LATIN AMERICA: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF SECURITY

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The authors explore the relationship between the theory and practice of democracy in Latin America and the changing roles of the U.S. and Latin American militaries. This is a period when many Latin American countries continue to be threatened by guerrilla movements and/or resurgent militarism and/or narcotrafficking. Among lessons learned during the 1980s are the critical importance of democratization, civilian responsibility, and the development of a civil-military dialogue for the ongoing challenge of maintaining national security. The authors emphasize the importance of keeping an open mind with regard to the threat that narcotrafficking poses to hemispheric security.
WARRIORS IN PEACETIME
CONFERENCE

Latin America: The Unfinished Business of Security

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FOREWORD

This report is a product of the Warriors in Peacetime Conference held at the Inter-American Defense College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, on December 11-12, 1992. This meeting was organized to explore the relationship between the theory and practice of democracy in Latin America, on the one hand, and the changing roles of the U.S. and Latin American militaries, on the other. The dialogue brought together a diverse group of scholars and civilian and military officials from the United States and Latin America. It was constructed around two major addresses, one by General George Joulwan, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, and the other by the Honorable Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Three panels addressed the themes: "The New World Order and the Democratic Imperative in Civil-Military Relations," "The Unfinished Business of Security," and "Winning the Peace."

This report and the accompanying transcript cover the heart of the conference, namely: "The Unfinished Business of Security." The subject is especially timely. In a period when many Latin American countries continue to be threatened by guerrilla movements and/or resurgent militarism and/or narcotrafficking, it is refreshing to find such a distinguished group of experts addressing these problems in ways that are of practical use to U.S. and Latin American policymakers. Among the lessons learned from the 1980s is the critical importance of democratization, civilian responsibility, and the development of a civil-military dialogue for the ongoing challenge of maintaining national security. Along these same lines, it is important to be able to keep an open mind with regard to the threat that narcotrafficking poses to hemispheric security. One need not necessarily agree with all of Kenneth Sharpe's conclusions to appreciate his analysis of the challenges and dangers confronting U.S. and Latin governments as they struggle to wage the War on Drugs.
Special thanks are due to General James Harding of the Inter-American Defense College for hosting the conference, to General (Ret.) Fred Woerner of Boston University, and Colonel John D. Auger of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Outreach Program for their organization and funding efforts. Without them, this dialogue could not have been held. The conference's primary organizer and source of inspiration was Dr. Gabriel Marcella, who collaborated closely with Dr. John T. Fishel of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Dr. Donald E. Schulz in identifying the issues to be addressed and potential participants to be approached. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to understanding this important subject.

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ABOUT THE SPEAKERS

CAESAR SERESERES is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and Associate Dean of the School of Social Sciences. He worked for the Department of State as a staff member in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and he was a consultant on national security at the Rand Corporation. Sereseres has served on the editorial board of The Journal of Small Wars, traveled throughout Latin America, and published many articles and books on such subjects as U.S. arms transfers, diplomacy, and security in Latin America; the Central American policy conundrum; and U.S. policy for Central America.

GUSTAVO GORRITI is a free-lance journalist, based in Lima, who has written for Peru's leading weekly magazine, Caretas. He is currently writing a multivolume work on the Shining Path guerrillas, Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Peru.

DAVID SCOTT PALMER is Professor of International Relations and Political Science and Director of the Latin American Studies Program at Boston University. He has written extensively on Peruvian affairs, most recently as editor of Shining Path of Peru. He is formerly Director of Latin American Studies, Foreign Service Institute.

KENNETH SHARPE is Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College. He has conducted extensive field work in Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. He is the author of Peasant Politics: Struggle in a Dominican Village and coeditor, with Morris Blachman and William LeoGrande, of Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America.

MAX MANWARING is formerly an associate of Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc. He has served in various roles at U.S. Southern Command and been a security affairs analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He has written extensively on low intensity conflict, and edited books on Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity
Conflict and (with Court Prisk) El Salvador at War: An Oral History. His most recent book is on the Gray Area Phenomenon: Confronting the New World Disorder.

EDWIN G. CORR is the Henry Bellmon Professor of Public Service at the University of Oklahoma. He is former U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Peru, and El Salvador. He is the author of The Political Process in Colombia and coeditor of Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. He is currently writing a book on El Salvador.
LATIN AMERICA:
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS
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Summary.

The panel discussed three basic questions: (1) How can a democratic government most effectively combat insurgency? (2) What specific lessons can be drawn from the history of insurgencies and, in particular, from the cases of Guatemala and Peru? and (3) How effective are U.S. supply-side efforts to combat drug trafficking?

There was general agreement that democratization was a key not only to the defeat of insurgencies, but to the creation of conditions that would prevent their reemergence. The objective of a democratic internal defense is to incorporate as many groups and individuals as possible into the defense process while at the same time bringing them into the democratic process. This means carrying out a democratic revolution at the grass roots level. People must be brought into the system so they will have a stake in its survival.

Institution-building is of crucial importance. Institutions provide the vital linkage through which citizens are brought into the political process and government is made more responsive to their needs and desires. A second key is legitimacy and the rule of law. A democracy cannot use counterinsurgency methods that undermine its own legitimacy or it risks self-destruction. Third, there must be civilian leadership. Here the British model of counterinsurgency has much to recommend it, emphasizing as it does such factors as a comprehensive plan under civilian direction, the predominance of political over military considerations, the importance of using local resources, the need to act in accordance with the rule of law and to punish human rights abuses, and the government's contractual obligation with its citizens. The point is that
legitimacy is a weapon, and either you use it against the enemy or he will use it against you.

Within this general context, a number of lessons were drawn from the Guatemalan and Peruvian cases. Caesar Sereseres noted that, in the former, elections had become part of the military's strategy to win the war; the legitimacy of the war effort worked. And the strategy worked. Unfortunately, democratization remained incomplete. The burden of fighting the insurgency remained disproportionately on the military. Guatemalan civilians tended to withdraw, leaving the army to do the job alone. Moreover, the civilians did not take advantage of the opportunities they had to fundamentally change the judicial process. Consequently, human rights abuses continued. At the same time, corruption (by both military and civilians, but especially the latter) further undercut democracy. And the unwillingness of the United States to hold civilians accountable, as it had done to the military, meant that opportunities to deepen democratization were largely wasted. That in turn raises the possibility that those gains that have been achieved may be reversed and that the insurgency may at some point regain momentum.

