The US Air Force
And
Homeland Civil Support
(White Paper)

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FORWARD

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 are a vivid and stark example that some organizations, groups, and individuals will implement extraordinary measures to further their cause and bring death and destruction to the United States. Consequently, it is imperative that the Air Force is fully prepared to preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from a myriad of natural and manmade emergencies, including terrorist activity.

Make no mistake about it: when the nation calls, the Air Force will respond – and we will respond quickly and effectively. We have much to contribute to homeland security, regardless of the nature of the scenario. We contribute to the defense of the homeland with counterair operations. We can bring in specialized assets to support Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) crisis management of terrorist events. We also have capabilities that can contribute to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) efforts at consequence management, ranging from disaster relief to scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices.

While the civilian sector and federal agencies possess the principal assets and capabilities to respond to these emergencies, the Air Force, by its expeditionary nature and through its core competencies, can contribute to protecting our nation and responding to disasters and emergencies.

This document describes how our Air Force organizes and employs air and space power in supporting civil authorities. Concepts such as airmen work for airmen; centralized control, decentralized execution; and unity of effort are just as relevant in the civil support arena as they are in warfighting. We will plan, organize, and employ our forces and resources for civil support missions in much the same manner we do for contingencies. And we will provide combatant commanders, the Secretary of Defense, and the President with a tailored expeditionary force package sufficient to meet their objectives.

JOHN JUMPER
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Date
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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This document has been prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF). The original tasking resulted from the 2002 CSAF Doctrine Symposium and directed the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) to develop Air Force doctrine on Civil Support (properly placed within the larger context of Homeland Security) and to capture the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) command and control mechanism for Civil Support operations.

This document establishes guidance for organizing and employing air and space forces at the operational level in the conduct of military operations in support of a lead federal agency. Additionally, discussion of Coordinating Authority and its applicability in Air Force civil support missions is provided. Coordinating Authority, which provides for unity of effort in operations involving Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Active Duty airmen engaged in interagency activities, has been formalized in Joint doctrine and will be formalized in Air Force doctrine.

APPLICATION

This document applies to all Air Force personnel – military, civilian, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard.

SCOPE

Most Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) may be used in the conduct of civil support missions. This document discusses the nature of the civil support environment and the fundamentals of organization and employment of Air Force capabilities to accomplish these missions.

NOTE CONCERNING CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

This document may be updated to reflect changes related to the stand-up of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Office of Homeland Security, and the Department of Homeland Security (should one be established). It is anticipated that current functions related to Department of Defense (DoD) support of civil authorities will remain the same; however, the office of primary responsibility may change (e.g., functions currently performed by Secretary of the Army [SECARMY], Director of Military Support [DOMS], etc.).
CHAPTER ONE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF AIR AND SPACE POWER

HISTORICAL BASIS

The Air Force has a long history of contributing forces and resources in support of requests for assistance from civil authorities. From disaster relief, counter-drug, civil disturbance, and military support to civil law enforcement agencies, to providing personnel to respond to anthrax scares and other terrorist activities, the Air Force will continue to play a role in civil support operations (see Figure 1-1).

![Image of Civil Support Missions]

**Figure 1-1. Potential Civil Support Missions**

COMBAT READINESS PRIORITY

Although the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its forces for combat, most Air Force assets have applicability and relevance to the civil support arena. In fact, the same forces needed to support combat operations overseas and at home are highly desired by the civil community when a crisis occurs. The Secretary of Defense, through his executive agent, will determine the degree of civil support feasible that does not jeopardize the Air Force’s combat readiness capability. **It is important to note that current policy stipulates that Department of Defense resources cannot be specifically allocated for the sole purpose of civil support and are made available only when not required for military operations.** DoD assets are
typically the “last in and first out” when supporting civil authorities in disasters or emergencies (reference DoD Directive [DoDD] 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities).

LEANING FORWARD

The Air Force will deliver “full spectrum” civil support to the nation. This includes the ability to work with communities, states, and federal agencies to plan ahead, to exercise, and to prepare for disasters before they occur.

Each year, installations are directed to “Be prepared to” assist communities during disasters or other emergencies. Present rules prohibit stockpiling supplies or equipment for civil support, but there are steps that commanders can take to minimize the timeline for responding when requested. During planning, key installation personnel should become familiar with the layout of the communities that surround the base, the hazards to AF personnel, and the type of support that may be required. Major Accident Response Exercises can be tailored to include military support to civil authorities (MSCA). In anticipation of being tasked during an actual emergency (under other than immediate response authority situations), commanders can recall personnel, run mobility lines, palletize equipment, and accomplish any other preparatory actions that will minimize the response timeline. Existing rules prohibit actual deployment of personnel until a formal request has been made, unless an immediate response is required to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The nature of the disaster, emergency, or the approved request for federal assistance (RFA) will ultimately influence what Air Force assets are requested to support civil authorities (see Figure 1-2). Examples of Air Force capabilities that may be requested in a domestic disaster or emergency include (but are not limited to):

?? Air Mobility. Air Mobility Command (AMC) may provide airlift to support local, State, DOD or other federal agencies.

?? Air Traffic Control (ATC). Air Force combat controllers can deploy to remote, abandoned, or inactive airfields and plan, organize, supervise, and establish terminal ATC operations.

?? Air Surveillance. Air Force Control Squadrons can deploy and provide radar surveillance of areas where none exist or where FAA facilities have been rendered inoperative.

?? Communications. Hammer Adaptive Communications Element (Hammer Ace) is an example of a deployable communications system that provides worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications, and secure on-site communications.

?? Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). The Air Force can provide ISR capabilities (e.g., UAVs, AWACS, JSTARS) to monitor a designated location and provide continuous airborne surveillance. They could be used to monitor flood waters, hurricane or tornado damage, terrorist movement activities, among other things. Air Force assets can also be used to collect airborne nuclear debris following a domestic nuclear event.
?? **Investigative Support.** The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) provides professional investigative expertise to support criminal investigations and counterintelligence services.

?? **Search and Rescue.** Provides rapid response capability for insertion, infiltration, exfiltration, and extraction functions. Operates in mountain, desert, arctic, urban, jungle, and water environments—day or night.

?? **Civil Engineering Support.** Agile military combat support civil engineer forces capable of rapidly responding to worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities include operation and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, aircraft rescue and facility fire suppression, construction management of emergency repair activities, rendering safe and disposal of explosive ordnance, and monitoring and protecting resources subject to NBC events.

?? **Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD).** EOD capability includes the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.

?? **Medical Capability.** Air Force Medical Service capability, while primarily designed to meet its wartime mission, is easily adaptable for civil disaster response. Small, incremental packages of tailored medical capability can be rapidly deployed to meet immediate and short-term civilian requirements.

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The Contributions of Air and Space Power in Civil Support

Potentially, the nature of the civil support scenario could change from a crisis management to a consequence management scenario (or vice versa); or the scenario may contain elements of both. Examples of AF capability relevant to these scenarios are highlighted below.

- ISR assets (e.g., space, Predator, etc.)
- AFOSF
- AFOSI
- Specialized assets (e.g., JDAM)

- Airlift
- Medical
- Logistics
- Civil Engineering
- Communications
- Security Forces

**Figure 1-2. Spectrum of Air Force Contributions**
SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIP TO LEAD FEDERAL AGENCY

Terrorism is a strategic threat to the United States, and US laws and policies are designed to prevent and respond to this threat. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), through Department of Justice (DoJ), is designated the lead agency for crisis management of threats or acts of terrorism that take place in the United States or in international waters that do not involve the flag vessel of a foreign country. Crisis management are those measures taken to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism (refer to Chapter 5 for additional discussion). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence management. Consequence management are those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism (refer to Chapter 5 for additional discussion). Figure 1-3 illustrates the relationship between crisis and consequence management.

Figure 1-3. Relationship Between Crisis and Consequence Management

The military’s role in domestic emergencies is well defined and, by law, is limited in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment, but do not replace local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. Air Force contributions in civil support operations will be in support of a lead federal agency, designated by the President or as indicated in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, or other federal response plan.
CHAPTER TWO

HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE AIR FORCE ROLE

“We are today a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat. The terrorist threat to America takes many forms, has many places to hide, and is often invisible. Yet, the need for homeland security is not tied solely to today’s terrorist threat. The need for homeland security is tied to our enduring vulnerability. Terrorists wish to attack us and exploit our vulnerabilities because of the freedoms we hold dear. The U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.”

--President George W. Bush
July 16, 2002

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (HLS)

The National Strategy for Homeland Security is designed to mobilize and organize the nation to secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks. The National Strategy for HLS defines Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” This definition serves as the foundation for the three strategic objectives of HLS:

- Prevent attack
- Reduce vulnerability
- Minimize damage and recover from attack

The National Strategy for HLS provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local and private organizations in addressing a specific threat to national security—the threat of terrorism in the United States. In structuring its response to secure the homeland, the United States will coordinate the resources of over 87,000 different federal, state and local jurisdictions, focusing on six critical mission areas:

- Intelligence and Warning
- Border and Transportation Security
- Domestic Counterterrorism
- Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
- Defending Against Catastrophic Threats
- Emergency Preparedness and Response

THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The highest priority of the United States military is the defense of the nation’s homeland and people against all enemies. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security
through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. Within the United States, the *National Strategy for HLS* envisions three circumstances under which the Department of Defense would be involved in improving security at home:

- In extraordinary circumstances, the military may conduct military missions in order to defend the people and territory of the United States;
- Quick response in support of civilian agencies by providing unique capabilities during an emergency such as an attack, or natural disaster; and
- Participation in “limited scope” missions where other agencies have primary responsibility for security—such as at the Olympics or other events.

President Bush established USNORTHCOM as a combatant command to better enable the U.S. military to conduct Homeland Security missions.

**Homeland Security (HLS)**

From the perspective of DoD, HLS has been defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as “the preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against and response to threats and aggressions directed toward U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.” Both the JCS definition and the *National Strategy for HLS* indicate that there are two components of HLS: Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

**Homeland Defense (HLD)**

HLD is the protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Homeland Defense missions include force protection actions, counterintelligence, air and space warning and control, counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, missile defense, and information security operations. In all of these missions the Department of Defense either acts as the designated lead federal agency, or with a high level of autonomy within the National Security structure.

**Civil Support (CS)**

CS is support provided by DoD to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Civil Support missions include, but are not limited to, response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and fires; response to chemical, biological, or radiological incidents; support to civilian law enforcement agencies, including counter-drug activities; and response to civil disturbances or insurrection. In all of these missions, various federal, state or local civilian agencies are primarily responsible for the management of the particular incident, and DoD’s involvement is supportive and dependent on a request from the lead agency (includes requests from local/state authorities that meet immediate response criteria or MOU/MOA conditions).
Emergency Preparedness (EP)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) adds a third component to HLS – emergency preparedness. EP is defined as those planning activities undertaken to ensure DoD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and the SECDEF in a designated national security emergency.

THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION OF THE AIR FORCE

The Directorate for Homeland Security, AF/XOH, stood up in January 2002 as part of the Air Staff. The directorate is organized into three divisions: the Homeland Defense Division (XOHD), the Homeland Security Plans, Integration and Transformation Division (XOHP), and the Civil Support Division (XOHC). The Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP) Agency is a field operating agency (refer to http://www.afnsep.af.mil for additional information). The Division Chief of XOHC is dual-hatted as the AFNSEP Commander. The mission and structure of XOHC, and specifically AFNSEP, are critical to providing efficient and effective AF support to civil authorities.

AFNSEP has been designated as the AF Principal Planning Agent (PPA) for MSCA. It facilitates domestic support to civil authorities for natural and manmade disasters and when required, critical events of national interest. This is accomplished by facilitating the use of AF resources to assist federal, state, and local authorities in alleviating suffering and damage that may result from disasters or emergencies and in response to requests for assistance from these agencies. AFNSEP maintains an on-call duty officer who validates requests for assistance, monitors total Air Force support of disasters or other civil emergency relief operations, and authorizes Civil Air Patrol (CAP) missions in support of MSCA activities. AFNSEP also manages the AF Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program. The EPLO’s role in MSCA is discussed in Chapter 3.

