

The Oddity of Waging War on a Tactic: Reframing the Global War on Terror as a Global Counterinsurgency

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT The US Global War on Terror is actually a Global Counterinsurgency as defined by FM 3-24 and Al Qaida is the global insurgent currently opposing the US. Al Qaida is held up as the global insurgent through the use of their own declarations in open-sources and their actions pursuant to what was stated in those open source reports. The Kinetic nature of terrorism and Al Qaida leads one to focus on the tactic of terrorism, not the insurgent nature of Al Qaida. There are two conflicting approaches being used now by the US: Law Enforcement and Military. A more effective and holistic method that blends the two approaches may prove more successful in the future. Key to this approach is to acknowledge the people as the center of gravity in any counterinsurgency and to act accordingly by separating them from the insurgents through methods both kinetic and non kinetic. One of the most effective ways nonkinetically to accomplish this is to go after the money of Al Qaida while ensuring economic opportunities for the people in play. A holistic counterinsurgency strategy would lend strategic clarity to the current fight against Al Qaida and allow for a broader approach to the problem on all levels.					
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Abstract

The purpose of this monograph is to suggest that the US Global War on Terror is actually a Global Counterinsurgency as defined by FM 3-24 and Al Qaida is the global insurgent currently opposing the US.

Through the use of definitions obtained in doctrine and open source reporting, the Global War on Terror is defined and compared with insurgency through the use of Al Qaida as the global insurgent. Al Qaida is held up as the global insurgent through the use of their own declarations in open-sources and their actions pursuant to what was stated in those open source reports.

The Kinetic nature of terrorism and Al Qaida leads one to focus on the tactic of terrorism, not the insurgent nature of Al Qaida. There are two conflicting approaches being used now by the US: Law Enforcement and Military. A more effective and holistic method that blends the two approaches may prove more successful in the future. Key to this approach is to acknowledge the people as the center of gravity in any counterinsurgency and to act accordingly by separating them from the insurgents through methods both kinetic and non kinetic. One of the most effective ways nonkinetically to accomplish this is to go after the money of Al Qaida while ensuring economic opportunities for the people in play.

The Global War on Terror is actually a Global Counterinsurgency and that Al Qaida is the global insurgent currently opposing the US. Further, that the counterinsurgency was possibly discovered at the tactical level and acted on before the idea of a counterinsurgency was codified in FM 3-24. A holistic counterinsurgency strategy would lend strategic clarity to the current fight against Al Qaida and allow for a broader approach to the problem on all levels.

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Introduction

[A]part from the oddity of waging war on a tactic, this expression [War on Terrorism] sidesteps the causes, dynamics, and shades of Islamic militancy, with unfortunate consequences for strategy, resources, and results.¹

— Gompert and Gordon,
War by Other Means

President George W. Bush coined the term “War on Terror” (WOT) after the events of September 11, 2001.² The US military has been engaged in this struggle since then in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places and has achieved some successes but also suffered certain failures. By far, the most public and significant success has been the “surge” in Iraq, during which counterinsurgency warfare as described in the new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, was put into widespread practice and applied in Iraq.³ While these events dominate the news here and abroad, there are other places in which the US is fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT)--the Philippines, Pakistan, and Columbia to name just three.⁴ The purpose of this monograph is to suggest that the US GWOT is actually a Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN) as defined by FM 3-24 and that Al Qaida⁵ is the global insurgent currently opposing the US. In addition, this monograph attempts to illustrate that Al Qaida’s end in their global insurgency is to establish a

¹David C. Gompert and John Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corp, 2008), 6.

²Wesley Anderson, Joint Special Operations University Report 08-3, “Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations” (Hurlbert Field, FL: The JSOU Press, April 2008), 3.

³Nathaniel C. Fick and John C. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Manual, Afghanistan Edition,” *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2009) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587 (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁴Robert Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts* (New York, Random House, 2005)

⁵National Counterterrorism Center, National Counterterrorism Calendar, 2008. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) adopts a system of transliteration that is “generally used throughout the US Government” preferring the letters “u” and “a” over “o” and “e”, hence “Al Qaida” is the preferred spelling and will be used throughout this monograph.

worldwide caliphate via global jihad.⁶ As such, this reframing of the GWOT as a GCOIN will require an exploration of Al Qaida and its strategy in the words of its leaders, counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and its applicability in a global theater against Al Qaida. To be effective, the US must have a holistic, long-term strategy that addresses Al Qaida's strategies combined with all elements of national power and in partnership with her allies worldwide.

This is not merely a name change; it is a change in strategy and thinking. To change the lexicon of the global struggle in which the US now finds itself will serve to capture what the adversary is trying to accomplish and set the boundaries for how the US should fight to achieve victory. This in no way dilutes the focus of the War on Terror per se; rather it broadens the scope of the struggle and allows the US to look beyond the tactics of the adversary in order to focus on their operational and strategic objectives. While the War on Terror is limited to fighting a tactic of the enemy, a Global Counterinsurgency strikes at the heart of the enemy's strategy.⁷

This nuance is important in that it will allow for some much needed strategic clarity for the persistent conflict, or "long war" in which the US finds itself.⁸ What this study will not do is attempt to glean why the opposition is fighting the US; whether it is a question of religion or extremism. Instead, it will merely take Al Qaida's leaders at their word that they are fighting a war against the US within the construct of their Muslim faith and look to their behavior for validation and context. In short, what the opposition says is assumed to be what it means without overly analyzing what it "really" means. (A historical example would be a reading of Adolf

⁶TX Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Saint Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 147; Usama Bin Laden, et al., "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement," *fas.org* February 23, 1998. <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> (accessed March 8, 2009); Anton La Guardia "Fanatics Around the World Dream of the Caliph's Return," *Telegraph.co.uk*. August 12, 2005. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/1399912/Fanatics-around-the-world-dream-of-the-Caliphs-return.html> (accessed March 16, 2009)

⁷Daniel Roper, "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War," *Parameters* 38, no. 3 (Autumn 2008): 92-108.

⁸Ibid.

Hitler's *Mein Kampf*; in which he said what he meant to say and did what he said he was going to do.)⁹ With the material extant in open sources, this study will attempt to see if that standard holds up in a like manner for Al Qaida (AQ) and what the implications of it doing so are for the US. In addition, ways to combat AQ will be reviewed. A holistic, whole of government approach will be advocated, as well as a "lack of government approach" in which private organizations are allowed to have direct contact and administer timely and effective aid to the people of other countries caught in the crossfire of the GWOT.

GWOT Defined

The "Global War on Terror" is a phrase brought into the national lexicon by President Bush shortly after the September 11th attacks, but it is not well defined.¹⁰ It is easier to define what it is not, considering commentators and politicians alike seem comfortable defining GWOT negatively. For instance, it is not the war in Afghanistan any longer or the war in Iraq, and the term "long war" is passé according to Fox News commentator John Gibson in 2007.¹¹ Other, more scholarly sources such as John Judis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, point towards what he sees as the lack of utility in the term now that the original intent of the War on Terrorism, which was to oust the Taliban-led government from Afghanistan. In his words, "That offensive largely succeeded."¹²

For common understanding, this monograph will use the definition of the Global War on Terror from Wikipedia: "the common term for the military, political, legal and ideological

⁹Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998).

¹⁰Anderson, 3.

¹¹John Gibson, "Democrats Nix Term 'Global War on Terror,'" *foxnews.com* April 4, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,264121,00.html> (accessed March 21, 2009).

¹²John Judis, "What Is The 'War on Terror?'" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 5, 2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18409&prog=zgp&proj=zusr> (accessed March 21, 2009).

conflict against what the effort's leaders describe as Islamic terrorism and Islamic militants, and it is specifically used in reference to operations by the United States since the September 11, 2001 attacks.”¹³ While Wikipedia is not considered scholarly due to its public and open editing practices and lack of formal peer review, the definition holds as a point of departure, and it is notable that corrections to Wikipedia are always solicited via the website.

The Global War on Terror is Actually a Global Counterinsurgency

The U.S. Army’s FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* defines an insurgency as: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”¹⁴ From the writings of Usama bin Laden (UBL) himself, it appears that Al Qaida is convinced they are in a global struggle with the West. For instance, in 1998, he declared war on the US with the following fatwa or religious ruling:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”¹⁵

Chilling as the above fatwa is, it is not the first time that UBL declared jihad on the US. In 1996, The Arabic daily *Al Islah* published a manifesto faxed to its London office cataloging UBL’s grievances against the West in general and Israel and the US in particular.¹⁶ In what became aptly titled, “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,” he laments the presence of

¹³Wikipedia, “War on Terrorism,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_War_on_Terror (accessed March 21, 2009).

