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National Security Action Memorandum 161: U.S. Internal Security Programs
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 161 tasked the Attorney General - Robert Kennedy -- to take the initiative in "ensuring the development of plans, programs and action proposal to protect the internal security of the United States." It also transferred two interdepartmental committees -- the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)-- under the supervision of the Attorney General.
United States. White House Office
1962-06-09
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National Security Directive 24: Chemical Weapons Arms Control Initiatives
National Security Directive (NSD) 24 reaffirmed the U.S.'s commitment to reaching a multilateral agreement for a global ban on and elimination of chemical weapons, as well as a reduction in current stockpiles. Additionally the U.S. agreed to look into a less intrusive inspection policy -- backing down from its previous "anywhere, anytime" stance -- supported by an increase in research and development efforts to improve its capability for verifying compliance with a global ban. Finally the directive described a change in sanctions as well as incentives to discourage states from constructing "dual use" facilities.
United States. White House Office
1989-09-26
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National Security Action Memorandum 205: Nuclear Testing
This Nuclear Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) outlines a process for review of the 1962 atmospheric test series and their effect on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities, and call for a Committee which "should address itself not only to the specific question of what has been learned by testing in terms of the design of nuclear weapons, their effects, and defense against them, but also to the broader question of the military significance of what has been learned and its probable effects on the present and prospective military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union."
United States. White House Office
1962-11-09
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National Security Decision Memorandum 254: Domestic Safeguards
National Security Decision Memorandum 254 is directed to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. "The President has reviewed the report forwarded on February 15, 1974 on domestic safeguards, as directed by NSSM 120 and the subsequent memorandum of May 4, 1971 for the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The President has noted the conclusions of the report, and particularly those regarding the needs (1) to weigh the possibilities of sabotage, plutonium contamination threats, an armed attacks (for example, by terrorists), along with the nuclear device threat, (2) to have a continuing process of threat assessment and establishment of appropriate countermeasures, and (3) to maintain fully adequate and essentially equivalent, in terms of quality and extent, safeguards systems in the licensed and license-exempt sectors."
United States. White House Office
1974-04-27
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National Security Decision Directive 26: US Civil Defense Policy
National Security Decision Directive 26 sets forth US Civil Defense policy. "Civil Defense, along with and effective Continuity of Government program, emergency mobilization and secure, reconstitutable telecommunications systems, is an essential ingredient of our nuclear deterrent forces. It is a matter of national priority that the US have a Civil Defense program which provides for the survival of the US population."
United States. White House Office
1982-03-16
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National Security Decision Directive 119: Strategic Defense Initiative
National Security Decision Directive 119 provides guidance on the United States strategic defense initiative: "Given the uncertain long-term future of offensive deterrence, I believe that an effort must also be made to identify alternative means of deterring nuclear war and protecting our national security interests. In particular, the U.S. should investigate the feasibility of eventually shifting toward reliance upon a defensive concept. Future deterrence should, if possible be underwritten by a capability to defeat a hostile attack."
United States. White House Office
1984-01-06
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16: [Classified]
National Security Presidential Directive 47/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16 are classified directives that address aviation security. According to the Rules and Regulations Plan for the Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) ( Federal Register volume 71, no. 203/Friday, October 20, 2006), where they are referenced, the directives change how air traffic would be controlled in the event of a terrorist attack. Decisions on shutting down airspace would be given to the Department of Defense with the President as the only civilian to have veto power. The new plan allows the Department of Defense to determine when to call an Air Defense Emergency and to decide what airspace sectors would be involved in a shutdown, a change seen as being friendly to the economic community. The plan does not define an "end" to an emergency.
United States. White House Office
Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946-
2006-06-22
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National Security Action Memorandum 127: Emergency Planning for Continuity of Government
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 127 requested the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning to create a committee with members of the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget to review and present a report on federal policy regarding emergency plans and continuity of government in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S. Points to be covered by the report included: procedures for selecting necessary emergency personnel, relocation sites and their communication, evacuation plans, plans for continuity in various agencies and for ensuring the survival of the Presidency.
United States. White House Office
1962-02-14
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National Security Decision Directive 238: Basic National Security Strategy
from the Document: "Significant progress has been made during the past six years in strengthening the position of the United States in world affairs. The constancy of purpose we have demonstrated in defending U.S. global interests and pursuing our policy objectives has strengthened global security. Yet, important changes have evolved in international affairs that must be considered as we further develop our strategy of peace for the future. This directive supersedes NSDD-32 [National Security Decision Directive 32] and its supporting documents as the primary source of U.S. national security strategy. It shall serve as the starting point for further development of policy and strategy where appropriate. Policy guidance now in effect is being reviewed to ensure its consistency with this document. Supplemental directives will be structured to ensure conformance with this guidance."