One other area where AF assets can be tasked, and in which AFNSEP coordinates the AF response, is during events that have been designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). When an event is designated an NSSE, the Secret Service is the lead agency responsible for the design and implementation of the security plan. As the lead agency, the Secret Service can request assistance from other federal agencies, including the DoD.

The Air Force can significantly contribute to the HLS mission and provide solutions through its unique core competencies. The challenge is to balance responses to local, state, and federal civil authorities’ requests for assistance without compromising combat mission capabilities. The Air Force must preserve its ability to project CONUS forces overseas in a terrorist threat environment.

AIR FORCE CIVIL SUPPORT RESPONSE

The Air Force has always responded to a wide variety of requests for support from civil authorities, and will continue to support such requests to the maximum extent practical,
consistent with applicable laws (e.g., Stafford Act, Economy Act – see Annex B), DoD and AF guidance, and readiness and mission requirements. The level of response is dependent on the nature of the request and the type of incident. Typically, a response will either be at the request of local officials, state officials, or as part of a coordinated federal effort. See Table 2-1.

There may be cases in which a commander receives a request for assistance during imminently serious conditions. Imminently serious conditions exist when immediate action must be taken to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist, and time does not permit requests for assistance to be passed through normal channels, the commander is authorized to take necessary action within their installation’s capabilities to respond to requests from appropriate civil authorities (reference DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities and AFI 10-802, Military Support to Civil Authorities). As soon as practical, all support provided to civil authorities must be reported to DOMS and AFNSEP, using the guidance contained in AFMAN 10-206, Operational Reporting.

### Table 2-1. Civil Support Response Levels

**Local Response**

Local responses are limited, localized requests for assistance and are not dependent on a Presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency. Installation commanders may support requests from local authorities based on mutual aid agreements with the local community in areas such as fire fighting, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handling, medical evacuation, or other appropriate areas. An installation commander may respond to a request based on inherent “immediate response” authority, in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and/or to mitigate great property damage. Local responses will typically not involve extensive coordination with state
officials or agencies, such as the National Guard. Similarly, cost reimbursement issues are limited and typically anticipated within the mutual aid agreement.

State Response

State level responses are conducted either in anticipation of a Presidential declaration, or pursuant to an installation commander’s “immediate response” authority when guidance cannot be obtained from higher headquarters due to an emergency situation. Under the “10-day rule,” Air Force units may be directed by the President to perform emergency work on public or private lands that is essential for the preservation of life or property. Operations of this type will follow a request by a State Governor under the Stafford Act (see Annex B), and may not exceed 10 days. State level responses require some level of coordination with state and likely with federal officials and agencies, as well as higher headquarters. Cost reimbursement issues are more pronounced and formalized.

Federal Response

Federal level responses involve Air Force forces as part of a coordinated federal response to a request for emergency assistance as a result of a natural disaster, attack, civil disturbance, or as an element in a formalized, regularly occurring civil support program. Requests for federal assistance are submitted by the appropriate lead federal agency (LFA). LFAs typically request Air Force resources when requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, or federal civil authorities. Federal level responses involve extensive planning and coordination with other federal agencies (FEMA, DoJ, etc…), as well as state and local authorities. Air Force forces will be presented to the supported combatant commander (e.g., USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) for these operations in accordance with procedures established by the DoD. The Air Force typically presents its forces in the form of an air and space expeditionary task force (AETF), to be deployed either as a single service task force (TF), or as the air component of a joint task force (JTF). Air Force forces will be tasked with a clear understanding as to command relationships between various deployed military units. Cost reimbursement issues are highly formalized and regulated.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following summarizes the status of various military personnel involved in civil support operations, and implications of that status vis-à-vis command and control, discipline, and tort liability. Where relevant, fiscal and law enforcement issues are also discussed.

Federal (Title 10) forces include active duty forces, reserve forces, and “federalized” National Guard forces. Command and control extends from the local commander to the President, and discipline is enforced pursuant to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Negligent or wrongful acts committed by Title 10 forces may be subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) if done within the “scope” of employment. The primary fiscal issue for civil support operations involving Title 10 forces involves reimbursement from local authorities. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which limits direct law enforcement actions by Title 10 forces, applies.
When National Guard forces are not “federalized,” they are subject to the command and control of the Governor, and are disciplined in accordance with state law. Non-federalized National Guard forces are typically categorized as either in “state militia” or “Title 32” status. “Militia status” exists for missions solely directed by state authorities, for state purposes, and paid for by the state. Negligent or wrongful acts committed by forces in militia status are subject to state law. “Title 32” status is usually a “training” status, wherein the federal government provides training funds to National Guard units. Negligent or wrongful acts performed by “Title 32” forces may be subject to the FTCA, if within the “scope” of their employment. The primary fiscal issues center on the Anti-Deficiency Act—use of Title 32 funding for purely “state” activities, or for non-authorized purposes. When not federalized, National Guard forces are not subject to the PCA. Congress has authorized certain counter-drug activities specifically for National Guard forces in Title 32 status.

Air Reserve Technicians (ART) and National Guard Technicians (NGT) are civilian employees of the United States government. Their respective employment rights as civilians are delineated in Title 5 (ART) and Title 32 (NGT). Their civilian status is eliminated when placed in military status, and they are subject to the same duties as any other military member. Negligent or wrongful actions by these civilian employees may be subject to the FTCA, if within the scope of their employment.

The laws governing military civil support include numerous statutes, regulations, directives and policy statements. Each civil support operation—law enforcement, counter-drug, counter terrorism, disaster response, CBRNE response, civil disturbance—involves various and differing statutory authorities. Annex B—“Legal Guidance, Policies and Plans” sets forth some of the most common legal authorities in more detail. Commanders should consult with the Staff Judge Advocate about the appropriate legal authorities for civil support operations.
CHAPTER THREE

OPERATIONS PLANNING AND COORDINATION

“Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit”

He who is not prepared today will be less so tomorrow

Ovid

PLANNING

Each year, natural disasters, accidents involving hazardous materials, and today, acts of terrorism stretch local and state emergency response resources to the limit, and sometimes beyond. When disasters and accidents occur and the required response is beyond the capability of state and/or local authorities (to include “non-federalized” National Guard forces), active-duty and reserve military units may be tasked to assist in response and recovery efforts.

Each year, active and reserve installations are directed to plan for situations which would require units assigned to that installation to assist local authorities. Installation commanders and planners should be aware of the various industries or other facilities in the surrounding communities and what type of assistance each may require in the event of an emergency situation. Additionally, installation commanders should be aware of critical dependencies on the surrounding community and work with involved agencies to ensure the installation is capable of continuing their minimum essential functions in an emergency. **Proactive planning between the installation and the community is critical to a successful response and must take into account the need to preserve the installation’s ability to project its forces when and where needed.** What occurs in the community may affect the installation’s ability to perform its mission.

Several installations have memoranda of agreement or understanding (MOA/MOU) with the surrounding communities to clarify such issues as response procedures and capabilities, and reimbursement of costs. MOA or MOU are highly recommended because they provide a means to answer numerous questions before a disaster or accident occurs; and allow for planning as to how military units will respond and what the local authorities expect of them.

Planning activities at installations (with or without MOA/MOU in place) should take the following issues into consideration:

**Circumstances for requesting assistance:** Circumstances under which any type of mutual response will be requested/provided between the parties named in the memorandum. The circumstances will vary from base to base, depending on what types of industries are located in the surrounding communities. The most common example of requested assistance would be firefighting or hazardous materials units, however, the request may be for any type of equipment and capabilities an installation may have that could be of assistance during an emergency.
**Procedures for requesting assistance (Entry Strategy):** There should be a written set of instructions that civil authorities must follow when requesting assistance. This will standardize request procedures and clarify requirements for both military and civilian organizations involved.

**Procedures for responding and communicating with the lead command element (Integration Strategy):** This section should list specific procedures responding units should follow when reporting to the scene of an emergency. It should specify how the military organization would be integrated with the civil authorities. It can include such items as frequencies for radio communications, radio procedures, equipment requirements, personnel requirements, etc.

**Procedures for accounting for costs incurred and reimbursement for those costs:** This section should contain instructions on tracking costs and requesting reimbursement, for both military and civilian agencies since most MOU/MOA are mutual response type agreements.

**Circumstances and procedures for withdrawing support (Exit Strategy):** The withdrawal can be a result of completing the mission, or of the assets being required to fulfill a different mission. The agreement can specify such things as minimum notification time before assistance is withdrawn, maximum amount of time assistance can be provided, and procedures for transferring responsibilities to relieving units.

**Procedures for scheduling and conducting exercises:** Procedures for conducting joint exercises to familiarize all parties with the command structure and the scenarios in which assistance might be rendered.

**Installation coordination:** This section should describe efforts to bring all DoD installations clustered in one greater community (e.g., San Antonio, TX; Hampton Roads, VA; Washington, DC; etc.) together into an integrated community-wide support plan.

**INTERAGENCY COORDINATION**

When a disaster, accident, or incident occurs, the scale of the response will determine the nature of the civilian command and control (C2) structure that is in place when military assets are requested. Initially in a localized response, the C2 structure will most likely be the local police or fire department command element, or county emergency management agency (EMA). This may be the initial interface between the Air Force installation commander and the civil authority. For larger responses, state EMAs will have a forward command element or will activate an emergency operations center (EOC). Upon the issuance of federal disaster declaration by the President, implementation of the FRP occurs. The FRP employs a multiagency operational structure that uses the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), a C2 structure based on a model adopted by the fire and rescue community. While the local or county C2 may be somewhat informal, the state and FEMA C2 will be considerably more formalized. Military commanders must understand how their C2 mechanism will integrate with the civilian structure. See Annex C for additional ICS discussion.
One of the things we have not done a very good job at is catastrophic planning -- catastrophic disaster planning. And we have to become better at that, which requires every agency sitting at a table, wading through the minutia that would be in front of us. And it's going to take time. I think a part of this education effort...if there is a time in our country's history where the American public needs straightforward facts, now is it. This isn't a time, in my opinion, for anyone to be "big dogging it" as we'd say down home. Folks just need straightforward facts and I am concerned that we don't have a joint information center that the federal government operates on a regular basis where members of the Senate, members of the House, members of the news media, have one reservoir, one resource that they can go to get the definitive facts that the American public deserves so richly.

Testimony of Joe M. Allbaugh
United States Senate Committee On Environment And Public Works, Oct 16, 2001

Presidential Declaration

Upon Presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency, an area becomes eligible for federal assistance. FEMA is responsible for coordinating federal assistance to State and local governments. The FRP (discussed below) is implemented in anticipation of a significant event likely to result in a need for federal assistance or in response to an actual event requiring federal assistance under a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Civil requests for support during presidentially declared disasters or emergencies flow through local and State emergency management channels to the State Coordinating Officer (SCO). Requests exceeding the capabilities of local and State governments are referred by the SCO to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for federal support. The FCO, appointed by the President, validates all requests, determines which federal departments or agencies can best respond, and tasks the proper departments or agencies through established channels. FEMA coordinates all federal assistance through the FCO and emergency support function (ESF) structure.

The Federal Response Plan (FRP)

The FRP describes the mechanism and structure by which the federal government (through FEMA) mobilizes resources and conducts activities to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency that overwhelms the capabilities of State and local governments. Federal assistance (including DoD) is available under the Stafford Act, as well as individual agency authorities, to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; alleviate damage and hardship; and reduce future vulnerability.

The FRP assigns primary and support agency responsibilities to 27 different federal departments and agencies including the DoD. These responsibilities include managing and coordinating ESFs at national and regional levels during a presidentially declared disaster. The 12 federal ESFs are listed in Annex D. Primary agencies have tasking authority over designated support agencies to accomplish their specific ESF mission. The DoD is the primary agency for ESF # 3, Public Works and Engineering, with the United States Army Corps of Engineers as the lead agency. DoD is one of only two federal agencies that are designated as support agencies for all other ESFs where they are not identified as primary agency (Department of Agriculture is the other).
The FRP outlines federal responsibilities (including DoD) and provides the framework for coordinating civil-military requirements. It establishes a national disaster response framework with FRP elements (see Figure 3-1); details the integration of response, recovery, and mitigation actions; outlines policy guidance and organizational relationships; and discusses concurrent implementation with other federal emergency plans. It also describes federal operations in response to domestic terrorism (reference the FRP “Terrorism Incident Annex”) and addresses the incorporation of federal plans that may be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism incident response. It is through the framework laid out by the FRP that requests for assistance are forwarded to the DoD. FEMA is the lead federal agency (LFA) charged with implementing the FRP. This plan may be found at http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/pdfs.shtm.