¹⁴US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 2006), Glossary-5.

¹⁵Usama Bin Laden, et al.

¹⁶Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Al Islah*.

“crusaders” in the Arabian Peninsula and urges all Muslims to “kill him [the occupying US enemy], fight him, destroy him. We should lie in wait for him until he is defeated, God willing.”¹⁷ He also entreats all Muslims to boycott US goods, for, in his words, “[t]he money paid for US goods is turning into bullets [fired at] the chests of our brothers in Palestine, and tomorrow the chests of the sons of the country of the holy Mosques.”¹⁸ This last financial aspect of UBL’s declaration of war shows a dimension beyond that of kinetics that indicates the totality and global nature of UBL’s thoughts. Other open source declarations of jihad from UBL include admitting that members of Al Qaida fought against US forces in Somalia¹⁹ and taunting the US to come after him.²⁰ Just a few months before the *Al Islah* article, a Pakistani newspaper carried an account of UBL, described as “the freedom fighter of the Islamic world,”²¹ asserting that “the duty of every Muslim is to take action against the United States because, it is the biggest enemy of the Islamic world and is conspiring to eliminate the power of the Muslim countries.”²²

Other signatories to the 1998 fatwa include Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt, Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.²³ It is significant to note that this fatwa was declared in 1998, three years before 9/11 and all of these organizations stretch geographically from Egypt through Pakistan to Bangladesh. Even as early as 1998 Al Qaida was gearing up for a regional war if not a global one. If one

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Robert Fisk, “Muslim Leader Warns of New Assault on US Forces” *The London Independent*, under “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994-2004, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2009).

²⁰Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Hamid Mir, “Usama Bin Laden dares US Commandos to Come to Afghanistan,” *Islamabad Pakistan in Urdu*, under “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994-2004, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2009).

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Usama Bin Laden, et al.

accepts that this is a declaration of war, then it is not a broad leap to see, in the words of Usama bin Laden himself, that it is a global war when he calls on “every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”²⁴ This last quote invokes the concept of the “Umma” or the community of believers that does not recognize national and ethnic boundaries, but is “bound by common obligations to a superior divine authority.”²⁵ It is further conceptualized as “the global Muslim ‘nation of one billion,’” in Gompert and Gordon’s RAND report.²⁶ Since it has no direct translation into English, this nation of a billion Muslim true believers is an important concept with regard to the global nature of Al Qaida. Also, this sense of community built around Islam is important to the idea of GCOIN because the repeated call to action to the Umma from bin Laden appeals to religious obligation regardless of where Muslims find themselves. This idea of the Umma coupled with the wide-ranging locations from which his fellow signers of the fatwa hail and the global reach of Al Qaida’s operations point to a global movement, not a localized group of militants.²⁷

From a Western perspective, this is hardly a declaration of war. But given the words of UBL himself as quoted above, it is clear he is leading an insurgency on a large, if not a global, scale. At the least, he is adamant that the “crusaders” must be expelled from the “country of the two holy Mosques.”²⁸ While he never mentions a global fight, he does mention the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (also known as The Temple of Solomon in Judaism) and the holy Mosque in Mecca as objectives to “liberate . . . from the grip . . . of the Americans and their allies.”²⁹ This points to a mission to create a Muslim haven encompassing the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 4

²⁶ Gompert and Gordon, xxviii.

²⁷STRATFOR Global Intelligence, “Jihadism in 2009: The Trends Continue,” January 7, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090107_jihadism_2009_trends_continue (accessed March 21, 2009).

²⁸Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Al Islah.

²⁹Usama Bin Laden, et al.

in which non-Muslims are not welcome: “That mission includes “purifying” the lands of Islam from a western culture he views as corrupting, especially when it comes to ejecting US troops from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden would also expand Muslim theocratic rule into the newly opened regions of Central Asia that were part of the Soviet Union, as Prof. Thomas Gouttierre, director of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska in Omaha puts it.”³⁰

His method to accomplish this “liberation” of Muslim holy sites is to kill or bring into subjugation those who stand in his way. According to Muslim scholars and those who study them, the way to victory is to offer unbelievers a choice: conversion to Islam, payment of the *jizyah*, or tax to keep one’s religion and live as a second class citizen, or death.³¹ The Qur’anic scripture from whence this comes is Surah 9, verse 29:³² “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, from among The People of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.”³³ This is no real choice at all. Most reasonable people, when faced with death, conversion to an alien religion, or payment of extortion money will opt for the path of least resistance. However, this is hardly the freedom of conscience westerners have come to hold dear. The problem then becomes how to resist AQ in their pursuit of their goals if they are willing to terrorize in order to accomplish them. Giving in to their demands and paying the jizya or converting to Islam furthers the aims of AQ by acquiescing to demands and falling under the authority of their interpretation of Sharia Law.

³⁰Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Daily News Carries Bin Laden Remarks” *New York Daily News*, under “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994-2004, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf> (accessed March 16, 2009)

³¹Khadduri, 175-201; S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* (Dehli, India, Adam Publishers and Distributors, 1992 (Indian Reprint Edition); Stephen Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring what Extremists Say About Jihad” (Thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., 2007).

³²Hereinafter, all Qur’anic references will be abbreviated by Q, Surah number and verse. So, for Qur’an, Surah 9, verse 29, the abbreviation would be: Q. 9:29. Also, all Qur’anic quotes are from Abdullah Yusuf Ali, “The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an,” (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2006).

³³Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Meaning of the Holy Quran*, 11th ed. (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1989), 445.

An important note to make here is the source of UBL and Al Qaida's strategy. For the most powerful invocations of moral authority, UBL goes to his holy book, the Qur'an, in verses, or Surahs, such as the "Sword Surah," or Q. 9:5: "[b]ut when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-Giving, Most Merciful."³⁴

Arguments about whether the basis of Al Qaida's strategy are a reflection of extremism within Islam or an accurate interpretation of it abound.³⁵ A settling of these differences is well outside the scope of this study and will not be attempted. Instead, Al Qaida and its leaders will be taken at their word and treated as if their public documents are true and to be acted upon by all members of Al Qaida. Further, in light of what AQ says, what it does will be analyzed as well to see if they mean what they say or are merely talking a good game.

Insurgents versus Terrorists

Terrorism is a loaded term, and many people are not comfortable using it. Yasser Arafat rejected the term terrorist when he spoke before the UN, stating that, "Whoever stands for a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, settlers and colonialists cannot possibly be called a terrorist."³⁶ For ease of understanding and a common point of reference, this monograph will define terrorism using Executive Order 13224, signed the month after the attacks of September 11, 2001:

For the purpose of the Order, "terrorism" is defined to be an activity that (1) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (2) appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;

³⁴Ali, 438.

³⁵Coughlin, .

³⁶AllGreat Quotes, Webpage, http://www.allgreatquotes.com/yasser_arafat_quotes.shtml (accessed March 21, 2009).

or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.³⁷

Insurgents, on the other hand, are different from terrorists in that they are defined as members of “[a]n organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”³⁸ The biggest difference is in the target audience and the target of the violence. Insurgents want to overthrow the government they oppose by means that include terrorism, but not always. In other words, terrorism is one tool in the insurgent kitbag, and the most successful insurgents discriminate between the forces they are fighting and the people they want to rule. For instance, Mao’s “Six Main Points for Attention” encourages his soldiers to be courteous and pay for anything they damage.³⁹ Terrorists, by contrast, would not rule out any target, be it civilian or military. Indeed, terrorists would look to civilian targets to sow fear in the population they are trying to influence as a matter of course or strategy.⁴⁰ The easier targets are to hit successfully--the “softer” they are--the more desirable they are to terrorists. After all, being lightly armed and minimally trained, most terrorists seek merely to get on the news by blowing up a bus or a train filled with commuters, not a military base full of armed soldiers. This targeting of civilians in order to influence governments is a hallmark of Al Qaida and has been used by them successfully in the past, as in the case of the London bus bombings in 2005.⁴¹

³⁷US Department of State, Executive Order 13224, Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, December 20, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm> (accessed March 21, 2009).

