to confront the Pack Virus, there are numerous examples of the Mexican military being deployed to areas where law enforcement is unable or unwilling to stop the violence caused by the Pack Virus. One example of the Mexican military being used instead of the police is in Juarez.

Ciudad Juarez, which is across the border from El Paso, is the most violent city in Mexico due to the “drug war.” In Juarez, there were approximately seven killings a day or 2000 deaths, since the start of the 2009 year (MSNBC, 2009; Stevenson, 2009). The proximity of Juarez to the U.S. border creates opportunities for international business and illegal trafficking operations to flourish. In addition to legal commerce, the lucrative illegal smuggling trafficking routes cause this city to be a contested area between the GOM and the non-state entities fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes. Gun battles between law enforcement and the Pack Virus have caused thousands of deaths. The gun battles are only part of the violence that has become part of the daily life in Juarez. Kidnappings, extortion, intimidation, and assassinations are also common occurrences.

G. THE DOTMILPF MODEL APPLIED TO THE MEXICAN MILITARY

Using the deployment of the Mexican military to Juarez and analyzing DOTMILPF (doctrine, organization, training and education, material solutions, intelligence, leadership, personnel, facilities) and techniques, tactics, and procedures

(TTPs) of the Mexican military provides the analysis for recommendations of a supporting USNORTHCOM Mexican strategy. Even without creating a new GOM strategy and understanding the criticism of the Merida Initiative, the Mexican military is one institution that could be strengthened and used as the foundation for bettering Mexico. Recognizing that a bad strategy can lead to poor performance must also be noted. Relying only on the Mexican military to solve the problems of the DTO violence is not a successful strategy for defeating the DTOs. If the measure of performance of reduced violence within Mexico is the goal of the Mexican strategy, then the Mexican military is failing. Non-state entities require the entire force of DIME-FIL (diplomacy, information, military, economic, finances, intelligence, and law enforcement) in order to counter this international non-state threat. Diplomacy, information, military, economic, finances, intelligence, and law enforcement must be used to counter the threat of non-state entities corrupting and intimidating local communities into allowing illegal trafficking operations in their areas. The Mexican strategy is focusing only on military efforts to reinforce out gunned and corrupt police.

The Mexican military can be dissected into parts in order to analyze a few specific areas of the strategic security approaches, which are being utilized to fight the Pack Virus. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel solutions, intelligence, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMILPF) process will be utilized for the specific areas of inquiry into the Mexican military. Understanding these areas enables the functional areas of the Mexican security strategy to be discussed in detail.

America is the best equipped and trained military in the world due to the DOTMILPF process and the enormous defense budget. Mexico, on the other hand, is ranked nineteenth in the world according to globalfirepower.com, ahead of North Korea by one only place (Global Firepower, 2009). No doubt, the DOTMILPF process would support the Mexican military's ability to counter its current problems, particularly those in Juarez.

1. Doctrine

Doctrine is the written and unwritten guide to action for any military. This is developed from national strategy, historic, cultural, and policy decisions and contributes to the organization of the military. Mexican military doctrine allows it to respond to national emergencies. “Mexico's foreign policy, guided mainly by the principles of nonintervention” has dictated the doctrine of the military (Wager, 1994). In addition, 9/11 increased the awareness to the external security threats to Mexico and the U.S. by non-state entities. The doctrine of the Mexican military is to provide for the defense of Mexico from external nations, response to natural disasters, and internal emergencies (Wager, 1994). First, the Mexican external defense has been against the historic intrusions and invasions of the United States. Second, the Mexican military has been used to assist in natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes. Third, the Mexican military can be called upon for internal crisis, such as is occurring in Juarez. The two reasons the Mexican military was sent to Juarez were that the non-state entities were openly killing the local police and these groups possessed more firepower and weapons than the police. The utilization of the Mexican military as law enforcement in Juarez was within published doctrine. However, there are Mexican politicians and generals who are concerned about the legality of the Mexican Army being utilized as police (Moreno, 2010; Sanchez, 2010). Doctrinal changes for the Mexican military include a change in laws that reflect the military or law enforcement (SSP) is in charge of operations. There is no one organization in charge of operations in Mexico.

2. Organization

Organization is derived from doctrine. SEDENA, commanded by a general, and SEMAR, commanded by an admiral, are separate organizations that have cultural and historical differences that neither allows for mutual support nor collaboration of lessons learned. There is no joint Department of Defense nor is there a civilian Secretary of Defense that unifies these organizations. These divides create friction at the operational level and cause gaps in information exchange that can be exploited by the non-state entities at the tactical level. One example, though it did not occur in Juarez, is when

SEMAR allowed the publishing of the name of a dead sailor, 3rd Petty Officer Melquisedet Angulo ,who was involved in the gun fight which killed, Beltrán Leyva, the leader of a splinter Sinaloa Cartel DTO (L. Cordoba , 2009) Afterwards, in retaliation, the cartel killed the family of the fallen sailor. The lack of institutionalized knowledge about the expected retaliation against families of the fallen sailor is nothing that SEMAR had prior experience in knowing. However, SEDENA experienced the failures of operational security and retribution attacks years before. SEDENA experienced violent ambushes from corrupt local police forces, corrupt federal police, and paramilitary groups in previous years (Moreno, 2010). If SEDENA could have warned SEMAR about operational security and retribution attacks, then the tragedy of Angulo may not have occurred. The lack of sharing of information is due to the cultural rifts between SEMAR and SEDENA because of the different missions, funding, historical cultural differences, and the geographical nature of the Navy and the Army.

3. Training

Training is honing of unit and personnel military skills. Historically, the Mexican military has neither possessed a large budget nor training programs to prepare for counter insurgency or law enforcement operations (Moreno, 2010). The Mexican military was not prepared to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) operations. Utilizing military forces as law enforcement requires specific training and is most similar to preparing for COIN. The last time the Mexican military faced an enemy in a COIN environment was in southern Mexico (Chiapas) in the early 1990s. It was not prepared then to fight an insurgency (Doyle, 2004). More recently, the threat has been from natural disasters where the Mexican military had to respond in support of the GOM. The Mexican military did not train to conduct law enforcement or COIN operations prior to Juarez in 2007 (Grayson, 2010). Due to this training deficiency, poor information operations and public affairs (PA), and a few illegal acts, the military has been accused of crimes against civilians. The blunt hand of the military in COIN operations is a continuous theme throughout militaries of the world (Hoyt, 2004). Training can eliminate and soften the hard hand of the military, but this requires change in doctrine, time, and experience to

successfully complete this transformation from blunt force to successful COIN operations. Action taken in Juarez showcases the poor performance of the Mexican military when the metric of continued violence is used to determine success (L. Cordoba, 2009).

4. Material Solutions

Materiel solutions are the equipment the military uses during missions. The Merida Initiative provides the Mexican military with ion scanners, aircraft, night-vision goggles, small boats, and radars (Milardo, 2009). These items only increase the capabilities of the Mexican military—if the military is properly trained to use the equipment. America is great at providing the material solutions as the Merida Initiative showcases. Unfortunately, increasing the capabilities for the Mexican military with material solutions is only one part needed to strengthen it. At the tactical level, the Mexican military is already better equipped than the non-state entities fighting for control in Juarez. Material solutions and support from the U.S. in technology and specialized equipment should be sustained. Mexico has the majority of military equipment need to sustain operations against the non-state entities.

5. Intelligence

Intelligence is the processing of information to help make decisions. Intelligence is a broad area that includes: systems, human, signal, imagery, and electronic intelligence. All of these make up the separate parts of the intelligence system. Human intelligence is the highest priority and must also be employed to fight illegal trafficking operations in Juarez. Unable to trust the local police due to corruption, human sources will need to be developed in order to fight the DTOs. The Mexican military will take time to develop these human assets in Juarez, since establishing human collection assets requires access and time (Lowenthal, 2009). The U.S. has promised through the Merida Initiative to share information with GOM. In fact, DHS has “a Letter of Intent to develop a coordinated and intelligence-driven response to the threat of cross border smuggling

and trafficking of weapons and ammunition” (DHS, 2009). The Mexican military is failing to employ all areas of intelligence to defeat the non-state entities.

6. Leadership and Education

Leadership and education encompass mentorship, scholarship, and training. The lack of training academies for the professional military education of the Mexican military is one major obstacle within the Mexican system. Mentorship from outside of Mexico has not occurred due to the past “historical non intervention policies” (Wager, 1994). In addition, the internal mentoring, though very strong, has a limited effect when numerous high level personnel are suspected of being corrupt. The Mexican military when ordered to intervene in Juarez did not have the leadership or education to operate in a law enforcement or counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. After the initial failures and allegations of human right abuses, SEDENA has gone to static road blocks as the tactic of choice to disrupt the non-state entities. (Sanchez, 2010) At many levels the Mexican military is improving through execution of mission, but not in an exponential way, due to lack of leadership at all levels. Similar to the Chiapas uprising, SEDENA was unprepared for operations against the Pack Virus, even though one of the four national plans was devoted to operations against DTOs (Wager, 1994). Failing to execute an operations plan is a sign of poor leadership and staff planning.

7. Personnel

Personnel are the lifeblood of any organization. The corruption of the Mexican government is a profound problem for the Mexican Army. *Time* reporter Grillo writes, “One entire unit of army special forces deserted in the late 1990s to form a paramilitary group called the Zetas, who worked as bloody enforcers to help the Gulf Cartel get the edge over its rivals” (2008). As the Zetas example showcases, non-state entities are famous for encouraging members to join the military and learn military skills in order to

then sell their capability to the drug cartels. The Zetas actually advertise for the military to join the Zetas using billboards and posters (Ware, 2009) (see Figure 2). This is a disturbing trend that must be countered.¹¹



Figure 2. Photo 1: Los Zetas Recruiting (From Los Zetas, 2008)

Once recruited, the Mexican military must retain the best and brightest through education, pay, and providing facilities for their families. Increasing the quality of personnel of the Mexican military will decrease the corruption within Mexico. The Mexican military, which has the means to fight the drug cartels, is less influenced by the cartels compared to Mexican law enforcement as the military is a product of all of Mexico and not from a local populace. Liaison officers from the Mexican military

¹¹ The Los Zetas sign reads: “Operative Group ‘Los Zetas’ wants you, soldier or ex-soldier. We offer good salary, food and care for your family. You don’t have to suffer mistreatment and hunger anymore. We don’t give you to eat cheap microwave soups. Conflictive men, please don’t call.” (Translation by Rodrigo Nieto Gomez 30 July 2010)

should take a polygraph test and be vetted by the Mexican and American intelligence to increase the likelihood of catching corrupt officers. Utilizing polygraphs would eliminate some “bad apples” and raise the standards across the Mexican military—and thus the entire Mexican federal government.