David Scott Palmer observed that in Peru the situation was even more tenuous. There the restoration of democracy had coincided with a major escalation of human rights abuses. Elections and civilian governments coexisted with military dictatorship in the form of regional war zones. As the state proved itself incapable of dealing with the country's profound socioeconomic crisis, moreover, ordinary citizens increasingly began to take on the responsibility for their own survival. The consequence was a growing informalization of Peruvian society, economy, and polity. Meanwhile, the insurgency spread, as the countryside surrounded the cities in classic Maoist fashion.

The culmination of this process of informalization was the Fujimori presidency. Alberto Fujimori was elected, in large part, because he was perceived to be the personification of anti-politics—of "politics as usual"—and he has been just that. In implementing the politics of anti-politics, he has sought to undermine the Peruvian Congress, the political parties, and
even the military. In effect, he has viewed the armed forces as just one more institution that needs to be put in its place. Palmer suggested that this was a dangerous game and could well come back to haunt him in the form of a military coup or a victory by the only well-institutionalized alternative force, Sendero Luminoso.*

Sereseres made some observations about the changing roles and missions of the armed forces in a democratic society. Beyond the obvious need to support democracy, he said that the military would have to assume a more limited national security role and that it would have to share that responsibility with civilians. The military cannot close out a civilian presence within the armed forces. Instead, there needs to be more bridge-building. A civilian-military dialogue must be developed so that military officers can come to view themselves as the defenders, rather than the victims, of democracy. At the same time, new socioeconomic missions have to be developed. (He pointedly noted, however, that the military could not be the police force.) For its part, the United States should support military modernization and professionalization. This means more support for military education, but with less emphasis on purely military skills and more on technical and sociological knowledge shaped to the new missions of the military.

The most controversial presentation of the conference was delivered by Kenneth Sharpe, who spoke on "The Drug War and Democracy in Latin America: What Would Clausewitz Tell Us?" Sharpe argued that, while the drug trade is a threat to Latin American democracies, so is the drug war. He noted that some of our allies are undemocratic and engage in human rights abuses, and he questioned the wisdom of strengthening these elements by giving them U.S. aid. Moreover, he observed that, while the drug trade is a threat to democracy, it also sustains a number of economies that would otherwise be in such crisis as to threaten political stability and democracy.

*Editor's Note: Since the capture of Abimael Guzman in September 1992, the Sendero Luminoso insurgency has experienced serious setbacks from the Fujimori government. Whether these setbacks are decisive remains to be seen.
Sharpe posed the question: Is military force an appropriate instrument for solving America's drug problem? He argued that our supply-side strategy violated the basic teachings of Clausewitz, as interpreted by modern military theorists like Harry Summers and Colin Powell. He suggested that the U.S. military does not have a clear mission in the drug war. It does not have decisive means; nor can it achieve decisive results. Moreover, it lacks the kind of support from the American public and Congress that would make victory possible over the long haul.

The military's mission is unclear because a mere injunction to reduce drug trafficking is not enough. What does reduction mean? How much is enough? Are we talking about a reduction from the Andean countries? Or are we also including Mexico and Central America? How about Central and Southeast Asia? What is the scope of the mission? The vagueness of the agenda makes it tempting to reduce the mission to a matter of body counts. (How many pounds of cocaine have been seized? How many refineries destroyed?) The danger is that, if after all this effort the flow still hasn't declined, the temptation will be to escalate.

Can the military use decisive means to achieve decisive results? Sharpe noted that, in spite of the increased U.S. effort in the 1980s, coca production skyrocketed. He doubted that the Andean strategy would be much more successful. The main problem, he said, is that Andean authorities do not have the will to carry out the strategy. Nor are the producers, processors, and traffickers likely to stop their activities. In Peru and Bolivia, coca is a major export crop; it brings in a lot of money and creates hundreds of thousands of jobs. A serious effort to destroy that part of the economy would create massive social unrest, with potentially devastating political consequences. (Among other things, it might push thousands of peasants into the arms of Sendero Luminoso and other guerrilla groups.) Thus, Andean governments will make a formal commitment in order to get U.S. aid. But a real commitment makes no sense in terms of their own interests. By the same token, drug-related corruption has created both individual and institutional interests in furthering the narcotics
trade. At the same time, it is virtually impossible to convince peasants to stop growing coca, since it brings them much higher prices than alternative crops, is easy to harvest, and doesn't require much in the way of transportation.

Sharpe said that a major problem is that the enemy has no "center of gravity." Even if we can destroy the oligopoly, that will only create a freer market. As long as there are huge markets and profits to be made in the United States and Europe, there will always be producers, processors, traffickers, and managers willing to take their chances in the drug business. Moreover, enforcement in one area simply creates incentives for production and processing elsewhere. Thus, even a limited "success" assures that there will never be a center of gravity. The strategy exacerbates the very problem it is trying to solve by causing the spread of coca production.

In the final analysis, he argued, the simple but powerful logic of guaranteed high prices for cocaine in the vast U.S. and European markets, within a Third World context of desperate need, is the strongest force undermining the local will and ability to fight the drug war. To continue to frame the central issue as how to reduce the foreign supply at the source guarantees continuing failure. And to send in the U.S. military as a response not only diverts the military from its primary mission of national defense, but implicates it in that failure. In the process, the military could well become a convenient scapegoat. He concluded that the focus of the drug war should be at home, especially in the inner cities.

Ambassador Edwin Corr closed the discussion by agreeing that the primary thrust of the drug war should be domestic. But he noted that we have never spent the amount of money that was necessary and that what we have spent has been largely on the domestic side. He also strongly endorsed Caesar Sereres' comments about the importance of civilian responsibility. He said that, if the civilians don't exercise the responsibility to create institutions and take on the tasks and functions that the military surrenders, then there will be a real problem. If the civilians don't transform their societies, the insurgencies will return. Within this context, he stressed the importance of developing a civilian-military dialogue and
argued that the adoption of new military missions would not necessarily undermine Latin American democracies.
The Unfinished Business of Security.

Remarks of BERNARD ARONSON, Assistant Secretary of State, on U.S. Policy on Democracy and the Military in Latin America.

Reflecting the policy of the outgoing Bush Administration as well as his own views, Bernard Aronson addressed the broad issue of the role of the Latin American military in a democracy and the role of U.S. policy. In our time, he stated, we have witnessed the competition of the ideas of democracy and totalitarianism. Democracy triumphed. The current worldwide democratic revolution began in Latin America during the 1970s.

Aronson said that Latin America faces any number of threats to democracy, most notably drugs, debt, economic underdevelopment, corruption, and a crisis of participation. If these challenges are not met effectively, democracy will be at risk. In addressing these threats in view of the New World Order, the Latin American nations and their armed forces need to redefine the roles and missions of the military. If the issue is not properly addressed, he argued, many Latin American militaries may revert to the role of arbiter of internal threats.

