Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations

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Summary

While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be used against Iraq, military contingency planning is underway. This report focuses primarily on these contingency preparations, notably potential military options available and the military preparations that have been undertaken. It addresses elements of the over-arching political debate only when immediately relevant to military planning. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on U.S. Military Action) Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with long-range missile development, and alleged support for terrorism are the justifications put forward for military action. Though initial emphasis was on the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the Administration has more recently pointed to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament as its prime objective.

In 2002 the Administration considered a range military of operational plans ranging from a so-called “lite” option involving primarily special operations forces and indigenous opposition groups to a “heavy”, large-scale invasion option put forward by U.S. Central Command. The Administration initially rejected the heavy option as depending too heavily on regional cooperation and requiring too long to deploy the necessary forces, even though it offered the surest possibility of success. However, the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council has provided the necessary time to deploy over 225,000 U.S. personnel to the Persian Gulf region, and to continue negotiations on international cooperation.

Press reports indicate that almost the full range of military forces would be brought to bear against Iraq, with an emphasis upon simultaneous air power and ground force attacks against the Iraqi leadership, command and control nodes, and seizure of suspected CBW storage sites and oil fields.

Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are reportedly in place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Negotiations continue with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The extent of cooperation may, however, depend heavily upon the results of the UN arms inspections and Security Council action. The United Kingdom and Australia remain the only nations committed to contribute forces. Though costs remain very difficult to predict, several estimate have been put forward, ranging from $50 billion to $1.2 trillion depending on the factors included (e.g., occupation costs, economic consequences).

This report will be updated as events warrant.
Iraq: Potential Military Operations

Background

Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal, however Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power by force, was the only way to eliminate the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.1 Although the Administration has voiced strong skepticism of United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq, it nevertheless negotiated the drafting and passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, which returned inspectors to Iraq. The resolution requires the inspectors to provide periodic reports on their findings.2 Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on August 12, specified the following conditions that the Administration believes Iraq must meet to forestall military action against it:

- Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
- End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
- Cease persecution of its civilian population.
- Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
- End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.3

While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be used against Iraq, military contingency planning and substantial force deployment are underway. This report focuses primarily on these contingency preparations, notably potential military options available and the military preparations that have been

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1Vice-Presidential speeches, August 26 and 29, before the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Veterans of the Korean War. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/]; Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz., Associated Press interview, September 10, 2002; Secretary Rumsfeld, BBC interview, September 13, 2002.

2For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, *Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy.*

3President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002.
undertaken. It addresses elements of the over-arching political debate only when immediately relevant to military planning.

Military Planning and Preparations

The Department of Defense has officially released limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq. There have been, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provide a range of details. News reports have indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.

Options Considered

In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing extensive use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.4

While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This option also does not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation.

This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command commander who first briefed it to the President and White House Staff calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the

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length of time required for deployment were the major concerns. However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy very substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military preparations today appear to adhere closely to CENTCOM’s originally recommendations.

**Current Planning and Preparations**

Reportedly, this option would involve 250,000 troops, and would combine an air offensive with up to four armored, mechanized, and/or Marine divisions. In essence, it would be a smaller version of the 1991 Desert Storm operation, with the smaller force reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option is greatly dependent upon the cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and has required months to deploy the necessary forces. It is generally considered to offer the greatest certainty for a rapid victory against even significant Iraqi resistance, and is in keeping with the so-called “Powell Doctrine’s” concept of overwhelming force. It also would result in substantial forces in place to maintain the occupation of Iraq until such time as a new government was established.

Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official figures, it appears that over 225,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) or en route. Five of the Army’s ten divisions have been dedicated to the operation, as have six of twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups. The Air Force has substantially augmented the units that have been maintaining the “no-fly” zone over northern and southern Iraq since 1991, and now has approximately 15 air wings in the region. Strategic bombers that are expected to play a large role may be operating from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases both in Europe and the United States. (For a detailed overview, see CRS Report RL317563, *Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.* ) The United Kingdom is deploying an armor task force of approximately 47,000 troops, and Australia has deployed an undisclosed number of special operations forces.

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Factors for Consideration

Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations

It appears that, unless there are major shifts in the international political scene, U.S. military action against Iraq will not be in the context of a large coalition similar to that formed for Desert Storm in 1991. To date, only the United Kingdom and Australia have offered their armed forces’ participation. In 1991, 28 nations contributed military units. Also, the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf States provided extensive staging and transportation facilities, and multiple fronts from which to launch attacks. Egypt, a 1991 coalition member, expedited passage of naval forces and transport shipping through the Suez Canal. Aside from their military force contributions, European allies also permitted use of U.S. airbases in their countries and granted overflight rights. Though some European allies appear to be less opposed to military action than previously, the extent and conditions of possible assistance remain unclear. Depending upon how international events play out – particularly the reports of U.N. arms inspectors and the actions of the U.N. Security Council, this type of cooperation may or may not be available to the extent it was in Desert Storm.