The Mexican military has enough personnel to sustain the fight against non-state entities. Institutional strength and credibility can be gained through use of polygraphs and vetting all of the military members. The U.S. can help with training additional investigators, polygraph operators, and maintenance specialists assigned to sensitive equipment.

8. Facilities

Facilities are the bases and the infrastructures on the military bases which the military utilizes everyday to live, work, and play. These secure locations offer the Mexican military a place to keep families safe, fed, and housed. The Angulo case may not have happened if the Mexican military had better facilities protecting the families and reducing the opportunities for corruption.

Facilities and bases must be improved to separate the military from retaliation and in order to provide secure areas for training. Until these facilities are built in Mexico, the Mexican military could utilize training bases in the U.S. to develop and prepare troops for deployment. Utilizing the historical Mexico/U.S. WWII model of pilot training would require changes in both GOM and U.S. policies that are not within the 2007 Merida Initiative. Fortunately, there is nothing forbidding the training of Mexican forces in the U.S. within the Merida Initiative.

9. Measure of Effectiveness/Measure of Performance

After analyzing the Mexican DOTMILPF process, the Mexican military can be judged against the performance of mission accomplishment and the reduction in violence. Utilizing the Measure of performance of increased deployed forces in support of law enforcement creates a failure of the measure of effectiveness to reduce violence within Juarez. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System defines measure of

effectiveness as “metrics used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance measurement” (Defense Acquisition University, 2006). Measures of performance are “the process whereby an organization establishes the parameters within which programs, investments, and acquisitions are reaching the desired results” (U.S. Department of Agriculture , 2007)

Measure of performance factors of less violence, additional arrests or captures, and conducting effective information operations of the Mexican military are not consistent. Currently, violence in Juarez has escalated since the deployment of the Mexican military to the region (L. Cordoba, 2009). Using deaths from the drug war throughout Mexico as the metric to determine success, the Mexican military is not producing quick results (Bricker, 2009). Yet, the Mexican military has been effective in increasing the numbers of leaders captured, members detained, and corrupt officials removed are improving as compared to the past (K. Cordoba, 2009). The Mexican military is performing poorly at information operations when most news reports are about the increase in violence. In addition, some critics have labeled the drug war a failure (Bowden, 2010). The lack of effective information operations highlights the inability of the Mexican military to counter the negative messages. Information operations are a critical component of any COIN strategy and are a must for defeating 4GW. Lastly, recognizing that the non-state entities could be degraded through COIN operations is not a concept that the Mexican military seems to recognize as a possible course of action to defeat the non-state entities currently fighting fourth generation warfare in Mexico.

All measures of performance must consider the limited amount of time that the Mexican military and the GOM have invested into defeating the non-state entities. Time is one critical component to defeating the non-state entities groups. According to Jones, a professor at Naval Postgraduate School, “Successful counter insurgency operations against groups averages about fourteen years” (2010). Mexico has national elections in 2012, and the political will for the military only approach to ending the violence from the non-state entities may not be sustained past this time. For the Mexican military to be able to continue the fight and defeat the non-state entities, the political will must be sustained

through the next Mexican election cycle in 2012. This will require political and diplomatic efforts within the GOM and the United States to sustain the fight.

H. CONCLUSION

The Mexican military was not prepared nor trained to conduct COIN operations in order to identify, locate, and capture members of the Pack Virus. Better equipped than their adversary, the Mexican military offered an immediate solution to GOM for the outgunned and corrupt local police. Though the Mexican military followed doctrine, it is outdated due to globalization and the current threat from non-state entities. The military doctrine and organization needs to be improved. Constructing a JTF like system, but not a replica of the U.S. military, will serve to break down the cultural barriers and to facilitate improved information exchanges.

The measures of performance for the Mexican military relate to the measure of effectiveness for the GOM strategy to only utilize the military. If the Mexican military fails, then the entire Mexican strategy fails. This is the critical vulnerability of the GOM strategy. In addition, this is a constraint that must be acknowledged by the U.S. government. Restrained by the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. government can support the GOM strategy by strengthening the Mexican military, supporting the extradition of DTO leaders for prosecution in the U.S. and preparing for the escalation of violence in the U.S.

Policy recommendations from the analysis of the Mexican DOTMILPF require that the Mexican military improve in order to be more effective against the Pack Virus. Tactically, the Mexican military can win battles against the Pack Virus (Sherman & Olson, 2010); however, winning the tactical gun battles against the Pack Virus fighting fourth generation warfare is not a real measure of success. Operationally and strategically the challenges of time, political will, corruption of local officials, and lack of a reliable judicial system will hamper any military efforts.

Most of these measures of performance in the DOTMILPF can be addressed through indirect support by the U.S. military as outlined in the Merida Initiative. The use of indirect U.S. military support creates opportunities to disrupt these non-state entities

prior to these groups conducting fourth generation warfare in America. In addition, a stronger, more capable Mexican military strengthens this institution within Mexico. This enables the GOM to have a shield against the corruption as the GOM builds a foundation for the other pieces of the government strategy. Similarly, the London School of Economics reports about institutional development in Kosovo, where even though it has major issues unrelated to Mexico in ethnic genocide and threats from neighboring countries, the common issues of poor economic conditions, corruption, transnational crime, inefficient judicial system, and mistrust in institutions and political leaders still applies (Aliu, 2007). The report describes establishing security as a foundation for other systems to build upon, it emphasized, “the need to improve the education and health systems to promote economic growth, and found that the judiciary—widely perceived as inefficient, and not sufficiently capable or independent—is a source of growing mistrust in institutions and political leaders” (Aliu, 2007).

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V. FINDINGS

The Pack Virus is perpetuating violence in Mexico. After reviewing the literature and analyzing the effectiveness of the Mexican military there is no clear and coherent GOM strategy for defeating the Pack Virus. One operational condition is present: the GOM continues to reinforce or replace law enforcement throughout Mexico with SEMAR and SEDENA. No matter how ineffective the GOM strategy appears, a desirable end state is achievable with support from the United States. The U.S. involvement in Colombia contributed to a reduction in violence throughout the country. Similar support to Mexico may make a difference in the ongoing “drug war” in Mexico.

Reducing the violence is the measure of performance, which the Mexican military will be judged by in the eyes of the Mexican people, politicians, and the media. Even so, caution is advised. A reduction in violence does not necessarily mean that the GOM has defeated the Pack Virus. The Pack Virus could have defeated the competition in the specific region or have penetrated and corrupted the GOM in order to operate unmolested. Fortunately, the 2007 Merida Initiative has created conditions for the U.S. military to interact and share information with the Mexican military in order to support it in the 4GW fight. Limited by the conditions of the Merida Initiative and U.S. laws, the U.S. military through USNORTHCOM can provide indirect and direct support to the Mexican military.

In this chapter, a comparison of funding for the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia will be presented. Figure 6 illustrates the correlation between funding and a reduction in violence associated with the activities of the DTOs and Pack Virus over time. The next set of charts depicts the levels of violence as it pertains to Colombia and Mexico. These relate to the security situations in both countries. For Colombia, it is a positive reduction in violence, but for Mexico the violence is increasing in correlation with the introduction of more military and federal police. Figure 7 depicts the differences between some of the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) required in a conventional, counter insurgency, and fourth generation warfare conflict.

A. MERIDA INITIATIVE FUNDING

A more detailed study of Tables 2 and 3 offers answers to some of the metrics identified in the methodology section. The answers are highlighted by color/underline/italics:

- How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and 2007 Merida Initiative?
- What areas were funded in Plan Colombia compared to 2007 Merida Initiative?

Table 2. Bailey's Contexts and Characteristics of Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative (After Bailey, 2009)

	Plan Colombia	Merida Initiative
Country context	Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. sq. km.; GDP=US\$250B* (2008); GDP/cap=US\$5,174; budget expend=US\$65B; unitary, with significant decentralization; 32 departments, 1,100 counties	Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.; GDP=US\$1,142B (2008); GDP/cap=US\$10,747; budget expend=US\$227B; federal, with 32 states, 1,400 counties
Problem profile	Major guerrilla insurgencies; generalized violence; major producer & trafficker of illicit drugs; limited central government presence; corruption in police-justice system	Minor regional rebellion; producer & major trafficker of illicit drugs; rapid upsurge in trafficking violence; localized challenges to government presence; acute corruption in police-justice system
Policy origins	1999–2000; U.S. proactive in policy design	2007–2008; U.S. reactive in policy design
Policy scope: goals & countries	Internal security & anti-trafficking; social justice; development. Primary=Colombia; secondary=Peru & Ecuador	Internal security; law enforcement & justice admin.; Primary=Mexico; secondary=Central America & Caribbean
Policy targets	<u><i>Insurgency (FARC; ELN); self-defense organizations; drug crop eradication; criminal justice system; economic development (e.g., crop substitution)</i></u>	<u><i>Counter-drug; counter-terror; border security; public security & law enforcement; institution-building & rule of law</i></u>

	Plan Colombia	Merida Initiative
Time commitment	2000–2006; succeeded by similar follow-on policies	Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010, with indications of extension
U.S. financial commitment	<i>US\$4.5B</i> ; U.S. currently seeks reduced commitment	<i>US\$1.5 B</i> announced; approx. 10% program costs;—appropriated in 2008; negotiations expected in Congress in 2009.
U.S. commitments for internal policy	Reduce drug demand	“Genuine partnership;” Reduce drug demand; halt: weapons trafficking, precursor chemicals, money laundering

Though there is some difference in the total amount of Plan Colombia, the cost estimate ranges from 4.5 billion to over 7.5 billion dollars (Sneyd, 2009; Ungerman, 2003). This is considerably higher than what Bailey lists. In addition, the consistent estimate for the 2007 Merida Initiative is 1.4 billion dollars for three years with 300 million dollars appropriated over those three years for military equipment (Milardo author year only 2009). This study will use the average of six billion dollars in funding for Plan Colombia with a population of 45 million over a six-year period as the estimate for funding compared to the Merida Initiative which is funded over a three-year period with 1.4 billion dollars and a Mexican population of 110 million. Simple calculations determine that Plan Colombia was funded to twice the level in a 6 year period; six billion dollars over six years compared to 1.4 billion dollars for three years. (Bailey, 2009) Once the percentage is adjusted for population, the amount of funding is 5.2 times as much. A \$133 per person in Colombia compared to a \$25.4 per person for Mexico. Plan Colombia was clearly generously funded as compared to the Merida Initiative.

