Advanced search    Help

Clear all search criteria

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

• Chapter 32: Ricin Toxin

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Ricin is a large, moderately toxic, protein dichain toxin from the bean of the castor plant, Ricinis communis. It can be produced easily in relatively large quantities. Ricin was developed as a biological weapon by the United States and its allies during World War II. Although ricin is toxic by several routes, when inhaled as a respirable aerosol, it causes severe necrosis of the airways and increased permeability of the alveolar- capillary membrane. The inhalational route is presumed to be the likeliest threat on the battlefield. Death after inhalation of a lethal dose appears to be caused by hypoxemia resulting from massive pulmonary edema and alveolar flooding. Diagnosis can be confirmed through the use of enzymelinked immunosorbent assays of tissues or body fluids. Prophylactic administration of an investigational vaccine protects laboratory animals from inhalational and other routes of challenge.

  United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General

  Franz, David R.; Jaax, Nancy K.

  1997
• Chapter 31: Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B and Related Pyrogenic Toxins

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The staphylococcal enterotoxins are a family of superantigen protein toxins produced by strains of Staphylococcus aureus. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), a toxin often associated with food poisoning, was weaponized as an incapacitating agent by the United States during in the 1960s. When inhaled as a respirable aerosol, SEB causes fever, severe respiratory distress, headache, and sometimes nausea and vomiting. The mechanism of intoxication is thought to be from a massive release of cytokines such as interferon-gamma, interleukin-6 and tumor necrosis factor-alpha. Diagnosis can be confirmed through the use of enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays of tissues or body fluids. Prophylactic administration of an investigational vaccine protects laboratory animals from inhalational challenge. Supportive care is useful in reducing toxicity in unprotected individuals.

  United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General

  Ulrich, Robert G.

  1997
• Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Munitions Distribution Study

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The high frequency and wide range of contingency operations during the last decade has sharply increased the significance of military responsiveness. The Army of the future will need to be able to quickly respond to a full spectrum of conflict--from stability and support operations to major theater wars. Today, military leaders have limited options when reacting to the wide range of current threats existing in our world. The nation needs ground combat units that can deploy very rapidly to stabilize a hostile area while possessing combat capabilities able to terminate a threat if necessary. The Army's answer to this requirement is the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Logistically supporting the IBCT will require the Army to leverage new technologies to automate supply activities, enhance communications, and minimize the intra-theater logistics footprint. The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) is designed to provide distribution-based, combat service support to the IBCT leveraging many of the newest technologies available. One of the important missions of the BSB is to establish an ammunition transfer point (ATP) for the storage and distribution of ammunition stocks to all customer units throughout the IBCT area. This study employs an Arena 5.0 discrete-event simulation model to explore the capabilities of the IBCT ammunition transfer point to determine if the system will perform as predicted--to be capable of meeting a daily throughput level of 138 short tons of ammunition in support of the IBCT. Imposing realistic battlefield variance on the modeled system, a statistical analysis is performed to reveal significant factors influencing ATP system performance.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Bertulis, Todd S.

  2000-03
• AF Instruction 14-111: Intelligence Support to the Air Force Acquisition Process

