THESIS

AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ESTABLISHING A STANDING STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE

by

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American Resistance to Establishing a Standing Stability Operations Force

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The United States is currently involved in stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and will likely continue this involvement in the future. Currently, general-purpose forces, the majority of which are U.S. Army soldiers, conduct these operations. As of this writing, the U.S. Army has resisted establishing a standing, dedicated, stability operations force. Such a force would, at first glance, seem to be a logical progression of American military force structure, based upon current Department of Defense directives and publicly stated policy. This thesis will explore the reasons behind the lack of this force. It will analyze costs and benefits of a stability operations force with regards to military readiness, domestic politics, and international politics. It will also consider the role of organization inertia. Finally, it will recommend a workable framework for such a stability operations force, using the lessons learned from the analysis within this thesis, making the most of the advantages described and mitigating the costs.
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ESTABLISHING A STANDING STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE

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ABSTRACT

The United States is currently involved in stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and will likely continue this involvement in the future. Currently, general-purpose forces, the majority of which are U.S. Army soldiers, conduct these operations. As of this writing, the U.S. Army has resisted establishing a standing, dedicated, stability operations force. Such a force would, at first glance, seem to be a logical progression of American military force structure, based upon current Department of Defense directives and publicly stated policy. This thesis will explore the reasons behind the lack of this force. It will analyze costs and benefits of a stability operations force with regards to military readiness, domestic politics, and international politics. It will also consider the role of organization inertia. Finally, it will recommend a workable framework for such a stability operations force, using the lessons learned from the analysis within this thesis, making the most of the advantages described and mitigating the costs.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1  
   A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................................1  
   B. IMPORTANCE ...................................................................................................1  
   C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ..................................................................2  
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................4  
   E. METHODS AND SOURCES ..........................................................................9  
   F. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................9  

II. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: EVOLUTION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS .................11  
   A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ............................................................................11  
      1. Pre-Cold War Operations .........................................................................11  
      2. Cold War Era .........................................................................................14  
         a. The U.S. Constabulary in Germany ...............................................14  
         b. Post-War Japan and Korea .............................................................15  
         c. UN Peacekeeping Takes Center Stage .........................................16  
      3. From Cold War to September 11, 2001 .................................................17  
      4. Post-September 11 Operations ............................................................20  
   B. STABILITY OPERATIONS TODAY .............................................................21  
      1. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 ...........................................22  
      3. The Debate: Specialized versus General-Purpose Troops .................24  

III. THE EXPLANATIONS: RATIONAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONAL INTERTIA .................................................................27  
   A. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS COSTS AND BENEFITS .........................27  
      1. Military Effectiveness Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force .................................................................27  
   B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................27  
      1. Domestic Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force ........................................................................31  
      2. Domestic Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force ........................................................................38  
   C. GLOBAL POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................27  
      1. Global Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force ........................................................................41  
      2. Global Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force ........................................................................45  
   D. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA .................................................................46  

IV. STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE REVISITED .................................................51
A. THE STANDING STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE .................. 51
   1. Size and Composition .......................................................... 51
   2. Command and Control ......................................................... 52
   3. Concerns ............................................................................. 53

B. SUMMARY ................................................................................ 54
   1. Most Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability
      Operations Force ................................................................. 55
   2. Least Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability
      Operations Force ................................................................. 55
   3. Conclusion ........................................................................... 55

LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................... 57
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................... 63
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Notional Operational Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort ...............32
Figure 2. Cost Comparison of Real UN and Hypothetical U.S. Missions in Haiti .........34
Figure 3. Costs of Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti, with Variables .................36
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CENTCOM  U.S. Central Command
COIN  Counterinsurgency
DoD  U.S. Department of Defense
DoDI  Department of Defense Instruction
EU  European Union
FM  United States Army Field Manual
GAO  Government Accountability Office
GOP  Grand Ol’ Party (Republican Party)
IFOR  NATO Implementation Force
IPTF  International Police Task Force
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
KFOR  Kosovo Peacekeeping Force
LTG  Lieutenant General
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-Government Organizations
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School
NSS  National Security Strategy
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
SBCT  Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SFOR  NATO Stabilization Force
UN United Nations
UNEF I United Nations Emergency Force One
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Why has the United States not established a standing stability operations force? Why has it not established a dedicated training pipeline for troops involved in stability operations? The United States, and its military in particular, has had a long history of adapting to meet new challenges. This adaptation has often resulted in new, specialized forces. At the very least, troop training has grown and improved, resulting in a better-prepared fighting force. As of now, the U.S. has resisted establishing a standing, dedicated, stability operations force. It has also resisted creating any sort of specialized career path for service members within this field. For the purpose of this thesis, a “standing stability operations force” is defined as a specialized organization within the military, dedicated to the sole mission of conducting stability operations. The potential size and composition of this force will be described in Chapter IV.

B. IMPORTANCE

Since the end of the Cold War Era, there has been a significant increase in “small conflicts,” including: contingency operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and similar armed struggles.\footnote{Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 124.} The causes and initial circumstances surrounding these actions are varied; however, the risks following this initial conflict are great. Civil wars are costly. A typical civil war can cost a small country and its neighbors around $64.2 billion.\footnote{Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Department of Economics: Center for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus, 2004), 8.} International intervention into the conflicts in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia has cost approximately $85 billion dollars.\footnote{Ibid., 8.} According to a recent survey of Oxford University economists, a UN Chapter VII-style peace operation...
is the most cost-effective way to prevent further conflicts. The U.S. has been involved in many of these conflicts, started a few, been in leadership roles in others, and generally footed a great portion of the bill. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 stresses that stability operations “are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” Therefore, it stands to reason that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to find the most effective way to prepare for and execute these stability missions. The question posed above is made even more puzzling by the fact that many American allies themselves have standing stability operations forces. Additionally, Charles C. Moskos has argued that soldiers engaged in stability operations actually are better and more capable soldiers than those who lack such experience.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

What reasons exist for this resistance to a specialized stability operations force? Any military’s primary mission is to fight and win a nation’s wars. Soldiers and Marines often view themselves as heroes, who “reduced war to its simplest terms—as armed violence directed toward the achievement of an end.” Hence, a “warrior ethos” is held in a high regard. Stability operations, however, can be, and often are, viewed as a lesser mission than warfighting. General Colin Powell, at his last press conference as the

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed concerns regarding an overemphasis on peacekeeping. He said that such a focus could weaken the warrior ethos necessary for the military to complete its primary mission.\textsuperscript{11}

Another reason for the lack of a standardized stability operations force may be the simple fact that the U.S. historically has not placed a high priority on such operations. However, emphasis is shifting within the U.S. military. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 is entitled “Stability Operations.” It addresses the full spectrum of post-conflict and small-scale operations.\textsuperscript{12} This instruction is important, as it shows that the military understands the environment in which it operates, and the necessity for post-conflict prowess and skill.

The preliminary hypothesis for this thesis is that the resistance to establishing a standing stability operations force and training track is two-fold. The first justification is a cost-benefit analysis, drawing on rational choice theory. The leadership involved in shaping force structure have examined the costs associated with establishing such a force, weighed those costs against the benefits, and ultimately decided that the status quo was the most beneficial course of action. The costs involved could be political (both domestically and internationally), economic, and/or military. These costs may or may not be simply perception, or perhaps, upon further analysis, the costs are not as great as expected.

This problem of perception leads to the second potential reason for resistance. This hypothesis examines the extent to which organizational inertia and path dependence have influenced U.S. policy toward establishing a standing stability operations force. The Army in particular, as an institution, is so big and unyielding that it is unable or unwilling to undergo major changes. Path dependency may be a significant governing factor in the modern Army’s decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{11} Spiers, “U.S. Peace Operations,” 16.
\textsuperscript{12} U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Department of Defense Instruction}. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on the subject of this thesis can be separated into several major camps. First it is important to examine existing doctrine. The American military has outlines of several aspects of stability operations. Joint Publication 3-0 defines “Stability Operations” thusly:

These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions and tasks are the essence of CMO. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs, and the private sector.13

More specifically, the U.S. Army’s Field Manual on Stability Operations outlines in detail its own particular doctrine: “[FM 3-07] proceeds from that definition to establish the broad context in which military forces assume that role before, during, and after combat operations, across the spectrum of conflict.”14 Each of these publications refers to the Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 on Stability Operations. FM 3-07 acknowledges, “the [Department of Defense] directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets the foundation for this doctrine.”15 Finally, the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also addresses stability operations as a core mission of the U.S. military. It states: “The Department defends the United States from direct attack, deters potential adversaries, fosters regional security, and assures access to the global commons by

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13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008), V-I, Washington, DC


15 Ibid., vi.
enhancing U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist partner-nation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations.” Additionally, the 2010 QDR states:

The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN), stability, and counterterrorism (CT) operations[…]. Moreover, there are few cases in which the U.S. Armed Forces would engage in sustained large-scale combat operations without the associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable governance. Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities to create a secure environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian relief.

It is clear that the U.S. Department of Defense, at least on paper, places a high priority on stability operations.