Table 3 depicts the amounts and type funded programs, the numbers of military advisors, and the lead federal agency in charge of developing the plan.

Table 3. Plan Colombia Compared to 2007 Merida Initiative (From Ware, 2009)

Plan Colombia compared to 2007 Merida Initiative

	Plan Colombia	2007 Merida Initiative
Time of Program	2000-2006	2008-2011 funded
DOS Funding	125 million per yr	300 million per yr
Military Funding	900 million per yr	100 million per yr
DOD/DOS program development	DOD developed	DOS developed
Training of special forces	YES	Some*2
US Military Advisors to	600	0
Military equipment	130 Helicopters 30 Planes	9 Helicopters 4 Planes

*2 Ware reports the training of Mexican Special Forces by U.S. military (Ware, 2009); the actual numbers are classified.

B. LEAD AGENCY

The lead agency in developing Plan Colombia was DoD. Though it is difficult to quantify the correlation between lead agency and funding priorities the two plans are quite different in the amount and types of programs funded. The development of Plan Colombia by DoD emphasized large funding to the Colombian military and security forces. The Department of State (DOS) developed the 2007 Merida Initiative and the majority of funds are to DOS programs for the Mexican justice system compared to the Mexican military. The best year-to-year detailed military funding of Merida is in the following slide from the proposed USNORTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation plan (Milardo, 2009).¹²

¹² FMF stands for foreign military funding.



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Merida Initiative Funding Breakout

	FY08 POTUS Request	FY08 Supp Approved	FY09 Request	FY09 Omnibus Approved	FY10 Request	Total
Total	\$500M (INCL)	\$400M \$283.5 INCL/ESF	\$450M (INCL)	\$300M	\$533M	\$1.383B
Military Portion	\$205.5M (INCL)	\$116.5 FMF	\$120.2M (INCL)	\$39.0M (FMF)	\$259M (FMF)	\$495.7M
DOD Equip	1. Bell 412 helos (8) \$104M 2. CASA CN-235 (2) \$100M 3. Ion scanners \$1.5M	1. Bell 412 helos (5) \$66M 2. CASA CN-235 (1) \$50M 3. Ion scanners (15) \$.5M 4. INL Funded: • (1) NIE (\$2M) • (30) ion scanners (\$1M)	1. NIE (8) \$20.2M 2. CASA CN-235 (2) \$100M	1. Bell 412 helos (3) \$39M	1. MH-60S helos (6-8)	
Status	Amended	1. Dec 09 delivery 2. Dec 10 delivery 3. Current delivery	Not approved	- Awaiting funding - FY09 Supp (Jun 09) Congress approved \$260M for (3) add'l CASAs + (TBD) HH-60s	TBD	

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18 Jun 09

Figure 3. DoD Merida Initiative Funding (From U.S. Northern Command, 2010)

Figure 4 depicts the actual amounts spent in 2008, the projected amount of money that was to have been spent in 2009, and the amount that possibly will be spent in 2010. The numbers of aircraft are still uncertain at this time. As shown in Figure 4, the approved amount of funding did not exceed 40 million dollars of military to military funding in 2009 (U.S. Northern Command, 2010). Unfortunately, 2009 recorded the most deaths from violence in Mexico and was also the least funded year of FMF funding (U.S. Northern Command, 2010).¹³ This appears to be an unfortunate coincidence, as the two levels are not correlated.

¹³ As of August 2010, reported numbers by the government of Mexico estimated the current death toll over 28,000 killed due to the “offensive against the country’s drug cartels” since December 2006 (Latindispatch.com, 2010).


C. INCREASED LEVEL OF SECURITY

Figures 4 and 5 depict the comparison of the levels of security during the years of U.S. involvement in Colombia.

There is still violence occurring in Colombia. As long as the FARC is actively engaged in violent resistance and guerilla warfare with the government of Colombia, the country will have sustained levels of violence. However, the FARC and the main DTOs within Colombia have been degraded by up to 90 percent of capability. (Kushner, 2009). With U.S. assistance and funding, Colombia has improved security and increased the capacity and capabilities of the security forces. Utilizing the measure of performance of improved security, Plan Colombia has been a success. For Mexico, best practices from Plan Colombia can be implemented to reduce the violence in Mexico and make the Merida Initiative a success.

The reduction in violence in Colombia is directly related to the amount of funding and support that was received by Colombia from the U.S. Over a 10 year period, the U.S. funded and supported Colombia security forces through Plan Columbia Figure 5 depicts the base line of violence and the reduction in violence over a five year period.

Plan Colombia Reduction of Violence



*All percentages are from (Colombian Ministry of Defense Report, 2009)

Figure 4. Plan Colombia Reduction of Violence (After Colombian Ministry of Defense, 2009)

Regarding the question about security, there is a measurable increase in Colombian security over the five-year period. There is a correlation between the increased funding and the decrease in violence in Colombia from 2000 till 2005. Other researchers have reported a lower homicide rate than the Colombian Ministry of Defense Report (Gonzalbo, 2009; Ramsey, 2009). Since the peak in 1991, the homicide rate is lower by 60 percent (Gonzalbo, 2009). Once U.S. intervention began, the level of violence and the numbers of incidents are fewer than before the intervention. In addition, the Combat Studies Institute states, “Between 1998 and 2008, Colombian security forces dramatically improved as they moved from what many considered the brink of disaster to being on the verge of victory” (Ramsey, 2009). According to Colombian officials, two

things contributed more than material support and advisors, “The importance of being treated with professional respect and the value of interacting with U.S. military personnel” (Ramsey, 2009).

With material support and advisors from the US, the Colombian military received a wide spectrum of training. Ramsey writes:

Training for the security forces took many forms—individual, group, and unit—and addressed numerous topics: infantry skills, special operations, helicopter pilots and mechanics, combat life-saving, riverine operations, military decision making, intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, military law, and human rights to name a few. Human rights received the greatest emphasis. (Ramsey, 2009)

In addition to the wide spectrum of military training, Ramey identifies the essence of training between the Americans and the Colombians when he writes, “The rigor and problem-solving approach of the Americans and their insistence on integrated planning, helped in organizing and coordinating, improved Colombian security efforts” (Ramsey, 2009). Understanding the host nation’s perspective is a key component to providing indirect military support to security forces. Employing these practices as part of the interaction with Mexico could improve the security forces within Mexico similar to the transformation of the Colombian forces.

D. MEXICO

The correlation between increased military forces and increased violence is a direct result of the change in policy of President Calderon in December 2006. From President Calderon’s attempt to limit the power of the drug cartels, violence increased as the Pack Virus reacted to the change in status quo. From the beginning of the 2006, GOM policy change the violence within Mexico has increased. This is prior to the 2007 Merida Initiative agreement. Though the Mexican approach has not lowered the violence to date, the concept of providing security is a foundation for any strategy. Critics of Merida are incorrect when blaming it with increasing the violence in Mexico (Whitney, 2010). The Merida Initiative provides the foundation for support to Mexico from the U.S.

There are increasing deaths in Mexico due to the Pack Virus fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes between themselves and the GOM. By April 2010, estimates of over 22,000 people have been killed in Mexico due to the “drug war” (Castillo, 2010). Figure 6 depicts the increase of deaths with the increase of military forces deployed over time.

Mexico Violence




Figure 5. Mexico Violence

The red lines indicate the numbers of military deployed and the blue line the number of deaths due to the violence. In 2009, almost 10,000 Mexicans died from the violence caused by the Pack Virus fighting over control of illegal trafficking routes. Though statistics are not complete for 2010, the rate of violence is above the amount for 2009 from January 2010 till March 2010. This upward trend of violence has not reached a plateau even with the addition of more troops deployed to fight the cartels. Reviewing metrics from previous U.S. military engagements with militant groups shows an increase

of violence once military personnel are deployed. Using the past experience of the two Fallujah battles in April and November of 2004, the surge of 2007 in Iraq, and operations in Maraj, Afghanistan in 2010 as models, it confirms that an increase of violence occurs once additional troops are deployed to troubled areas (Ricks, 2009). However, after a period of time, the violence plateaus. Yet, in the case of Mexico, there is no distinguishable plateau of violence observed.

E. TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES (TTPS)

Throughout the first four chapters, the differences in techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) s between conventional military operations and those required in a counter insurgency and 4GW conflict were discussed. The tactics, techniques, and procedures needed in an asymmetric fight against the Pack Virus are shown in Table 7. These align closely with COIN operations vice conventional forces.

Table 4. Conventional vs. Asymmetric Warfare

Conventional vs. Asymmetric Warfare

4GW	COIN	Techniques, Tactics, Procedures	CONVENTIONAL
Vehicle Checkpoints install tracking device	Vehicle Checkpoints	Road Blocks vs Vehicle Checkpoints	Road Blocks
Make into Human Intelligence Source	Gather Intelligence for Further operations	Detainee operations	Search, Segregate, ID Silence, Hold/prison
Police led Raids to gather evidence	Searches and Raids to gain intel/disrupt enemy	Search and Cordon	Attack and Hold Key terrain
Precision Fires Less than Lethal Equipment	Sniper Operations Precision Fires	Fire Power	Mass fires
Create intelligence Sources/Human informants	Intelligence Sharing Operations	Intelligence Operations	Intelligence cycle Focus on enemy forces
80 % SOF Mission	30% SOF Missions	SOF Personnel	90% Conventional troop 10% SOF
Target friendly to support military action	Target host population to NOT support insurgency	Information Operations	Target Enemy Forces Will to fight

The reenergizing and transforming the Mexican military into a national institution that can defeat the Pack Virus and reduce the violence in Mexico requires that a shift away from conventional operations must occur. As Table 7 depicts, the employing conventional military forces against the Pack Virus is not ideal. Additional Special Operations Forces (SOF), Information Operations, and military intelligence units are needed to work within the “gray area” where the Pack Virus operates. These military forces must be able to work with partners within the GOM to insure that the GOM strategy has a designed transition from military to law enforcement operations. Winning the military fight against the Pack Virus requires a reduction of violence, the establishment of credible law enforcement, and a functional GOM criminal justice system in order to prosecute and imprison leaders and supporters of the Pack Virus.