Figure 3-1. Federal Response Plan Elements

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)

In addition to ESF primary and support agency responsibilities, DoD plays a lead role in the NDMS, a system within the FRP. The NDMS is a nationwide medical response system to supplement state and local medical resources during disasters or major emergencies. Its major components include federal medical response (e.g., disaster medical assistance teams), patient evacuation (DoD has lead responsibility), and definitive medical care (DoD/Veteran’s Affairs [VA] has lead responsibility). Significant capabilities exist in the civilian arena and are activated in support of federal health medical disasters.
The FRP, and specifically ESF #8 (Health and Medical Services Annex, headed by the Public Health Service for the Department of Health and Human Services), includes the NDMS. It is through ESF #8 and the NDMS that DoD medical assets may be tasking to support consequence management activities. Joint Regional Medical Planners (JRMPs) are DoD’s regional medical planning liaisons that work with the Public Health Service in facilitating requests for DoD medical assets in support of the disaster or emergency. The JRMPs are normally co-located with the defense coordinating officer (DCO) in the disaster field office (DFO).

**AIR FORCE SUPPORT AND THE TASKING PROCESS**

Once an event has been designated a Presidentially declared disaster or emergency, the authority for tasking DoD/Air Force assets begins with the SECDEF. Requests for assistance follow a structured process beginning at the disaster scene, and flowing up through the state EOC, through FEMA, and then to the DoD. The process is outlined below.

- Initial Air Force tasking in support of an emergency or disaster will flow from FEMA to DOMS to the supported Combatant Commander (e.g., NORTHCOM, PACOM).

- If the Combatant Commander has been authorized to task Services, then Air Force assets may be tasking through the supported Combatant Commander’s air component. Those Air Force Combatant Commander-assigned assets tasked under war-fighting plans must have SECDEF approval for release prior to participating in MSCA operations.

- For requirements beyond the supported command’s capabilities and/or capacity, forces may be attached to the supported command to participate in MSCA operations by direction of the SECDEF via an execute order (EXORD).

- The tasking of Air Force forces not assigned to a combatant commander will flow from FEMA to DOMS to CSAF to the regional planning agent (RPA). The RPA should coordinate the tasking of these forces with the AEF Center.

- Once FEMA establishes a DFO within the disaster/emergency area, taskings, in the form of a “Request for Federal Assistance” (RFA), will flow from civil authorities to the FCO, through the ESFs, and to the defense coordinating officer (DCO) for DoD support.

- Upon appointment, the DCO is the single point of contact for coordinating DoD assistance in the disaster area, and represents the Secretary of Defense. The DCO is responsible to ensure that the RFA is valid and that the mission is one DoD could appropriately accomplish. The
DCO will ensure the request for DoD/USAF resources is coordinated and resources are obtained.

- Once validated by the DCO, Air Force mission tasking is through either the air component of the supported Combatant Commander to the MAJCOM, field operating agency (FOA), or direct reporting unit (DRU), to the Air Force activity or installation concerned; or through the CSAF for assets not assigned to a combatant command (refer to related discussion above). A FEMA disaster identifying number will accompany such tasking and must be cited in all related reports and billings for reimbursement purposes. Unless waived by the President, all DoD support and resources provided are subject to reimbursement policies of either the Economy or Stafford Acts (see Annex B – “Legal Guidance, Policies, and Plans”).

- Installation commanders who receive support requests directly from civil authorities within the Presidentially declared disaster or emergency areas should refer these mission requests to the FEMA DFO for mission validation and assignment.

Base Support Installation (BSI)

Any military installation close to an actual or projected domestic emergency operational area may be designated a base support installation (BSI). BSIs, designated by SECDEF, must be prepared to provide or coordinate support for interservice and interagency personnel involved in rescue or recovery operations. The BSI will be a staging base for all relief supplies and equipment sent to the area.

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs)

EPLOs are a critical element of the Air Force’s ability to coordinate the proper response to disasters, emergencies, or NSSEs. EPLOs are Air Force reservists, managed by AFNSEP, who volunteer to be activated when needed to deploy to an emergency area, or other location within the FEMA and DoD disaster response structure. EPLOs will be deployed to the FEMA disaster field office in order to provide critical advice on Air Force capabilities to the DCO. The DCO then forwards requests to the DOMS for tasking. Other locations where EPLOs may deploy include the FEMA National Headquarters, each of the 10 FEMA Regional Operations Centers (ROCs), DOMS, FORSCOM, the CONUSAs, Air Force MAJCOMs, the Air Force crisis action team (CAT), and any other location deemed critical to coordinating support. At each level, they provide critical advice and resolve issues related to AF capabilities.

Civil Air Patrol (CAP)

AFNSEP also coordinates and approves CAP support for disaster recovery operations. The CAP provides critical support to state and local government officials during disasters. In many cases, the CAP provides the initial capability for damage assessment that allows emergency response personnel to provide assistance where it is most needed. The CAP also
conducts search and rescue (SAR), when assessing damaged areas, and transports personnel and equipment critical to recovery efforts. Authorized missions flown by CAP are accomplished on a cost reimbursable basis from the requestor. Requests for CAP assistance must come from a local or state government official, be validated by AFNSEP, and receive an Air Force mission number (issued by AFNSEP) in order to be designated an official Air Force mission.
CHAPTER FOUR

ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF AIR FORCE FORCES

ORGANIZING AIR FORCE FORCES

Effective civil support operations require an appropriate organization that includes the requisite command relationships both within the Air Force organization and between Air Force forces and other agencies. Past civil support operations, even though successfully conducted, have frequently involved ad hoc organizations and command relationships. Although the precise nature and makeup of the resulting command relationships will depend on the specific situation, Air Force and Joint doctrine provide a solid foundation for the establishment of command relationships. In all cases, organizations should be founded in Air Force doctrine and in accordance with Joint doctrine.

Local Response

The first and easiest presentation of forces for civil support operations is a local level response as previously described in Chapter 2. An example of this type of response might be Air Force engineering and medical personnel from a local Air Force installation providing assistance to its civilian neighbors in the immediate aftermath of a tornado. Such response should be covered in a preexisting MOU between the civilian officials and the installation commander. In crafting this MOU, the local commander must carefully balance what level of assistance can be provided to local authorities against what resources must be maintained in readiness to carry out assigned missions.

Because this is a limited response involving (initially) only locally assigned forces, no special organizations or command relationships are required. The local commander can present and command the Air Force effort using his inherent authority as an Air Force commander. The extent of cooperation and coordination between the Air Force and the civilian authorities should be spelled out in the MOU. From these memoranda, the local commander should publish written orders to his local subordinate commanders to clarify that Air Force assets will interact with the civilian authorities but still remain under Air Force command and control. Civil and military actions may be coordinated IAW civilian requirements, but the orders for execution will always come from an Air Force commander. Finally, the local commander must coordinate his support activities with his Service superior command.

State Response

For larger Civil Support emergencies such as flood relief, a localized response will not provide sufficient forces and capabilities to respond to the emergency. When the situation exceeds the abilities of the local civil authorities and the local installation commander, a state level response involving increased participation by state civilian agencies and state National Guard, may be required. A state level response may also be called for as a preliminary response in anticipation of a Presidential Declaration for a federal response.
As long as the responding forces are solely state units from that state, the Guard forces will probably not be activated for Title 10 federal service but will remain in the command and control of their home state’s Adjutant General and governor. In these instances, there may be some need to establish “unity of effort” between the non-federalized Guard forces and any available active forces. However, non-federalized National Guard forces cannot be treated under the same presentation of forces and command relationships as apply to active forces. The local installation commander cannot command National Guard forces nor can the National Guard commander command active duty forces. The separate Air Force components can best be employed if they are operating together in an integrated effort.

Even if unity of command is not feasible, a method for achieving unity of effort when dealing with several disparate military forces has been successfully employed for the last two years in combating wildland forest fires in the western United States. By use of an MOU, the involved state governors have agreed to cooperate by acceding to the general direction of an active duty COMAFFOR, pursuant to Coordinating Authority. Coordinating Authority does not provide unity of command but does enable unity of effort without usurping the authority of the governors over their state forces. Under the terms of the MOU, the state governor(s) retains command and control over state ANG forces, but orders those forces to respond to the tasking and direction of the established COMAFFOR for integration of all Air Force forces. Under this use of an MOU, if the ANG forces fail to comply with the Coordinating Authority of the COMAFFOR, they are answerable to their state governor.

At present, this form of unity of effort through Coordinating Authority has only been employed in the interstate wildland forest fire operations. However, historic experience suggests that this same method should be adaptable to the full spectrum of Civil Support activities, both interstate and intrastate. If the contingency/event remains a state level response, then it is possible that Active and state National Guard operations can be most effectively conducted using Coordinating Authority established by a written MOU/MOA between the two commanders and the state governor involved.

Federal Response

These first two examples are relatively simple and can be conducted with existing Service organizations and Service chains of command for Service forces and complemented by Coordinating Authority for those assets that are not under Air Force Title 10 authority. As operations expand in scope beyond the local area or to more challenging scenarios (e.g., western states wildfires, hurricane relief, or a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive [CBRNE] event), they will inevitably involve Joint operations that should normally be conducted using the operational channel of the chain of command. See Annex A for notional organizational constructs and related discussion.

For these larger Joint contingencies, Air Force forces should be presented to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) as an AETF under the operational control (OPCON) of a COMAFFOR. The proper command relationships between a JFC and his various component commanders (e.g., the COMAFFOR) are detailed in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). The details

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1 JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, page III-11, para 9.b.)
for the proper organization and command relationships both internal to the AETF and between the COMAFFOR and the JFC are spelled out in greater detail in AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine* and AFDD 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*. These AETF organizations and presentation of forces are the same that have been used to good effect in recent operations around the world.

**Air And Space Expeditionary Task Force**

If all of the Air Force components for the civil support operation are brought under federal control and Title 10 status, the organization, even though larger in scale, will be fairly simple. All of the forces will be organized as an AETF under a single COMAFFOR who will be the single Air Force face to the JFC. If all the AETF assets are federalized under Title 10, this COMAFFOR should be the senior Air Force officer within the AETF, regardless of permanent status. The task-organized AETF should be established through G-series orders with a designated COMAFFOR and clearly attached to an appropriate higher headquarters for reachback support. This provides the cleanest, most easily understood chain of command. Although using such an AETF structure for Civil Support operations within the CONUS will be a fairly new development, there is ample experience with these structures so that we may be confident that what works outside the CONUS for combat operations can be successfully adapted for non-combat operations within the CONUS.

**Joint Task Force**

If the standard organization of joint forces, as described in the UNAAF, is followed for civil support operations, the combatant commander (e.g., of USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) would normally establish a subordinate joint task force (JTF) commander specifically focused on joint civil support operations. The Air Force component to the supported combatant commander would then provide a task organized AETF, with a designated COMAFFOR, that would be attached to the JTF with specification of OPCON to the JTF commander. Normally, the JTF commander would, in turn, delegate OPCON of the AETF to the COMAFFOR. If all of the Air Force component forces have been activated to Title 10 status for the operation, then the COMAFFOR would exercise OPCON and specified elements of ADCON over all AF forces participating in the operation. The nature and extent of the cooperation that would be involved between the civil authorities and the JTF commander and then, in turn, between the civil authorities and the COMAFFOR would still have to be spelled out in the appropriate MOU/MOA, but there would at least be clear unity of command within the AETF.