Despite this written support for stability operations, and the priority placed on such, there remains a debate as to whether or not such an emphasis is indeed good for the armed forces. A great deal has been written on the subject, both for and against separation and special emphasis on stability operations. Nathan Freier argues that in a world of “hybrid warfare,” the military must always be ready for multiple types of threats and missions. He writes: “It is difficult to classify DOD’s strategic focus today. Defense capabilities are placed into action to secure vulnerable core interests for a variety of reasons, under wide-ranging circumstances.” Army doctrine seems to agree with this concept. U.S. Army FM 3-07 emphasizes such concepts as: “whole of government,” “comprehensive approach,” and stability operations as simply one aspect of “full

19 FM 3-07, 1-4.
20 Ibid.
spectrum operations.” Support for an integrated force is demonstrated perhaps most clearly and forcefully in the 2010 QDR. This document identifies, as some of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense, the goals to: “Increase COIN, stability operations, and CT competency and capacity in general purpose forces.” On the other hand, others have stated clearly that a separate force would have significant military advantages. Robert M. Perito describes an ideal stability operations force as including military police and Stryker brigades, along with special police units, civil police, and judicial and penal experts. Finally, in 1999, the Congressional Budget Office compiled a report on peace operations and combat effectiveness. It explored costs concerning several options to improve both combat effectiveness and peace operations capabilities. It concluded:

As long as the Army must deploy often to peace operations, it will continue to run the risk of being less ready for conventional combat than it would be otherwise. If that level of risk is considered unacceptable, decision makers may face a choice: either increase funding enough to provide the means for responding to peace operations while maintaining readiness for conventional war, or decrease U.S. commitments to peace operations.

However, others have acknowledged that military costs are not the only factor likely contributing to America’s lack of a standing stability operations force. Michael G. MacKinnon outlined the gradual shift of public sentiment regarding peacekeeping, a key component of stability operations. Thoughts of the Vietnam War were still in the minds of many, and they were unwilling to use the military for what could be seen as misguided goals, at best. President George H. W. Bush’s actions early in his presidency (the invasion of Panama and the Gulf War) seem to support the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,

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21 FM 3-07, 2-1.
23 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 330–333.
that is, only use overwhelming force and only use it towards a clear goal.\textsuperscript{26} Kimberly Zisk Marten described the problems, risks, and failures associated with the lack of American political will to engage fully in peace [stability] operations.\textsuperscript{27} “[T]he United States military tries to avoid taking on police-like functions as much as possible, at least in part to avoid casualties on missions like peacekeeping that are considered less central to U.S. security concerns than war-fighting.”\textsuperscript{28} Planners have determined that one of their goals is “maintaining public support for military action by limiting the perception that troops are put in harm’s way for no good reason.”\textsuperscript{29} One major cause of these perceptions was, and continues to be, the memory of the UN operations in Somalia.\textsuperscript{30}

Domestic political concerns, however, are not the only area of debate on the subject of stability operations. International politics are always at play when talking about international actions. Perito lays out several arguments supporting the U.S. fighting (and winning) wars, and letting its allies conduct the post-conflict and peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{31} The general consensus on peacekeeping is that the UN leads the charge on this function around the world. In fact, peacekeeping is “the mission which is, indeed, [the UN’s] very raison d’être.”\textsuperscript{32} However, even the UN has had its stumbling blocks. The famed “Brahimi Report” was commissioned in order to help the UN complete that mission. Throughout the 1990s, “the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge.”\textsuperscript{33} Part of the difficulty faced by UN forces after the Cold War era was the changing aspects of peacekeeping. The Brahimi report defined “Peace Operations” as consisting of three main activities: peacemaking, i.e., actions to bring an end to a conflict in progress; peacekeeping, i.e., many groups (including the military)

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{26} MacKinnon, \textit{The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping}, 15.
  \item\textsuperscript{27} Kimberly Zisk Marten, \textit{Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 102.
  \item\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 104.
  \item\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 105.
  \item\textsuperscript{31} Perito, \textit{Where is the Lone Ranger}, 250–255.
  \item\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., viii.
\end{itemize}
“working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars”; and peace building, i.e., the bulk of actions following a conflict, aimed at establishing conditions conducive to sustaining a lasting peace.\textsuperscript{34} The U.S. was willing to engage in the peacemaking part, but not the peacekeeping and peace building processes. American political leaders preferred to leave that to the UN, NATO, the EU, and other allied forces.\textsuperscript{35} Complications arose, however, when this plan was put into practice. Prior to UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), UN’s Chapter VII interventions were clearly either a UN- or U.S.-led operation where force was authorized when necessary.\textsuperscript{36} The failures of this mission have been tied to “the folly of reaching impetuously for too many objectives at once... especially when a firm hold on the nettle looked like involving more casualties and a long-drawn out campaign.”\textsuperscript{37}

Finally, much has been written on the institutional, social, and bureaucratic nature of the Army itself that might make it resistant to the development of a standing stability operations force. John H. Faris explains that the U.S. military is not operating at optimal levels due to the “preeminence of bureaucratic rationalism in planning and managing the all-volunteer force...”\textsuperscript{38} The military’s bureaucratic system, he says, is so stubborn and unyielding that it has adversely affected morale, cohesion, and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{39} Brian McAllister Linn has written about the Army’s painful lessons after the Korean War. The Army used those lessons and “the Army leadership would take as a mantra ‘No More Task Force Smiths.’”\textsuperscript{40} The Army was concerned that post-conflict reconstruction in Europe and Japan had softened its forces, and felt that it must always be ready for full

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Brahimi, \textit{Report of the Panel on United Nations}, 2–3.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Perito, \textit{Where is the Lone Ranger}, 255.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 207.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Faris, “The Social Psychology of Military Service,” 69.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Task Force Smith was LTC Charles B Smith’s undermanned and poorly equipped command that was easily overrun by the North Koreans. Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 163.
\end{itemize}
combat. Perito writes of this attitude continuing today, explaining the prevailing opinions of current officers: “US military leaders believed their job was to ‘fight and win the nation’s wars.’ Participation in peace operations dulled combat skills, expended resources, exhausted troops and equipment, and reduced readiness.”

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

To understand past and current American resistance to a standing stability operations force of any stripe, this thesis will rely on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. Key primary sources will include current military doctrine (both joint and service-specific), training instructions, public speeches, and Congressional reports. Secondary sources will be used to evaluate various aspects of stability operations and American participation in them, including academic papers, journalistic sources, and scholarly books. Comparisons will be made between American and the United Nations involvement in peacekeeping, as well as apparent disconnects between stated policies and actual execution.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The purpose of this thesis will be to determine the political, economic, military, and social reasons behind American resistance to establishing a standing stability operations force. It will initially present the historical context for the importance of stability operations. It will make the case that the U.S. has been involved in stability operations for years, the involvement continues today, and that involvement will continue for the foreseeable future. It will examine recent and current policy and doctrine, showing a shift in policy, doctrine, and implementation thereof. It will also show a break in the apparently logical progression of stability operations development: the absence of a standing stability operations force.

41 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 163.
42 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 238.
Next, the reasons for this break will be examined. First, this thesis will examine the cost-benefit hypothesis presented above. It will analyze various arguments concerning military, political, economic, and geo-political costs concerning a standing stability operations force. It will also examine various theories as to the possible mitigation of these costs, and potential benefits that could be gained in each area concerned.

The thesis will then examine organizational inertia as a possible explanation of the American resistance to establishing a stability operations force. It will explore the prevailing attitudes in today’s Army and Department of Defense. It will identify the validity of various points of view, and the impact each has on both the development and the actual implementation of policy.

Finally, the thesis will propose a structure for a stability operations force, using lessons learned from the previous chapters to emphasize the benefits of such a force and mitigate the costs. It will then conclude with the most likely and influential causes of American resistance to establishing a standing stability operations force.
II. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: EVOLUTION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

When examining the motivations and prejudices of decision makers, it is important to examine the historical context in which they work. This chapter will present salient aspects of the history of American involvement in stability operations, and how that involvement has changed over time. It will then analyze the current state of stability operations, both in doctrine and practice, and will identify any disconnect in American policy and execution.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States has a long history of conducting stability operations, at nearly every level of involvement and in every corner of the world. However, the degree of emphasis placed on these operations has varied, as has their success. An examination of the forces used in these operations, their specific missions, and their level of success is key to understanding the attitudes and opinions of decision-makers today.

1. Pre-Cold War Operations

American involvement in stability operations is not new to this generation, or to the past century. American constabulary forces have operated in Cuba and the Philippines as early as 1898, followed by several other campaigns: Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. American occupation of the Philippines was one of the greatest challenges faced by American forces at the turn of the century. An active war broke out in February of 1899 and lasted more than two years, leaving 4,234 American and 16,000 Filipino soldiers dead, along with more than 200,000 civilians. Though separate from the fighting in other parts of the Philippines by both distance and culture, Mindanao presented the U.S. Army with its first real experience with

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43 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 52.
constabulary- and stability-type operations in a predominantly Muslim area. American forces actively intervened in the affairs of the locals: “slavery was outlawed, schools that taught a non-Muslim curriculum were established, and local governments that challenged the authority of traditional community leaders were organized. A new legal system replaced the sharia, or Islamic law.”