F. CONCLUSION

Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative are not funded equally. Not surprisingly, the violence in Mexico is increasing even as the violence in Colombia decreases. In order for Mexico to be successful in the military fight against the Pack Virus, the Mexican military must transform from a conventional army into a modern counter insurgency force. Through the framework of the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. can assist Mexico in the transformation of the Mexican military through funding, military to military exchanges, and indirect support to the Mexican military.

VI. PROPOSED DOD/USNORTHCOM STRATEGY

A. 2007 MERIDA INITIATIVE AND 2009 COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY

The Merida Initiative 2007, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against the drug cartels in Mexico (Roberts & Walser, 2007). The *2009 Counter Insurgency Guide* outlines a “whole-of-government approach” for the U.S. government to support the fight against non-state entities (U.S. Department of State, 2009). These two documents provide guidance to USNORTHCOM in the development of a strategy to support the U.S. State Department and the government of Mexico in the fight against the Pack Virus in Mexico. The best practices from analysis and the Mexican military deployment experience create opportunities for the development of the USNORTHCOM strategy.

B. USNORTHCOM STRATEGY FOR MEXICAN/U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION

Currently, USNORTHCOM does not have a strategy to support U.S. strategic interests involving the Mexican military or the GOM. Though the funding for the 2007 Merida Initiatives ends in 2011, major modifications to the initiative are not foreseen as the Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s policies (Grillo, 2009). Any strategy involving Mexico must take into account the cultural sensitivities or the political acceptability¹⁴ of the Mexican people and military and the level of corruption throughout Mexico.

The first challenge of collaboration and sharing between the Mexican and U.S. militaries is the lack of established trust between organizations (Covey, 2008). Historically, the two militaries have fought against each other. The Mexican-American

¹⁴ Political acceptability is a term used by Eugene Bardach (2000) in the *Practical Guide for Policy Analysis*.

War is just one of numerous times the two countries have used their military against the other. Almost a century has passed since the last time the U.S. invaded Mexico (Vera Cruz in 1914), but animosity within the Mexican military exists to having the U.S. assistance (Moreno, 2010). The U.S. has not gained Mexican territory since 1848, yet it is this history of conflict, cultural differences, and the different world perspectives of American intervention and Mexican isolation between the two organizations, which must be overcome in order for the two to collaborate effectively. The security cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. must work to counter common threats for both nations and to reinforce the Mexican legacy of “preserving internal security” (Wager, 1994). The common threats for both Mexico and America include: terrorism, drug cartels controlling territory, illegal trafficking (human, drug, weapons, and money smuggling), maritime and air domain situational awareness, and critical infrastructure defense. In addition, the consequence management roles of the Mexican and U.S. military during natural disasters constitute critical components to accomplishing the mission of homeland defense and security.

The USNORTHCOM Mexican strategy must take into account the scale of corruption in Mexico at all levels of government. Fortunately, the Mexican military is one of the least corrupt institutions within Mexico (Newsmax.com, 2005). As reported in the international press by Newsmax, “The [Mexican] military—historically rallying point of Mexican nationalism—was long viewed as relatively free of the kind of corruption that has engulfed the country and many of its institutions” (2009). Interaction with the Mexican military could lead to information loss to the Pack Virus through intimidation or corruption of Mexican officials. This concern can be mitigated through proper intelligence vetting, administration of polygraphs, and implementation of internal security procedures.

C. USNORTHCOM IN A SUPPORTING ROLE

The U.S. national strategy must be articulated at the highest levels as to what end state is desired for all the organizations working in collaboration. The U.S. national strategy comprises more than just the military. It utilizes all the power of the United

States to include: diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) means to achieve the national objectives. The DOS should provide the national level guidance for engagement with Mexico as the lead federal agency. The Department of Defense will publish its guidance to the combatant commanders for theater engagement based on many published plans including: the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF)*,¹⁵ the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)* and the *National Security Strategy 2010* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008; Office of the President of the United States of America, 2010). Thus, the USNORTHCOM strategy for Mexico in a supporting role must provide some tools and a foundation to increase the capability and credibility of the Mexican military. As identified in the literature review, there is a lack of either a classified or an unclassified DOS end state for interacting with Mexico. Commander's guidance and some assumptions as to where the USNORTHCOM strategy should steer is provided by the former Commander USNORTHCOM. Air Force General Gene Renuart:

The threats facing the United States take on many faces: terrorists and terror groups, nation states, drug cartels, uncontrolled immigration and natural and man-made disasters...The enemy seeks to attack the seams and gaps in American defenses...These seams are between areas—such as the boundary between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command; agencies like those between the departments of Defense and Homeland Security; and domains such as space and maritime. (2009)

The USNORTHCOM strategy on Mexico must address the gap that the commander describes in testimony to Congress. This includes the 2000-mile international border with Mexico and the sea approaches of the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, the commander lists the four common threats that should be addressed with Mexico including: terrorist groups, drug cartels (DTOs), uncontrolled immigration, and natural and man-made disasters. Others however, view the threat differently. University of Houston history professor John Mason Hart would argue the U.S. national strategy is a “losing strategy,” and that there should be less funding of the Mexican military. He states, “The U.S. needs to focus more on limiting the demand for drugs and less on

¹⁵ The *Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF)* is a classified document. It establishes the priorities for the services and assigns responsibilities for the combatant commanders.

militarizing Mexico” (Hillen, 2009). In addition to Hart, Corcoran writes that the Merida Initiative is another attempt for the U.S. to influence Mexico through military means vice the stated goals of strengthening the GOM criminal justice system (Corcoran, 2010)

However, the evidence does not support the critics. As listed in Figure 4, the Merida Initiative provides the majority of the funding to development of the Mexican criminal justice system not the Mexican military. Until there is a change to the U.S. national strategy, the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy must support the national strategy and fulfill the commander’s guidance.

The USNORTHCOM theater strategy should emphasize the supporting role of the U.S. military by focusing on enhancing the capabilities of consequence management, military training, mentorship, increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection, maritime and air sovereignty situational awareness, and command and control. As stated in an AP release, President Obama said, “We are going to be dealing not only with drug interdiction coming north, but also working on helping to curb the flow of cash and guns going south” (MSNBC, 2009) With no published change to the Bush administration’s policy towards Mexico, except for more law enforcement activities directed towards the Mexican border, the planning assumption of increasing the professionalism of the Mexican military as an institution in Mexico will be an enabling objective to achieve the overall national goal of stabilizing and then diminishing the drug violence in Mexico.

Though P. Corcoran writes that there is “no GOM strategy” to reduce the violence in Mexico, a USNORTHCOM strategy is still needed in order to support the efforts of the Mexican military (2010). One known component of the GOM strategy is deploying the Mexican military to fight the DTOs. These deployments, if successful, should eventually allow the refocusing of the Mexican military on defense and enable the Mexican law enforcement to deal with the Pack Virus. The endstate for the USNORTHCOM strategy for Mexico is a more capable and professional Mexican military. A more professional Mexican military can be achieved through increasing the efficiency of the Mexican military to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) operations through supporting the Mexican DOTMILPF process as described in Chapter IV.

Utilizing the 2007 Merida Initiative objectives as a catalyst, USNORTHCOM identified eight functional areas to increase the Mexican military's capabilities in the near future. These eight functional areas include: air and maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, command and control network hardware and software, interdiction capabilities, consequence management, special operations, and institutional development (Milardo, 2009). The continued support to these eight functional areas will increase the capabilities of the Mexican military in each of the four common threat areas as outlined by the commander USNORTHCOM. In addition, USNORTHCOM should leverage its vast knowledge of systems and procedures to teach planning and mission analysis to the Mexican military at all levels. The eight functional areas already funded through Merida bond to increasing specific capabilities gaps of the Mexican military. These same capabilities are required in a counterinsurgency (COIN) and 4GW conflict. Compared to current Mexican military doctrine, the increase in capabilities of the eight functional areas will enable the Mexican military to observe, report, and interdict air and maritime trafficking operations within Mexico.

D. WAYS: UTILIZING THE AMERICAN DOTMILPF PROCESS

As explained in Chapter IV, the American military is the best in the world due to a process of doctrine, organization, training, materiel solutions, leadership, education, intelligence, personnel and facilities (DOTMILPF) and the enormous defense budget. Understanding these areas enables the functional areas of the Mexico strategy to be discussed in detail. Also, understanding the constraints that the Mexican military brings to the cooperative efforts enables the strategy to avoid these obstacles.

1. Doctrine and Organization

The doctrine and organizational constraints of the Mexican military due to laws and historic perspective must be taken into consideration. Doctrine is a cornerstone for the foundation of any military organization. Understanding that the USNORTHCOM strategy can only influence and not change the basics of the Mexican military on how its doctrine is written and organizational chart is created allows for a start in discussions to

improve efficiency and capabilities. Typically, capability brings credibility and trust (Covey, 2008). This is similar to the development of the new Iraqi Army when building credibility was more important than being capable (Ricks, 2009). During operations in Ar Ramadi, Iraq in 2005, the Iraqi military faced similar problems of credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people. During a brief to his staff Colonel Smith spoke about credibility, “At times building credibility is more important than being capable” (2005). If the Mexican military has the credibility of being professional, honest, loyal to the constitution and not a person, and thus not corrupt, then the Mexican people will believe the military has more capabilities. This concept of defining security as something other than by capabilities has also been discussed as “subjective security” by Wolfers (Wolfers, 1952). The gain in credibility will buy time to bring the capabilities of the Mexican military to a sufficient level to defend against the common threats of terrorism, drug cartels, illegal trafficking, and air and maritime sovereignty.

