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Regional Combatant Commanders and The Center of Gravity of  
Radical Islamic Terrorism

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The Contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

14 February 2005

## **Abstract**

The thesis of this paper is that Religion is the center of gravity for radical Islamic terrorists, and that is precisely where a Combatant Commander should focus his attention in order to accomplish his theatre objectives in the Global War on Terrorism. The Author gives a brief history of Islam and selected sects, shedding insight as to the origin of the radical Islamic terrorist ideology.

He follows this with identifying the relationship between Islam and terrorism, focusing on jihad. Center of Gravity is then defined and it's importance is delineated. As identifying the wrong Center of Gravity can have grave consequences in warfare. Critical strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities are acknowledged as three very important factors that can identify a Center of Gravity.

The author demonstrates the fallacy of jihad as it pertains to terrorism as well as suicide bombers. In the Global War on Terrorism, tactical centers of gravity are easily to define and the strategic center of gravity lies in the hearts and minds of uncommitted Muslims. Essentially the doctrinal concept of Center of Gravity essentially skips him. Ultimately, the author postulates that on an operational level, there is very little military force that a Combatant Commander can bring to bear. He must make the most of his information warfare and psychological operations personnel in order to have the greatest impact on the Center of Gravity.

As a western society, Americans find it difficult to identify with a culture in which religion is woven into every element of daily living. The same holds true for military leaders trying to grasp the concept of an enemy willing to die in the name of religion for their cause. Not just willing to die, but seeking to die, similar to the war in the Pacific during World War II.

However, the enemy in the Pacific in 1944 was a nation state, Japan, with an identifiable center of gravity and straightforward strategic objectives. The fourth generation warfare of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is quite different. In our war, the enemies are terrorists, with no nation state upon which we can use our global influence, and a center of gravity that is nebulous at best.

There are numerous opinions in defining an enemy Center of Gravity. A center of gravity encompasses both tangible and intangible elements. They vary from land forces and carrier strike groups to the intangible elements such as morale, military or political leadership.<sup>1</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 defines it as: “the characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.”<sup>2</sup> The US Marine Corps prefers to attack an enemy’s weakness and has long regarded the enemy’s center of gravity its critical vulnerabilities.<sup>3</sup>

Although usually an obvious choice, the center of gravity may not always be the enemy forces themselves. Centers of gravity can be manifested as organizations or intangible ideologies. Religion is the center of gravity for radical Islamic terrorists. A Combatant Commander should focus his attention on this in order to accomplish his theatre objectives in the Global War on Terrorism. Unlike most intangible centers of gravity, Islam applies to all levels of warfare:

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<sup>1</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Operational Warfare*, (Newport, RI Naval War College, 2000): 310-311.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0. *Doctrines for Joint Operations*, (Washington DC, 10 September 2001), GL-5.

<sup>3</sup> Antonio J. Echevarria. “Center of Gravity, Recommendations for Joint Doctrine,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (October 2004): 11.

tactical, operational and strategic. The Combatant Commander needs to apply all the assets at his disposal on this intangible center of gravity, and needs to determine a military solution to what appears to be a religious/ideological problem.

Muslim society is deeply rooted in tradition and the all encompassing aspects of Islam. The various sects have each spawned their own groups of terrorists, which are influenced by their theological differences. Sun Tsu said we need to know our enemy, it is therefore appropriate to quickly review some background on radical Islamic extremists.

### **A Brief History of Islam**

*“This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favor unto you and have chosen for you as religion, AL-ISLAM.” (Al-Ma’idah 3)*

This was the last revelation from Allah to the prophet Muhammad.<sup>4</sup> The prophet Muhammad was forty when he began receiving his revelations delivered from Allah, through visions of the Archangel, Gabriel, in a cave in the hills overlooking the city of Mecca.<sup>5</sup> The revelation the Qur’an was “to correct human error that had made its way into the scriptures and belief systems of Judaism and Christianity.”<sup>6</sup> From the beginning, his ministry gained followers from the deprived class. The aristocracy and businessmen of Mecca were contemptuous of his preaching. His intolerance of idols and message of justice and egalitarianism threatened their

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<sup>4</sup> Caesar E. Farah. *Islam*, (Hauppauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc, 2000), 63.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-39.

