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Mapping COVID-19 Disinformation in Brazil: An Analysis of Disinformation Consumption and Demand for Fact-Checking
From the Introduction: "COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] related disinformation is globally accessible and has been a feature of the pandemic since the first infections. COVID-19 related disinformation is often shared online by the general public through social media or messaging apps, and in some instances world leaders and political officials have adopted and shared disinformation related to the virus. Brazil has been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, experiencing the rapid spread of the virus alongside a severe economic crisis and intense political polarisation between President Bolsanaro's far right government and left wing political and social movements. In this context, COVID-19 disinformation and fake news have spread widely, with a resulting uptick in the appetite for fact checkers. Over a five week period in June - July 2020, Moonshot gathered data on Portuguese-language Google searches that indicated interest in COVID-19 related disinformation and fake news, and fact checking services, across all 26 states of Brazil."
Moonshot
2021-03
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Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Pro-Russian Vaccine Politics Drives New Disinformation Narratives
From the Introduction: "On 17 July, a press release was posted to the websites of the Luhansk People's Republic, the pro-Russian self-declared state in Luhansk, Eastern Ukraine. The press release related to a supposed US Covid-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] vaccine trial that had been conducted on Ukrainian volunteers, including soldiers, in Kharkiv (which is controlled by the Ukrainian Government). According to the press release, of the 15 patients who received the trial vaccine, five were killed, including four Ukrainian soldiers. The press release was published the day after Russia announced plans to mass-produce its own vaccine in a matter of weeks. The Ukrainian vaccine trial never happened. However, this disinformation narrative--which has clear political, anti-American and anti-Ukrainian Government undertones--has achieved widespread dissemination in multiple languages and across multiple communities. [...] The success of this completely fictional narrative reflects a broader shift across the disinformation space. As the world's focus moves from the initial response to the coronavirus crisis towards the race to a vaccine, with all of the complex geopolitical interests that entails, political disinformation is also moving on from the origins of the virus to the vaccine race. This report uses the US-Ukrainian vaccine narrative as a case study to examine how political disinformation about Covid-19 vaccines is being laundered into the international information ecosystem."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Thomas, Elise; Zhang, Albert; Currey, Emilia
2020-08
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Follow the Money: How the Online Advertising Ecosystem Funds COVID-19 Junk News and Disinformation
From the Abstract: "As people around the world turn towards search engines to access information about COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019], it is important to understand why and how users are being exposed to junk news content. In this memo, we examine the role of search engines and their optimization processes in directing traffic towards junk news & disinformation about COVID-19, and how these sites, in turn, monetize that traffic through digital advertising. We ask: [1] How do the search engine optimization strategies of professional news sources compare to those of junk news & disinformation sources? [2] In what way do third party sites boost the online reputation of junk news and disinformation on COVID-19 through backlinks? [3] How and to what extent do major advertising platforms monetize junk news & disinformation around COVID-19? Comparing professional versus junk news & disinformation sources, our analysis draws from a sample of 830 sources of news and information that are reporting on COVID-19. We review key search engine optimization (SEO) metrics, as a means of assessing sites' online reputation, and their reliance on advertising. We find that: (1) The top junk news & disinformation sources achieve outstandingly high key SEO factors and are slightly better optimised for distribution on search and social media. (2) Major high-prestige, high-trust sites inadvertently boost junks news & disinformation promoting their online reputation and visibility. (3) The overwhelming majority of junk news & disinformation domains rely on major advertising platforms to monetize their pages and 61 percent of junk news & disinformation sources used Google ads."
Oxford Internet Institute. Project on Computational Propaganda
Taylor, Emily; Neudert, Lisa-Maria N.; Hoffmann, Stacie . . .