Because of these actions, “United States rule, even more than that of the Spanish, was seen as a challenge to Islam. Armed resistance grew, and the Moro province remained under United States military rule until 1914, by which time the major Muslim groups had been subjugated.”

The intent and missions of other American operations were varied. In Cuba, the military’s main role was to maintain law and order during the occupation following the expulsion of the Spanish. In Panama, the U.S. military became that country’s only armed protection following the revolution and independence from Colombia. The Panamanians knew they could rely upon the U.S. for protection because of the Canal Zone. The U.S. Marine Corps mission in Nicaragua was originally to protect the U.S. legation there, but grew (under pressure from the Nicaraguan government) to develop and lead a national constabulary. The Dominican Republic was effectively invaded and taken over by the U.S. military following a major insurrection against the ruling government. Again, the Marines were charged with developing and leading a national, modern constabulary.

Finally, in Haiti, the Marines were once again called upon to occupy and run the country, with the specific goal of establishing “an indigenous security force that would put an end to Haiti’s history of repeated military insurrections.”

The forces used in each of these interventions were also varied from the start, and evolved throughout the course of the early Twentieth Century. American actions in Cuba provided perhaps the strongest call for at dedicated stability operations force, or at least a

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46 Ibid.
47 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 54.
48 Ibid., 55.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 59.
constabulary corps. Brigadier General Leonard Wood established a constabulary that would eventually become the Cuban Rural Guard. This force “was dressed and equipped to resemble the U.S. Cavalry, but its duties ranged from suppression of banditry to executing court orders and investigating crimes, accidents, and arson.”\(^{51}\) The success of this force even inspired Secretary of War Russell Alger to recommend a similar force for Puerto Rico and the Philippines.\(^{52}\) However, in the other campaigns that followed, U.S. Marines provided the bulk of the leadership (and often forces) involved with constabulary and stability operations.

Finally, the success (or, more accurately, lack thereof) of these missions was directly influenced by American policies and priorities. “Even though […] the United States […] believed at the turn of the twentieth century that [its] colonies were important to [its] security interests, [its] foreign policy attention was focused elsewhere.”\(^{53}\) While places like Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti were not “colonies” exactly, the principle still holds. The Nicaraguan occupation was ended in 1933 by President Hoover’s concerns about such operations during the Great Depression.\(^{54}\) Without American support, the Nicaraguan government fell to a coup three years later. Similarly, the government installed by the U.S. in the Dominican Republic was taken over by political maneuvering following American troop withdrawal.\(^{55}\) Lastly, American training worked perhaps too well in Haiti. U.S. Marines built and trained the Garde d’Haïti, which “evolved into the Forces Armees d’Haïti and the gardes-champêtres into the attaches that were the primary targets of Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S.-led Multinational Force intervention in Haiti in 1994.”\(^{56}\) The continued military dominance of the civilian leadership there was certainly an unintended consequence of American intervention.

\(^{51}\) Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 52.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 53.
\(^{53}\) Marten, *Enforcing the Peace*, 98.
\(^{54}\) Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 56.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., 57.
\(^{56}\) Ibid., 60.
2. Cold War Era

Following World War II, Americans saw a vastly different geopolitical situation. The Soviet Union now posed the greatest threat to American power and interests, and to Capitalist ideals the world over. Stability operations in such a bi-polar environment were vastly different in scope and intent than those that had come before.

a. The U.S. Constabulary in Germany

Germany was in bad shape following its defeat in 1945. “Germany had no government. Its economy and infrastructure were in ruins. People were hungry. The country was spotted with camps for displaced persons and refugees.”

57 General Dwight D. Eisenhower amended General George C. Marshall’s plan for occupation of post-war Japan to fit it to Europe. He believed that the best way to maintain order was to establish a force “composed entirely of American military personnel.”

58 The War Department ordered the establishment of this corps, and that it be modeled after state police forces in the U.S.

59 It is important and interesting to note here that this constabulary was initially built out of the best of the best of the units within the European theater, but then clearly separated from the main warfighting force. The soldiers were trained in Germany, and were outfitted with their own special insignia on their uniforms.

60 The leadership at the time believed it was important to identify this stability force as different from their warfighting brethren. This differentiation was done despite the fact that the clear purpose of the Marshall Plan was not simply maintaining peace and order in post-war Germany, but also a “defensive step, taken to prevent Soviet expansion into Western Europe.”

57 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 61.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 63.
60 Ibid.
61 Parrish, “The Turn Toward Confrontation,” 2.
b. Post-War Japan and Korea

Troops in Japan following the surrender were not given the same advantages or respect. “Since Japan surrendered prior to the entry of U.S. forces, the United States established a military administration but left the emperor and the Japanese government in place.”62 However, even though Japanese police fulfilled all of their normal functions, “From September 1945 to April 1949, Occupation duties required the full attention of the maneuver formations of the Eight Army.”63 The Americans attempted to reduce the role of traditional police by dividing up the force into separate agencies that would handle customs, census taking, intelligence gathering, and other tasks separately.64 General MacArthur defined the priorities of the Eighth Army as first performing those occupation duties, then supporting other U.S. policies and interests in Japan, and lastly preparing for a major war.65 They were clearly not prepared for the Soviet threat that showed itself in Korea.66 “Army strategists had been convinced, as were their political superiors, that the primary danger was a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. They had paid little attention to the Far East and even less to peripheral areas.”67 The American troops’ lack of preparation again showed the results an American foreign policy that is focused elsewhere. North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel less than five years after the war ended in Japan. General MacArthur was forced to order the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division from Japan to Korea. This division had been barely a skeleton as late as 1949; while it trained in earnest, it had very little time to prepare for a war.68 One small task force from that Division, Task Force Smith, was the first to face the Koreans. This force of 514 men was also the first to face crushing defeat, as they were outnumbered fifteen to one and using antiquated World

62 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 68.
63 Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready?: The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 14.
64 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 69.
65 Hanson, *Combat Ready?*, 14.
66 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 69.
68 Hanson, *Combat Ready?*, 79.
War II weapons against advanced Soviet tanks. This failure became a rallying cry for those opposed to training soldiers for anything other than major combat operations: “No more Task Force Smiths.”

c. UN Peacekeeping Takes Center Stage

The conflict in Korea marked the first major action of the United Nations, and, arguably, its largest ever. However, the remaining years of the Cold War Era saw numerous, smaller actions headed by the UN. Peacekeeping became the main security function of the UN, and these missions generally consisted of monitoring cease-fires and neutral buffer zones between belligerents. The United States, following the unsatisfactory end to the Korean conflict, was happy to let the UN handle those missions. Peacekeeping, as one aspect of stability operations, had no place in a post-Korea Army. As such, U.S. involvement in UN operations, and stability operations in general, was very limited throughout the Cold War. “From 1948 to 1978, the United Nations established only thirteen peacekeeping and observer missions, with the United States assigning military observers in Palestine (1948) and Lebanon (1978).” The Army had reorganized and built itself up to the point of incredible confidence, identifying itself as a viable option to a conflict with the Soviet Union that would lead to mutual nuclear annihilation.

However, “[b]y 1969, when the army was mired in a bloody, divisive, and corrupting conflict in Southeast Asia, such hubris was long gone.” The conflict in Vietnam shook up the Army, but it responded by simply moving its focus back to a

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69 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 70–71.
70 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 163.
73 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 191.
74 Ibid.
European fight. 75 “Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen as an aberration and then as a mistake to be avoided. Instead of focusing on the proper synchronization of military and political tools with objectives necessary for success in low intensity unconventional conflicts, the Army continued to concentrate on mid to high intensity conventional wars.”  76 From the media, to the politicians, to the public, it was everyone else’s fault but their own, and hence they had no real need to change from their earlier doctrine. 77 The Army “knew” that it was strong, and that it could not afford to weaken itself again with anything smacking of stability operations or even a constabulary force. 78

3. From Cold War to September 11, 2001

The fall of the Soviet Union officially ended the Cold War Era and signaled the opportunity for a shift in American and military priorities and strategies. Without a major foe always in the picture, the military could lessen its focus on major combat operations with a peer-level power; however, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine still became the policy of the United States. This doctrine reflected the military finally examining the failure of Vietnam and putting those lessons (along with lessons from Beirut) to good use. 79 The Weinberger-Powell doctrine outlined six major tests that must be applied before using military force:

1) Vital interests must be at stake; 2) overwhelming force must be used so as to ensure victory (i.e., no half-hearted use of the military); 3) objectives, both political and military, must be clear; 4) proper resources must be made available, and if the situation on the ground changes, the force structure must be adapted; 5) before troops were deployed, there must be bipartisan support from Congress and from the American people; and 6) the use of armed force should be the last resort. 80

76 Ibid.
77 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 194–195.
78 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 71.
79 Findlay, The Use of Force, 391.
This policy “implicitly did not incorporate the direct use of U.S. military personnel in peace operations.”\textsuperscript{81} Despite extolling the virtues of this doctrine, the U.S. operated in several campaigns throughout the 1990s that could be categorized, at least partially, as stability operations.