<sup>6</sup> John Esposito. “Ten things Everyone needs to know about Islam,” *Arabworld*, 2002, <http://arabworld.nitle.org/texts> (accessed 02 December, 2004): 1.

livelihood and community status.<sup>7</sup> Thus began the class war that permeated the embryonic stages of Islam.

As Muhammad increased the intensity of his message in Mecca, the persecution on him and his followers became unbearable and many of his followers moved to Abyssinia, while he remained behind.<sup>8</sup>

Years later he fled to Yathrib, location of modern day Medina,<sup>9</sup> joining many of his followers there. His escape was followed by eight years of skirmishes and battles between Mecca and the Muslims at Yathrib, culminating with the submission of Mecca in the year 630.<sup>10</sup> Muhammad died two years later, after uniting Arabia under the religion of Islam.

During the years Muhammad spent in Yathrib, a transformation the nature of Islam began. Muhammad began assuming the role as a societal head as well as the religious leader.<sup>11</sup> The beginnings of a theocratic Islamic government began to take form. After his death the caliphates took over leadership of Islam. Shortly afterwards there became conflicts over the assumption of the caliphate and Islam began to violently splinter into several different sects and sub-sects. Of these, the two largest are the Sunnis and the Shiites.

The Sunnis, the largest sect in Islam, make up nearly 90% of the religion's followers.<sup>12</sup> Sunnis claim to be the continuation of the Islam as it was defined through the revelations given to Muhammad and the way he led his personal life (Hadith). “The actual theological and ritual differences between Sunni and the Shiites came over a couple of centuries with development.

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<sup>7</sup> Farah, 41-42.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>9</sup> Medina, [Al Medina, Yathrib]. *Global Security.org*, 2004, <http://globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/medina.htm> (accessed 31 December, 2004).

<sup>10</sup> Farah, 54-55.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 46-47.

<sup>12</sup> What is the difference between Sunnis and Shiites? *History News Network*, 09 September 2002, <http://hnn.us/articles/934.html> (accessed 22 January, 2005).

For a long time, Sunni Islam was defined from Shiia Islam by its adherence to the Caliph as the leader of the Muslim world. But there are many small and some large differences between Sunni and the other orientations, in all aspects of the religion.”<sup>13</sup>

The Shiite movement consists of about 10 percent of the total Muslim population.<sup>14</sup> Shiia is a shortened form of Shi'at Ali, which means "the party of Ali," describing a group of his followers that formed after his death in 661 AD.<sup>15</sup> After Ali died, the Umayyads took control of the caliphate. The Shiites believed it should have been passed to one of his sons, who were also Mohammed's grandsons, and that ultimately the rightful heir will return as the Mahdi, a leader guided personally and directly by Allah. The Mahdi is Islam's only messianic figure.<sup>16</sup> Shiia Muslims continue to hold the same fundamental beliefs of other Muslims, except they view the caliph as a temporal leader, and have added a prayer leader called an imam.<sup>17</sup>

Wahhabi Islam is a radical sub-sect of the Sunnis. They are an extreme minority sect. The founder, ibn Abd al-Wahhab, is perhaps the first modern Islamic fundamentalist. He made the central focus of his reform movement the idea that absolutely everything added to Islam over the centuries was false and should be eliminated.<sup>18</sup> Therefore any movement that worked to bring Islamic law more inline with Western standards would violate the tenants of Wahhabism.

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<sup>13</sup> Sunni. "Encyclopedia of the Orient," January 2005, <http://I-cascom/e.o/sunni.htm> (accessed 14 January 2005).