2020-08-03
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Survey of Public Attitudes to Coronavirus Disinformation and Fake News in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
This report contains coronavirus disinformation data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. From the Document: "Over half of people surveyed in each country had seen COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] disinformation / fake news. A smaller but substantial portion reported sharing COVID-19 disinformation with others either intentionally or unintentionally. '[1] Spain had the highest percentage of those who had seen (87%) and shared (26%) coronavirus related disinformation. [2] The UK had the lowest percentage who had seen (51%) and shared (12%) COVID-19 disinformation.' Males and females were equally likely to see and share COVID-19 disinformation / fake news in all countries. Younger people were more likely to see and share COVID-19 disinformation. The association between seeing COVID-19 disinformation and age was statistically significant in France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Whilst the association between age and sharing COVID-19 disinformation / fake news was statistically significant in France, Germany, Spain and the UK."
Crime and Security Research Institute
2020-07-02
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Healthcare Disinformation [presentation]
From the Introduction: "[1] Disinformation; also called 'active measures' when referring to its use by a state for national security and power projection purposes; [2] The difference between disinformation and misinformation is intent; [3] Not all false stories are organized campaigns pushed by a nation-state; [4] Often indistinguishable from conspiracies, and often piggy back on them; [5] Many countries, both powerful and established as well as smaller, engage in disinformation; [6] There are estimates of over 10,000 individual disinformation operations during the Cold War: [a] It's believed to be even more prevalent in the Internet Age; [7] Disinformation is very challenging to deal with because: [a] It can be difficult to identify, [b] It can be difficult to trace to its source, [c] It can be difficult to counteract; [8] Famous (recent) case: 2016 U.S. Presidential election; [9] This presentation will lean heavily towards Russia and its long history of leveraging disinformation, going back to at least the early days of the Soviet Union. Many countries utilize disinformation in the modern era."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2020-12-03
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Online Imposters and Disinformation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, September 26, 2019
This is the September 26, 2019 hearing "Online Imposters and Disinformation" held before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Mikie Sherrill: "We're here today to discuss online impostors and disinformation. Researchers generally define misinformation as information that is false, but promulgated with sincerity by a person who believes it is true. Disinformation, on the other hand, is shared with the deliberate intent to deceive. It turns out that these days the concepts of disinformation and online impostors are almost one in the same. We all remember the classic scams and hoaxes from the early days of e-mail--a foreign prince needs help getting money out of the country. But today the more common brand of disinformation is not simply content that is plainly counterfactual, but that is being delivered by someone who is not who they say they are. We are seeing a surge in coordinated disinformation efforts, particularly around politicians, hot-button political issues, and democratic elections." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Siwei Lyu, Hany Farid, and Camille Francois.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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Disinformation Dozen: The Sequel: How Big Tech is Failing to Act on Leading Anti-Vaxxers Despite Bipartisan Calls from Congress
From the Introduction: "In March 2021, CCDH [Center for Countering Digital Hate] and Anti-Vax Watch identified the top 12 spreaders of anti-vaccine disinformation on social media in our report, The Disinformation Dozen [hyperlink]. The CEOs of Facebook, Twitter and Google responded by pledging to strengthen and better enforce their policies; crack down on vaccine disinformation on their platforms; and protect public health - but they have not kept their promises. Despite continued violations of community standards, the majority of the Disinformation Dozen remain online and active in their disinformation-spreading campaigns on at least one platform. [...] We know the most effective way to disrupt the dissemination of harmful misinformation is to stop providing services to the most egregious repeat offenders. Each day the Disinformation Dozen's accounts remain active is another day that their lies cost lives. It's time to finish the job."
Center for Countering Digital Hate
2021-04-28
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Addressing Disinformation: Insights and Best Practices
From the Executive Summary: "In mid-2010s, 'disinformation' emerged as the term of choice to describe the distortion of information and perception management for political ends. Disinformation aims to create confusion, sow general distrust and demoralize a public. While often used broadly and interchangeably with propaganda, fake news or misinformation, disinformation works more subtly and aims to achieve different objectives, which is why it needs to be differentiated from the other concepts. USAGM [U.S. Agency for Global Media] and its networks are proactively addressing the threat of disinformation around the world through the practice of independent reporting and strong journalism ethics. Where appropriate, they are pointing out falsehoods and challenging false narratives, as well as fighting to maintain the audience's access to truthful and factual reporting. USAGM has also established a number of partnerships and collaborations to promote media literacy and help build civic resilience in vulnerable markets. The paper highlights several examples of disinformation from around the world to provide a general overview of the myriad ways in which USAGM is addressing this threat. It also provides a set of recommendations to public service media organizations on how to approach the issue, based on extensive review of the literature and over 25 interviews with USAGM journalists and experts[.]"