Unfortunately, actual events in civil support operations often evolve differently than the textbook case. Frequently, even when an overall Joint Task Force is organized, not all forces will be activated for Title 10 federal service. Recent examples of this have occurred in wildland forest fire operations when Air Force participants include Active Duty, ANG federalized to Title 10 status, non-federalized ANG forces loaned from their home state to a neighboring state, and ANG members that are strictly volunteers. Under these circumstances, the COMAFFOR cannot exercise OPCON or administrative control (ADCON) of those forces that are not in Title 10 status. However, cooperation may be achieved through Coordinating Authority perhaps delineated in the publication of the appropriate MOU/MOA between the Active, National Guard,
and Reserve forces and the appropriate governors. Thus, a single (Title 10) COMAFFOR can still achieve unity of effort to integrate all Air Force activity and present a single Air Force face to the JFC.

**Single Service Task Force Established Through The Service Component**

There is another variant for presentation of forces and command relationships described in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, which has been frequently employed in recent Civil Support operations, particularly in combating wildfires. Instead of organizing a subordinate Joint Task Force, the combatant commander can choose to employ single service task forces, i.e. a separate Air Force Task Force, and a separate Army Task Force, both working in the same general area, but not under the command of a single JTF commander. There are two different chains of command and command relationships that could be employed if the combatant commander elects to organize single service task forces. Normally, as recommended in JP 0-2, the combatant commander would task his Service Component Commander (e.g., NORTHAF, PACAF) to form a single service task force that would remain under the OPCON of the Service Component Commander. In accordance with Air Force doctrine, this single service task force should normally be named an AES, AEG or an AEW (depending upon size), not an AETF, since the single service task force would not be under the direct OPCON of a JFC (e.g., USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) but would be under the OPCON of an intervening Air Force commander (e.g., NORTHAF, PACAF).

Under this scheme for presentation of forces, the Air Force single service task force would be under the command of a designated AEG or AEW commander who would in turn be under the OPCON of (for example) the NORTHAF or PACAF commander. OPCON should normally be specified from the combatant commander to the Air Force component commander who should normally, in turn, specify OPCON over the AEG/AEW to its designated commander. Internal Air Force command relationships within the AEG/AEW would be established as previously discussed for an AETF under a Joint Force Commander, taking into account the status of the various forces involved (i.e., Title 10, Title 32, or other). This is the appropriate presentation of forces and command relationships under AFDD 1 and AFDD 2, and in accordance with the UNAAF, when a combatant commander tasks his service component commander to establish a single service task force.

**Single Service Task Force Established By The Combatant Commander**

A second form of command relationships for a single service task force exists if the combatant commander (e.g. of USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) elects to retain OPCON of the task force at his level and not exercise it through his service component commander (e.g., NORTHAF, PACAF). If the combatant commander chooses this command relationship, the correct presentation of forces would be an AETF under a designated COMAFFOR. The designated AETF COMAFFOR would respond to the direct OPCON of the combatant commander. This method of presentation of forces is allowed for under JP 0-2 but is not in accordance with Air Force doctrine as established in AFDD 1 and AFDD 2.

Establishing an AETF with a COMAFFOR under the OPCON of the combatant
commander violates the Air Force doctrinal principle that there should be only one Air Force commander presenting Air Force forces to a JFC. The combatant commander’s single Air Force face is already established as his Air Force Service component commander. A separate AETF commanded by a separate COMAFFOR presents a second Air Force face to the same JFC. This is inconsistent with the Air Force doctrinal position on unity of command for air and space forces, and the doctrinal position that all assigned and attached Air Force forces are presented to the JFC by a single Air Force officer (i.e., the COMAFFOR).

**Recommended Air Force Organization for Civil Support Operations**

Under most circumstances, the preferred method of presenting Air Force forces is an AETF presented to the Joint Task Force commander. Alternatively, an appropriately sized and commanded AEG or AEW could be commanded through the Air Component commander (e.g., NORTHAF, PACAF) and the AEG/CC or AEW/CC. Only as a last resort should Air Force forces be presented as a second, separate single service AETF under the direct OPCON of the combatant commander.

Civil support operations can involve very complex command, control, and coordination challenges requiring very careful consideration of which agency is charged with which responsibilities and exercises which authorities. As always, when effective command and control of Air Force personnel and assets is required, it is a good practice to draw the “lines and boxes” first, then put the people in them. Finally, ensure that the command relationships are spelled out clearly in written orders, preferably electronic message traffic, and disseminated to all parties up and down the chain of command and across the interagency activity. If it is not in writing, it doesn’t exist.

**PRESENTATION OF AIR FORCE FORCES**

Command mechanisms for leading Air Force forces in MSCA remain consistent with AFDD 2 and AFDD 2-8, *Command and Control*. In a civil support role, as in combat, the three key leadership positions within the joint construct that affects the employment of air and space power are the JFC or single-service task force commander, the COMAFFOR, and the JFACC. However, the JFACC rarely will be needed in MSCA operations, given that the DoD will always be in a supporting role to an LFA, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) functions to support US federal agencies. This section amplifies existing responsibilities, relationships, and staff organizations of these three leadership positions when the JTF or AETF is in a supporting role to civil authorities (for which little doctrine currently exists). This section also examines command of ANG forces employed with AFRC and active duty (AD) airmen in support of the same operation, since local ANG forces are typically on scene well before federal forces might be requested.

Once SECDEF has tasked a combatant commander with a civil support mission, the combatant commander may elect to act as the JFC, establish a subordinate JTF, or establish a single service task force. When the combatant commander acts as the JFC, he usually tasks and deploys one or more single service task force for command and control of deployed forces, and in some cases may retain OPCON of those forces. Typically, the air component commander
establishes an AETF for presentation of US Air Forces to the JFC. In turn, the regional planning agent (RPA) should coordinate the tasking of Air Force units with the AEF Center.

Early in the crisis action planning process, the air component commander nominates the COMAFFOR, which may be the air component commander or the task force commander. The COMAFFOR is selected based on the preponderance of forces involved (related to permanent status), the type and scope of operations, and specialized expertise required. The COMAFFOR develops courses of action (COAs) and advises the JFC on the best employment of air and space capability.

Wildland firefighting operations in the western United States provides an example of command relationships that can be established for total force support to civilian authorities:

?? The United States Forest Service (USFS), an element of the Department of Agriculture, is the LFA. SECDEF designated USCINCJFCOM as the supported COMBATANT COMMANDER. Upon USFS request and DOMS concurrence, USCINCJFCOM tasked TRANSCOM, a supporting command, to provide airlift support, supporting ground forces, eight ANG and AFRC C-130 aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS), necessary logistical support, and active component services and support personnel, as well as a command and control element. USCINCJFCOM accepted OPCON of the transferred ground forces and MAFFS aircraft to include the COMAFFOR and immediate staff. The COMAFFOR, dual hatted as the DIRMOBFOR, exercised TACON of attached airlift assets.

?? USCINCJFCOM established a single-service task force for OPCON of forces assigned and attached in support of the LFA. In response to a subsequent USFS request for ground support to contain fires, USCINCJFCOM tasked his land component, USFORSCOM, to provide ground forces. USCINCJFCOM established a second single-service task force for OPCON of ground firefighting units. USCINCJFCOM retained full command authority over both task forces as the JFC.

?? In response to USCINCJFCOM’s tasking, COMACC, as the Air Component commander for USCINCJFCOM, provided the forces necessary to establish 146th AEG to command and control operations of the 1st AETF. The 1st AETF had been previously activated in Sep 01 to present forces to CINCFOR for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. After receiving COMACC’s nomination, USCINCJFCOM designated Brigadier General John Iffland as Commander of the 1st AETF, dual hatted as the 146th Provisional AEG/CC. The 1st AETF commander, Brigadier General Iffland, was COMAFFOR. Brig Gen Iffland and staff deployed forward to the USFS - National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) to better coordinate USAF support of the USFS, and reported operationally to USCINCJFCOM. Reachback for administrative support was to 1st AF at Tyndall AFB, and by Letter of Agreement, for airlift and air mobility support to the Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB.

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

The JFC determines appropriate objectives and sets priorities for the entire joint force. In combat operations, the JFC normally exercises operational authority through designated functional component commanders, such as a JFACC, as needed. Standing JTFs for civil support and consequence management have tended not to be organized by Service
component, but rather by function. The result is a JFC supported by a series of functional task forces such as TF Transportation, TF Medical, and TF Aviation. In these cases, Airmen should strive for unity of command through presentation of an appropriate AETF structure.

Because the DoD could have a supporting role in any federal emergency, close cooperation between the JTF and other federal agencies is required through the supported combatant commander’s DCO. The DCO and the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) provide interface with the federal response effort for this coordination. The DCO (with the DCE staff) normally works for the JFC as a special staff officer.

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES

The air component commander or his AETF commander will act as the COMAFFOR to provide unity of command for airmen attached to a JTF or AETF. If more than one unit is attached, the COMAFFOR should normally be designated at a command level above the operating forces and should not be dual-hatted as commander of one of the subordinate operating units. The subordinate commanders should be chosen using the same criteria used to choose the COMAFFOR (e.g., preponderance of forces, scope of operations, and specialized expertise required).

The JFC has great latitude in determining command relationships. In combat operations, the JFC normally delegates OPCON over all assigned and attached US Air Force forces to the COMAFFOR. Some US Air Force forces and capabilities (such as intertheater air mobility and space assets) must maintain a global focus, thus preventing the transfer of OPCON from their assigned combatant commander to the JFC and COMAFFOR. These globally focused forces are normally employed in direct support to the JFC.

In some civil support operations, the JFC may elect to attach expeditionary combat support (ECS) forces to subordinate functional task force commanders (TFCs) with a specification of OPCON to the TFC. This organizational scheme has the potential to “penny packet” attached Air Force assets and is not the most operationally effective scheme for unity of command and unity of effort under a single airman. The best practices of Air Force doctrine would recommend that the JFC allow the COMAFFOR to retain OPCON and TACON at his level and that the COMAFFOR provide direct support to the various functional TFCs.

The COMAFFOR may elect to provide this direct support through an AES, AEG, or AEW with DIRLAUTH between the AES/AEG/AEW and the TFC. For Air Force elements presented in smaller than squadron size, the COMAFFOR may make those assets available for tasking through specification of TACON to the functional TFCs. These decisions for command relationship and presentation of forces will ultimately be the prerogative of the JFC. However, Air Force commanders should be knowledgeable of and advocate the most operationally effective organizations consistent with the principles of unity of command and unity of effort.
The COMAFFOR’s command element has three main components: the commander, an appropriately sized staff, and adequate C2 facilities to direct and support the operating forces and interact with the JFC. The C2 mechanism has two faces: operational and service.

**AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC)**

The AOC is an Air Force weapon system performing C2 for forces at operational level. The COMAFFOR normally makes and executes command decisions through the AOC. The fundamental principle of this system is centralized control through the AOC, with decentralized execution by subordinate organizations and elements.

In civil support operations, there may not be a need for a JFACC, as air operations fall under the purview of either FAA control and routing or a LFA center coordinating air traffic on a small scale. Only in the largest scenarios would the JFC require a JFACC. If the COMAFFOR were designated as the JFACC, the AOC would become a JAOC. Portions of the AOC dedicated to planning and executing civil support missions, as well as appropriate members of the AFFOR staff, however, do play critical planning, command and control, and/or reachback roles for the COMAFFOR.

When operations primarily involve air mobility, the COMAFFOR’s Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) may require support from the Air Mobility Division (AMD) slice of an AOC. The AMD slice normally deploys forward, conducting reachback and/or dispersed operations with the supporting AOC when needed.

For small or functionally unique missions, the COMAFFOR’s forward-deployed A-staff centrally plans and controls the operation, and manages the service authority issues. This situation is appropriate in a civil support mission requiring only ECS forces. In this case, AMC provides airlift required to move and supply the AETF, without relinquishing command and control of air mobility assets. In either case, the COMAFFOR may require a DIRMOBFOR on staff to plan and coordinate air mobility requirements with the TACC.

