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# THESIS

**DISRUPTING TERRORIST NETWORKS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION**

by

Anıl Karaca

December 2010

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# DISRUPTING TERRORIST NETWORKS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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# ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization, an ethno-nationalist separatist terrorist organization that has been operating in Turkey since 1978. Through the lens of the contemporary social movement theory, this thesis attempts to designate and disrupt the key components of the PKK terrorist organization. Ultimately, the study focuses on the "mobilizing structures" component among the three key variables of this theory in order to disrupt the structure of the PKK terrorist organization. First, the study analyzes in detail sources of terrorist financing, such as state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, extortion and the international diaspora, in order to designate the fund-raising assets of the PKK. Next, utilizing geographical information systems (GIS), the study examines the role of geographical safe havens as a mobilization asset in the PKK's armed campaign. The dependence of the PKK's armed campaign on geographical safe havens is spatially and temporally analyzed using data on terrorist incidents in Turkey from 2008 to 2010. Finally, the study concludes with strategic-level policy recommendations that counter the financial and physical structure of the PKK, built in accord with the outcomes of these analyses.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| DHKP/C | Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front |
| GIS | Geographical Information Systems |
| GOI | Government of Iraq |
| KADEK | Kurdistan Democratic and Freedom Congress |
| KDP | Kurdistan Democrat Party |
| KONGRA-GEL | Kurdistan People's Congress |
| KRG | Kurdish Regional Government |
| PJAK | Kurdistan Free Life Party |
| PKK | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| PUK | Patriotic Union of Kurdistan |
| SMO | Social Movement Organization |
| THB | Trafficking Human Beings |
| UKO | National Liberation Army |
| UN | United Nations |

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Kerkaren Kurdistan: PKK) terrorist organization officially began its armed campaign against the Turkish government in 1984. Since that time, it has claimed the lives of more than 30,000 people, a number that continues to grow. In addition to lives lost, conservative estimates calculate that the PKK terror has maimed, injured, or resulted in the conviction of 200,000 people over the course of more than 30 years of terrorist activity.

During this timeframe, Turkey has spent billions of dollars to increase the capabilities of its military assets, in an effort to counter the PKK and to provide security for its citizens—money that could have been spent for the welfare of the Turkish people in the construction of much-needed hospitals, schools, roads, and factories, rather than to buy bombs that fall on Turkey's own soil.

Besides loss of life and its economic impact, the PKK terror campaign has also created complications for Turkey in the international arena. The PKK successfully sided with many countries that have disputes with Turkey. Some countries do not refrain from using the PKK as an extension of their policy options against Turkey. Consequently, the PKK has enjoyed a significant amount of external support from these countries, ranging from safe heavens to professional military training.

There are innumerable factors that explain the prolonged existence of the PKK, from external support to funds generated through lucrative illegal activities. This continued presence is cause for concern, given the fact that Turkey has run a decisive counterterrorist campaign for 30 years in order to address the effects of these conditions. Turkey's strategies have included a prolonged and successful military campaign, economic measures to increase the overall welfare and quality of life of population sectors most susceptible to the influence of the

PKK, and political efforts and initiatives aimed at resolving social problems. Turkey also captured and imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and cultic leader of the PKK, in 1999. Surprisingly, even with its key leader in prison, state sponsorship at an all-time low, and security problems significantly addressed, the PKK continues to thrive.

The PKK has not often been the subject of scholarly studies, even though it is one of the largest and most important terrorist organizations in the world. This research aims to identify strategies for disrupting the PKK's organizational structure with the aim of contributing to the growing body of literature on counterterrorism efforts. Since identifying the fundamental concepts that drive terrorist networks helps to increase their visibility, one of the main questions guiding this research is: "What are the omnipresent features of the PKK terrorist organization?" The answer to this question is expected to identify the fundamental and noninterchangeable features of the PKK. This answer in turn generates another important question: "Is it possible to disrupt the PKK by exploiting these key components?" In addition to describing the fundamental features of the PKK terrorist organization, this research seeks tangible ways of disrupting these components.

## B. THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The main purpose of this research is to identify the governing dynamics of the PKK terrorist organization and to craft strategic-level tangible policy options and recommendations that could be employed against these fundamental features, which would in turn cause friction within the PKK, disruption of its activities, and, ultimately, its collapse. In an effort to discover the key components of the PKK, the study examines the PKK through the lens of the social movement theory. After identifying the fundamental features of the PKK, the study conducts an in-depth analysis of these features in order to find applicable measures for disrupting the PKK terrorist organization.

Central to any counterterrorism effort is its capability to engage the full spectrum of an organizational structure and to thus render the terrorist group unable or unwilling to continue to function. Nonetheless, this study is not intended either to establish a new, all-encompassing counterterrorism strategy, or to evaluate the overall effectiveness of Turkey's existing counterterrorism campaign. Neither is it concerned with past counterterrorism strategies and their ensuing effects. Obviously, the results of political decisions and counterterrorism measures carried out to date have had a significant role in shaping the current state of the PKK's campaign and its effects on Turkey. The scope of this research is limited to framing the PKK terrorist organization through the lens of social movement theory and conducting an analysis of the key components of its structure in order to find and exploit weak spots.

Existing literature about the PKK terrorist organization is largely subjective, due to the aforementioned fact that the PKK is one of the least-frequently studied terrorist organizations. This phenomenon is further underscored by the fact that the PKK's campaign is ongoing and thus, the literature is still open to manipulation for the purposes of propaganda and agitation. However, this study aims to evaluate the literature objectively and to prevent rhetoric from overshadowing or directing the analysis and conclusions of this research.

Counterterrorism is a war fought on many fronts. In order to win such a war, incumbent authority needs to win several battles on different fronts. This study examines some of the existing fronts against the PKK from a different viewpoint. Its main idea is that looking at the problems from different perspectives can provide a better understanding of the problem and accordingly help create better solutions. The study intends to find applicable counterterrorism measures to create friction within the PKK, to disrupt the PKK's activities, and ultimately to win a battle on one front against the PKK within Turkey's ongoing counterterrorism campaign.

## C. METHODOLOGY

The first phase of this research draws on the social movement theory in order to explore the key components of the PKK's organizational structure. The second phase examines these components in greater depth using both qualitative analysis (e.g., case studies) and quantitative analysis (e.g., geographical information systems analysis). These in turn help identify measures that can undermine the PKK's organizational structure. The final phase consists of identifying appropriate policy recommendations based on the previous analysis.

One of the main concerns of security studies is finding precise and complete data for analysis. This study uses government reports, news articles, books, studies made by security experts, and other related open source data to analyze the financial and organizational structure of the PKK terrorist organization.

## D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter I presents an overview of the persistent terrorism campaign of the PKK in Turkey, and sets forth the research questions that address the literature gap that the study intends to fill. It also defines the purpose of the study and draws the boundaries of the study, designating its limitations. Furthermore, it discusses the methodology of the study and includes the organization of the thesis.

Chapter II examines the conceptual framework of the study. Drawing on Resource Mobilization Theory,[1] the Political Process Model,[2] and Frame-

[1] McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (May, 1977): 1212–1241, www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2777934 (accessed October 5, 2010).

[2] McAdam, Doug, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 41–58.

Alignment Process Theory,[3] contemporary social movement theory is outlined and elaborated. The chapter concludes with the definition of the theoretical picture and the conceptual roadmap of the thesis.

Chapter III examines the PKK terrorist organization in its historical and social context. It also highlights the prominent characteristics of the PKK, putting the organizational structure in the spotlight as well as examining its physical structure. The chapter concludes with a chronology of important events in the PKK's terror campaign of the last 30-plus years.

Chapter IV discusses the financial aspects of the PKK terrorist organization. This chapter is organized as a case study to examine the major sources that the PKK uses to generate its funds. This chapter also provides insight into the fundamental concepts of terrorist financing.

Chapter V presents a quantitative analysis of the physical infrastructure of the PKK terrorist organization. Examining terror incidents between 2008 and 2010, it uses geographical information systems (GIS) analysis to identify the PKK's physical infrastructure. This chapter focuses on spatial clustering and temporal analyses of terrorist incidents in order to examine the characteristics of the PKK's armed activities within Turkey.

Chapter VI summarizes the results of the analysis and provides policy recommendations for targeting the key components of the PKK's organizational structure. The thesis attempts to offer tangible strategic-level countermeasures that would disrupt the PKK terrorist organization. The author of this thesis believes that the outcomes of analyses presented in this study also provide insight into Turkey's past and present counterterrorism measures, and hopes that this study will provide further understanding of the underlying principles of past efforts, enhancing present and future measures, even if only in a small way.

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[3] Snow, David A., Burke E. Jr., Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August, 1986): 464-481, http://prelim2009.filmbulletin.org/readings/08-Social_Change/Snow.pdf (accessed October 9, 2010).

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# II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Drawing on McCarthy and Zald's[4] resource mobilization theory, McAdam's political process model,[5] and Snow's[6] frame-alignment process theory, this chapter outlines contemporary social movement theory, which serves as this thesis's conceptual framework, beginning with a brief overview before exploring the theory in depth. The chapter also includes the interpretation of these models as they are used in this research.

## A. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY[7]

### 1. Introduction

People often assume that social movements and insurgencies emerge when individuals become angry enough about a given societal condition that they organize in order to bring about change. While there is an element of truth in this sentiment, in most societies, there are plenty of individuals dissatisfied with the status quo, but few become activists or form a social movement.[8] Instead, other factors need to fall into place before a social movement can emerge. In particular, social movement theorists argue that in order for a movement to successfully mobilize, not only do people need to harbor grievances of some kind, but (1) they also need to recognize that they share their grievances with others and that together they can do something about them (i.e., *framing, development of an insurgent consciousness*); (2) they need to have access to

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[4] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements."

[5] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 36–59.

[6] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation."

[7] Much of the following discussion is based on Sean Everton, "Social Movement Theory," Working Paper, Graduate School of Operational & Information Sciences, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2010, n.p. and Douglas A. Borer, Sean F. Everton, and Moises M. Nayve, Jr., 2009, "Global Development and Human (In)security: Understanding the Rise of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and Balik Islam in the Philippines," Third World Quarterly 30:181–204.

[8] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements."

sufficient internal resources (e.g., *adequate financing, formal organizations, informal network of potential members and organizations, leaders, meeting places, safe spaces*, etc.) in order to mobilize on their own without having to rely on external funding (i.e., *sufficient mobilizing resources*); and (3) the broader political environment needs to become conducive to insurgency formation (i.e., *expanding political opportunities*).[9] Individually, none of these factors is sufficient to generate and sustain an insurgency, but when they converge, the probability that a social movement will emergence increases.[10] Specifically, when expanding political opportunities interact with strong indigenous organizations, they provide potential insurgents with the "structural potential" for collective action, which in turn can facilitate the development of an insurgent consciousness that can transform the movement's "structural potential" into an actual insurgency.[11] The following discussion examines these factors in more depth.

### 2. Political Opportunities

Societies consist of many different groups. Minorities within a given society usually face many obstacles when it comes to changing the political status quo in their favor. According to McAdam, various events and processes such as "wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes" can cause a shift in political opportunities.[12] These opportunities are both rare and can change abruptly. Nevertheless, there are four dimensions in which political opportunities

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[9] Everton, "Social Movement Theory," n.p.

[10] Everton, "Social Movement Theory," n.p.

[11] Smith, Christian S., *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 64–65.

[12] McAdam, Doug, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 41.

can materialize: (1) the openness of the political system, (2) political instability, (3) the presence of elite allies, and (4) the state's ability and inclination for repression.[13]

The first dimension constitutes the "formal legal and institutional structure of a given polity"[14] and refers to the reaction of the incumbent political system to the social movement. Broad social changes may serve to increase society's overall tolerance level to unorthodox ideas favorable to aggrieved populations.[15] The emergence and life cycle of social movements are significantly related to the political structure of the incumbent authority. While some formal political structures like democracy provide more opportunities for the emergence and sustainment of social movements, other political structures may make it harder for political opportunities to expand.

The second dimension, political instability, is concerned with the level of control exercised by the existing power structure. When the incumbent authority runs the formal legal structure effectively, the overall system is considered stable, but events that affect the incumbent authority's level of control can lead to political instability. Such events include armed conflict, economic crises, and natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods, and epidemic diseases. Social movements can capitalize on these when they expand their political opportunities.[16] On the other hand, the accumulation of the effects of broad social processes, such as industrialization, can expand political opportunities over the long term in a less dramatic way than sudden incidents can.[17]

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[13] McAdam, Doug, "Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions." Chap. 1, in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 23–41, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 27.

[14] McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions," 27.

[15] McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 42.

[16] Smith, Christian S., *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 59.

[17] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 41.

Third, the amount of political power available to an aggrieved population is directly related to the number of power sources within the formal structure that support a social movement advocating for that population. The presence of elite allies strengthens the power base of these movements. With a strong political power base in the legal system, realizing social change becomes easier for social movements. However, when the expansion of political opportunities occurs in this manner it tends to be a more gradual process because it depends on the formal system's adoption to some extent of the goals of the social movement.[18]

Fourth, a state's ability and inclination to repress insurgent groups presents a limiting factor for expanding political opportunities. McAdam points to the 1989 Chinese student movement and the 1979 Iranian revolution in order to highlight this dimension.[19] According to McAdam, the Chinese student movement was in relatively good shape in terms of the other dimensions of political opportunities until Communist party hard-liners utilized the social control assets of the system to repress the movement.[20] In contrast, one of the reasons why the Iranian revolution succeeded was because the incumbent political system lacked the ability to repress the movement.[21] Thus, these cases illustrate how the state's ability and inclination to repress insurgent groups affects the extent to which political opportunities will expand in terms of particular social movements.

These four dimensions illustrate how expanding political opportunities can help social movements achieve their goals. Successful social movements capitalize on these factors in order to bring about the social change they desire.

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[18] Smith, "The Emergence of Liberation Theology", 59.

[19] McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions," 28.

[20] McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions," 28.

[21] McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions," 28.

### 3. Mobilizing Structures

Favorable changes in the political environment only increase the probability that insurgent movements will successfully mobilize. Whether they actually do so or not also depends on whether they have sufficient access to the resources they need in order to mobilize and sustain their cause.[22] While expanding political opportunities helps create an environment in which social movements can mobilize, their organizational capacity as well as their ability to access, attract, and generate resources helps to define the breadth of the movements. The main focus of mobilizing structures is "the organizations and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions,"[23] a subject to which this thesis now turns, beginning with McCarthy and Zald's resource mobilization theory and then examining the insights of McAdam's political process model.

#### *a. Resource Mobilization Theory*

In developing their resource mobilization theory,[24] McCarthy and Zald sought "to break with grievance-based conceptions of social movements and to focus instead on *mobilization process* and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes."[25] Their theory is built on the assumption that in any given society there are enough grievances to support grassroots movements if the movements are well organized and have access to some degree of political power and material support.[26] Furthermore, the theory argues that "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by

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[22] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*; McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*; McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements;" McAdam, Doug and David A. Snow, 2010, *Readings on social movements: origins, dynamics and outcomes*, New York: Oxford University Press.

[23] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 3.

[24] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements."

[25] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 3.

[26] As cited in McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1215.

issue entrepreneurs and [social movement] organizations."[27] Briefly, the resource mobilization model puts the emphasis on the mobilization process as a means of explaining the emergence of social movements.

Resource mobilization theory highlights the types of resources to be mobilized, inter-movement relationships, external support, and the interactions between social movements and those in authority in order to explain social movement dynamics. In so doing, it adopts more of a sociological and economic approach to explaining collective behavior than a social psychological approach.[28] The theory's emphasis on a movement's strategy and tactics, support base, and its relation to the larger society helped differentiate it from more classical approaches current at the time of its development.

According to traditional approaches, "social movements are based upon aggrieved populations which provide the necessary resources."[29] Resource mobilization theory, however, claims that social movements may not necessarily be based upon the resources of aggrieved populations. Instead, other groups who do not directly benefit from the success of the movement can provide major sources of support.[30]

Both traditional and resource mobilization perspectives agree that the strategy and tactics employed by social movements to interact with authorities depend heavily on the historical context, ideology, and the effectiveness of past applications between these two entities.[31] Resource mobilization theory, however, emphasizes other strategies, such as mobilizing supporters and generating funds, which are also utilized by social movement organizations (SMOs).[32] Thus, while traditional approaches note the ways in

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[27] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1215.

[28] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1213.

[29] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1216.

[30] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1216.

[31] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

[32] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

which SMOs implement tactics and strategies to interact with those in authority, resource mobilization theory adds the strategic tasks of resource generating and manipulating the dynamics of inter-organizational relations into this set of functions.

McCarthy and Zald also argue that traditional models neglect the ways in which SMOs can utilize the social environment.[33] They focus more on the level of grievances or the level of tolerance to the *status quo* in the larger society and treat the larger society and culture as background noise.[34] In contrast, resource mobilization theory argues that the larger society provides the infrastructure that SMOs utilize.[35] "The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks, and occupational structure and growth."[36]

Resource mobilization theory argues that the central task of SMOs is accomplishing sets of target goals defined in accordance with particular social movements.[37] SMOs need to possess adequate resources to realize their goals. Consequently, resource mobilization theory defines two basic limiting factors for SMOs: (1) "…resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible"; (2) "…the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization."[38]

#### *b. The Political Process Model*

The political process model incorporates many of the insights of resource mobilization theory but argues that informal (also called grassroots and indigenous) organizations are just as (or possibly more) important for the

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[33] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

[34] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

[35] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

[36] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1217.

[37] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1220.

[38] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1221.

emergence of social movements. According to the political process model, they are the most important assets of social movements when it comes to generating resources. Informal organizations provide five crucial resources to movements: members, leaders, established incentives, communication networks, and enterprise tools.[39] This thesis examines each of these factors in turn.

While families and friendship networks sit on the least formally-organized end of the structure spectrum, SMOs, with their formal and complex organizational structures, land at the high end of this spectrum.[40] Social movements mobilize members utilizing the full spectrum of these structures. Informal organizations often provide movements with members through kinship and friendship ties alone, while SMOs use the full range of structure and resources to provide members.

Leaders are crucial for movements because the quality of leadership significantly affects the progress and success of movements. Social movement leaders usually emerge from the aggrieved population because of their abilities to unite, direct, motivate, and set an example for the movement. Eventually, these leaders promote the capabilities of the movements in order to acquire more resources, whether manpower or financial assets.

McAdam defines incentives as "interpersonal rewards that provide the motive force for participation in these groups."[41] As mentioned above, whether it is a formal and complex SMO or an informal organization such as a family or kinship network, all movements take place within an established organization of some kind. Thus, if social movements can tie incentives to

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[39] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 44–48.

[40] McCarthy, John D., "Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 142–143.

[41] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 45.

organizational membership, they overcome the "free rider problem"[42] and provide higher degrees of participation to the movement.[43]

Communication networks that disseminate movement ideas are crucial to all social movements. An effective communication network among the members of an organization enhances the movement's ability to mobilize resources. When social movements utilize existing organizations to generate resources, an existing communication network may also be utilized to disseminate the movement across the organization.[44]

Enterprise tools are crucial in acquiring the most needed resources for social movements. Pre-existing organizational structures, either owned by the state or other organizations, are the main channels for new movements to acquire resources such as materials and funds. Movements may also approach other communities or their own sympathizers to obtain these resources.