<sup>14</sup> Religions of Iran. *Iran Chamber Society*, (January 23, 2005) [http://www.iranchamber.com/introduction\\_to\\_shiism.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/introduction_to_shiism.php) (accessed 23 January 2005).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Shiia Islam. *Global Security.org*, (January 14, 2005) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-shiia.htm>(accessed 14 January 2005).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Wahhabi *Global Security.org*, (January 14, 2005) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-shiia.htm> (accessed 14 January 2005).

Adherents of Wahhabi Islam do not regard it as simply one school of thought out of many; rather it is the only path of true Islam.<sup>19</sup> Osama bin Laden is a Wahhabi adherent. This extremism has generated much of the violence against not only the Western cultures, but other Muslims that do not follow Wahhabi fundamentalism.

The base of all Islamic sects is their interpretation of the Qur'an, the cornerstone of the daily lives of Muslims. It is relied upon extensively in all aspects of Muslim culture. From basic laws to religious and ethical well being, it is the "ultimate unchallengeable recourse for religious knowledge."<sup>20</sup> There is no separation between church and state as there is in most western cultures. "Western legal systems adapt to the changing circumstances of contemporary society. Islamic law, however, is conceived as the immutable embodiment of divine will, imposed by God upon Islamic society. The process of interpretation and adaptation of Islamic law is held to have been completed in the past with the crystallization of the legal manuals."<sup>21</sup>

The will of Allah permeates the society, thus Democracy or other manmade governments are a difficult concept to grasp. Many fundamental Muslims look at positional leaders as divining their authority from Allah, and his will is not to be challenged. "Today one witnesses a surge against leadership that has not abided by the decrees of faith on social justice and amelioration. Misfortunes are no longer endured with passivity and resignation."<sup>22</sup> The terrorists have clearly gone beyond the "it is the will of Allah" mentality and taken matters into their own hands.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Farah, 77-78.

<sup>21</sup> Mark A. Copeland. "A Survey of the Origins and Beliefs of Islam," *Executable Outlines.com* (2004), <http://executableoutlines.com/islam.htm> (accessed 31 December 2004).



## Islam and Terrorism

Violence has surrounded Islam since its inception: battles in and around Mecca; the establishment of their empire; the Crusades, and now the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East. The Qur'anic policy of jihad has been around for centuries. After the initial, massive conquests of Islam ended in the eighth century, Muslim jurists ruled that the caliph "had to raid enemy territory at least once a year in order to keep the idea of jihad alive."<sup>23</sup>

Terrorism and jihad have been associated with Islam for the past thirty years. One can scarcely think of one without also thinking of the other. Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda, are the faces of Islam to most Americans.

*But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (Qur'an 9:5)*

*Fight those who believe not in God, nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book (Christians and Jews), until they pay the jizya [tribute] with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. (Qur'an 9:29).*

These are examples of "sword verses" that provide the justification of jihad. Many Muslim scholars consider these verses to have cancelled the previous verses mandating kindness and persuasion thus jihad became the explicit norm.<sup>24</sup> Men such as bin Laden have also interpreted these to imply that a jihad against Christians, Jews and Western Culture is the duty

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<sup>22</sup> Farah, 7.

<sup>23</sup> Mark Hartwig. "Spread by the Sword?" *Answering-Islam.org*, (2004) [http://answering-islam.org.uk/Terrorism/by\\_the\\_sword.html](http://answering-islam.org.uk/Terrorism/by_the_sword.html). (Accessed 16 January 2005).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

for all able bodied Muslim males. Taking it a step farther he has rationalized that “terrorism is a legitimate and morally demanded duty.”<sup>25</sup>

The Department of Defense defines terrorism as the “unlawful or threatened use of violence to intimidate or coerce a government or society to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”<sup>26</sup>

The use of force, as far as the Qur’an is concerned, is defensive in nature. Offensive jihad (jihad undertaken to convert all humanity to Islam) is not referenced in the Qur’an.<sup>27</sup> Traditional Islamic law prohibits the killing of women and children. Clearly bin Laden’s interpretation has extended beyond the religious constrains of jihad and entered into the political and ideological realms.