The first major test of the doctrine post-Cold War Era was the U.S.-led UN intervention into Somalia in 1992 and 1993. After President Bush realized that simply air- and sea-lifting food into Somalia was insufficient, he ordered in thousands of Marines and soldiers, reaching a peak number of over 25,000 in country in January of 1993.\textsuperscript{82} UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali would have preferred a UN-led mission, but the U.S. would only participate if it were in charge. “[T]he dominance of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was so complete, no other method of deploying troops could be conceived.”\textsuperscript{83} Crucially, major misunderstandings between the UN and U.S. gradually became clear, as the UN intended the force to disarm Somali militias and establish a secure environment, whereas the U.S., responding to public outcry over the horrible images of starvation and suffering seen on TV, simply wanted to deliver humanitarian relief and provide force protection for those operations.\textsuperscript{84} The Americans envisioned the whole mission would last only a few months.\textsuperscript{85} In retrospect, these misunderstandings are fairly clear in origin. Prior to American entry, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) was “in disarray.”\textsuperscript{86} Teenagers in pickup trucks armed with machine guns roved freely, and no UN forces could move at all without paying off one or more of the various clans.\textsuperscript{87} So the resolution written to implement the American offer of help with the humanitarian mission almost seemed to draw in the U.S. into the larger business of stability operations in Somalia by connecting the mission to peacekeeping

\begin{footnotes}
\item[82] Ibid., 17.
\item[83] Ibid.
\item[84] Ibid., 17–18.
\item[85] Spiers, “U.S. Peace Operations,” 17.
\item[86] Parsons, \textit{From Cold War to Hot Peace}, 200.
\item[87] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
and post conflict peace-building. Still, the U.S. stuck to its original plan and led the effort to deliver humanitarian goods, leaving the disarmament and other true stability operations to the other UN forces.

UNOSOM II began in May of 1993 (later than the U.S. had intended\(^{88}\)), with the transition to a new UN mission: “the reconstruction of a member state.”\(^{89}\) Though the U.S. drew down its forces to around 4,000 on the ground and 1,300 Marines afloat, President Clinton endorsed the plan, giving it some major credibility within the UN itself.\(^{90}\) It also marked a major turning point in American policy regarding stability operations and state building. Clinton’s endorsement of UNOSOM II exhibited a clear departure from his predecessor’s reluctance to affect the political outcome of the conflict in Somalia.\(^{91}\) However, this endorsement was short-lived. On October 3, 1993, 18 Army Rangers were killed and 75 were wounded in Mogadishu, and several bodies were dragged through the streets.\(^{92}\) The public reaction to this tragedy, and the American government’s response, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.

The other major American involvement in stability operations during the 1990s was the intervention in the Balkans. Before the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 1995, the conflict was, like the Gulf War before it, mostly a conventional small war. Following the signing of the Peace Accord, the UN created an International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF was designed to assist in the training and ethnic integration of the various police forces acting within Bosnia.\(^{93}\) This force was intentionally very different than the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR was the more conventional military force operating in Bosnia, “with ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO countries.”\(^{94}\) At the insistence of the U.S. and European

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89 Ibid., 21.
90 Ibid., 20.
91 Ibid., 21.
93 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 118.
94 Ibid., 119.
powers, the IPTF was to be unarmed, leaving IFOR as the only legitimate user of force in Bosnia. The NATO leadership feared that if the IPTF were armed, it would create more problems for IFOR, and it would be a target of weapons thieves. IFOR was intended to be the backup for IPTF if necessary. However, IFOR was forbidden from using military force in support of police functions, unless specifically authorized in the Dayton Accords. This mismatch of missions, combined with the impotence of the IPTF, meant “the international community was unable to accomplish the forcible integration it intended.” As the IFOR became the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) and later Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), mandates changed, and the situation improved, but only slightly; military forces were reluctant to engage in any sort of police action, and coordination with civilians was poor.

4. Post-September 11 Operations

Peace operations, as a subset and integral part of stability operations, were thrust into the center of the debate about American foreign policy after the events of September 11, 2001. The first, and still ongoing, challenge was Afghanistan. After the Taliban and al Qaeda fell, the UN authorized the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This force, comprised of troops from nineteen countries in 2002, was separate from American forces conducting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but still fell under U.S. control, under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). This alignment was to ensure the best possible coordination between U.S. and Coalition forces, while also maintaining the supremacy of American military (OEF) operations. “ISAF’s purpose was to provide a ‘breathing space’ during which the Afghans could create their

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95 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 115.
96 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
101 Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, 289.
102 Ibid.
own security forces and judicial system.” However, ISAF’s progress was slow until the introduction of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 2003. However, the U.S. and NATO mission continues in Afghanistan today, with around 100,000 troops in country. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has categorized the current mission as the stabilization of Afghanistan in order to hand over control, not to conduct wholesale reconstruction of the entire country.

Finally, America’s second major battle in the War on Terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, has led to another massive stability operation. After President George W. Bush’s now-infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech in May of 2003, nearly 145,000 American troops remained in Iraq. These forces certainly had their work cut out for them, though. “As a result of years of neglect and the recent wave of widespread looting, Baghdad’s fragile infrastructure ceased to function: electricity failed, potable water stopped flowing, and telephone service ceased.” These events simply marked the start of a years-long stability operation in Iraq. President Obama recently announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom ended officially on August 31, 2010, with the final withdrawal of all combat forces, leaving the 50,000 troops in Iraq to help train and support Iraqi forces.

B. STABILITY OPERATIONS TODAY

This long and challenging history has helped to shape the current official doctrine of the United States’ regarding stability operations. Several documents provide guidance.

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103 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 289.
105 Cohen, Planned Afghanistan Drawdown.
106 Ibid.
108 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 289, 313.
concerning priorities and best practices. From Department of Defense-level instructions, down to service-specific manuals, the military has attempted to reshape and refine its role and tactics in stability operations. However, the degree of implementation and internalization of these doctrines is up for debate.

1. **Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.5 in September of 2009. This instruction sets the tone and ultimate priorities for the whole U.S. military. Arguably, the key sentence contained within the DoD’s defining document for stability operations is this one: “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” This prioritization, at least on paper, is unprecedented in American history, and is a clear reflection of the realities of modern warfare. The invasions and defeat of both Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan each only took less than two months, however, as of 2010, tens of thousands of U.S. troops are still stationed there, performing stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

This instruction identifies and clarifies the role of the DoD in stability operations with regards to other U.S. agencies and foreign governments and security forces. It identifies the DoD as the lead agency in some area, a partner in others, and subordinate in others. The DoD will lead and conduct efforts to:

1. Establish civil security and civil control
2. Restore or provide essential services
3. Repair critical infrastructure
4. Provide humanitarian assistance

The DoD is a partner agency when planning for stability operations, coordination with foreign governments, and building long-term, sustainable host nation capabilities. Finally, the DoD shall assist other agencies and foreign governments with regards to:

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110 Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Instruction.*
111 Ibid.
1. Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.
2. Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.
3. Strengthening governance and the rule of law.
4. Fostering economic stability and development.\footnote{Department of Defense, \textit{Department of Defense Instruction}.}

As described above, NATO forces (led by the U.S.) were unwilling to mire themselves too deeply into state building and police operations in Bosnia. Additionally, shortsighted and incomplete planning has been blamed for many of the problems in Iraq faced by Coalition troops after the initial invasion and push into Baghdad.\footnote{Perito, \textit{Where is the Lone Ranger}, 310–311.} This DoDI is ambiguous enough regarding planning and actual stability operations responsibilities that, after (or during) stability operations, the DoD can either pat itself on the back for a job well done, or pass blame off to another agency, depending on the conditions on the ground at the time. The shrewd politics of this document, and the motivation behind them, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters III and IV.

2. \textbf{U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations}

The U.S. Army published Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07) represents an anticipation of the shift in DoD priorities, and also the realities of the wars in which the Army had been engaged for the past seven years. The Army itself regards the document as revolutionary. LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander of the Army Combined Arms Center, writes in the Forward, “[FM 3-07] represents a milestone in Army doctrine. It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history.”\footnote{FM 3-07, Forward.} While this endorsement is reminiscent of the political posturing found in DoDI 3000.5, the majority of the document is much more down to earth, providing a framework for leadership on the ground as well as force structure implications for Army leadership.
This Field Manual acknowledges that stability operations can and must occur across the spectrum of conflict. From peacetime engagement with a partner nation and humanitarian relief, to UN-style peacekeeping operations, to COIN, major war, and post-conflict reconstruction, the Army must be ready to perform the functions of stability operations.\footnote{FM 3-07, 1-3.} FM 3-07 also emphasizes the need for unity of effort with all involved, including U.S. government agencies, foreign governments, and non-government organizations (NGOs). Of note, FM3-07 specifically identifies specific tasks for the State Department in post-conflict situations. These tasks fall into several sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.\footnote{Ibid., 2-5.} This delineation of responsibilities is important, because with FM 3-07 the Army, like the DoD, is careful to provide itself plausible freedom from blame if stability operations go badly. However, the Army does identify many crucial and complicated areas in which is takes the lead and responsibility for task accomplishment. FM 3-07 lists several specific tasks within each security sector in which the Army is participating: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and information engagement.\footnote{Ibid., 3-2–3-19.} These sectors are similar and run parallel to those in which the Army expects the State Department to operate, but they are distinct. Where they overlap, FM 3-07 often stresses that the military only takes initial actions, while civil authorities will conduct follow-on and long-term operations.

