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Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Pro-Russian Vaccine Politics Drives New Disinformation Narratives
From the Introduction: "On 17 July, a press release was posted to the websites of the Luhansk People's Republic, the pro-Russian self-declared state in Luhansk, Eastern Ukraine. The press release related to a supposed US Covid-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] vaccine trial that had been conducted on Ukrainian volunteers, including soldiers, in Kharkiv (which is controlled by the Ukrainian Government). According to the press release, of the 15 patients who received the trial vaccine, five were killed, including four Ukrainian soldiers. The press release was published the day after Russia announced plans to mass-produce its own vaccine in a matter of weeks. The Ukrainian vaccine trial never happened. However, this disinformation narrative--which has clear political, anti-American and anti-Ukrainian Government undertones--has achieved widespread dissemination in multiple languages and across multiple communities. [...] The success of this completely fictional narrative reflects a broader shift across the disinformation space. As the world's focus moves from the initial response to the coronavirus crisis towards the race to a vaccine, with all of the complex geopolitical interests that entails, political disinformation is also moving on from the origins of the virus to the vaccine race. This report uses the US-Ukrainian vaccine narrative as a case study to examine how political disinformation about Covid-19 vaccines is being laundered into the international information ecosystem."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Thomas, Elise; Zhang, Albert; Currey, Emilia
2020-08
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Follow the Money: How the Online Advertising Ecosystem Funds COVID-19 Junk News and Disinformation
From the Abstract: "As people around the world turn towards search engines to access information about COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019], it is important to understand why and how users are being exposed to junk news content. In this memo, we examine the role of search engines and their optimization processes in directing traffic towards junk news & disinformation about COVID-19, and how these sites, in turn, monetize that traffic through digital advertising. We ask: [1] How do the search engine optimization strategies of professional news sources compare to those of junk news & disinformation sources? [2] In what way do third party sites boost the online reputation of junk news and disinformation on COVID-19 through backlinks? [3] How and to what extent do major advertising platforms monetize junk news & disinformation around COVID-19? Comparing professional versus junk news & disinformation sources, our analysis draws from a sample of 830 sources of news and information that are reporting on COVID-19. We review key search engine optimization (SEO) metrics, as a means of assessing sites' online reputation, and their reliance on advertising. We find that: (1) The top junk news & disinformation sources achieve outstandingly high key SEO factors and are slightly better optimised for distribution on search and social media. (2) Major high-prestige, high-trust sites inadvertently boost junks news & disinformation promoting their online reputation and visibility. (3) The overwhelming majority of junk news & disinformation domains rely on major advertising platforms to monetize their pages and 61 percent of junk news & disinformation sources used Google ads."
Oxford Internet Institute. Project on Computational Propaganda
Taylor, Emily; Neudert, Lisa-Maria N.; Hoffmann, Stacie . . .
2020-08-03
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Online Imposters and Disinformation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, September 26, 2019
This is the September 26, 2019 hearing "Online Imposters and Disinformation" held before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Mikie Sherrill: "We're here today to discuss online impostors and disinformation. Researchers generally define misinformation as information that is false, but promulgated with sincerity by a person who believes it is true. Disinformation, on the other hand, is shared with the deliberate intent to deceive. It turns out that these days the concepts of disinformation and online impostors are almost one in the same. We all remember the classic scams and hoaxes from the early days of e-mail--a foreign prince needs help getting money out of the country. But today the more common brand of disinformation is not simply content that is plainly counterfactual, but that is being delivered by someone who is not who they say they are. We are seeing a surge in coordinated disinformation efforts, particularly around politicians, hot-button political issues, and democratic elections." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Siwei Lyu, Hany Farid, and Camille Francois.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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EEAS Special Report Update: Short Assessment of Narratives and Disinformation Around the COVID-19 Pandemic (Update 23 April - 18 May)
From the Document: "The objective of this report is to provide a snapshot overview of the current trends and insights into disinformation activities related to COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. It does not provide a comprehensive or complete overview and focusses primarily on the external dimension, in line with the European External Action Service (EEAS) mandate. The report was authored by the EEAS Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division, which contributes to the EU's efforts to counter disinformation, including through detection, analysis and exposure of disinformation campaigns. In addressing disinformation and identifying and analyzing disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak, the EEAS is working closely with the European Commission, European Parliament services and EU Member States. The EEAS also cooperates on this issue with international partners (G7 [Group of Seven], NATO and non-state actors)."