Doctrine changes for the Mexican military should also incorporate counter insurgency operations to reflect the realities of the situation in Mexico vice the historic defense of Mexico against U.S. invasion. Further changes to be instituted include:

- A change in laws that would reflect the military or law enforcement (SSP) in command of operations against the Pack Virus
- Revision of the operation plans to include a (JTF) joint task force structure.

Though fighting the Pack Virus for almost three and a half years, the GOM still lacks unity of effort and unity of command as there is no one organization in charge of operations in Mexico. The U.S. could offer experienced counter insurgency and strategic planners to contribute to the writing of a new Mexican doctrine that addresses these discrepancies.

Organizational structure and the divide between SEMAR and SEDENA could be addressed in the following manner:

1. Constructing a U.S. joint task force model, where each organization is represented within the structure of the task force would improve the unity of effort and command of operations against the Pack Virus.

2. Appointing the JTF commander in writing with the authority to conduct operations against the Pack Virus. This would create unity of effort and enable other agencies and organization to support these efforts.
3. Create additional JTFs along the already established military districts within Mexico. If Mexico employs a JTF model, the intelligence function and process can be incorporated into the structure. Intelligence operations need to be expanded to include development of human resources. While the capability is enhanced, the U.S. can contribute additional intelligence resources to Mexico as outlined by the 2007 Merida Initiative.

2. Training, Leadership, and Education

Efficient training, leadership, and education all require mentorship by a professional who is a subject matter expert in the particular area being studied. The military to military exchanges between the Mexican and U.S. military officers must continue. While, these exchanges are ongoing and have occurred for some time, the number and frequency must be increased. The learning and sharing of ideas as equal partners is a very inexpensive way to build camaraderie and friendships. Based on the Colombian experience, meetings and partnering efforts benefited both the Colombian and U.S. officers in development of future operations plans and the understanding of each perspective (Ramsey, 2009). These relationships then can be used to foster more communication between the two military institutions. Leveraging the experience gained from our current counter insurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan in the development of foreign militaries and police forces would allow Mexican commanders the opportunities to learn from our mistakes and triumphs on acting as a police force countering fourth generation warfare. The lessons learned from the Mexican military will benefit the U.S. officers when they return to combat overseas or if the drug violence were to escalate out of control on the northern side of the U.S. border. The increased interaction between the Mexican and U.S. military will help to create a more professional Mexican military. Maintaining these military to military contacts is important for future combined exercises and planning.

Military training is the sharpening of the unit and the personnel. The foundation rests on the doctrine and organization of the military. Changing the doctrine and

organization of the Mexican military to use counter insurgency techniques and procedures similar to those of the U.S. military is a requirement to improve the training and education of the Mexican military. Proven combat techniques, tactics and procedures in fighting terrorists and insurgents in the Iraqi desert or the Pack Virus in gun battles in Juarez are all the similar and necessary to win a fourth generation gun battle. However, winning the tactical gunfight is not as important as winning the population over to support operations against the Pack Virus. Training to conduct COIN is more time consuming and can only be successful if there is decentralized execution of the TTPS on the battlefield.¹⁶

Mentorship is a key component for all professional military education (PME). For example, as quoted by General John A. Lejune, in the *U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-11*, “The relation between officers and enlisted men should in no sense be that of superior and inferior, nor that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son” (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], 2002). Mentorship of all members of the Mexican military includes recognition of their abilities and constraints due to the doctrine and organization of the Mexican military. Specifically, a mentorship program between the Mexican and U.S. military should be both sides acting as the teacher and the scholar learning from each other. Even though the Mexican military does not emphasize joint operations, (Navy, Air Force, Army working together) training the Mexican military can be tailored to fit the student. In addition, the interaction of the enlisted between the U.S. and Mexican military would provide the Mexican military with examples to emulate.

The Mexican military must improve initial training for troops deployed to conduct operations in support of law enforcement. Counter insurgency, police techniques, tactics, and procedures must be taught, maintained, and sustained throughout the ongoing contingency operations.

¹⁶ For a list of TTPs comparison see Figure 7 in Chapter V.

3. Material Solutions

Material solutions include the hardware and software of the command and control systems, radar platforms, and aircraft. These are excellent tools for assisting in the gaining and maintaining of situational awareness and gathering intelligence within Mexico. The United States is very good at producing technological solutions for military problems. Night vision goggles (NVGs) to counter human smuggling activities on the border are a prime example of the materiel solutions that the U.S. military is providing to the Mexican military at the tactical level. Advanced radar and sonar to track planes and boats in the Gulf of Mexico are hardware that can be used to gain situational awareness. These are examples of operational capabilities to be expanded and sustained under the Merida Initiative. Additionally, the raw data created from the radar picture needs to be fed into a command and control center where the command, control, communication, computers and information (C4I) process can complete the intelligence picture for the Mexican military. The material solutions that USNORTHCOM is already providing to the Mexican military from the 2007 Merida Initiative include: ion scanners, aircraft, NVGs, small boats, and radars (Milardo, 2009).¹⁷ Increasing the capabilities for the Mexican military is only one part of the strategy. A more capable Mexican military, with many new items but is still corrupt, will not help to support either the GOM strategy or the U.S. national strategy. Correcting the problem of corruption is an ongoing and continuous problem for the GOM. The use of technology, in the form of polygraphs, to decrease corruption is a simple material solution to the persistent problem which faces Mexico. It should be noted that the polygraph is only as reliable as the operator.

Material solutions and support from the U.S. in technology and specialized equipment should be sustained. Mexico has the majority of military equipment required to sustain operations against the Pack Virus. More importantly, the equipment must be maintained and integrated into the entire military system. Providing radars for air and maritime surveillance is useless if the personnel running the radars do not know how to

¹⁷ See Figure 5 for the list of military equipment funded by the 2007 Merida Initiative.

maintain the equipment and the equipment is not integrated and connected to the larger C4I system. The material solution requires training of personnel to be effective and efficient.

4. Personnel

The corruption within the Mexican military is not a profound problem, but one that must be addressed in order to raise the credibility of the institution. As the Zetas are famous for joining the military and learning military skills in order to then sell their capability to the drug cartels is a trend that must be countered (Grillo,2008) The practice of recruiting the poor in Mexico will not change as the military is one avenue to create opportunities for the poorest to prosper. Nevertheless, the Mexican military must start to recruit the increasing numbers of the growing middle class within Mexico. This will not lead to less corruption driven by money, as the cartels can pay incredible amounts of money to corrupt officials. The inclusion of the middle class into the Mexican military would begin the transformation of the institution from the wealthy traditionalists as officers and the poor as enlisted. USNORTHCOM can mentor the Mexican military and offer suggestions for recruiting more talented individuals. Once recruited the Mexican military must retain the best and brightest through education, pay, and providing facilities for their families.

Increasing the quality of personnel of the Mexican military will contribute to decreasing the corruption within Mexico. The Mexican military that has the means to fight the drug cartels is less influenced by the cartels compared to Mexican law enforcement (Castaneda, 2010). To increase its human capital, the Mexican military must be educated and trained to a higher standard. This training can occur at both U.S. military schools and the established Mexican military schools. Prior to attending a U.S. military school, the Mexican military personnel should take a polygraph test and be vetted by both the Mexican and U.S. governments. This would eliminate potential “bad apples” and raise the bar for the standards across the Mexican military and the Mexican federal government. It would be a first step to sharing of sensitive information with the Mexican military. Increasing the education and training of the Mexican military will

increase the capability and credibility of this institution. Having a strong, reliable and non corrupt military benefits Mexico by serving as a credible institution to emulate and employ. In addition, it benefits U.S. interests to have a competent ally on our southern border filling a current gap identified by the USNORTHCOM commander.

5. Facilities

The force protection of U.S. bases throughout the world is the highest standard for physical counter measures against terrorism (TRADOC, 1997). The Mexican military should improve the base structures in which the military is billeted. These secure locations then offer the Mexican military a place to keep families safe, fed, and housed. Once the Mexican military personnel have better base facilities they will be less susceptible to corruption from the drug cartels. In addition, the institutions that develop the leadership within the Mexican military must be expanded. Academies for the officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and boot camps should be modernized and through put increased. At these institutions, the Mexican military must develop lectures and teachings on ethics and loyalty to the Mexican constitution. These secure areas will provide the Mexican military with a place to train and live away from the outside influences of the drug cartels. Once the military bases are secure, the same principles of defense and counter measures can be applied to other critical infrastructure in Mexico such as the international electric power system and Gulf of Mexico oil platforms.

E. CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE EIGHT FUNCTIONAL AREAS FUNDED THROUGH THE MERIDA INITIATIVE

1. C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information Management

Increased command and control capability includes all parts of the C4I system. Having the ability to see across the Gulf of Mexico with a new radar system but not the ability to relay that information to a command post, which orders a new plane to intercept a suspected drug shipment, is not a failure of hardware or training but of a process. Increasing air and maritime awareness means tracking, listing, and controlling

information flow through and among Mexican military units with the responsibility for these missions. The increases in surveillance capabilities created by the Merida Initiative are useless without an increased capability in understanding C4I processes. Utilizing USNORTHCOM expertise to track and monitor all the air traffic in North America should be taught to the Mexican military.

2. ISR: Intelligence Collection, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

Increased numbers of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection platforms increases the surveillance capability of the Mexican military. The material solutions have been discussed, yet the system to process the information gained from the sensor platforms must also be understood and mastered by Mexican military personnel. Having the best radar platform, but not being able to maintain the system nor feed the information to a regional or national level headquarters, is a suboptimal application of a material solution. The importance is the ability to observe and report violations of Mexican maritime and air sovereignty. Providing real time situational awareness to the Mexican military increases the information used by the Mexican government to combat the common threat of drug smuggling. Increased surveillance, however, increases the information the military must process. Systems must be updated with hardware and software which allows this information to be processed through a C4I system producing better real time intelligence. These resources can be used for monitoring the border, maritime and air sovereignty or critical infrastructure.