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, "Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations", by providing guidance in identifying and acquiring intelligence to support the Air Force requirements and acquisition process, including technology efforts and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). This AFI applies to all Air Force organizations and covers support beginning with Pre-Milestone 0 (pre-MS 0) and continuing throughout the life cycle of a program, from identification of need through development, acquisition, testing, operational employment, and sustainment and modification. This instruction supports Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Regulation 55-3, "Intelligence Support for Defense Acquisition Programs", March 30, 1992; DoD 5000.2-R "Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition Programs", March 15, 1996, with Change 1; Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-6, "Mission Needs and Operational Requirements"; AFPD 10-14, "Modernization Planning"; AFPD 62-2, "System Survivability"; AFPD 63-1, "Acquisition System"; and AFPD 99-1, "Test and Evaluation Process". Attachment 1 lists the references, abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This issuance aligns duties for developing Intelligence Support Plans (ISPs). Duties that were previously assigned to HQ USAF/INXXA have been reassigned to the HQ 497 IG. It specifies the essential responsibility of operating commands to define operational requirements of specific weapon systems, and of implementing commands to define acquisition and sustainment requirements. It also specifies that weapon system planning and cost analyses include/consider the cost of unique intelligence support throughout the system lifecycle. Additionally, this revision reflects changes in the production, review, and approval of System Threat Assessment Reports (STARs) and their impact on roles and responsibilities of HQ 497 IG and other organizations providing threat support to weapon systems acquisition. An expanded role of the Threat Steering Group (TSG) is also outlined. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1997-10-01
• AF Instruction 14-110: Congressional Notification Procedures

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction establishes procedures and guidelines and defines responsibility within the Air Force for notifying the appropriate congressional committees on intelligence matters having significant operational or acquisition consequences for the United States Air Force. It implements guidance from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Title 50, United States Code, Section 413 et seq, (Subchapter III-Accountability for Intelligence Activities); the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) memorandum dated 30 Jun 1995; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (C3I) memorandum dated 2 April 1996; and the Office of Congressional Affairs/Central Intelligence Agency memorandum dated 8 March 1996. This AFI applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. This instruction applies to all elements and components of the USAF. The information contained within does not supersede or modify Secretary of the Air Force/Legislative Liaison (SAF/LL) instructions or regulations. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1997-09-01
• Information System Incidents: The Development of a Damage Assessment Model

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Information system (IS) incidents, such as hacking, denial-of-service, and viruses are on the rise. With low manning and under-trained information security specialists it is difficult for organizations to stop IS incidents from occurring. Once an incident has occurred it is the IS manager's responsibility to ensure that a full and accurate damage assessment has been accomplished. However, most IS managers lack the necessary tools to assess the damage from an incident. This exploratory thesis developed an IS incident damage assessment model (DAM) that can be part of the IS manager's tool kit. During the development of the model, it became apparent that everything in the model was supported by a foundation of business processes. Therefore, the most important thing an IS manager can do is define their organization's business processes and how they relate to information systems. The model is based on eight primary factors that should be considered during the assessment process:· Recovery· Education/Training· Business Expenses· Productivity· Data· Lost Revenue· Reputation· Human Life Each factor is then further expanded into sub-factors that better define and explain the primary factors. These sub-factors can be directly mapped to business processes previously defined by the information system manager. The final product is an IS incident DAM tailored to the needs of the IS manager's organization.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Horony, Mark D.

  1999-12
• Information Security: Securing Smart Cards with Iris Recognition

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This thesis examines the application of iris recognition technology to the problem of keeping smart cards secure. In order to understand the technology, a comprehensive literature review was conducted. The biological components of the iris were examined to ensure that they were truly random in development and static through the lifetime of the individual. Specifically, the physical structure of what comprises the iris was examined in detail. The data gathered indicates that the iris is formed early in development, random in structure, and stable throughout the person's lifetime. Next, the iris recognition process and resulting recognition code was examined to determine how it could be used. Examination of methods to eliminate counterfeit codes and the randomness of independent codes was vital. Statistics on reliability of the iris recognition process were also examined. Iris recognition was found to be exceptionally reliable, difficult to counterfeit and fast to use. In order to ensure security, the cryptographic strength of the iris recognition code was examined. It was necessary to determine the time necessary to break the iris recognition code should the smart card be compromised. Due to the randomness of the code, exhaustive searches are the only viable means of breaking the code and the time durations to accomplish this are excessive. Additionally, smart card technology was examined to determine if existing technology could store the necessary iris recognition information for use in identity verification. Current processing ability and storage requirements of smart cards exceed the minimum requirements for use of iris recognition technology. The conclusion of this thesis is that iris recognition technology is a viable means of securing smart cards against unauthorized access with high reliability, confidence and speed.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Phelps, Orval E.