United States. White House Office
Reagan, Ronald
1986-09-02
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13: Maritime Security Policy [Fact Sheet]
"The President has signed a maritime security policy directive outlining his vision for a fully coordinated U.S. Government effort to protect U.S. interests in the maritime domain. This document, the Maritime Security Policy National Security/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD/HSPD), reiterates the President's commitment to maritime security and aims to integrate and align all U.S. Government maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local and private sector entities."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2005
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National Security Decision Directive 77: Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security
National Security Decision Directive 77 designates a Special Planning Groups under the National Security Council to be responsible for the overall planning, direction and coordination of public diplomacy activities.
United States. White House Office
1983-01-14
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Presidential Policy Directive 23: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy [Fact Sheet]
This Fact Sheet defines "security sector assistance" as it pertains to U.S. assistance to build the capabilities of allies and partner nations. The goals of U.S. security sector assistance are to help other nations address common security issues, promote support for U.S. interests and universal values, and to strengthen the collective security of the U.S. and partner nations.
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2013-04-05
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Presidential Directive 15: Chemical Warfare
In this Directive, President Carter directs that "a United States delegation under the direction of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should immediately initiate bilateral consultations with the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, to be followed by negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of a comprehensive treaty to ban chemical warfare...The President has also directed that US chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement. This directive will be reviewed, beginning with the start of the FY 1980 budget cycle, on the basis of the progress made in arms limitation talks."
United States. White House Office
1977-06-16
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National Security Decision Memorandum 6: Presidential Decision to Ratify Non-Proliferation Treaty
National Security Decision Memorandum 6 describes the Presidential Decision to Ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. "The President has decided to go forward with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Until this decision is reported in a Presidential message to Congress, the Government's public position should be that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is still under consideration by the President and the National Security Council. The President directed that, associated with the decision to proceed with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there should be no efforts by the U.S. Government to pressure other nations, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, to follow suit. The Government in its public posture should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify, while clearly dissociating itself from any plan to bring pressure on these countries to sign or ratify."
United States. White House Office
1969-02-05
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National Security Decision Directive 207: The National Program for Combatting Terrorism
From the Document: "National Security Decision Directive 207 provides policy guidance on combatting terrorism: U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms whether it is domestic terrorism perpetrated within U.S. territory, or international terrorism conducted inside or outside U.S. territory by foreign nationals or groups. The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held by terrorists."
United States. White House Office
1986-01-20
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Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism
Presidential Directive 39 explains the U.S. policy on terrorism. "It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it."
United States. White House Office
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1995-06-21
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Presidential Decision Directive 62: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas
From the Document: "In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated United States counterterrorism policy in PDD-39. [Presidential Decision Directive] That policy directive remains valid. Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations, are increasingly likely to attack us in unconventional ways. Adversaries will be tempted to exploit vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities, disrupt our transportation systems, attack us when we gather as a community at special events, and prey on our citizens overseas. As this cluster of threats matures in the coming century, I am determined that we will be prepared to deter them, prevent them, or, if necessary, limit the damage they can inflict. Success requires that we recognize the common nature of these threats, the need for an integrated response, and, in the case of critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a public-private partnership."
United States. White House Office
1998-05-22
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Presidential Study Directive 1: Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
From the Document: "Accordingly, I direct the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism to lead an interagency review of ways to reform the White House organization for counter-terrorism and homeland security in order to strengthen the Government's ability to craft and implement sound policies designed to keep our country secure and our citizens safe. This Presidential Study Directive (PSD) will enhance strategic planning among the Principals and help clarify issues and options for my final decision. In assessing and proposing possible structural reforms, this review shall consider many of the recommendations of numerous bipartisan and expert studies that have examined the White House organization on counterterrorism and homeland security issues."
United States. White House Office
Obama, Barack
2009-02-23
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National Security Decision Directive 301: Establishment and Operation of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
National Security Decision Directive 301 directs policy for the establishment and maintenance of a National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (U.S. NRRC): The U.S. objective is to use the NRRC Agreement to enhance U.S. efforts to reduce further the risk of conflict with the Soviet Union that could result from accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.
United States. White House Office
1988-02-22
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National Security Decision Memorandum 90: Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT III)
From the Document: "After considering the discussions and recommendations of the Verification Panel, the President has made the following decisions with respect to instructions for the U.S. Delegation for continuing discussions at Helsinki: (A) The principle aim of the U.S. Delegation will be to elicit a detailed Soviet response to the issues contained in the U.S. proposal tabled in Vienna. Accordingly, the Delegation should avoid volunteering any clarifications except for that in paragraph F below; (B) In the discussion of 'accidental and unauthorized launch,' it should be made clear that this general issue is to be treated as part of a general strategic arms limitation agreement. A separate agreement on this issue cannot be considered at this time; (C) Should the Soviets propose further negotiations on the proposed agreements for exchange of information and notifications concerning accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, the Delegation should take this position: (1) We can agree to an exchange of information on events when it is judged that such an exchange of information would be useful in reducing the danger of an unintended war between the U.S. and the USSR."