Considerations such as these, particularly in a fluctuating international political environment, confront military planners with complex challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations which indicate a greater willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this could result in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps overt cooperation after an attack has begun and a U.S. victory appears assured.

Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, has now expressed some willingness to permit the United States use of its facilities, upon condition of a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. Saudi cooperation would provide a very significant boon to military planners, though there may be some concern over what role in military decision-making the Saudi government would play once an operation is underway.

Knowing that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia may not be available for full operations against Iraq, the United States has been establishing defense agreements, and expanding or upgrading airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the region is judged the most reliable. Each of these countries has permitted use of airbases to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia

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allowed only the use of the air operations command center on its territory. Given the range of facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued cooperation would be crucial to a military offensive against Iraq. As with the European allies, the extent of cooperation from these nations will probably great depend upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and the actions of the U.N. Security Council. If they insist upon a second U.N. resolution specifically authorizing military action against Iraq as a condition for their full cooperation, there are concerns that this could delay operation beyond April, which is considered the latest date to avoid having to conduct desert operations in the heat of the Iraqi summer.

The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the United States has maintained a presence of 4,000-6,000 troops in Kuwait, rotating ground force units in and out on training exercises, and has pre-positioned at least a brigade’s equipment. Construction is complete on a new, expanded U.S. staging facility. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanaeh, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations. Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaird airbase comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and 600 personnel from Central Command Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002. DOD described this deployment as a training exercise, though most believed it to be connected to preparations for an Iraq offensive. In the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra airbase.

The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq is a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from Turkey has delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, however there is the possibility of the parliament’s reconsideration of that proposal, and the ships carrying a mechanized infantry division’s equipment have not been diverted. CENTCOM spokesmen have downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a successful operation. U.S. officials are also exploring the possibility that permission for overflight rather than basing rights could be easier to obtain. Currently, the U.S. Air Force is carrying out the “no-fly zone” enforcement operation Northern Watch from Incirlik airbase in Turkey under a detailed agreement which limits flights and the number of U.S. aircraft that can be stationed there. There have also been press reports that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located inside northern Iraq. After a significant delay, Turkey has now allowed a U.S. Air Force survey team to begin evaluating additional airfields inside Turkey. Aside from

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permitting air operations from Incirlik, Turkish cooperation could also provide a northern front for U.S. ground operations. Though very difficult, mountainous terrain presents challenges in this area, if the United States intends to coopt the indigenous Kurdish opposition forces as part of its attack strategy, access to northern Iraq would be crucial. Complicating this issue are Turkish concerns about Kurdish opposition groups’ desires for autonomy which could encourage Kurd separatist groups in western Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds’ objections to any increase in the number of Turkish troops in their region. With press reports varying from day to day, it still remains to be seen whether the Turkish government will eventually endorse a northern ground offensive.

**Improved U.S. Military Technology**

Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that an air campaign against Iraq would be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation Desert Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-guided. That ratio could well be the inverse in an air campaign today. This would allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage. U.S. military planners have paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi SCUD missiles. In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles, some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads. Using new equipment, such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense missiles, DOD hopes to be able to greatly reduce the time from missile launch detection to intercept, improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances over Desert Storm capabilities.

The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain. There have been some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan campaign, but DOD has insisted they remain adequate for operations against Iraq. Military operations in an urban environment would, however, limit the effectiveness of air power and armor units. Timely targeting information, rules of target engagement, and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties will remain prime concerns. There is also, of course, the separate issue of the distinctive requirements of “building-to-building” urban warfare.

Cyberwarfare is an area where U.S. technology could be brought to bear, but still has unresolved policy issues. DOD is recommending penetration of Iraqi computer networks to degrade communications and air defense capabilities, however

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the inter-agency policy group that must approve military attacks against computer networks has yet to grant such authority.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Iraqi Military Capabilities}

\textbf{Conventional Forces.} There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000. Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700 armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.\textsuperscript{14} A number of factors are believed to hamper Iraqi military effectiveness. A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much equipment now being obsolete or inoperable. Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions are undermanned and all comprise mostly conscripts. Large unit and combined arms training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and commanders are relatively few. Logistical support is not robust, and is vulnerable to air interdiction.

Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military effectiveness. The best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican Guard, are kept near Baghdad for regime protection. The officer corps is subject to intense scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges. The distribution of weaponry and supplies is curtailed among regular army units to forestall attempts to overthrow the regime. There also exist tensions, to some extent purposely encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could hamper coordination.\textsuperscript{15}

These considerations notwithstanding, the Iraqi military still presents some significant challenges for U.S. military planners. Given that any U.S. military offensive operation will depend heavily upon “control of the skies”, U.S. planners must ensure that Iraqi air defenses are neutralized early. Press reports have noted that U.S. and British pilots in the overflight Operation Southern Watch have recently stepped up attacks on Iraqi air defense sites. DOD maintains that these attacks have been solely in response to hostile fire, though some have speculated that they represent a “softening up” of Iraq’s southern air defenses.\textsuperscript{16}