#### *c. Summary*

Before moving on to the discussion of the final factor, one last point remains to be discussed about mobilizing structures. While both the political process model and resource mobilization theory underline the importance of available resources to social movements as a means of explaining the emergence and growth of these movements, the political process model also argues that social movements emerge either through informal institutional associational networks (i.e., friendship networks or kinship networks) or within established institutions. In contrast, resource mobilization theory points to SMOs as the sole explanatory variable of social movements.

Movements change their character throughout their lifetime. When analyzed at different times, the relative importance of informal and formal

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[42] Smith, "The Emergence of Liberation Theology," 60.

[43] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 45.

[44] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 46–47.

organizations for the same movement may fluctuate. Moreover, the type and scope of movements significantly affect the importance of required resources. Consequently, as the character of a movement changes over time, so does the importance of resources available to it. In some phases the movement can survive on few resources, while in other phases resources play a leading role for the movement's survival. Thus, the explanatory values of these theories vary in different phases of a movement. Keeping this argument in mind, the study moves on to discuss the final factor of social movement theory.

### 4. Frame-Alignment: Developing an Insurgent Consciousness

In order for a social movement to rise and emerge, a group of people must both feel discontent about some aspect of their lives and believe that together they can take action to address this problem. When either of these perceptions is absent, it is unlikely that they will mobilize even if the structural potential for them to do so exists. Highlighting the dynamic and interactive relationship between political opportunities and mobilizing structures, the development of an insurgent consciousness is a uniting factor between these two elements in the emergence phase of social movements. Simply put, regardless of the scope of the change in the political arena, this change "becomes an 'opportunity' when it is framed as such by a *group* of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared framing of the situation."[45] Thus, frame alignment processes have a significant role in explaining movement participation.[46]

Frame alignment theory builds upon the shortcomings and blind spots of the resource mobilization, psychofunctional and rational choice explanations of movement participation in social movements.[47] One shortcoming is grievance interpretation. Resource mobilization and psychofunctional perspectives neglect

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[45] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 8.

[46] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 464.

[47] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 465.

the fact that grievances are subjective in interpretation and such interpretations can change over time.[48] A second shortcoming is their explanations of the decision to participate to a movement. Psychofunctional and rational choice perspectives see movement participation as a one-time decision for individuals. Frame alignment theory, however, argues that the continuance of participation is an ongoing process where individuals constantly reassess and renegotiate their participation in a movement.[49] A final shortcoming is the tendency to over-generalize participation processes. Different types of movement participation processes have been identified for social movements, such as block recruitment, network recruitment, sentiment pools, and conversion.[50] The literature tends to bind the movement participation process to these theories, "regardless of variation in objectives, organizational structure, and opposition" to the social movement.[51] Frame alignment theory also highlights the dynamic nature of the participation process, and argues that it is not possible to explain participation with a single static model throughout the lifetime of a movement. It Identifies four types of alignment processes explain the connection of the interpretive frames of participants and social movements.

(1) The *frame bridging* process unifies two separate entities with the same ideology that are unaware of each other's presence.[52] Individuals, groups, and SMOs that possess the same ideology cannot collectively act unless they are aware of each other. Frame bridging refers to the organizational breadth of an SMO. Individual and group level networks and other information channels, such as e-mail, mass media and Web 2.0 assets, can be utilized to disseminate

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[48] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 465–466.

[49] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 466–467.

[50] As cited in Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 467.

[51] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 467.

[52] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 467.

information to the targeted population. In sum, the frame bridging process unites the organizations and groups that have the same frameworks but are unaware of each other by utilizing information diffusion techniques, which ultimately enables collective action.

(2) *Frame amplification* refers "to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events."[53] Events and their interpretation by individuals life are often blurred by the opinions of others, prior life experiences, and information from various sources. Frame amplification highlights the importance of the interpretive frame to provide support and participation in collective action. There are two types of frame amplification: value and belief amplification.

(a) *Value amplification* refers to the process that clarifies, emphasizes and elevates the values that a particular movement is concerned with in order to mobilize the related population.[54] For instance, different social movements highlighted values "associated with family, ethnicity, property and neighborhood integrity" during in the United States in 1985.[55]

(b) *Belief amplification*, on the other hand, refers to the clarification and invigoration of the relationships between two things.[56] It utilizes three different kinds of beliefs relevant to mobilization and participation: (i) Stereotypic beliefs about antagonistic or targets of influence; (ii) Beliefs about the probability of change or the efficacy of collective action; (iii) Beliefs about the necessity and propriety of standing up.[57] Social movements point out and energize the

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[53] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 469.

[54] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 469.

[55] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 469.

[56] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 469.

[57] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 470.

importance of these beliefs in an individual's life so as to resonate their cause with that of the target audience. The ultimate outcome of this effort is to mobilize people for collective action.

(3) *Frame extension* is concerned with the spectrum of values and beliefs that SMOs promote. Sometimes the main values and beliefs that SMOs promote may not completely resonate with the interests of the target audience. At this point, SMOs may need to enlarge their frame in a way that includes a larger audience and promotes more participation.[58] Frame extension is a common strategy used by SMOs to increase participation for their cause. For instance, a SMO whose main objective is to reduce the defense budget may sponsor famous rock bands to rally otherwise uninterested individuals. In sum, frame extension is the growth of an SMO's primary framework in order to encompass larger populations.

(4) *Frame transformation* differs from other processes of frame alignment process in that it seeks to get participants to adopt an altogether new perspective for existing phenomena. Snow describes frame transformation process as follows

> The programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote…may not resonate with…conventional lifestyles…and extant interpretive terms. When such is the case, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or "misframings" reframed in order to garner support and secure participants. What may be required, in short, is a transformation of frame.[59]

Two beliefs underlie the basic concept of frame transformation, "the seriousness of the problem, issue or grievance in question; [and] beliefs about the locus of causality or blame."[60] Frame transformation is the redefinition of

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[58] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 472.

[59] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 473.

[60] As cited in Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 470.

these two beliefs in accordance with the beliefs of the movement. The scope of these beliefs designates the domain in which transformation is necessary in order to ensure participation.

If the frame alignment process reshapes only a particular domain of life, "such as dietary habits, consumption patterns, leisure activities, social statuses, and self perception"[61] it is referred as the *transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames*. This kind of transformation targets the change of a single interpretive perspective, rather than the whole value and belief system of the susceptible population. For instance, SMOs against drunk driving managed to transform the beliefs of participants that drunk driving is an inexcusable, immoral and unjust social practice.[62] In this instance, only one belief (e.g., an accident caused by drunk driving is not unfortunate, it is a serious incident caused by the misbehavior of the drunk driver) is targeted within the interpretive perspectives of the participants.

*Transformations of global interpretive frames*, however, targets change in all other domains in order to become the framework through which the subjects see the world.[63] All other values and beliefs are reframed in accordance with this new frame. For instance, converts to Nichiren Shoshu, an orthodox Buddhist sect, state they have reached a clearer understanding of themselves and their surroundings after adopting the perspective of their sacred text.[64] Put simply, their interpretive perspectives have been transformed, and they see the world through the framework of their new teachings. A final remark about frame transformation is that, whether it addresses a specific domain or the major framework, frame transformation or conversion is the only way to mobilize the

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[61] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 474.

[62] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 475.

[63] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 475.

[64] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 475.

population to join a social movement when there is little or no overlap between the perspective of the target audience and that of the social movement.[65]

The frame alignment processes discussed above help social movements mobilize their target audience. Without a proper relationship between the beliefs and values of the population and the social movements, or an awareness of each other's presence, social movements are unable to mobilize the population and collective action will not be possible. Frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation serve as ways to close the interpretive gap between the target population and a movement's emergence.

After the movement is underway, the framing of the underlying issues is no less important to the movement than they were in early stages.[66] Social movements put significant effort into disseminating their message to larger populations.[67] Furthermore, rather than the spontaneous and need-driven nature of the framing processes in the emergence phase, later framing processes are "heavily constrained by the ideas, collective identities, and worldviews adopted previously."[68] Finally, as a movement progresses and accumulates notable power, other actors (i.e., authorities and counter movements) intervene in the framing process, and it becomes a scene in which social movements and other actors conflict.[69]

In sum, the frame-alignment process provides a bridge to unite political opportunities and mobilizing structures in the emergence phase of movements. In later phases, as a movement gains momentum, the framing process characterizes and distinguishes the movement and becomes the main plane on which a movement interacts with other actors.

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[65] Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 476.

[66] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 16.

[67] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 16.

[68] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 16.

[69] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 17.

## B. THEORETICAL ROADMAP FOR ANALYSIS

### 1. Framing the Concepts and Addressing the Problem

The accumulated literature on social movement theory is vast. As far as the subject matter is concerned, the actors that seek social change are defined as minorities and aggrieved groups within a society. More often than not, violence, ranging from civil disobedience to outright terrorist acts, is defined as a strategy or tactic for social movements as a way of achieving their goals. Increasingly, social scientists use social movement theory, either in full or in part, to explain the emergence and growth of terrorist organizations.[70] In his study, Beck concludes "it is appropriate to view terrorism as one form of contentious politics analyzable with the conceptual framework of social movement theory."[71] Similarly, this research examines the PKK from the perspective of social movement theory.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the PKK is one of the least studied terrorist organizations in the world, although it is also one of the most important ones. The growing body of literature about the PKK is commingled with the Kurdish issue. Thus, many scholars examine the PKK in light of the Kurdish issue and see it as an extension of this problem.[72] The PKK is also the subject of numerous

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[70] See Snow, David A. and Scott C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Process, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review* 12, no. 2 (June, 2007): 119–136; Sageman, Mark, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; Sageman, Mark, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008; Robinson, Glenn, "Hamas as Social Movement," Chap. 4, in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, 112–139, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004 for further research on this issue.

[71] Beck, Colin J., "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism." *Sociology Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 1565–1581, doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00148.x (accessed October 9, 2010), 1574.

[72] Akçura, Belma, *State's Kurdish Movie: 1925–2007 Kurdish Reports [Devletin Kurt Filmi: 1925-2007 Kurt Raporlari]*, translated by the author of this study, Ankara: Ayrac Kitabevi Yayinlari, 2008.

terrorism studies and security studies.[73] Even though the explanatory value of these studies is beyond doubt, existing literature tends to fall short on the analytical dimension. More specifically, and more relevant to the subject of this study, the PKK's organizational structure and its ability to generate resources have been the subject of research by various law enforcement organizations. Nonetheless, the functional role and importance of these components in the PKK's structure are not studied in detail.

To summarize, it is possible to examine terrorist organizations through the lens of the social movement theory. Additionally, while the literature on the PKK is heavily skewed toward the emergence of the movement and is characteristically descriptive rather than analytic, there are only partial analyses on how to disrupt the PKK. Thus, by examining the PKK through the lens of the contemporary social movement theory, the present study seeks to address this particular gap in the existing literature.

### 2. Research Questions Revisited

One of the main research questions that this study set out to answer is, "what are the omnipresent components of the terrorist organizations whose absence would disrupt the terrorist organizations?" Table 1 presents the key independent variables explaining social movements in accordance with contemporary social movement theory.

[73] See Semiz, Burhan, *Dead End PKK: The Methodology and the Sociology of PKK's Field Cadre [Çikmaz Sokak PKK: PKK Dag Kadrosunun Metodolojisi ve Sosyolojisi]*, translated by the author of this study, Ankara: Lalezar Kitabevi, 2007; Özdag, Umit, *The PKK Operations of the Turkish Army: (1984–2007) [Turk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonlari: (1984–2007)]*, translated by the author of this study, Istanbul: Pegasus Yayinlari, 2007; Sehirli, Atila, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures) [Türkiye'de Bölücü Terör Hareketleri (ve Devletin Aldigi Tedbirler)]*, translated by the author of this study, Istanbul: Burak Yayinevi, 2000; Mango, Andrew, *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years we Fought Alone*, London; New York: Routledge, 2005. There are also countless reports and articles discussing the affects of the PKK on international relations and regional studies.

| **Expanding Political Opportunities** | | **Mobilizing Structures** | | **Framing Processes** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -Openness of the Political System | + | -Informal (Grassroots) Organizations | + | -Shared Understanding | = | **Social Movement** |
| -Political Stability | | | | | | |
| -Presence of Elite Allies | | -Formal Organizations | | -Collective Identity | | |
| -State's Ability and Incline to Repression | | | | | | |

Table 1. Theoretical Framework of the Social Movement Theory

As discussed above, social movements can only emerge and sustain themselves in the presence of all three of these variables. Thus, examining the PKK through the lens of social movement theory designates these three variables as the key components of the PKK. Because there are numerous studies on the PKK that address frame-alignment processes and political opportunities, this study focuses on mobilizing structures, with an emphasis on identifying the PKK's weak points in order to disrupt it. This study argues that effectively denying required resources to the PKK will cause significant friction to the organization and may ultimately lead to the marginalization of the PKK's armed campaign.

The second research question seeks ways to deny the PKK required resources and disrupt its organizational structure. This research seeks to identify two different ways to prevent the PKK from acquiring required resources: (1) targeting the organization's financing function, and (2) targeting the armed wing's physical infrastructure. The analyses in the following chapters attempt to address these issues to the greatest possible extent. Before analyzing these two aspects, however, the study turns to a brief overview of the PKK in Turkey.

# III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

## A. INTRODUCTION

Turkey has been fighting against PKK terrorism since the organization's formal establishment in 1978. During more than three decades, this struggle has been transformed, as have the variables affecting it. Among many other important incidents, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf Crisis in 1991, political problems between Turkey and its neighbors, and the capture of PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan have all played a part in this struggle. While these events had significant effects on terrorist and counterterrorist strategies, they alone cannot explain the persistence of the PKK's terrorist activities. This chapter's purpose is to paint an objective picture of the PKK terrorist organization. Specifically, it aims to describe the social and political context into which the PKK terrorist organization was born. Furthermore, the most important characteristics and the physical infrastructure of the PKK are examined to better understand the organization's governing dynamics. Finally, the course of more than three decades of PKK terror is summarized, along with milestone events in order to draw an all-encompassing picture of Turkey's fight against separatist terror.

## B. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire resorted to different ways of defining a nation in order to protect the unity of an ethnically diverse empire. Between 1876 and 1909, Sultan Adbulhamid II emphasized pan-Islamist thought, which aimed to unite Muslims around the world under the banner of Islam and the rule of the Ottoman Empire, whose *Padishah* also carried the title of caliphate. Thus, by definition Ottoman nationality embraced all Muslims. Even though this definition caused serious uprisings in the Balkans, which were then under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, it also played a vital role in uniting the

Turkish and Kurdish people.[74] This unification strongly depended on one of the main characteristics of Kurdish society: strong loyalty to religion.[75] Even though there were numerous Kurdish uprisings reaching as far as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, none of these uprisings possessed a revolutionary nature.[76] Thus, the Kurds were a loyal member of the Ottoman nation, united under the banner of Islam.

After WW I, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign The Treaty of Sevres. In Section III, Articles 62 and 65 of this treaty addressed the Kurdish issue.[77] In essence, these articles enabled the Kurdish people to establish an independent Kurdish State. However, the leading Kurdish figures of the time opposed the idea of "deserting the Turks in their hour of need and to deal them a fatal blow by proclaiming the independence of Kurdistan."[78] Close on the heels of the treaty came the War of Independence, which ultimately gave birth to the Republic of Turkey. Throughout the war, Kurds fought side-by-side with Turks among many other people from different ethnic backgrounds who together formed the Turkish nation. How then should the Kurdish uprising prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic be understood? It may be best to view it as a local power struggle among the Kurdish tribes trying to obtain local power and secure privileges from the Ottoman Empire.

An important change that separated the newly formed Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire was in its political structure. The Ottoman Empire was a monarchy that was ruled in accordance with Islamic law. By contrast, Turkey is a secular democratic republic. As mentioned, one of the focal characteristics of

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[74] Laciner, Sedat and Ihsan Bal, "The Ideological and Historical Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey: Ethnicity, Demography, Politics," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 15 October 2004, www.turkishweekly.net/article/15/the-ideological-and-historical-roots-of-kurdist-movements-in-turkey-ethnicity-demography-politics.html (accessed September 6, 2010).

[75] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[76] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[77] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[78] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

the Kurdish society is its strong loyalty to religion; another important characteristic is its tribal structure. This change in the political structure of Turkish society in its transition from monarchy to democracy affected the fundamental characteristics of the Kurdish society. First, the secular nature of the new regime was at odds with the Islamic rule of law that Kurdish society upheld. Second, democracy in its essence jeopardized the political power of the feudal tribal structure of the Kurdish society.[79] As the Turkish republic deprived the sheiks of their religious and feudal power, several major rebellions took place, such as Seyh Said in 1925, or Seyyit Riza in 1937. Additionally, many minor uprisings took place between 1925 and 1950, particularly in the area where majority of the residents were Kurds.[80] Interestingly, these uprisings served to transform the public perception of nationalism, which in turn shaped the Kurdish perception of the new social structure in a positive way. As a result, the second quarter of the 20th century witnessed the birth of a new Turkish state and the gradual integration of Kurdish society into this new system.

As a result of the 1950 elections, Turkey transformed into a multi-party democracy and a more liberal political structure was formed. Under the rule of the Democrat Party, winner of the first multi-party elections, increased freedom of expression allowed all, including the Kurds, to express their complaints.[81] The more pluralistic and open political environment of the 1950s and 1960s enabled Kurds to participate in different aspects of the country's social and political life.[82] Moreover, the 1950s also saw the rapid improvement of material conditions and the birth of the Turkish bourgeoisie. However, because Turkey's economy was not able to finance this rapid improvement, the economy experienced high inflation and the country's solvency could only be sustained by foreign, mainly

[79] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[80] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[81] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[82] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

American, aid.[83] Left-leaning student groups found the answer to the country's economic problems in Marxist ideology.[84] Eventually, the left-wing movements of the late 1960s gave way to radical socialist movements such as Dev-Genc and terrorism took its toll on Turkish democracy, resulting in a military coup.

Under the government formed by the military between 1971 and 1973, radical political violence came to a stop.[85] Throughout this period, Kurdish socialism grew alongside the broader Turkish socialist movement.[86] Ultimately, the Turkish left's rejection of the Kurdish socialist's nationalistic tendencies led to the formation of the PKK, which later turned against the Kurdish religious and tribal leaders and other Turkish revolutionary groups, adopting the practices of violence and terror.[87]

The historical context in which the PKK's terrorist activities commenced challenges the common fallacy of seeing the PKK's rise as an expression of the political desires of Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnicity. The Kurdish people had been a part of the Turkish nation dating back to the War of Independence. The revolutionary change that came with the establishment of the republic affected the Kurdish people as much as it did other segments of the community. However, the parts of the Turkish community that came from diverse ethnic backgrounds successfully integrated in subsequent years under the new national definition of Kemalism. Increasingly, the Kurdish people sought solutions for their problems and complaints within the democratic system. Thus, as Turkish democracy grew stronger, differences within Turkey were diminished with political solutions. The late 1960s and early 1970s marked a worldwide era of student protests and increased extremist thought. Turkey had its share of left and right wing terrorism in this era, and social order could only be restored with a military coup. After a

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[83] Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, New York: Routledge, 2005, 14.

[84] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 14.

