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Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood
"On November 5, 2009 a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured. The initial response to the incident was prompt and effective." Following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood" who's task was to "focus on the non-criminal aspect of the tragedy and [conduct] a thorough review of the alleged perpetrator's training and military records along with a quality review of the care he provided to patents during his career. The President directed a review of intelligence matters related to the Fort Hood shooting, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] is conducting a review of its procedures, and a criminal investigation is underway. It was critical to maintain the integrity of these investigations." The report make comes to a number of conclusions and makes corresponding recommendations.
United States. Department of Defense
2010-01
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Weekly Address: President Obama Calls for Comprehensive Review of Events Leading to Tragedy at Fort Hood [November 14, 2009]
"With the investigation into the tragedy at Fort Hood ongoing, President Barack Obama used his weekly address [on November 14, 2009] to call for a careful and complete review of what happened before the tragedy." President Obama stated: "There is an ongoing investigation into this terrible tragedy. That investigation will look at the motives of the alleged gunman, including his views and contacts. As I said in Fort Hood, I am confident that justice will be done, and I will insist that the full story be told. That is paramount, and I won't compromise that investigation today by discussing the details of this case. But given the potential warning signs that may have been known prior these shootings, we must uncover what steps - if any - could have been taken to avert this tragedy."
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2009-11-14
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Air Force Follow-On Review: Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood
"On 5 November 2009, a tragic shooting allegedly carried out by a military member at Fort Hood, Texas, left 13 dead and 43 wounded or injured. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates subsequently established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood [...]. The review identified possible deficiencies and provided recommendations regarding Department of Defense (DoD) policies, programs, and procedures related to force protection, personnel policies, mass casualty response, and sufficiency of care for the health care providers involved in such events. [...] It concluded force protection measures focused solely on external threats are no longer sufficient. Force protection measures must now also consider internal threats-- 'disaffected individuals within the force motivated to violence against the force and the nation.' The DoD report recommended that each of the Services conduct in-depth follow-on reviews. In response, Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley issued Terms of Reference on 25 January 2010 and directed Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, Commander of Air Education and Training Command, to chair an in-depth Air Force Follow-on Review (Air Force FOR) to identify and resolve policy, program, and procedural gaps that could create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of Air Force personnel, other supported personnel, and their families. [...] Our review addressed three fundamental force protection shortfalls identified in the DoD report related to the internal threat challenge. First, there is no commonly accepted list of indicators concerning potential violence. Second, outside the medical field, there is no centralized process for assessing an individual's potential for violence. Third, there is no effective means for sharing information about those with a history of violence or those who may become violent."
United States. Department of the Air Force
2010-10-29
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Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team: Final Report
"On 5 November 2009, a gunman opened fire on military and civilian personnel at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 31 others were wounded, 34 by gunshot and 9 by other means. While the response to the incident was prompt and effective, the tragedy raised questions about the DoD's [Department of Defense] preparedness to prevent or defend against internal threats. Immediately following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established the DoD Independent Review Panel headed by the Honorable Togo West and Admiral Vernon Clark. In January 2010, the DoD Independent Review Panel published its report setting forth seventy-nine recommendations, divided into five major areas: personnel, information sharing, force protection, installation emergency response and health affairs. Subsequent to the publication of the DoD Independent Review Panel's report, the Secretary of Defense directed the Services to report back to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), the Services internal review and assessment of 'their organization's ability below the headquarters level to identify internal threats and force protection (FP) and emergency response programs, policies and procedures.' In response to the Secretary of Defense's directive, the Army Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) established the Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team (AIRT). The result of the Internal Review Team's effort is this report."
United States. Department of the Army
2010-08-04
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Findings of the Department of Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood, Hearing Before the Full Committee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, January 20, 2010
From the opening statement of Ike Skelton: "On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. In line at the center were soldiers preparing for deployment to combat zones overseas by completing last-minute administrative tasks. Thirteen people were killed and 43 were wounded on the U.S. Army base on United States soil. The alleged gunman, Army Major Nidal Hasan is an active duty Army psychiatrist. As of today, he has been charged under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with 13 counts of premeditated murder and Article 80 of attempted premeditated murder. I am troubled by the fact that it would appear that some of the circumstances that led to the shooting were the result of military officers not following existing policies and procedures. Specifically there are numerous stories in the press, NPR, AP, MSNBC, CNN, Fox News and others, that the alleged shooter's raters and senior raters failed to document negative information in his official record. We have questions." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Howard P. McKeon, Vern Clark, and Togo West.