³⁸US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, . Glossary-5.

³⁹ Hammes, 47

⁴⁰Foreign Broadcast Information Service, John Miller, “Esquire Interview with Bin Laden” *Esquire Magazine* 131, no. 2 (February 1999), 96, under “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994-January 2004,” <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf>, (accessed March 16, 2009).

⁴¹Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2006), 251.

A look at the logic of Al Qaida reveals an interesting disagreement between western sensibilities and UBL's theories on war and terror when it comes to defining a terrorist. Whereas Executive Order 13224 defines terrorists for this monograph, UBL points to the US and its conduct in the Middle East as proof positive that the United States is in fact a terrorist regime and that whatever tactics he uses against it are permissible.⁴²

A differentiation between insurgents and terrorists is needed for the US to continue to prosecute the GWOT successfully. An appreciation of the nature of both insurgents and terrorists is needed not only for strategic clarity but for tactical fidelity as well. The current approach to the War on Terror is largely linear, military-centric and sets up a competitive environment between law enforcement and the military. What is needed is a whole-of-government, more holistic approach that addresses not only the kinetic means of the terrorists but the softer insurgent methods that win the hearts and minds of the people in play. A more holistic approach incorporates counterinsurgency principles and what has been learned so far in Iraq and Afghanistan. There, many in the current fight have realized that the US military is involved in a counterinsurgency in fact and has adapted accordingly.⁴³

⁴²Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Miller.

⁴³Fick and Nagl.

Part One: Al Qaida: Global Insurgents

Many people think it impossible for guerillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish who inhabit it.

— Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerilla War*

Since UBL declares his intentions and the intentions of his organization in clear language and those intentions are to overthrow the “apostate” Muslim nations and all other nations that refuse to bend to the will of Sharia law, one is led to believe that UBL is an insurgent in the classic sense of the word and the world is his battleground. As can be seen from his own words, he states clearly that he is engaged in a jihad against the US and Israel numerous times⁴⁴ based off what he calls a defensive war against the “crusaders” in his own fatwa and later supports this in interviews.⁴⁵ More importantly, AQ's actions fully support UBL's words. One can also see in the structure of Al Qaida how highly organized and potentially far-reaching it is.⁴⁶

Al Qaida (Arabic for “The Base”),⁴⁷ is led by Usama bin Laden, son of a wealthy Yemeni businessman who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia in construction, thanks to his close ties to the Saudi Royal Family.⁴⁸ His deputy is Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian medical doctor who doubles as bin Laden's spiritual advisor and second in command. Bin Laden has also hand-picked a staff of subordinates to head the three committees through which Al Qaida is administered:

⁴⁴Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994-January 2004,” <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf>, (accessed March 8, 2009).

⁴⁵Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Al Islah.

⁴⁶Hammes, 147.

⁴⁷Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Miller.

⁴⁸Ibid.

Islamic study, military, and finance.⁴⁹ These and a few others form his council of elders, or shura counsel, that provide him with advice and help to run the quasi-state that is Al Qaeda.⁵⁰

The Islamic study committee runs the network of religious schools, or madrasas that recruit and indoctrinate young men into the ways of Al Qaeda as well as interpret the Quran in order to espouse their decidedly fundamentalist views on it. It is out of this fundamentalist interpretation of the Muslim holy book that *fatwas* are issued and the propaganda of Al Qaeda is distributed to the rest of the Islamic world. It is this study of Islamic law that is the source of UBL and AQ's strategy.⁵¹

The finance committee handles all the financial assets that support Al Qaeda, some of which are legitimate businesses such as fruit and livestock companies, others are front companies and still others are nongovernmental organizations and charities.⁵² All of these financial institutions exist to do one thing: further the Al Qaeda march to the Islamic caliphate and the destruction of both Israel and America.⁵³ This is just a taste of how complex the financial machinations of Al Qaeda are, to say nothing of the logistics and strategy they support.⁵⁴

The third is the military committee that is responsible for all training of individuals and units within Al Qaeda.⁵⁵ Key to note is that the planning for Al Qaeda operations is done at all levels, from the Shura council to the individual cell, making Al Qaeda a very difficult opponent to eliminate with one blow. The beauty of a cellular structure such as that of Al Qaeda is that even if one cell is destroyed, another can pick up where it left off or plan an even more destructive operation independently based off their high degree of compartmentalization and independent

⁴⁹Hammes, 135.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Coughlin, 10-16; Hammes, 135.

⁵² Anderson.

⁵³Usama Bin Laden, et al.

⁵⁴ Hammes, 136.

⁵⁵Ibid.

leadership at the cell level. In other words, if one cell does not know what another one is planning, then crushing one, no matter how decisively, will not affect the others' planning and execution.⁵⁶ Even more vexing is the tendency of Al Qaida "franchises" to pop up where least expected. The so-called "Fort Dix Six" is an example of a bunch of would-be Al Qaida operatives with minimal training and no formal ties to the hierarchy of Al Qaida carrying out terrorist actions in Al Qaida's name.⁵⁷ This is a win/win situation for Al Qaida: they get publicity for an act they merely inspired, rather than planned or supported in any way. They have lost nothing--no men or money or time--but can claim a great victory.

As can be seen, Al Qaida is a well-organized and well-led, non-hierarchical organization that uses a flat cell structure to convey its message, train its members and fight what it sees as a threat to its worldview and its religion. Indeed, as Strategic Forecasting, a civilian intelligence website envisions it, Al Qaida is a "global jihadist network rather than a monolithic entity."⁵⁸ This global mission of jihad is a leading threat to the rest of the world that does not see the Quran as the word of Allah the way Al Qaida interprets it. In the words of UBL himself: "[I]t is our duty to lead people to the light."⁵⁹

As pointed out by the RAND corporation in its recent study,⁶⁰ and the Director of the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center,⁶¹ a holistic strategy that handles all the elements of a global counterinsurgency is needed to defeat Al Qaida, not a narrow focus on one of their tactics. Doing so would help the US envision a strategy and a means to end the insurgency that is Al Qaida, sooner rather than later. Terror is no more than simply a tactic used

⁵⁶STRATFOR Global Intelligence, "Jihadism in 2009."

⁵⁷STRATFOR Global Intelligence, "US: The Fort Dix Plot and the Profiling Dilemma," May 8, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/u_s_fort_dix_plot_and_profiling_dilemma (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁵⁸STRATFOR Global Intelligence, "Jihadism in 2009."

⁵⁹Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Miller.

⁶⁰Gompert and Gordon.

⁶¹Roper, 92-108.

by Al Qaida in its jihad against the US. In the words of bin Laden to *Esquire Magazine*: “We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa.”⁶² The goal of this claim is to strike fear into the hearts of Al Qaida’s opponents, so that they will lose heart and stop fighting altogether, convert to Islam and become part of the caliphate under Sharia law.

The use of the phrase “Global War on Terror” limits the scope of the means used to end the threat of Al Qaida. Ignoring the insurgent nature of Al Qaida and focusing on terrorism as the sole enemy in the GWOT leaves too narrow an aperture through which to observe the enemy. Ignoring the overall goals of Al Qaida and adhering to stomping out one of the tactics that they use is to miss the asymmetrical warfare forest while chopping down terrorist trees. As paraphrased in Gompert and Gordon, Francis Fukuyama has said that a war on terrorism is like a war on submarines, “both are weapons, not enemies.”⁶³ Here the absurdity of waging war on a means to prosecute a war rather than combating the ends of the enemy is pointed out. Also, the ease with which many will focus on the more brutal aspects of the enemy’s tactics and how that focus has a tendency to cloud good judgment as well as good strategy to combat it are apparent as well. Once the emotion is taken out of the equation and clear logic is applied to the Global War on Terrorism, Global Counterinsurgency becomes a much more viable option.

Legalistic Versus Militaristic Approaches

There is currently a school of thought in the West that terrorism is at its root a criminal enterprise and therefore should be handled like any other challenge of law enforcement.⁶⁴ The now infamous “wall” memo during the Clinton Administration is a good example. In it, Jamie

⁶²Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Miller.

⁶³ Gompert and Gordon, 6.

⁶⁴Judis; A.C. McCarthy, “The Wall Truth,” *National Review Online*, 2004, <http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200404190849.asp> (accessed May 13, 2008).