[85] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 17.

[86] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

mere 2 years of peace under the government established by the coup, political extremist violence erupted. Born in these circumstances, the PKK claimed to be the voice of the Kurdish people. On the contrary, regardless of its historical endurance, the PKK is merely another radical ethno-nationalist terrorist organization that splintered from left-wing extremist groups of the era.

## C. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: GOVERNING DYNAMICS

Apart from its ideology and the real world implementation of this ideology, the PKK has four characteristics that define the organization's fundamental alignment.

First, the PKK is a cult of personality.[88] Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and leader of the PKK, is the symbol of Kurdish nationalism to PKK supporters and sympathizers.[89] He is known as "Apo," which is a diminutive for Abdullah, and the word also means "uncle" in Kurdish. PKK members are called "Apocu" (Apoist), and the word is synonymous with the PKK.[90] Turkish security forces captured Apo in 1999, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on an island prison in Turkey. Nonetheless, communicating with the PKK through his lawyers, he has continued to determine the PKK's strategy from within prison.[91] Furthermore, Abdullah Ocalan's imprisonment has arguably increased his existing high esteem among PKK members, giving him the image of a living martyr.[92] Initially, Turkey was able to use this cult of personality as an advantage, as the capture and imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan caused severe

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[87] Laciner and Bal, "Roots of Kurdist Movements in Turkey", n.p.

[88] Cagatay, S., "Can the PKK Renounce Violence? Terrorism Resurgent," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2007, www.meforum.org/1060/can-the-pkk-renounce-violence.pdf (accessed September 6, 2010).

[89] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)," *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*, jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/printFriendlyView.do?docId=/c, (accessed August 24, 2010).

[90] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 32.

[91] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[92] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

demoralization in the PKK.[93] Nonetheless, Abdullah Ocalan's ability to rule the PKK from his prison cell diminished the Turkish government's advantage quickly and caused some degree of public discontent. Abdullah Ocalan is an important part of the PKK terrorist organization, and even after being imprisoned, he plays a crucial role in determining the ideology and the course of the PKK's activities.

Second, the PKK follows Maoist ideology to the greatest possible extent.[94] Abdullah Ocalan favored Maoism, finding the Marxist-Leninsts of the 1970s It is possible that Ocalan first fell in with Marxist teachings as a student of political science at Ankara University, which at that time was ideologically influenced by the Marxist thought by some of its professors.[95] Abdullah Ocalan was born and raised in a village in southeastern Anatolia and personally experienced the rural feudal values and the social structure of the area. When combined with his education, his political ideas favored both Marxist revolution and Maoist guerilla warfare tactics.[96] Consequently, the PKK was designed to establish a left-wing Kurdish state by liberating the so-called oppressed and exploited Kurdish worker-peasant alliance, where the peasantry would provide the manpower for the people's army.[97] Since 1978, this vision has caused the deaths of more than 30,000 Kurdish peasants.[98]

Third, the PKK aims to monopolize the Kurdish nationalist struggle.[99] The PKK has continuously and consistently attempted to intimidate and even to eradicate political entities that in some way related themselves to the Turkish Kurds.[100] One of the most renowned instances of this is the PKK's clash with Turkish Hizbullah, a right-wing extremist terrorist organization whose members

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[93] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[94] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[95] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 33.

[96] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[97] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[98] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[99] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[100] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

were mainly Kurds, which operated in southeastern urban areas of Turkey.[101] The PKK also decimated Revolutionary Unity of People, the Liberation of the People, and the Revolutionary East Cultural Association.[102] In addition to these violent extremist groups, the PKK eradicated peaceful Kurdish political parties such as the Kurdistan Socialist Party.[103] The PKK even manipulates the Kurdish politicians that officially represent Turkish Kurds in the Turkish National Parliament.[104] In sum, neither the Turkish government nor any other nongovernmental movement has been able to create an entity that would express the complaints of Turkey's Kurds in a peaceful and democratic framework.

A final fundamental characteristic of the PKK terrorist organization is its dependence on foreign patrons.[105] During the Cold War, the PKK enjoyed the physical and economic support of Soviet surrogate countries such as Syria.[106] The PKK had training camps in Lebanon's Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.[107] Moreover, Abdullah Ocalan resided in a safe house in Syria until his forced deportation in 1998.[108] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria continued to support the PKK, albeit this time its support was the result of bilateral political problems with Turkey.[109] Likewise, Iran and Iraq have also supported the PKK covertly and have used it as a bargaining chip in their relations with Turkey,[110] especially in the wake of the First Gulf War, when "Operation Provide Comfort"

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[101] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[102] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[103] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[104] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p. I''

[105] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[106] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[107] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[108] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 34.

[109] FAS Intelligence Resource Program, "Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/mfa-t-pkk2.htm, (accessed August 19, 2010).

[110] FAS, "A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey", n.p.

created a Kurdish zone in the northern region of Iraq. The PKK skillfully took advantage of this political vacuum to establish a safe heaven for its operations.[111] The PKK has also enjoyed the support of local political parties in the northern region of Iraq, such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and later the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[112] The Greek[113] and Armenian[114] governments also found the existence of the PKK useful and did not hesitate to support it when it suited their own interests. The PKK finances its movement, provides recruits, and seeks political support for its cause in Western Europe as well.[115]

Consequently, the PKK has enjoyed the excessive sponsorship of foreign patrons. Different groups have supported the PKK for their own interests under different political contexts. External support had significant effects on the manpower, training, and financing operations of the PKK. With the help of these immense sponsorships, the PKK was able to establish safe heavens to generate funds[116], set up the physical infrastructure to support its terrorist activities, and create an international diaspora to promote its cause and muster political support.[117]

## D. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The PKK has a very hierarchical organizational structure; Abdullah Ocalan has dominated the PKK's leadership from its very beginning. Other than minor changes over time, the PKK has had two different organizational structures. The initial structure was preserved with minor, but necessary, changes until the

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[111] FAS, "A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," n.p.

[112] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[113] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[114] FAS, "A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," n.p.

[115] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[116] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[117] Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 35–36.

reorganization of the PKK in 2005. The second organizational structure, which arose from the 2005 reorganization, is still in effect today.




Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the PKK Before 2005

The PKK's functional organization, until its reorganization in 2005, is shown in Figure 1. Prior to 2005, the PKK's structure consisted of a "Central Executive Committee" that presided over a "Central Committee," whose secretary general was Abdullah Ocalan.[118] As a result, Ocalan ruled the PKK with absolute and unchallenged power.[119] Amongst many other sub-committees attached to the Central Committee, the two most important were the military and external central committees. After the Third Congress of the PKK in 1986, the military sub-committee was renamed the Kurdistan People's Liberation Army

[118] FAS Intelligence Resource Program, "Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - A Report on the PKK and Terrorism," www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/mfa-t-pkk.htm, (accessed August 24, 2010).

[119] FAS, "A Report on the PKK and Terrorism," n.p.

(Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, or ARGK).[120] The external operations center was called the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan, or ERNK), which was established in 1985 and began to operate in 1989. While the ERNK undertook propaganda activities, recruited new militants, conducted militant training, established contact with other armed groups, generated funds, and provided intelligence and counterintelligence for operational security, the ARNK was responsible for armed attacks directed at Turkey.[121]




Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the PKK After 2005

[120] FAS, "A Report on the PKK and Terrorism," n.p.

[121] FAS, "A Report on the PKK and Terrorism," n.p.

In February 2005, the PKK reorganized its structure under the guidance of Ocalan, as illustrated in Figure 2.[122] The People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gele Kurdistan, or KONGRA-GEL) is the legislature and presides over Kurdish Democratic Federation (Koma Komalen Kurdistan, or KKK).[123] The KKK is the new executive committee, and it consists of a series of hierarchically-formed regional committees.[124] In theory, the regional committees are formed in league with the laws and governmental structures of the countries in which Kurds live.[125] The *raison d'être* of the regional committees is to remove the need for Kurdish autonomy or independence through unifying and coordinating the efforts of the regional committees. Regional committees are formed in countries where Kurdish people live. In theory, these committees regulate the relationships among Kurdish citizens in the country where they are established so that the Kurdish citizens can live as members of an autonomous or independent entity. Nonetheless, none of these committees has been formed in practice.[126] The militants belong to the People's Defense Force (Hezen Parastina Gel, or HPG).[127] The HPG is divided into regional commands and these commands are further divided into units, which consist of eight to twenty militants.[128] The cells or individuals responsible for bombing campaigns are directly under the command of HPG leadership in Qandil Mountain.[129]

In theory, the power flows from bottom to top in the KKK, yet in practice it is imposed from the top down.[130] Ocalan designates the ideology and strategic objectives of the PKK, and the KKK executive committee handles the day-to-day

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[122] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[123] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[124] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[125] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[126] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[127] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[128] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[129] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[130] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

running of the organization within the parameters set by Ocalan.[131] Today, Nurettin Sofi heads the HPG, the financial chief of the PKK is Duran Kalkan, and the strongest figure in the leadership is Murat Karayilan, who is a hard-line Ocalan loyalist.[132]

Consequently, throughout its lifetime, the PKK has had a strongly hierarchical organizational structure. The original structure of the terrorist organization was more inclined to functionality than its current structure; the organization was departmentalized according to functional processes. However, the pause in PKK operations between 1999 and 2004, as well as its inclination to a political solution, required a new structure that would match reality. This transformation was completed in 2005, although nothing has changed in reality because the transformation depended on the establishment of regional committees with considerable political power within the legal systems of multiple countries. PKK members staffed these regional committees, and thus real-world functionality was never the true intention behind their formation.[133] It would not be incorrect to assert that the organizational transformation of the PKK did not change much in practice.

## E. THREE DECADES OF PKK TERROR

The PKK terrorist organization was founded as a Marxist-Leninist group.[134] The initial objective of the PKK was to form a left-wing Kurdish state espousing Marxist revolutionary ideology, and Maoist guerilla warfare tactics were chosen to realize this objective.[135] The PKK declared that it was not a nationalist secessionist movement several times, reiterating this issue in its

[131] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[132] Cagatay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" n.p.

[133] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[134] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[135] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

congresses.[136] However, in practice the PKK continued to carry out its strategy of revolution within the Kurdish population and as a result created a rift between Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic background and the rest of Turkish society. Thus, the PKK held true to the characteristics of ethno-nationalist separatist and Marxist extremist groups. However, in time the PKK shifted its emphasis from one side of its fundamental ideology to the other in an attempt to adapt to changes in the global political scene.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1980s resulted in the PKK downplaying Marxism-Leninism and emphasizing Kurdish nationalism more.[137] Changes to the PKK flag clearly illustrate this changed emphasis. As shown in Figure 3, the hammer and sickle figures in the organization's flag have been removed in the current version.

Figure 3. The PKK's Flags

With its Marxist–Leninist roots, the PKK initially denounced religion, but by the mid-1990s, it had to downplay this ideology in order to adapt to the changing

[136] "Ocalan's PKK: A Look at the Movement," *The Estimate Political & Security Intelligence Analysis of the Islamic World and its Neighbors*, 11, no. 5 (2006), www.theestimate.com/public/022699.html (accessed September 6, 2010).

[137] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

international political context, and prevent the alienation of the Kurdish society.[138] The PKK's revised attitude toward religion was an attempt to protect its support base.

The PKK was established at a 1974 meeting of a group of leftist Kurdish students in the Fis village of Diyarbakir, a city in southeast Turkey, which had assembled to form the National Liberation Army (Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu, or UKO) and which appointed Abdullah Ocalan as their leader.[139] Later on, this assembly would be viewed as the first meeting of the PKK, as the UKO changed its name to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or PKK) in 1978.[140] The PKK targeted the Kurdish tribal leaders and fought with other rival left and right wing extremist groups until the military coup of 1980.[141] The 1980 military coup pushed the PKK to a new stage, with its members either in prison or having fled to neighboring Syria. Abdullah Ocalan also fled Turkey and established a PKK training camp in the Bekaa valley, under Syrian control.[142] Between 1980 and 1984, the terrorist organization established its military wing and increased its ranks.[143]

In 1984, the PKK changed its strategy. Ocalan declared that the PKK had chosen Mao's Public Revolution style to achieve its main objectives and began using violent tactics.[144] August 15, 1984 marked the beginning of a massive campaign of violence. Starting in 1986 and gradually increasing from then on, "the PKK stepped up its attacks on southeast Turkey, targeting state officials, the security forces, schoolteachers, and the family members of the village

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[138] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[139] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[140] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[141] FAS, "A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," n.p.

[142] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[143] FAS, "A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," n.p.

[144] "Chronology of the Important Events in the World/PKK Chronology (1976–2006)," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 27 May 2007, www.turkishweekly.net/article/217/chronology-of-the-important-events-in-the-world-pkk-chronology-1976-2006-.html, (accessed September 6, 2010).

guards."[145] The PKK deliberately attacked and literally "leveled" remote villages that supported the government or that did not support the PKK.[146]

Until 1991, the PKK's attacks were confined to the southeastern region of Turkey. Beginning that year, the PKK increased its area of operations and targeted major cities in the western regions of Turkey with bombing attacks. In August 1991, the Turkish Armed Forces conducted the first cross-border attack against PKK bases in Iraq.[147] These attacks would total 24 by 1999.[148] The first years of the 1990s witnessed a successful military counterterrorism campaign by the Turkish government.

In 1993, Abdullah Ocalan declared the first of what would be many so-called unilateral ceasefires. This ceasefire was adopted as a strategic tactic to mislead public opinion about the terrorist nature of the PKK, and was aimed at fulfilling the PKK's objectives through legal means, which the PKK had not been able to accomplish with its ongoing terrorist campaign.[149]

As an extension of the proliferation of its terrorist actions in the major western Turkish cities in 1991, the PKK started an intensive bombing campaign that targeted Turkey's tourism centers in 1994.[150] Also, as a part of its declared ideology and strategy, the PKK formed an alliance with the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi, or DHKP/C), another militant left-wing terrorist group operating in Turkey.[151] However, it turned out to be a short-lived and weak alliance. In March 1998, the DHKP/C declared that its alliance with the PKK was over.[152]

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[145] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[146] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[147] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[148] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[149] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[150] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[151] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[152] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

In May 1995, the PKK held its Fifth Conference. One of the important decisions arising from this meeting was to intensify its suicide bombing activities.[153] As a result, the PKK became one of the world's terrorist organizations that resort to suicide attacks. The PKK carried out 21 suicide attacks between June 1996 and July 1999, causing relatively insignificant loss of life when compared to other terrorist organizations' suicide campaigns.[154]

Beginning in 1996, the Turkish military campaign effectively countered the organization and forced the PKK militants deeper into the mountains.[155] This continuous pressure on the PKK, as well as Turkey's military build-up on the Syrian border demanding the delivery of Abdullah Ocalan, ultimately forced Syria to expel Ocalan from Damascus in October 1998.[156] After a series of international deportations, Ocalan was captured in Kenya with a Greek Cypriot passport on February 15, 1999.[157] After his capture, Ocalan ordered PKK militants to leave Turkey and to stop its armed attacks in an effort to minimize his punishment and to prevent the organization from self-destructing by overreacting to his capture.[158]

Between 1999 and 2004, the PKK engaged only in defensive operations, yet it maintained about 5000 active militants.[159] The PKK resorted largely to civil disobedience-type actions throughout this time period, albeit with little success.[160] The PKK was renamed the Kurdistan Democratic and Freedom Congress (Kongra Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan, or KADEK) in 2002, and the

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153 "PKK Chronology," n.p.

154 Schweitzer, Yoram, "Suicide Terrorism–Development and Characteristics," A lecture presented at the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at ICT, Herzeliya, Israel on 21st February, 2000, ftp.beitberl.ac.il/~bbsite/misc/ezer_anglit/klali/01_46.doc (accessed August 15, 2010).

155 Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

156 Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

157 "PKK Chronology," n.p.

158 "PKK Chronology," n.p.

159 Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

160 "PKK Chronology," n.p.

Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongre Gele Kurdistan, KONGRA-GEL) in 2003, in an attempt to be removed or omitted from lists of terrorist organizations kept by various international entities. However, both the United States and the European Union included the PKK/KONGRA-GEL on their lists of terrorist organization in 2004.[161] One month after the PKK's designation as a terrorist organization, Ocalan ordered the resumption of its armed campaign. The emergence of both rival Kurdish groups and of factions within the PKK played an important role in this decision.[162] The years 2005 and 2006 witnessed a number of internal confrontations, where members of the PKK who supported a peaceful political solution were assassinated by the hard-line PKK leadership.[163]

In 2005, the PKK resumed using its former name, as well as changing its mission statement and adopting pan-Kurdish thought.[164] The PKK employed this strategy in an attempt to unite all Kurdish movements under one umbrella.[165] Moreover, the PKK's main objective was moderated to claim cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.[166] Nonetheless, the PKK's ethnic minority, federation, and autonomous governance demands go far beyond simple cultural and political rights, and principally serve as a means of dividing the Turkish Republic.

Between 2005 and 2008, the PKK increased its terrorist attacks. While sustaining minimal rural activity and keeping a small footprint in the rural areas, the organization resorted to urban bombings and civil disobedience-type acts.[167] In the meantime, 2006 saw Turkey, the United States, and Iraq establishing an

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[161] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[162] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[163] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[164] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[165] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[166] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[167] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

inter-governmental pact to fight against the PKK.[168] The United States agreed to provide actionable intelligence to Turkey under the terms of this mutual pact.

In 2009, the Turkish government started pressing hard with legislative reforms in order to disband the PKK for good. Several disputed issues, such as enhancing opportunities of language education and television broadcasts in Kurdish have been regulated. In October, eight PKK militants crossed the border to surrender as peace ambassadors.[169] While the Turkish government evaluated this development as the end of an era (namely the end of armed propaganda), the PKK viewed it as the beginning of a peace process, where they would be allowed to participate in the political process along with Abdullah Ocalan representing the Kurdish population of Turkey.[170] Later, it turned out that both the PKK and the Turkish Government had misread the developments; as the PKK resumed its terrorist activities and still claims that the conditions to end the armed struggle have not been met and that the Kurdish people will not be represented properly if the PKK gives up its armed struggle. As of 2010, while significantly marginalized when compared to the first terrorist campaign of 1978–1999, the PKK is still far from dissolving. Recently, the PKK has increased the level of terrorist attacks and continues its terror campaign with the strategy of attrition.

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[168] "PKK Chronology," n.p.

[169] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Security, Turkey," jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA/printFriendlyView.do?docId (accessed August 8, 2010).

[170] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Security, Turkey," n.p.

# IV. BLOODY MONEY: PKK FUNDING

Global corporations are in a constant race to increase their market share. It takes the best-educated workforce, the most experienced managers, and the most creative and innovative marketing strategies for successful companies to grow and profit. Even though these companies are legal and pursue no other ends than making profit with their actions, thousands of corporations go bankrupt every year. The question is, then, how does the PKK and other illegal terrorist organizations raise enough funds to run their operations while the law enforcement agencies track and intercept their financial activities on a global level?

Terrorist organizations are inherently illegal and illicit. The PKK is not an exception. Countries follow and intercept the activities of terrorist organizations to the greatest possible extent. Even under these limiting circumstances, the PKK manages to raise sufficient funds to sustain and even seemingly to improve its organizational capabilities.