European External Action Service
2020-05-20?
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Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns: A Whole-Of-Society Issue
From the Disinformation Overview: "[T]he purpose of disinformation is to mislead. disinformation is information created and distributed with the express purpose of causing harm. [...] A targeted disinformation campaign, in the context of this paper, is more insidious than simply telling lies on the internet. One untrue meme or contrived story may be a single thread in a broader operation seeking to influence a target population through methods that violate democratic values, social norms and, in some jurisdictions, the law. [...] Targeted disinformation campaigns are not a new phenomenon and sophisticated ones follow a predictable progression. after establishing the objective, a threat actor follow distinct steps, discussed later in more detail: recon, build, seed, copy, amplify, and control to bring about an outcome."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2019-10
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Serial No. 115-7: Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 9, 2017
This is the March 9, 2017 hearing titled, "Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims," held before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of Edward Royce, U.S. Representative from California's 39th Congressional District and Chairman of the Committee: "This morning we examine Russia's systematic attempts to undermine and discredit Western democratic institutions, with one goal being to splinter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. In January, the U.S. intelligence community produced a report which found that 'Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential election.' [...] Indeed, the intelligence community reports warn that 'Moscow will apply lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.' [...] with elections on the horizon in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Italy, European intelligence services are sounding the alarm about Russian attempts to skew the outcome with targeted disinformation and propaganda. [...] What is new is that Russian disinformation has been growing in sophistication, intensity, reach, and impact. [...] Russia has deployed its arsenal of trolls, propaganda, and false information to a new level. These techniques have even become enshrined in official Kremlin doctrine. Moscow's strategic objective is to break apart the NATO alliance and, thus, to boost Russian geopolitical influence in Western Europe. [...] I am afraid it is not exaggeration to say the long-term future of the European security order and America's role as an Atlantic power is at risk." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Peter B. Doran, and Daniel Baer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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CSCE 115-1-5: Scourge of Russian Disinformation: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, September 14, 2017
This is the September 14, 2017 hearing on "The Scourge of Russian Disinformation," held before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the opening statement of Cory Gardner: "Today's hearing focuses on the pressing issue of Russian disinformation, and how it undermines the security and human rights of people in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] region. Disinformation is an essential part of Russia's hybrid warfare against the United States and the liberal world order." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John F. Lansing, Molly K. McKew, and Melissa Hooper.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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European Union Efforts to Counter Disinformation [December 1, 2016]
From the Document: "The European Union (EU) is increasingly concerned about the use of propaganda by both state and non-state actors and has sought to devise new strategies to combat disinformation. On November 23, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution entitled 'EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Anti-EU Propaganda by Third Parties.' In passing this non-binding resolution (by a vote of 304 to 179, with 208 abstentions), the EP added its support to European Union efforts to counter what Brussels believes are propaganda and disinformation campaigns against the EU and its member states by Russia and non-state actors such as the Islamic State terrorist organization. In adopting the resolution, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) expressed the view that propaganda and disinformation campaigns seek to distort the truth, incite fear, provoke doubt, discredit the EU institutions, divide the EU and its North American partners, and paralyze decision-making. According to the main author of the resolution, MEP Anna Fotyga (from Poland), even the preparation of the text was a target of hostile propaganda."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morelli, Vincent L.; Archick, Kristin
2016-12-01
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Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 Disinformation
From the Introduction: "This policy brief - the first of two in a series - uses the term disinformation to broadly refer to content that is false and has potentially negative impacts. These impacts can have fatal consequences during a pandemic. The intent of the agent producing or sharing the inaccurate content can differentiate disinformation from misinformation. The production of content promising fake treatments for reasons of private profit is an example of 'disinformation'. But it can be described as 'misinformation' when the same content is believed to be true, and is then shared with the intention of being helpful."