Jihad as a “divinely sanctioned means to combat the enemy, provides justifications for going to war for reasons of realpolitik without concern for limitations on the means.”<sup>28</sup> Simply put, Al-Qaeda (Wahabbis) even though they are a small faction, want to convert others to become a majority status and take control of the religion. They want western culture out of the Middle East, and the ends will justify the means. A distorted interpretation of the Qur’an has lead to proliferation of terrorism and suicide bombers inflicting high amounts of collateral damage.

Once a sanctioned theological justification to defend oneself when peaceful methods failed, jihad has been perverted into an ideological power struggle. Islam, a religion of peace,

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<sup>25</sup> Abdulaziz Sachedina. “From Defensive to Offensive Warfare: The Use and Abuse of Jihad in the Muslim World,” *University of Virginia*. (December 2, 2002) <http://people.virginia.edu/~aas/article/article8.htm> (accessed 02 December 2004): 8.

<sup>26</sup> Bruce Hoffman. “Defining Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Edited by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 19.

<sup>27</sup> Sachedina, 3.

has become the veil that the radical leadership hides behind while calling for war against Jews, Christians and Western cultures.

### **The Center of Gravity**

Clausewitz does not distinguish among tactical, operational, or strategic centers of gravity.<sup>29</sup> It can be argued that centers of gravity can exist for every level of war. Defeating tactical centers of gravity leads to tactical objectives and so on until national strategic objectives are reached.<sup>30</sup>

On the operational level, the Combatant Commander needs to parlay the exploitation of tactical centers of gravity into the larger goal of accomplishing operational objectives. This is one approach to the center of gravity concept that seems very practical in addressing the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). There are numerous terrorist cell and factions with slightly different ideologies. They have a common enemy in the West and Israel. They are very loosely linked with intermittent communications, while causing chaos throughout a theatre.

In any case the center of gravity is the area where a commander wants to focus. Identifying critical strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities is the first step in deciding where to focus effort. A misidentification of an enemy center of gravity can have grave consequences; “specifically, the inability to accomplish the military objectives at an acceptable cost and the

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>29</sup> Antonio J. Echevarria. “Reining in the Center of Gravity Concept,” *Air and Space Power Journal*, (Summer 2003):4.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 11.

unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results.”<sup>31</sup>

“Critical strengths are capabilities considered vital for the accomplishment of a given or assumed military objective.”<sup>32</sup> Force on force, our adversary in the war on terrorism is simply no match for the power and technology of the US and the coalition forces. They must make up for that shortcoming through other means, either tangible or intangible. That means is religious ideology, the critical strength of our enemy.

Embedded within the ideology are three components that make it so formidable. Using Islam as the catalyst, the radical Islamic terrorists have created hatred towards the Jews, Christians and the West (the US in particular). In some instances on the battlefield, this hatred has created bedfellows of former enemies, Wahhabis, Shiites and Sunnis. Currently in Iraq they are all antagonizing the coalition, using their common bond as Muslims and hatred to set aside centuries of conflict to battle the infidel.

Second, our enemy is fanatical; so much so that they are willing to die for their cause. This fanaticism leads to the third element of their ideology, which is the terror itself. It is an effective tool in the arsenal of their ideology, and sanctioned by the well respected bin Laden. The element of surprise and difficulty in obtaining and assessing intelligence makes terrorism the weapon of choice for these radicals.

“Critical weaknesses are those sources of power that, while considered essential for the accomplishment of the assigned military objective, are grossly inadequate to perform their intended function or task.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Dale C. Ekmeir. “Center of Gravity Analysis,” *Military Review* (July-August 2004): 2.