3. Intelligence

Intelligence involves the processing of information to help make decisions. Intelligence is a broad area that includes: systems, human, signal, imagery, and electronic intelligence. All make up the separate parts of the intelligence system. Human intelligence must also be employed to fight human and drug smuggling operations. The integration of federal law enforcement information (DEA, FBI, ATF) already occurs within USNORTHCOM. Similar integration within the Mexican military will not occur until the corruption problem is corrected. Even so, vetted Mexican military must be

allowed to use U.S. intelligence to fight the Pack Virus. Increasing the Mexican military's ability to break cipher and encrypted messages or computers from drug cartels is not within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility; however, the U.S. can provide assistance in decoding the messages and computers. This assistance can lead to new intelligence to be utilized against the Pack Virus. Finding ways to utilize the vast intelligence resources of the U.S. in support of the Mexican military should continue. USNORTHCOM should be a bridge between the U.S. intelligence community and the Mexican military.

4. Mexican Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Mexican Special Operation Forces (SOF) must be increased to counter the internal threat from the Pack Virus. Special Forces conduct raids, undercover work, surveillance, tracking, and scouting missions for the military. These forces are in training longer and under more stressful conditions than conventional military troops. The increased professionalism of these forces leads to less corruption and increased operational capabilities among the Mexican military. In the near term, these professionals are conducting raids on known drug cartel sites capturing people and equipment. In the future, after the Mexican law enforcement resumes responsibility for fighting the Pack Virus, special operations forces should be the bridge connecting the military to law enforcement. Using this pathway, special operations forces and military personnel from the U.S. could train Mexican law enforcement in the near to midterm, until U.S. State Department teams are in place. As described in Table 7, the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed in an asymmetric fight against the Pack Virus are best employed by the highly trained Special Operations Forces. The use of special operations forces increases as missions in the 4GW environment demand an increase in precision engagement, criminal investigations, and intelligence collection operations—which require more professionalism and specialization.

5. Institutional Development

Institutional development is the increase of professionalism of the military through expansion of existing schools and courses, military to military liaison officers, observer, and distinguished visitor exchanges. In addition, the creation of Mexican non-commissioned officer academies will create a more professional enlisted corps of military personnel. Through boot camp to retirement, ethics, and loyalty to the Mexican constitution should be emphasized at all schools. The Mexican military should be a route out of poverty for anyone in Mexico as a non corrupt respected institution. Building a more professional Mexican military regardless of capabilities will increase the credibility of the institution. The Mexican military has historically been an institution of pride and power within Mexico. Leveraging this tradition and increasing the professionalism of the military will create a stronger tool for the GOM to employ against the Pack Virus.

6. Interdiction Operations

Interdiction of suspected illegal traffickers is accomplished through integration of aircraft, speed boats, better checkpoints, and timely intelligence. Improved search techniques at random and known check points can lead to more information in respect to drug routes and human smuggling locations. Technologies (material solutions) are already being bought and employed by the Merida Initiative. The continuation of buying and maintaining the aircraft, speedboats, and sensors must be planned for by the Mexican military. The planning process and future funding for this existing equipment must begin immediately before the equipment becomes unserviceable. In the fight against the Pack Virus, the interdiction of illegal trafficking routes creates intelligence for future operations and disrupts the funding and logistics of the Pack Virus.

7. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is primarily a military function. The expansion of special operations forces will enable more assets to be employed in defending against the potential employment of these weapons. Terrorist groups using WMD or chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and high explosive yield (CBRNE)

devices are a common threat to both Mexico and the U.S. The failure to stop terrorists from using WMD will result in catastrophic economic, psychological, and physical damage. This damage will directly affect the national security of both nations no matter where the event occurs. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved the economic ties between America and Mexico were strained by shutting down the border. Andreas writes, “The resulting traffic jams and other border delays sent shock waves through the local economies on both sides of the border. Mexican trade to the United States contracted by 15 percent in the weeks that followed” (2004). Counter proliferation operations, international agreements, and security assistance are common areas of cooperation focusing on WMD and terrorist groups, between Mexico and the United States.

8. Consequence Management (CM) and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA)

Consequence management operations when conducted in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner builds the credibility of the military institution in the eyes of the people. Mexico’s laws dictate the use of the military during and after natural disasters, earthquakes, or hurricanes (Wager, 1994). Consequence management involves providing an appropriate response to a disaster. Providing capabilities to the local communities, which no other institution can provide due to timing or competing requirements, are basic humanitarian assistance tasks. Providing shelter, food and water; moving logistics and equipment; and operating in all areas are basic skills of any military organization. Building capabilities for consequence management that increase the basic skill level of the Mexican military should focus resources on these realistic and most likely operations. For example, both countries should start to conduct combined exercises using a scenario of a major hurricane hitting the international border of Texas and Mexico. Information sharing, planning, and the personnel exchanges for these exercises would enable regular interaction between the two militaries. Preparing to conduct consequence management operations will increase the professionalism of the Mexican military and create opportunities for interaction between the military and local communities. These relationships, in turn, can be leveraged to gain information on Pack Virus operations and community concerns.

The proper use of public affairs and information operations during these training events could positively increase the perception of the Mexican military in areas such as Juarez. Development of robust information operations and public affairs capabilities is a requirement for COIN and 4GW operations. In addition, conducting combined operations in northern Mexico would generate additional information from local human sources and provide opportunities to the U.S. intelligence community to assist its Mexican counterpart target its region with electronic intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment.

F. MEANS

The lack of funding past 2011 is the immediate problem that the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy faces. Congress must authorize new appropriations for funding the eight functional areas past 2011. There are currently 16 separate lines of funding that support the present day Merida Initiatives (Milardo, 2009). The prioritization of funding must remain at the current level and not be reduced to the 2007 levels for this cooperation to continue towards success.

Human capital as a resource must be employed through more mentorship programs and interaction between the leadership of both militaries. Trainers for the Mexican military must be identified, prepared and equipped for duties from the U.S. military. U.S. military trainers should be used to train the Mexican police until the DOS can arrange to have other teams take over and provide professional instruction. The Mexican military should be encouraged to expand the number of military members attending U.S. military schools at all levels. This training must occur immediately in order to employ the new materiel solutions (e.g., planes, helicopters, ion sensors). In addition to the police and specific skill sets, the U.S. military would benefit from training regular Mexican military personnel in preparation for its own operations in Afghanistan training Afghan armed forces, border guards, and law enforcement personnel. Training foreign militaries is a common mission for the U.S. military, but a specialty for Special Operations Forces. Gaining experience in a real world operation prior to combat operations will better prepare the entire U.S. military for its deployments.

Time is the most critical resource once the funding expires. Focusing on the near term requires that the capabilities and materiel solutions already funded must be delivered on time. Increasing funding along 16 separate lines of funding should be based on empirical research rather than the “wish list” mentality that occurred in the beginning of the Merida Initiative.¹⁸ Capability shortfalls must be prioritized in order to be identified, funded, and sourced.

Leadership from senior officers in both militaries must continue to set the conditions for open exchanges and communication between the organizations. Military-to-military exchanges, liaison positions, combined exercises, and education will only occur if the commander supports the program. Working together and providing the most talented officers to focus on the problems of funding and research is a leadership function. Recognizing which problems can be fixed through military solutions and which are best suited for other national level agencies must be identified by USNORTHCOM.

Leveraging both the USNORTHCOM Interagency Directorate and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (NC/SJFHQ) would enable numerous lines of communication and coordination to remain in place for planning, exercises, and support. Prior to conducting combined operations with the Mexican military, these liaison officers and planners could conduct familiarization and orientation exchanges with the Mexican military. Obviously, additional translators and language proficiency must be addressed for both militaries to operate efficiently together. Yet, this frequent exchange of officers and planning, both the Mexican military and USNORTHCOM can facilitate the improved execution of real world operations.

G. CONCLUSION

Preparing for fourth generation warfare requires an expansion of intelligence collection, analysis, and processing of data with regard to these organizations. Human intelligence takes years to develop, but must be employed in order to counter the growing

¹⁸ The “wish list” of items that was funded as military equipment for the initial purchase for the Mexican military was funded by utilizing sixteen separate lines of accounting, that were in some cases reimbursed once the Merida Initiative funding was approved (Milardo, 2009).

threat. Though DoD controls almost 80 percent of the Intelligence Community's (IC) assets, these assets are focused predominately on the threats in current theater of operations (Iraq and Afghanistan). With limited DoD assets available in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, due to legal restrictions posed by intelligent oversight policies and employment in other theaters, the non-state entities in the U.S. must become a focus of DHS and DOJ intelligence gathering.

There is little evidence that suggests a 4GW fight will be won by military means alone, as only seven percent of terrorist organizations are defeated through military means (Jones, 2010). A parallel is that successful counter gang strategies involve more than law enforcement (Brannan, 2006; Sullivan, 2008). In addition, the 2007 Merida Initiative divides the responsibility of helping Mexico end drug violence by placing DOS as the lead federal agency and employing numerous agencies in addition to DoD.

Yet, DoD should not be discarded as a vital player in the homeland security of the US, against this emerging threat. Through USNORTHCOM, DoD should develop a strategy to increase the support to the Mexican military, which is currently fighting the Pack Virus. In fact, part of the solution to reducing the violence in Mexico and the U.S. is insuring that GOM defeats and disrupts the Pack Virus's illegal trafficking operations along the U.S./Mexico border. Lastly, the destruction of these groups will be through incarceration and destruction of leadership, intelligence sharing, and loss of profits from illegal trafficking operations. This requires a coordinated support from law enforcement, DoD, DOS, and DOJ and the GOM counterparts. The grey area must be divided into operational lanes where each organization liaisons and contributes to solutions for each problem.