UNESCO
Posetti, Julie; Bontcheva, Kalina
2020
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COVID-19 Disinformation: Narratives, Trends, and Strategies in Europe
From the Document: "As the virus swept across the world, we decided to zoom into the narratives defining what the WHO [World Health Organization] term as 'the infodemic'. Based on our monitoring of independently fact-checked disinformation from France, Italy, and Spain, we have been able to draw trends from the content, such as the strategies and platforms used to disinform. We have analysed the time period from the end of January to the last week of March and accordingly noticed an evolution in the disinformation."
EU DisinfoLab
2020-04-02
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Science Disinformation in a Time of Pandemic
From the Executive Summary: "The advent of social media has conferred on the public a freedom of expression and virtual assembly that has transformed contemporary society. In doing so, the 21st century media environment has also given licence to information extremism and disinformation of all stripes, from the comical to the venomous. Here, Christopher Dornan examines a specific species of information disorder: content that adopts the mannerisms of science in order to advocate anti-science. Science disinformation, he argues, is an especially worrying genre of falsity because it amounts to an attack on rationality, and therefore on the underpinnings of informed public policy and good governance. The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic provides a case study to examine specific instances of science disinformation, how these spread, and the dangers they pose to the public good."
Public Policy Forum (Ottawa, Ont.)
Dornan, Chris
2020-06
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Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms
From the Executive Summary: "Although online disinformation and misinformation about the coronavirus are different--the former is the intentional spreading of false or misleading information and the latter is the unintentional sharing of the same--both are a serious threat to public health. Social media platforms have facilitated an informational environment that, in combination with other factors, has complicated the public health response, enabled widespread confusion, and contributed to loss of life during the pandemic. Looking ahead, the Center for American Progress expects disinformation and misinformation about the coronavirus to shift and worsen. As public health conditions vary more widely across the United States, this geographic variation will be an ideal vector for malicious actors to exploit. Without robust local media ecosystems, it will be especially difficult for social media platforms to moderate place-based disinformation and misinformation."
Center for American Progress
Simpson, Erin M.; Conner, Adam
2020-08
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GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem
From the Document: "Russia has operationalized the concept of perpetual adversarial competition in the information environment by encouraging the development of a disinformation and propaganda ecosystem that allows for varied and overlapping approaches that reinforce each other even when individual messages within the system appear contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the sources of disinformation and propaganda--official government statements, state-funded media outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, etc.--and the different tactics that these channels use. [...] This report provides a visual representation of the ecosystem described above, as well as an example of the media multiplier effect it enables. This serves to demonstrate how the different pillars of the ecosystem play distinct roles and feed off of and bolster each other. The report also includes brief profiles of select proxy sites and organizations that occupy an intermediate role between the pillars of the ecosystem with clear links to Russia and those that are meant to be fully deniable. The emphasis on these proxy sites is meant to highlight the important role they play, which can be overlooked given the attention paid to official Russian voices on one end of the spectrum, and the social media manipulation and cyber-enabled threats on the other."
United States. Department of State
2020-08
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EENA Webinar 2020 - Cyberthreats & Disinformation During COVID 19 Outbreak [video]
From the Video Description: "As the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] outbreak continues spreading worldwide, we are witnessing an increase in the dissemination of disinformation. Unchecked and even untrue facts are often inadvertently spread by citizens eager for information in uncertain times. This pandemic is not only becoming a breeding ground for disinformation, but cybercriminals are also taking advantage of the current situation to target citizens and even emergency services. In this webinar, we explore how disinformation and cyberthreats are affecting the work of public safety organisations and what can be done to minimise their impact in the fight against coronavirus." The duration of the video is 54 minutes and 22 seconds.
European Emergency Number Association
2020-04-07
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Weekly COVID-19 Disinformation and False Propaganda Report (August 14, 2020)
From the Key Highlights: "[1] Trending disinformation on an old publication taken out of context from 2005 is accelerating theories and disinformation surrounding the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. Though numerous health organizations have debunked the utility of the drug for treating COVID-19, bad actors have capitalized on that study and have stepped up attacks on Dr. Anthony Fauci. [2] The #Plandemic has evolved into the #Scamdemic, as media personalities and anonymous individuals alike are making false claims about how coronavirus testing is not only unreliable, but that the disease itself is a hoax. Tweets featuring #Scamdemic echo previously debunked claims about US testing rates, and show the continued efforts to bring disinformation to trend online. [3] The announcement of a Russian vaccine, called Sputnik V, was met with baseless claims that the US has purchased 100,000,000 doses of the rushed vaccine from Russia. Though no single tweet has reached virality, the idea is quickly spreading around Twitter networks with the potential to grow as more and more users discuss the Russian vaccine roll out."