**A-STAFF**

In engaged operations the A-staff manages the service authority issues—the “beds, beans, and bullets.” This activity, functionally separate from the activities performed by the AOC, is responsible for a range of support activities such as (but not limited to) logistics, personnel, medical, and security. In MSCA operations, this range of support activities can become a primary effort, with the A-staff assuming the C2 role for Air Force forces at the operational level, if these functions are not provided by the LFA. In the case of ESF #4 (Firefighting), the US Forest Service (also the LFA), provides most of the A-staff functions, allowing for a highly tailored COMAFFOR staff with a small forward footprint.

The tasked air component is responsible for providing the core of the headquarters A-staff. If requested by the COMAFFOR, the parent MAJCOM provides augmentation in functional areas not permanently assigned to the air component staff. The A-staff structure is used instead of the “traditional” US Air Force staff designations (DO, LG, SC, etc.) to more readily identify
the Air Force component staff equivalents of the corresponding J-staff functions. The full staff is comprised of normal staff directorates, A-1 through A-6, as well as a special and personal staff. Experience has shown that in most MSCA operations, a full A-staff may not be required since support can often be obtained through reachback to the MAJCOM and supporting units. [Exception: If the combatant commander establishes a direct reporting single service task force, the combatant commander’s joint staff would be responsible for the majority of these functions.] If requested by the COMAFFOR, the air component provides augmentation in functional areas not permanently assigned to the combatant commander’s staff. Again, a full A-staff may not be required if reachback capability to the joint staff is sufficient.

In addition to the component liaison elements normally attached to the A-staff in combat operations, MSCA operations may require liaisons to the LFA or mutually supporting agencies to facilitate unity of effort. A liaison from AFNSEP should keep the COMAFFOR apprised of civilian RFAs being considered by the FCO, DCO, and DOMS so that the COMAFFOR can advise the JFC of relevant Air Force capabilities.

When elements or functions of the AOC or A-staff are placed in a geographically separated location, the COMAFFOR should have the same degree of control as if they were forward deployed. Support/supporting relationships must be specific to ensure the COMAFFOR has the span of control required.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF REACHBACK AND DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS

In MSCA operations, the COMAFFOR should plan for and conduct reachback and distributed operations to multiply the effectiveness of forward deployed forces, and to limit the USAF forward-deployed footprint. Limiting the forward deployed footprint reduces the support burden on the LFA and preserves our readiness to project air power in support of combat operations overseas.

Reachback is a generic term for obtaining forces, materiel, or information support from Air Force organizations not forward deployed. Reachback C2 is normally provided from a supporting/supported relationship. This relationship gives the forward-deployed COMAFFOR the support necessary to conduct operations while maintaining a smaller deployed footprint. Effective reachback C2 enhances the operational capability and facilitates informed and timely decision making of the engaged COMAFFOR.

Reachback in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Expeditionary medical units in the CENTCOM AOR used reachback to receive medical re-supply from Wilford Hall Regional Medical Center at Lackland AFB, TX. Wilford Hall used peacetime supply contracts to obtain supplies overnight, and used opportune military airlift and commercial carriers to ship supplies directly to expeditionary medical units, or to the tactical airlift hub in the AOR providing support to the expeditionary medical unit’s location.

This formal supporting/supported relationship enabled expeditionary units to initially deploy with only seven days of medical supply, and without forward deploying logistics staging assets. Planning for reachback can reduce deployment lift requirements and reduce the forward footprint.
Distributed operations occur when independent or interdependent nodes or locations participate in the operational planning and/or operational decision-making process in support of the engaged commander. In some instances, the commander may establish a formal supported/supporting relationship between distributed nodes. In other instances, distributed nodes may have a horizontal relationship.

TOTAL FORCE AND COORDINATING AUTHORITY

In MSCA operations, particularly in consequence management of a manmade or natural disaster, the contribution of airmen will likely include ANG, AFRC, and AD personnel. A normal tiered response to a large event results in local, state, and then federal resources (at the request of the governor) working in direct support to an LFA. This poses unity of effort challenges for any COMAFFOR. AD officers cannot command “non-federalized” ANG forces, and a “non-federalized” ANG commander cannot command AD forces.

Unity of effort for active and ANG units are synchronized through the use of the “Coordinating Authority” given the commander assigned responsibility for Air Force assets. The UNAAF defines Coordinating Authority as the authority to “require consultation between the agencies involved.” Coordinating Authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Consultation may be formalized through the use of a Memorandum of Understanding between the appointing authority and the appropriate state authority (Governor or Adjutant General). Such a formalized approach has been used in Air Force wildland firefighting efforts involving active and ANG units and has proven effective.

The COMAFFOR should consider a formalized request for Coordinating Authority from the appropriate state authority when “non-federalized” ANG forces are operating with active forces in an integrated effort. See Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1. Command Relations for ANG and Active Duty Forces
MOU for C2 in MSCA Operations Utilizing Coordinating Authority

Responsibilities:
The Director of Homeland Security, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations (HQ USAF/XOH) is responsible for planning and facilitating USAF MSCA operations. XOH will ensure that Air Force plans and preparedness measures for MSCA foster close and continuous coordination for efficient employment of resources of the National Guard and the Air Force.

The designation of a COMAFFOR will be based on the scope of the operation, the preponderance of Air Force Forces, and the specialized expertise required of the COMAFFOR. Depending on the scope of operations, the COMAFFOR may be dual-hatted as the air and space expeditionary unit (AEU)/CC.

For operations in which the preponderance of forces is an ANG force, the COMAFFOR would be appointed from the ANG, activated to Title 10 status.

Limitations:
ANG forces remain under their State chain-of-command unless they are federalized. ANG forces operate under coordinating authority and are authorized direct liaison with their State chain-of-command and support structure and the COMAFFOR and his/her staff at all times.

State ANG forces engage in MSCA outside their State pursuant to Interstate Compacts, by agreement between governors or in missions consistent with training requirements. This agreement does not, by itself, authorize State ANG forces to operate outside their State or provide the COMAFFOR with authority to direct state forces to operate beyond the terms of existing interstate agreements. The COMAFFOR will comply with such agreements and training requirements when employing State forces.

The COMAFFOR will respect the unit integrity and command relationships that exist in ANG units as presented.

ANG units and personnel comply with the direction of the COMAFFOR under orders from State authorities. Therefore, directions from the COMAFFOR to the ANG units and personnel are enforceable only by State means. Administrative and disciplinary control over ANG forces in State status remains solely with the State chain-of-command (with the exception of federal recognition authority, which rests with the United States Air Force).

The State may withdraw its forces from control of the COMAFFOR at any time.

AIR MOBILITY

Mobility Resources for Civil Support Operations

USTRANSCOM is charged to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense both in times of peace and in times of war. As the air component of USTRANSCOM, Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides common-user airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and air mobility support forces to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy
US forces on a global basis (refer to AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations* for additional discussion). Additionally, certain airlift aircraft, like the MAFFS C-130 aircraft, may provide unique capabilities for use in special circumstances.

**Command and Control**

AMC maintains 24-hour global command and control (C2) of all AMC operations through the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). This is a very robust C2 structure unique to air mobility operations. Direct integration into civilian efforts is limited, but capable of augmenting civilian C2 agencies.

AMC also maintains Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE) and Mission Support Teams (MST), specialized teams that deploy to the field and act as extensions of the TACC to ensure seamless integration of mobility capability. In the case of an incident where airlift support would be conducted from a location with considerable infrastructure, an MST would provide C2 support and coordination with existing civilian aerial port capability. In those cases where the situation requires operation from a more austere location, or where the full operating capabilities are not available, a TALCE team would be tasked to provide the required C2 and other support. In the past, TALCEs have deployed to locations within the CONUS to provide assistance to civil authorities in support of hurricane and other disaster relief operations.

**Requesting AMC Resources**

Requests for military assistance must be directed to the SECDEF or his lead executive agent (currently SECARMY). This level of coordination ensures the selected military resources are available and not assigned to other missions or requirements, and establishes a clear line of command with the designation of a supported command.

**Priority System.** Air mobility is a finite resource and must be managed effectively to ensure maximum support from a limited number of airframes. Air mobility assets are assigned to particular missions based upon Chairman Joint Chief’s of Staff (CJCS) established airlift or air refueling priorities to ensure the proper allocation of resources. Airlift priorities are established in accordance with JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*.

**Mobility Request Validation Process.** Mobility requests are forwarded from the requesting agency through the appropriate supported command validator. The supported command “validates” the requirement and the CJCS priority and forwards that request to the appropriate mobility validator. USTRANSCOM validates the mode of transportation and priority of airlift requirements. Validated airlift requirements are then submitted to AMC and then passed to the TACC for planning and tasking.
Command Relationships

The SECDEF or his executive agent establishes command relationships for military operations. Supported commands are normally designated through the release of a CJCS EXORD. Supporting commands will also be delineated, followed by specific capabilities and/or requirements that must be made available to the supported command.

USTRANSCOM, acting through AMC and the TACC, maintains OPCON and TACON of all USTC-assigned CONUS-based air mobility forces during peacetime. However, SECDEF may direct the transfer of mobility forces to the supported command. When this occurs, the supported command should recognize that effective employment of mobility forces and resources in support of theater objectives relies heavily upon specialized mobility C2. In these situations, the supported command should ensure appropriate mobility C2 is available and in-place.

If a direct support relationship is established, USTRANSCOM will maintain control of air mobility resources and respond directly to the supported commander’s request for assistance. AMC typically provides the supported commander an Air Mobility Division/Element to assist with mobility C2 and planning. This relationship uses the robust AMC mobility C2 structure while enabling optimum application of mobility resources based on specific theater requirements.

Role of the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)

The preponderance of CONUS-based mobility forces resides within the ANG and AFRC. These forces, while trained and equipped to integrate into AMC, are made up primarily of civilians who maintain civilian jobs, thus limiting the immediate access to their capability. Various Air Reserve Component (ARC) mobilization options are available to the President and Congress based on the level of commitment and available resources. Mobilization of ARC forces, however, takes time. The ANG and AFRC also have additional commitments to specific mobility requirements and other unique relationships.

When not mobilized to Title 10 status, ANG units are under the control of the state governors and the state chain of command is exercised through the state adjutant generals. Each state has specific mobility requirements that their ANG units fulfill. The AFRC falls under the DoD but must be mobilized and MAJCOM-gained in order to integrate their full capability into theater operations. Both ANG and AFRC provide volunteer capability to AMC, which is integrated into daily operations.
CHAPTER FIVE
OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

The NSHLS introduces the President’s proposal that the Department of Homeland Security consolidate federal response plans (thus eliminating the distinction between crisis and consequence management) and build a national system for incident management in cooperation with state and local governments. Until this happens, federal response to a disaster or emergency, in support of a designated LFA (e.g., DoJ/FBI, FEMA) will likely follow current organizational constructs as described in various federal response plans. Air Force leaders must understand key aspects of the current civil support operating environment, which contains two major components – crisis management and consequence management.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. (This text is taken from the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan [CONPLAN], to which DoD is one of seven signatories.)

State and local governments will submit requests for federal crisis management assistance through the FBI. The FBI is responsible for proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident response including its functioning as the commander of on-scene operational response to all terrorist threats and acts occurring in the US. As the lead agency for crisis management, the FBI will implement a federal crisis management response as outlined in the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN. If crisis and consequence management activities occur concurrently, FEMA will coordinate consequence management activities in support of the FBI, as outlined in the Federal Response Plan’s “Terrorism Incident Annex.”

DoD will provide military assistance to the LFA and/or the CONPLAN primary agencies during all aspects of a terrorist incident. Requests by the appropriate authority will be approved by the SECDEF.

Air Force Role

The Air Force may be tasked to support FBI activities in terrorist events. The RFA will process through the FBI, then forwarded to DOMS (refer to Chapter 3 for review of tasking process once the RFA is received by DOMS). AFOSI maintains liaison and is the Air Force single point of contact and interface with the FBI, federal, state, and local law enforcement for matters falling with the AFOSI mission. As such, it is important that Air Force leaders better understand the crisis management environment, the role the FBI plays as the lead federal agency,
and the organizational construct for federal response as outlined in the CONPLAN and Terrorism Annex referenced in the previous paragraph. Air Force capability that may potentially be requested in crisis management events include (but are not limited to):

- Providing homeland air patrols over critical infrastructures such as airports, federal buildings, nuclear reactor plants, public and private utilities, and cultural, social or sporting events, etc.
- Providing ISR assets to determine an adversary’s location and activities.
- In extraordinary circumstances, providing counterforce capabilities to preemptively strike and eliminate an adversary’s capability.
- In extraordinary circumstances, providing active defense capabilities to interdict an attack against a US target.
- Providing Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) capabilities to respond to an attack of a US target.