3. **The Debate: Specialized versus General-Purpose Troops**

The current written doctrine of the DoD and the Army demonstrate a clear emphasis on stability operations. However, there still exists debate as to how to actually develop and conduct stability operations. FM 3-07 supports one side of the debate: stability operations are simply another mission of the Army, and should be conducted by general-purpose forces. “The foundations for Army operations conducted outside the
United States and its territories are reflected in the elements of full spectrum operations: continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.”118 As the Army needs to be prepared to conduct any and all of these operations at any time, it must structure itself and train to all of these tasks.

On the other side of the debate are those who advocate a separate, specialized stability operations force. A prominent example is Robert M. Perito’s book. In it, he argues for a specialized force, consisting of “robust military forces specifically designed, trained, and equipped for such missions.”119 Finally, many of the tasks described in FM 3-07 are specific, complicated, and generally enduring in nature. In other words, stability operations are not easy. Additionally, both DoDI 3000.5 and FM 3-07 acknowledge the reality that, “As the War on Terrorism progresses, U.S. ability to establish sustainable security in post-conflict societies will become more important, not less.”120

Given all of this history, these instructions, and these realities, why has the U.S. chosen to endorse the general-purpose force, instead of a dedicated, trained, and properly equipped stability operations force? Chapters III and IV will provide possible answers to this question, and more detailed rationale of those on both sides of the debate.

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118 FM 3-07, 2-1.
119 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 329.
120 Ibid., 323.
III. THE EXPLANATIONS: RATIONAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OR ORGANIZATIONAL INTERTIA

The lack of a standing, dedicated American stability operations force can likely be explained in some combination of two ways. This chapter will discuss first that those involved in shaping the force structure of the Army are rational actors, have weighed the costs and benefits of establishing such a force, and have decided to use general-purpose forces in stability operations. The costs and benefits of a specialized force will be analyzed with regards to military readiness, domestic politics, and international politics. Finally, an alternative explanation will be explored: organizational inertia within the Army makes the development of a stability operations force difficult and unlikely.

A. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS COSTS AND BENEFITS

Military leadership has certainly considered the impact that the establishment of a specialized stability operations force would have on existing force levels, funding and expertise. Using Perito’s vision, a stability operations force would require thousands of troops: perhaps a core consisting of Stryker brigade, and including Military Police assets, special police units, civil police, and judicial and penal experts. Any force hoping to replace local capacity for providing public security would have to be very large and well equipped. An examination of the military tradeoffs is important here, and can shed perhaps the brightest light onto the puzzle of the absence of a stability operations force.

1. Military Effectiveness Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force

The main argument for a specialized stability operations force is that such a force would be able to perform such functions better than a general-purpose force. “The education of commissioned and noncommissioned officers is a key component of

121 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 329–333.

stability operations. Preparation requires different skills and a different mindset from major combat operations.”

To achieve proficiency in these skills, soldiers, especially non-commissioned officers and officers, must be properly trained at all levels. This training includes “skills training; situational training exercises; field training exercises; combined arms live-fire exercises; mobility exercises; command post exercises; and simulation exercises to train commanders, staff, and units.”

In order to accomplish this training, the Army must invest a great deal of time, both in the unit and the individual soldier. “Obviously, the greater the time for preparation, the higher the probability of success. Adequate preparation time is critical for the alerting, mobilization, predeployment, deployment, and combat employment of one’s forces.”

A standing specialized force allows the Army to spend the time effectively. That force would receive its training in advance of any conflict and in a focused manner. The other general-purpose forces would be able to concentrate on their own offensive and defensive capabilities and not have to worry about an extra mission set.

However, when these missions are accomplished by general-purpose troops, each unit must be quickly trained to a new mission prior to each deployment, and perhaps at the expense of general combat training. A dedicated stability operations force would require much less time to prepare for their mission than, say, a conventional brigade combat team. In warfare, this time is critical. “In general, there is a great advantage in completing one’s mobilization and deployment before the enemy does.”

As the “enemy” in a stability operations environment is the environment itself, the Army cannot afford to waste any time in preparation for engagement. The Pakistan floods in August of 2010 provide a prime example of an enemy that can be effectively countered by a stability operations force. In this case, the enemy is both the environment and the Taliban in the areas devastated by floods.

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124 Ibid., 23–24.
126 Ibid.
Over the past year, Pakistan's army has succeeded in driving Taliban fighters out of key sanctuaries in South Waziristan and the Swat Valley. But the damage from the floods could jeopardize those gains, officials acknowledged, unless infrastructure is quickly rebuilt—an undertaking that will cost billions of dollars and will probably take years.\textsuperscript{127}

The people of that area are growing tired of a government that they see as ineffectual, and are turning more and more to the Taliban for help.\textsuperscript{128} A standing, trained stability operations force could have quickly come into the area (if requested by Pakistan) and helped the people there, thus denying an advantage to the enemy in that specific area at that specific time, but perhaps throughout the region by improving American relations and image.

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the importance of properly apportioning time and training.

[R]isk exists in relation to preparation and planning for future stability operations. Unlike World War II, modern rapid decisive operations, such as were seen in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, no longer allow the luxury for detailed and complex planning efforts during the hostilities phase. In addition, the myopic nature of our nation makes it difficult to continue the current stability operations momentum once the immediate challenge fades.\textsuperscript{129}

These conditions have led to a Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) suffering due to a “lack of coordination and oversight.”\textsuperscript{130} These PRTs are a primary tool used by U.S. and NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces to conduct stability operations in Afghanistan. Their model will likely be used more often in the future.


\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
Another benefit of establishing a standing stability operations force may be a simple demonstration of an understanding of the world as it is, instead of how the U.S. might wish it to be.

As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly on the ground—at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos... We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.”

The DoD might be well served to embrace this new world. One criticism of the American Army is that its leadership has “irreconcilable definitions of war,” leading to disagreement as far as how to plan and execute the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has not had a long history of strong policy guidance from above. As recently as the beginning of the Iraq War, American policy-makers continued to fail to learn lessons from stability operations in past conflicts. “Even the most powerful liberal democratic state can have a hard time establishing coherent policy when it comes to peacekeeping.” As the guidance in both DoD instruction 3000.5 and FM 3-07 are both fairly new, a specialized stability operations force would show an internalization of the publicly stated policy. The generals would show a real embracement of the doctrine and intention to put it into practice.

Even without a full embracement of stability operations, troops on the ground will still likely face situations requiring skills related to those operations. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin expressed his concerns about parallel missions sets.

People who are trained to be soldiers, are then told to be police officers and are retrained for that role. But if the circumstances on the ground change, without a parallel shift in the mandate, it is up to the individuals to

132 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 1.
133 Marten, Enforcing the Peace, 103.
determine when they are to react as police officers and when as soldiers. Aspin stresses that this is a terribly dangerous situation.134

A standing stability operations force would have focus on its own actions, and how it fit into the Army’s general mission, allowing other forces to conduct offensive or defensive operations.

Finally, anyone leading a military state-building endeavor must be aware of what David M. Edelstein calls the footprint dilemma. He argues that while a large military force may initially be needed to quell a great deal of violence, this is not always the case. And the size of the force can generally get smaller as time wears on, and violence goes down. The concern is that a military with a large footprint within a host nation can and generally does wear out its welcome much more quickly than a smaller, less intrusive force. If an occupying force loses the support of the people it is theoretically there to protect, it will face a larger resistance.135 Ideally, a well-trained stability operations force could conduct operations and state-building with a smaller, lighter force than if general-purpose troops were used.

2. Military Effectiveness Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force

At present, the United States does not have a large, dedicated stability operations force. Instead, it prefers to use general-purpose forces for such tasks. FM 3-07 identifies stability operations as simply another mission, falling within the continuum of “Full Spectrum Operations.”136 Given the evidence above, it is important to examine the costs of establishing such a specialized force.

One of the main arguments against a specialized stability operations force is that it is simply not required. The Army Field Manual for stability operations stresses the need for all forces to be able to operate across the full spectrum of operations, including stability operations.137 The Army training manual elaborates on this point.

136 FM 3-07, 2–1.
137 Ibid., 2-5
The future will be one of persistent conflict. Today’s operational environments are being shaped by multiple factors. These include science and technology, information technology, transportation technology, the acceleration of the global economic community, and the rise of a networked society. The international nature of commercial and academic efforts will also have dramatic effects. The complexity of today’s operational environments guarantees that future operations will occur across the spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{138}

Additionally, Joint Publication 3-0, \textit{Joint Operations}, shows that a military force is almost always involved in stabilizing activities, but those activities do not always constitute the majority of effort.

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139 Joint Pub 3-0, IV-26.
As shown in Figure 1, stabilizing activities are even present at the beginning of any operation plan, but those operations are only a very small part of the military focus and effort. Generally, stabilizing activities would not start en masse until the operation is nearing the end of Phase III. A specialized stability operations force would be well trained in stability activities, but may be lacking in the other facets of warfare. This force, therefore, may not be needed for some time, and might not be the most efficient use of manpower and resources at the onset of a conflict. Arguably, a specialized stability operations force would not be necessary, as perhaps the relief general-purpose forces could be trained up as the conflict wore on. As discussed above, a specialized force would require a great deal of resources, both in funding and manpower that could possibly be better spent on the actual ongoing fight.