Federation of American Scientists
2020-08-14
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Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Covid-19 and the Reach of Pro-Kremlin Messaging
From the Introduction: "This research investigation examines Russia's efforts to manipulate the information environment during the coronavirus crisis. It leverages data from the European External Action Service's East StratCom [Strategic Communications] Task Force, which, through its EUvsDisinfo [EU vs. Disinformation] project, tracks pro-Kremlin messages spreading in the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. The taskforce monitors media in those countries to identify and expose Russian disinformation, maintaining a regularly updated database of samples. [...] Using this open-source repository of pro-Kremlin disinformation in combination with OSINT [open-source intelligence] investigative techniques that track links between online entities, we analyse the narratives being seeded about coronavirus and map the social media accounts spreading those messages."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Serrato, Raymond; Wallis, Jacob
2020-10
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Apparatus of Lies: Saddam's Disinformation and Propaganda 1990-2003
In December 1998, when U.N weapons inspector Dr. Richard Spertzel became exasperated by Iraqi evasions and misrepresentations, he confronted Dr. Rihab Taha, the woman the Iraqis identified as the head of their biological weapons program and asked her directly, "You know that we know you are lying. So why do you do it?" She straightened herself up and replied, "Dr. Spertzel, it's not a lie when you are ordered to lie." Dr. Taha's brief reply is one symbol of a highly developed, well disciplined, and expertly organized program designed to win support for the Iraqi regime through outright deceit. Apparatus of Lies discusses the lies that Iraq has used to promote its propaganda and disinformation in four broad categories: crafting tragedy, exploiting suffering, exploiting Islam, and corrupting the public record. An important priority of Saddam's deception apparatus is to manipulate the televised images the world sees. The regime's most cynical strategy is to actually cause severe civilian hardship or even deaths and then exploit the Iraqi people's suffering by placing the blame on UN-imposed sanctions or other nations. Recent U.S. government reports, including A Decade of Defiance and Deception, have documented Saddam's deceit regarding UN resolutions and weapons inspections. In order to raise awareness of many of the regime's other forms of deception, particularly those likely to be repeated, Apparatus of Lies examines the facts behind Iraqi disinformation and propaganda since 1990. Given the nature and history of the regime, evidence of further deception is almost certain to come to light.
United States. White House Office
2003-01
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Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, July 16, 2019
This is the July 16, 2019 hearing on "Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of William R. Keating: "Today's hearing is on Russia's attacks on democratic elections through targeted disinformation campaigns and the takeaways from Europe where this activity has been accelerating for years. It is on what the EU and the European countries are doing themselves, what has been effective, what has not been, lessons learned." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel Fried, Jessikka Aro, Jakub Kalensky, and Frederick W. Kagan.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019
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Disinfodemic: Dissecting Responses to COVID-19 Disinformation
From the Document: "This policy brief assesses the emerging responses to the prolific spread of disinformation associated with the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic in the context of freedom of expression challenges. It is the companion brief to Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation which described the themes, formats and types of responses to what the World Health Organisation (WHO) has called a 'massive infodemic'."
UNESCO
Posetti, Julie; Bontcheva, Kalina
2020
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Live Webinar Panel: Fighting the Spread of Foreign Disinformation in the COVID Era [video]
From the Video Description: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] outbreak that began in China has since evolved into a global pandemic, resulting in mass quarantines, lockdowns, accelerating fatalities, and an unprecedented global economic slowdown. China in particular has been working in overdrive in recent weeks to alter the narrative on the rapidly evolving crisis, openly flaunting false narratives and conspiracy theories, including that the virus may have originated in either Italy or as a biological weapon from the US. Yet China is not alone. As the European Union has warned, Russian disinformation about COVID-19 was also putting lives at risk. [...] To shed light on these issues, MLI [Macdonald-Laurier Institute] will host a virtual webinar bringing together experts to answer key questions about this flood of disinformation in the COVID era. How are states looking to alter narratives amidst the crisis. What are their methods and have they changed? How can democracies look to mitigate and combat such narratives? What are the dangers of an authoritarian narrative? Why do democracies do a better job?" The duration of the video is 1 hour, 5 minutes, and 40 seconds.