If consequence management activities are occurring concurrently with FBI actions, FEMA may also submit requests for Air Force forces and assets. Air Force capability that may potentially be requested to support FEMA in its consequence management activities in a crisis include (but are not limited to):

- Deploying emergency response assets such as firefighting, medical, or explosive ordnance disposal units/personnel.
- Providing logistical and aeromedical airlift support via Air Mobility Command for local, state, or federal resources, personnel, or patients.

The Oklahoma City bombing is an historical example of an event where crisis management and consequence management activities occurred concurrently and DoD played a supporting role to each lead federal agency.

**Oklahoma City**

The bomb that was detonated outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 resulted in 167 dead, 467 injured, and two missing. Unlike a hurricane, there was no warning. The event highlighted the ability to provide technical support on extremely short notice in support of civil authorities. Fort Sill dispatched two medical evacuation helicopters and Tinker Air Force Base deployed a 66-man rescue squad. Under his immediate response authority, the Secretary of the Army directed DOMS to establish the 24-hour crisis action team one hour after the explosion and sent a liaison officer to FEMA headquarters. DoD ultimately provided technical support and equipment to many agencies including the FBI as LFA for crisis management and FEMA as LFA for consequence management.

DOMS received its first request for support three hours after the bombing when FEMA requested transportation for an urban search and rescue team from Phoenix. An airborne C-141 from McChord Air Force Base was immediately diverted to Luke Air Force Base to support the team tasking and further actions were initiated in anticipation of a Presidential declaration of emergency. Following the declaration later in the day, DOMS staffed and issued an execute order tasking the Combatant Commander, ACOM, as supported combatant commander. DCO
and the nucleus of DCE arrived at 1800L (eight hours after the blast) and began coordinating all on-site requirements for support. The team from Phoenix reached the site at 2130L and other support arrived throughout the night. Although the last formal request for support was received on April 29, DoD continued to assist in rescue and law enforcement efforts until the end of May. The peak strength reached 1,002 personnel and included a large amount of aviation and ground transport, specialized equipment with operators, and life support items.

NOTE: The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 saw not only Air Force units respond but also volunteers from all professions and skills at Tinker AFB. Firefighters, readiness troops, and disaster preparedness personnel, in particular, helped organize and manage support for search and recovery efforts.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In an actual or potential terrorist incident, a consequence management response will be managed by FEMA using the structures and resources of the FRP. (This text is taken from the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan [CONPLAN], to which DoD is one of seven signatories.)

Consequence management takes place throughout a spectrum of events that include domestic disaster relief operations; accidental release of radiation, chemicals, etc.; and terrorist activities. If potential criminal activity is associated with the disaster or emergency, FEMA will act in support of the FBI as the LFA. If criminal activity is not associated with the disaster or emergency, FEMA will be the LFA for coordinating federal assistance to state and local governments for consequence management of natural disasters and emergencies. FEMA uses the FRP as the mechanism for coordinating federal assistance and for accessing DoD support (see previous discussion in Chapter 3 on the RFA and tasking process of Air Force assets). Consequence management response begins at the local level. Initial actions—to reduce the loss of life, injury, and property damage—will fall to the emergency responders before federal help arrives.

Air Force Role

The Air Force may be tasked to support FEMA in its consequence management activities as was the case, for example, when typhoon Chata’an assaulted Guam in July 2002. In fact, the majority of Air Force responses to FEMA requests for assistance have been in non-CBRNE events. As such, it is important that Air Force leaders better understand the Federal Response Plan and the interagency environment. Additionally, understanding that crisis and consequence management activities could be happening concurrently, and understanding the differences between crisis and consequence management will ensure that Air Force efforts contribute to the solution, and not become part of the problem.
Much of the Air Force’s combat support capability is relevant in consequence management events. The Houston floods offer an example of Air Force support to FEMA during a Presidentially declared disaster.

### Tropical Storm Allison

Beginning on 5 June 2001, rains from Tropical Storm Allison led to some of the worst flooding in Texas history. Particularly hard hit was the city of Houston which lost much of its hospital capacity. On 9 June President Bush declared 28 East Texas counties a disaster area, making them eligible for federal assistance. FEMA was given responsibility for coordinating the federal response, and the Federal Response Plan was implemented.

On 12 June a request for medical assistance was passed from FEMA to the Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS was able to fill most of the request from within its own resources, but turned to the DoD to fill a request for a 25-bed modular hospital to augment Houston’s critical care capability. This tasking was ultimately given to the 59th Medical Wing (Wilford Hall Medical Center) at Lackland AFB, Texas. Lead elements of the 59th Medical Wing departed Lackland for Houston during the early morning hours of 14 June.

In addition to the response by Lackland medical personnel, AMC airlift missions were also accomplished to support the disaster area.

9 June 2001:

- President Bush declared 28 East Texas counties a disaster area. The counties became eligible for federal assistance. FEMA stepped in as the lead agency to coordinate the federal response.

**Tropical Storm Allison (cont’d)**

- FEMA issued a request for assistance to the PHS for four Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) to deploy to East Texas. The PHS asked for DoD assistance in transporting the DMATs to the Houston area. DOMS approved two Special Airlift Assistance Missions (SAAMs). The tasking ultimately fell to the Air Force.

10 June 2001: One C-5 mission from Dover AFB and one C-17 mission from Charleston AFB successfully carried the DMATs to Houston.

**Observation:** Multiple types of MSCA might be requested/provided in one contingency. In this case, Air Force medical units responded and Air Force airlift was used to transport DMATs to the area.

### CBRNE OPERATIONS

The Air Force must be prepared to support crisis or consequence management operations in concert with other Services and civilian agencies. These entities may have operational capabilities and equipment or, conversely, weaknesses that could play a large part in the Air Force’s ability to survive and fight through the effects of a CBRNE attack. Installation-level and higher echelon commanders should establish working relationships, remove barriers to sharing information, and understand what other entities provide. Commanders should also make
effort to coordinate Air Force efforts with federal, state and local agencies. Air and space forces may be asked to provide support in the form of mobility, command and control, medical, and force protection, including passive defense support.

**Lead Federal Agency**

CBRNE operations on US territory will be conducted by civilian agencies with support from military forces. Air Force personnel should expect to work with personnel from other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the other military Services. Normally a JTF (e.g., JTF-CS for CBRNE) will be established to coordinate DoD support to civil authorities. In the event of a CBRNE terrorist incident on an Air Force installation in U.S. territories, there will likely be parallel lines of command over concurrent aspects of the operation. DoJ/FBI is the overall LFA for crisis management, and FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management for deliberate events, whether the incident occurs on or off military installations. The Air Force installation commander will retain responsibility for on-going military operations while the FBI will assume control over the crime scene. The installation commander may coordinate with and provide assistance such as technical expertise, logistics support, manpower, etc. to the FBI response team. Military forces will remain under military command at all times and may provide or receive supplemental support, as appropriate.

**Multiagency Response Structure**

The federal response to a terrorist incident is a highly coordinated interagency operation that can include Federal, State, and local participation. Primary federal agencies besides the DoJ and the FBI are the FEMA, DoD, the Department of Energy (DoE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). A liaison officer from each agency will be assigned to the ICS as each federal response support element arrives. The Air Force would likely provide a C2 liaison representative to the local incident command post to transmit and receive information, discuss Air Force capabilities, and resolve issues.

Throughout the management of the terrorist incident, crisis and consequence management activities may operate concurrently. The concept of operations for a Federal response to a terrorist threat or incident provides for the designation of an LFA to ensure multiagency coordination and a tailored, time-phased deployment of specialized Federal assets. It is critical that all participating Federal, State, and local agencies interact in a seamless manner.

“If there is a single item that we could do is to make sure that police, fire, emergency responders can communicate with one another. Oftentimes I go into a community and there are all types of bands and frequencies used and folks, literally, who are responding to an incident can’t talk to one another. So that is one single item I can put my finger on that we need to address immediately.”

Testimony of Joe M. Allbaugh, United States Senate Committee On Environment And Public Works  Oct 16, 2001
Command of DoD Forces

The Installation Commander will notify the FBI Field Office as soon as possible if an apparently intentional CBRNE event occurs on a domestic Air Force installation. The Commander will request and coordinate support through higher headquarters and/or the supported combatant commander as required. The installation commander has the authority and responsibility to notify state and local officials of the CBRNE situation when it poses a potential threat outside the installation and may make recommendations to state and local officials on actions to protect the public. Installation commanders will immediately report any CBRNE situation through military channels to inform the CJCS who may recommend the SECDEF request assistance from other federal agencies. As mentioned, the installation commander maintains overall command of the installation, but the FBI exercises authority relating to the CBRNE situation.

All official initial requests for CBRNE consequence management assistance will enter through the DoD Executive Secretary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will determine whether or not the CBRNE situation warrants special management procedures and channels. If the determination is that the CBRNE situation does not warrant special management, the RFA is passed to the SECARMY (SECDEF’s executive agent) and DOMS for execution through normal DOMS MSCA procedures. If special management is warranted, CJCS CONPLAN 0500 will be executed.

The appropriate combatant commander will be designated as the supported combatant commander depending on the location of the event. As necessary, the supported combatant commander will activate and deploy an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for the designated DoD forces responding to the event (e.g., JTF-CS for CBRNE). The commander of the JTF will exercise OPCON over designated DoD forces.

A DCO will be appointed and will coordinate DoD support to civilian agencies through the FCO and ESF leaders at the DFO. Once DoD forces have been deployed, RFAs for DoD support will be coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the FRP.

Air Force Role

Air Force capabilities that may potentially be requested in CBRNE events include (but are not limited to):

?? Providing continuing medical surveillance for military personnel involved in the response.
?? Providing technical reachback capability for specialized personnel, teams, agencies, modeling, etc.
?? Providing laboratory support for analysis of environmental samples or NBC monitoring.
?? Providing information management systems for personnel, logistics, administrative data, health information, CBRNE specifics, etc.
?? Providing on-scene and in-patient medical support for casualties.
?? Providing CBRNE monitoring, detection, identification, and safing capabilities.
?? Providing logistics, traffic, or security support.
?? Providing on-scene communications support.
On 18 August 1998, the civil engineer squadron at McConnell AFB received a *mutual aid request* to respond to an anthrax threat in Wichita, Kansas. An employee in the Finney State Office Building in downtown Wichita discovered an envelope on the floor of an elevator, which contained white powder and a note saying that anthrax had been placed in the building. McConnell dispatched eight hazardous material technicians, two operations-level personnel, a bioenvironmental specialist, and the base fire chief as a command officer. The team set up decontamination equipment, including tents, showers, and containment equipment for waste water runoff control. Following decontamination, all equipment and suits were sealed in plastic and over-pack drums and secured at a Wichita fire station. Tests eventually proved negative. Since September 11, 2001 Air Force civil engineers have responded to numerous community reports of suspicious “white powdery substances.”

**Observation:** This Air Force response depicts multiple capabilities including detection, assessment, and containment measures. It is often difficult to determine if an incident is real or a hoax before actually responding and assessing the situation. Failure to respond and characterize the situation could be catastrophic.
CHAPTER SIX

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

“We will eventually see a (NBC) weapon of mass destruction used in terrorist act...We had better start thinking about how we’re going to be prepared for that, because we’re woefully unprepared for that event. And that’s inevitable, as this asymmetry continues.”