Gorelick, an Associate Attorney General, expressed a belief that terrorism is chiefly a criminal enterprise and should be treated as such by building a so-called “wall” between criminal investigations and intelligence operations when information relative to suspected terrorists is discovered.⁶⁵ What this brought about, whether warranted or not, was a culture within the law-enforcement community and the intelligence community of exclusivity for fear of breaking federal law.⁶⁶ While accusations and counteraccusations abound as to why--or even if--Ms. Gorelick built this “wall,” the point is that the mere mention and practice of a separation of criminal investigations and intelligence operations with regard to terrorists points to a certain mindset that favors thinking of terrorists as criminals and not as enemy combatants, as if they are in it for the money, not the ideology. Partisan politics aside, the government should at least be open to the possibility that certain threats require different responses as they change over time and a “wall” to separate the two communities that are literally on the front line of terrorism is less than effective.

While this “wall” is not the wrong answer to the challenge of terrorism, especially in light of the civil liberties Americans hold dear, it is not the only right answer. Perhaps a review of the words and actions of the then-shadowy Al Qaida would have helped Ms. Gorelick and her subordinates understand that, even if the US was not at war with Al Qaida, Al Qaida was at war with the US.⁶⁷ An appropriate response to a declaration of war on the part of a state or a non-state actor with the capability to harm American citizens is to at least acknowledge that the other side has declared war and plan to fight them in a reciprocal manner. After all, the US did not try to arrest the Emperor of Japan in 1941, it declared war on his nation after Pearl Harbor. Given that Al Qaida had already struck within the Continental United States in 1993 in the first World Trade

⁶⁵ McCarthy.)

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Hammes, 141-144; Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Center bombing,⁶⁸ and the declarations of jihad in open-source reporting at the time,⁶⁹ this course of action would have been prudent.

Another weakness of a law-enforcement-centric fight against terrorism is that the international police agency (INTERPOL) has no arrest powers; it is merely an ad hoc, advisory organization that coordinates intelligence between police agencies in different countries.⁷⁰ Much like the UN, participation is voluntary and INTERPOL has no enforcement capability whatsoever, so while INTERPOL can watch Usama bin Laden move from Afghanistan to Africa, all it can do is inform the countries affected by his movement, according to Ron Noble, head of INTERPOL and the first American to hold the position.⁷¹

Yet another weakness in a law-enforcement-centric fight against terrorism is the fact that, with the exception of the US, most of the western world rejects the death penalty as a legitimate punishment for anything, including murder.⁷² No European Union country has the death penalty-- in fact it is a requirement to join the European Union that the applicant country abolish it as a punishment.⁷³ Assuming a terrorist is caught and convicted by a state, where will he be imprisoned and for how long? What sort of rehabilitation program will be offered, if any? Whose taxpayers will pay for his incarceration? And how will his brothers respond when he is released after his debt to society is paid? Granted, killing hard-core terrorists is playing into their hands in many cases by making them martyrs, but one can hardly argue that a world without Usama bin

⁶⁸BBC News, "Timeline: Al Qaida," *BBC News Online*, August 7, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7546355.stm> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁶⁹Foreign Broadcast Information Service

⁷⁰Ron Noble, interview by Steve Kroft, "60 Minutes," CBS, October 7, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/04/60minutes/main3330289_page3.shtml (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁷¹European Union, "External Relations, The EU's Human Rights and Democratisation Policy, Abolition of the Death Penalty," *European Union Website*, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/adp/index.htm (accessed May 13, 2008).

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

Laden is worse off. Also, what of the capacity of terror groups to launch a rescue mission to spring their brothers from incarceration?

Taking into account that terrorists are non-state actors, there are several nations in the world that support terrorism, such as Iran and Syria.⁷⁴ A law-enforcement regime of counterterrorism facilitates a building of legal barriers in these countries to protect the terrorists they harbor. It took the U.K. thirteen years to bring the men responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 that killed over 270 people aboard to justice.⁷⁵ Even then, only one was convicted.⁷⁶ Can the world afford to wait thirteen years to bring Usama bin Laden to justice? It follows that if terrorists are treated like criminals, they will hire lawyers in an attempt to legally avoid any penalties they are due to pay and live to fight another day.⁷⁷

However, that is not to say that police work does not have its place in the strategic toolkit of every nation at risk. After all, if police can find the cells first, catch them while they are breaking the law in preparation of a terrorist act, and stop them before execution of the act, it is a victory for the nations fighting terrorism.⁷⁸ But at times the only effective way to dispose of the threat is to use military force in an overwhelming manner such that the threat is destroyed, as in the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaida in Iraq until 2006, when he was killed by US Special Forces.⁷⁹

⁷⁴US Department of State, Office of Counterterrorism Coordinator, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm> (accessed March 20, 2009). The four countries on the list are: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.

⁷⁵BBC News, "Lawyer Confident About Lockerbie Appeal," *BBC News Online*, January 21, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/scotland/2002/lockerbie_appeal/1773680.stm (accessed March 19, 2009).

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Susan Candiotti, Ed Hornick, and Jeanne Meserve, "What's Next for Guantanamo Bay Detainees?" January 26, 2009, CNN.com, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/26/gitmo.next/> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁷⁸STRATFOR Global Intelligence, "US: The Fort Dix Plot and the Profiling Dilemma."

⁷⁹BBC News, "Timeline: Al Qaida."

Competing with the aforementioned law-enforcement-centric approach to fighting terror is the militaristic approach. If one can think of a law-enforcement-centric approach as seeing the terrorists as criminals, one can similarly think of the militaristic approach as seeing the terrorists as combatants in a war, therefore, the rules of evidence and capture are not applicable, only the rules of war.

Just as there are weaknesses to the law-enforcement-centric approach, there are weaknesses to the militaristic approach as well. First, while many terrorists are dedicated to their cause, many more are merely intimidated or paid to carry out terroristic acts and the author's experience in Iraq bears this out where many enemy combatants can be bought off with a job or a promise of protection, or just facing the power of the US military and deciding that being a martyr isn't for them after all.⁸⁰

As in any military operation, violence is used to modify behavior. This use of violence can lead to motivating innocents and others to become terrorists themselves if the force used is perceived as too much in the prosecution of the operation, regardless of the righteousness of the cause in which it is employed. If a militaristic approach is pursued, the leaders and planners must ensure that the threatened nation does not create more terrorists than it destroys.⁸¹

While the solution to the complex problem of terrorism is hardly simple, one possible way to help manage it involves using a combination of the two approaches so the strengths of both are accentuated and the weaknesses of both are mitigated. This would involve a coordination of both efforts at the highest levels, with bright lines drawn between what is a permissible police operation and what is a permissible military operation. This is probably better handled in detail at the state level as international policing does not have the best record, as Somalia, Beirut, and

⁸⁰Dana Hedgepeth and Sarah Cohen, "Money as a Weapon," *Washington Post*, August 11, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2008/08/10/AR2008081002512.html?hpid=topnews> (accessed March 18, 2009).

⁸¹Negative examples include The French in Indochina in the 1950s, the Nazis in the Balkans and the Japanese in China in the 1940s

Korea can attest. Somalia, sixteen years after the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from the nation, is a country without a functioning government.⁸² Beirut is the capital of a country that is run by a terrorist organization (Hizbullah) that counterterrorism expert and senior Brookings Institution Fellow Daniel Bynum calls “the most powerful single political movement in Lebanon.”⁸³ The Korean Peninsula is still in a state of war more than fifty years after the signing of the armistice between North Korea, the US, and South Korea.⁸⁴ Also, the state is better equipped to balance the civil rights of its polity with the fight against terror. What is envisioned here is a melding of the military, intelligence and police communities in order to capitalize on the strengths of the states at risk and exploit the weaknesses of the terrorists. The effort envisioned here is that of a blended law enforcement/military community that leads the way for a whole of government approach to Global Counterinsurgency with other agencies in support.