This chapter analyzes the fundamentals of terrorism financing and particularly examines the PKK in this area. The study first presents the sources that terrorist organizations utilize to raise funds, along with their advantages and disadvantages, and then discusses how the PKK uses those particular sources to generate funds. Following these analyses, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the conditions that augment fund-raising activities.

## A. SOURCES OF FUNDING

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20th century marked the end of an era. As the Cold War ended, the superpowers' economic support of various countries and international groups also diminished. Social groups and organizations in the supported countries, which raised their funds through state sponsorship, lost their material support. Moreover, as the strict

supervision of the supported countries abated, these social groups and organizations had the opportunity to materialize their organizational and political objectives. While some of these groups pursued their patriotic visions peacefully and legally, others turned to terrorist initiatives. The new initiatives were in addition to seasoned, long-term global terrorist groups such as FARC, ETA, Hezbollah, and many others.

Giraldo and Trinkunas[171] state that the end of the Cold War was a turning point in both the structures of terrorist organizations (e.g., the rise of transnational radical religious terrorism) and their financing operations. They also argue that the effects of globalism played a significant role in providing ample opportunities for terrorists to widen their spectrum of fund-raising activities. The conditions that favor terrorist organizations raising funds will be discussed in later sections. When examining terrorist financing sources, however, the shape of the global and regional political arena should be kept in mind, inasmuch as changes in the political environment, such as the global war against terrorism, can significantly affect the organizational and ideological structure of terrorist organizations and require revisions in their fund-raising efforts. Like any other enterprise, terrorist organizations tend to widen the spectrum from which they can generate funds in order to guarantee a minimum amount of income; they also shift their efforts to another source in the case of losing one of their fund-raising assets. Every asset available to terrorist organizations comes with advantages and disadvantages. Understanding these factors also helps analysts to designate the weak points of terrorist financing efforts.

When one examines its sources of fund-raising, like every other terrorist organization, the PKK has its own unique footprint. The following analysis will reveal that the amount of resources, as well as the sources that these resources are obtained from has changed significantly throughout the PKK's lifetime. In an

[171] Giraldo, Jeanne K. and Harold A. Trinkunas, "The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing," Chap. 1, in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, 7–21. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, 8–10.

effort to understand and engage the full spectrum of the PKK's funding sources, the research makes an effort to thoroughly examine the financing function of the PKK.

### 1. State Sponsorship

#### *a. Advantages and Disadvantages of State Sponsorship*

Before the end of the Cold War, state sponsorship was the most pervasive source of money for terrorist organizations. When sponsored by a state, terrorist organizations can raise significant amounts of money and guarantee a steady income.[172] States also provide tactical and diplomatic cover for the supported terrorist organizations' actions. State sponsorship can provide access to professional training, physical sanctuary, and a disruption-free system for the flow of funds, and these support assets are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, an alliance with a state provides noticeable credentials for terrorist organizations in the international arena, making it easier to muster support from transnational groups and providing a strong case in legitimizing their case.

However, there are some drawbacks to state sponsorship for terrorist organizations. Despite the fact that states provide significant amounts of money via disruption-free networks, they also tend to be unreliable. Changes in the international arena, public opinion, and policy on certain issues can make states unreliable resources.[173] Another constraint is the high amount of control that states demand in the techniques and actions of terrorist organizations.[174] States may want to limit the targets, timing, scope, frequency and intensity of attacks. Another possible drawback can be the emergence of rival terrorist organizations competing for the same resources. Finally, terrorist organizations must consider the negative effects of an alliance with a state, as this alliance can

[172] Giraldo and Trinkunas, "The Political Economy of Terrorist Financing," 11.

[173] Giraldo and Trinkunas, "The Political Economy of Terrorist Financing," 13.

[174] Giraldo and Trinkunas, "The Political Economy of Terrorist Financing," 14.

prove to be contradictory to the essence of that terrorist organization. For instance, if a radical Islamist terrorist organization is attempting to establish a sharia-based government instead of a democratic one, it will not help this particular terrorist organization to make an alliance with another state that is not ruled by the sharia.

#### *b. PKK and State Sponsorship*

The PKK terrorist organization has enjoyed the support of multiple state sponsors throughout its lifetime. These sponsors have provided the PKK with a plethora of resources ranging from training camps to political support.

(1) Greece. The state sponsorship of the PKK by Greece has its roots in the "Lavrion Camp," where Kurdish fugitives of Turkish nationality were held in the 1980s.[175] According to Sehirli, the Greek secret service has used these Kurdish fugitives in demonstrations and civil disobedience-type actions that were held against Turkey in Greece and, beginning in 1982, explicitly accommodated DHKP/C and PKK militants in Athens.[176]

The sponsorship of Greece gradually increased through the 1990s. It allowed the PKK to open multiple offices within its borders and to hold PKK office meetings with official members of the government on more than one occasion.[177] It also provided political and military training to PKK militants in the Lavrion Camp, on the island of Kos, and at two more camps in close proximity to Athens.[178] On multiple occasions, Greece financially supported the PKK and even started a fundraising campaign with the motto "200 Million Drachma for Kurdistan—Aegean Peace is Provided from Kurdistan Mountains."[179]

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[175] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 407.

[176] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 407.

[177] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 408–409.

[178] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 409.

[179] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 410.

Greece also provided diplomatic and political support to the PKK. In addition to explicit official visits to the PKK camps in Lebanon and public meetings that sympathized with the establishment of a Kurdish state on Turkish soil, Greece masterfully used its political position in the European Union (then the European Community) to pass communiqués that promoted Kurdish independence.[180] Finally, Greece provided implicit support to the PKK terrorist organization through nongovernmental organizations established by the government.[181]

(2) Syria. One of the most committed state sponsors of the PKK is Syria. First, Syria provided shelter for PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan from July 7, 1979 to October 16, 1998, either in its capital, Damascus, or in Lebanon's Bekaa valley, then under its physical control.[182] The Bekaa valley has been the home and militant training facility of many terrorist organizations other than the PKK. Some of these terrorist organizations are Japanese Red Army, Italian Red Brigades, IRA, ETA, Corsica Terror Teams, Hamas, and Hezbollah.[183] From 1992 to 1998, Syria hosted three Greek, one German, one Italian, and two English official committees that visited Abdullah Ocalan either in Damascus or in the Bekaa valley.[184]

There are several reasons behind Syria's support of the PKK: (1) Turkish annexation of Hatay province in 1939; (2) Southeast Anatolia Project of Turkey, which redirected the waters of the Euphrates river; (3) historical grievances left over from the Ottoman rule; and (4) Hafez Assad's, former president of Syria, desire for regional power.[185]

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[180] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 410–411.

[181] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 412.

[182] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 412.

[183] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 412.

[184] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 414.

[185] Gunter, Michael M., "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," *Conflict Quarterly*, 11, no. 2 (Spring, 1991): 7–29, http://dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/CQ/vol011_2spring1991/gunter.pdf (accessed April 12, 2010).

Recently, Syria's support of the PKK ceased partly because of Turkey's active counterterrorism policy in the region, and partly because of Syria's attempts to change the international actors' perception of Syria's well-established state sponsorship of terrorism. Syria even undertook successful law enforcement measures that banned the PKK in the country, conducted raids, and imprisoned PKK militants.[186] Bessar Esad, the current president of Syria, have officially denounced PKK terror and announced that Syria will not allow any terrorist organization to operate within its borders.[187]

(3) Russia. Russia's support of the PKK is commingled with the historical enmity between Turks and Russians. Russia supported Kurdish uprisings implicitly in 1920s, and played a significant role in the 1937 Tunceli revolt.[188] During the Cold War era, through the use of clandestine radio stations (e.g., Our Radio and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party), Russia employed communist propaganda and also addressed Kurds.[189] Russia kept the Kurdish issue as a trump card in its hands against Turkey. For instance, in 1995, the PKK held its Third Congress in Moscow; in 1996, a KGB official announced that Russia did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization; on the contrary, Russia defined the PKK as "the leader of the Kurdish national democratic struggle" and declared that the Kurds were its allies.[190]

Russia also supported the PKK implicitly through its proxy state in the Middle East: Syria.[191] Russians provided political support in Syria, training and resources to the PKK, and supervised the PKK terrorist organization

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[186] "PKK Operation in Syria," *CNN Turk*, September 29, 2010, www.cnnturk.com/2010/dunya/09/29/suriyede.pkk.operasyonu/591276.0/index.html (accessed September 29, 2010).

[187] "PKK Operation in Syria," *CNN Turk*, September 29, 2010.

[188] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 18.

[189] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 18.

[190] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 417–418.

[191] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 17.

to some extent.[192] There were two PKK camps 285 kilometers from Moscow, and intelligence reports stated the PKK's involvement in Moscow's gambling mafia and extortion from prostitution.[193]

(4) Iraq. The PKK established its main bases of operation and camps in the northern region of Iraq more than two decades ago.[194] The PKK had its first bases in Iraq in the area under the control of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), and up to the present, all of its camps and main bases are located in this region and supported by Massoud Barzani.[195] The PKK's 12 main and 28 smaller camps are scattered along the Iraq-Turkey border and all of the camps are in the KDP-controlled region.[196] Thus, the northern region of Iraq has always been a geographical safe haven for the PKK, in part because of the security vacuum on the part of Iraqi governments, and in part because the ethnic background of the PKK coordinates well with the strong actors in the area. Additionally, the KDP and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) neither in the past nor in the present have the military might needed to eradicate the camps of the PKK should they choose to do so.[197] Furthermore, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, also admitted that the PUK has given material and weapons support to the PKK.[198] The central Iraqi government is known to have supplied weapons to the PKK between 1987 and 1989 in return for information on KDP forces.[199] The PKK have established alliances with both the KDP and the PUK, though never at the same time.[200] Thus, the PKK has played its ethnicity card well

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[192] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 17.

[193] As cited in Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 416.

[194] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 11.

[195] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 446.

[196] As cited in Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 447.

[197] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 448.

[198] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 448.

[199] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 11.

[200] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 448.

against the local powers in the northern region of Iraq. Even now, the PKK's main base, which is located on the Qandil Mountains, is in the PUK-controlled area, while its bases are located in the KDP-controlled area.

More recently, both the Iraqi government and the KRG have denounced the ways of the PKK and have become founding members of the information exchange committee between Turkey, the United States, and Iraq on fighting PKK terrorism. Nonetheless, the lack of military might, ethnic resemblance, and a political vacuum in Iraq prevent the Iraqi government from carrying out an effective counterterrorism campaign against the PKK.

(5) Iran. During the First Gulf War (1980–1988), both Iran and Iraq armed the other side's Kurdish populations as allies.[201] The PKK has also benefitted from Iran's support to KDP. During the First Gulf War the KDP and the PKK were in an alliance, and the KPD transferred resources acquired from Iran, such as weapons and funds, to the PKK. Furthermore, unlike Iraq, Iran refused to let Turkish armed forces pursue the PKK militants within its borders.[202] There were also several PKK camps in Iran until the end of 1990s.[203] Iran's support of international terrorism is a well-established and proven fact. Even though Iran officially denies such claims, Turkey has empirically demonstrated that the Iranian government has provided training, accommodation, weapons, ammunition, campsites, and other logistical support to the PKK.[204]

On the other hand, the after United States' occupation of Iraq, Iran feared the emergence of a Kurdish state in the northern regions of Iraq and designated the PKK as a terrorist organization in 2004.[205] The very same year the PJAK, a proxy terrorist organization of the PKK, was established. Even

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[201] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 10.

[202] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 10.

[203] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 10.

[204] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 420–421.

[205] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

though there have not been any joint or coordinated counterterrorism operations with Turkey, Iran runs its own campaign against the PJAK and the PKK.[206]

(6) Armenia. As Syria, the grievances of Armenians with Turkey date back to WW I. Apart from their support of the Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s, Armenians have cooperated with the Kurds in an effort to realize their so-called "Great Armenia: utopia.[207] ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) declared an alliance with the PKK in 1980, and ASALA members were reported to be operating with the PKK in the late 1980s.[208] Especially after the cross-border operations of Turkey in the early 1990s, the PKK realized that it was not totally safe to operate from within Iraq as it had before. The PKK then contacted the new Armenian state, formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union; Armenia provided the PKK with accommodations, shelter in the ethnically Kurdish villages and regions, recruitment opportunities, money, and military and political training.[209] Armenia officially met PKK representatives and signed a joint action plan against Turkey in Beirut, and when Abdullah Ocalan declared a ceasefire in May 1993, the Armenians reprimanded the PKK by referring to this joint action plan.[210]

(7) The United States. There are several arguments as to why and to what extent the United States supported the PKK. One of the well-known incidents include Jalal Talabani's Washington visit in 1988 immediately after signing an accord with the PKK.[211] Another argument points out the United States' desire to establish a weak land state in the Middle East to use as a regional base.[212] Especially some activities related to Operation Provide Comfort

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[206] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

[207] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 20–22.

[208] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 21.

[209] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 423.

[210] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 424.

[211] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 23.

[212] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 23.

drew significant attention. Many Turkish sources claim that Operation Provide Comfort forces clandestinely provided logistical support to the PKK, and were allied with Jalal Talabani in Iraq, who also supported the PKK.[213]

On the other hand, none of these arguments was ever proven to be true. The United States never engaged the PKK physically, but it did designate the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1997, and re-designated it as a terrorist organization in 1999 and 2001;[214] finally, in 2004, the United States included all front organizations of the PKK in this designation and stated that "the PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change or press release can alter that fact."[215] Furthermore, the United States agreed to provide instant actionable intelligence to Turkey about PKK militants, and an organization was formed with the participation of Turkey, the United States, and Iraq in order to demobilize the PKK. Operation Provide Comfort had the effect of reducing the political power of the Iraqi government in the northern regions of the country, and created a security vacuum in the area, which the PKK successfully manipulated to its own needs. The United States, however, provided explicit political support to some extent in the international arena on Turkey's counterterrorism campaign. Thus, the United States can be classified as an unwitting state sponsor, whose policies' second order effects provided indirect support to the PKK.

(8) Other Countries. Some Western European countries have provided political support to the PKK and turned a blind eye to the PKK's actions within their borders either because of the fear of retaliation from the PKK terrorist organization, or as an extension of their policy options against Turkey. These countries enabled the PKK to generate funds, conduct separatist

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[213] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures),* 435–440.

[214] Cronin, Audrey K., Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2004, www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf (accessed February 13, 2010), 54.

[215] Audrey et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 53.

propaganda and provide awareness for the PKK's cause by commingling the Kurdish issue with the PKK's armed campaign against official international organizations, such as the United Nations. They have also turned a blind eye while the PKK recruited, trained, indoctrinated militants, extorted the population, or taxed the sympathizers of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.[216] Unfortunately France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Italy, and England have supported the PKK terrorist organization on these issues to some extent.

When examining state sponsorship of terrorism, there are two important points to note. First, states almost never explicitly accept that they are sponsoring terrorist organizations. Second, unlike other material resources, the monetary value of safe havens, political support, professional training, and turning a blind eye to the activities of the terrorist organizations cannot be measured. Thus, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to name monetary amounts raised through state sponsorship.

Overall, the PKK relied heavily on state sponsorship from its establishment to late 1990s. Throughout this phase, the PKK was mainly sponsored "by Syria and other states interested in weakening Turkey."[217] "In 1998, Syria cut its ties with the PKK after Turkey threatened to invade [Syria,] what was then the group's primary sanctuary."[218] Especially after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's armed campaign drastically decreased, as did its need for material resources. In an unprecedented development, the United States' declaration of a global war on terror also helped to create sensitivity about sponsoring terrorist organizations in the international arena. Iran's policy

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[216] Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 12–16; Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 429–434, 449–453.

[217] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," www2.janes.com/janesdata/jir/history/jir2008/jir10346.html (accessed April, 14, 2010), n.p.

[218] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

shift on the PKK diminished the all-time low state support for the PKK even further.[219] Thus, the PKK lost its state support as these factors came in to play.

Nonetheless, the PKK terrorist organization, known for its high adaptability to changing environments, had other funding resources at hand to compensate for this loss. Beginning with Syria's policy change, the PKK terrorist organization funded its campaign independently from state sponsors.[220]

### 2. Illegal Activities

#### *a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Illegal Activities*

Terrorist organizations can raise funds through illegal activities, such as smuggling, petty theft, sales of pirated goods, and kidnapping for ransom. Terrorist organizations can obtain funds relatively quickly by utilizing criminal activities.[221] In addition, these methods are easily accessible. Cities and other population centers are ideal for armed theft, credit card theft, fraud, counterfeiting, intellectual property theft, and kidnapping. Furthermore, criminal activities such as kidnapping and armed robbery do not demand high skill and expertise to conduct.[222] Thus, it provides a certain amount of independence to terrorist groups. For other illegal activities that require expertise, such as identity theft, counterfeiting, and trafficking in persons and smuggling of goods, terrorists can outsource the required expertise from other criminal groups.[223] Resorting to illegal activities also undermines the incumbent authority by challenging the state's security apparatus and disrupting public order. Even if that is an unintended consequence, it serves the fundamental principles of terrorist

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[219] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[220] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[221] Picarelli, John T. and Louise I. Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," Chap. 3 in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Harold A. Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo, 39-55, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, 40.

[222] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 45.

[223] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 45.

organizations well: to weaken state authority and establish their own rule over the population. Moreover, small-scale illegal activities leave small footprints and can be hard to trace back to terrorist organizations.[224] On the other hand, narcotics and smuggling remain the most significant activities that terrorist groups employ to generate funds.[225] Establishing an adequate infrastructure to run these kinds of operations, however, requires high levels of expertise and makes terrorist organizations highly visible to authorities. Thus, getting involved in drug trafficking and trafficking human beings (THB) is a strategic decision for terrorist organizations insofar as the extra benefit obtained from the funds generated must outweigh increased law enforcement activity against the organization.

One of the major disadvantages of occupying with criminal activities is that, "terrorists who choose criminal enterprises may become distracted from their perceived mission."[226] Terrorist organizations are inherently embedded in the population and derive their material and political support from the community they emerge from. Getting overly involved in criminal activities may cause community support to erode as criminal activities become harmful to the community.[227] Resorting to criminal activities also makes the motives of terrorist groups questionable.[228] The second major vulnerability created by resorting to criminal activities is that terrorist organizations become more visible to government authorities as they become heavily involved in criminal activities.[229] High visibility to authorities brings with it increased costs of operational security. Accordingly, terrorist organizations are forced to develop highly sophisticated structures in order to generate the same amount of funds. Thus, the costs of criminal activities increase. Moreover, other organized crime entities and terrorist organizations can rush in to increase their market shares and generate funds as

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[224] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 45.

[225] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 42–43.

[226] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 50.

[227] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 50.

[228] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 50.

well. In time, groups that involve in excessive illegal activities may separate from the organization and the organization may lose command and control of the apparatus that specialize in illegal activities. Finally, the ringleaders of illegal fund-raising activities enjoy an increasing power base within terrorist organizations due to having access to large amounts of funds. These individuals may cause fractioning within the organization and a competition for leadership may weaken the terrorist organizations over the long term.