U.S. Agency for Global Media
Osipova-Stocker, Yelena; Shchetko, Nick
2020-07-28
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EEAS Special Report Update: Short Assessment of Narratives and Disinformation Around the COVID-19 Pandemic (Update 23 April - 18 May)
From the Document: "The objective of this report is to provide a snapshot overview of the current trends and insights into disinformation activities related to COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. It does not provide a comprehensive or complete overview and focusses primarily on the external dimension, in line with the European External Action Service (EEAS) mandate. The report was authored by the EEAS Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division, which contributes to the EU's efforts to counter disinformation, including through detection, analysis and exposure of disinformation campaigns. In addressing disinformation and identifying and analyzing disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak, the EEAS is working closely with the European Commission, European Parliament services and EU Member States. The EEAS also cooperates on this issue with international partners (G7 [Group of Seven], NATO and non-state actors)."
European External Action Service
2020-05-20?
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Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns: A Whole-Of-Society Issue
From the Disinformation Overview: "[T]he purpose of disinformation is to mislead. disinformation is information created and distributed with the express purpose of causing harm. [...] A targeted disinformation campaign, in the context of this paper, is more insidious than simply telling lies on the internet. One untrue meme or contrived story may be a single thread in a broader operation seeking to influence a target population through methods that violate democratic values, social norms and, in some jurisdictions, the law. [...] Targeted disinformation campaigns are not a new phenomenon and sophisticated ones follow a predictable progression. after establishing the objective, a threat actor follow distinct steps, discussed later in more detail: recon, build, seed, copy, amplify, and control to bring about an outcome."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2019-10
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Fanning the Flames: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Time of COVID
From the Introduction: "The emergence of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] in 2020 introduced not only a devastating virus but a vacuum of information at a time of deep uncertainty and fear - a perfect storm for disinformation. The pandemic and aptly named 'infodemic' was exploited by state actors, especially Russia and China, to advance their positions on the global stage. China, in particular, increased its use of aggressive influence operations, coordinating messaging between state media, official social media accounts, and inauthentic networks to target government officials and critics across the world in a bid to improve Beijing's image following its mishandling of the outbreak. COVID-19 mis/disinformation also combined with election-related mis/disinformation, straining the growing community of stakeholders seeking to counter and mitigate the deluge of inaccurate or misrepresented information, particularly that pushed by state actors globally. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic also offered an opportunity to test platforms' resolve in addressing inaccurate and harmful information that threatens safety and security. The major social media companies have broadly underplayed their responses to disinformation on their platforms, claiming a commitment to free speech and freedom of expression. Then COVID-19 arrived, and with it, all the mis/disinformation that threatened to make an already devastating situation worse. The major platforms leaped into action, taking steps to aggressively label and fag false and misleading content and outright remove content that spread conspiracy theories and harmful lies. [...] This report highlights these efforts and more to increase general understanding of the challenges, the players, the tools, and the continuously evolving responses."
Park Advisors; Disinfo Cloud
Bhulai, Rafia Barakat; Nemr, Christina; Ragnet, Marine . . .