To preclude reverting to an internal threat orientation, the armed forces need to undertake legitimate missions as part of international peacekeeping forces. This argues for a revitalized Organization of American States, something that has been taking place. In addition, Aronson counseled that the gap between Latin American civilian and military leaders be narrowed—the view of the military as somehow apart from civil society must disappear. A dialogue encompassing military and civilian ideas needs to take place. He recommended that the United States rethink its international military education programs to promote such dialogue.
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN ELLERSON introduced the panel by noting that the title recognized the fact that we are entering a new era and face new challenges. Things that were unthinkable a few years ago are now possible. Yet, there are also enduring realities that need to be dealt with. There is still much to be done. Low intensity conflict is often not very low in intensity, and peacetime engagement is often not very peaceful. The challenge for this panel is to chart a course into the new world, recognizing that this is not a blank sheet of paper and that there are still many rocks out there that need to be avoided.

The first presentation was by CAESAR SERESERES on Guatemala: Lessons Learned for Democracy in Low Intensity Conflict.

Serereses noted that there were a lot of analytical dangers in drawing general conclusions from a single, very narrow case study but said that Guatemala provides a lot of insight as to how a society and a (military) institution deal with an internal war and also how the United States deals with such a situation. There are two core questions: One has to do with the role of the military in a democratic society that is engaged in an internal war, and the other involves U.S. policy (especially military-to-military relationships) in working in a positive way with Latin American military institutions. How do the experiences of Guatemala help us address these two issues?

With regard to the role of the military in a democratic society, he made several points:

First, regardless of its ideology and corporate character, the military, especially in the 1990s, is essentially a national institution that exists to support and defend a political process, including certain values and institutional arrangements. Democracy is an essential feature of international relations, particularly in American foreign policy.

Second, although its role is national security, in the 1990s the military will have to assume a much more limited responsibility and, most important, will have to share that responsibility. In the past, the military has assumed that it was to its benefit to monopolize the responsibility for security
issues. He argues that, regardless of the country and the institution, it has now become fully recognized that it is an enormous psychological, political and professional burden to assume complete and total responsibility for national security. That must now be shared with civilians and civilian institutions.

Third, the military will have to assume responsibility for the high-risk micro-socioeconomic projects that establish services and authority in areas that the central government and national bureaucracies tend not to go.

Fourth, in its contact with the general population (through both its officers and enlisted men), the military is in effect a socialization agent to foster and develop a civic culture.

Fifth, a new responsibility that has yet to be defined by individual militaries is that of engaging in regional and global responsibilities/cooperation.

Sixth, the military cannot be the police force of the nation.

Finally, it cannot close out a civilian presence within the military institution or within the society at large.

As for U.S. policy, Sereseres said that there are three essential lessons to be drawn from our past experience. These are basically ways in which the United States needs to think about the future of the Latin American militaries within a democratic setting; they should serve as the pillars of U.S. policy:

First and foremost, there has to be support for military modernization, including educational skills and the professional military knowledge needed to be productive in the 21st century. There will be less emphasis on purely military skills and more stress on technical and socioeconomic forms of knowledge shaped to the mission of the military.

Second, the United States must serve as a catalyst for bridge-building between the civilians and the military. With some exceptions, there has been little change between these two cultures. Their psychologies are distinct; their educational systems are distinct; the ways in which they look at each other are distinct; and despite the fact that several military institutions
have almost driven themselves into the ground in self-destruction, most have not learned the lessons of the past. And neither have the civilians.

Third, U.S. policy must facilitate communications and cooperation between hemispheric military institutions.

Sereseres went on to give a bit of historical background on the situation in Guatemala. He noted that between 1944 and 1954, there had been a "social revolution" in Guatemala. The first elected civilian president, Juan José Arévalo, instituted major reforms in Guatemalan society. Since his departure in 1951, there have been approximately 42 years of governance. Ten of the 13 chiefs of state have been military officers. Eleven of the 42 years have been under elected civilian presidents; 8 years have been under military government; 23 years have been spent under elected military officers. In these 42 years there have been five successful coups. The country has gone through over 30 years of internal war, beginning in 1962 in the aftermath of the military reformist coup of November 1960. During this three-decade period, we have seen two generations of guerrillas, fighting different strategies and pursuing two different social revolutions. At least 60,000 lives have been lost. There have been over 600,000 refugees and displaced persons and a standing army that has grown from less than 12,000 in the early 1960s to well over 40,000 today.

What lessons can be learned from this experience? First, the military has remained the central national institution of Guatemala, for better as well as for worse. There exists a military culture that has been influenced not only by the war but by the society that it serves. And added to that has been the nature of American foreign policy. To put it mildly, U.S. policy has not been very consistent. There have been a lot of zig-zags and U-turns to the point where Guatemalans could describe U.S. policy as schizophrenic and the United States could describe Guatemalan behavior as paranoid. And there is a little bit of truth in both characterizations. Not only are the Guatemalan generals and colonels of today the products of the war, but they have seen U.S. policy change every 4 to 6 years with or without any good explanations.
In summarizing, in terms of lessons learned, he said that five points can be made about the Guatemalan case: First, there is an unequal burden of fighting the insurgency. Whether it is a military or a civilian government, ultimately the burden is absorbed by the military institution. The civilians quite often tend to withdraw or disengage in dealing with the insurgency, politically, socially, and economically, leaving the military to do the job alone. That causes all kinds of unintended problems.

Second, the civilians, partially as a response to the military but largely as a civilian problem, have not taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the systemic crisis to, for instance, drastically and radically change the judicial process. This only encourages paramilitary and death squad strategies. In a country where there is no confidence in the judicial process, the penal system, etc., time and time again opportunities to change the system have been wasted.

Third, elections became part of the military's strategy to legitimate the war against the insurgents. It was a strategy that was enunciated after the March 1982 coup. It was carried out in less than 4 years; and it worked. The problem is that the elections by themselves did not bring about the necessary change; they simply changed the political context of the war. Remarkably, this was sufficient to effect a political and military offensive against the guerrillas that was successful in 1985.

Fourth, there is the unpleasant interface between democracy and corruption. This has been the Achilles' heel of our policy, and it has been the Achilles' heel of the democratic process in Guatemala and many other countries. The military is part of the problem; but by far the civilians have been the leaders in the area of corruption and inefficiency. They themselves do not institute a system of accountability. They can accuse the military of having no accountability procedures in terms of money, personnel and operations, but the civilians themselves have made no effort to make these changes.