#### *b. PKK and Illegal Activities*

(1) Drug Trafficking. Even though accumulated drug usage data verify that Turkey is primarily a transit country, rather than a significant drug market, the majority of the drugs that pass through Turkey return as bullets and bombs used by the PKK.[230] Various reports from different resources connect the PKK with drug trafficking. The PKK's involvement in drug trafficking dates back to the early 1980s. From the very beginning, the PKK took part in the production and transportation sectors of drug trafficking.[231] Turkey's geographical position enables the utilization of its geography as a bridge between the "Golden Crescent," the area made up of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, which where most of the drugs in the global market are produced, and Europe. Sources state that 80% of the drugs produced in this region are transferred to Europe through Turkey,[232] and 94% of the Afghan-originated opiate seizures took place on an extended route through the Balkans.[233] The same reports further demonstrate

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[229] Picarelli and Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," 50.

[230] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," International Strategic Research Organization, www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=702 (accessed August 18, 2010), n.p.

[231] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[232] Roth, Mitchel P. and Murat Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30, (2007): 901-920, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701558620 (accessed February 13, 2010), 907.

[233] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2009*: UNODC Vienna, 2009, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2009.html (accessed April 27, 2010), 44.

the opportunity for the PKK to become involved in drug trafficking. Accordingly, it did not take long before the PKK discovered this opportunity and began utilizing it in order to generate funds for its terrorist activities. The U.S. State Department's consecutive annual reports on "The International Narcotics Strategy" in 1996, 1998, and 1999 emphasizes that the PKK uses drug trafficking to support its terrorist activities.[234] The PKK also generated money by taxing other drug smugglers by simply providing them with security services[235] and "extracting so-called revolutionary taxes from narcotics traffickers and refiners in order to finance terrorist actions."[236] As the PKK enhanced its smuggling infrastructure in Turkey, it transferred "tons of morphine base, heroin, liquid hashish and other drug materials" to European countries utilizing the "Balkan Route."[237] A brief look at the journey of a kilogram of heroin would demonstrate the profitability of drug trafficking; one kilogram of heroin can be obtained from Afghanistan for approximately $1,000 to $2,000. The price of this product is between $6,000 and $8,000 in Turkey. A wholesaler in Germany would pay $20,000 to $80,000 for it, and ultimately a kilogram of heroin would value somewhere around $75,000 to $225,000 on the streets of Western European countries.[238]

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[234] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 907.

[235] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[236] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 908.

[237] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[238] UNODC, World Drug Report 2009, 44.



Figure 4. Balkan Route (After UNODC, World Drug Report 2009, 180.)

The PKK was also quick to understand that the real profit came from processing raw drug material rather than transporting it. Thus, beginning in the late 1980s, the PKK constructed drug-processing laboratories in Turkey.[239] In the 13 years between 1986 and 1998, 50,000 tons of heroin, hashish, and morphine related to the PKK were seized.[240] Authorities also state that, while it had access to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon during 1980s and early 1990s, in addition to the drugs it processed in Turkey, the PKK produced 60 tons of heroin and hashish annually in the area.[241] The establishment of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and the PKK's control over it provided the PKK with a significant boost in drug trafficking. Apart from other aspects, the PKK used Kurdish immigrants in the drug business, even forcing 10- to 15-year-old children to sell drugs.[242] According to Interpol data, the PKK owned 80% of the European drug market with 178 organizations in 1992.[243] Germany stated that 75% of the

[239] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[240] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 363.

[241] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 363.

[242] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[243] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

drugs apprehended in the country in 1994 were related to Kurds living in Germany, while other sources estimated that some 60% to 80% of the European drug market was controlled by the PKK between 1992 and1996.[244]

The turn of the century did not bring good news on this issue. Drug trafficking became even more important for the PKK because of its loss of state support in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the war in Iraq re-routed a significant amount of heroin traffic from Iran to Iraq due to decreasing law enforcement levels and the power vacuum in Iraq; the PKK benefitted from this change.[245] Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, countering the financing of terrorism became more important, and the European states strengthened their efforts in this area. Various law enforcement operations throughout Europe targeted the PKK. British security services arrested two PKK militants in a case related to PKK financing in 2002; the Netherlands raided a PKK camp in 2004, arresting 29 PKK militants, who admitted that they were training to participate in the PKK's armed campaign against Turkey; in 2005 Germany shut down several websites and news agencies that supported the PKK.[246] In 2007, France arrested 13 people who were suspected of PKK financing and drug trafficking activities; simultaneous arrests also took place in Belgium, where most of the suspects were gradually released afterwards, and Germany.[247] Nonetheless, these efforts had limited effects on the PKK. European sources state that in 2005, Turks controlled 80% of the European drug market.[248] Even if it is unrealistic to assume that the PKK is completely responsible for this 80%, the PKK is known for taxing the income of other criminal organizations. While the PKK may not directly control 80% of the

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[244] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

[245] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," www2.janes.com/janesdata/jir/history/jir2008/jir10346.html (accessed April 14, 2010), n.p.

[246] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[247] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[248] Laciner, Sedat, "Drug Smuggling as Main Source of PKK Terrorism," n.p.

European drug trade, it is possibly earning a share through so-called taxes from the part of the trade for which it is not directly responsible.

In sum, the PKK utilized the geographical features of Iraq and Turkey to establish its drug trafficking infrastructure to the greatest possible extent. The PKK was involved in the production, transport, and sales phases of the illegal drug trade from the early 1980s to late 1990s. Additionally, the PKK taxed other criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking, and used the funds generated to support its terrorist actions. The PKK lost its state sponsorship in late 1990s; thus, other sources of income became more important to support the organization's needs. On the other hand, the international environment became more sensitive to the need to counter terrorism funding after 9/11 with the efforts of the United States as an example. Nevertheless, the European Union countries' crackdowns on the PKK's drug trafficking structure are far from producing the desired outcomes. On one hand, Western Europe countries are reluctant to act decisively against the PKK's drug trafficking activities. On the other, there is little, if any, control over the Golden Crescent countries' drug production functions. Thus, without control over the main parameters that fuel drug trafficking, it seems there is little Turkey can do without international cooperation to disrupt funds flowing to the PKK via drug trafficking.

(2) Trafficking Human Beings. The geographical position of Turkey plays a significant role in the THB issue as well. Turkey is an important transit country for illegal immigrants trying to gain access to European Union countries.[249] The PKK utilizes human trafficking to such an extent that it is the PKK's second most profitable illegal activity after drug trafficking.[250] Beginning in 1989, the PKK established passport counterfeiting groups to traffic refugees into Western Europe. Some sources argue that the PKK purposefully encouraged

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[249] Jane's Military and Security Assessments. "Security, Turkey," n.p.

[250] Onay, Abdulkadir, *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 21, 2008, http://www.turkishcoalition.org/media/PKK_Criminal_Network_in_Europe.pdf (accessed April 30, 2010).

immigration in order to capture European public opinion and manipulate that attention so as to reach its own goals.[251] Between 1989 and 1992, the PKK was involved in trafficking Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnicity into Europe and thereby manipulating the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The PKK helped Turkish Kurds only if they declared that they were facing deliberate ethnic discrimination from the Turkish government.[252] After providing passage to Western Europe countries, the PKK managed to utilize these growing refugee and illegal immigrant population according to its own needs. This issue will be discussed in detail in the following sections. An overall examination of the issue reveals that the PKK also uses its drug trafficking routes to traffic human subjects from South Asia to Europe via Turkey.[253] Interpol states that the PKK generates between €2,000 and €3,000 from each illegal immigrant, and Italian security officials accuse the PKK of smuggling some 9,000 refugees solely in 2001.[254] In 2005, after dismantling a PKK-related human smuggling ring, Romanian officials stated that the PKK charged each illegal immigrant from €6,000 to €7,000 in exchange for safe passage to Western European countries.[255] The same sources claim that the money generated through these operations is then sent to PKK camps in Iraq to support the PKK's terrorist campaign.[256]

(3) Other Illegal Activities. In addition to forging passports and other materials used to traffic illegal immigrants to Western Europe, according to Interpol data, the PKK was involved in counterfeiting government stamps and $100 banknotes in mid-1990s.[257] Furthermore, the PKK smuggles contraband cigarettes with forged tax stamps and then sells them for retail

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[251] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 361.

[252] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 361.

[253] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 909.

[254] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 909.

[255] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 909-910.

[256] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[257] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 912.

price.[258] A lawsuit in 2002 indirectly "revealed that [between 1990 and 2002] the PKK units in northern Iraq were collecting tax on all cigarettes trafficked into Baghdad and the rest of Iraq" through the towns of Dohuk and Zakho, which were then under the control of Uday Hussein, the son of Saddam Hussein.[259]

Other reports have added blood smuggling to the trafficking activities of the PKK. In 2005, *Aksiyon*, a weekly Turkish newsletter, reported that the PKK was collecting blood from southeastern areas of Turkey under its so-called Kurdish Red Crescent organization, and smuggled this blood abroad to sell, pass tests on to generate an ethnic map and sell the acquired results to make money.[260]

### 3. Legal Activities

#### *a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Legal Activities*

Terrorist organizations utilize legal activities, such as front companies and legal businesses, to generate funds. Most transnational terrorist organizations benefit from legal fund-raising activities. These legal businesses or front companies serve as money laundering operations, which help terrorist organizations to move funds generated by means of illegal activities into the legal commercial system.

However, legal businesses can be seized because they are visible to the authorities. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies perform continuous surveillance to prevent direct support to terrorist organizations, and when there is clear evidence that a legal organization is providing funding for a terrorist organization, its funds are either frozen or confiscated by the government. The complexity involved in establishing and running a successful business is another

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[258] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 912.

[259] As cited in Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 912.

[260] As cited in Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 912.

difficulty for terrorist organizations. Legal businesses require high levels of expertise and experience to run; this aspect of legal activities raises the bar and cost of entry to this market. The last, but not the least, important drawback to utilizing legal businesses for fund-raising is that these entities provide an entry point for the authorities. States can infiltrate agents into the terrorist organizations' economic system through legal businesses and obtain a continuous flow of intelligence about the fund-raising activities of the terrorist organizations.

#### *b. PKK and Legal Activities*

(1) Affiliated Organizations. When it comes to legal activities as a source of terrorism financing, "according to Turkish authorities, the PKK has a vast network of 400 affiliated organizations in Europe—about half of which are in Germany—engaged in these activities."[261] One of the difficulties of designating a legal organization as an apparatus of a terrorist organization's financing function is linking the legal organization's money flow to the terrorist organization. As the effects of globalization made it easier to move money and materials across borders, national law enforcement agencies became helpless against the legal loopholes utilized by these legal companies. Nonetheless, the following list[262] demonstrates the spectrum of the legal activities that the PKK is involved in:

- Two news agencies
- Four television stations
- Thirteen radio stations
- Ten newspapers
- Nineteen periodicals
- Three publishing houses

[261] Onay, *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*, n.p.

[262] Onay, *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*, n.p.

In-depth analysis and naming these organizations are beyond the scope of this analysis; however, this list demonstrates the wide spectrum that the PKK uses to raise the funds it uses to support its terrorist actions. It should also be noted that however small the income generated from these legal businesses, these companies mainly serve two other more important purposes for the PKK: propaganda (i.e., legal businesses disseminate the political message of the PKK and serve as the showcase of the PKK to the masses) and money laundering (i.e., legal businesses are invaluable money laundering assets for every group that generate funds from illicit means—it is this issue that is discussed next).

(2) Money Laundering. The PKK's need for money laundering is not great because the PKK, like many other terrorist organizations, uses its monetary resources to buy illegal goods and services. For instance, the PKK raises significant resources through drug trafficking and uses these resources to buy weapons and ammunition from illegal third parties, or to bribe officials to turn a blind eye to its cigarette smuggling activities. Thus, the need for clean money is relatively low compared to total income, insofar as the majority of expenses are incurred in illegal economic markets. The PKK has also directed some of its income to establish legal investments and corporations as a means of sustaining a steady income over the long term, thus supporting its existence.[263] Two important law enforcement operations reveal the size and the scope of the money laundering apparatus of the PKK.

In September 18, 1996, the English, Belgian, German, and Luxembourg police forces launched Operation Sputnik in order to investigate the Med TV Broadcasting Company's suspected money laundering activities as they related to the PKK. Authorities were able to link $11 million U.S. of Med TV's assets to PKK drug trafficking and THB operations undertaken.[264] Further

[263] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 364.

[264] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 911.

investigation revealed that "the PKK conducted its activities through fifteen different companies that laundered illicit money" including the so-called Kurdish Parliament in Exile.[265]

In 2002, the Belgian and French police forces launched Operation Sputnik II to target the PKK's money laundering activities. The investigation revealed a Paris-based company, which laundered money and forged documents.[266] As the investigation matured, the authorities discovered that a company named Kurdish Foundation Trust transferred laundered money to the PKK.[267] Other sources stated that Kurdish Foundation Trust was originated from the "Jersey Islands, known as an offshore haven for international money laundering."[268] Turkish authorities also name Greek Cyprus, also another international haven for money laundering, as one of the locations that the PKK utilizes for this purpose.

Considering the scarcity of operations that target the PKK's money laundering apparatus and the legal difficulties surrounding the money laundering issue as a whole, these two operations demonstrate the spectrum of PKK's money laundering operations. They reveal that the PKK has a vast network of legal companies that are used for transferring assets and launder dirty money generated through illegal sources. It would not be too far-reaching to assert that the PKK has professionally set up its money laundering system utilizing the legal loopholes and black holes of the European money market.

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[265] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 911.

[266] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 911.

[267] As cited in Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 911.

[268] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 911.

### 4. Donations, Charity Organizations and International Diasporas

#### *a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Donations, Charity Organizations and International Diasporas*

Donations, charity organizations, wealthy individuals, and international diasporas that favor the cause of terrorist organizations also provide significant income for the terrorist organizations. Due to its nature, popular support can be as much witting as unwitting. For instance, terrorist organizations can easily generate funds from an unwitting public through aid money collected in mosques after Friday prayers, door-to-door sales of published material, and charity organizations working under pseudo-causes. Terrorist organizations, however, can also establish liaison offices and well-known charity organizations to raise funds. Donations and charities provide a relatively easy and low-cost way to generate funds. They are simple to establish and law enforcement agencies cannot interrupt them at will because they are legal. Geographical flexibility is another benefit of these assets; terrorist organizations do not need to spend the money obtained through donations and charities in the areas where they are generated. These entities help raise funds from individuals who fear public pressure by keeping the donors' identities anonymous. International diasporas can help terrorist organizations in two ways. First, members can either directly donate money and labor to terrorist organizations or can help terrorist organizations in expanding their support bases. Second, powerful members of the diaspora, who have access to the political systems of the states they operate or hold significant political power, can lobby on behalf of the terrorist organization's cause and provide political and/or funding support for the terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, there is a limit to the funds that can be raised in this way because participation cannot be forced. The legal nature of these assets also leaves them open to scrutiny, and transparency regulations limit direct involvement in funding terrorist actions. In fact, when links between charities and

terrorist organizations are exposed, states can seize or freeze the charities' assets. Moreover, the amount of funds generated is not steady and usually fluctuates depending on the political situation, economic circumstances, and public opinion of the targeted population. Also, donations and charity organizations that generate significant amounts of funds can easily be intercepted, tracked, and infiltrated by law enforcement agencies. Another downside is that if donations and charity organizations generate the majority of the funds for the terrorist organizations, it is possible that these can exercise significant power over terrorist organizations similar to the control exerted by state sponsors. Additionally, a natural order effect can be the emergence of different terrorist organizations that want to benefit from the same public domain resources.

#### *b. PKK and International Diaspora*

The Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe has provided political and material support to the PKK for a long time. On one hand, the PKK masterfully establishes its own diaspora (utilizing THB), while on the other hand it tries to muster more support for its existing diaspora (utilizing propaganda.) For instance, while discussing the THB issue this thesis pointed out the PKK's utilization of trafficked illegal immigrants in order to raise funds. Here the study discusses how the PKK uses THB to establish a diaspora of its own.

The PKK forcibly registers illegal immigrants with various front companies of its own as they are smuggled into Western European countries.[269] Sources point out that the importance of these memberships, as "being related to the Kurdish associations abroad is one of the most important conditions for a Kurd to become a refugee and the acceptance of his/her application."[270] After the illegal immigrants are delivered to their destination, the PKK's front companies provide them with accommodation, food, and take care of the legal issues until

[269] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[270] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 361.

the refugees are able to find a job and provide their own financial support.[271] Ultimately, the refugees provide "membership fees" to these front companies that have helped them during the hardest part of their lives.[272] Furthermore, the PKK has forced children to sell drugs, and has used them as nondeciphered agents in drug trafficking.[273]

Aside from providing an important and stable source of income, Kurdish nongovernmental organizations have provided a strong power base for the PKK in Europe and enabled the PKK to be seen as the so-called political representative of the Turkish Kurds abroad.[274]

### 5. Extortion

#### *a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Extortion*

Even though they use different techniques, both urban and rural insurgencies utilize extortion as a means of fund-raising. Extortion is the natural result of wielding power. Insurgencies tax the public under the name of "revolutionary taxes" in rural areas, and the name of the tax becomes "protection fees" in urban settings. Extortion is a quick and reliable way of generating funds. Terrorist organizations both undermine the legitimacy of the state and establish political control over the population at the same time by taxing the population.

Extortion has many drawbacks if not handled carefully. First, extortion creates resistance from the population. As the amount and the frequency of material demands increase, so do the number of groups that oppose the terrorist organization within the subject population. Given enough time and the necessary conditions, there is a high probability that the population will appeal to the authorities or establish their own enforcement structure for

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[271] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[272] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[273] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[274] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay–Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

protection against extortion. Second, extortion alienates the population from the cause of the terrorist organization. Third, terrorist organizations expose themselves to the law enforcement apparatus of the state, which in turn can exploit this visibility to infiltrate the terrorist organization. Moreover, employing extortion as a fund-raising effort draws unwanted attention to the terrorist organization from third parties, and might possibly cause friction in other fields of operations. Finally, income from extortion is limited to the profits of the businesses being extorted. Consequently, terrorist organizations must consider wisely while employing the extortion strategy to generate funds, because too much of it can backfire and rapidly erode public support for the movement.

#### *b. PKK and Extortion*

Among other forms of fund raising, the PKK is known to use extortion as a way to generate funds. Through coercion, violence, or the threat of violence the PKK extorts members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe who do not voluntarily donate to the terrorist organization.[275] In 2005, the Belgian police arrested several suspects who were tied to the PKK's financing activities. Authorities quickly found that "the suspects were collecting 'tax' from their fellow countrymen" to support the PKK.[276] The "PKK also taxes ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers in Western Europe."[277] Other accounts of PKK extortion in Europe include a protection racket in Northern London where restaurants pay "insurance fees," Turkish businessman of Kurdish origin and various other companies in Belgium that are extorted on a monthly basis, and similar extortion activities in North Rhineland, Westphalia, and Saxony in Germany.[278] The PKK also resorts to extortion in order to generate funds in Turkey from Turkish Kurds who live in

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[275] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay - Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[276] Onay, *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*, n.p.

[277] As cited in Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.

[278] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910–911.

the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey.[279] Other sources state that the PKK extorts money from firms and contractors that are hired by the Turkish government for contracts, travel agencies that work in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, local government offices through coercion and threat of violence, families who obey the law and conscript their children, and ethnic Kurdish businessmen and hotel owners.

### 6. How Much Does the PKK Make?

Up to this point this study has discussed the main sources of funding for terrorist organizations and has analyzed the PKK's position within the terrorism financing spectrum. It now seeks to estimate the amount of income the PKK raises from each source.