2021-05
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National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy
From the Executive Summary: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has shown that health-related misinformation and disinformation can dangerously undermine the response to a public health crisis. Contradictory messaging and active subversion have reduced trust in public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, and politicized public health measures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease. Setbacks in the COVID-19 response have highlighted that health-related misinformation or disinformation can lead to more infections, deaths, disruption, and disorganization of the effort. The public health response and communication environment in the United States have been disrupted by significant distrust in government, exacerbated by confusing and conflicting messages from leaders. As a result, information voids have developed, easily filled by false or misleading information and directly targeted by perpetrators of disinformation. Taken together, the spread and consequence of public health misinformation and disinformation can lead to a range of outcomes that have national security implications and require effective response. [...] The development of a national strategy to prevent and respond to COVID-19 and future public health misinformation and disinformation is an important first step in the establishment of a solution set to this threat."
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Center for Health Security
Sell, Tara Kirk; Hosangadi, Divya; Smith, Elizabeth . . .
2021-03
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COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation and Disinformation Costs an Estimated $50 to $300 Million Each Day
From the Document: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has shown that false or misleading health-related information can dangerously undermine the response to a public health crisis. These messages include the inadvertent spread of erroneous information (misinformation) or deliberately created and propagated false or misleading information (disinformation). Misinformation and disinformation have contributed to reduced trust in medical professionals and public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, politicized public health countermeasures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease, and increased loss of life. As a country, we do not yet have a trusted set of approaches for managing misinformation and disinformation or exact methods for monetizing the costs resulting from their spread. The challenge to assigning an exact, high-confidence monetary cost to them is the lack of detailed data available on this issue. To begin to fill this gap, we have developed an initial conservative estimate of the total monetized costs of one facet of this issue--the misinformation or disinformation-informed decision to not get a COVID-19 vaccine."
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Center for Health Security
Bruns, Richard; Hosangadi, Divya; Trotochaud, Marc . . .
2021
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European Union Efforts to Counter Disinformation [December 1, 2016]
From the Document: "The European Union (EU) is increasingly concerned about the use of propaganda by both state and non-state actors and has sought to devise new strategies to combat disinformation. On November 23, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution entitled 'EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Anti-EU Propaganda by Third Parties.' In passing this non-binding resolution (by a vote of 304 to 179, with 208 abstentions), the EP added its support to European Union efforts to counter what Brussels believes are propaganda and disinformation campaigns against the EU and its member states by Russia and non-state actors such as the Islamic State terrorist organization. In adopting the resolution, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) expressed the view that propaganda and disinformation campaigns seek to distort the truth, incite fear, provoke doubt, discredit the EU institutions, divide the EU and its North American partners, and paralyze decision-making. According to the main author of the resolution, MEP Anna Fotyga (from Poland), even the preparation of the text was a target of hostile propaganda."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morelli, Vincent L.; Archick, Kristin
2016-12-01
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Serial No. 115-7: Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 9, 2017
This is the March 9, 2017 hearing titled, "Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims," held before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of Edward Royce, U.S. Representative from California's 39th Congressional District and Chairman of the Committee: "This morning we examine Russia's systematic attempts to undermine and discredit Western democratic institutions, with one goal being to splinter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. In January, the U.S. intelligence community produced a report which found that 'Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential election.' [...] Indeed, the intelligence community reports warn that 'Moscow will apply lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.' [...] with elections on the horizon in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Italy, European intelligence services are sounding the alarm about Russian attempts to skew the outcome with targeted disinformation and propaganda. [...] What is new is that Russian disinformation has been growing in sophistication, intensity, reach, and impact. [...] Russia has deployed its arsenal of trolls, propaganda, and false information to a new level. These techniques have even become enshrined in official Kremlin doctrine. Moscow's strategic objective is to break apart the NATO alliance and, thus, to boost Russian geopolitical influence in Western Europe. [...] I am afraid it is not exaggeration to say the long-term future of the European security order and America's role as an Atlantic power is at risk." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Peter B. Doran, and Daniel Baer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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CSCE 115-1-5: Scourge of Russian Disinformation: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, September 14, 2017
This is the September 14, 2017 hearing on "The Scourge of Russian Disinformation," held before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the opening statement of Cory Gardner: "Today's hearing focuses on the pressing issue of Russian disinformation, and how it undermines the security and human rights of people in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] region. Disinformation is an essential part of Russia's hybrid warfare against the United States and the liberal world order." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John F. Lansing, Molly K. McKew, and Melissa Hooper.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 Disinformation
From the Introduction: "This policy brief - the first of two in a series - uses the term disinformation to broadly refer to content that is false and has potentially negative impacts. These impacts can have fatal consequences during a pandemic. The intent of the agent producing or sharing the inaccurate content can differentiate disinformation from misinformation. The production of content promising fake treatments for reasons of private profit is an example of 'disinformation'. But it can be described as 'misinformation' when the same content is believed to be true, and is then shared with the intention of being helpful."