  2001-03
• AF Instruction 14-101: Intelligence Contigency Funds

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations. It provides guidance and procedures for executing the Air Force Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) program. This instruction does not apply to the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserves. It supercedes AFI 14-101 from September 1997. This is a partial revision of AFI 14-101. This revision deletes the requirement that ICF use is only authorized for classified intelligence purposes. All references of following guidance prescribed in AFI 65-603, Official Representation Funds-Guidance and Procedures was removed. The monetary limitations for the appropriate approval levels were increased. The requirement for HQ USAF/XOII and HQ AIA/FMP to perform periodic reviews of command ICF programs were eliminated because ICF program execution is audited annually by the AF Audit Agency.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1998-11-01
• AF Policy Directive 14-1: Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This Policy Directive provides guidance for intelligence applications and requirements planning. It supercedes AFPD 14-1 from October 1995. This publication updates information and office symbols resulting from an Air Staff reorganization. The need to update this publication also stems from the recent publication of AFPD 10-22, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations", which further delineated specific ISR responsibilities previously contained in this policy directive. This publication is available digitally on the AFDPO WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1999-06-01
• AF Policy Directive 14-3: Control, Protection, and Dissemination of Intelligence Information

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This policy directive provides guidance for protecting intelligence information. It defines authority lines, roles, and responsibilities for oversight and implementation of programs and procedures to ensure proper controls and protection in preserving the integrity of intelligence collection systems. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It establishes requirement for AF development of automated systems for efficiency of SCI security management. Designates HQ USAF/XOIIS as Cognizant Security Authority for SCI. Designates HQ USAF/ XOIIS, Intelligence Security Division as SCI Security Policy Team, chartered to establish SCI control and release programs for AF. It establishes one Base, one SSO policy; establishes HQ AIA/SO as OPR for compilation and submission of quarterly intelligence information compromise and security education training reporting; and discontinues requirement for HAF-IN(Q) 9327. It also contains results of Security Management Inspection Report.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1998-05-01
• AF Instruction 14-106: Intelligence Education, Research and Training Programs

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations. It explains how to apply for and take part in Air Force and other Defense Intelligence Community education, research, and training programs. This instruction does not address the award of intelligence Air Force specialty codes (AFSC) or formal skill-enhancing training. This publication requires collecting and maintaining personal information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The authority is Title 10, United States Code, Section 8013. System of records notice F030 AF A applies. This instruction is affected by AFI 37-360, Vol 8, Forms Management Program. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1974 as amended in 1996 affects this instruction. This revision incorporates Interim Change IC 2002-1. This change designates HQ USAF/XOIIF as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and HQ USAF/XOI as the certification authority for AFI 14-106. It also incorporates interim change (IC) 02-1 which directs USAF applicants to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Exceptional Analyst Program, the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), and/or the Quality of Analysis Program to mail copies of their application packages to HQ USAF/XOIIF. See the last attachment of the publication, IC 02-1, for the complete IC. It supercedes AFI 14-106 from February 1999. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2002-09-05
• AF Instruction 14-105: Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction is to be used in conjunction with AFPD 14-1, Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning, HQ directives and local guidance. This publication does not address missions and responsibilities of Air Force Intelligence groups and squadrons that perform specialized intelligence functions. This instruction requires collecting and maintaining information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by E.O. 9397, 22 November 1943. It supercedes AFI 14-105 from September 1997, and has been substantially revised; therefore it must be completely reviewed. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2002-06-03
• AF Instruction 14-104: Oversight of Intelligence Activities