<sup>32</sup> Vego, 307.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

Centuries of bloody conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites won't be forgotten just because of this current conflict. The Muslim nation truly is a house divided. For the Wahhabis, secular Muslims and secular Muslim governments are high on the "to do list," right behind Jews and Americans. The Wahhabis have made no bones about their hatred of several of the Islamic governments, Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia for example.<sup>34</sup> While the terrorists do hate western culture, their internal theological conflicts are old flames that have been burning brightly for centuries, and can be exploited to sever their fragile partnership.

A note from Abu Musab Zarqawi found on an al-Qaeda operative stated that the only way to prolong the duration of the fight was to foment the conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites.<sup>35</sup> This is a critical weakness they know they need to protect, or it will be exposed and exploited.

Critical vulnerabilities are critical weaknesses or their elements that are especially vulnerable to physical attack or other actions- diplomatic, informational, economic, etc."<sup>36</sup> By taking advantage of these vulnerabilities a commander can achieve effects "disproportionate to the resources applied."<sup>37</sup> Critical vulnerabilities make great targets and are something that one wants to protect. Planners often will correctly identify a critical vulnerability, but misidentify it as a center of gravity. Finding the critical vulnerabilities and exploiting them is essential in combating Islamic terrorists. Linking the centers of gravity to critical vulnerabilities enables attack through the weak points in the overall system.

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<sup>34</sup> Daniel L. Byman. "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do we understand our Enemy?" *World Politics* 56 (October 2003): 144.

<sup>35</sup> Romesh Ratnesar. "Abual-Zarqawi: Letter from an Islamic Terrorist," *Time* (April 26, 2004):56.

<sup>36</sup> Vego, 307.

## What can the Combatant Commander do?

Focus on the center of gravity is designed to have the effect of the collapse of the enemy. It is an effects based rather than a capabilities approach to victory.<sup>37</sup> The effect being either the adversary's defeat or force him to abandon aims or change his behavior.<sup>38</sup> So, how does one "attack" an ideology or religion in order to have the desired effect?<sup>39</sup>

The tactics used by the operators need to be scrutinized. There is a starfish syndrome when fighting terrorists; cut off an arm and it grows back. It does little good if as we kill or capture current operatives more rise up to take their place. Restricting the ideology's spread is crucial,<sup>40</sup> and military force will only go so far. Especially in the GWOT, Combatant Commanders need to be wary of mirror imaging, assuming the adversary will act and react in the same manner as his forces.<sup>41</sup>

Combat operations and security efforts are merely one of the tools to fighting terrorism, they need to be associated and supported with national, cultural, political, and socioeconomic efforts.<sup>42</sup> Information operations (IO), intelligence analysis, psychological operations, cultural and political advisors, and inter-agency coordination are the centerpieces of the Combatant Commander's toolbox against the radical Muslims, not the fighting forces. Once access to the community and to the roots of the movement away from the battle has been attained, the

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<sup>37</sup> Eckmeir, 3.

<sup>38</sup> Echevarria, Recommendations for Joint Doctrine, 15.

<sup>39</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-00.1. *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, (Washington DC, 25 January 2002), ix.

<sup>40</sup> Stephen Biddle. *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*, Edited by John R. Martin (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January 2002): 10.

<sup>41</sup> JP 5-00.1, II-9.

<sup>42</sup> Muhammad Mahfouz. "The only way to End Violence and Terrorism is to Fight a Cultural and Ideological Battle'" *Saudi Gazette*. (Saudi Arabia), December 30, 2004.

Combatant Commander can begin to have a long term effect on war fighting. Efforts focused here will hold back some of the willingness of the new fighters to join the fight.

Calls for the use of terrorism in a jihad against the enemy should be refuted by rational Muslim clerics. Jihad is defensive in nature, and “must be declared by a ruler or head of state.”<sup>43</sup> Suicide bombers in public arenas with aims to disrupt clearly violate this tenet as well as the Muslim prohibition against suicide. A religious leader from Saudi Arabia has declared that those bombers that kill themselves in an attack did not die as martyrs, but as suicides.<sup>44</sup> This is a critical vulnerability that should be uncovered by the Combatant Commander.