Once the Pack Virus is contained and disrupted, the threat of terrorists using the illegal trafficking routes in order to infiltrate the U.S. will be decreased. The "marriage of convenience" between terrorist groups and Pack Virus based on mutual interests and monetary gain may continue, but this interaction will be targeted by U.S. intelligence resources. Ultimately, Mexico and the U.S. will be more secure once these groups are marginalized as power brokers within Mexico. Regardless of what definition is used to

define the Pack Virus or fourth generation warfare, the emerging threat to the future security of both nations is the non-state entities conducting illegal trafficking operations and open warfare in Mexico.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of the recommendations is to strengthen the current Mexican national strategy and to prepare for a future fight with non-state entities on American soil by continuing to support the DOS efforts within the framework of the Merida Initiative. In the previous chapters the problem of non-state entities conducting fourth generation warfare in Mexico was explained. The Merida Initiative creates opportunities for USNORTHCOM to assist the Mexican military with indirect support. The key take away from this thesis is that the problem is not isolated in Mexico, as these organizations have direct ties to cities within America (FBI, 2010). Any solution to the “Mexico situation” must be a combined effort and supported by both the GOM and the U.S. (Winnefeld, 2010).

Diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) means to achieve national objectives must be used together to defeat the threat of non-state entities operating in Mexico and the U.S. Over reliance of the military to accomplish the mission will limit the effectiveness of the response (Department of the Army (b), 2006). Utilizing counter insurgency operations and law enforcement techniques enables the Mexican military to sharpen the focus of its operations among the populace; however, the military is still a blunt force instrument, where quick results may not eliminate the cause of the problem. Social, economic, and information solutions may create environments more suitable to sustained rule of law and provide a catalyst for the people to openly seek to distance themselves from the non-state entities.

Though far from a perfect solution, the GOM strategy to confront the Pack Virus by deploying the Mexican military as the lead agency creates opportunities for USNORTHCOM to partner with our strategic ally. The support to the GOM must continue in order to confront the emerging threat to America. The Mexican military is the least corrupt institution available to the GOM. Solutions to confront the realities in Mexico are not limited to only the Mexican authorities. The U.S. government can create

operational space by confronting the threat in the U.S. and by assisting the GOM through continued support of Merida. The disruption of the Pack Virus throughout the U.S. will enable the GOM to confront the threat in Mexico with greater success.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommendation 1: Continue U.S. Indirect Military Support to Mexico

President Calderon's change in Mexican policy and the 2007 Merida Initiative have provided opportunities for DoD to strengthen ties with the Mexican military. The U.S. must continue the indirect approach to countering the Pack Virus operating in Mexico. Indirect military support to Mexico should be increased in the DOTMILPF areas described in Chapter VI. Increase the number of U.S. personnel attending Mexican military schools and encourage the Mexican military to send more personnel to U.S. professional development courses. This is an immediate and cost effective way to increase the capability of the Mexican military through mentorship, leadership in the middle, and the pacesetter approach (Goleman, 2000).

In addition to utilizing the indirect support of military engagement with Mexico, the U.S. must increase the priority of Mexico in the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) (Gates, 2009).¹⁹ The GEF must reflect the prioritization of Mexico as part of the U.S. national military strategy. A change to the GEF is needed to reflect the continuing support of the U.S. to Mexico.

2. Recommendation 2: Leverage Consequence Management Combined Operations

Consequence management is directed by law for both the Mexican and U.S. militaries.²⁰ The intent of the law is clear that the military can respond to disasters.

¹⁹ The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) is a classified document. It establishes the priorities for the services and assigns responsibilities for the combatant commanders.

²⁰ The Mexican Defense plan of DN-III-E establishes military procedures during a natural disaster. It can be found at <http://www.sedena.gob.mx>.

Planning to discuss the issues of search and rescue (SAR) operations, mass migrations, mutual assistance, and air and maritime control of the operational area must occur in the near future. Providing a template of organization of a combined headquarters in the case of a disaster along the border is one mission of the USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters (NC/SJFHQ). Leveraging these officers and the consequence management professionals of USNORTHCOM to plan for resource shortfalls is necessary to produce better operational plans for both the U.S. and Mexico. The Mexican military and USNORTHCOM must develop common terminology and habitual working relationships prior to a disaster occurring. As the two militaries become more familiar with each other's operations, capabilities, and terminology, the working relationship between the U.S. and Mexico will become less rigid and, hopefully, less formal. A relationship similar to the U.S. Marines and the British Royal Marines, where the organizations effectively communicate ideas, plan, and train together, would enable the two organizations to operate successfully together during war ²¹ (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Consequence management offers an immediate template to work through common issues which can be used for subsequent discussions about mutual support against the Pack Virus. In addition, as a planning event against national disasters and catastrophic events, politicians, the public, and critics are less likely to complain of increasing readiness that directly contributes to increased preparedness and more rapid and effective response among ourselves and neighbors.

More importantly, when combating 4GW, the strategic message to the populace must be reinforced that the Mexican and U.S. militaries are working together. Meeting and discussions of consequence management are not only needed to improve the efficiency of both militaries during a disaster, but create a unified message that the two militaries are capable of solving mutual problems together. The two militaries working together and sharing information enable a stronger in depth defense of North America from common threats.

²¹ For a more detailed description, read Gordon and Trainor's *Cobra II*, about how the U.S. Marines of the 15th MEU were working for a British General who worked for a combined joint forces land component commander, who is a U.S. Army General.

3. Recommendation 3: U.S. Congress Fund the Merida Initiative Past 2011

Through the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. and Mexico have used diplomacy and finances to support the Mexican change in policy. Merida has created the support template to Mexico and contributes to the military, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement of DIME-FIL. Arguably the economic portion of aiding Mexico with 1.4 billion dollars in funding is an important part of the program. Yet, the original agreement was only funded until 2011 by the U.S. Congress (Milardo, 2009). The Merida Initiative must continue and be fully funded past the original 2011 deadline. The Initiative is more than just a military solution. It encompasses most elements of DIME-FIL (diplomacy, information, military, economic, finances, intelligence, and law enforcement). The emphasis on supporting all of the tenets of national power must be maintained and continued for the GOM to be successful in defeating the Pack Virus.

USNORTHCOM has identified eight functional areas that have already received support and funding due to Merida. These functional areas must be funded with a more streamlined approach of appropriations instead of 16 separate lines of accounting (Milardo, 2009). The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy requires additional funding to achieve the increases in the Mexican military professionalism required to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, the paramilitaries, and the violent gangs within Mexico and the U.S. The funding requires congressional support through appropriations of specific funds by new legislation and appropriations or through supplemental funding.²²

Fixing the immediate gaps in capabilities already established by the Merida Initiative is a continuous process of identifying, prioritizing, and sourcing. The U.S. military industrial complex is superior at providing materiel solutions to the capability problems of the Mexican military. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a study to “assess the effect that Border Patrol activity has on the number of illegal entry

²² The fiscal year 2011 supplemental appropriations act signed by President Obama on June 25, 2010 authorized an additional 420 million dollars for the Merida Initiative (Committee on Appropriations, 2010). As of August 2, 2010, no other information was available on the distribution of funds as to whether this was additional funding or just the release of funds from the original 1.4 billion dollars pledged (U.S Embassy Mexico, 2010).

attempts” and the illegal immigration rates from Mexico along the southwest border (Center for Naval Analysis, 2008). As the CNA report states, sourcing capabilities that are not needed or not integrated are not helpful. Research on specific shortfalls must be undertaken in order to prioritize which shortfall will be sourced. A dedicated team of officers or finance professionals should be formed to continue preparing for budget items, until the U.S. Congress appropriates funding to directly support Mexico.

4 Recommendation 4: Military to Military Exchanges

Increasing the number of military to military exchanges and conferences is an immediate and cost effective approach to supporting Mexico. These exchanges provide venues in which to communicate and plan for consequence management operations. In addition, these venues provide opportunities for U.S. intelligence agencies to vet the Mexican officers who attend the conferences against drug cartel organizational charts.

An immediate conference of senior leaders from both countries must occur to identify the problems of the Merida Initiative. The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy must have Mexican input and reflect plausible outcomes. This is similar to the observations of Ramsey when studying after actions of Plan Colombia stated that planning and interaction with the U.S. military raised the level of professionalism and provided improved solutions to the problems of DTOs (Ramsey, 2009). Without collaboration from the Mexican military the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will fail.

5. Recommendation 5: Increase Intelligence Collection Operations on Non-State Entities

Intelligence must drive proactive operations instead of reactive investigations of crimes committed by the Pack Virus. This is similar to the intelligence led policing (ILP) report of New Jersey, where law enforcement is “shifting from emphasizing post-event evidence collection to constantly gathering all relevant data” (Fuentes, 2006). DoD assets must be used in collection operations against the Pack Virus as DoD controls 75 to 80 percent of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assets (Lowenthal, 2009).

In addition, similar violent groups have been successfully targeted by utilizing a task force model. In 2005, the National Major Gang Task Force utilized the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to prosecute members of MS-13. The collaborative efforts of the federal intelligence community combined with local law enforcement activities would have a greater effect on diminishing the capabilities of these organizations. According to the National Major Gang Task Force, “The integration and partnerships between corrections, law enforcement, military and education has resulted in obtaining successful state criminal indictments and Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) prosecutions with multiple defendants” (2005). Creating a similar joint task force may produce similar results against the Pack Virus.

One approach is to create a joint task force (JTF) targeting non-state entities similar to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) that pursue terrorist organizations and violent criminal gangs. The task force must include interagency partners from the GOM and the U.S. The collection of information against non-state groups must include national intelligence assets, federal law enforcement liaison with other nations, and partners within the criminal justice system. Prison officials, parole officers, and social workers who have contact with the people of these groups must be cultivated as sources of information. Collection from human sources close to or within these groups takes considerable time to organize (Department of the Army (a), 2006; Perkins, 1998). Therefore, the proposed JTF must start now to create human intelligence about these groups in order to assist Mexico and prepare for possible increased violence in the U.S. from non-state entities. Developing the human element of local law enforcement informants and tip lines from the public will lead to more arrests in order to disrupt operations. Liaison officers from Mexico must be vetted and included into the JTF.²³ Since the non-state groups are international in nature, limiting the potential collection of information to only U.S. law enforcement assets plays to the advantage of non-state entities by enabling them to remain clandestine and use jurisdiction to elude the police.

²³ If a JTF is established with foreign military members it is technically called a CJTF for Combined Joint Task Force, yet for the purposes of this thesis the term JTF will suffice.