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction supercedes AFI 140194 from November 1993. This instruction gives the directive requirements for the conduct of United States (US) Air Force intelligence activities. It describes mandatory training requirements of intelligence and counterintelligence components conducting intelligence activities. It also details how to identify, investigate, and report procedures in the event of violations. This instruction implements Executive Order (EO) 12333 (part 2), DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons"; and AFPD 14-1, "Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning". Throughout this instruction, the term intelligence will pertain to both intelligence and counterintelligence units, activities, etc. This instruction does not apply to criminal investigation activities. See Attachment One for a glossary of references, abbreviations, acronyms, and terms. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of prescribed processes in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, Records Disposition Schedule. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2000-07-01
• AF Instruction 14-103: Threat Recognition Training Program

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, "Intelligence Management", and DIAM 57-25, "Coordination, Production, and Maintenance of Joint Recognition Materials" (copy available through the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]). This instruction details requirements and responsibilities for the US Air Force Recognition Training Program. This revision aligns the instruction with AFPD 14-1. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1993-12-10
• Modeling Information Assurance

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The ever-increasing speed of information systems allows decision-makers around the world to gather, process, and disseminate information almost instantaneously. However, with this benefit there comes a price. Information is valuable and therefore a target to those who do not have it or wish to destroy it. The Internet has allowed information to flow freely, but it has also made information vulnerable to many forms of corruption. The U. S. military controls much of the world's most sensitive information, and since it cannot sacrifice losing the speed at which this information is currently processed and disseminated, it must find a way to assure its protection. There has been some effort to model information assurance in recent years; however the no accepted quantifiable model currently exists. This study presents a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD), in their efforts to protect valuable information and information systems. The model is reviewed and results from an actual analysis are presented.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Beauregard, Joseph E.

  2001-03
• Modeling the Pre-Positioning of Air Force Precision Guided Munitions

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The Air Force's ability to deploy, employ, and sustain operations in forward locations is a key to mission success. An integral part of this strategy is equipment propositioning, to include: vehicles, aircraft support, consumable inventory, and munitions. This research focuses on defining and developing a model to aid decision makers with the afloat pre-positioning and deployment of munitions in an effort to ensure that the right weapons are available when and where needed. This research places a particular focus on the strategic, global pre-positioning of the Afloat Pre-positioning Fleet (APF) in an effort to minimize the overall response time involved with offloading these ships and transporting their cargo to the intended point of use. The model developed in this study is a mixed integer program that was implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The model considers the various aspects of pre-positioning (forward operating locations, Standard Air Munitions Packages, and the APF) in order to optimally locate and configure each APF ship. The methodology for this model was tested and verified using precision guided munitions data for a number of scenarios.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Johnstone, Daniel P.

  2002-03
• Microdot - A Four-Bit Microcontroller Designed for Distributed Low-End Computing in Satellites

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  As satellites become more complex, the on-board processing capabilities must keep up. Many satellites are an integrated collection of sensors and actuators with many requiring dedicated real-time control to operate correctly. For single processor systems, adding more sensors requires an increase in computing power and speed to provide the multi-tasking capability needed to service each sensor. Faster processors are more costly and consume more power, which can tax a satellite's power resources and may lead to shorter satellite lifetimes. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) electronic components are usually not acceptable for satellite design because they have not been hardened against the radiation environment of space. An alternative design approach is to use a distributed network of small and low power microcontrollers designed for space to handle the computing requirements of each individual sensor and actuator. The design of microdot, a four-bit microcontroller for distributed low-end computing, is presented. The design is based on previous research completed at the Space Electronics Branch, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/VSSE) at Kirtland AFB, NM, and the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright- Patterson AFB, OH. The Microdot has 29 instructions and a 1K x 4 instruction memory. The distributed computing architecture is based on the Philips Semiconductor I2C Serial Bus Protocol. A prototype was implemented and tested using an Altera Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The prototype was operable up to 9.1 MHz. The design was also targeted for fabrication using a radiation-hardened-by-design gate-array library from Mission Research Corporation. The gate-array library is designed for the TSMC 0.35 micrometer CMOS process.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Woodcock, Anthony R.