As noted earlier it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the amount of resources that the PKK raises utilizing state sponsorship. Additionally, some aspects of state sponsorship, such as political support for the PKK's cause and turning a blind eye to its activities cannot be translated into monetary figures. Figure 5 demonstrates the change in the PKK's overall funding sources in accordance with the result of the analysis provided in this chapter.

[279] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 910.




Figure 5. Tentative Projection of Shifts in PKK's Financing Sources

The PKK terrorist organization has been benefiting from state sponsorship since its establishment. The era of first armed campaign funding, from 1978 to 1998, is dominated with state sponsorship. Foreign states provided the required money, camps, weapons, training, bases and the infrastructure to generate more of these assets to the PKK. Political support from states that held various grievances with Turkey was immense. Accordingly, the PKK slowly but steadily established its own funding sources. As the PKK gained expertise in drug trafficking and trafficking human beings, the organization expanded its reach and scope of the illegal sources of funding. Through the early- to mid-1990s, the PKK managed to stay under the radar as it slowly established its infrastructure and Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not affect the PKK's funding such that the PKK's funding structure was well-established long before this event. In mid- to late-1990s both the legal and illegal funding infrastructure of the PKK had strong foundations and various states' law enforcement agencies increasingly mentioned PKK's name.

As demonstrated in Figure 5, the second era of the PKK's funding is relatively independent compared to the first phase of the armed campaign. The PKK lost its state sponsorship as Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan and no other country dared to provide a safe haven for the terrorist organization. Thus, the main income sources of the PKK have shifted from state sponsorship to self-generated funds. Losing its state sponsors, the PKK was not able to generate as much funds as before (note that Figure 5 represents the percentage of income, not the amount.) Even though European countries cannot be classified as providing funds for the PKK anymore, their passive policy on eradicating PKK's funding assets indirectly help PKK to raise funds freely. Accordingly, Western European countries' reluctance to crack down the PKK's funding apparatus and other activities within their borders is represented as the small state sponsorship area in Figure 5.

One of the main handicaps of working on terrorism financing is the availability of certain figures. Terrorist organizations are illegal entities, and they operate covertly to the possible extent. Thus, it is nearly impossible to map the amount of income they generate and break it down to more detailed articles in order to study extensively. Not making the effort to do so, however, does not help either. Thus, this study compiles figures from various open source data to examine the estimated income of the PKK terrorist organization. The accumulated data are demonstrated in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Estimated Income of the PKK Terrorist Organization

These results underscore the importance of drug trafficking and THB in PKK's funding assets. These two assets, which comprise the majority of its illegal activities, are the backbone of the PKK's funding efforts. The second most profitable asset is legal activities. Front companies, television stations, news agencies, radio stations, and publishing houses generate approximately a quarter of the PKK's income. As discussed above, unlike other assets, these are completely visible to the authorities; the attribution problem, however, coupled with the reluctant law enforcement efforts of the European countries, shield these entities from decisive countermeasures. After Abdullah Ocalan's capture, the PKK had difficulty generating resources from the Kurdish diaspora.[280] Nonetheless, the funds collected from sympathizers constitute approximately 10% to 15% of total annual income. Finally, the income generated through extortion constitutes approximately the same percentage as generated by the Kurdish diaspora.

[280] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay - Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

This section of the chapter examined different sources of income, with their advantages and disadvantages, available to all terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the study discussed the level of the PKK's fund-raising activities utilizing these sources in detail. Finally, a picture of the funding sources and their importance in the overall funding activities of the PKK terrorist organization is analyzed. The remaining part of this chapter discusses the assisting factors whose level of existence significantly affects the amount of funds generated by the terrorist organizations.

## B. ASSISTING FACTORS

Analysts can better designate counterterrorism financing (CTF) strategies if they are aware of the sources and the advantages that these sources provide for terrorist financing. Examining some of the major intervening variables that affect terrorism financing, however, can provide a better understanding of the subject, and increases the precision of the CTF strategies. This section of the chapter focuses on the two major intervening variables of terrorism financing: the effects of safe havens and the relationship between the terrorist financing and organized crime.

### 1. Safe Havens

Safe havens can be identified as geographic areas, infrastructure, and facilities where terrorists can raise funds through different types of financing activities; conduct training and indoctrination; develop logistics networks to enable travel, the movement of money, and the access to fraudulent documents and weapons; and safe areas where terrorist organizations can plan and launch operations.[281] In order for a geographic area to become a safe haven for terrorist activity, it must posses certain attributes. First, geographical areas "that have rugged terrain to ensure the inaccessibility of local authorities, porous borders

[281] Kittner, Cristiana C. Brafman, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 3 (2007): 307–329, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550701246791 (accessed February 4, 2010), 308.

allowing for the easy movement of people and equipment as well as natural geographical features that may serve as physical obstacles to conceal activities" can serve as suitable candidates for physical safe havens.[282] The long shores and porous borders of Chile, the mountainous landscape of the Waziristan region, and the dense forests of Colombia are sound examples of geographical inaccessibility.

The eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, where the PKK's terrorist activities are clustered, have a rugged and mountainous terrain, with average peaks of around 3,000 meters. The terrain comprising the proximity of the Iraq-Turkey border is covered with steep mountains that allow little to no vehicular traffic except on the roads established in riverbeds. The mountain passes are closed by snow during the winter season, which makes ground operations impossible with temperatures as low as -30ºC. The rocky characteristics of the mountains and deep valleys hinder the effectiveness of air operations significantly, including observation and air strikes. The movement speed of dismounted units can be as low as 8 to 10 kilometers a day. Thus, it is nearly impossible to control this area completely. Both the Iraqi and Turkish sides of the border have the same characteristics, and neither government can fully exercise their authority outside population centers. Consequently, the northern regions of Iraq, where the PKK's main and operational bases are located, and the southeastern region of Turkey, where the PKK's terrorist activities are clustered, share the same geographical characteristics and infrastructure deficiencies in general. These attributes of the mentioned region make the area prone to being a geographical safe haven for the PKK terrorist organization.

Another attribute of safe havens is weak governance, which can be defined as the inability of the state to provide security, law and order, and basic public services such as education, health, and infrastructure for the population; to establish and run institutions to provide and maintain domestic and international

[282] Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," 309.

legitimacy; and finally, to control an economic system in order to process internal and external revenues. The level of presence and absence of these conditions places the states along a spectrum ranging from collapsed to failed, failing, and sovereign states.[283] Moreover, weak governance does not need to comprise the whole state for safe havens to emerge. Even sovereign states may have pockets of political instability where the state fails to exert its authority.[284]

The PKK's bases are located in the PUK- and KDP-controlled regions of KRG.[285] After the 1991 Gulf Crisis, coalition forces, and especially the United States, denied the Iraqi central government the ability to exercise its authority in the region by forcing a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel.[286] Thus, beginning in 1992 the PUK and the KDP have actively controlled the region, filling the security and political vacuums in the absence of the central authority. After a skirmish between 1994 and 1997 over the revenue from the border trade in oil, the groups united their efforts and rose as a player both in domestic and international arena to some degree.[287] Accordingly, the region has been controlled by nongovernmental armed groups for a long time, and these groups have neither the military power nor the political will to act against the PKK for the reasons discussed above. In sum, the political history and current political situation surrounding the region inherits the necessary weak governance characteristics for becoming a safe haven for the PKK.

A final attribute of safe havens is "a history of corruption, both governmental and those conducted by criminal individuals, which can further

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[283] Simons, Anna and David Tucker, "The Misleading Problem of Failed States: A 'Socio-Geography' of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era," *Third World Quarterly*, 28, no. 2 (2007): 387–401, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590601153887 (accessed March 18, 2010), 389.

[284] Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," 310.

[285] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Territories, Kurdistan Region," http://jmsa.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/JDIC/JMSA/printFriendlyView.do?docID (accessed October 19, 2010), n.p.

[286] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Territories, Kurdistan Region," n.p.

[287] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Territories, Kurdistan Region," n.p.

exacerbate the circumstances that facilitate terrorists' activities."[288] Corruption boosts the illegal economy, demeans the legitimacy of the state and undermines its authority. As the scale of corruption increases, so does the scale of the shadow economy and creates significant opportunities for terrorist groups to generate funds.

Drug trafficking, sale of counterfeit cigarettes, trafficking human beings, and smuggling both domestically and internationally constitutes the economy of the region.[289] Local industries in the region are nearly nonexistent and the KDP's and PUK's "semi-institutionalized smuggling networks" with Iran and Turkey provide the only source of income for the region.[290] The PKK generates significant amounts of funds taxing these informal trade routes that pass through its region.[291]

In sum, safe havens provide significant opportunities for terrorist organizations to establish and run their infrastructure. Both the presence and level of these attributes designate the level of ungovernability of an area. Financing cannot be thought of as a separate function of terrorist organizations, so safe havens also provide favorable conditions for the financing infrastructure of these organizations. In the light of these conditions, the northern region of Iraq, where the PKK has its physical infrastructure, has been a geographical safe haven for more than two decades. The geography is inaccessible, there is a security and political vacuum in the region, and there has been no legal economy to speak of for nearly two decades. All of these attributes create a physical safe haven from which the PKK can run its operations, in addition to providing significant opportunities to generate funds for its terrorist activities.

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[288] Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," 311.

[289] See "Sources of Funding" section in this chapter for detailed information.

[290] Jane's Military and Security Assessments, "Territories, Kurdistan Region," n.p.

[291] See "Sources of Funding" section in this chapter for detailed information.

### 2. The Relationship Between the Terrorist Organizations and Organized Crime

Scholars increasingly examine the nexus between terrorist organizations in order to identify the impact of this relationship on terrorist financing. To put it briefly, organized crime can be described as a networked or hierarchical structure that systematically adopts as its ultimate objective criminal activities in pursuit of profit.[292] Organized crime entities are profit-focused and employ violence in order to eliminate threats to their businesses, rival organizations, and increase their profit.[293] Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, "can be understood as entities quintessentially political organizations with a commitment to large-scale political change and the use of violence to enable that change."[294] Terrorist organizations are focused on political change and violence is a defining characteristic that differentiates terrorists from other political activists.[295] Williams argue that the common denominator between organized crime and terrorist entities is generating funds, no matter their fundamental differences upon employing violence.[296] Figure 7 demonstrates Williams' modeling of relationships between organized crime and terrorist organizations.

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[292] Williams, Phil, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation?" Chap. 6, in *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, 126–149, New York: Routledge, 2008, 129.

[293] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 129–130.

[294] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 131.

[295] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 131.

[296] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 131.




Figure 7. Possible Relationships and Transformations Between Terrorist Organizations and Criminal Enterprises (From Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 134)

The most common relationship between the criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations is the appropriation of organized criminal activities by terrorist entities.[297] The Provisional Ireland Republican Army (PIRA), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hezbollah, Abu Sayyaf, The Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and the PKK are some of the transnational terrorist organizations that fit this template.[298] While unlikely, cooperation between two entities and the transformation of one entity to other is also possible.

Terrorist entities and criminal enterprises have different priorities and employ violence under different concepts. These groups can meet on common

[297] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 137.

[298] Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime," 134–143 and Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate."

platforms as terrorist organizations employ criminal activities more frequently. Forming alliances and strategic partnerships, however, is unlikely insofar as the gap between the visions of these groups is vast.

The PKK's involvement in organized crime is well established and examined thoroughly in this study. For instance, the PKK takes part in all phases of drug trafficking, from production to retail distribution.[299] The PKK operates laboratories in Iraq and Turkey, using morphine base mostly obtained from Pakistan, and imports anhydride acid from Germany to produce heroin.[300] The PKK has also established its own distribution network for selling the drugs produced on the street, where their value is highest.[301] "Besides trafficking done by individual cells to support their operations, the PKK also 'taxes' ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers in Western Europe."[302] THB, smuggling, and extortion are other activities that cement the PKK's appropriation of organized crime to generate funds. Furthermore, in a study designed to examine different types of criminal activities, a group of law enforcement experts created parameters to distinguish organized crime from other types of criminal activity. After the examination of the PKK's criminal activities according to the eleven parameters established by the study, it turned out that the PKK has actively participated in nine of them.[303] Moreover, when evaluated according to the definitions of the U.N., the PKK is identified as both a transnational criminal organization and a terrorist group.[304]

As much as the PKK's involvement in organized crime is clear, it would be a far-reaching argument to assert that this involvement is turning the PKK into a

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[299] Curtis, Glenn E. and Tara Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*, Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 2002, www.loc.gov/rr/frd (accessed February 13, 2010), 21.

[300] Curtis and Karacan, The Nexus among Terrorists and Organized Crime Networks, 21.

[301] As cited in Curtis and Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists and Organized Crime Networks*, 21.

[302] Curtis and Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists and Organized Crime Networks*, 21.

[303] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 913.

[304] Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 913.

criminal organization.[305] Far from keeping a low profile in order to avoid decisive government retaliation and focusing on profits, the PKK relaunched its armed campaign in 2004.[306] Thus, the PKK can be identified as a "hybrid entity," which can be described as a terrorist organization "stealing whole chapters out of the criminal playbook" to fund its terrorist activities.[307] Unfortunately, Michael Braun, the Drug Enforcement Administration's former chief of operations, identifies these hybrid entities as "the face of twenty-first century organized crime—and they are meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced. They represent the most significant security challenge facing governments around the world."[308] The PKK incorporated the characteristics of organized crime into its structure so as to generate funds only years after being established, and its relation with organized crime turned it into a hybrid entity. Especially after losing its state sponsorship and beginning to finance its terrorist activities independently, the importance of its organized crime activities peaked. On the other hand, as various reports and studies concur, this embeddedness did not turn the PKK into a criminal group.

In this part of the chapter, the study focused on the assisting factors that serve as a force multiplier for terrorism financing sources. First, the roles of geographical safe havens and the nexus among terrorist organizations and organized crime were defined. Next, the PKK was analyzed according to the attributes provided by these definitions to understand the role of these factors in PKK's financing. The findings of the study show that the PKK's funding efforts are boosted by existing physical safe havens, and the PKK successfully incorporates organized crime activities into its financing efforts.

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[305] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay - Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[306] Jane's Intelligence Review, "Kurds and Pay - Examining PKK Financing," n.p.

[307] As cited in Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate," 915.

[308] Freedman, Benjamin and Levitt, Matthew, "Contending with the PKK's Narco-Terrorism," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3151 (accessed August 18, 2010), n.p.

The role of safe havens and the PKK's physical infrastructure play an important role in the ongoing "armed propaganda" of PKK too. The next chapter will further analyze the role of geographical safe havens along with the embeddedness of the PKK terrorist organization in the population, utilizing GIS.

# V. SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN TURKEY: 2008–2010

Developing policy and security options that disrupt terrorist organizations can only be achieved through a clear understanding of the governing dynamics of terrorist organizations. Considering the complex nature of variables that affect terrorist and insurgent movements, countering these threats requires an in-depth analysis in multiple disciplines.

Futrell and Simi's work highlights the effects of locality on social movements.[309] They argue that both indigenous and transmovement free spaces create opportunities for movements to recruit members and sustain collective identity.[310] Likewise, terrorist organizations can benefit from available free spaces to support their activities both materially and politically. Temporal and spatial analyses of terrorist incidents in a given region can provide significant understanding of terrorist organizations' movements utilizing already existing data. GIS permits a better interpretation of the available data and makes statistical analyses more understandable, as GIS provides a common plane on which quantitative and qualitative analyses can merge. This chapter utilizes spatial and temporal statistical and cluster analysis techniques to examine patterns of terrorist incidents. These techniques enable a better understanding of terrorist incidents by adding a spatial dimension and enabling various data processing techniques to be used with current statistical processes.

This chapter analyzes the PKK's activities in Turkey from July 2008 to March 2010. It focuses on the spatial and temporal dispersion of PKK-based terrorist incidents in Turkey within this time span, and on observation of the geographical and temporal patterns of these terrorist incidents. The primary

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[309] Futrell, Robert and Pete Simi, "Free Spaces, Collective Identity, and the Persistence of U.S. White Power Activism," *Society for the Study of Social Problems*, 51, no. 1 (February, 2004): 16–42, www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4148758 (accessed August 15, 2010).

[310] Futrell, Robert and Pete Simi, "Free Spaces, Collective Identity, and the Persistence of U.S. White Power Activism," 16.

questions it addresses are as: (1) Do terrorist incidents form a statistically meaningful distribution over time and space? (2) Can clustered terrorist incidents be identified? (3) Do terrorist attacks follow a distinguishable temporal pattern? Through these questions, the study aims to reach an understanding of the physical infrastructure of the PKK's armed activities in Turkey, whether they are based in geographical safe havens in Iraq's KRG region, or if the PKK is embedded in the population to a degree that supports its independent armed activities within Turkey. Finally, temporal analysis of these incidents will examine the force-on-force counterterrorism capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces. The lack of open-source data and different incident types has an impact on the precision of the following analysis, but the detail level of the data is precise enough to obtain reliable outcomes in accordance with the scale of the study.

## A. A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES

Geographical research of terrorist incidents is focused on the chronology of terrorist events and activities of individual terrorist organizations in a qualitative nature.[311] Nonspatial statistics analyses,[312] hot-spot analyses at the regional or global level,[313] and the identification of the regional origins of terrorist attacks contribute little to address the country-level analyses of terror hot spots.[314] A different study, upon which this thesis is based, analyzes terrorist incidents at the country level and demonstrates that with corresponding intelligence assets and better quality data, the spatial and temporal dispersion of terrorist incidents can

[311] Cronin, Audrey K., "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security,* 27, no. 3 (2002): 30–58.

[312] Hoffman, Bruce, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, Michele Zanini Ronfeldt and Brian Michael Jenkins, 7–38, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999.

[313] Braithwaite, Alex and Quan Li, "Transnational Terrorism Hot-spots: Identification and Impact Evaluation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 24, no. 4 (2007): 281–296.

[314] Braithwaite and Li, "Transnational Terrorism Hot-spots."

be analyzed in order to achieve insightful outcomes.[315] Consequently, this chapter examines the understudied area of spatial and temporal dispersion of terrorist incidents at the country level so as to gain insight into terrorist goals, activity spaces, and behavior patterns.

The majority of crime analysis techniques that are used by police forces around the world can also be utilized in analyzing terrorist incidents. One of the similarities between crime and terrorist activities is their nature. Even though they serve different ends, terrorist incidents are committed in the same way that crimes are. Another similarity is nonrandom target selection. Criminals and terrorists alike choose their targets methodically.[316] Finally, the purpose of the techniques used to detect spatial and temporal patterns of crimes and terrorist incidents is similar: both aim to identify incident patterns and to evaluate the pattern characteristics to generate possible reasoning.[317]

This study utilizes the same spatial autocorrelation, hot-spot analyses and cluster detection methods employed in crime mapping and analyses techniques. When working with GIS, clustering should be examined spatially and temporally to precisely determine the relationship between incidents.[318] With this principal in mind, this study first examines the spatial clustering of the incidents, and then moves on to analyze their temporal characteristics. Finally, the results of both analyses are discussed so as to obtain integrated results with higher explanatory value.

Multi-disciplinary approaches underline the difficulties of developing a working knowledge of different disciplines at the same time. In an effort to relieve

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[315] Seibeneck, Laura K., Richard M. Medina, Ikuho Yamada, and George F. Hepner, "Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004–2006," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32, no. 7 (2009): 591–610.

[316] Seibeneck et al., "Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004-2006," 593.