Of Fish and Water

Mao Tse Tung, the brilliant insurgent leader of China, likened the people of a country to water and the guerrilla troops in that country to fish.⁸⁵ If this is true, and successful counterinsurgencies in the past have proven that it is, taking the water away from the fish by separating the terrorists from the civilian population can be done via a holistic approach to combating terrorism.⁸⁶ By holistic, what is meant is that the approach to COIN is all-

⁸²Peter Clotey, “Somalia’s New Government Moves to Restore Peace to Mogadishu,” voanews.com, March 16, 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2009-03-16-voa2.cfm> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁸³Daniel Bynum, interview with Bernard Gwertzman, May 29, 2008, Council on Foreign Relations website, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16378/hezbollah.html> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁸⁴Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea, (translated to English) “From Invasion to Armistice,” <http://www.mnd.go.kr/> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁸⁵Mao Tse Tung, “On Guerilla Warfare,” Marxist Internet Archives: Mao Tse-Tung, <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerilla-warfare/ch06.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009)

⁸⁶J.A. Nagl and P. J. Schoomaker, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005); Hammes.

encompassing and does not rely primarily on either kinetic or non-kinetic strategies. Chiefly, a holistic approach to COIN recognizes that the people of a country or a region in which an insurgency is taking place are the center of gravity, or “the source of all power”⁸⁷ and must be secured in order to win. An example of a successful holistic approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is the British in Malaya in the 1950s. Chiefly, this can be done by gaining and maintaining good relationships with people vulnerable to recruitment or intimidation by terrorist organizations in the civilian population in which both sides are striving to win hearts and minds. An important note here is that it is not the governments of nations that must be appealed to so much as the people themselves. If the people in play in an insurgency are willing to inform on the insurgents, the government conducting the counterinsurgency will be much more able to crush the insurgency. However, if the people are not willing to inform on the insurgents, or if they are just passive in their outlook toward both insurgents and counterinsurgents, the government will have a much harder time.⁸⁸

A good current example of this is the success of civil-military operations in Iraq by Coalition Forces. More and more, the US is establishing good relationships with the people of Iraq and their legitimate leaders, be they local sheiks or Imams, and showing good will to all in the form of security and infrastructure development as the author has seen in his multiple deployments to Iraq.⁸⁹ These gains are manifesting themselves in the increase of tips pouring into unit call-in tip-lines from the Iraqis themselves, turning in terrorists and criminals alike and

⁸⁷Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 720.

⁸⁸Nagl and Schoomaker.

⁸⁹The author has deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom three times; 2003, 2004-2005, and 2007-2008 and every time, he saw how the participation of the local people in turning in suspected insurgents and criminals led to more stability in the area and more prosperity for the people. Most poignantly, he observed a sister unit take six months to establish relationships with the locals around Forward Operating Base (FOB) Scania, then capture or kill the top ten individuals on their High Value Target (HVT) List *twice* with the help of local Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics (ISWAT) teams.

aiding the counterinsurgency effort. Once people see that the alternative to terrorism is more desirable and begin to support it, the terrorists start losing the fight.⁹⁰

Probably the best method to build these kinds of relationships and good public relations internationally lies in the mercy missions the nations of the west already undertook to the poorer nations of the world in times of natural disasters, such as the tsunami that ravaged Indonesia and Sri Lanka in 2004 or the more recent cyclone in Burma. First among the nations to offer help were the nations of the west and western based non-governmental organizations (NGOs). How does this stack up against the widespread image of the US as “The Great Satan” or of Usama bin Laden’s characterization of the west as decadent? Why is it that the US and western NGOs such as Medicines sans Frontiers are the first to respond to a catastrophe? Chipping away at the wall of implacability by humanizing the west will go a long way toward not having to resort to kinetic operations in the first place--being the first to respond in a predominantly Muslim nation’s hour of greatest need will greatly help in breaking down the walls of hate and misunderstanding among the Arab and Western world. Of course, this is more a matter of advertisement than actual execution, but pushing good news stories and seeing to it that they make it into the Arab press and the international news cycle can only help.⁹¹

Also, recent armed interventions by the west on behalf of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo are worthy of note and a great reminder to many people the world over, going a long way in separating the terrorists from the civilians amongst which they hide. This is being done in Iraq with the help of civil military projects such as infrastructure development and small business

⁹⁰Multi-National Division-North Public Affairs Office, “Iraqi Army Connects with Neighbors,” November 3, 2008, http://www.hood.army.mil/3d_acr/in_the_news/0811/20081103-1.pdf (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁹¹BBC News, “Burma Continues to Reject Help,” *BBC News Online*, May 13, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7397617.stm> (accessed March 21, 2009).

loans and grants to the people of Iraq.⁹² Helping the people of the world see these and many other acts of kindness by the west to other nations of the world will further the holistic approach in the fight against terror and develop relationships with the nations most vulnerable to terrorist manipulation.

In sum, the US is in what it calls a War on Terror, but what is really a counterinsurgency on a global scale. What has happened in the process of fighting this Global War on Terror in places as far flung as Afghanistan and Iraq, the Horn of Africa and the Philippines is that the people fighting it have rediscovered counterinsurgency's efficacy.⁹³ An acknowledgement of the global aspirations of the main enemy in this fight, Al Qaida, will help frame the need for a more holistic approach involving the whole of government, not just the Department of Defense. One way to help reframe the War of Terror is to look at one of the other key aspects of Al Qaida's strategy: money.

⁹²Major General Kevin Bergner and Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault, "Operational/JCC-I Update" Multinational Force-Iraq website. July 9, 2008, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21072&Itemid=128 (accessed March 20, 2008).

⁹³Fick and Nagl.

Part Two: A Brother and Money, Al Qaida's Formula for Jihad

There are two things a brother must always have for jihad, himself and money.

— *Al Qaida Operative*⁹⁴

Terrorism is very much in the news today. But more than the blowing up of a group of Iraqi policemen on their lunch break by a female suicide bomber⁹⁵ or another killing of a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan as a result of an improvised explosive device (IED),⁹⁶ students of terrorism must recognize that never has the phrase “follow the money” been more appropriate in warfare. Explosives cost money, as do the vests they are put in to ensure that the most damage is done to the suicide bombers’ victims. Money is further spent on the suicide bombers’ families as a death gratuity to see to their needs after the terrorists are “martyred.”⁹⁷ In Iraq, IEDs are often fashioned from readily available artillery shells or mortars left over from the old regime⁹⁸ or smuggled in from Iran.⁹⁹

The skill and expertise to properly wire the explosives costs money as well. While planters of IEDs are often men paid \$40 or more,¹⁰⁰ it is the actual “brains” behind the explosion

⁹⁴John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Willie, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 17.

⁹⁵Abigail Hauslohner, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Kills 16,” *Time* (June 22, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817119,00.html?iid=digg_share (accessed March 18, 2009).

⁹⁶CTV.ca, “Canadian Soldier Killed by IED in Afghanistan,” *CTV News*, January 31, 2009, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090131/kandahar_death_090131/20090131, (accessed March 18, 2009).

⁹⁷Anderson, 6.

⁹⁸Hedgepeth and Cohen.

⁹⁹Brian Ross, Richard Esposito, and Jill Rackmill, “Exclusive: Iraq Weapons--Made in Iran?” *abcnews.com*, March 6, 2006, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/Story?id=1692347&page=1> (accessed March 20, 2009).

¹⁰⁰Evan Thomas and John Barry, “A New Way of War,” *Newsweek.com*, August 20-27, 2007, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/32259/page/2> (accessed March 20, 2009).

that is the professional terrorist. He is often trained by Iran or its proxies, Hezbollah or Hamas,¹⁰¹ and paid by the network for which he works. As the US continues to fight the GWOT, the lessons learned are increasingly that, to be truly effective in eliminating the scourge of the twenty-first century, the US must “follow the money.” One of the ways to combat the effects of the money floating around in vulnerable populations is to offer money to military aged men for something other than planting IEDs or blowing themselves up in a crowded restaurant. In other words, not just to follow the money, but to fight money with money.

While the kinetic part of the GWOT is what makes the news and generates much discussion in the US today, the economic aspect of the GWOT is something that the author believes is a major piece of winning the global counterinsurgency. In fact, as pointed out by Wesley Anderson of US Special Forces, “One of the goals of President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) is to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to impair their ability to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate their financial networks.”¹⁰² In order to defeat the enemy, the west must disrupt the enormous financial networks that support transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaida. Analyzing financial networks that support terrorist groups can also be instrumental in creating “actionable intelligence by establishing a solid and reliable link between individuals, networks, and organizations.”¹⁰³ Although starving terrorists of funds was the prior approach to combating terrorism by the US in terms of the financial fight against terrorism, the current intelligence community doctrine now “focuses on using financial transactions, in close coordination with other types of intelligence, to

¹⁰¹Times Online, “ Hamas Wages Iran’s Proxy War on Israel,” *London Sunday Times*, March 9, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3512014.ece (accessed March 20, 2009).