Terrorists must be alienated from the population of their “host” country. An information campaign that emphasizes how their tactics are ineffective and the heroic image of their perpetrators must be discredited.<sup>45</sup> Prudent and aggressive use of IO and psyops teams as well as other government agencies at the Combatant Commander’s disposal can minimize the effectiveness of these tactics.

## Conclusions

So where does all this lead us? In the post September 11<sup>th</sup> era, US focus has been on defeating the terrorists from the radical Islamic ideological wing. Much of the emphasis has been on attacking the terrorists and engaging them head on as much as possible. This is classic

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<sup>43</sup> Esposito, 16.

<sup>44</sup> Dilip Hiro. *War Without End*, (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 2002): 417.

<sup>45</sup> Douglas V. Johnson and John R. Martin. “Terrorism Viewed Historically” *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*. Edited by John R. Martin. (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College January 2002): 4-5.

mirror imaging, and the “American way of war” solution may not be the answer. “The security battle will not help much in putting an end to this phenomenon,”<sup>46</sup> it’s only a small part.

The strategic center of gravity of this war lies not in the fight between forces, but lies in the hearts and minds of uncommitted Muslims.<sup>47</sup> On the operational level, there is only so much a regional Combatant Commander can do. From a joint doctrine standpoint, the Center of Gravity concept in the war on terrorism essentially skips him, going right from the tactical to the strategic levels. The campaigns in country are necessary, as eradication of the fighters is part of the mission, but winning the fight behind the lines of battle is even more crucial. It is a “battle of culture and thought to fight and defeat terrorism in all its stages.”<sup>48</sup>

As stated previously, psychological operations is one of the Combatant Commander’s most effective weapons. It must be used to under mine some of the myths of terrorism, such as poverty. It’s not strictly a socio-economic issue; terrorists come from many diverse backgrounds. So why do young Muslims get involved in this behavior? “Brainwashing of the youth at the hands of ‘religious clerics’ with backward views” is one of the main contributors.<sup>49</sup> Why don’t these leaders and clerics give up opportunity to carry out the “honorable deed” and aspire to reach paradise themselves? Exposing the radical Muslim leaders for who they really are is essential. Notice no Muslim preacher has blown himself up. Nor has any relative of an influential Islamist. It’s all deception and left unrevealed, the radical leadership will continue to subjugate the weak in their society. Most suicide bombers are outcasts, naïve children or political hotheads with clouded minds.<sup>50</sup> As the rhetoric continues and the hatred spreads, more

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<sup>46</sup> Mafauz, *Saudi Gazette*, December 30, 2004.

<sup>47</sup> Biddle, 10.

<sup>48</sup> Mafauz, *Saudi Gazette*, December 30, 2004.

<sup>49</sup> Abdallah Rashid. “The Reason for Arab Muslim Youth Involvement in Terrorism is Religious Brainwashing,” *Al-Itihad*. (United Arab Emirates) January 10, 2005.

<sup>50</sup> Mortimer B. Zuckerman. “We can Win and We Must,” *US News and*



fighters will take the place of the dead ones. Quelling this tide of propaganda is difficult to overcome using the big stick that a Combatant Commander has, his military forces. The best he can do is plug the holes with forces and play the waiting game as the other agencies work with the populace.

Zarqawi wrote to al-Qaeda, “Democracy is coming. There will be no excuse thereafter for terrorism in Iraq.”<sup>51</sup> This statement reinforces the notion that this jihad is all about power, as terrorism in the name of jihad will be inexcusable. The radical Muslim leadership can see their days are numbered and they will be powerless if focus is on their charade, and not the engagement of forces.

We are in the midst of an ideological struggle with an enemy that has had over a thousand years of practice. “This war of ideas will matter as centrally as the war of bullets for ultimate victory or defeat: if we lose the former, we will surely lose the latter.”<sup>52</sup>

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*World Report* (September 13, 2004).

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Biddle, 10.

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