UNESCO
Posetti, Julie; Bontcheva, Kalina
2020
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COVID-19 Disinformation: Narratives, Trends, and Strategies in Europe
From the Document: "As the virus swept across the world, we decided to zoom into the narratives defining what the WHO [World Health Organization] term as 'the infodemic'. Based on our monitoring of independently fact-checked disinformation from France, Italy, and Spain, we have been able to draw trends from the content, such as the strategies and platforms used to disinform. We have analysed the time period from the end of January to the last week of March and accordingly noticed an evolution in the disinformation."
EU DisinfoLab
2020-04-02
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Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms
From the Executive Summary: "Although online disinformation and misinformation about the coronavirus are different--the former is the intentional spreading of false or misleading information and the latter is the unintentional sharing of the same--both are a serious threat to public health. Social media platforms have facilitated an informational environment that, in combination with other factors, has complicated the public health response, enabled widespread confusion, and contributed to loss of life during the pandemic. Looking ahead, the Center for American Progress expects disinformation and misinformation about the coronavirus to shift and worsen. As public health conditions vary more widely across the United States, this geographic variation will be an ideal vector for malicious actors to exploit. Without robust local media ecosystems, it will be especially difficult for social media platforms to moderate place-based disinformation and misinformation."
Center for American Progress
Simpson, Erin M.; Conner, Adam
2020-08
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GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem
From the Document: "Russia has operationalized the concept of perpetual adversarial competition in the information environment by encouraging the development of a disinformation and propaganda ecosystem that allows for varied and overlapping approaches that reinforce each other even when individual messages within the system appear contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the sources of disinformation and propaganda--official government statements, state-funded media outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, etc.--and the different tactics that these channels use. [...] This report provides a visual representation of the ecosystem described above, as well as an example of the media multiplier effect it enables. This serves to demonstrate how the different pillars of the ecosystem play distinct roles and feed off of and bolster each other. The report also includes brief profiles of select proxy sites and organizations that occupy an intermediate role between the pillars of the ecosystem with clear links to Russia and those that are meant to be fully deniable. The emphasis on these proxy sites is meant to highlight the important role they play, which can be overlooked given the attention paid to official Russian voices on one end of the spectrum, and the social media manipulation and cyber-enabled threats on the other."
United States. Department of State
2020-08
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EENA Webinar 2020 - Cyberthreats & Disinformation During COVID 19 Outbreak [video]
From the Video Description: "As the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] outbreak continues spreading worldwide, we are witnessing an increase in the dissemination of disinformation. Unchecked and even untrue facts are often inadvertently spread by citizens eager for information in uncertain times. This pandemic is not only becoming a breeding ground for disinformation, but cybercriminals are also taking advantage of the current situation to target citizens and even emergency services. In this webinar, we explore how disinformation and cyberthreats are affecting the work of public safety organisations and what can be done to minimise their impact in the fight against coronavirus." The duration of the video is 54 minutes and 22 seconds.