Finally, the last lesson concerns the U.S. unwillingness and inability to hold the fire to the feet of Guatemalan civilians as closely and constantly as it has held it to the feet of the military. We have trouble imposing the same kind of standards on
civilians that we impose on the military. He suggested that Guatemala over the past 30 years has been a clear indication as to how we have dealt with countries and institutions at war.

This is a dangerous mix because Guatemala, as well as Venezuela and other countries, can easily step backward. He said that unless these bridges are built and unless the military is willing to accept a civilian presence and unless the civilians are willing to accept a critical role for the military in national policy, democracy would not work. It would be but a passing phase.

In closing, he quoted a statement from Luigi Einaudi which he said hit at the heart of the dilemma that U.S. policy faced in dealing with the military as professional organizations: "We have seldom had the luxury of dealing with the Latin American military outside the optic of American domestic politics—as human rights, as democracy or as proliferation." Einaudi pins it down to the very crux. The future consolidation of democracy in the Western Hemisphere requires true civil-military cooperation. To keep those civilian governments requires that the civilians develop a dialogue with the military so that the military can see themselves as the defenders, rather than the victims, of democracy.

At this point, GUSTAVO GORRITI arrived. Since he could only stay for a short time, he was allowed to speak on his topic: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Relationship with Democracy.

Gorriti began by explaining why he had become interested in the subject. He noted that he had begun working as a journalist at a time when the Shining Path insurgency was just beginning. This was also a time in which democracy was being restored in Peru. It was a time of high hopes and yet it also coincided with the rise of this strange, difficult-to-understand insurgency. He recalled one of his early interviews with the first minister of the interior in the Belaunde Government. The minister had told him that, in spite of all the pressure he was under to react with repression, he would not "order good pajamas and dynamite suppositories for captured Shining Path
militants." Gorriti came away from the interview instinctively persuaded that he had the right approach.

But the problem was that although the Minister and the Belaunde Government knew what shouldn't be done, they didn't know what had to be done. Within a few years, military officers and other officials were telling Gorriti that this was a war, and certain costs has to be assumed. The only way to extract tactical intelligence was through torture. Thus, within a few years of the inauguration of democracy, Peru's human rights record was worse than those of the most notorious Latin American dictatorships. In 1989, for instance, for the third year in a row, Peru had one of the worst human rights records in the world. In Ayacucho Department, from 1982 to 1988, more than 6,000 people were killed or disappeared. That is twice the number Pinochet's government (in Chile) killed or who disappeared in 16 years. One must keep in mind also that the population of Ayacucho is only slightly more than half a million people. What happened in Peru was that the zones placed under emergency, which were those most affected by internal war, became for all practical purposes an area under military government and a de facto dictatorship within the larger democratic framework. And so you had the corrosive growth of military government inside democracy. At the same time, the insurgency spread, following the classic people's war pattern, with the cities encircled by the countryside. For years, Peru has lived a kind of political schizophrenia not unknown in many Latin American countries, only more acute. This process of systemic weakening culminated in the April 1992 coup, which ended the 12-year experiment in Peruvian democracy.

In terms of its broader significance, the Peruvian case showed (and this is confirmed by over 30 years of studies on internal wars in Latin America) that (1) democracies are not immune to insurgencies; (2) insurgencies do not directly overthrow democratic regimes (there are no historical examples of such overthrows); and (3) the way a democratic government controls an insurgency may not necessarily be critical for the war's outcome, but it is certainly critical for its own survival. It is just this lesson that is so often overlooked by
officials: A democracy cannot use counterinsurgency methods that are not built on democratic legitimacy.

Gorriti asked how democratic regimes can control their insurgencies without defeating themselves in the process. He referred to the three most important counterinsurgency doctrines: the French, the British, and the American. All of these, he noted, were forged in colonial circumstances. He said that the British approach is best suited because it is largely predicated on a low profile and an economy of force; on trying to find solutions that would not require great investments in manpower or equipment; on using to their utmost local resources; and building close cooperation with civilian authority. To these, Sir Robert Thompson’s theoretical contributions add: the necessity of having a comprehensive plan under civilian direction; the need for government to act in accordance with the law; the need to use legitimacy as a weapon and as a fulfillment of the government’s contractual obligations with its people; to treat torture and extrajudicial execution as crimes; and consider popular support not as an exercise in behavior modification to be attained by scientific techniques, but as a primary exercise of free will.

Gorriti stressed that a democratic internal defense relies on the principles of (1) civilian control; and (2) the predominance of the political over the military. He said that the most important lesson that can be drawn from historical examples concerns the tremendous need for civilian leadership. The two most important examples of such leadership are the Philippines under Magsaysay and Venezuela under Betancourt. A number of policies that these strong leaders put into effect were considered counterproductive by some of the experts of the day. In Venezuela, for instance, some experts felt that restrictions imposed by the government on the internal security forces made it very difficult to mount an effective counterinsurgency effort. But Betancourt knew better. By using legitimacy and the rule of law (including using the war as a means of establishing the rule of law) and by granting generous amnesties (which were offered by his successors as well), they were able to defeat the insurgency and get through with an exemplary (until 1992) democratic model which in its time was
considered the most threatening one not only by the Castroite revolutionaries but by the dictator Rafael Trujillo.

In practical terms, what the examples of Betancourt and Magsaysay mean is that, for a democracy to survive in a state of internal war, it will have to fight as a democracy but readjust its mechanisms to cope with the demands of internal war. A besieged democracy fighting for its life cannot function as it would in peacetime. It must limit secondary freedoms in order to save essential liberties. It has simplified political measures related to internal war efforts in order to make them practical and effective so as to parallel the legal systems of enforcement that enable the society to cope with emergencies. In the final analysis, the objective of any democratic internal defense is precisely that society, throughout the emergency period, incorporate into the process as many groups and individuals as possible and also incorporate them dramatically into the democratic process so they will have a stake in keeping it alive and robust. This means to carry out the democratic revolution at the grass roots level, to energize the country and the people to lead the internal war effort, which is, in short, a defense of democratic legitimacy. In the end, the best way for a fragile democracy to defend itself is to carry out a democratic revolution while going about the business of trying to win the war.