United States. Government Printing Office
2010
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Insider Threats: DOD Should Improve Information Sharing and Oversight to Protect U.S. Installations, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
"The attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, on
November 5, 2009, and at the
Washington Navy Yard, D.C., on
September 16, 2013, drew nationwide
attention to insider threats at DOD
installations. DOD defines an insider
threat as the threat that an insider will
use her or his authorized access,
wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to
the security of the United States.
House report 113-446 included a
provision that GAO [Government Accountability Office] review DOD's
antiterrorism and force protection
efforts to address insider threats. This
report evaluates the extent to which
DOD has (1) reflected insider threat
considerations in its force protection
policies and other guidance, (2) shared
actions that U.S. installations have
taken to protect against insider threats,
and (3) implemented recommendations
from the official reviews of the 2009
Fort Hood and 2013 Washington Navy
Yard shootings. GAO reviewed official
reviews from the shootings, DOD force
protection-related policies, interviewed
agency officials, and visited eight
nongeneralizable U.S. installations
representing all four military services, a
joint base, and different geographic
locations. GAO recommends that DOD
consistently use existing mechanisms
to share information about actions
taken to protect against threats, and
take steps to improve the consistency
of reporting and monitoring of the
implementation of the
recommendations from the 2009 Fort
Hood review. DOD concurred with
GAO's recommendations and cited
related actions planned or under way."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2015-07
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Defense Security Enterprise Architecture: Product Reference Guide. Revision 1.0
"The need to improve information-sharing capabilities across all five primary Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) domains (i.e., physical, personnel, industrial, information, and operational) has been tragically highlighted by events such as the shootings at Fort Hood, TX, in November 2009, at the Washington Navy Yard, DC, in September 2013, again at Fort Hood in April 2014, and most recently the shootings in Chattanooga, TN. Currently, defense security information sharing requests are sent manually via email, telephone calls, PowerPoint briefings, and other non-automated processes. These are neither effective nor efficient methods of accessing defense security-related information. This information is available within the DSE domains and must be readily accessible to prevent, protect, mitigate, or respond to security-related incidents. When the aforementioned events occurred, neither installations in the surrounding area nor U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) were notified. Had any of these shootings been part of a coordinated attack, U.S. installations were unprepared to prevent, protect, mitigate, or respond to another simultaneous or secondary incident. This lack of preparedness directly impacts broader mission assurance interests, goals, and objectives."
United States. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
2016-06
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Addressing Remaining Gaps in Federal, State, and Local Information Sharing, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, February 26, 2015
This is a testimony compilation from the February 26, 2015 hearing "Addressing Remaining Gaps in Federal, State, and Local Information Sharing," held before the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Subcommittee Chairman Peter King: "There are over 780,000 law enforcement officers in the United States (including federal, state, and local law enforcement officers (LEOs). Ensuring that information is available and accessible to appropriate state and local law enforcement personnel is a critical force multiplier in our nation's efforts to defend against homeland terror attacks. Since September 11, 2001, there have been a number of terror attacks on the homeland conducted by violent Islamist extremists: the 2009 Little Rock Recruiting Station shooting, the Fort Hood shooting (2009), Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009, the 2010 attempted car bombing in Times Square, and the April 2013 bombings at the Boston Marathon. Additionally, there have been at least two small-scale attacks inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Oklahoma beheading (2014) and the hatchet attack against four New York Police Department (NYPD) officers (2014). […] While progress has been made to improve the flow of information, action analysis of past attacks shows that there are remaining challenges. A common trend in these different reviews is the need for federal departments and agencies to view state and local law enforcement as partners in national security and counterterrorism, the need for leadership within organizations to ensure accountability for information sharing, wider access to necessary databases, and the professionalization of analysis and information sharing." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mike Sena, Richard Beary, and Cedric Alexander.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security
2015-02-26
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United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security: Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers
"In the aftermath of the information sharing failures leading to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York City, at the Pentagon, and in a Pennsylvania field, States and localities across the United States established what are known today as State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (fusion centers). Collectively known as the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network), many of these -- now numbering 78 -- fusion centers are still in their infancy. The Homeland has been attacked five times since 2001: the Little Rock Recruiting Station shooting (2009); the Fort Hood shooting (2009); the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day (2009); the attempted car bombing in Times Square (2010), and the Boston Marathon bombings (2013). In the wake of these attacks, we have come to understand that homeland security, including counterterrorism efforts, must be a National responsibility -- a true and equal partnership across all levels of government, and inclusive of the American people themselves. A top down, wholly Federal approach simply does not and cannot suffice. Fully integrating State and local law enforcement and emergency response providers as National mission partners requires a grassroots intelligence and analytic capability. Stakeholders rely upon fusion centers to provide that capability."
United States. Congress. House
2013-07
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Can Military Servicemembers Carry Firearms for Personal Protection on Duty? [July 17, 2015]
"On July 16, 2015, an armed shooter attacked a Marine Corps recruiting center and U.S. Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, killing four Marines and wounding at least three other members of the Marine Corps, Navy, and local police before the shooter was killed. This follows other recent active shooter incidents on military installations, including the 2009 and 2014 shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, and the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting. While those incidents took place on military installations, the most recent incident, in contrast, took place at a reserve center and a recruiting office. Military installations have armed guards and security gates or checkpoints, while reserve centers and recruiting offices are typically integrated into local communities in locations where they are most likely to be approached by interested recruits. Therefore, recruiting offices, by design, are less likely to have the same level of security as other government facilities where military servicemembers are assigned. Following the most recent incident, some have questioned whether force protection measures at recruiting stations are adequate, and asked what U.S. statutes and DOD policies say regarding the ability of servicemembers to carry government-issued firearms for personal protection while on duty. Following is a discussion of the applicable law and policy regarding government-issued firearms for personal protection of servicemembers on duty. This does not address law or policies regarding privately-owned firearms."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kamarck, Kristy N.; Peters, Heidi M.
2015-07-17
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National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)-Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns [December 19, 2011]
"The attempted attack on a U.S.-bound airliner on December 25, 2009, and the earlier shootings at Fort Hood Army Base in November 2009 and various other incidents have led to increased concerns about the effectiveness of the laws, regulations, and organizational relationships created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to prevent future terrorist attacks. Although no system is infallible and the possibility of human errors has to be assumed, recent attacks appear to demonstrate specific failures by the Intelligence Community to 'connect the dots,' to bring together disparate pieces of information to provide clear warning of an impending attack. In regard to the December 2009 attack, President Obama stated that, 'this was not a failure to collect intelligence; it was a failure to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had.' Within the sprawling U.S. Intelligence Community, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was specifically established in 2004 to bring together all available information on terrorism, analyze the information, and provide warning of potential attacks on the U.S. Some observers argue that the failed December aircraft plot as well as other incidents raise questions about the NCTC's ability to carry out its responsibilities. The challenges involved in sifting through mountains of data on a daily or even an hourly basis are acknowledged and supporters point out many unpublicized successes by NCTC working with its sister agencies. Nevertheless, questions exist about the roles and missions of NCTC and whether it is fulfilling its statutory responsibilities. Potentially, there are also concerns about the relationship between NCTC and the Counterterrorism Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which, prior to the establishment of NCTC, was responsible for performing much of NCTC's current mission."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.
2011-12-19
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Updated NCTC Guidelines - Mission Justification Fact Sheet
"Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States Government has made dramatic progress in information sharing -- particularly in sharing information once it is identified as terrorism information. However, the government continues to address the challenge of correlating disparate pieces of information that reside in various agency systems when the relevance of the information to terrorism is not readily apparent. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism. To fulfill its statutory terrorism information responsibilities, NCTC must access and review datasets already lawfully collected by other government entities for national security purposes even if those datasets also include non-terrorism information. For example, certain information regarding visa applications, refugees, and international travelers may have potential connections to terrorism that are not readily apparent to the federal agency that maintains the data. It is often only through NCTC's access to terrorism information held by other government agencies that NCTC is able to correlate disparate information and uncover threats to the nation. In March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, and NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen signed updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to more effectively analyze certain data already in the government's possession to better address terrorism-related threats, while at the same time increasing the protections for privacy and civil liberties. These guidelines were updated in response to issues identified by the White House, Congress, and Intelligence Community after the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt. One such issue was the government's limited ability to query multiple federal datasets residing at different government agencies, and to correlate that information to proactively identify information that might relate to a potential attack. Similarly, the reviews noted that information that is not believed to be relevant could later be recognized as relevant based on subsequent events or information obtained at different points in time."
National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.)
2012?
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Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks for Firearms [May 1, 2013]
"The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and Brady background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual's firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of the Brady background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Krouse, William J.
2013-05-01
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Department of Defense Memorandum: Final Recommendations of the Ft. Hood Follow-on Review
This Department of Defense (DOD) memorandum is a review of recommendations issued by an independent panel in regards to the November 5, 2009 Fort Hood Shootings. According to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, "These initiatives will significantly improve the Department's ability to mitigate internal threats, ensure force protection, enable emergency response, and provide care for victims and families. In particular, the Department will strengthen its policies, programs, and procedures in the following areas: (1) Addressing workplace violence; (2) Ensuring commander and supervisor access to appropriate information in personnel records; (3) Improving information sharing with partner agencies and among installations; (4) Expanding installations' emergency response capabilities; (5) Integrating force protection policy, and clarifying force protection roles and responsibilities; and (6) Ensuring that we provide top quality health care to both our service members and our healthcare providers."
United States. Department of Defense
2010-08-18
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Activities of the Committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate and Its Subcommittees, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, October 28, 2014
"This report reviews the legislative and oversight activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittees during the 112th Congress. These activities were conducted pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended; by Rule XXV(k) of the Standing Rules of the Senate; and by additional authorizing resolutions of the Senate. See Section II, ''Committee Jurisdiction,'' for details. Senator Lieberman was Chairman of the Committee during the 112th Congress; Senator Collins was the Ranking Member. Major activities of the Committee during the 112th Congress included legislation to strengthen the Nation's cybersecurity, to reform the U.S. Postal Service, and to bar Congressional insider trading; releasing an investigative report into the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting; and a series of oversight hearings on the progress of homeland security to mark the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001. Discussion of these major activities appears in Section I below; additional information on these and other measures appears in Section VII, 'Legislative Actions.'"
United States. Government Printing Office
2013-10-28
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DOD Installations: Monitoring Use of Physical Access Control Systems Could Reduce Risks to Personnel and Assets, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Highlights: "In November 2009, an Army officer killed or wounded 45 people at Fort Hood, Texas; 4 years later in September 2013, a Navy contractor killed or wounded 16 people at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. Independent reviews conducted in the aftermath of these shootings identified physical access control weaknesses at DOD installations. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to assess DOD's installation access control efforts. GAO (1) described actions DOD has taken to develop guidance on physical access to domestic installations and to field PACS [physical access control systems] at these installations, (2) evaluated the extent to which DOD has monitored the use of fielded PACS at these installations, and (3) evaluated the extent to which DOD has implemented an approach for addressing PACS technical issues and assessing associated performance. GAO analyzed DOD guidance on physical access control requirements, and visited installations to discuss with installation command and security force officials their experiences using PACS. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2019. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2019-08
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Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks for Firearms [February 1, 2012]
"The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and Brady background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual's firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of the Brady background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Krouse, William J.
2012-02-01
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Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information [January 28, 2010]
"This report examines the role of Congress as a consumer of national intelligence and examines several issues that Congress might address during the second session of the 111th Congress. The President, by virtue of his role as commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch, has access to all national intelligence collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. By definition, the President, the Vice President, and certain Cabinet-level officials, have access to a greater overall volume of intelligence and to sensitive intelligence information than do members of the congressional intelligence committees. Moreover, since the intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, the President has the authority to restrict the flow of intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees. The Fort Hood Army base shootings in November 2009, followed later that year by the Christmas Day airline bombing plot and the Afghanistan suicide bombing that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees refocused congressional attention on a number of intelligence issues, including the role Congress plays as a consumer of intelligence. Each of these cases serves to underscore the sensitivity with which Congress views the executive branch's statutory obligation to keep the legislative branch fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-28
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