¹⁰²Anderson, 1.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 8.

identify and track terrorist groups.” Eventually, this tracking of terrorist groups will lead to disruption of one kind or another.¹⁰⁴

This disruption should take place on the three levels of warfare as defined by the US military: tactical, operational and strategic. For the tactical level, economic weapons to combat terror are projects at the community level that have an immediate or near immediate impact on the people and serve to take military aged men out of the recruiting pool of the terrorist network.¹⁰⁵ At the operational level, economic weapons include injecting money into the national economies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples of this include programs such as “Iraqi First” through which Iraqi contractors are given preference to fill orders by US units in Iraq for such things as commonly available spare parts, light bulbs, or cleaning services.¹⁰⁶ On the strategic level, economic weapons include freezing the assets of transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaida that are in the international banking system. In 2001 alone, the US seized over \$264 million in assets from Al Qaida, enough money for Al Qaida to operate for almost nine years according to CIA estimates.¹⁰⁷

The Levels of War

In order to discuss the economics of the Global War on Terror, one must understand how the US military defines the three levels of war. The tactical level is marked by engagements and battles and defined by Joint Publication (JP) 3.0, *Joint Operations*, as: “The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 8,10.

¹⁰⁵ Hedgepeth and Cohen.

¹⁰⁶Bergner and Dussault.

¹⁰⁷Anderson, 4-5.

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.”¹⁰⁸

The next level of war is the operational level and is marked by campaigns, or series of battles and engagements, and is defined in JP 3-0 as:

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.¹⁰⁹

The final level of war is the strategic level and it is marked by national political and diplomatic interests. The strategic level of war is defined in JP 3-0 as:

The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.¹¹⁰

Key to note here is that the levels of war are far from discrete. While the definitions quoted above form a very neat and orderly set of lines in which to stratify the levels of war, practice is much less definitive and often confusing, especially in the Global War on Terror.

The Tactical Level of War

As previously defined, the tactical level of war is marked by engagements and battles in which two opposing forces perform operations of a kinetic or non-kinetic nature in order to gain some sort of advantage over one another. It is important to note here that not all operations in war

¹⁰⁸US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), Glossary-27.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, Glossary-22.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, Glossary-26.

are of a bullet-launching or violent (kinetic) nature. Propaganda campaigns to convince the people of a village that the terrorists using it as a safe haven or a cooperative medical engagement in that same village to vaccinate its citizens are examples of non-violent or non-kinetic operations.

In the realm of money as a weapon system (MAWS),¹¹¹ programs to combat terrorism focus mainly on giving those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment an alternative to the only other means available to them to earn money. Many times in Iraq, men have a choice: fight for the insurgents, terrorists, or freedom fighters du jour or die. In the words of reporters Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen of the *Washington Post*, US forces in Ramadi in 2008 were trying to “get young men to pick up shovels instead of guns.”¹¹² By making work such as picking up trash on the side of the road in Iraq or Afghanistan, the US and coalition forces give another alternative to the stark choice many men face.¹¹³

This program, known as CTIT in Iraq, for Civilian Transportation Improvement Team, serves two interdependent purposes. First, it gives an alternative to military aged men who might otherwise not be able to make a living other than planting IEDs for terrorists. Second, it clears the ubiquitous trash off the sides of the roads on which American service members must drive at all hours, thus robbing the terrorists of a place in which to hide their IEDs. This “adopt a highway in Iraq” is hardly a new phenomenon¹¹⁴ and has so far paid enormous dividends contributing directly to deaths in Iraq reaching a wartime low.¹¹⁵ The synergy gained by giving a job to someone ripe for recruitment into the ranks of the enemy in Iraq gives men who would normally

¹¹¹Hedgpeth and Cohen.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Lee Egerstrom, “Minnesota’s ‘Adopt a Highway’ Idea Takes Hold in Iraq,” Pioneer Press, November 17, 2006: 3, www.dot.state.oh.us (accessed August 9, 2008).

¹¹⁵AFP, “US deaths in Iraq Hit All Time Low, Australian Troops Pull Out” June 1, 2008, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gTdVJNG8VjuFX75TyjspuBddgvjA> (accessed March 19, 2009).

be thought of as a liability hope for a future and a stake in that future. Their constructive employment gives them something to lose and a reason to resist the terrorists, not to mention a good image of both the US and Iraqi governments. In terms of the culture of the Middle East, CTIT and programs like it are a way for men to save face by earning a living for their families. In an ancient and honor-based society such as the Middle East, the value of this can hardly be understated.

It is this kind of relationship building, and not the kinetic operations that make the news, that are proving to be the winning factors in Iraq and Afghanistan in the opinion of the author. The ability of a man in a patriarchal culture to earn an honest living to feed his family is paramount in sowing the seeds of stability. This in turn will ensure a representative government that will stand for the people in peace and war. The fact that these men now have a stake in that stability in the form of their jobs is an invaluable point of leverage for the US and its allies in places currently embroiled in insurgencies. Enlightened self interest of this sort will bring true representative democracy to the Middle East and help to get the US out of Iraq and Afghanistan more quickly than a reliance on kinetic operations.¹¹⁶

The Operational Level of War

The operational level of war is the level that is marked by its tying of the strategic or national ends with the tactical means. Here, MAWS is characterized by injecting money into the national and sub-national economy in places such as Iraq or Afghanistan. A success in this vein is “Iraqi First,” a program in which Iraqi contractors are given preference for purchases in support of coalition forces, such as paper, light bulbs, furniture, and others.¹¹⁷ This is a way in which the US can help the Iraqi economy build economies of scale and encourage owners of businesses of

¹¹⁶Author’s experience, June 2007-April 2008.

¹¹⁷Bergner and Dussault.

all sizes. The irony of “Iraqi First” is that what often happens is the Iraqi contractor will utilize the internet to get the items ordered by the US unit.

Another success in the “Iraqi First” story is that of the service contracts for US bases there. Instead of giving no competition bids to Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), “Iraqi First” has begun to make a dent in their monopoly. Services such as latrine cleaning and laundry, even some limited dining facility contracts, have gone to Iraqi and Kuwaiti companies. This furthers positive interaction between the US and Iraqi governments and makes Iraqis stakeholders not only in the security of Iraq, but in the security of the bases on which they work.

While this particular program garnered no small amount of concern on the part of US Soldiers with regard to security and the possibility of Iraqis on base acting as informants to the local Al Qaida in Iraq or Mehdi Army cell, its execution proved to be a combat and economic multiplier.¹¹⁸ When rocket attacks on Contingency Operating Base Adder in southern Iraq increased, the local Iraqis employed there were not allowed on base to work, which led to a flood of tips on who the perpetrators were and the subsequent reopening of the base to the Iraqi workers, who were paid by the day.¹¹⁹ Again, although anecdotal, these experiences lend themselves to a common sense depiction of the life of a person in Iraq. If the only hope of an income a people have is taken away and they have information that can help them get that income back, they are more than likely to give that information freely to the people who desire it.

The Strategic Level of War

The strategic level of war is the level of war most closely associated with the word “strategy,” or “Grand Strategy” as the great military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, is often quoted as saying.¹²⁰ The strategic level of war is that level at which national or coalition policy

¹¹⁸ Author’s experience, June 2007-April 2008.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ von Clausewitz, 146.

resides. Here, MAWS is utilized by the freezing of financial assets known to be tied to terrorists and the use of economic sanctions against countries that harbor terrorist organizations. Examples of this go back as far as the Iranian hostage crisis of the late 1970s, when Iranian students took over the US Embassy in Tehran and held it and a number of US diplomatic and military personnel for 444 days.¹²¹ President Carter froze the assets of the Iranian government in the US soon after the embassy was taken by force.¹²² Although the pejorative effect of this was arguable and might have done more damage to the people of Iran than to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's regime,¹²³ it was the first of many regimes of sanctions against that country and set a precedent for future dealings with Iran and its further isolation from the rest of the international community.