The third speaker was DAVID SCOTT PALMER, who spoke on the topic of Democracy Fights Internal War: The Requirements for Winning in Peru. Palmer suggested that institution-building was at the heart of the "lingering challenges to security." He noted that according to social science theory, the more institutionalized a polity, society or economy—i.e., the more autonomous its institutions and the better able they are to pursue their own interests—the more "developed" it is. One reason why so many observers are so enthusiastic about what has been happening in Latin America during these last 10 to 15 years is that it appears that we are witnessing a process of redemocratization, in which we are seeing the development and routinization of democratic procedures. We are not talking here about complete or fully consolidated democracy. Rather, we are talking about the routinization of the procedures and
practices associated with the process of getting citizens plugged into the center and getting the center to be responsive to the citizens. That is what democracy is all about. Between 1930 and 1965, just about 50 percent of all changes of government in Latin America occurred through nonconstitutional means. But if you look at the 1980s, you find that less than 20 percent of government changes were through nonconstitutional means. And furthermore in two-thirds of the changes that occurred through constitutional means in the 1980s—a decade in which there were fewer coups than in any other decade since independence—there were victories by opposition parties. What we are witnessing in Latin America is a process of substitution of an electoral opposition for the military in the latter’s historic role as an institution of last resort—an institution to turn to when the political system became immobilized or unable to deal with the various problems that faced the broader society.

Palmer said that Peru is a fascinating case for a number of reasons. For one thing, this is a country that has in combination one of the worst sets of problems of any country in the hemisphere—including insurgency, drug trafficking, a terrible economic crisis, and a social situation in which two-thirds of all Peruvians live below the poverty line. What we have been witnessing over the past 25 years has been a process of informalization that has been taking place in the society, the economy and, most recently, the political process. He hypothesized that, in at least some respects, as the government became less able in the late 1970s and early 1980s to deal with social problems, society itself began to take on real responsibility for dealing with those problems. There was a proliferation of grass roots organizations that were designed to deal with a host of issues, some of which were politically inspired but many of which were not. Many of these responses were simply local adaptations to local needs and problems in the absence of an effective government presence or in the presence of a government which couldn’t do the job right. (As many would argue, it was the military government’s fate to try to transform Peru at the grass roots, even as it lacked the resources to be able to do that effectively.) Moreover, in the 1980s, as the economy worsened, there was an effort on
the part of Peruvians to gain employment and other opportunities to survive. As individuals, families and other collectivities, they began to work out their own solutions, and we began to see, beginning in the 1970s and expanding dramatically in the early 1980s, a very large informal economic sector. As Hernando de Soto has noted, at least 40 percent of the Peruvian economy is based on informal activities that never make their way into national economic data.

What is fascinating, he said, is that even as democracy returned to Peru in 1980 and even as we have seen three successive democratic elections, in spite of all the problems associated with other aspects of society—25,000 people killed in the terror and insurgency, inflation of over 2 million percent cumulatively between 1985 and 1990, real wages declining by 70 percent in the 1980s, government salaries reduced by 80 to 90 percent even as government employment increased by 400,000—there is still large-scale, overwhelming support for the democratic process, as imperfect as it has been. This includes two successive elected governments, both of which in different ways were unable or unwilling to respond effectively to the needs of the population. And it leads to the election of 1990 where there was ushered in another figure—an opposition figure—who represented in his person the antithesis of "politics as usual." He is the epitome in civilian guise of the erstwhile politics of anti-politics" of the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s. He represented the antithesis of politics as usual—and has proceeded as President to do exactly that.

Fujimori is in the process, consciously or unconsciously, with substantial popular support, of implementing the informality of politics in Peru. Undermining the parties (working around them), the autogolpe (self-coup) of April 1992 was designed to wrench control from a Congress that looked like it was going to spend the last half of Fujimori's term destroying him and whatever he was trying to do. At least, it would have made life very difficult for him. And this could have been done, since opposition parties controlled the majority of seats in Congress. In the elections of November 22, a large portion of the population either did not vote or spoiled their ballots.
Fujimori set it up in such a way that with 38 percent of the vote his forces were able to get a majority in the constitutional convention which will adopt the constitution and then will become the Congress. The groups that participated, with only two exceptions, are groups which are not traditional parties of Peru. The traditional parties of Peru did not participate. This is the informalization of politics. It carries over into a relationship between President Fujimori and the military institution. Through his politics of anti-politics approach, he has also treated the military institution as one more organization that needs to be put in its place.

Palmer said that the way that Fujimori has gone about this led to the failed coup of Friday, November 13, 1992. The leader of that coup was concerned that Fujimori was slowly undermining the professional capacity of the armed forces and their 30-year struggle to build a very professionalized military in which professional advancement is based on merit, rather than one's political views or loyalty to a particular civilian or political party. It is a judgment of a variety of people in Peru, as of early December 1992, that this is a very dangerous game. That in the final analysis the informalization of the society, the economy, and now the polity could very well come back to haunt Fujimori through either a successful coup or (equally likely) a well-institutionalized alternative force—namely Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). As much as they have been adversely affected by the recent capture of scores of key people, the fateful September 12, 1992 capture of Abimael Guzmán and 20 of his associates, Shining Path is now in the process of reorganizing. It is going back into the countryside, reforming, reorganizing, and reidentifying itself before going on to the next stage.

Palmer said that we must remember that Shining Path spent 17 years in various modalities preparing for the armed struggle. This is not an overnight guerrilla movement. The organization, even though it now lacks its founder and long-time leader, is still a potent, organized force. Within the context of the informalization of other sectors of Peruvian society, it may be the most potent force outside the military establishment at this particular juncture. The question is: How
will the Shining Path reorganize and reset its priorities and agenda for the future? This could take several forms.

Two key questions are: (1) How well will the military respond to the challenge? and, (2) How effectively will the government implement its economic program to the grass roots? For the moment, Peru is basking in the euphoria of Guzmán's capture. This was a major blow to Sendero, but a far cry from its total defeat.

The fourth speaker was KENNETH SHARPE, who spoke on The Drug War and Democracy in Latin America: What Would Clausewitz Tell Us? He argued that while the drug trade threatens democracy in Latin America, so does the drug war. This puts the U.S. military in a very difficult position and suggests that we need to ask a much larger question about drug wars and U.S. military strategy if we are to think our way out of a potential morass. The ways in which the drug trade threatens democracy are fairly obvious: The assassination of presidential candidates in Colombia is just one example. Uncontrollable corporations that do not pay taxes and that use force and terror to intimidate publicly elected officials, that join with right-wing landlords to kill local leaders of citizens' organizations, that take over entire governments; the list is extensive.

The problem, he said, is that going to war against this trade also threatens democracy. For example, some of our major allies in the drug war are antidemocratic. Some engage in human rights abuses. There is the example of the military supporting the autogolpe in Peru. Similarly, some observers have suggested that increasing the Bolivian military's capabilities to fight the drug war will augment its autonomy. Thus, the United States may very well be breaking down the military's subordination to civilian powers. Such concerns, he noted, cannot be taken lightly in a country that has experienced 182 coups in the 168 years of its independence.