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, Ret.
Former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command
19 Oct 00, Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony on USS Cole Attack

EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The threat to the United States from state and non-state terrorist groups intending to use weapons of mass destruction is valid. The United States government is reorganizing federal agencies and departments to provide the most efficient command and control structure for response and mitigation to these events. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, MSCA was predominately focused and structured for response to natural disasters, such as forest fires, weather phenomena, and earthquakes. The federal state, and local governments began preparing for large scale response to weapons of mass destruction in the mid to late nineties while the DoD continued to focus on military operations outside the continental US. A major attack on the US would require a total federal response to defend the homeland and mitigate devastating damage. Senior leaders in the federal government have now embraced the seriousness of this threat and are restructuring federal and military departments to rapidly respond to future attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

EVOLVING FEDERAL STRUCTURE, ROLES AND MISSIONS

The Department of Defense is restructuring with the establishment of a new unified combatant command, NORTHCOM. This command is responsible for homeland defense and for assisting civil authorities. The Commander of NORTHCOM will update plans to provide military support to domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made disasters and during national emergencies. Both the Department of Homeland Security (if/when established) and the DoD will participate in homeland security training that involves military and civilian emergency response personnel.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING AIR FORCE LEADERS AND RESPONDERS

The recent restructuring of the federal government for response to terrorist events and military support to civil authorities has generated doctrinal concerns on potential missions and core capabilities the Air Force is suited to provide. The unique Air Force capabilities best suited to provide assistance to civilian authorities must be provided and managed in a way that merges
these assets seamlessly with the civilian command structure. To enhance this transition, Air Force leaders and responders need to have a firm understanding of the civilian command and control structure and capabilities of local, state and federal emergency management organizations.

Local, state and federal emergency management agencies have developed standard protocols and structures to merge assets and control the response effort. The Air Force uses a command and control system similar to the Incident Command System however from a military perspective. The Air Force Disaster Control Group (DCG) has related functions to the Incident Command System; however, Air Force responders at installations must understand how to merge into the federal, state, and local organizational structure. Also, staff officers at unified commands, major commands (MAJCOMs), and numbered Air Forces (NAFs) should be knowledgeable on the lead federal agency and other agencies involved in the overall federal response effort. This understanding will enhance military planning, command and control and training functions.

WHO NEEDS TO TRAIN FOR MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Military installations located throughout the United States interface frequently with local emergency managers during responses to aircraft accidents, natural disasters, structural fires and hazardous material responses. In many situations, MOU/MOA exist between military and civilian fire, medical, and law enforcement agencies to assist in a local community. At the local level, the installation emergency response function has reasonable working relationships. When the event requires state and federal assistance, these relations are less solidified and lead to confusion in the life saving and mitigation stages. Installation command posts, DCG, wing and group leadership should receive training on when and how to respond, up-channel reporting requirements, and federal agencies who are in-charge during the response effort.

MAJCOMs and NAFs are tasked with providing command and control assistance to a large Air Force response effort at the federal level. Staff officers performing the planning function, selecting units to deploy in support of AETF taskings, and advising senior commanders on response efforts must know the federal response plans and taskings assigned.

Headquarters Air Staff functions who formulate guidance and policy for military support to civil authorities require a firm understanding of the federal strategy and those agencies tasked under federal plans. These staff officers are also responsible for educating the executive staff on appropriate actions and capabilities the Air Force can provide to the response effort.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE TRAINED

Installation Disaster Response Force personnel and commanders should receive training every two years on the federal and military response structure. DCG members must understand the role of the FCO, SCO, DCO, the ICS, and Public Affairs considerations. Installation responders must understand the four categories under which military units provide support to civil authorities, when support should be withdrawn, the reporting requirements to higher headquarters, and validation procedures for requests from FCOs and state officials.
Commanders must ensure MOU/MOA are consistent with law and the DoD and Air Force directives. Training must be provided on how military support to civil authority taskings will be processed through the regional planning agent, AEF Center, and the Air Force command and control structure for responding units. Installation planners require training in the FRP, regional disaster assistance plans, and city and county emergency response plans in the vicinity of the installation.

MAJCOM and NAF staffs require training on the national homeland security structure, agencies at Headquarters USAF who are responsible for developing Air Force homeland security policy; the federal response system to include roles of federal agencies, FCO, SCO, DCO, and EPLOs; legal aspects of providing military support to civilian jurisdictions; AETF deployment structure for civil support; and military capabilities most likely of value to the civil support role.

Members of the Air Force Operations Center and two and three letter directorate chiefs require education on the FRP, Air Force, NORTHCOM, and PACOM plans outlining response taskings; federal response structure to include command and control; interagency process for decision making; federal agency taskings; role of the Department of Homeland Security; and how to evaluate requests based on legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness and readiness of forces to accomplish the mission.

WHO ARE THE TRAINERS

City and state first responders and emergency managers receive training from a consortium of federal and state institutions (e.g., DoD, DoJ, FEMA, etc.) to prepare responders and decision-makers for dealing with the myriad of considerations involved in response to CBRNE events. These courses are also available to military personnel.

The Air Force education and training system is organized to provide training to four distinct groups: officer/enlisted accessions, professional military education, operational training (provides entry through seven level Air Force specialty training), and special schools to meet functional mission training. Figure 10-1 illustrates the types of training provided in the Air Force relevant to MSCA and CBRNE subject matter.
Figure 10-1. Air Force Education and Training Dissemination Nodes

MSCA training is addressed in one of these four broad groups. Currently Air Force first responders are: Fire Department, Security Forces, medical personnel, emergency managers (Civil Engineer Readiness), Bio-environmental Engineers, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. These personnel receive initial training in the operational training category to receive an Air Force specialty. The DCG members receive training at the installation and the on-scene commanders attend specialized training at the On-Scene Commanders course taught at Maxwell AFB. Enlisted personnel return to school or complete correspondence courses to receive five and seven level up-grade training. Officers receive professional military education throughout their career to provide additional knowledge on leadership, tactical, operational and strategic principles.

The Air Force education and training organizational structure is well suited to provide the necessary training on MSCA to Air Force active and reserve personnel. However, this training is not institutionalized across the Air Force and will require a concentrated effort at the NAF and MAJCOM levels. The training provided to first responders and DCG members at the installation outline installation disaster preparedness planning, and command and control principles but fall short in training the group to participate as members of a local, state, or federal ICS. Civil engineer flights must ensure the training requirements identified in the first paragraph of the previous section (“What Needs To Be Trained”) are included in the appropriate lesson plan and taught to all DCG members.
Installation Command Post controllers, and contingency action staffs should receive training every two years. The AFNSEP Office should ensure Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers provide this training to the wing senior leadership and contingency support staff.

MAJCOM and NAFs require the training identified in the second paragraph of the previous section (“What Needs To Be Trained”). Command Post controllers, contingency staff, and planning functional representatives for the directorates should receive this training upon assuming these responsibilities. AFNSEP officers should conduct periodic training briefings to keep these staffs current on planning and response issues.

Members of the Air Force Operations Center and two and three letter directorate chiefs should receive the training described in the third paragraph of the previous section (“What Needs To Be Trained”) upon assuming these responsibilities. AFNSEP is required to perform this training per AFI 10-802, Military Support To Civil Authorities.

To capitalize on the education and training exposure available through professional military education, Senior NCO Academy, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College should include MSCA, homeland security, and homeland defense topics in both elective and core classes. This provides an avenue to educate all senior NCOs and officers on the challenges of response to weapons of mass destruction events.

The On Scene Commanders course should ensure weapons of mass destruction and MSCA training is adequately discussed to ensure both Fire Chiefs and Support Group Commanders are prepared for commanding the dynamic response effort to an incident of this nature. The wing commanders and group commanders courses taught at the specialized schools within Air University should also ensure the curriculum includes a discussion on MSCA and WMD response.

The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education should address planning for force deployment in support of MSCA and WMD missions at the Contingency Wartime Planning Course.
ANNEX A - COMMAND STRUCTURES (NOTIONAL)

Single Service Task Force (TF)

Established by the unified commander, the Task Force commander (TFC) reports directly to the unified commander. Observations:

• Not referenced as an option in JP 0-2, page xvii – would need to be codified in joint doctrine

• Has proven workable in JFCOM for two years of supporting the wildland fire operations

• Has the advantage of being able to send a very small command and control footprint forward for the operation (TF Wildfires 2002 has an incredibly small C2 forward footprint)

• Challenges for CS:
  • Some get confused over ‘multiple’ COMAFFORs – shouldn’t be confusing
  • In order to maintain a small forward command element footprint, this structure requires significant specificity in how the Service Component and the Unified Command Staff supports the TFC in terms of reachback – who is the reachback staff, where are they located, and what will the TFC be reaching back for. In this scenario, operational reachback should be to USNORTHCOM’s staff.
Single Service TF Established by the Air Component

JP 0-2, page xvii, “The unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options: …5) single-Service force (normally the combatant commander assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service component).

In this scenario, the TFC would be subordinate to the Service Component. Operational reachback would be to NORTHAF’s staff.

(Cont’d on next page)
The air component could establish any number of mission-specific task forces (see graphic below), under the direction of the unified commander. Consistent with the intent of Cooperative Authority and a related MOU with state officials, the TF Commander should be from the component (e.g., Title 10 or Title 32) with the preponderance of Air Force forces involved in the mission. However, the TF Commander will be in Title 10 status while performing their duties.
Joint Task Force (JTF)

The JTF structure is the most common when the mission has a specific limited objective. Normally, the JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created is no longer required. Historically, this command structure has not been utilized to organize DoD’s response to request for assistance from civil authorities due to manpower requirements (e.g., a 2-star general officer and 120 people). Consideration should be given to tailoring the size of the JTF headquarters to the mission (utilizing reachback as appropriate), versus a “one size fits all”-sized staff.

Operational reachback under this structure would be from the TF to the JTF staff.
Standing JTF Headquarters (S-JTF HQ)

The commander, USNORTHCOM may elect to establish standing JTFs for Civil Support (CS) and Homeland Security (HLS). This is a variation of the previous JTF structure except there is a standing HQ staff, and subordinate JTFs are established (ad hoc) for each civil support operation. The Defense Planning Guidance directs Unified Commands to establish S-JTFs.

Some advantages include:

• The S-JTF staff would have visibility and planning capability for developing CS contingency response; significant continuity; and opportunities to build long-term interagency relationships.

• The S-JTF can provide the forward HQ of the ad hoc JTF significant reachback capability

Some challenges might include:

• Requires significant specificity in the reachback responsibilities of the S-JTF staff

• Also requires significant specificity in the reachback responsibilities of the NORTHAF staff to the 1AETF commander/staff
ANNEX B - LEGAL GUIDANCE, POLICIES, AND PLANS

**General Considerations:** Military support to civil authorities, and support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEA) in particular, is significantly impacted by federal statutes, Executive Orders, and DoD Directives. The legal issues are complex. Commanders should consult with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) when considering requests for military support to civilian agencies. Typically, support to civilian agencies will not be provided if its provision will adversely impact the military preparedness of the United States. The statutes and directives highlighted in this annex are not comprehensive.

**The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) 18 USC § 1385:** The PCA restricts direct military support to civilian LEA for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress (such as those listed below) or the United States Constitution (such as actions pursuant to the President’s inherent authority in Article II). Prohibited direct support includes actions in which the military pervades LEA activities, or that subject civilians to compulsory, proscriptive military power. The PCA does not apply to National Guard units in non-Federal status (state active duty status or in status pursuant to 32 USC §§ 101 et seq.).

**Military Purpose:** The PCA does not prohibit direct support to LEA if the primary purpose is to further a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. Actions that serve a primarily military purpose include investigations taken pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other military administrative proceeding, and actions taken pursuant to a commander’s inherent authority to protect military personnel, property, or guests, or to maintain order on an installation.

**Emergency Authority:** The PCA does not prohibit direct support in emergency situations when the action is taken under the inherent right of the United States to preserve order and carry out government operations. During sudden or unexpected emergencies, responsible DoD officials or commanders may approve the use of military forces in a law enforcement capacity in order to prevent the loss of life or the wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning or order. This “immediate response” authority should be used with great caution and in extremely unusual situations.

**Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 10 USC §§ 371-382:** These sections authorize support to civilian LEA and deal with use of military information, equipment and facilities, and personnel.