It cannot be assumed that a ground campaign would be simply a replay of 1991’s Operation Desert Storm. After that experience when Iraqi units deployed in the open desert were subjected to devastating air attacks, Iraq’s military leadership may choose

\textsuperscript{13}Fulgham, David. “War Preparations Reveal Problems”, \textit{Aviation Week and Space Technology}, December 9, 2002. p. 29


\textsuperscript{15} See also, CRS Report RL31339, \textit{U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime}, January 8, 2003.

an urban strategy to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower. By choosing to defend only urban centers, Iraq would force the United States to commit troops to urban combat—one of the most difficult types to conduct—and simultaneously constrain U.S. Air Force targeting because of concerns over collateral damage and casualties. The Iraqi government has shown no hesitation to locate military facilities in civilian areas to exploit this concern. Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, as part of their regime protection mission, have trained for urban combat, and could provide significant resistance mingled with Baghdad’s population of 4 million. There have been reports of underground tunnel systems in urban centers specifically designed to facilitate urban defense.  

**Chemical and Biological Weapons.** Though not yet judged to have developed a nuclear weapons capability, Iraq is believed to have probably retained chemical and biological (CB) stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and may have continued covert CB development and/or production since. Some CB facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re-built. Iraq is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Though unconfirmed, it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide eradication in the early 1970s. Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CB weapons, including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and aerial sprayers for both manned and unmanned aircraft. There have been some questions about the effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain unanswered.

Though Iraq did not use CB weapons in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard will be not repeated. This view is based on the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein would have “nothing to lose” by their employment. The actual use of these weapons will rest ultimately, however, upon the military commanders who control them, and U.S. planners are focusing on ways to persuade these officers that using CB weapons would be suicidal. In addition, known CB weapons sites will likely be very early targets regardless of which invasion strategy is chosen. In attacking CB facilities—particularly those with substantial amounts of munitions—military planners will have to consider the possible effects on U.S. personnel and Iraqi civilians of the inadvertent release of CB agents.

Given that Iraqi employment of CB weapons remains an open question, U.S. forces must be prepared to operate in a CB contaminated environment. Though perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I. U.S.
planners will have to ensure that there are adequate supplies of protective and decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and will again be confronted with the problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of this latter problem, even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with the smallpox vaccine. In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its concerns over “serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories.19 With regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the manufacturing defects detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.20

One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the casualties actually inflicted. Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return. Civilian ships chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse to enter the war zone. In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could prove just as disruptive as their physical effects.

Another concern is the possibility of Iraq employing biological or toxin agents as retaliatory terror weapons against the populations of cooperating countries, Israel, or the United States itself. The spread of a contagious disease such as smallpox could be the most devastating to civilian populations, though if used regionally, the use of a contagious disease would run the risk of its re-introduction into the Iraqi population.

The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.21 On the other hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose” attitude conducive to using CB weapons.

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Post-War Requirements

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam Hussein’s ouster. On February 25, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki expressed the opinion that up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation of Iraq. This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian leadership. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the political and military situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S. military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government could be established. 

The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and casualties, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility, it is likely that a continued deployment of substantial military ground force will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. It is possible, however, that some nations unwilling to participate in military action against Iraq may be willing to contribute to a post-war stabilization force, thus alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces. Given the current international political climate regarding U.S. military operations against Iraq, it is difficult to estimate the possible extent of such assistance.

Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements

Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about 12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about 7,000. DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re-fueling is possible. While the Department of Defense could meet the overall manpower requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is whether sufficient “low density-high demand” assets can be made available. These include assets such as aerial re-fueling tankers, the EA-6B aircraft used to engage air defense radars, the AWACS and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Combat-Air-Search and rescue (CSAR), and all special operations forces (SOF). Demands on special operations forces have been particularly high over the last year. Most notably in Afghanistan, but there have also been training/advisory missions in the Philippines, Georgia (Gruzia), and Yemen as part of a world-wide antiterrorism campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in Columbia. And, recently Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that he intended to increase further the SOF commitment to the war on terrorism. It is in this context, that some

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23 See CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues (continued...)
have suggested that an invasion of Iraq would detract from the resources available to continue efforts to pursue the world-wide war on terrorism, which they view as currently a greater threat to U.S. security than Iraq.24

North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition to a campaign in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.25 At a minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation.

Costs

Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and remains a highly conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Secretary Rumsfeld has expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost.”26

Nevertheless, some estimates have appeared. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, has pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay has estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and has stated that the costs would be between $50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.27 In response to a request from Senator Conrad and Representative Spratt, members of the Budget Committees of their respective chambers, the Congressional Budget Office prepared a cost estimate with supporting documentation that divided the costs into three segments: force deployment – $9 to $13 billion; combat operations – $6 to $9 billion per month; and post-conflict occupation – $1 to $4 billion a month. This CBO estimate includes only “incremental” costs, i.e. those over and above DOD’s normal
operations and maintenance costs. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a more wide-ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion. For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.

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