Moreover, there is a second and more important way in which the drug war threatens democracy. If the new democracies of Latin America don't come through on growth, it will be very hard for them to survive. In many of these
countries, he contended, the secret ingredient of economic
growth is the coca economy. Coca generates as much foreign
exchange for Bolivia as all of its exports combined. It provides
a critical cushion for many of those left unemployed by the
government’s austerity program. The coca trade now employs
about 20 percent of the workers; at least 300,000 Bolivians
have jobs directly tied to it. And so while the drug trade
threatens democracy, at the same time it is currently sustaining
a number of economies that would otherwise be in such a crisis
that it would also endanger democracy. Further, the security
forces that we enlist in the U.S.-sponsored drug war are likely
to become more antidemocratic as a result of the war. So how
are we then to address the issue of the mission of the U.S.
military in the drug war?

Sharpe said that we could ask how the U.S. military could
most effectively work with the Latin American militaries to fight
the drug war in ways that would be more, rather than less,
democratic. From this approach would follow some classic
questions that the U.S. military asked about war both during
and after Vietnam. For example: How can local militaries
professionalize? Can we inculcate in them human rights
values? Can we discourage and control corruption? How can
we minimize operations and not alienate the local population?
Can we win the hearts and minds of the local population
through specific actions, and so on? These are difficult
questions, but he suggests that there is a prior and more central
question, namely: Is this a war that the U.S. military ought to
be fighting in the first place? Is U.S. military force the
appropriate instrument for dealing with the drug trade abroad
in order to solve drug problems in our nation’s streets? Here
he suggests that the lessons of Clausewitz, as interpreted by
recent military theorists like Harry Summers, recent
Secretaries of Defense like Caspar Weinberger, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, provide some guidance.

Sharpe argued that what emerges from Summers and other
military strategists who have revitalized Clausewitz is a clear
understanding of what it means to employ armed forces to
secure objectives of national policy. First, it means there must
be clear missions—as in Panama or in the Gulf War but unlike
Beirut in 1982-84. What are to be avoided, say these strategists, are unwise or ill-defined missions. There is a special skepticism regarding using the military as a "signaling device" to let the enemy know U.S. intentions. You must begin, said Colin Powell recently, with a clear understanding of what political objective is being achieved. A clear military objective, not just a vague injunction to stop the drug traffickers, must be specified.

A second related principle is that decisive means and results are to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. Military force is best used to achieve the decisive victory. As Powell said: "As soon as they tell me its limited it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me surgical, I head for the bunkers."

Finally, and very importantly, these strategists say that in a democracy the mission assigned to military (the national objective) must have the support of the American people and their elected representative from Congress.

Sharpe analyzed the drug war using these principles. Is the political objective of military force in the drug war clear? He says that we can only make sense of that in terms of the overall U.S. drug strategy. He believes that the strategy can be simply put: The reason why there is such abuse and addiction here at home is primarily because drugs are cheap on our nation's streets. And they are cheap because they are readily available. So if we could cut the supply, if they were scarce, that would raise the prices. People would buy less, and there would be fewer drug problems.

How do we cut the supply? One way is to do it at home by arresting traffickers and dealers. The drug strategy, however, suggests that the best way to raise prices at home is to cut the supply before it even gets into the country. As Ed Corr said when he was Ambassador to Bolivia, the closer you get to where it comes from the more bang you get for your buck. Let's interdict it before it crosses our borders, and let's go after supplies in the Andes. We go after supplies in the Andes with enforcement and economic assistance. Enforcement means eradicating coca crops, destroying labs, blocking the transport
of processing chemicals, arresting traffickers, and so on. Economic assistance is provided, along with balance of payments support and crop substitution to encourage peasants to look for alternative.

Sharpe argued that, within the context of this strategy, grave difficulties emerge for those anxious to define a "clear political objective" and a clear mission for the military. The ultimate political objective of our drug strategy is the reduction of addiction and abuse in the United States. Also the reduction of drug-related violence. But the key role for the U.S. military in accomplishing this objective is the reduction of the amount of narcotics entering the United States. But what does "reduction" mean? How much is enough? A vague injunction to stop the drug traffickers is not a military objective. It is unclear whether reduction means reduction in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, or whether it also means reduction in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Or does reduction also include reduction in other countries to which the drug trade is spreading, like Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador? Or should reduction be on a worldwide scale, to include narcotics from Burma, Thailand, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia? Or should the objective also be the reduction of drug production within the United States, which is a major producer of marijuana and synthetic narcotics? How ambitious, exactly, is the mission?

He said that the vagueness of our political agenda creates a temptation to reduce the mission to measurements—to set goals in terms of tons of cocaine seized or the number of labs destroyed, or the acres of crops eradicated. But these drug-war equivalents of body counts are meaningless without clarity of objectives. One must first know what the military objective is and how such indicators are related, so that the objectives can be interpreted in relation to the numbers. This lack of a clear mission creates grave dangers because sending in the military is a kind of signalling to those involved in drugs that the United States is serious about catching and stopping their production and trafficking. Here is a taste of what is in store if you don't stop: If the traffic and production does not significantly abate, which is probable, then the military will be in exactly the same
position that many strategists want to avoid: Continued escalation to send continued signals that continue to be ineffective.

There is of course a second kind of signalling—symbolic signalling to the U.S. public by elected officials: Elect me because I am tough on drugs, and I can prove my toughness by escalating the use of U.S. force in Latin America. I'm for sending in the military to get the job done. But using the military to send electoral signals to the U.S. public is not exactly the kind of national policy objective that Clausewitz and his current students have in mind.

This leads to the second principle: Use decisive power. Sharpe says that this is hard to measure, since the objectives are so mushy. But even so, there is evidence that military force is never going to work. Despite escalation in the 1980s, coca production skyrocketed. Preliminary evidence indicates that the results of the Andean strategy will not be much different. There will be increased success in terms of crops eradicated. More labs will be destroyed and more traffickers arrested, but there will be no major impact on the U.S. street price. The U.S. Government claims progress, but official reports suggest a failure to achieve real supply reductions.

Will increased U.S. military aid turn the situation around? Expediency may encourage some to respond to failure with escalation. One can always argue that we just haven't put in enough resources or that there is light at the end of the tunnel. But a hard look at the realities of the region should give us pause. Two of the key conditions for success of this drug strategy were outlined by General Joulwan in the morning session. One of these is that the Andean governments, police and militaries must have both the will and capability to carry out the U.S. narcotics-control strategies; and second is that the producers must have the will and capability to stop growing and processing coca.