At this, the highest and most all-encompassing level of war, the US makes the decision to find and interdict the networks of funding that crisscross the world like a global spider web. Transnational terrorist networks are sophisticated in that they mirror Mao Tse Tung's cell structure where one cell works independently of another and there are only a few well hidden leaders that coordinate the activities of a large number of cells.¹²⁴ Independence is encouraged in cell leaders, and a lack of centralized planning makes it difficult for counterterrorism forces to track down the nexus between planning and execution for a number of operations in the works.

Financing these cells is no different. A terrorist financier will be affiliated with a multiplicity of cells or a leader of several cells and will provide the money and materiel they need to carry on the struggle. This overlap in information and contacts makes the terrorist financier a critical vulnerability and high value target for those seeking to hurt him and his organization.¹²⁵

¹²¹Angela Cosgrave, "Iran Hostage Anniversary," *CBS News.com*, January 18, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/01/18/iran/main265244.shtml> (accessed March 18, 2009).

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Meghan O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

¹²⁴Anderson, 14.

¹²⁵Ibid.

Often the means to move and hide this money is a sophisticated network of banks, front companies, and legitimate businesses run much like international drug cartels where legitimate business practices and legitimate businesses are used to “clean” money from accounts of nations or organizations known to support terrorists. Recently, however, terrorist organizations have been forced to rely more heavily on the physical movement of small sums of money and other, more informal methods throughout the global financial network due to increased scrutiny.¹²⁶

A good example of this is the use of Islamic charity organizations for raising funds.¹²⁷ What happens in this case is that an Islamic charity will raise money from private donors and simply give the money raised to terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida.¹²⁸ Whether the donors are aware of this transfer of wealth depends largely on the charitable organization itself: many of these organizations in the west speak of helping starving children in impoverished parts of the world, so it is completely feasible that their donors have no idea that they are giving money to an organization that advocates and carries out terrorism. However, other organizations, mostly in the Middle East “tend to rely on not-for profit organizations, donations from individuals and businesses (both witting and unwitting), and funds skimmed from charitable organizations.”¹²⁹ It is here, at the strategic level of the GWOT, that the US can have great success in shutting down whole swaths of terrorist organizations financially, thus making them combat ineffective for a time. And it is precisely here at the strategic level that GCOIN looks to a holistic, interagency approach to leverage the considerable capabilities of the US Government (USG) in such a way as to manage terrorism.

This concentration of the key nodes of finance for terrorist organizations is not limited to Al Qaida. In fact, it is in the interconnected web of finance that the interdependent and

¹²⁶Ibid., 5, 16.

¹²⁷Anderson, 5, 7.

¹²⁸Ibid., 7.

¹²⁹Ibid., 4.

cooperative nature of international terrorism is most visible. For instance, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) helps finance the activities of several international terrorist groups, among whom are Al Qaida affiliates Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian terror group Hamas.¹³⁰ Finding and neutralizing the terrorist financier can pay even bigger dividends for the west than neutralizing an upper-level money man in the organization due to the amount of knowledge and contacts the financier must have to fund the organization sufficiently. Add to that the fact that he is often in contact with several cells and the intelligence value of capturing him and his paper trail--which can lead to both the suppliers of the money he moves and the consumers of that money--is astronomical.¹³¹

Money as a weapon system on the strategic level also encompasses interagency considerations such as the US State Department's involvement in the further expansion of the Iraqi economy with programs such as the standing up of the Iraqi oil industry in order to make it internationally competitive again and cultural programs that look to the future of Iraq and the building of a tourist industry there. With two of the most holy cities in Shia Islam located in Iraq, Najaf and Karbala, it is easy to see the economic opportunities for the future there.¹³² Also, with sites such as the ancient city of Ur, the potential for archeology and insights into ancient cultures that shaped the Middle East and the world are undeniable.¹³³

Money as a Weapon System In a Non-State Setting

Any study of a whole of government solution would be remiss if it did not take into account the numerous private organizations (POs) that work to combat terrorism in their own,

¹³⁰Anderson, 7.

¹³¹Ibid., 14.

¹³²Khaled Farhan, "Iraq Hopes new Najaf Airport Heralds Tourism Boom," *Reuters.com*, July 20, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GCA-iraq/idUSANS84004720080720> (accessed March 18, 2009).

¹³³Iraq Heritage Program, "Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Ur Site Description," *Global Heritage Fund*, 2006, <http://www.globalheritagefund.org/where/ur.html> (accessed March 19, 2009).

non-kinetic ways. Spirit of America (SoA) is one such private organization. Founded shortly after the outbreak of the war in Iraq, it is dedicated to providing grassroots support to the people of Afghanistan and Iraq in any medium in which they have a need. SoA's mission is "to help Americans serving abroad assist people in need."¹³⁴ For instance, SoA was instrumental in working with the US Marines in Al Anbar province before the "surge" of troops to Iraq was a twenty first century counterinsurgency success story. SoA, through their contacts with many of the Marine units in the western desert of Iraq, arranged to send sewing machines, cloth, needles, threads, all the necessities for a sewing center in Iraq so that Iraqi women could make products and sell them.¹³⁵ The key note with regard to SoA is that it is a private organization, made up of individual and corporate donors who give of their own volition to a cause in which they believe.¹³⁶ This could be termed a "lack of government solution" rather than a "whole of government solution." This person to person contact is a way to encourage democracy and self sufficiency on a grassroots and, therefore, more effective level. It is the people of America helping the people of Iraq. Without SoA, these women would have little way to make money and feed their families. To date, the sewing centers of Al Anbar and several other areas of Iraq are a success story not just for the people of Iraq, the people of the US and the US military, but the women of Iraq as well.¹³⁷

Another success of SoA comes from Afghanistan, where recently a member of the US military had saffron bulbs sent from America for Afghan farmers to plant rather than opium poppies, thus striking at both the international terrorist financing trade and the international drug

¹³⁴Spirit of America, "Rebuilding Trust, Rekindling Hope," <http://www.spiritofamerica.net/site> (accessed March 19, 2009).

¹³⁵Spirit of America, "Sewing Machines For Women in Ramadi Provide Clothes and Jobs," http://www.spiritofamerica.net/site/success/Sewing_Centers (accessed March 19, 2009).

¹³⁶Spirit of America, "Rebuilding Trust, Rekindling Hope."

¹³⁷Spirit of America, "Sewing Machines For Women in Ramadi Provide Clothes and Jobs."

trade, which often find a none-too-cozy relationship of interdependence mutually beneficial.¹³⁸ Here, the twofold purpose of money as a weapon system is served by a personal, nongovernmental solution. Combining the identification of a problem with a military effect by members of the military and the economic solution to that problem by those same service members is a true success for all involved, especially the people living in the active war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Implications for the Future

Fighting terrorism is as much about money as it is about weapons and flex cuffs. As can be seen from the evidence above, the levels of war are a useful construct for thinking about any war, the Global War on Terror included. When one uses the construct of the levels of war to apply money as a weapon system, it is easy to compartmentalize the various programs the US is utilizing in their efforts to fight terror worldwide.

At the tactical level, programs such as CTIT have been enormously successful in building relationships with the Iraqi people and offering an alternative to unemployment and coercion into a terrorist organization. In addition, they give those employed a stake not just in the successful execution of their jobs, but the successful execution of the US and coalition mission in Iraq--the sheiks that administer the program are held to a high standard and are fired when they do not perform. Although anecdotal, these assertions make common sense and are part of the reason for the writing of this monograph and the author's firmly held belief that a more holistic approach to the problem of terrorism and insurgency is the best possible course.¹³⁹

While it is true that the program has gone through its growing pains--not the least of which was ensuring that the police and CTIT crews were not colluding to get paid a little extra by

¹³⁸Spirit of America, "CNN Heroes and Spirit of America," http://www.spiritofamerica.net/cgi-bin/soa/site.pl?rm=page;page_id=894 (accessed March 19, 2009).

¹³⁹Author's experiences in Iraq, June 2007-April 2008.

planting an old IED, then “discovering” it during their workday¹⁴⁰--it has, in the author’s opinion, been a key factor in lowering the number of combat casualties in Iraq from IEDs. Its combination of clearing trash off the side of the road, thereby denying key hiding places for IEDs along major roadways; employing vulnerable military aged men, helping to dry up the pool of recruits for the terrorists; and the relationships that it builds at the tactical level all go to setting conditions for better security in Iraq and a more stable nation and government there.