United States. White House Office
1970-11-02
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National Security Decision Directive 18: Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control
From the Document: "National Security Decision Directive 18 set forth policies to encourage compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925."
United States. White House Office
1982-01-04
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National Security Decision Memorandum 44: United States Policy on Toxins
National Security Decision Memorandum 44 states that "Following a review of United States military programs for toxins, the President has decided that: (1) The United States will renounce the production for operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either by bacteriological or biological processes or by chemical synthesis; (2) The United States military program for toxins will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes only; (3) the Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerning the disposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. These recommendations should accompany the recommendations pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 35 regarding the disposal of bacteriological/biological weapons."
United States. White House Office
1970-02-20
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National Security Decision Directive 44: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations III
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 44 provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations outlined in NSDD 33 and NSDD 36.
United States. White House Office
1982-07-10
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National Security Decision Directive 195: The U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks
National Security Decision Directive 195 provides negotiating instructions for U.S.-Soviet arms control talks related to strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space weapons.
United States. White House Office
1985-10-30
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National Security Decision Directive 192: The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program
National Security Decision Directive 192 directs that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program will not be restructured due to restrictions contained in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
United States. White House Office
1985-10-11
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National Security Decision Memorandum 69: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
National Security Decision Memorandum [NSDM] 69 is directed to: the members of the National Security Council; the Attorney General; the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Director of Central Intelligence. From the Document: "After considering the report of the Delegation on the talks to date and the recommendations of the Verification Panel, I have made the following decisions with respect to the U.S. position in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: (1) It apparently being impossible to reach agreement along the lines of either of the two approaches I authorized in NSDM-51, the United States will attempt to reach an initial agreement concentrating on imposing numerical limits on the most important strategic weapons systems, with the collateral constraints necessary to make such limits adequately verifiable; (2) the U.S. proposal for such an agreement will have the following main elements: (a) the aggregate total of ICBM [interncontinental ballistic missile] launchers, sea-based ballistic missile launchers and strategic heavy bombers would be limited to an agreed number. We would initially propose 1900 as this number."
United States. White House Office
1970-07-09
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National Security Decision Memorandum 73: Supplemental Guidance for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
National Security Decision Memorandum 73 is directed to: the members of the National Security Council; the Attorney General; the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Director of Central Intelligence. From the Document: "After considering the Delegation's request for changes in NSDM [National Security Decision Memorandum] 69 and the views of the Verification Panel, the President has directed that the following supplemental guidance be issued: (1) the limit in paragraph 2(B) of NSDM 69 would entitle the United States as well as the USSR to 250 launchers for modern, large missiles, within the overall limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the sub-limit on launchers for ICBMs [intercontinental ballistc missiles] and sea-based missiles; (2) the limits set forth in paragraph 2(E) and (F) on relocation of existing ICBM silos, modification of existing ICBM silos in externally observable ways, on construction of new silos for IR/MRBMs [intermediate-range/medium-range ballistic missiles], and on construction of new silos for IR/MRBMs, and on construction of all new ICBM silos are particularly intended to enhance confidence in verification by national means of the limit of paragraph 2(B)."
United States. White House Office
1970-07-22
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National Security Decision Memorandum 59: FY 1971-72 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
National Security Decision Memorandum 59 is directed to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. From the Document: "The President has approved the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for end FY 1972, the proposed adjusted stockpile composition for end FY 1971, and adjustments to the previously approved FY 1970-71 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile caused by fire damage at the Rocky Flats plant, submitted by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on February 6, 1970. The President has authorized the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long-lead-time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1973 production of warheads required by the Defense Management Summary."
United States. White House Office
1970-05-09
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National Security Directive 72: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1992 and FY 1993
In this Directive, President H.W. Bush authorizes the Secretary of Defense "to deploy nuclear weapons during FY 1992 and FY 1993 as indicated in Tables 1 and 2, subject to future policy and programming decisions. Deployment figures are end-fiscal year levels and are to be achieved in an orderly manner consistent with operational requirements."
United States. White House Office
1992-08-03
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National Security Decision Memorandum 242: Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
National Security Decision Memorandum [NSDM] 242 is directed to: the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. From the Document: "Based on a review of the study conducted in response to NSSM [National Security Study Memoranda] 169 and discussions by the Verification Panel, I have reached the following decisions on United States policy regarding planning for nuclear weapons employment. These decisions do not constitute a major new departure in U.S. nuclear strategy; rather, they are an elaboration of existing policy. The decisions reflect both existing political and military realities and my desire for a more flexible nuclear posture. This NSDM provides the policy framework for planning the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons. It also establishes the process by which the principal aspects of this policy will be coordinated, reviewed and revised."
United States. White House Office
1974-01-17