Sharpe argued that the police and military lack the requisite capability to fight the drug war. They are no match for narcotrafficking organizations operating transnationally, backed by private armies and with financial and other

23
resources to spare. The Andeans are further hamstrung by their operational ineffectiveness. The United States could improve the capability of the Andean militaries, but—and this is very important—the key problem is not capability. The key problem is will. There is nothing that the United States can do to create will. Why doesn't that will exist? Sharpe suggested two reasons: First, the drug war is not a national priority in these countries. The primary concern of President Fujimori in Peru and President Paz Zamora in Bolivia is to insure economic and political stability in impoverished nations now suffering from hyperinflation, low wages, and high unemployment. Immediate economic and political interests dictate against the crackdown on coca, since it is one of these nations' most significant and dependable sources of jobs. In Peru, for instance, coca brings about a billion dollars annually, or 30 percent of the total value of exports. It employs some 15 percent of the national workforce. A serious effort to destroy that economy would have a devastating political impact, one which Andean leaders are in no position to absorb. The livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of citizens would be threatened, triggering massive social unrest. President Jaime Paz Zamora compared the effect of eliminating the coca industry in Bolivia to laying off 50 million American workers by closing down a single industry. Certainly, Andean governments share an interest in getting U.S. aid. So they are going to make a formal commitment to the drug strategy. A real commitment, however, does not make sense to them (politically or economically).

Sharpe said that the second reason why governments, police, and military lack the will is because of drug-related corruption. According to DEA officials, corruption is a major factor within the police, military, and judiciary in Peru. And in Bolivia, according to the State Department, widespread corruption compounded by government weakness and poor policy implementation further hampers the government's counternarcotics efforts. Endemic corruption creates individual and institutional interests not in fighting the drug trade, but rather in furthering the drug trade. The forms of corruption are widespread. Agents tip off narcotics traffickers before drug operations; they accept payoffs to allow arrested traffickers to escape, or let drugs and processing chemicals pass through
checkpoints. The roadblocks in some regions of Bolivia have become profitable ventures for some police personnel. The problem is so widespread that DEA agents routinely run through checkpoints on their way to a raid in order to prevent checkpoint personnel from calling ahead and warning the traffickers.

The motivation for corruption is not too complicated. In recent congressional testimony, a retired special forces commander described a conversation with a Peruvian border patrol agent about one checkpoint. The colonel from Lima said: "Look, I have the opportunity while I am here to make $70,000 just by looking the other way at certain times. You have a family. They are protected in the United States. You have a pension plan. I will never again have the opportunity to make $70,000 as long as I live. I'm going to take it." A senior officer in Peru earns about $240 a month. It should therefore be no surprise if officers bribe their superiors to get assigned to coca-producing regions. These zones are seen as sources of easy money. Areas once considered as outposts to be avoided at all costs are now the most sought-after assignments.

Sharpe said that the main point he wanted to make here was that the United States has very little leverage in doing anything about this corruption. The success of the U.S. drug strategy depends not only on the will and ability of the local military, police, and government, but also on the ability of the United States and Andean governments to convince millions of peasants to stop growing, processing, and shipping coca products. This means transforming the current interest of the Andean peasants in growing coca because of its high profitability relative to other products. We think we can do this with carrots and sticks and by providing an alternative in the form of crop substitution.

Or we can try to eliminate large amounts of coca. Sharpe says that these strategies have failed, and will continue to fail, to stem the overall increase in drug cultivation or the amount of coca produced. The reason why the carrot-stick approach is doomed is obvious when you consider the world from the peasants' point of view. Coca is easy to harvest and process into paste. It doesn't require its growers to transport it to distant
markets. Traffickers will fly into the local strip and pay cash. Government intervention to increase the risk of coca growing and the attraction of economic alternatives is not going to change that logic.

Sharpe returned to Clausewitz to make another point about why decisive military means cannot achieve decisive results. He said that Clausewitz emphasized the importance to military success of finding the enemy's center of gravity. This is the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends, the point against which all energy should be directed. This center, Clausewitz says, varies by country and conflict. It could be the enemy's army or his capital or the army of the enemy's protector. Sharpe argues that this should raise another question in thinking about U.S. military involvement in the war against the Latin drug supply. Why? Because there is no center of gravity. The growth of cartels in the drug trade is like the role of major corporations in an oligopolistic market. Busting up the cartels is like trustbusting—it would break the oligopoly, but the results would likely be something like what has happened in post-Noriega Panama. There would be a freer market in drugs. And that's not going to have a major long-term impact on cutting the supply and raising the price. One of the prime reasons why it is so difficult to find the drug enemy's center of gravity is that the enemy is a market—a market of hundreds of thousands of peasant producers, processors, runners, traffickers and managers, who are responding to high profits in large markets in the United States and Europe.

There is also a second reason why we are not going to find the center of gravity. That is because successful enforcement in one area causes and even creates incentives for production and processing elsewhere. The result is that even limited success in the drug war assures there will never be a center of gravity. The strategy itself exacerbates the very problem it is trying to solve by causing a dramatic spread of coca production. It is like hitting mercury with a hammer.

Hitting the mercurial center of gravity has a long history. Colombian efforts to eradicate marijuana production in the late 1970s had considerable success, but the result was the expansion of production into Mexico. Mexico's campaign
against marijuana production encouraged the rapid growth of production in the United States. We now meet about a third of the U.S. demand with domestic production. Similarly, breaking the "French Connection" in heroin in the early 1970s simply led to the transfer of large-scale opium powder production from Turkey and Mexico. The simple but powerful market logic of guaranteed high prices for cocaine in the vast American and European markets, within a Third World context of desperate need—this, finally, is the deepest force undermining local will and ability to fight the drug war.

Sharpe concluded by citing research by Rand economist Peter Reuter, which he said should raise even more questions. Reuter's work shows that even if the U.S. military could significantly reduce the supply of narcotics to the United States, it would have little effect on the price of cocaine on the street. The reason is that the actual cost of growing and processing coca is only a minimal part of the street price in the United States. In fact, even at the point of export in Colombia, the price of cocaine is only three to five percent of the price the U.S. consumer will pay. The smuggling cost from Colombia to Miami accounts for less than five percent of the retail price. So look at what this means: Suppose you had an incredibly successful crop eradication program; that would raise cocaine prices by about one percent. Even if we seized 50 percent of all cocaine shipped from Colombia—which no one suggests we can ever do—this would add less than three percent to the retail street price in the United States. In her recent book, The Making of a Drug-Free America, Mathea Falco states the inevitable failure of the supply-side strategy even more simply by noting that only four Boeing 747 cargo planes or 13 trailer trucks could supply the United States with cocaine consumption for a year. Annual U.S. demand for heroin could be met by a 20 square-mile field of poppies.