European Emergency Number Association
2020-04-07
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Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Covid-19 and the Reach of Pro-Kremlin Messaging
From the Introduction: "This research investigation examines Russia's efforts to manipulate the information environment during the coronavirus crisis. It leverages data from the European External Action Service's East StratCom [Strategic Communications] Task Force, which, through its EUvsDisinfo [EU vs. Disinformation] project, tracks pro-Kremlin messages spreading in the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. The taskforce monitors media in those countries to identify and expose Russian disinformation, maintaining a regularly updated database of samples. [...] Using this open-source repository of pro-Kremlin disinformation in combination with OSINT [open-source intelligence] investigative techniques that track links between online entities, we analyse the narratives being seeded about coronavirus and map the social media accounts spreading those messages."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Serrato, Raymond; Wallis, Jacob
2020-10
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Weekly COVID-19 Disinformation and False Propaganda Report (August 14, 2020)
From the Key Highlights: "[1] Trending disinformation on an old publication taken out of context from 2005 is accelerating theories and disinformation surrounding the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. Though numerous health organizations have debunked the utility of the drug for treating COVID-19, bad actors have capitalized on that study and have stepped up attacks on Dr. Anthony Fauci. [2] The #Plandemic has evolved into the #Scamdemic, as media personalities and anonymous individuals alike are making false claims about how coronavirus testing is not only unreliable, but that the disease itself is a hoax. Tweets featuring #Scamdemic echo previously debunked claims about US testing rates, and show the continued efforts to bring disinformation to trend online. [3] The announcement of a Russian vaccine, called Sputnik V, was met with baseless claims that the US has purchased 100,000,000 doses of the rushed vaccine from Russia. Though no single tweet has reached virality, the idea is quickly spreading around Twitter networks with the potential to grow as more and more users discuss the Russian vaccine roll out."
Federation of American Scientists
2020-08-14
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Science Disinformation in a Time of Pandemic
From the Executive Summary: "The advent of social media has conferred on the public a freedom of expression and virtual assembly that has transformed contemporary society. In doing so, the 21st century media environment has also given licence to information extremism and disinformation of all stripes, from the comical to the venomous. Here, Christopher Dornan examines a specific species of information disorder: content that adopts the mannerisms of science in order to advocate anti-science. Science disinformation, he argues, is an especially worrying genre of falsity because it amounts to an attack on rationality, and therefore on the underpinnings of informed public policy and good governance. The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic provides a case study to examine specific instances of science disinformation, how these spread, and the dangers they pose to the public good."
Public Policy Forum (Ottawa, Ont.)
Dornan, Chris
2020-06
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Apparatus of Lies: Saddam's Disinformation and Propaganda 1990-2003
In December 1998, when U.N weapons inspector Dr. Richard Spertzel became exasperated by Iraqi evasions and misrepresentations, he confronted Dr. Rihab Taha, the woman the Iraqis identified as the head of their biological weapons program and asked her directly, "You know that we know you are lying. So why do you do it?" She straightened herself up and replied, "Dr. Spertzel, it's not a lie when you are ordered to lie." Dr. Taha's brief reply is one symbol of a highly developed, well disciplined, and expertly organized program designed to win support for the Iraqi regime through outright deceit. Apparatus of Lies discusses the lies that Iraq has used to promote its propaganda and disinformation in four broad categories: crafting tragedy, exploiting suffering, exploiting Islam, and corrupting the public record. An important priority of Saddam's deception apparatus is to manipulate the televised images the world sees. The regime's most cynical strategy is to actually cause severe civilian hardship or even deaths and then exploit the Iraqi people's suffering by placing the blame on UN-imposed sanctions or other nations. Recent U.S. government reports, including A Decade of Defiance and Deception, have documented Saddam's deceit regarding UN resolutions and weapons inspections. In order to raise awareness of many of the regime's other forms of deception, particularly those likely to be repeated, Apparatus of Lies examines the facts behind Iraqi disinformation and propaganda since 1990. Given the nature and history of the regime, evidence of further deception is almost certain to come to light.