[317] Getis, Arthur and J. K. Ord, "The Analysis of Spatial Association by use of Distance Statistics," *Geographical Analysis,* 24, no. 3 (1992): 189–206.

[318] Seibeneck et al., "Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004–2006," 594.

the reader of this burden, the chapter begins with an explanation of the spatial and temporal analysis techniques used in this chapter before presenting the actual analyses.

## B. METHODOLOGY

One method used in this research is spatial autocorrelation. Positive spatial autocorrelation highlights geographical areas surrounded by similar rates of incidents, whereas negative spatial autocorrelation indicates areas that have experienced higher rates of incidents in comparison to surrounding areas. Incidents of the same type are likely to be clustered in close proximity to each other, either because of the properties of the target, or the structure of the terrorist organization. Thus, spatial autocorrelation values provide some insight into the occurrence of clustering.

Whereas spatial autocorrelation analysis helps in determining whether the data are clustered, hot-spot analyses identify the locations and size of these clusters.[319] When dealing with hot-spots, it is important to take temporal change into account because over time hot-spots can change size, shape, and location.[320] As Seibeneck argues,

> Tracking hot spots temporally can provide information on the spatial diffusion of crime. Insights into the reasons for the crimes may be found by researching these crime characteristics of local regions…. When applied to terrorist incident data, this technique is useful in the identification of terrorist hot spots, as well as in determining emergent and evolution patterns of hot spots over time.[321]

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[319] Getis and Ord, "The Analysis of Spatial Association by use of Distance Statistics."

[320] Harries, Keith, Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1999, www.ncjrs.gov/html/nij/mapping/pdf.html (accessed December 3, 2009), 114.

[321] Seibeneck et al., "Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004–2006," 594.

Temporal clustering of incidents is a valuable means of analyzing crime.[322] While spatial clustering analysis of data focuses on the location of incidents, temporal clustering analysis focuses on the time clusters of incidents. Time analysis can explain patterns of incidents and add a significant amount of clarity to the interpretation of spatial clustering. This research employs the spatial and temporal analyses while considering these characteristics.

This study utilizes Getis-Ord's $G_i$ and Moran's I tests to analyze the dataset of terrorist incidents. These algorithms are powerful techniques that can provide high precision outputs for interpreting the relations within geographical datasets. Getis-Ord's $G_i$ and Moran's I tests are used to detect areas with a high or low count of terrorist incidents.

Getis-Ord's $G_i$ analysis identifies hot-spots where incidents cluster in a given time period. Hot-spots are designated as areas in which the existence of incidents is not coincidental and where the incidents originate from a specific cause. For this study, higher $G_i$ values indicate areas that experience more terrorist incidents than others, within a region.

On the other hand, Moran's I analysis identifies the spatial autocorrelation of incidents. As discussed above, positive values indicate areas that are surrounded by areas with a similar number of incidents, where negative values indicate areas with a higher number of incidents than surrounding areas. For instance, consider a province that is experiencing high numbers of terrorist incidents. If the neighboring provinces also experience high counts of terrorist incidents, the positive I value of the selected province will be higher. However, if the neighboring provinces experience low numbers of terrorist incidents, the selected province is assigned a negative I value. Thus, the proximity of events is significant to spatial analyses, as opposed to temporal and chronological analyses.

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[322] Johnson, Shane D. and Kate J. Bowers, "The Stability of Space-Time Clusters of Burglary," *British Journal of Criminology*, 44, (2004): 59.

In sum, both hot spot and spatial autocorrelation analyses provide invaluable insight by utilizing the geographical dispersion of incidents, if interpreted correctly. GIS provides a plethora of tools for analysts to use in interpreting the geographical and temporal dimension of various incidents. While the available information on the terrorist incidents makes it tempting to conduct multiple analyses, this study opts for a parsimonious framework, as outlined in the following section, in an effort to focus on the main research questions of this study.

## C. DATA AND EXPLANATORY VALUE OF ANALYSES

### 1. Dataset Preparation

The data used in this research are accessible from the official website of the Turkish General Staff.[323] The data used in the study include the date of the incident, location (province and sub-district), type of incident, number of dead, number of wounded, and a description of the event. Another attribute designating the distance of the provinces from the Iraq border is also incorporated into the data. The latitude and longitude of provinces and sub-districts are obtained from open-source gazetteer files. Finally, the resulting dataset is divided into four-month intervals before running Getis-Ord's hot-spot analyses and Moran's I analyses to identify the spatial autocorrelations and the hot-spots in the dataset.

The geographical detail level of the data and the scale level of the research force a smaller scale hot spot analysis; however, this should not be considered as a shortcoming, since the purpose of this research is to examine country-level terrorist incidents. Sub-district level research would have yielded similar results, as the geographical scale of the study would have rendered the accuracy of distance meaningless. A more detailed study on a larger geographical scale, however, definitely needs sub-district level analyses.

[323] "Bolucu Teror Orgutuyle Mucadele Olaylari," Turkish General Staff, www.tsk.tr/HABERLER_ve_OLAYLAR/5_Bolucu_Teror_Orgutuyle_Mucadele/bolucu_teror_orgutuyle_mucadele_2010.htm (accessed March 7, 2010).

### 2. Proximity to Safe Havens

Using spatial clustering analyses, this study also aims to test the effects of physical distance to Iraqi border on the level of terrorist incident counts. One hypothesis argues that PKK militants are more active near the Iraqi border, where their main bases and camps are located. The camps provide logistical support, and the international border helps terrorists evade pursuit by security forces. Therefore, to examine the importance of external support and protection that the political geography provides, a “Border Effect” variable is also analyzed in this study. It was generated with the following equation:

$$\text{Border Effect} = C \times (1/D)$$

Where “C” represents the count of events over a specific time period for a province, and “D” is the distance from the province to the Iraqi border. The inverse of the distance to the border is used in order to better capture the impact of incidents that take place closer to the border. If the inverse of the distance is not used, then a relatively small number of remote incidents can distort both the hot spot and spatial autocorrelation values calculated for “Border Effect” variable.

Hot-spot analyses and geographical autocorrelation tests for the “Border Effect” shed light on the infrastructure and the effectiveness of the PKK’s armed activities in Turkey. For instance, hot spots designated with the “Border Effect” variable in neighboring provinces that are in close proximity to the border indicate that militants are tied logistically to their camps beyond the border. Ultimately, hot spots around the border area can be interpreted as the PKK’s inability to operate without the active support of the population. Finally, if a province is not designated as a hot spot with incident count analysis and identified as a hot spot for distance analyses, this means that the terrorist incidents in that province are supported significantly from beyond the border camps.

Autocorrelation *z* values indicate the incident relationship between neighboring provinces. This study looks for high negative *z* values near the border area because such values indicate outliers (i.e., provinces surrounded

with unlike incident values). Provinces with high negative *z* values calculated for the "Border Effect" near the border area represent a geographical distinction that is dependent to the distance from the border. When compared with Moran's I test for incident counts, the *z* value of "Border Effect" variable displays the effect of distance to the Iraqi border. Some provinces with a high level of clustering will not be considered outliers. In that situation, the clustering for outlier provinces proves to be highly correlated with their distance to the Iraqi border.

### 3. Temporal Pattern Analyses

For the purposes of temporal pattern analyses, the dataset is divided into time periods that are similar to the spatial analyses dataset. However, incidents are classified according to their types. Terrorists seized and surrendered, depots and weapon caches found by security forces, and extortion of resources from civilians are counted as successes for counterterrorist forces. All of these events indicate information superiority, the terrorists' loss of faith in the cause, and the lack of infrastructure to support armed activities independently. These indicators point to a decline in the power of the terrorist organization. Accordingly, these types of events demonstrate the impact of counterterrorism efforts on the structure of the terrorist organization. This part of the study draws on an aspect of counterinsurgency theory that argues that the success of a counterinsurgent effort should not be measured in terms of the number of insurgents incapacitated, but rather in terms of the damage inflicted on the terrorist organization's infrastructure.[324] Accordingly, incidents that are not classified as successful counterinsurgency incidents, such as clashes between terrorists and security forces, regardless of initiator or outcomes; IED attacks, both successful and unsuccessful; and any interaction with civilians other than extortion of

[324] McCormick, Gordon, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, (2009). Depicted in Wendt, Eric P, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare*, 18, no. 2 (September, 2005): 2-13, http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/CLFCSC-CCEMFTC/courses/OPPCOIN/Pre-Reads/Strategic%20COIN%20Modelling%20Wendt.pdf (accessed August 12, 2009), 5–6. This counterinsurgency model also explains the approach of the GIS analyses in this chapter to temporal classification of the terrorist incident types and interpretation of analysis results.

resources, such as kidnapping or killing, are considered to be successful terrorist incidents. The logic behind this classification is that these incidents would not have taken place if the PKK were not present and capable of undertaking armed terrorist activities.

The classification of the data has a significant effect on the outcome of the temporal analysis. The results of temporal analyses can vary widely, according to the incident types designated as successful terrorist activity or as successful counterterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, this study makes an effort to examine the temporal patterns of terrorist activity and the effectiveness of the security forces' counterterrorist strategy on a strategic level. Detailing the variables in order to obtain tactical level success over time is beyond the scope of this research.

## D. RESULTS

### 1. Spatial Clustering Analyses

Both Anselin and Moran's I and Getis-Ord's $G_i$ tests are run twice for each subset of the dataset. One set of the tests is run for incident counts, and the other set is run for the dataset created using the "Border Effect" variable. Table 2 summarizes the results of $G_i$ and I tests. In an effort to determine whether particular results are statistically significant and to normalize the test results among data groups, *z* scores are used instead of $G_i$ and I values. The hot-spot and clustering analyses outcomes are evaluated in accordance with the normal distribution *z* values, where $|z| \geq 1{,}96$ represents a p-value $< 0{,}05$, which indicates that there is a greater than a 95% chance that the observed scores have not occurred by chance.

| Cluster Tests | Incident Count Hot Spots | | Border Effect Hot Spots | | Incident Count Clusters | | Border Effect Clusters | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Province | Z Score | Province | Z Score | Province | Z Score | Province | Z Score |
| 2008 Aug - Dec | Sirnak | 4,40412 | Sirnak | 4,25160 | Hakkari | 8,65873 | Sirnak | -2,75464 |
| | Hakkari | 4,26427 | Siirt | 3,62737 | Sirnak | 7,34739 | | |
| | Siirt | 3,91368 | Bitlis | 3,19502 | Van | 5,95747 | | |
| | Bitlis | 3,52702 | Hakkari | 2,52855 | Siirt | 4,00833 | | |
| | Van | 3,46692 | Van | 1,98615 | +3 More | | | |
| 2009 Jan - Apr | Sirnak | 4,24619 | Sirnak | 4,53605 | Diyarbakir | 6,37233 | Sirnak | -3,48367 |
| | Siirt | 3,59938 | Siirt | 3,88024 | Bingol | 5,89263 | | |
| | Bitlis | 3,25375 | Bitlis | 3,42713 | Sirnak | 5,61891 | | |
| | Bingol | 3,11150 | | | Mardin | 3,67951 | | |
| | +6 More | | | | +2 More | | | |
| 2009 May - Aug | Hakkari | 4,57917 | Sirnak | 3,76534 | Hakkari | 6,58598 | Sirnak | -2,18369 |
| | Sirnak | 3,85330 | Hakkari | 3,46381 | Van | 4,60767 | | |
| | Van | 3,76783 | Siirt | 3,19959 | Sirnak | 3,54811 | | |
| | Siirt | 3,36319 | Bitlis | 2,80633 | | | | |
| | Bitlis | 2,93125 | Van | 2,75106 | | | | |
| 2009 Sep - Dec | Sirnak | 4,78346 | Hakkari | 4,12313 | Sirnak | 10,9160 | None | |
| | Siirt | 4,14836 | Sirnak | 3,29221 | Siirt | 6,19962 | | |
| | Hakkari | 3,93878 | Van | 3,29221 | Hakkari | 3,67998 | | |
| | Bitlis | 3,77466 | | | Bitlis | 3,35045 | | |
| | Van | 3,13633 | | | Van | 2,48491 | | |
| 2010 Jan - Mar | Sirnak | 4,11809 | Sirnak | 4,83046 | Mardin | 7,18462 | Sirnak | -5,92393 |
| | Siirt | 3,85962 | Siirt | 4,15331 | Diyarbakir | 4,84218 | Siirt | -2,04954 |
| | Mardin | 3,62608 | Bitlis | 3,68782 | Sirnak | 3,66905 | | |
| | Bitlis | 3,33178 | | | Siirt | 2,68796 | | |
| | +2 More | | | | | | | |

Table 2. *z* Score Values for Clustering Analyses

### *a. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2008*

The $G_i$ scores run for 2008 incidents that took place between August and December identify Sirnak, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Van as hot spots. These provinces are shown in Figure 8. The Moran's I test, run for the same period, indicate that Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Van, and three more cities experienced significant positive spatial autocorrelation. Taken together, the $G_i$ and I scores, along with Figure 8, suggest that the incidents in these provinces were highly related to each other and that the count of events produced a geographical zone of hot spots, indicating a nonrandom pattern of incidents.




Figure 8. Hot Spots Identified by Getis-Ord $G_i$ Analyses

The results for the “Border Effect” variable also identified Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, and Van as hot spots. Moran’s I test, however, indicate that Sirnak experienced negative spatial autocorrelation. The results of $G_i$ and I tests indicate that the incidents that took place in Sirnak were highly correlated to its distance to the Iraq border, whereas cities surrounding Sirnak were relatively less affected in relation with their distance to Iraq border in terms of terrorist incidents experienced.

#### *b. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2009*

The hot-spot tests from January 2009 to April 2009 reveal the following results: Sirnak, Siirt, Bitlis, Bingol and six additional cities as hot spots. According to Moran’s I cluster analysis, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Mardin, and two additional provinces experienced spatial autocorrelation, which indicates that they were surrounded by provinces that experienced a similar number of events. These results suggest there is a significant increase in the terrorist incidents that are spatially coherent and follow a pattern. When compared with the previous time period, the number of hot spots doubled, while the number of cities experiencing spatial autocorrelation was almost the same, except for the fact that the spatial weight of clustering expanded slightly to the western part of the country, as shown in Figure 8.

From May 2009 to August 2009, Hakkari, Sirnak, Van, Siirt, and Bitlis were identified as hot spots, which are hot spots throughout the time period of this study. Furthermore, Hakkari, Van, and Sirnak experienced clustering according to autocorrelation analyses. One interpretation of this result is that Siirt and Bitlis were hot spots because of the high number of incidents that their neighboring provinces experienced. On the other hand, Hakkari, Van, and Bitlis remained hot spots due to nonrandom spatial incidents they suffered.

Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, and Van experienced above-average levels of incidents relative to their distance to the Iraqi border. Moreover, Sirnak was the only province that experienced strong negative spatial autocorrelation.

Similar to the previous periods, Sirnak was surrounded by provinces that were not affected by their distance to the Iraqi border as much as Sirnak was.

From September 2009 to December 2009 the hot spots remained the same, with slight differences in *z* values. As in the previous time period, Sirnak, Siirt, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Van remained hot spots as shown, and according to the Moran's I statistic, they also experienced spatial autocorrelation. For this time period, the results of both analyses matched perfectly as seen in Table 2, which indicates the nonrandom spatial relationship between the hot spots.

$G_i$ tests for the "Border Effect" variable identified Hakkari, Sirnak, and Van as hot spots, but Anselin and Moran's I test does not detect any notable spatial autocorrelation among the provinces. This result indicates that while these provinces were hot spots in relation to their distance to the border, there is little sign of a pattern for this phenomenon within them.

#### *c. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2010*

Before discussing the results of clustering tests for the 2010 dataset, it must be noted that, unlike other datasets, which consist of four months of data each, there are only two months of data available for the 2010 dataset. As the number of incidents in a dataset decrease, there is a significant chance that the $G_i$ and I analyses will not produce consistent outcomes for the "Border Effect" variable, due to the geographical scale of the study. Therefore, to prevent inconsistent results related to the small-scale variance in the 2010 dataset, when conducting Getis-Ord's $G_i$ and Moran's I analyses, the "Border Effect" variable was multiplied by ten. Thus, every incident in the 2010 dataset is ten times more sensitive to the incident's proximity to Iraqi border. This multiplier was derived by comparing the data from other periods and running multiple tests for consistency between periods. As seen in Table 2, the results were consistent. Moreover, the

multiplier is applied to entire 2010 dataset, preventing subjective outcomes between provinces. Hot-spot clustering analyses were conducted without any modification to the dataset.

The dataset for January and February 2010 hot-spot analyses of incident counts reveals that Sirnak, Siirt, Mardin, Bitlis and two additional provinces were hot spots. Unlike the preceding period, Mardin, Batman, and Diyarbakir were found to have a higher number of incidents than average. Spatial autocorrelation tests for 2010 time period also revealed a positive spatial relationship between Mardin, Diyarbakir, Sirnak, Siirt, and their surrounding provinces. Notably, Mardin's *z* score is the third-highest in the research. On the other hand, Bitlis's situation can be interpreted as a spillover effect from the high incident count of its neighbors. Like hot-spot analyses for the same time period, as shown in Figure 8, the clustering analyses confirmed a slight shift of clustering to the western part of the country.

The $G_i$ and I tests using the "Border Effect" variable indicate that Sirnak, Siirt, and Bitlis were hot spots and that Sirnak and Siirt experienced significant negative spatial autocorrelation. Similar to the results from previous periods, these results suggest that Sirnak and Siirt were more significantly affected by their distance to the Iraqi border than were other provinces that suffered similar or greater numbers of incidents.

### 2. Temporal Analyses

For the purposes of temporal analyses, unlike spatial analyses, the dataset is not divided into time periods. In order to obtain a comparable outcome, however, the data are categorized into two subsets as explained in the Data Preparation section. One of these subsets represents terrorist incidents. Clashes, regardless of which side initiated them or their outcome, were considered to be terrorist incidents. IED incidents and any incident related to civilians, except extortion of resources by the PKK militants, were also considered terrorist events. The logic of this classification is that none of these types of incidents

would have occurred if it were not for the PKK. Therefore, the aforementioned types of incidents are counted as terrorist incidents. On the other hand, counts of terrorists who have surrendered, depots and weapons caches found, and terrorists seized by security forces are counted toward successful counterterrorism efforts. These incidents demonstrate the impact of counterterrorist efforts on the structure of the terrorist organization. The results of the temporal comparison are shown in Figures 9 and 10.




Figure 9. Security Forces Efforts Compared to Terrorist Incidents Intensity

The temporal analyses of terrorist and security forces incidents are clearly correlated, although they are more correlated beginning in 2009 when the security forces' counterterrorist efforts increased. It should also be noted that terrorist incidents declined sharply from 2008 to 2009. Had more data been available, monthly matched comparison of temporal analyses for consecutive years would have revealed a better understanding of the trajectory and efficiency of counterterrorist efforts.