**Military Information:** Information collected during the normal course of military operations may be forwarded to federal, state, or local LEA if the information is relevant to a violation of a criminal law. While the needs of LEA may be considered when scheduling routine missions, missions may not be planned for the primary purpose of aiding LEA. (See DoDD 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, Encl. 2.)
**Intelligence:** The USA Patriot Act removed some of the legal obstacles to the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence components. Intelligence is a specialized activity that is governed by multiple Congressional statutes, Executive Orders and Department of Defense Directives. (See DoDD 5240.1, *DoD Intelligence Activities* and DOD 5440.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*, AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*).

**Military Equipment and Facilities:** Military equipment and facilities may be made available to LEA, subject to certain restrictions, including support of counter-drug (CD) and counter-terrorism efforts. (See, DODD 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, Encl. 3) Generally, military working dogs can be used to support civilian law enforcement agencies if there is no cost to the government and no impact on unit readiness. (See AFI 31-202, *Military Working Dog Program*).

**Military Personnel:** Except when authorized by statute or the Constitution, direct participation by military personnel in the execution or enforcement of the law is prohibited. Prohibited activities include interdiction, searches and seizures, arrests and surveillance activities. Training of LEA, use of personnel to maintain and operate equipment, and the provision of expert advice are also limited. Generally, the Air Force will not provide advanced military training to civilian law enforcement agencies. Permissible training includes basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical and survival skills. (See, DoDD 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, Ecl. 4.)

**Insurrection Statutes, 10 USC §§ 331-334:** These sections authorize the use of military forces, by Presidential order, in response to civil disturbances, including rebellion, insurgency, insurrection or domestic violence such that the state authorities cannot or will not enforce state or federal law. The Insurrection Statutes are a specific exception to the PCA, and permit the President to use federal forces in response to a request from a state or territory, to enforce federal authority, or to protect Constitutional rights. (See DoDD 3025.12, *Military Assistance with Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*).

**The Economy Act, 31 USC § 1535:** This act governs transfer of material between Executive Branch agencies within the Federal Government. The Economy Act does not apply to the transfer of material to non-Federal LEA. Reimbursement to the Department of Defense from non-Federal agencies is authorized under 10 USC § 377 to the extent such would be authorized under The Economy Act.

**The National Defense Authorization Acts, § 1004:** Since 1991, Congress has annually renewed military support for counter-drug operations. Under this section, the Secretary of Defense may authorize a variety of support to federal, state, local or foreign law enforcement agencies if requested. Types of support include maintenance and repair of DoD equipment, transportation of personnel and supplies for the purpose of facilitating counter-drug activities, counter-drug training activities, aerial and ground reconnaissance and provision of support for command and control networks. 10 USC § 124 makes the DoD the lead federal agency for the
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq. [Stafford Act]: The statutory authority for federal disaster assistance. The Act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance available. The Act authorizes the President to provide DoD assets for relief once a disaster is declared. DoD may use resources to “save lives, protect property” and avert future threats. See DoDD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civilian Authorities*.

The National Emergencies Act 50 USC §§ 1601-1651: This Act establishes a process for *statutory* Presidential declarations of emergencies. These declarations must be published in Federal Register, and Congress must review declaration every 6 months. Congress is also able to terminate these declarations. Does not apply to Constitutional authority of the President.

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 50 USC §§ 2301-2367: Requires DoD coordination with WMD response agencies. Authorizes DoD support to DoJ in enforce laws involving WMD, *when* DoJ requests support, and SECDEF and Attorney General jointly determine that WMD threat exists and civil authorities lack capabilities.

Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) 31 USC sec. 1341-42, 1511-19: The ADA generally prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds in advance of, or in excess of, an appropriation by Congress, as well as the use of funds for an unauthorized purpose.

Immediate Response Authority: In the event of an emergency or an attack, and when unable to obtain guidance from higher headquarters, a commander may legally assist civil authorities or the public in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under immediate serious conditions. See DoDD 3025.1 and DoDD 3025.15.

Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities”, states that the National Security Emergency Preparedness Policy of the United States is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. A national security emergency is any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, terrorist attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.

Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001 *Establishing Office of Homeland Security*: This EO established the Office of Homeland Security that is headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Its mission is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office coordinates the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attack within the United States.
OTHER FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS

There are a number of other plans that may be implemented independently or concurrently with the FRP. These include:

United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN is designed to provide overall guidance to Federal, State and local agencies concerning how the Federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving WMD. It establishes conceptual guidance for assessing and monitoring a developing threat, notifying appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies of the threat, and deploying the requisite advisory and technical resources to assist the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) in coordinating interdepartmental crisis and consequence management activities.

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The FRERP coordinates the federal radiological response to a nuclear materials incident.

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP). This plan coordinates the federal environmental response to HAZMAT and chemical-agent incidents. Environmental response includes monitoring, decontamination, and long-term restoration.
ANNEX C - INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

This annex introduces the Incident Command System (ICS). The structure of the ICS will vary in degree of formality depending on the level of response. What Air Force installation commanders need to know is that there will be a civilian C2 structure in place; and installation activities will be in support of the incident commander. If the event progresses to the level of requiring a federal response, the ICS will be highly formalized and structured; and a DCO will be in place to provide the link between civil authorities and DoD.

GENERAL

C2 of a terrorist threat or incident is a critical function requiring a unified framework for preparing and executing plans and orders. Emergency response organizations at all levels of local or state government may manage command and control activities somewhat different depending on the organization's history, the complexity of the crisis, and their capabilities and resources. Management of local, state, and federal response actions must reflect an inherent flexibility in order to effectively address the entire spectrum of capabilities and resources across the United States. An effective C2 system supports military and civilian-agency operations and ensures effective response to crisis management and consequence management operations. If an incident occurs without warning, produces major casualties, and/or appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence management and crisis management actions concurrently. FEMA will support the FBI as required and coordinate the response of FRP agencies providing support to the affected area.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

State and local emergency management organizations are generally structured to respond to an incident scene using a modular, functionally-oriented incident command system (ICS) that can be tailored to the kind, size and management needs of the incident. ICS is employed to organize and unify multiple disciplines with multi-jurisdictional responsibilities on-scene under one functional organization. The ICS is a modular system that uses common terminology and implements incident action plans in five component (functional) areas: command, operations, logistics, planning, and finance/administration. State and local emergency operations plans generally establish direction and control procedures for their agencies’ response to disaster situations. The organization’s staff is built from a “top-down” approach with responsibility and authority placed initially with an Incident Commander who determines which local resources will be deployed. In most cases, the incident commander will come from the State or local organization that has primary responsibility for managing the emergency situation.

When the magnitude of a crisis exceeds the capabilities and resources of the local incident commander or multiple jurisdictions become involved in order to resolve the crisis situation, the ICS command function can readily evolve into a Unified Command (see Figure AC-1). Under Unified Command, a multi-agency command post is established incorporating officials from agencies with jurisdictional responsibility at the incident scene. Multiple agency resources and personnel will then be integrated into the ICS as the single overall response management structure at the incident scene.
Figure AC-1. New York State Incident Command System

Multi-agency coordination to provide resources to support on-scene operations in complex or multiple incidents is the responsibility of emergency management. In the emergency management system, requests for resources are filled at the lowest possible level of government. Requests that exceed available capabilities are progressively forwarded until filled, from a local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), to a State EOC, to Federal operations centers at the regional or national level.

State assistance may be provided to local governments in responding to a terrorist threat or recovering from the consequences of a terrorist incident as in any natural or man-made disaster. State agencies are responsible for ensuring that essential services and resources are available to the local authorities and Incident Commander when requested. When State assistance is provided, the local government retains overall responsibility for command and control of the emergency operations, except in cases where State or Federal statutes transfer authority to a specific State or Federal agency. State and local governments have primary responsibility for consequence management. FEMA, using the FRP, directs and coordinates all Federal response efforts to manage the consequences in domestic incidents, for which the President has declared, or expressed intent to declare, an emergency.
ANNEX D – EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

The Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Annexes in the Federal Response Plan describe the mission, policies, concept of operations, and responsibilities of the primary and support agencies involved in implementing 12 functional areas that supplement State and local activities. Activation of the ESF is based on the nature and scope of the event and the level of federal resources required. The table below summarizes the ESFs and identifies examples of equivalent Air Force support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Primary Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># 1: Transportation</td>
<td>Civilian and military transportation support</td>
<td>Dept of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 2: Communications</td>
<td>Telecommunications Support</td>
<td>National Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>Restore essential public services and facilities</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 4: Firefighting</td>
<td>Detect and suppress wildland, rural, and urban fires</td>
<td>U.S. Forest Service; Dept of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 5: Information and Planning</td>
<td>Collect, analyze, and disseminate critical information to facilitate overall Federal response and recovery operations</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 6: Mass Care</td>
<td>Manage and coordinate food, shelter, and first aid for victims; provide bulk distribution of relief supplies; operate a system to assist family reunification</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 7: Resource Support</td>
<td>Provide equipment, materials, supplies, and personnel to Federal entities during response operations</td>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 8: Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>Provide assistance for public health and medical care needs</td>
<td>U.S. Public Health Service, Dept of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 9: Urban Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Locate, extricate, and provide initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 10: Hazardous Materials</td>
<td>Support Federal response to actual or potential releases of oil and hazardous materials</td>
<td>EPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 11: Food</td>
<td>Identify food needs; ensure that food gets to areas affected by disaster</td>
<td>Food and Nutrition Service, Dept of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 12: Energy</td>
<td>Restore power systems and fuel supplies</td>
<td>Dept of Energy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table AD-1. Emergency Support Functions With Air Force Parallels
ANNEX E

ACRONYMS

ACC  Air Combat Command
ACC  Airlift Control Center
AECC  Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center
AEF  Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AEG  Aerospace Expeditionary Group
AES  Aerospace Expeditionary Squadron
AETF  Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force
AFCESA  Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
AFI  Air Force Instruction
AFMC  Air Force Material Command
AFNSEP  Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness
AFPD  Air Force Policy Directive
AFRAT  Air Force Radiation Assessment Team
AFSFC  Air Force Security Forces Center
AMC  Air Mobility Command
AMS  Aerial Measuring System
ANG  Air National Guard
AOR  Area of Responsibility
ARAC  Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability

C/B-RRT  Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team
CBIRF  Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRG  Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CE  Civil Engineer
CIRG  Critical Incident Response Group
CJCSI  Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction
COMAFFOR  Commander, Air Force Forces
CONUS  Continental United States
CONUSA  Continental United States Army
COOP  Continuity of Operations Programs
CPC  Counterproliferation Center
CSD  Chemical Support Division
CST  Civil Support team

DCE  Defense Coordinating Element
DCO  Defense Coordinating Officer
Dept  Department
DEST  Domestic Emergency Support Team
DFO  Disaster Field Office
DHHS  Department of Health and Human Services
DMAT  Disaster Medical Assistance team
DOD   Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense Directive
DOE   Department of Energy
DOJ   Department of Justice
DOMS  Director of Military Support
DOT   Department of Transportation

EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ERT   Emergency Response Team
ERT-A Emergency Response Team-Advance Element
ESF   Emergency Support Function
EST   Emergency Support Team

FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC   Federal Coordinating Center
FCO   Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRP   Federal Response Plan

HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HHS   Health and Human Services
HLD   Homeland Defense
HRT   Hostage Rescue Team

IC    Incident Commander
ICS   Incident Command System

JIC   Joint Information Center
JIOC  Joint Information Operations Center
JOC   Joint Operations Center
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF   Joint Task Force
JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support

LFA   Lead Federal Agency

MACA  Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
MOA   Memorandum of Agreement
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding
MSCA  Military Support to Civil Authorities
MSLEA Military Support to Law Enforcement Agencies
NBC  Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCP  National Contingency Plan
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NMRI  Naval Medical Research Institute
NMRT National Medical Response Team
NSEP National Security Emergency Preparedness

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSC On-Scene Coordinator
OSI Office of Special Investigation

PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PHS Public Health Service
PPA Principal Planning Agent
Prime BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

RAP Radiological Assistance Program
REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
RFA Request for Assistance
ROC Regional Operations Center
RPA Regional Planning Agent
RTF Response Task Force

SCO State Coordinating Officer
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDDEF Secretary of Defense
SIOC Strategic Information Operations Center

TEU Technical Escort Unit

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe
USAMRIID US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
UTC Unit Type Code

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction