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Mapping COVID-19 Disinformation in Brazil: An Analysis of Disinformation Consumption and Demand for Fact-Checking
From the Introduction: "COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] related disinformation is globally accessible and has been a feature of the pandemic since the first infections. COVID-19 related disinformation is often shared online by the general public through social media or messaging apps, and in some instances world leaders and political officials have adopted and shared disinformation related to the virus. Brazil has been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, experiencing the rapid spread of the virus alongside a severe economic crisis and intense political polarisation between President Bolsanaro's far right government and left wing political and social movements. In this context, COVID-19 disinformation and fake news have spread widely, with a resulting uptick in the appetite for fact checkers. Over a five week period in June - July 2020, Moonshot gathered data on Portuguese-language Google searches that indicated interest in COVID-19 related disinformation and fake news, and fact checking services, across all 26 states of Brazil."
Moonshot
2021-03
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Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Pro-Russian Vaccine Politics Drives New Disinformation Narratives
From the Introduction: "On 17 July, a press release was posted to the websites of the Luhansk People's Republic, the pro-Russian self-declared state in Luhansk, Eastern Ukraine. The press release related to a supposed US Covid-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] vaccine trial that had been conducted on Ukrainian volunteers, including soldiers, in Kharkiv (which is controlled by the Ukrainian Government). According to the press release, of the 15 patients who received the trial vaccine, five were killed, including four Ukrainian soldiers. The press release was published the day after Russia announced plans to mass-produce its own vaccine in a matter of weeks. The Ukrainian vaccine trial never happened. However, this disinformation narrative--which has clear political, anti-American and anti-Ukrainian Government undertones--has achieved widespread dissemination in multiple languages and across multiple communities. [...] The success of this completely fictional narrative reflects a broader shift across the disinformation space. As the world's focus moves from the initial response to the coronavirus crisis towards the race to a vaccine, with all of the complex geopolitical interests that entails, political disinformation is also moving on from the origins of the virus to the vaccine race. This report uses the US-Ukrainian vaccine narrative as a case study to examine how political disinformation about Covid-19 vaccines is being laundered into the international information ecosystem."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Thomas, Elise; Zhang, Albert; Currey, Emilia
2020-08
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DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns
From the Highlights: "In recent years, cyberattacks, intellectual property theft, and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns against our Nation have increased significantly. Our objective was to determine the internal and external coordination efforts the Department has taken to counter disinformation that appears in social media. [...] The Department of Homeland Security began internal and external coordination efforts in 2018 to counter disinformation appearing in social media. These efforts were predominantly focused on disinformation campaigns that pertained to election infrastructure or to distinct mission operations. Although DHS components have worked across various social media platforms to counter disinformation, DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide strategy to effectively counter disinformation that originates from both foreign and domestic sources. DHS faced challenges unifying component efforts because disinformation is an emerging and evolving threat. We also attributed some challenges to the continual changes in DHS leadership, which may have hindered the development of top-down strategic guidance for countering disinformation. Without a unified strategy, DHS and its components cannot coordinate effectively, internally, or externally to counter disinformation campaigns that appear in social media. [...] We recommend DHS develop a unified strategy to counter disinformation campaigns that appear in social media."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-08-10
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Countering Disinformation in the United States
From the Executive Summary: "In its March 2020 Final Report, the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission called on the U.S. government to promote digital literacy, civic education, and public awareness in order to build societal resilience to foreign malign cyber-enabled information operations. As the scourge of disinformation swept across the globe and expanded its scope beyond elections, the Commission decided to conduct a deeper examination of cyber-enabled disinformation and propose steps that the United States could take to begin building greater resilience to disinformation, particularly from foreign actors. [...] This white paper sets out seven recommendations to both reduce the prevalence of disinformation in the information ecosystem and build greater individual and societal resilience to disinformation and malign foreign influence: [1] Recommendation 1: Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force, enable greater access to civic education resources, and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation. [2] Recommendation 2: Congress should ensure material support to nongovernmental disinformation researchers[.] [3] Recommendation 3: Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonprofit centers seeking to identify, expose, and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to the American public[.] [4] Recommendation 4: Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland Security to actively monitor foreign disinformation[.] [5] Recommendation 5: Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify foreign disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies[.] [6] Recommendation 6: Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the Federal Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media ownership transparency in the United States[.] [7] Recommendation 7: Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce transparency guidelines for social media platforms[.]"
United States. Cyberspace Solarium Commission
Morgus, Robert; Thompson, Natalie
2021-12
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Follow the Money: How the Online Advertising Ecosystem Funds COVID-19 Junk News and Disinformation
From the Abstract: "As people around the world turn towards search engines to access information about COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019], it is important to understand why and how users are being exposed to junk news content. In this memo, we examine the role of search engines and their optimization processes in directing traffic towards junk news & disinformation about COVID-19, and how these sites, in turn, monetize that traffic through digital advertising. We ask: [1] How do the search engine optimization strategies of professional news sources compare to those of junk news & disinformation sources? [2] In what way do third party sites boost the online reputation of junk news and disinformation on COVID-19 through backlinks? [3] How and to what extent do major advertising platforms monetize junk news & disinformation around COVID-19? Comparing professional versus junk news & disinformation sources, our analysis draws from a sample of 830 sources of news and information that are reporting on COVID-19. We review key search engine optimization (SEO) metrics, as a means of assessing sites' online reputation, and their reliance on advertising. We find that: (1) The top junk news & disinformation sources achieve outstandingly high key SEO factors and are slightly better optimised for distribution on search and social media. (2) Major high-prestige, high-trust sites inadvertently boost junks news & disinformation promoting their online reputation and visibility. (3) The overwhelming majority of junk news & disinformation domains rely on major advertising platforms to monetize their pages and 61 percent of junk news & disinformation sources used Google ads."
Oxford Internet Institute. Project on Computational Propaganda
Taylor, Emily; Neudert, Lisa-Maria N.; Hoffmann, Stacie . . .
2020-08-03
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Survey of Public Attitudes to Coronavirus Disinformation and Fake News in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
This report contains coronavirus disinformation data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. From the Document: "Over half of people surveyed in each country had seen COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] disinformation / fake news. A smaller but substantial portion reported sharing COVID-19 disinformation with others either intentionally or unintentionally. '[1] Spain had the highest percentage of those who had seen (87%) and shared (26%) coronavirus related disinformation. [2] The UK had the lowest percentage who had seen (51%) and shared (12%) COVID-19 disinformation.' Males and females were equally likely to see and share COVID-19 disinformation / fake news in all countries. Younger people were more likely to see and share COVID-19 disinformation. The association between seeing COVID-19 disinformation and age was statistically significant in France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Whilst the association between age and sharing COVID-19 disinformation / fake news was statistically significant in France, Germany, Spain and the UK."
Crime and Security Research Institute
2020-07-02
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Third Annual Disinformation in Society Report: How Americans Perceive Intentionally Misleading News or Information
From the Introduction: "The third annual Institute for Public Relations (IPR) 'Disinformation in Society' study examines and tracks how disinformation -- defined as 'deliberately' misleading or biased information -- is spread in U.S. society. The poll of 2,200 Americans conducted November 10-14, 2021, by Morning Consult explores the prevalence of disinformation in the U.S., the parties most responsible for sharing disinformation, the level of trust the American public has in different information sources, and whose job it is to combat disinformation. Additionally, the report focuses on major issues facing society. New items added to this year's report included added sources of information, how people perceive the impact of disinformation on themselves and society, and how disinformation affects COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] and vaccination uptake."
University of Florida. Institute for Public Relations
2022-03
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Healthcare Disinformation [presentation]
From the Introduction: "[1] Disinformation; also called 'active measures' when referring to its use by a state for national security and power projection purposes; [2] The difference between disinformation and misinformation is intent; [3] Not all false stories are organized campaigns pushed by a nation-state; [4] Often indistinguishable from conspiracies, and often piggy back on them; [5] Many countries, both powerful and established as well as smaller, engage in disinformation; [6] There are estimates of over 10,000 individual disinformation operations during the Cold War: [a] It's believed to be even more prevalent in the Internet Age; [7] Disinformation is very challenging to deal with because: [a] It can be difficult to identify, [b] It can be difficult to trace to its source, [c] It can be difficult to counteract; [8] Famous (recent) case: 2016 U.S. Presidential election; [9] This presentation will lean heavily towards Russia and its long history of leveraging disinformation, going back to at least the early days of the Soviet Union. Many countries utilize disinformation in the modern era."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2020-12-03
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Three Ways to Counter Disinformation
From the Document: "There are three basic ways to counter disinformation: 1. refuting disinformation claims before they can take hold, as is done in Lithuania [hyperlink] 2. a 'counter-allegation' approach, in which one tries to correct misperceptions after they have become established 3. a 'counter-brand' approach, which emphasizes exposing the disinformer's misdeeds rather than just trying to correct false claims. When most people think about countering disinformation, the 'counter-allegation' approach is what usually comes to mind. But, as academic studies and experience show, correcting misperceptions after they have become established can be difficult, especially among those for whom a false claim reinforces important beliefs. Approaches 1 and 3 offer other ways to counter disinformation. As described in GEC [Global Engagement Center] Counter-Disinformation Dispatches #1 [hyperlink], refuting disinformation claims before they can take hold, as data scientists, researchers, and journalists do in Lithuania, is ideal, but it is also very difficult to achieve. It requires: [1] sophisticated algorithms and constant monitoring to spot false claims very soon after they appear [2] immediate, thorough research [and 3] very close cooperation with professional journalists who can rapidly write articles exposing the allegations as false."
United States. Department of State. Global Engagement Center
2020-02-11
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Online Imposters and Disinformation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, September 26, 2019
This is the September 26, 2019 hearing "Online Imposters and Disinformation" held before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Mikie Sherrill: "We're here today to discuss online impostors and disinformation. Researchers generally define misinformation as information that is false, but promulgated with sincerity by a person who believes it is true. Disinformation, on the other hand, is shared with the deliberate intent to deceive. It turns out that these days the concepts of disinformation and online impostors are almost one in the same. We all remember the classic scams and hoaxes from the early days of e-mail--a foreign prince needs help getting money out of the country. But today the more common brand of disinformation is not simply content that is plainly counterfactual, but that is being delivered by someone who is not who they say they are. We are seeing a surge in coordinated disinformation efforts, particularly around politicians, hot-button political issues, and democratic elections." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Siwei Lyu, Hany Farid, and Camille Francois.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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Disinformation Dozen: The Sequel: How Big Tech is Failing to Act on Leading Anti-Vaxxers Despite Bipartisan Calls from Congress
From the Introduction: "In March 2021, CCDH [Center for Countering Digital Hate] and Anti-Vax Watch identified the top 12 spreaders of anti-vaccine disinformation on social media in our report, The Disinformation Dozen [hyperlink]. The CEOs of Facebook, Twitter and Google responded by pledging to strengthen and better enforce their policies; crack down on vaccine disinformation on their platforms; and protect public health - but they have not kept their promises. Despite continued violations of community standards, the majority of the Disinformation Dozen remain online and active in their disinformation-spreading campaigns on at least one platform. [...] We know the most effective way to disrupt the dissemination of harmful misinformation is to stop providing services to the most egregious repeat offenders. Each day the Disinformation Dozen's accounts remain active is another day that their lies cost lives. It's time to finish the job."
Center for Countering Digital Hate
2021-04-28
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Psychology of (Dis)information: Case Studies and Implications
From the Abstract: "The absorption and spread of disinformation is a pervasive phenomenon across a wide variety of topics and media. Most disinformation research focuses on the source (who created it?) and the environment in which it exists (what platform/medium transmits the information?). Recognizing that disinformation primarily works in an individual person's mind, this report describes four normal, routine psychological mechanisms that are associated with the absorption and spread of disinformation. We then describe real-world case studies--focusing on activities linked to COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019], and to campaigns coordinated by US adversaries including Russia, China, and Iran--to illustrate the way these mechanisms can be manipulated to aid the spread disinformation. The report concludes with multi-pronged recommendations that DOD can use to address the vulnerabilities associated with these psychological mechanisms so as prevent the spread of disinformation and protect both US servicemembers and the country."
CNA Corporation
McBride, Megan K.; Wolters, Heather; Haney, Kaia . . .
2021-10
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Addressing Disinformation: Insights and Best Practices
From the Executive Summary: "In mid-2010s, 'disinformation' emerged as the term of choice to describe the distortion of information and perception management for political ends. Disinformation aims to create confusion, sow general distrust and demoralize a public. While often used broadly and interchangeably with propaganda, fake news or misinformation, disinformation works more subtly and aims to achieve different objectives, which is why it needs to be differentiated from the other concepts. USAGM [U.S. Agency for Global Media] and its networks are proactively addressing the threat of disinformation around the world through the practice of independent reporting and strong journalism ethics. Where appropriate, they are pointing out falsehoods and challenging false narratives, as well as fighting to maintain the audience's access to truthful and factual reporting. USAGM has also established a number of partnerships and collaborations to promote media literacy and help build civic resilience in vulnerable markets. The paper highlights several examples of disinformation from around the world to provide a general overview of the myriad ways in which USAGM is addressing this threat. It also provides a set of recommendations to public service media organizations on how to approach the issue, based on extensive review of the literature and over 25 interviews with USAGM journalists and experts[.]"
U.S. Agency for Global Media
Osipova-Stocker, Yelena; Shchetko, Nick
2020-07-28
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Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns: A Whole-Of-Society Issue
From the Disinformation Overview: "[T]he purpose of disinformation is to mislead. disinformation is information created and distributed with the express purpose of causing harm. [...] A targeted disinformation campaign, in the context of this paper, is more insidious than simply telling lies on the internet. One untrue meme or contrived story may be a single thread in a broader operation seeking to influence a target population through methods that violate democratic values, social norms and, in some jurisdictions, the law. [...] Targeted disinformation campaigns are not a new phenomenon and sophisticated ones follow a predictable progression. after establishing the objective, a threat actor follow distinct steps, discussed later in more detail: recon, build, seed, copy, amplify, and control to bring about an outcome."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program (U.S.)
2019-10
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National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy
From the Executive Summary: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has shown that health-related misinformation and disinformation can dangerously undermine the response to a public health crisis. Contradictory messaging and active subversion have reduced trust in public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, and politicized public health measures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease. Setbacks in the COVID-19 response have highlighted that health-related misinformation or disinformation can lead to more infections, deaths, disruption, and disorganization of the effort. The public health response and communication environment in the United States have been disrupted by significant distrust in government, exacerbated by confusing and conflicting messages from leaders. As a result, information voids have developed, easily filled by false or misleading information and directly targeted by perpetrators of disinformation. Taken together, the spread and consequence of public health misinformation and disinformation can lead to a range of outcomes that have national security implications and require effective response. [...] The development of a national strategy to prevent and respond to COVID-19 and future public health misinformation and disinformation is an important first step in the establishment of a solution set to this threat."
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Center for Health Security
Sell, Tara Kirk; Hosangadi, Divya; Smith, Elizabeth . . .
2021-03
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Fanning the Flames: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Time of COVID
From the Introduction: "The emergence of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] in 2020 introduced not only a devastating virus but a vacuum of information at a time of deep uncertainty and fear - a perfect storm for disinformation. The pandemic and aptly named 'infodemic' was exploited by state actors, especially Russia and China, to advance their positions on the global stage. China, in particular, increased its use of aggressive influence operations, coordinating messaging between state media, official social media accounts, and inauthentic networks to target government officials and critics across the world in a bid to improve Beijing's image following its mishandling of the outbreak. COVID-19 mis/disinformation also combined with election-related mis/disinformation, straining the growing community of stakeholders seeking to counter and mitigate the deluge of inaccurate or misrepresented information, particularly that pushed by state actors globally. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic also offered an opportunity to test platforms' resolve in addressing inaccurate and harmful information that threatens safety and security. The major social media companies have broadly underplayed their responses to disinformation on their platforms, claiming a commitment to free speech and freedom of expression. Then COVID-19 arrived, and with it, all the mis/disinformation that threatened to make an already devastating situation worse. The major platforms leaped into action, taking steps to aggressively label and fag false and misleading content and outright remove content that spread conspiracy theories and harmful lies. [...] This report highlights these efforts and more to increase general understanding of the challenges, the players, the tools, and the continuously evolving responses."
Park Advisors; Disinfo Cloud
Bhulai, Rafia Barakat; Nemr, Christina; Ragnet, Marine . . .
2021-05
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EEAS Special Report Update: Short Assessment of Narratives and Disinformation Around the COVID-19 Pandemic (Update 23 April - 18 May)
From the Document: "The objective of this report is to provide a snapshot overview of the current trends and insights into disinformation activities related to COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. It does not provide a comprehensive or complete overview and focusses primarily on the external dimension, in line with the European External Action Service (EEAS) mandate. The report was authored by the EEAS Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division, which contributes to the EU's efforts to counter disinformation, including through detection, analysis and exposure of disinformation campaigns. In addressing disinformation and identifying and analyzing disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak, the EEAS is working closely with the European Commission, European Parliament services and EU Member States. The EEAS also cooperates on this issue with international partners (G7 [Group of Seven], NATO and non-state actors)."
European External Action Service
2020-05-20?
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European Commission Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation
From the Introduction: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] crisis has starkly illustrated the threats and challenges disinformation poses to our societies. The 'infodemic' - the rapid spread of false, inaccurate or misleading information about the pandemic - has posed substantial risks to personal health, public health systems, effective crisis management, the economy and social cohesion. The pandemic has also elevated the role digital technology plays in our lives, making it increasingly central to how we work, learn, socialise, provide for material needs, and participate in the civic discourse. It has raised the stakes to ensure that the online ecosystem is a safe space, and it has shown that, despite considerable efforts made to date, there is an urgent need to step-up efforts to fight disinformation . From its inception, the EU approach to countering disinformation has been grounded in the protection of freedom of expression and other rights and freedoms guaranteed under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In line with those rights and freedoms, rather than criminalising or prohibiting disinformation as such, the EU strategy aims to make the online environment and its actors more transparent and accountable, making content moderation practices more transparent, empowering citizens and fostering an open democratic debate. To this end, the EU has sought to mobilise all relevant."
European Commission
2021-05-26
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COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation and Disinformation Costs an Estimated $50 to $300 Million Each Day
From the Document: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has shown that false or misleading health-related information can dangerously undermine the response to a public health crisis. These messages include the inadvertent spread of erroneous information (misinformation) or deliberately created and propagated false or misleading information (disinformation). Misinformation and disinformation have contributed to reduced trust in medical professionals and public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, politicized public health countermeasures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease, and increased loss of life. As a country, we do not yet have a trusted set of approaches for managing misinformation and disinformation or exact methods for monetizing the costs resulting from their spread. The challenge to assigning an exact, high-confidence monetary cost to them is the lack of detailed data available on this issue. To begin to fill this gap, we have developed an initial conservative estimate of the total monetized costs of one facet of this issue--the misinformation or disinformation-informed decision to not get a COVID-19 vaccine."
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Center for Health Security
Bruns, Richard; Hosangadi, Divya; Trotochaud, Marc . . .
2021
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Kremlin-Funded Media: RT and Sputnik's Role in Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem
From the Executive Summary: "Russian state-funded and state-directed media outlets RT [Russia Today] and Sputnik are critical elements in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. In an August 2020 report [hyperlink], the U.S. Department of State's Global Engagement Center [hyperlink] (GEC) outlined the five pillars of Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. RT and Sputnik are key state-funded and directed global messengers within this ecosystem, using the guise of conventional international media outlets to provide disinformation and propaganda support for the Kremlin's foreign policy objectives. RT and Sputnik also interact with other pillars of the ecosystem by amplifying content from Kremlin and Kremlin-aligned proxy sites (some of which are connected to Russian intelligence), weaponizing social media, and promoting cyber-enabled disinformation."