Costs would likely be great even in an operation that more resembles a pure stability operation. Recently, the Government Accounting Office conducted a study, comparing the actual costs of UN stability operations in Haiti and a hypothetical U.S.-only operation with the same goals. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had a UN budget of $428 million for the first fourteen months of the operation. Out of that total, the U.S. contributed $116 million. The GAO then estimated that a similar operation conducted by only U.S. forces and civilian police would cost approximately $876 million.140

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Figure 2. Cost Comparison of Real UN and Hypothetical U.S. Missions in Haiti

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

The GAO considered several factors when determining the military costs of a hypothetical U.S. operation in Haiti. First, it assumed an active duty to reserve force ratio of 85 to 15. Using an all-reserve force would cost an extra $477 million. This increase comes from providing pay and benefits to all the reservists that would not have otherwise been activated. Active duty pay is not calculated in the total costs of the hypothetical operation because those forces would be paid whether or not they were actively engaged in an operation.\textsuperscript{142} This particular data set is telling, and raises questions as to from where such a force would or could be pulled. If a standing stability operations force were stood up from the regular Army, the troops would be getting paid whether they were needed or not. And if they were activated reserves or National Guard, the costs of using them when needed would also be great. General-purpose forces, while always on the government payroll, would also always be available for other, conventional fights.

Additionally, the GAO considered two other factors concerning such a hypothetical operation in Haiti: a more rapid deployment and higher operational tempo. The U.S. military in Haiti could, if desired, outpace and have a heavier footprint than a UN force. The GAO’s original cost estimates, in Figure 2, are based on a 180-day deployment and a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff-estimated operational tempo of 1.5 out of three. The GAO estimated that decreasing the deployment time to 60 days would increase costs by around $60 million, and increasing operational tempo to two out of three would incur an additional $23 million.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{142} GAO, “Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison,” 4–5.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 13.
These cost comparisons again illustrate potential concerns when considering a standing stability operations force. Such a force would ideally be able to deploy quickly and with a significant footprint. If the Army were to fully employ the Powell Doctrine and only deploy with overwhelming force, such a stability operations mission, if it were

\[\text{Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.}\]

**Figure 3. Costs of Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti, with Variables}^{144}\]

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144 GAO, “Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison,” 12.
executed at all, would likely be quick and powerful. The question that policy-makers would have to answer is whether or not such actions are worth the increased cost, or if it would be better to let the UN accomplish these missions. A stability operations force could be seen by cost-counting politicians as the Army simply waiting and itching for such a mission, and might not deem it worth the cost.

Finally, the separation of forces may create conflicting missions. The American mission in Iraq and Afghanistan has been to both root out terrorism and to establish strong, sovereign governments. However, as American activities in Afghanistan and Iraq have made clear, “these two goals are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. An ongoing anti-terrorist campaign layered on top of a state-building effort, or vice versa, may only complicate efforts to build effective state institutions.” A specialized stability operations force may complicate matters on the ground by weakening the unity of command and confuse all involved.

B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

While military effectiveness costs and benefits are certainly important in the debate of using specialized vs. general purpose forces for stability operations, other factors are likely at play here. The establishment of a standing stability operations force would be a major restructuring of the Army in particular and the DoD as a whole. As discussed in Chapter II, the Army currently chooses to use general-purpose forces for stability operations. “[C]reating a U.S. Stability Force will require extensive congressional involvement, new authorizing legislation, and new funding.” Such a sweeping change would likely gain the attention of many pundits, and media outlets. Additionally, in the world of the Internet and social media, even the Army knows it can directly influence, and be influenced by, the general American public. “The Army decided it was time to open up the lines of communication and further the conversation”

147 FM 3-07, 2-1.
148 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 336.
and stood up its new Online and Social Media Division at the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in January 2009. Questions would be asked. Why is this change being made now? What does it mean? How will this change affect military readiness? How much will it cost? Integral to this thesis are not the answers to these questions, but rather the fact that they are being asked in the first place. The applicable issues in this paper are how the uncertainty behind them came to be and how it affects the decisions made by those involved with stability operations and force structure requirements.

1. Domestic Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force

The court of public opinion can be a powerful force. Attitudes toward American involvement in stability operations have waxed and waned over the years. During the 1990s, survey data showed that the American public was “a generally supportive lot when it comes to U.S. participation in UN peace operations, in terms of both troop contribution and funding.”

Despite an outcry after watching the body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, and the subsequent pull-out of all American troops, the U.S. still offered millions of dollars of aid and equipment to assist the UN in its efforts to establish some semblance of law and order in Somalia.

Demonstrations of American commitment to stability operations continue today, both in rhetoric and action. Many politicians currently argue for a continued presence in Afghanistan, saying that setting a date for withdrawal would be an admission of defeat without getting the job done.

“We want to know that if we’re engaged in such activity where we are protecting our own country, we’re helping to protect our allies, we had better be in it for ... the long haul.” [Former Governor Sarah] Palin said “But we had better be in it to win it or, no,
we're not going to keep supporting this idea of sending innocents, our young men and women, America's finest, over there for some futile effort."\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Planned Afghanistan Drawdown}.}

Recent statements by the new Commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, imply that most (if not all) of the Democratic leadership, including President Obama, shares this view.

General Petraeus, who took over last month after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal was fired for making disparaging remarks about civilian leaders, said he believed that he would be given the time and matériel necessary to prevail here. He expressed that confidence despite the fact that nearly every phase of the war is going badly—and even though some inside the Obama administration have turned against it.


Senator Lindsay Graham has expressed concern that politics on both the right and the left sides of the spectrum could undermine the war effort.

You know what I worry most about: an unholy alliance between the right and the left,” Graham said. “That there are some Republicans who are not going to take a, you know, do-or-die attitude for Obama’s war. There are some Republicans that want to make this Obama’s war. ... There will be some Republicans saying you can’t win because of the July 2011 withdrawal date, he’s made it impossible for us to win, so why should we throw good money after bad?

Graham added that liberals could also refuse to back the president’s plans in Afghanistan.

“You’ve got people on the left who are mad with the president because he is doing exactly what [former President George W.] Bush did and we’re in a war we can't
win,” Graham said, adding: “My concern is that, for different reasons, they join forces and we lose the ability to hold this thing together.”  

A standing stability operations force could serve to allay the fears of both the right and the left, and also serve both of their interests. Such a force could signify both a commitment to finishing the job, and a resistance to simply relying on brute conventional military strength to accomplish America’s goals.

Once again, the development of a standing, dedicated stability operations force could show a major change in the employment of American military forces. As the Democratic Party currently controls both Congress and the White House, it may wish to distance itself even further from the Republican Party by demonstrating a departure from a contradictory GOP platform.

Iraq demonstrated that it was impossible to separate regime change, which conservatives had generally supported, from nation building, which they rejected. The post-invasion chaos that American troops confronted in Iraq and Afghanistan and the failure of the Bush administration to develop viable democratic institutions made it clear that a greater commitment was needed, in terms of money and manpower, to achieve the objectives that conservatives sought overseas.

The Bush administration’s policy promoting regime change helped to keep them in power in the 2004 U.S. elections, but “Democrats, after having run a campaign in 2008 that defined itself in opposition to President Bush’s record […] found themselves in control of Washington.” Indeed, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be making the most of this distinction. As opposed to the 2002 or 2006 NSS, “The 2010

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155 Filkins, “Petraeus Opposes a Rapid Pullout.”


157 Ibid., locations 10,249–10,260.
[NSS] also makes no mention of regime change, or similar “ending tyranny”-style remarks.”\textsuperscript{158}

2. Domestic Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force

Despite a change in administration and growing and developing strategies, a specialized force has yet to materialize. Political winds may also be blowing against the establishment of such a force. As stated above, the establishment of such a force would require significant funding.\textsuperscript{159} What is not clear, however, is from where such funding would be pulled. The current NSS discusses improved readiness and shifting of priorities toward more “soft power” techniques, but makes no mention of any funding changes.\textsuperscript{160} These questions complicate matters, and do not give the public (or the military itself) a clear picture of what actual national priorities are.

An example of this is with WMD and nuclear proliferation, labeled the number-one threat since 2002; non-proliferation funding amounts to two-tenths of one percent of defense spending. Is that the really the priority? Or is it fighting al Qaeda, the strategy for which occupies more space in the NSS than nonproliferation issues?...Again, what is the priority for the future force?”\textsuperscript{161}

Additionally, establishing a stability operations force might indeed create a focus and direction for the military, but it might not be one to which the public is receptive. While the American public has generally been supportive of deployment of stability operations, or peace operations, forces when clear national interests are present, these deployments are still subject to significant public debate.\textsuperscript{162} Then-candidate George W. Bush campaigned on decreasing American participation in stability operations and other military excursions around the world, often criticizing President Clinton’s policies on the


\textsuperscript{159} Perito, \textit{Where is the Lone Ranger}, 336.


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{162} Schwartz, “U.S. Policy Toward Peace Operations,” 41–42.
matter. And although President Bush won reelection in 2004, then-Senator Barack Obama, in 2008, also campaigned on ending at least one major American military operation overseas: the Iraq War.