Cooperation among federal agencies and departments must occur and all federal agencies should contribute to the JTF. The Department of Treasury must be involved in tracking the finances of these groups. The Department of State must be involved in sharing information and requesting information from other nations (particularly Colombia, El Salvador, Canada, and Mexico) to track the movements and leadership of these groups. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security must lead the efforts to prioritize the non-state groups as an emerging threat to America and lead the JTF intelligence requirements as DHS is the organization with responsibility for border security. Channell explained the emphasis on prioritization of the intelligence process when we writes, “Senior officials [of DHS] should first identify the new agency's intelligence requirements or Essential Elements of Information (EEI)...while ensuring that intelligence assessments or even raw information is disseminated quickly to law enforcement and security personnel” (2002). Energizing and informing the intelligence community’s policy makers that DHS sees these non-state groups as a priority creates the conditions to improve the process of intelligence gathering on the Pack Virus. In addition, DHS will provide the feedback from the consumer of intelligence to focus national assets on this tactically challenging problem and provide strategically important support to allies against non-state organizations.

6. Recommendation 6: Continue the Extraditions of DTO Leaders to the U.S.

In Mexico, the criminal justice system is corrupt and broken (Kearney, 2009). In the future, the entire Mexican criminal justice system must be used to support the fight against the non-state entities. Prisons, judges, courts, and prosecutors must be focused on this problem. In Mexico, numerous people have bribed or shot their way out of prisons, which are controlled by the inmates through corruption of officials (El Universal, 2010; Inside Prison.Com). This Pack Virus tactic of breaking out of prison has not yet occurred in the U.S. However, in both the U.S. and Mexico, non-state entities continue to operate from prison. “According to the *LA Times*, gang members pay guards to smuggle in cell phones, which members use to consult and communicate with other members in Guatemala, Honduras and the US” (Corsi, 2007; Inside Prison.Com). Currently, Mexico

uses a secret court system and unidentified judges in order to help fight the corruption (Kearney, 2009). Until Mexico creates a less corrupt criminal justice system, which enables the non-state entities to operate within the system, high profile leaders should continue to be extradited to the U.S. in order to stand trial.

7. Recommendation 7: Revise the Roles of the Military in U.S. Homeland Defense

The operational use of the U.S. military must be revised in order to support the other components of national power. The strategic concept that a strong military will deter an enemy must be updated to take into consideration the globalization and systematic violence a non-state entity can bring to bear within a state. Globalization has created interconnectedness and complexity that calls for reevaluation of the use of the military as deterrence (Moghaddam, 2008). Strategically, having the best military is not a deterrent for non-state entities as the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda have proven.

Non-state entities are using fourth generation warfare (4GW) to fight for control of areas in Mexico. Placing the responsibility of targeting and collecting information regularly against these non-state entities on the U.S. military would be a very proactive step in policy to prepare for 4GW occurring on American soil. Non-state entities in Mexico and the U.S. conduct intelligence operations, intimidation campaigns, information operations, transportation, and networking to conduct illegal trafficking operations. In addition, these groups are well equipped and financed (Grayson, 2010; Grillo, 2008). Employing the military solely in the role of the police to provide strategic solutions will handicap the government's response similar to the results of the last few years in Mexico. The U.S. military must prepare for the next fight before it occurs on U.S. soil by better integration and collaboration with U.S. law enforcement prior to the escalation of violence in America.

Proactively and properly preparing for war is to prepare the battlefield prior to fighting (Department of the Army, 1994; Tzu, 2009). Currently the use of liaison officers from the DEA, FBI, DHS, ATF and other law enforcement agencies at USNORTHCOM and JTF North, enables the military to have a basic understanding of the growing threat.

The gathering of intelligence, targeting (kinetic and non kinetic) and interdiction of non-state entities no matter their location or intent would increase the understanding and knowledge of the enemy. The revised military approach would be a strategic shift in targeting non-state entities for engagement by the U.S. military.

A change to U.S. law, specifically the use of Active Duty Title 10 forces in the indirect support but not “pursuit and apprehension” of these non-state groups operating in the U.S., is not needed. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) limits the U.S. military in its ability to conduct law enforcement operations in the U.S., but more specifically it limits the arrest of American citizens by the military. Some of the people within the Pack Virus are U.S. citizens. The power to use the military against non-state entities engaged in these criminal activities is already available. As Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez addressed in his comments during the planning conference in February 2010, “The U.S. military can target these groups outside the U.S. according to 10USC 376-385, CJCSI 3121.01B and fiscal year 1991 NDAA (National Defense Appropriations Act) sect 1004B as amended” (2010). DoD would not be the lead, but would support law enforcement efforts throughout the U.S.

Legislation allowing intelligence gathering and surveillance of non-state entities involved in terrorism or narcotics trafficking in America by the U.S. military is already in place (Sanchez, 2010). As highlighted by the GOM, the use of the military to provide a police force to counter the non-state entities in Mexico is one tool a nation state can employ to defeat non-state entities. Historically, the U.S. has used the military in areas where corruption or ideology did not allow law enforcement to be trusted to fulfill the mission. The intervention by the U.S. military during the late 1950s in response to efforts to secure civil rights is one historical example of intervention by the U.S. military in the U.S (U.S. Army, 2010). The current military deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have created a talented pool of counter insurgency operators. This corps of professionals can write new doctrine and continue to train for these types of operations in support of U.S. law enforcement, but only if directed by the DoD and USNORTHCOM.

8. Recommendation 8: Improving the Mexican Military

The following recommendations are to improve the Mexican military in their primary mission as law enforcement in order to support the GOM strategy for dealing with the Pack Virus. However, these recommendations are made not from personal experience or observations but from open source reporting of the operations in Mexico. Recommendations include:

1. The Mexican military should also incorporate counter insurgency (COIN) operations into the doctrine. Utilizing the best practices from both Plan Colombia and the current U.S. wars provide a foundation for a change of military doctrine by the Mexican military. This change would reflect more counter insurgency operations and would contribute to the capability of the military in this current fight against the Pack Virus.
2. The divide between SEMAR and SEDENA could be addressed by adopting the U.S. joint task force (JTF) system, where each organization is represented within the structure of the task force. However, creating a like image of the U.S. military in Mexico will not be supported nor is endorsed due to historical and cultural legacy of Mexico. Fortunately, the JTF model can be used to integrate both organizations without disrupting the Mexican constitution and be immediately employed as an operational concept and model.
3. The Mexican military must improve initial training for troops deployed to conduct operations in support of law enforcement. Counterinsurgency operations and police techniques, tactics, and procedures must be taught, maintained, and sustained throughout this contingency operation. The U.S. could offer experienced COIN planners to sustain Mexican doctrine development. In addition, the U.S. could continue to provide mobile training teams (MTTs) to teach small units of the Mexican military.
4. Leadership and career courses for the Mexican military must be created. Until these staff academies are operational, the U.S. could increase the input of Mexican military to these career courses. In addition, Mexican liaison officers could be vetted through intelligence and military processes. Once vetted, these officers would help to bring additional credibility to the Mexican military. The use of American courses is a temporary solution to fill the void until the Mexican military can perform this function.
5. The Mexican military should improve the base structures in which the military is billeted in order to create safe havens which cannot be penetrated by the Pack Virus.

B. CONCLUSION

The ultimate objective of the U.S. national strategy is to strengthen the government of Mexico through indirect support to the Mexican military and increase the efficiency of the Mexican justice system. Assisting the GOM to defeat the Pack Virus will help to stop the illegal trafficking prior to entering Mexico from Central and South America and will relieve pressure on the Department of Homeland Security to control the flow of drugs across the 2000-mile southern American border and the Gulf Coast region. As stated by the commander NORAD and USNORTHCOM, Admiral Winnefeld, “While not a counterinsurgency, the Mexico situation has many of the same characteristics” (Winnefeld, 2010).

The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will reinforce the principles of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of America which emphasizes the importance of defending America against threats before they occur in the United States by having an “active layered defense” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). The strengthening of our southern ally supports this national strategy. In addition to supporting the NDS, the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will benefit Mexico in the transformation of its military into a more professional and specialized counterinsurgency force. Fortunately, this is one of the strongest and least corrupt institutions within Mexico. More importantly, a stronger Mexican military enables the U.S. to partner with Mexico during response efforts to natural or man-made disasters along the international border. Leveraging the expertise and resources of the U.S. military to partner with the Mexican military in order to help educate the Mexican military in counter insurgency operations is within the construct of the Merida Initiative and supports the growth and transformation of the Mexican military to create a layered defense.

Obviously, the strengthening of the Mexican military benefits more than just the DoD mission. There are three main beneficiaries of the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy. The Mexican people, DHS, and the U.S. economy will benefit from a stronger and more capable Mexican military which provides a foundation for the GOM to reestablish law and order to the chaos of the “Mexican situation.” A strong Mexican

military solidifies the authority of the Mexican government, creates an institution to provide a foundation for leveraging support against the Pack Virus, and contributes to more stability for economic development in both Mexico and the U.S.

The USNORTHCOM goal to equip and train the Mexican military to a level that creates a more professional institution is obtainable through continued indirect support to the Mexican military. This enables USNORTHCOM to partner with the Mexican military for combined exercises and operations involving counter narcotic and consequence management operations. President Calderon's employment of the Mexican military against the Pack Virus buys time for the Mexican government to create less corrupt Mexican law enforcement units. A less corrupt and more prosperous Mexico is a benefit to the U.S. and to the people of Mexico.

As addressed by the Merida Initiative, training of Mexican law enforcement must occur in order to replace the military already deployed to fight the Pack Virus. A more efficient and less corrupt Mexican judicial system will allow the Mexican military to focus on theater level common threats and strengthen all of North America against the Pack Virus, terrorist groups, and natural and man-made disasters. Eliminating the corruption in one historic Mexican institution creates operational space for the Mexican government to generate economic growth, increase stability, and reduce violence. The increased situational awareness of the Mexican national air and maritime sovereignty by GOM produces a theater partner capable of detecting and responding to threats prior to detection and engagement by the U.S. The increases in capability of the GOM produce opportunities that can allow for greater trade, increased tourism and better economic opportunities for the people of Mexico and the United States.

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