EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

At least twenty countries–many of them hostile to the United States and its allies-have flow or are seeking to develop the capability to produce nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. More than twelve countries have operational ballistic missiles, and others have programs to develop them.

Weapons of mass destruction may directly threaten US forces in the field and, in a more perplexing way, threaten the effective force employment by requiring dispersal of those forces. Potential adversaries may use weapons of mass destruction to deter US power projection abroad. As President Clinton stated to the United Nations in September 1993, *"If we do not stem the proliferation of, the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure."*

Because of concern over this threat, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (NDAA 94) required the establishment of an interagency review committee composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency and tasked the committee to report on nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities and programs. To ensure comprehensiveness, representatives of other departments and agencies were asked to participate.

In accordance with NDAA 94, this report provides a top-down overview of existing, planned and proposed capabilities and technologies, as well as a description of priorities, programmatic options and other issues. Other than Nunn-Lugar activities, this report specifically excludes activities and programs for dealing with extant weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China, but does address non/counterproliferation activities and programs for dealing with issues germane to the proliferation of WMD through illicit export of materials, technology, and expertise from FSU states. The report discusses ongoing and planned Agency programs and activities that are unique to the non/counterproliferation problem as well as those that are strongly related. The funding summaries presented for these efforts are estimates. The report focuses on the non/counterproliferation capabilities to support US policy goals.

2. DISCUSSION

a. Findings

The review committee performed an assessment of current and proposed non/ counterproliferation activities. The following summarizes the findings of this assessment:

- Current non/counterproliferation programs and activities that are non/counterproliferation are approximately $1 billion in FY95 and those that related are approximately $3 billion. A substantial Intelligence Community reflected in these numbers (see classified annex).

- High priority shortfalls in operational capability needed to implement US non/counterproliferation policy have been identified in nine areas, along with technology opportunities that exist for addressing them. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is conducting a six-month study, in conjunction with the Services and combatant commands, of counterproliferation military requirements, including a detailed evaluation of the functions of the Services and missions of the combatant commands.

- Sixteen capability areas for progress have been identified to address current and future national non/counterproliferation needs, 14 of which are believed to be underfunded at present. (See Figure 1).

- Better coordination and communication across Departments and Agencies are needed among the more than 80 different groups and entities at all levels in the Federal Government now engaged in supporting national non/counterproliferation policy

Non/Counterproliferation Areas for Progress	Recommended Increases in Annual Investment (For FY96 and Later)
• Real time detection and characterization of BW/CW Agents including stand-off capability	$75M
• Underground structures detection and characterization	$75M
• Hard underground target defeat including advanced non-nuclear weapons (lethal or non-lethal) capable of holding counterforce targets at risk with low collateral effects	$4OM
• Detection and tracking of shipments and control and accountability for stocks of WMD-related materials and personnel including worldwide WMD and dual-use item tracking	$25M
• Capability to detect, locate and render harmless WMD in US	$1OM
• Ehhancement of Collection and Analysis of Intelligence	$25M
• Support of Chernical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention	$1OM
• Support of Conclusion of a Verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	$1OM
• Capability to detect, locate and disarm, with high assurance and in a timely fashion, outside the United States WMD hidden by a hostile state or terrorist in a confined area	$15M
• Passive defense capabilities enabling military operations to continue in contaminated conditions-actual or threatened (low cost, lightweight)	$15M
• Rapid production of protective BW vaccines	$15M
• Detection and interception of low flying/stealthy cruise missiles	$50M
• Transparency and control of foreign fissile material	$15M
• Safe disposition for foreign missile- and WMD-related materials (except fissile material)	$20M
• Intercept capability in boost phase	Adequately funded
• Prompt mobile target kill	Adequately funded

Figure 1.

b. Ongoing Actions

Consistent with the findings above, the review committee is taking the following actions:

1. The review committee principals will continue to refine the "order of magnitude" estimates of investment increases for the areas for progress shown in Figure 1 to address them within budget planning ceilings of the agencies for FY96 and later years.

2. The review committee has recommended to the NSC the creation of a Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Technology Working Group ("The Technology Working Group") within the National Security Council structure. This Technology Working Group would be charged with reviewing all the technology efforts underway in the various agencies that pertain to nonproliferation or counterproliferation. The Technology Working Group would also have authority to set priorities for non/counterproliferation technology efforts in the various agencies and to make specific resource allocation recommendations to the participating agencies, the NSC, the OSTP and the 0MB. Moreover, the Technology Working Group would have representation from and a strong connection to the National Science and Technology Council. The Technology Working Group would be comprised of representatives with management, resource allocation, and program planning authority. The existing Research and Development Subcommittee of the Community Non-Proliferation Committee provides a good basis for building the Technology Working Group.

3. Technology development should not take place in a policy vacuum. Accordingly, the Technology Working Group would be integrated with the other working groups addressing important proliferation issues. Overall policy guidance would come from a new NSC-chaired Standing Committee of the IWG on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. This Standing Committee would have broad policy oversight and coordination responsibilities and bring together senior managers from the various agencies responsible for proliferation issues to assure communication and integrated management attention across all nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts and working groups. A conceptual organization diagram is:



Figure 2.

4. The proposed Technology Working Group and the new Standing Committee on Nonproliferation and Export Controls should have as one of their priorities the continued, careful examination of non/counterproliferation programs to locate and eliminate marginal or unnecessarily redundant activities. This will enhance US capabilities to prevent and defend against proliferation and it could free modest amounts of resources to help fund higher priority areas.

3. SUMMARY

The new consensus on nonproliferation policy that President Clinton called for last September requires, among other things, the creative use of technology and the reallocation of government resources. It is not easy to change the direction of the ship of state--especially when its course for over 45 years was primarily aimed at preparing for threats that have receded, while the problems of proliferation have grown and become more urgent. The actions of this review committee are designed to help steer the new course.