Macdonald-Laurier Institute
2020-06-11
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Weekly COVID-19 Disinformation and False Propaganda Report (As of July 23 2020)
From the Key Highlights: "[1] Twitter and other social media platforms have increased their monitoring and surveillance of conspiracy theories and disinformation, resulting in an observable suspension of accounts and deletion of tweets spreading disinformation. [2] According to a recent poll released by Axios-Ipsos, nearly a third of Americans believe that the number of deaths resulting from COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] are less than what is officially reported. [...] [3] Conspiracies regarding government surveillance via microchips in vaccines and through contact tracers are ongoing. [4] The majority of tweets about COVID-19 are retweets or quotes. [...] [5] In Michigan, local medical experts are combating the view that government officials are inflating mortality numbers for the purpose pressuring mandatory mask usage. [...] [6] Our social media analysis indicates the overall sentiment of the conversation regarding 'masks' were 59% negative and 44% negative for 'contact tracing.' This suggests the compliance on mask usage and contact tracing will continue to face an uphill battle as many social media conversations are negative instead of viewing the initiatives as positive actions that will save lives."
Federation of American Scientists
2020-07-23
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Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital Age
From the Document: "If there is one word that has come to define the technology giants and their impact on the world, it is 'disruption.' The major technology and social media companies have disrupted industries ranging from media to advertising to retail. However, it is not just the traditional sectors that these technologies have upended. They have also disrupted another, more insidious trade - disinformation and propaganda. The proliferation of social media platforms has democratized the dissemination and consumption of information, thereby eroding traditional media hierarchies and undercutting claims of authority. The environment, therefore, is ripe for exploitation by bad actors. Today, states and individuals can easily spread disinformation at lightning speed and with potentially serious impact. [...] The following interdisciplinary review attempts to shed light on these converging factors, and the challenges and opportunities moving forward."
Park Advisors
Nemr, Christina; Gangware, William
2019-03
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Digital Disinformation Is a Threat to Public Health
From the Document: "As the death toll from COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] surges past half a million worldwide and over 10 million people have become infected, it is clear this crisis is far from over. National leaders have refused to acknowledge the seriousness of the issue and neglected to act on behalf of the people they govern and serve. In the U.S., the lack of a comprehensive and science-based response has led to poor health and economic outcomes. Healthcare disinformation has driven attitudes of minimization and denial of the pandemic crisis and is an existential threat to the welfare of the population. A recent study by researchers at Carnegie Melon University (CMU) highlights a disturbing trend in social media. Researchers have determined that nearly half of all the Twitter accounts promoting the reopening of America were likely bots. [...] The ongoing coronavirus pandemic highlights the susceptibility of a population under duress, particularly regarding health and science communication efforts. This pandemic calls attention to the urgent need to directly combat public health disinformation."
Syracuse University. Lerner Center for Public Health Promotion
Brown, Austin McNeill
2020-07-07
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Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 30, 2017
This testimony compilation is from the March 30, 2017 hearing on 'Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,' held before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Eugene Rumer: "The issue before this panel is Russian active measures and influence campaigns. It rose to the top of our national agenda in 2016, when we became aware of Russian interference in our presidential campaign. It remains one of the most contentious issues in our national conversation, for the very idea that another nation could put at risk the integrity of our country's most essential institution--the process of electing our president--is hard for us to comprehend." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Eugene Rumer, Roy Godson, Clint Watts, Kevin Mandia, Keith Alexander, and Thomas Rid.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2017-03-30
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Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet?: Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation
"Scientific progress continues to accelerate, and while we've witnessed a revolution in communication technologies in the past ten years, what proceeds in the next ten years may be far more transformative. It may also be extremely disruptive, challenging long held conventions behind public diplomacy (PD) programs and strategies. In order to think carefully about PD in this ever and rapidly changing communications space, the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) convened a group of private sector, government, and academic experts at Stanford University's Hoover Institution to discuss the latest trends in research on strategic
communication in digital spaces. The results of that workshop, refined by a number of follow-on interviews and discussions, are included in this report. I encourage you to read each of the fourteen essays that follow, which are divided into three thematic sections: Digital's Dark Side, Disinformation, and Narratives."