United States. White House Office
2003-01
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Global Engagement Center: Leading the United States Government's Fight Against Global Disinformation Threat, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International Operations, and Bilateral International Development of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Second Session, March 5, 2020
This is the March 5, 2020 hearing on "Global Engagement Center: Leading the United States Government's Fight Against Global Disinformation Threat," held before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on State Department and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] Management, International Operations, and Bilateral International Development of the Committee on Foreign Relations. From the opening statement of Rob Portman: "Information is power today, and we see it all over the globe and when it is used improperly, it is used as a weapon. Democracies like ours require a well-informed electorate to function properly, but our enemies are increasingly trying to undermine that principle through so-called disinformation campaigns designed to mislead voters and, in doing so, delegitimize our democratic elections. Malign actors, like Russia, systematically exploit social media, radio, television, and print to twist facts to suit their needs and distort the truth to an unsuspecting populace. It is not just about elections. We see it today with regard to the coronavirus and misinformation that is being spread. It is an interesting tactic because it is inexpensive and yet can be very effective. It has a high degree of deniability. It is anonymous almost always. And again, if left unchecked, it can be devastatingly effective." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Rob Portman, Cory Booker, Lea Gabrielle, Daniel Blumenthal, and Alina Polyakova.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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'Fanning The Flames: Disinformation and Extremism In The Media': Testimony of Jonathan Turley, Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, February 24, 2021
This is the February 24, 2021 testimony of Jonathan Turley on, "Fanning The Flames: Disinformation and Extremism In The Media," before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology.
From the Introduction: "I would like to touch on three basic points in my testimony today. First, I will briefly address the problem of disinformation and extremist speech in our society. Second, I will discuss the growing anti-free speech movement building within our society. Third, and finally, I will address how free speech remains the best response to bad speech. Increasingly, free speech is being referenced as a danger in itself that needs to be controlled as opposed to being the very value that defines us as a people. History has shown that limiting free speech will not reduce hateful or false speech, but rather will only fuel such speech in different forums while enforcing approved or orthodox viewpoints. Before you abandon the bright lines of protections for free speech and the free press, I urge you to consider and weigh those costs in the interest of our country."
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce
Turley, Jonathan
2021-02-24
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Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, July 16, 2019
This is the July 16, 2019 hearing on "Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of William R. Keating: "Today's hearing is on Russia's attacks on democratic elections through targeted disinformation campaigns and the takeaways from Europe where this activity has been accelerating for years. It is on what the EU and the European countries are doing themselves, what has been effective, what has not been, lessons learned." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel Fried, Jessikka Aro, Jakub Kalensky, and Frederick W. Kagan.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019
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Disinfodemic: Dissecting Responses to COVID-19 Disinformation
From the Document: "This policy brief assesses the emerging responses to the prolific spread of disinformation associated with the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic in the context of freedom of expression challenges. It is the companion brief to Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation which described the themes, formats and types of responses to what the World Health Organisation (WHO) has called a 'massive infodemic'."
UNESCO
Posetti, Julie; Bontcheva, Kalina
2020
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Live Webinar Panel: Fighting the Spread of Foreign Disinformation in the COVID Era [video]
From the Video Description: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] outbreak that began in China has since evolved into a global pandemic, resulting in mass quarantines, lockdowns, accelerating fatalities, and an unprecedented global economic slowdown. China in particular has been working in overdrive in recent weeks to alter the narrative on the rapidly evolving crisis, openly flaunting false narratives and conspiracy theories, including that the virus may have originated in either Italy or as a biological weapon from the US. Yet China is not alone. As the European Union has warned, Russian disinformation about COVID-19 was also putting lives at risk. [...] To shed light on these issues, MLI [Macdonald-Laurier Institute] will host a virtual webinar bringing together experts to answer key questions about this flood of disinformation in the COVID era. How are states looking to alter narratives amidst the crisis. What are their methods and have they changed? How can democracies look to mitigate and combat such narratives? What are the dangers of an authoritarian narrative? Why do democracies do a better job?" The duration of the video is 1 hour, 5 minutes, and 40 seconds.
Macdonald-Laurier Institute
2020-06-11