United States. Department of State. Global Engagement Center
2022-01
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Russia's Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives Fact Sheet
From the Document: "Over many years, Russia has fabricated a set of false narratives that its disinformation and propaganda ecosystem persistently injects into the global information environment. These narratives act like a template, which enables the Kremlin to adjust these narratives, with one consistency - a complete disregard for truth as it shapes the information environment to support its policy goals. Russian military and intelligence entities are engaging in this activity across Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, to include malign social media operations, the use of overt and covert online proxy media outlets, the injection of disinformation into television and radio programming, the hosting of conferences designed to influence attendees into falsely believing that Ukraine, not Russia, is at fault for heightened tensions in the region, and the leveraging of cyber operations to deface media outlets and conduct hack and release operations. [This document includes] five major reoccurring Russian disinformation themes that the Kremlin is currently readjusting in an attempt to fill the information environment with false narratives about its actions in Ukraine."
United States. Department of State. Office of the Spokesperson
2022-01-20
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Counter-Disinformation System That Works
From the Document: "'This is the first issue of 'GEC [Global Engagement Center] Counter-Disinformation Dispatches,' which will be issued on an occasional basis. The Congressionally-mandated 'mission' of the Global Engagement Center (GEC) of the U.S. Department of State is to lead U.S. government efforts to 'recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation.' 'GEC Counter-Disinformation Dispatches' seeks to pull together the best information on how to counter disinformation from frontline fighters in this effort around the world.'"
United States. Department of State. Global Engagement Center
2020-01-08
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Homeland Security Advisory Council, Disinformation Best Practices and Safeguards Subcommittee: Final Report
From the Introduction: "On May 18, 2022, Secretary Mayorkas asked a Subcommittee of the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Advisory Council to make recommendations for how the Department can most effectively and appropriately address disinformation that poses a threat to the homeland while protecting civil rights and providing greater transparency across this work. This report presents our assessment and recommendations. Part I defines our terms. Part II provides concrete examples of disinformation's deleterious impacts on DHS's Congressionally mandated missions. Part III describes DHS's current activities. Part IV contains our recommendations. Our review preceded the release by the DHS Inspector General (IG) of its report, 'DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns,' but many of the observations in that report are consistent with our own. Our recommendations would produce a more strategic approach to disinformation."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2022-08-24
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Clandestine Disinformation and Agents of Influence
From the Document: "There are two basic types of 'active measures' (deceptive influence operations) and disinformation that Russian specialists engage in - one aimed at public opinion and the other aimed at decision makers and leaders. There is an enormous amount of public information about the former, but very little about the latter. KGB [Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti] disinformation specialists used a variety of methods to try to influence the decisions of foreign leaders, particularly relying on invented disinformation claims that played on the deepest fears of these leaders. There is no reason to believe that the same basic techniques are not being used by Russian foreign intelligence services today. Perhaps the best document on clandestine Soviet disinformation aimed at decision makers was written by Vasili Mitrokhin, the former head archivist of the KGB's foreign intelligence branch, the First Chief Directorate (FCD). He based it on the top-secret KGB documents [hyperlink] he managed."
United States. Department of State. Global Engagement Center
2021-03-23
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Goals and Main Tactics of Russia's Disinformation
From the Document: "GEC [Global Engagement Center] Counter-Disinformation Dispatches summarize lessons learned about disinformation and how to counter it based on the experiences of frontline counter-disinformation practitioners, for the benefit of those newly engaged in this issue. [...] The overall goals of Russia's influence operations are simple and straightforward: [1] manipulate others in a way that benefits Russia's position' [and 2] weaken the Kremlin's perceived adversaries. According to an authoritative KGB [Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti] dictionary of intelligence terms [hyperlink] edited by former KGB foreign intelligence chief archivist Vasili Mitrokhin [hyperlink], the goals of Soviet active measures [hyperlink] (the KGB term for covert influence operations) were to 1) 'exert influence on the adversary' and 2) 'weaken his political, economic, scientific, and technical and military positions.' There is little reason to believe today's Kremlin leaders, with their KGB backgrounds, have not instructed Russia's intelligence services to use the same techniques in current operations. Examining these tactics can help understand and counter today's disinformation operations."