President Obama’s campaign promises highlight a final reason that a major shake-up of military force structure may not be politically beneficial. Obama has arguably fulfilled his promise to end the war in Iraq by officially ending combat operations in August of 2010. However, he is drawing criticism from more liberal Democrats for increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. But perhaps of more importance is how little attention is being paid by the general public to operations in Afghanistan. This inattention is aided by politicians on both sides of the aisle who had their own motivations to keep the issue quiet. Democrats do not wish to undercut the President on foreign affairs, worrying that it will weaken him with regards to health care, a top Democrat priority. Republicans generally support Obama’s strategy, but do not want to openly support him, because they want to continue to make the argument that Democrats are weak on national security. A major revamp of military force structure would bring the war in Afghanistan into the headlines again.

C. GLOBAL POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

American military muscle is always flexed within full view of the world. The policies and priorities exhibited by military action are watched and noted by friend and foe alike. In order to better conduct stability operations the U.S. has looked to build

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164 Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, locations 10,189–10,208.
165 CNN Wire Staff, U.S. Drawdown in Iraq.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
partner capacity and cooperation. The 2010 NSS “ostensibly seeks to build coalitions with strong international support and participation.” American policy-makers must understand what their decisions regarding a stability operations force signify to friends and foes alike.

1. Global Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force

As shown in Chapter II, the United States has a long history of participating in stability operations. This commitment continues today. In 2009, the U.S. had nearly 50,000 troops involved in peace operations. However, only a tiny number of these troops were involved in UN operations. This non-involvement comes at a time when U.S. monetary contributions to the UN has reached nearly $1.7 Billion in 2010, in addition to $2.1 for the U.S. State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account. “Does this reluctance [to participate in non-U.S.-led stability operations] (and resulting non-involvement) deprive the international community of signals of political resolve that can be critical for the success of operations of geopolitical significance?” Such signaling is important for American interests, especially when it comes to stability operations. Post-conquest military occupations are rarely successful; they only have a chance if the local population allows itself to be ruled (if temporarily) by an outside force.

Most significantly, the imprimatur of the United Nations appears to grant [state-building missions] legitimacy in the eyes of both the international community and the population of the territory that they control.

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involvement of the UN, therefore, slows the rate at which a population becomes impatient with a foreign military presence and makes that population more willing to accept a larger and more intrusive footprint.176

A dedicated stability operations force could help to bridge the gap with the UN. Such a force would not necessarily fall under the control of the UN, especially considering American resistance to allowing American forces to wear the blue helmet, both metaphorically and literally.177 This force would ideally be trained in the ways of the UN, allowing it to integrate well with those forces.

Such gestures of goodwill and teamwork are important when considering the operations the U.S. is likely to face in the future.178

Most historical nation-building operations have fallen into one of two categories. The first are peacekeeping missions mounted on the basis of prior agreement among the warring parties. The second are peace enforcement operations launched over the opposition of one or more of the indigenous factions. Interventions of the first type have typically been led by the United Nations, those of the second by a major global or regional power or by an alliance of such powers. Peace enforcement actions of this latter type have proved much more expensive than peacekeeping operations, and particularly so for the leading participants.179

As the United States is generally a leading participant, it would be well served to do what it can to share the costs and burdens of future conflicts.

Finally, the U.S. can help to garner good will among various peoples of the world, even when operating unilaterally. Humanitarian operations and support are an important part of stability operations. A standing force would be ready and trained to deploy quickly to help where needed. American forces, well practiced from operations in Afghanistan, have provided a great deal of assistance in Pakistan following some of the worst flooding on record.

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179 Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide, 255.
The American assistance has been considerable, it has been prompt, and it has been effective,” said Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former Pakistani foreign secretary and now chairman of the Islamabad-based Institute of Strategic Studies. “The sheer visibility of American personnel and helicopters working in the field gives a feeling of very welcome assistance from the United States.\(^{180}\)

However, as described above, the assistance has not been enough, and allowed a resurgence of the Taliban in some areas.\(^{181}\) A standing, trained stability operations force could be ready to effectively and efficiently accomplish similar missions on short notice anywhere in the world, and would be even better prepared to thwart enemy progress than a general-purpose force, especially if that force had not been recently involved in stability operations.

2. Global Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force

The establishment of a stability operations force by the United States might not be well received by the international community. As described above, a standing stability operations force could be trained to work well alongside UN troops. However, the U.S. still prefers to keep American troops under only American control.\(^{182}\) That way, American troops are not subject to UN rules of engagement or command and control.\(^{183}\) Such preferences do not signal a great deal of cooperation or team building with the international community.

Despite American reluctance to provide troops for the efforts, the UN has participated in many peace operations since its inception.\(^{184}\) However, the UN never intended for the great powers to participate in peace operations, and in fact openly discouraged such participation.\(^{185}\) The intention was to keep forces involved in peace operations.

\(^{180}\) Witte, “Flooding’s Devastation in Pakistan.”
\(^{181}\) Ibid.
\(^{182}\) Schwartz, “U.S. Policy Toward Peace Operations,” 42.
\(^{183}\) Ibid.
\(^{184}\) Peacekeeping operations are one aspect of stability operations but a vital one. See FM 3-07, 1-7.
\(^{185}\) Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 64.
operations neutral, therefore keeping the operations themselves neutral.\footnote{Diehl, \textit{International Peacekeeping}, 64.} Such neutral operations were preferred for several reasons: including a greater likelihood of acceptance of troops by local populations and belligerents, lower possibility of politically controversial actions by troops involved, and a greater perceived plausibility of actual neutrality of action.\footnote{Ibid., 64.} The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in Egypt was a precedent-setting mission for UN peace operations. “One might plausibly say that the neutrality of the UNEF I force was a part of the ten-year success of the operation […]”\footnote{Ibid., 65.} An American stability operations force may signal a greater desire to take on missions normally reserved for UN peacekeepers and forces, putting into question the potential for future success of military interventions. As an initial proponent of UN peacekeeping, then-UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold clearly stated that neither states who have a vested interest in the conflict at hand, nor permanent members of the Security Council, should ever participate in peacekeeping missions.\footnote{Reprinted in R. B. Tackaberry, “Keeping the Peace: A Canadian Military Viewpoint on Peace-Keeping Operations,” \textit{Canadian Institute of International Affairs}, no. 26 (September 1966), 6.} The international community may prefer the U.S. to maintain its role as a superpower and only use that power when traditional peacekeeping does not work, as happened in Bosnia.\footnote{Kenneth R. Dombroski, \textit{Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime} (New York: Routledge, 2007), 118.} A standing stability operations force may signal American intentions to overstep its traditional bounds.

\section*{D. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA}

Despite all of these influences on military policy and force structure, perhaps other factors are at play. The United States Department of Defense is a colossal bureaucracy. It currently employs more than 750,000 civilian employees and more than 1.4 million active duty personnel.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{DoD Personnel and Military Casualty Statistics}, \url{http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MMIDHOME.HTM} (accessed August 21, 2010).} Out of those totals, nearly 290,000 civilians and
more than 566,000 active duty soldiers are in the Department of the Army. Making major changes is quite a challenge in any system this large, where organizational inertia is the norm.192

The assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner is of course an assumption, not an empirically tested insight. Political scientists often assume high degrees of rationality, not because it is accurate, but because it is helpful: it provides a relatively simple way of making predictions, by linking perceived interests with expected behavior.193

As an alternative to purely rational choice theory, this section will examine the influence organizational inertia has on force structure decisions regarding stability operations.

As shown in Chapter II, American attitudes towards stability operations have swayed over the years. Politicians, Army and DoD leadership have not been consistent with regard to stability operations. Vietnam is a distant memory, if a memory at all, of Army leadership today. More recent actions, they themselves of course shaped by memories and impressions of the past, likely hold more sway on the minds of today’s decision makers. In the early 1990s, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine guided the actions of the military of first President Bush, and then President Clinton. Under Bush, the military quickly and easily pushed Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait in a military action, that “just as Operation Just Cause in Panama, was a military action true to the criteria and spirit of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.”194 Even the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia, at least at first, was guided by the principles of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. It was a powerful U.S.-led force with a clear initial mission and mandate, requested and assisted by the UN. It was not until after the mission started that the waters really muddied for the U.S., with words like “nation building” and

“disarming” being tossed around. Such efforts resulted in the deaths of American soldiers in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, and greatly affected the attitudes of both the DoD and Congress concerning matters of stability operations. “US/UN relations reached a nadir following the Somalia debacle in 1993, to the degree that the superpower virtually dissociated herself from the international body, thereby weakening the organization.”

These operations reinforced several impressions held by military leadership. “US military officials believe that U.S. military forces should be held in reserve for the highest priority, war-fighting and conventional defense missions, and are concerned about the impact of peace support deployments on overall military readiness.” The leadership also feared open-ended commitments and unclear missions. “A legacy from Vietnam, this anxiety was compounded by the ‘mission creep’ experienced in Somalia.” Additionally, U.S. military leadership also stresses that American forces are already working hard around the world. Their skilled efforts are already being put toward both kinetic warfare and logistic support to other stability operations, and “the demands of burden-sharing suggest that others should take the lead in [peace support operations].”