United States. Department of State
Powers, Shawn; Kounalakis, Markos
2017-05
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S. Hrg. 115-40, Pt. 2: Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel II, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 30, 2017
This is the March 30, 2017 hearing on Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel II, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. The purpose of this hearing was to establish the extent by which a foreign adversary interfered in the 2016 Presidential elections in the United States. The witnesses listed presented unclassified information for Congress to determine the severity and impact of the events that took place. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Kevin Mandia, Keith B. Alexander, and Thomas Rid.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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S. Hrg. 115-40, Pt. 1: Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel I, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 30, 2017
This is the March 30, 2017 hearing on "Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel I" before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. From Senator Richard Burr's opening statement: "This morning the committee will engage in an activity that's quite rare for us, an open hearing on an ongoing critical intelligence question: the role of Russian active measures past and present. As many of you know, this committee is conducting a thorough, independent, and nonpartisan review of the Russian active measures campaign conducted against the 2016 U.S. elections. Some of the intelligence provided to the committee is extremely sensitive, which requires that most of the work be conducted in a secure setting to maintain the integrity of the information and to protect the very sensitive sources and methods that gave us access to that intelligence. However, the Vice Chairman and I understand the gravity of the issues that we're here reviewing and have decided that it's crucial that we take the rare step of discussing publicly an ongoing intelligence question. That's why we've convened this second open hearing on the topic of Russian active measures, and I can assure you to the extent possible the committee will hold additional open hearings on this issue." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Roy Godson, Eugene Rumer, and Clint Watts.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference
"This study on the Active Measures Working Group provides a window into one little known but highly influential interagency group and its methods. Although the study examines just one case, it makes some intriguing arguments about how and why this interagency process managed to work well. Its historical and organizational insights are immediately relevant to many interagency efforts that the military finds itself involved in today. Along with pointing to best practices, this study disproves some conventional notions about the interagency process. Most notable of these is that small interagency groups need to be far away from Washington to work well. […] This study reveals how one small and remarkable interagency group made a major contribution in this area. Beyond its strategic and organizational relevance, this study is a historical behind-the-scenes look into a little known yet successful government effort to counter Soviet disinformation. It is a new and fascinating chapter in the history of the Cold War."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Schoen, Fletcher; Lamb, Christopher J. (Christopher Jon), 1955-
2012-06
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First Responder's Toolbox: Violent Extremists Likely Will Continue to Use Disinformation on Social Media Outlets to Instill Fear and Radicalize Others
"This product highlights examples of official media releases by designated foreign terrorist organizations, such as ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], and unofficial media releases by auxiliary news agencies and terrorist supporters. It is intended to describe how terrorists use disinformation to potentially influence Homeland and Western audiences, and introduce steps that can be taken to determine the credibility of the messaging."
National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.)
2018-08-09
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Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms
From the Comparative Summary: "Concerns regarding the impact of viral dissemination of disinformation on democratic systems of government, on political discourse, on public trust in state institutions, and on social harmony have been expressed by many around the world. These concerns are shared by countries with advanced economies as well as those with emerging and developing economies. [...] This report is composed of individual surveys of the European Union (EU) and fifteen selected countries from around the globe. The countries surveyed vary geographically, culturally, in their systems of government, and in their commitment to democratic principles of governance, which include protections for freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and transparency and oversight of governmental actions, among other things. The surveys were prepared by the foreign law specialists and analysts of the Law Library of Congress's Global Legal Research Directorate based on primary and secondary sources available in the Law Library of Congress's collections, legal databases to which it subscribes, and open sources."
Law Library of Congress (U.S.)
Levush, Ruth; Buchanan, Kelly (Kelly S.); Ahmad, Tariq . . .
2019-09