Figure 10. Temporal Intensity of Terrorist Incidents and Counterterrorism Efforts

## E. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

The spatial distributions of incident clusters identified by hot-spot analyses were concentrated in the southeastern region of Turkey. Moreover, the tests run to examine the effects of the provinces' distance to the Iraqi border also identified hot spots in the same region of the country. Thus, the results for both incident counts and proximity to the Iraqi border match, with high spatial autocorrelation values. The results also lend support to the argument that the distance of the provinces to the Iraqi border has a significant positive effect on the number of terrorist incidents. Put simply, provinces closer to the Iraqi border experienced more terrorist incidents. Test results also support the hypothesis that the PKK does not have a strong infrastructure within Turkey, such that it supports its terrorist activities from its bases located in northern regions of Iraq. When examined, the dataset reveals that some provinces that are not in close proximity to the Iraqi border also experienced high counts of terrorist incidents. The spatial clustering analyses, however, did not identify these provinces as hot spots. This suggests that the PKK lacks the infrastructure and logistical support to sustain its terrorist activities in these provinces and that its activities are marginal in these regions. A second-order inference would be that the PKK lacks the adequate embeddedness within the population to support and sustain its terrorist activities as the distance to its safe havens in Iraq increases.

Temporal analyses as shown in Figures 9 and 10 indicate that security forces can adapt to changes in the intensity of terrorist incidents in a timely manner. It should be noted that clashes were considered to be terrorist incidents regardless of the initiator. Moreover, IED incidents were not classified as either defused or detonated. IED incidents were also considered terrorist incidents. IEDs and clashes constituted 45% of the overall incidents. As shown in Figure 10, the impact of counterterrorist incidents rose during the winter period, where the intensity of terrorist incidents peaks between mid-spring and mid-fall.

There are several explanations for this pattern. One of them is the effect of the rugged terrain of Turkey's southeastern regions. While steep mountains provide cover for terrorist groups, they also make it impossible to operate during harsh winter conditions. With a strong infrastructure the PKK would divert its activities from rural areas to cities where climate changes would not affect the militants. However, the earlier spatial analyses indicate that the PKK's support structure is not strong enough to sustain its activities without support from its bases in Iraq. When the mountain passes are blocked by snow and militants lack support from safe havens, they keep a low profile and try to survive the winter with minimal losses. Temporal analysis indicates that the level of incidents diminished when compared to previous years. Examining more data encompassing a larger time span would provide better evidence for this argument, yet there is a significant decline in the intensity of terrorist attacks through the observed time period.

A third inference can be that the level of terrorist movement is at the level of strategic defense. Figure 10 shows that security forces can easily counter the intensity of terrorist incidents without significant time delays and can adapt to the pace of ongoing activities. Additionally, when examined over time, there is an observable decline in the intensity of terrorist activities, indicating that security forces appear to have been successful in disrupting the PKK's physical structure.

The research could be detailed even further with more precise incident location data. This would allow the analyses of different patterns on a larger geographical scale. When combined with geographic information on rural population concentration and terrain analyses, more detailed clustering patterns can be obtained. Moreover, incidents can be classified according to their types and intensity. Hot-spot analyses of different types of incidents can help to determine changes in the tactics used by the PKK. Furthermore, using spatial analyses to examine the change in the tactics employed can provide a metric for the success of different strategies employed by security forces. If a real-time data feed were available, emerging hot spots could be identified with spatial clustering

tests and counterterrorism efforts could be directed to emerging hot spots in order to prevent an increase in the influence zone of the terrorist incidents. Finally, another way to obtain more precise evaluations would be to acquire more temporal data to designate the trajectory of terrorist incidents over time.

## F. CONCLUSION

The study successfully answers the research questions set for terrorist incident analysis. The results indicate a significant level of spatial and temporal correlation in terrorist incidents. According to the results of spatial clustering analyses, some provinces experienced above-average levels of terrorist incidents. Furthermore, temporal analysis discovered a correlation between terrorist incidents and the Turkish government's counterterrorism efforts, shedding light on the success level of the counterterrorism strategy employed. The results are both statistically significant and reveal much about the patterns of terrorist activities, ranging from the state of counterterrorist efforts to logistic support structure of the PKK terrorist organization.

Initially, the study set out to find a means of disrupting the structure that provides resources to the PKK. The hypothesis tested with the help of GIS and inferences from the results of the analyses in this chapter reveals that:

1. Proximity to the PKK's safe havens affects the number of experienced terrorist incidents,
2. The PKK lacks the logistical infrastructure to sustain armed activities within Turkey independent from logistical support provided by the geographical safe havens,
3. The PKK is not embedded in the population to the level where it can sustain its armed activities through logistical support provided from the population,
4. The PKK lacks the infrastructure to conduct armed campaign in urban areas.

In sum, this chapter concludes that efforts designed to disrupt the physical infrastructure of the PKK's armed activities in Turkey should look beyond the Iraqi border where the geographical safe havens of the PKK are located.

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# VI. CONCLUSION

## A. DESIGNATING THE PROBLEM AREAS

The main objective of this study was to identify the key components of terrorist organizations, whose absence or disruption would affect a terrorist organization as a whole. Deriving a conceptual roadmap from contemporary social movement theory, the research focused on analyzing the resources required to sustain the PKK's terrorist activities. Its main argument was that targeting the resource generation and organizational structure of the PKK can lead to an overall disruption to the PKK's network, ultimately diminishing its terrorist activities and creating greater opportunities to demobilize and reintegrate its members back into the community.

The study thoroughly analyzed the PKK's funding resources and organizational structure. Table 3 shows the designated problem areas in accordance with the analyses conducted in this study.

| Problem Areas | Domain | |
|---|---|---|
| | Financing | Organizational Structure |
| Safe Havens | X | X |
| Illegal Activities | X | |
| Legal Activities | X | |
| International Diaspora | X | X |
| Extortion | X | |

Table 3. Problem Areas and Their Domains

As a result of the conducted analyses, safe havens, illegal activities, legal activities, the international diaspora of PKK members, and funds generated through extortion were designated as principal problem areas. Other means of support, such as state sponsorship, are not as essential as they once were to the PKK's financing or organizational structure. The areas listed above constitute the

backbone of the PKK's funding and material resources; they also provide a disruption-free infrastructure for a sustained armed campaign within Turkey's borders.

## B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy recommendations address the identified problem areas to the greatest possible extent and are focused on their characteristics and attributes. While the second-order effects of these policies on domestic and international audiences cannot be completely anticipated, necessary adjustments should be considered when feedback from these communities becomes available in order to mitigate second-order effects. Furthermore, some of these options require preexisting alliances, strong political support from regional and/or global power sources and timely actions to successfully implement the policies. Letting similar technical and political considerations of the application phase aside, the study offers the following policy recommendations for the problem areas designated in Table 3:

### 1. Mobilize Multinational Organizations and Promote Regional Partnerships

Empowering multinational organizations like the United Nations (UN) to force member states to comply with CTF regulations is one of the most effective ways of countering the PKK's legal and illegal activities. The G-8's Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have all made significant progress regarding CTF issues in the last decade. Furthermore, the European Counter Terrorism Group (a body composed of the 25 EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland) can investigate the PKK's illegal fundraising activities.[325] Likewise, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, which was specifically established to monitor and prevent

[325] Phillips, David L. and National Committee on American Foreign Policy, *Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party*, New York, N.Y.: National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 2007, 13.

terrorism financing activities, can muster the support of the member states against the PKK's legal fundraising efforts through front companies within their borders.[326] The cooperation of states in CTF policies must be further encouraged through the above-mentioned international institutions and others that regulate the money flow of the global economy, remembering that some international organizations might prove more useful than others. For this reason, the Turkish government should primarily collaborate and engage with the most promising international organizations.

The Turkish government should also promote regional partnerships that will prevent the PKK from generating resources and that will deny them safe havens. Turkey should work constructively with neighboring countries such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece, and other stakeholders, as well as with most Western European countries in order to create initiatives where both sides can benefit from the eradication of the PKK's terrorist activities.

Most importantly, Turkey should seek to coordinate its efforts with other power bases, primarily with the Government of Iraq (GOI), as well as with other local organizations, such as the KRG, PUK, and KDP (to some degree) in order to establish border control and impact PKK logistics within the KRG region. On the contrary, exercising political power over the PUK, KDP, KRG, or GOI and operating with a large military footprint (e.g., establishing a military bumper zone within Iraqi territory) would backfire in the long term and provide more material and political support to the PKK. Rather than imposing its will on the GOI, Turkey should cooperate with it.

### 2. Establish and Promote Intelligence Sharing Efforts

The PKK financing mechanism benefits significantly from the effects of globalization. The PKK uses organized criminal activities to generate funds on a global scale. In contrast, the international state system is still struggling to

[326] Phillips, *Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party*, 13.

transform its functions, such as judicial differences, law enforcement regulations and differences in the economical systems to the effects of globalism. Ironically, the PKK generates the majority of its funds within the most developed economies in the world. Effective intelligence sharing, however, can easily turn the tide against the PKK's financing apparatus.

Promoting intelligence-sharing can help states fight terrorist financing more effectively. The legitimacy of the state system does not allow one country's law enforcement efforts to take place within another country's borders. Nonetheless, there are well-established international structures that can be utilized to address this problem. Interpol is one of a number of organizations that promote intelligence-sharing and law enforcement on a global scale. Other multinational organizations such as the U.N. and NATO have their own structures for exchanging information among their members. Accordingly, Turkey should promote intelligence-sharing capabilities within the multinational organizations of which it is currently a member.

Furthermore, Turkey should invest in mutual partnerships and special initiatives on a state-by-state basis in order to improve its intelligence-sharing capabilities. These partnerships should focus on sharing information in order to disrupt the PKK's funding and operational structure. Turkey has already established such a relationship with the GOI through a Counter-Terrorism Agreement[327] and a mechanism is in place with the United States that facilitates sharing operational intelligence.[328] Framing mutual sets of interests with related states can help significantly in establishing these partnerships, inasmuch as stakeholders should be convinced that they will benefit more from cooperation, as opposed to turning a blind eye to the PKK's funding and terrorist activities.

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[327] Phillips, *Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party*, 11.

[328] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

### 3. Enhance the Capabilities of the Partner States

Turkey should work to enhance the capabilities of countries in which the PKK operates. Through existing international partnerships or mutual agreements, Turkey should invest in enhancing the security, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities of related countries.

The PKK utilizes the geographical position of Turkey as a bridge between the Middle East and Europe for its activities, ranging from drug trafficking to THB. On one hand, Turkey should increase its law enforcement efforts to prevent the PKK's criminal and terrorist activities within its borders, while, on the other, it should help its neighbors develop their law enforcement and economical mechanisms to intercept the PKK's terrorist, criminal. and financial activities within their borders.

Turkey's economy is not strong enough to provide significant monetary aid to other countries over the long term. Thus, rather than making marginal economic aid efforts, it should engage in relatively low-cost efforts, such as workshops on countering PKK activities, personnel exchanges between agencies, experience-sharing conferences, and joint training sessions on law enforcement issues related to CTF and terrorist activities of the PKK. Disseminating knowledge about the PKK's operating characteristics also helps law enforcement agencies to establish better counter strategies to cope with crimes such as extortion and illegal activities. These efforts offer long-term solutions. However, they also significantly help in increasing the related countries' awareness of the PKK's overall activities and in forming a strong international alliance against the PKK's financial and terrorist activities.

### 4. Identify an Interlocutor to the Kurdish Issue

As discussed several times in the study, the PKK wants to equate its cause with the Kurdish issue, and at every chance declares itself as the sole

spokesperson on the Kurdish cause.[329] Identifying and supporting a moderate interlocutor for the Kurdish issue will create a rival that can compete with the PKK for its existing power base.

Barkan and Haines examine the radical flank effect in the social movements.[330] Their findings argue that moderate social movement organizations benefit from the presence of extremist movement groups, because extremist movement groups change the perception of the movement in the eyes of authority, and make the cause of the moderate groups seem more tolerable, providing them a stronger bargaining position.[331] With regard to the Kurdish issue, however, identifying a moderate interlocutor should cause a reverse radical flank effect and siphon power from the PKK's support base.

Moreover, such a proposed moderate actor would very likely cause fractioning within the PKK. In the beginning of the resurgence in 2004, Osman Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan's younger brother, and a group of leading figures including field commanders opposed the resumption of armed violence. This group cut its ties with the PKK and formed the Patriotic Democratic Party (Partiya Welatpareze Demokraten, or PWD) and started advocating the Turkish Kurds' cultural rights by nonviolent means.[332] Ultimately, the PWD initiative diminished, in great part because of the PKK's assassination of its members, and in part because of the pressure from the Turkish government. Nonetheless, this example demonstrates that the PKK is subject to fractioning because of alternative moderate initiatives, and could lose a significant portion of its power base because of the emergence of other players on this issue. A new alternative entity would also cause fragmentation and obtain a notable portion of the PKK's

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[329] "Karayilan: 'Operasyon Surerse Ateskes Biter'," *CNN Turk*, October 26, 2010, www.cnnturk.com/2010/dunya/10/19/karayilan.operasyon.surerse.ateskes.biter/593427.0/index.html (accessed October 10, 2010).

[330] As cited in McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 14.

[331] McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 14.

[332] Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "PKK," n.p.

diaspora support in Western Europe, giving moderates within the Kurdish community an option other than the PKK's violent agenda.

In sum, identifying and supporting a moderate interlocutor on the Kurdish issue is very likely to diminish the PKK's power base within the Kurdish diaspora by offering them a nonviolent option. This, in turn, can reduce the amount of revenue collected and recruits drawn from the Kurdish diaspora, both in domestic and international scales. A possible second order effect of this policy is that it could promote fractioning within the PKK, thus undermining its unity and further diminishing its power.

### 5. Increase the Credibility and the Legitimacy of the Government

However minimal its presence, the PKK can still muster material and political support from Turkish Kurds living in the southeastern region of Turkey. Past counterterrorism policies and applications have alienated a portion of the population in this region. Thus, Turkey should increase the credibility and legitimacy of the government, especially in these regions, in order to deny the PKK public support. Furthermore, the PKK's geographical safe haven in Iraq is an ungoverned territory for the GOI. Thus, encouraging measures and cooperating with the GOI to strengthen GOI's authority in this region will increase the governability of the area, and will ultimately eradicate the PKK's camps in the KRG region. Turkey can increase the capabilities of the GOI so as to counter the PKK's activities through other policy options mentioned here. Nonetheless, increasing the governability of an area cannot be achieved through these policies. Furthermore, increasing the overall credibility and legitimacy of the government ensures that the safe havens will be eradicated permanently rather than emerging in other areas of the region.

As discussed earlier, one of the characteristics of safe havens is their physical and political inaccessibility. Turkey should invest in the infrastructure of the southeastern regions of the country. Roads can improve the mobility of law enforcement forces and increase security in the area. Moreover, improved

mobility can help local markets so that legal merchandise can be brought to markets more cheaply and thus compete with smuggled goods. Utilities and other basic public services, such as hospitals and public education, should be extended to the most remote corners of the region. Public goods should be delivered uniformly and reliably in order to help reduce the appeal of PKK propaganda. For instance, the slowness of jurisdiction in the region helps the PKK's propaganda stating that "the citizens do not take their disputes to the Turkish government, we handle them."[333] The Turkish government should employ effective structural reforms to solve similar problems. Basic public services and the rule of law should be a standard, rather than a privilege, in the daily life of citizens.

Border security is another area needing improvement. While improving its own surveillance and security measures, Turkey should come to a mutual border security agreement with the GOI to control and secure the Iraq-Turkey border in order to deny the infiltration of PKK militants and trafficking of illegal goods.

Smuggling and border trade constitutes a major portion of the local economy on both sides of the border. Both Turkey and the GOI should enforce necessary regulations so as to decrease the black and gray economies in the region. Measures such as well-regulated free trade zones near the border areas, offering incentives to trading businesses and establishing more border crossings, thus increasing the volume of border trade, can boost the legal economy and deprive the PKK of its illegal resources in the region. Promoting the local economy will in turn expand job opportunities and increase the wealth of the region. Increased welfare will make the local population less susceptible to PKK's false promises of wealth to recruit militants.

The law enforcement capacity of Turkish agencies should be increased, destroying criminal networks. Petty criminals, drug dealers, and THB suspects should be captured and brought to trial in an efficient manner, so as to deter the

[333] Sehirli, *Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures)*, 464.

criminals' ability to conduct illegal activities. On one hand, this capacity will decrease the PKK's income generated from illegal activities; on the other, it will deter criminal groups from serving as contractors for the PKK's illegal activities. Another effect of increased law enforcement capacity would be to promote the legal economy and increase government legitimacy.

In sum, Turkey should take measures to increase the legitimacy and credibility of state authority by improving the infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, electricity, water, and irrigation, and basic public services, such as education, health services, law, and order in the region. Furthermore, Turkey should aim to improve the legal economy in the region, both by creating jobs and fighting gray and black markets. Establishing strict border security can further undermine the infiltration of PKK militants and the trafficking of illegal goods. Turkey should also increase its law enforcement and judiciary capacity so as to improve government's legitimacy in the region.

Cooperating with the GOI and KRG officially is a must to effectively destroy the PKK's safe havens in the KRG region. Most of the mentioned applications should also be employed by the GOI to disseminate the authority of the GOI effectively into the remote regions of the KRG area. The GOI should make every effort to deny its territory to groups that perform terrorist activities in neighboring states. The ethnicity and nationality of these groups should not prevent the GOI from taking action against them. Some of the measures, such as effective border security and eradication of the PKK's camps, can only be achieved through cooperation of the two states. Accordingly, Turkey and the GOI should actively cooperate to apply measures that will ultimately deny the PKK a geographical safe haven and fund-raising apparatus in the KRG region. Should Turkey choose to directly engage the PKK's camps in the KRG region without the cooperation or consent of the GOI, the local populace and the GOI will not support Turkey's actions and the PKK will gain more political power in the region. Even if it takes longer, cooperating with the GOI and KRG is the only feasible way to eradicate the PKK's safe havens.

## C. MERGING THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION

The policy recommendations proposed in this section address the problem areas designated by the analyses in Chapter IV and Chapter V. Table 4 shows the problem area and solution matrix.

| Policy Recommendations | Problem Areas | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Safe Havens | Illegal Activities | Legal Activities | International Diaspora | Extortion |
| 1. Multinational & Regional Organizations | X | X | X | | |
| 2. Intelligence Sharing | X | X | X | | |
| 3. Capability Building | X | X | X | | X |
| 4. Identify an Interlocutor | | | | X | |
| 5. Increase Credibility & Legitimacy | X | X | | | X |

Table 4. Policy Recommendations and Problem Areas Addressed

Table 4 reveals that recommended policy options generally address more than one problem area. While it is logical to assert that some options have a greater impact on the PKK's resources and physical structure, it would be equally unwise to single out these options and apply them separately. The overlapping options usually address different dimensions of a problem area, and should be applied simultaneously in order to generate a more effective impact on the PKK.

Another point is that the effectiveness of policy options relies heavily on international actors. This situation should not be interpreted as the subjectivity of the study, because the majority of the funding apparatus and physical structure of the PKK is located outside the borders of Turkey. Consequently, countermeasures generally require action or cooperation from international actors. Even though Turkey has made a lot of progress in countering the PKK, especially after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, a vast array of problem areas remain to be addressed regarding this issue domestically.

A fundamental characteristic of counterterrorism strategies is that there is no silver bullet. Therefore, no single strategy can eradicate a terrorist organization completely. Nonetheless, decisive and proper application of this study's policy recommendations should cause a significant amount of damage to the financial and organizational structure of the PKK, which, in turn, should provide further opportunities to ultimately demobilize the PKK terrorist organization.

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