Finally, support for stability operations in general is certainly not universal. Not all agree that such operations are the best use of American forces and/or resources.

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In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and failed states can be most dealt with through military and political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions. The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success.\textsuperscript{201}

Even today, some question the both the ability of the military to resurrect a failed (or defeated) state, and the need for them to do so in the first place.

U.S. national security depends most fundamentally on our economic strength. An open-ended commitment in Afghanistan demands vast resources better used at home and for purposes that contribute effectively to our security. It depletes our military and distracts our political leadership from more pressing challenges.\textsuperscript{202}

The current strategy is not working, and the administration has not identified the end-state it is seeking to achieve or the circumstances that would make withdrawal possible. The U.S. government emphasizes that withdrawal in summer 2011 will depend on conditions prevailing at the time. The current strategy and the stated timetable are out of synch; objectives need to be updated to realities on the ground to ensure that a drawdown in the summer of 2011 proceeds in a timely and effective manner.\textsuperscript{202}

Such attitudes clearly do not support a major force restructuring, resulting in a force dedicated solely to operations that are considered futile.

The attitudes described above have held great sway over Army leadership, sometimes to the detriment of mission effectiveness. “Despite decades of personal experience to the contrary, army officers have consistently underestimated the difficulty of unconventional warfare, military occupation, and pacification. The price of this hubris has been high, in both the past and the present.”\textsuperscript{203} This hubris was reflected in Army

\textsuperscript{201} Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010).


\textsuperscript{203} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 237.
training and doctrine for years. “During the late 1990s, it was almost mandatory that any briefing by a senior officer would show a slide juxtaposing German tanks with the Maginot Line as a warning of the dire fate that awaited should the nation not fund the army’s transformation program.”\textsuperscript{204} While the world has undoubtedly changed since then, and the some attitudes along with it, such memories have certainly not disappeared, as demonstrated above.

While the lack of a standing stability operations force is likely due, in part, to these attitudes, the costs and benefits described earlier in this chapter certainly have been taken into account by various decision-makers. The question still remains as to whether such a force could be created in a way that would fully address these costs and benefits. The next chapter will attempt to answer that question, and make recommendations for a standing stability operations force.

\textsuperscript{204} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 237.
IV. STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE REVISITED

So far, this thesis has examined many factors influencing decision-makers concerning the development of a standing stability operations force. The historical record, cost-benefit analysis, and organizational inertia have shaped the current force structure to varying degrees. This final chapter will propose a framework for establishing a standing stability operations force. This framework will address the influences described above. It will embrace and build upon the advantages of such a force. It will also address and mitigate the various concerns and problems associated with the establishment of a stability operations force. Finally, this chapter will conclude the thesis, examining which are the least and most compelling reasons behind American resistance to the creation of this force.

A. THE STANDING STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE

A standing, trained, equipped, and dedicated stability operations force could be a valuable tool of American diplomacy and military might. This force would be trained to accomplish the various tasks that compose stability operations. Its mission would be to use those skills and the strength of the U.S. military to accomplish the stability operations tasks lined out in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07. This force would be prepared to provide forces that can deploy in a variety of situations, including following an invading force or a direct deployment into a failed or failing state.

1. Size and Composition

The bulk of this stability operations force would be a specialized Army force comprised of at least a division’s worth of units. Robert M. Perito suggests that an existing structure could be the core of this new force: Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCT). It is important that this force has real firepower, but is also light and maneuverable. “The fact that the Stryker is transportable by C-130 aircraft means SBCTs
can arrive anywhere in the world within 96 hours from bases in the United States.”205 It also has its own infantry battalions and intelligence capabilities.206 All of these components, when trained consistently for stability operations missions, would be an agile, formidable force. However, more capabilities are required. Perito goes on to suggest adding significant numbers of military police, civilian police, and legal experts to round out the force and provide it more experience and skill in specific stability operations functions, such as law enforcement, preventing public disorder, and enforcing justice.207

The size and skill sets of this force would do well to address the costs and benefits outlined in Chapter III. This force would be powerful enough to be effective in a post-conflict environment, but would be small and light enough to mitigate the problems caused by a heavy footprint, as it can perform the same functions of a much larger, general-purpose force. This maneuverability also helps to show that the U.S. is not interested in occupying countries or overstepping its traditional bounds, as a more heavy-handed force might. Additionally, these forces could be trained to integrate quickly with UN peacekeepers, if so desired. American stability operations forces could be deployed into an area requiring peace making or enforcement, where a stronger force is required. Once the situation has calmed down, the teams would be trained to hand off peacekeeping responsibilities to UN forces.

2. Command and Control

Key to the success of stability operations forces is their ability to operate in a joint, interagency environment.

The very definition of stability operations raises the problem of how to command and control endeavors that are by nature Joint, interagency, and often multinational. Since the U.S. government will continue to conduct

205 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 329.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid., 330–333.
stability operations, the U. S. defense establishment must develop a comprehensive view to integrate military land power with its interagency partners for these deployments.208

A specially trained, standing stability operations force could be a first step in developing that integration. Not only would all members of the force be trained (at least at the basic level) in the language of joint and interagency communication, but also the staff would consist of liaison officers of various stripes. State Department/USAID, embassy, Department of Justice, and other agencies would require representation at the brigade level in order to provide the best coordination possible.

Additionally, the coordination could extend out from the stability operations forces as well. Officers trained and experienced in stability operations would hold billets in other Army units conducting offensive and defensive operations. This placement would help the Army hold true to even the current Field Manual 3-07, and better enable all Army forces to operate all the way along the spectrum of conflict, including stability operations. No unit operates in a bubble, and the stability operations liaison officer could help other Army units actually conduct these types of operations when necessary. The liaison officer could also help to mitigate the problem of conflicting missions described in Chapter III. Coordination is key to preventing (to the extent possible) sending mixed messages to the local population.

3. Concerns

A standing stability operations force would certainly not be without some problems. First and foremost, it would not be cheap. As stated above, sizeable numbers of troops and civilians would be required to provide even the most basic capabilities. Stability operations, by their very nature, tend to take significant amounts of times, often measured in years rather than months. Three or four brigades would be required for each brigade required in the field. While one brigade is deployed, one would be returning from a deployment, one would be training to deploy, and yet more soldiers would be

required to fill vacancies caused by injury, illness, schools, or soldiers leaving the Army. The question most concerning to the Army is where from where would the personnel and the funding required be pulled. It is unlikely that the Army would receive a funding increase large enough to support this force, so it would be forced to cut costs elsewhere. Such cuts would not sit well with those who still hold the attitudes described in Chapter III, those who still invoke images of German tanks when imagining the greatest threats facing the United States today.

Finally, what happens if the political winds shift? Currently, as described in Chapter III, there is at least some support for stability operations as national security policy. However, this may not always be the case in the future. What happens to the forces that are trained to do a mission that the U.S. no longer values? If the American people elect politicians favoring more isolationist policies, the first Army forces on the chopping block may be those that are not necessarily viewed as direct contributors to national security.

These concerns, though real, can be overcome. Congress must ask the Army hard questions about how its money is spent now. Would it really be more expensive to establish a standing stability operations force? Or is it more cost-effective to continue to train general-purpose forces to specific deployment tasks? What is the actual impact to mission readiness? Such questions are answerable if addressed honestly and without preconceived notions, but are beyond the scope of this thesis.

B. SUMMARY

The preceding chapters of this thesis have explored the basis of American resistance to establishing a specialized stability operations force within the Army. Many reasons have been laid out, both for and against the creation of such a force. This final section will analyze the most and least compelling reasons for this resistance and conclude the thesis.
1. Most Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability Operations Force

Military readiness is (ideally) always at the forefront of decision makers’ minds. The concerns raised in Chapter III about the costs of establishing a stability operations force are very real, and may have a very real impact on the ability of the Army to defend the U.S. and its interests. More specifically, the attitudes in Section 4 of Chapter III can compound and distort the true costs and benefits of a stability operations force. As shown above, these costs might be mitigated, but results of any study must be closely scrutinized to determine if, in fact, it was conducted without bias or preconceived notions. If the results are fair, they could be used either to enhance or scrap the stability operations force proposed in this chapter.

2. Least Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability Operations Force

The political costs described in Chapter III have a role to play in American resistance to a stability operations force, but it is a smaller role than military readiness. Political winds, both international and domestic, shift often and for many different reasons. The Army, by design, follows the orders and direction of elected/appointed civilian leadership. However, the career DoD civilians and generals have all served through multiple administrations and have seen those winds blow one way or the other. While not immune to these winds, the Army, as described above, is a giant bureaucracy and is unlikely to move much on the whims of popular opinion.

3. Conclusion

This thesis has established the question regarding a standing stability operations force, explored the historical context of such a force, analyzed several reasons both for and against its establishment, and offered a framework for a potential force using the lessons learned from all the above reasoning. The United States has not yet established a standing stability operations force. Whether or not it ever will remains to be seen. However, it is clear that the stability operations missions (or those like them) are not
likely to disappear any time soon, and that the U.S. Army will have critical role to play in those operations. Whatever course the Army leadership chooses, it is important that it recognizes clearly the influences to which it is subject, and makes decisions accordingly, with national interests in mind.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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