At the operational level, the successes of “Iraqi First” in re-igniting the spark of entrepreneurship and initiative for the businessmen of Iraq are self-evident in the increasing reliance on US units to get much needed yet common civilian items and the reliance of the Iraqis on that demand to earn a living. While this program is less immediate in its effects on the security of Iraq locally and nationally, it does encourage Iraqis to become part of the global marketplace and can be a springboard to a much larger business.¹⁴¹

At the strategic level, the long-term effects of money as a weapon system are yet to be felt. However, just as a train takes a period of time to get up to speed, so does a competitive economy. With time horizons in the tens of years and security a paramount issue with projects such as the oil industry of Iraq, it will be a few years hence before the full benefits of these kinds of programs are realized. However, as security is established and relationships with the international community get better, the future is promising indeed for Iraq.¹⁴²

In short, money as a weapon system works. The successes of programs such as CTIT and “Iraqi First” are the very building blocks of the success of the Iraqi nation in the future. Already the opening of the oil industry is paying dividends in the form of a budget surplus for the

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Multi-National Forces-Iraq, *MNF-I Iraqi First Program Surpasses \$1 Billion for Year*, 16 July 2007, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12881&Itemid=128 (accessed March 19, 2009).

¹⁴²Erik de Vrijer, Udo Kock, and David Grigorian, “Iraq Makes Progress on Economic Front,” *International Monetary Fund Survey Magazine* (February 13, 2008), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/car021308b.htm> (accessed March 19, 2009).

government of Iraq.¹⁴³ While this is trumpeted as proof that the war was a waste by the antiwar left, the fact that the Iraqi and US governments are arguing over what to do with a surplus of money is a measure of the success of a war that was once called a quagmire and likened to Vietnam.¹⁴⁴ It would seem that something as typically democratic as budget squabbles would point to anecdotal success in a country that only a few years ago was thought to be lost by many commentators in the rest of the world. Perhaps the increasing security in Iraq, coupled with the increasing prosperity the people of Iraq are enjoying as a result of that security are indicators of a much brighter future than many would have the citizens of the US and the world believe was possible only two years ago.

¹⁴³Associated Press, "Iraq Oil Revenue Soars, Creating Huge Surplus," *MSNBC*, March 11, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23578542/> (accessed March 19, 2009).

¹⁴⁴Paul Abrams, "Vietnam and Iraq, From Quagmire to Quicksand," *The Huffington Post* (25 February 2007), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-abrams/vietnam-iraq-from-quag_b_42052.html (accessed March 19, 2009).

Conclusion

Removing the ‘war on terrorism’ from the official lexicon and replacing it with a more precise and descriptive term such as . . . ‘global counterinsurgency’ would be an important step in identifying the real nature of the enemy, the security challenges posed, and the array of techniques the enemy may employ. More importantly, the change in descriptor will help focus the intellectual framework required to develop a successful strategy for dealing with this complex and lethal problem.”

— Colonel Daniel Roper, US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, 2008¹⁴⁵

The US is currently in a Global Counterinsurgency, rather than a Global War on Terror as originally framed by President Bush in 2001. Despite the successes of the past seven years, the US needs to reframe the Global War on Terror as a Global Counterinsurgency in order to gain strategic clarity and begin to fight it in a more holistic manner. Al Qaida is the US’s main enemy in the Global Counterinsurgency and must be identified as such based off its rhetoric and behavior.¹⁴⁶ The term “Global War on Terror” limits the actions of the US to fighting a tactic used by the enemy and is both divisive and unhelpful. The strategic clarity of a Global Counterinsurgency articulated along the lines of FM 3-24 will go a long way to managing expectations in what is now being called the “Long War” by many leaders in the US government and commentators in the press and academia.¹⁴⁷ The main reason the Global War on Terror is actually a Global Counterinsurgency is best ascertained by reading the words of the enemy themselves,¹⁴⁸ which are rife with exhortations to Muslims worldwide to take up arms or wallets

¹⁴⁵Roper, 92-108.

¹⁴⁶Hammes, 147; Usama Bin Laden, et al.; La Guardia.

¹⁴⁷Andrew Bacevich, “The ‘Long War’ Fallacy,” *Los Angeles Times*, under “Opinion,” <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-bacevich13-2008may13,0,7251551.story> (accessed March 18, 2009), also see “The Long War Journal” <http://www.longwarjournal.org/> (accessed March 21, 2009).

¹⁴⁸Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

in jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.¹⁴⁹ Al Qaida's reach and global aspirations are a red flag pointing to the global nature of their insurgency.¹⁵⁰ This reframing will allow the US to execute a strategy based on known doctrine, such as FM 3-24, and will also open up the conversation for more theoretical discussions in the academy as to causes and solutions to ancillary problems as well.

Al Qaida is a well organized international insurgent organization that uses terror to further its goal of an Islamic caliphate.¹⁵¹ An acknowledgement of this worldwide insurgency in fact will begin the process of strategy setting and sets up a solution that is more along the lines of FM 3-24. Terrorism is a tactic, insurgency a strategy, and counterinsurgency a way to holistically fight it along the lines of Mao's famous fish and sea analogy in the kinetic, non-kinetic, and ideological realms. Whereas the Global War on Terrorism focuses on counterterrorism and antiterrorism, Counterinsurgency looks to hearts and minds of the people in order to remove the fish from the sea and leave them high and dry by acknowledging the people as the center of gravity.¹⁵²

Rather than make value judgments on a whole religion, it is more effective to take the leaders of Al Qaida at their word and assume they mean what they say, especially when filtered through the lens of their actions. If the assumption is made that they are backing their actions with words, identification of the problem is accomplished and strategy can be formed. While UBL thinks his cause is not only just but commanded by his God, many Arabs in a recent survey

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Hammes, 147; Usama Bin Laden, et al.; La Guardia.

¹⁵¹ Hammes, 147; Usama Bin Laden, et al.; La Guardia.

¹⁵²Us Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, 1-20, 1-23.

disagree with his tactics while simultaneously sympathizing with his cause, especially in light of the Palestinian situation and the fact that Al Qaida confronts the US.¹⁵³

Within this holistic strategy is a blending of the strengths of both the law enforcement and military communities. Whereas currently they are often at odds, or on both sides of a “wall” as illustrated by McCarthy, a more holistic and more effective strategy blending their strengths within a counterinsurgency framework might prove to be more effective.¹⁵⁴ No doubt, bright lines must be drawn in order to protect civil rights, but a cooperative effort on the part of both law enforcement and the military can go a long way to making both more effective against Al Qaida and the people feel safer.

Terrorism costs money. Another way to fight it is to follow the money and cut it off at the funding source. Here the levels of war as laid out in JP 3-0 are helpful as a construct in thinking about how to fight Al Qaida and reveal a strategy for winning that not only isolates and incapacitates their networks, it creates actionable intelligence through links to individuals, cells, and networks. This points to a whole of government approach as the most effective as the US military cannot do this alone. In order for the Global Counterinsurgency to be fought and won, other agencies will necessarily be involved.¹⁵⁵ Perhaps the most unique success in the current Global War on Terror has been with a “lack of government solution” such as Spirit of America’s grassroots approach to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. Relationship building seems to be a more effective way of combating Al Qaida than the kinetic or financial means as it is hard to hate

¹⁵³Professor Shibley Telhami, “2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll: Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International),” The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/topics/~media/Files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf (accessed March 18, 2009).

¹⁵⁴A. C. McCarthy, “The Wall Truth,” *National Review Online*, 2004, <http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200404190849.asp> (accessed May 13, 2008).

¹⁵⁵Anderson, 33-36.

a person with whom one has a relationship.¹⁵⁶ This further pulls the fish from the water and humanizes the US, creating personal relationships and fostering trust and cooperation between people.

In conclusion, the US started fighting the physical network of Al Qaida in a War on Terror and came to discover that it was actually fighting a global insurgent organization. When those entrusted with the security of US--the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines--discovered the effectiveness of counterinsurgency principles, they started to use them, eventually codifying them in a new manual based off old principles.¹⁵⁷ This is the reframing of the Global War on Terror to a Global Counterinsurgency that is currently ongoing in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. It must be further reframed in places like Washington, DC and academia in order to gain strategic clarity and increase US chances for victory in the “Long War.”

¹⁵⁶Spirit of America, “Rebuilding Trust, Rekindling Hope.”

¹⁵⁷US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, 1-20--1-24.

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