United States. Department of State. Global Engagement Center
2021-08-23
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European Union Efforts to Counter Disinformation [December 1, 2016]
From the Document: "The European Union (EU) is increasingly concerned about the use of propaganda by both state and non-state actors and has sought to devise new strategies to combat disinformation. On November 23, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution entitled 'EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Anti-EU Propaganda by Third Parties.' In passing this non-binding resolution (by a vote of 304 to 179, with 208 abstentions), the EP added its support to European Union efforts to counter what Brussels believes are propaganda and disinformation campaigns against the EU and its member states by Russia and non-state actors such as the Islamic State terrorist organization. In adopting the resolution, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) expressed the view that propaganda and disinformation campaigns seek to distort the truth, incite fear, provoke doubt, discredit the EU institutions, divide the EU and its North American partners, and paralyze decision-making. According to the main author of the resolution, MEP Anna Fotyga (from Poland), even the preparation of the text was a target of hostile propaganda."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morelli, Vincent L.; Archick, Kristin
2016-12-01
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Atlantic Council: Disinformation [website]
This section of the Atlantic Council's website focuses on disseminating research and information about online disinformation that threaten democracy. From the webpage: "The rise of the internet and online social networks has altered the scope and scale at which people access, consume, and communicate information. But the same technologies that have democratized access to information have also enabled malicious actors who seek to undermine our democratic values and processes. Disinformation is false or misleading information spread with the intention to deceive. It's distinct from misinformation, which is the unintentional spread of false information. When left unchecked, disinformation has the potential to sow confusion in public dialogue, exacerbate political polarization, and promote distrust in our political systems and democratic institutions."
Atlantic Council of the United States
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Country in Crisis: How Disinformation Online is Dividing the Nation, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Second Session, June 24, 2020
This is from the June 24, 2020 joint hearing on "A Country in Crisis: How Disinformation Online is Dividing the Nation," held before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce of the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. From the prepared statement of Mike Doyle: "The matter before the Committee today is one of pressing importance, the flood of disinformation online - principally distributed by social media companies - and the dangerous and divisive impact it is having on our nation as we endure the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] epidemic. [...] While our nation has long been divided, today we see that much of this division is driven by misinformation distributed and amplified by social media companies - the largest among them being Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. These platforms have become central to the daily lives of many around the globe - and to the way that people get their news, interact with each other, and engage in political discourse. Our nation and the world are facing an unprecedented tsunami of disinformation that threatens to devastate our country and the world." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Brandi Collins-Dexter, Hany Farid, Spencer Overton, and Neil Fried.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce
2020-06-24
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Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 9, 2017
This is the March 9, 2017 hearing titled, "Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims," held before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of Edward Royce, U.S. Representative from California's 39th Congressional District and Chairman of the Committee: "This morning we examine Russia's systematic attempts to undermine and discredit Western democratic institutions, with one goal being to splinter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. In January, the U.S. intelligence community produced a report which found that 'Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential election.' [...] Indeed, the intelligence community reports warn that 'Moscow will apply lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.' [...] with elections on the horizon in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Italy, European intelligence services are sounding the alarm about Russian attempts to skew the outcome with targeted disinformation and propaganda. [...] What is new is that Russian disinformation has been growing in sophistication, intensity, reach, and impact. [...] Russia has deployed its arsenal of trolls, propaganda, and false information to a new level. These techniques have even become enshrined in official Kremlin doctrine. Moscow's strategic objective is to break apart the NATO alliance and, thus, to boost Russian geopolitical influence in Western Europe. [...] I am afraid it is not exaggeration to say the long-term future of the European security order and America's role as an Atlantic power is at risk." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Peter B. Doran, and Daniel Baer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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CSCE 115-1-5: Scourge of Russian Disinformation: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, September 14, 2017
This is the September 14, 2017 hearing on "The Scourge of Russian Disinformation," held before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the opening statement of Cory Gardner: "Today's hearing focuses on the pressing issue of Russian disinformation, and how it undermines the security and human rights of people in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] region. Disinformation is an essential part of Russia's hybrid warfare against the United States and the liberal world order." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John F. Lansing, Molly K. McKew, and Melissa Hooper.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