These conclusions, in turn, raise serious questions about U.S. public support, which is an essential condition for the conduct of military operations. An extended U.S. involvement in a never-ending, limited war which lacks clear objectives and fails to seriously impact on supply or price will inevitably generate further calls for escalation. The drug war's foreign
allies are often corrupt or antidemocratic. The fact that tens of thousands of ordinary citizens are involved in growing, refining, transporting, and marketing narcotics does not bode well for sustaining the necessary public support. The harsh reality is that there is no supply reduction strategy that can significantly lower the demand for drugs at home. The supply reduction policy defies both the logic of the market and the rational interests of Latin governments and populations, thereby undermining the local will to fight the war. To continue to frame the central issue as how to reduce foreign supply at the source guarantees continued failure; and to send in the U.S. military as a response to failure not only diverts the military from its primary mission of national defense, but implicates it in failure. In the process, the military could well become a convenient scapegoat.

As a nation, we must be concerned with drug abuse, addiction, and drug-related violence that plague our cities. But the central focus must be demand at home, not supply abroad. There is no magic bullet. Legalization is no more an instant cure than is more militarization. U.S. policy must confront the fact that 90 percent of the addicts in the United States who seek help are turned away at treatment centers due to lack of space at the same time that we waste millions of dollars in the Andean region on fighting this war. U.S. drug policy must also confront the hard fact that many drug dealers and users will not say no to drugs unless they have something better to say yes to.

To summarize: Focus on inner city treatment, education, and urban development. How we do so is a complex issue requiring much debate among community leaders, health officials, and policymakers. But unlike the current discourse on drug policy, at least it is the right debate to engage in. However this new debate cannot even begin until we abandon our foolish and costly obsession of solving our nation's drug problem in the distant jungles of South America.

The first discussant was MAX MANWARING, who observed that old Karl (Clausewitz) must be rolling in his grave.

Manwaring said that there is a view (or formula) that states that democracy equals elected civilian government and
dictatorship equals military rule; therefore, if you get rid of the military, you *ipso facto* have democracy. He noted that there is a corollary to this also—namely, that the military has no legitimate role: there is no external threat and the internal threat takes us back to military dictatorship. Therefore, we can't talk to the military or use them to do anything. You have to go around them. But in so doing, you miss a major opportunity to influence those political, economic, and social systems you want to influence because, like it or not, Latin American military institutions are a reality and must be dealt with.

Manwaring observed that there is a forgotten dimension of the drug war that goes beyond the military. There is more than one center of gravity. Another center is legitimacy; a third is demand. To ignore the latter as being too difficult to deal with is absurd.

The second discussant was AMBASSADOR ED CORR. Ambassador Corr suggested that Caesar Serereses had made several extremely important points. Facing responsibility on civilians as well as the military is crucial. If the civilians don't exercise their responsibility to create institutions and pick up the tasks and functions that the military surrenders, you will have a real problem. Civilians have to do their part. He said that he is convinced of the necessity of civilians transforming their societies. That is the key. If they don't do it, the insurgency will just come back. We can't do it for them, but we can help. He noted the importance of establishing a civil-military dialogue.

With regard to the drug war, he agreed with Ken Sharpe that the main thrust must be in the United States, dealing with demand. But he noted that we have never spent the amount of money that was necessary and that what we have spent has been largely on the domestic side. Of the $12 billion we spend on narcotics control, we have never had more than a tiny percentage go to the overseas program.

He also believes that the Andean countries are hurt more by the cocaine trade than they are helped. The trade may be an economic plus in the short run. But how do you measure
the cost of the total corruption of your police, judicial, and other systems?

He went on to note that the military in every country has roles that go beyond the use of force. In the United States, for instance, the Army Corps of Engineers has done a lot in terms of roadbuilding, bridgebuilding, etc. The Army played a major role in the settlement of the West. If Latin Americans want to use their militaries the same way, that does not necessarily mean that this will undermine democracy.

**Conclusion:**

**An Agenda for U.S. Policymakers.**

The Warriors in Peacetime Conference reached a new level of sophisticated dialogue between civilians and military officials in this hemisphere. The conference was designed to produce new insights on what military institutions ought to do in the post-cold war as well as what their roles ought to be in democracy. The discussion of "The Unfinished Business of Security" reminds us that the New World Order has by no means eliminated the need for armed forces. At the same time, the opportunity is at hand for a redefinition of U.S. policy towards the Latin American militaries.

Such a redefinition is a unique challenge at a time when the United States is itself redefining its global military strategy and reducing the size of its armed forces. The Latin American experience debated throughout the conference recommends that civilians and military work together closely to define their responsibilities in matters of national defense. Both the Peruvian and Guatemalan cases speak eloquently of the need for effective civilian leadership of counterinsurgency operations. We will go further: civilian leaders must develop the professional capacity to exercise prudent, effective, and confident control of the military instrument. The major challenge ahead in Latin American countries (and in some the challenge is greater) is to develop such levels of civil-military cooperation in order to deepen the democratic systems now emerging. Democracy is not possible without civilian control. Absent civilian control, military professionalism is not possible.
What of the role of U.S. policy? In a time when the United States is redefining its global role and focusing on strengthening the domestic power base, there is a serious danger that the above agenda will be relegated to secondary or tertiary priority in U.S. policy. The frankness and intensity of the exchanges of views between military officers and civilians during the conference indicate that such a prospect would be a serious setback to the democratization theme in U.S. policy for Latin America. We need to sustain our progress through a policy of constructive engagement with the Latin American civilians and military. Such engagement would stress the primacy of civilian leadership in national defense and the complementarity of a doctrine of democratic military professionalism. The United States, with its vast experience and wisdom in civilian control of military professionals, can be the catalyst for making this happen. The interaction for such policy would take place at three levels: (1) empowerment of civilian officials and academics in military affairs via education in mechanisms and norms of civilian control, in defense budgeting, intelligence, strategy, logistics, laws of armed combat, and new missions, such as peacekeeping; (2) civilian-military relations in the conduct of diplomacy and in crisis decisionmaking; and (3) civilian control of the conduct of military operations through the various intensities of war—low, mid, and high.