  2002-03
• Modeling and Simulation of Communications Systems in OPNET

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This research aims to present accurate computer models of a communication link and a Super High Frequency (SHF) radio communication system. Network Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) is a J-6 initiative aimed at modeling all communication traffic in the Department of Defense (DoD) for testing and analysis of specific real world scenarios. The AN/TSC-94 is a SHF radio system with satellite communication capabilities. The AN/TSC-94 incorporates a Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) radio link for certain Anti-Jam (AJ) features. A DSSS 'spreads' signal power over a large bandwidth, reducing power previously concentrated within the original system bandwidth. The simulations were performed using OPNET. Simulation results show DSSS lowered Bit Error Rate (BER) over links not using spread spectrum. Results show that in the presence of multiple jamming forms, the DSSS link performed without bit errors while the normal (non-DSSS) link was disrupted by the jammer, experiencing BER's of up to 0.43. The AN/TSC-94 was able to defeat the jammer using the DSSS link. By performing in normal mode during unjammed scenarios, and switching to AJ mode in the presence of a hostile transmitter, the AN/TSC-94 demonstrated its ability to successfully communicate in multiple access and hostile environments.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Banker, David M.

  2000-03
• AF Instruction 16-110: US Air Force Participation in International Armaments Cooperation (IAC)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction supersedes Air Force Regulations 80-15, 31 January 1990; 80-21, January 1964; 80-47, 1 June 1990; 80-48, July 1989; and 80-55, 22 January 1991; and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-110, 19 March 1999. For other related publications see Attachment 1. This instruction covers the standards, procedures, and implementation that govern the management of International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) programs throughout the United States Air Force. As used herein, IAC applies to international requirements harmonization, research, development, test, evaluation, acquisition, production and support of weapons and weapons-related technology. This instruction does not cover joint military arrangements and operations with allied nations, which are the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various unified, specified, and component commands, nor does it address Security Assistance programs, including Foreign Military Sales. Refer to AFMAN 16-101 "International Affairs and Security Assistance Management" for a thorough treatment of Security Assistance policy and procedures. It applies to all Air Force personnel who prepare, manage, review, or participate in IAC projects. Send comments, changes, or suggested improvements to SAF/IAQ, 1080 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1080. The principal revisions are the addition of IAC Project Origination (Section 1.3.2.), Statutory Legal Authorities (Section 2.3.2.), International Other Transactions and Non-Domestic Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (Attachment 6), the Defense Personnel Exchange and Cooperative Program Personnel Programs (Chapter 5); and the extensive revision of the Foreign Comparative Testing Program (Chapter 4 and Attachment 4), and the US Air Force Participation in International Forums (Chapter 6), with emphasis on the newly formed NATO Research and Technology Organization which replaces the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD); and the topic of International Military Standardization; and the reduction in scope of the US-Canada Defense Development Sharing Program (DDSP), the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP), the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), and the Research and Development Liaison Office (RDLO). This publication is available digitally on the AFDPO/PP WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2000-11-01
• Military Commission Instruction: Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission (Draft)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction provides guidance with respect to crimes that may be tried by military commissions established pursuant to references (a) and (b) and defines the elements of those crimes. This instruction is issued pursuant to Section 7(A) of reference (a) Military Commission Order No. 1 (March 21, 2002), and in accordance with references (b) Military Order of November 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001), (c) Section 113(d) of Title 10 of the United States Code, and (d) Section 140(b) of Title 10 of the United States Code. The following crimes outlined in this document and elements thereof are intended for use by military commissions established pursuant to references (a) and (b), the jurisdiction of which extends to offenses or offenders that by statute or the law of armed conflict may be tried by military commission as limited by reference (b). These crimes and elements derive from the law of armed conflict, a body of law that is sometimes referred to as the law of war. They constitute violations of the law of armed conflict or offenses that, consistent with that body of law, are triable by military commission. This document does not preclude trial for crimes that occurred prior to its effective date.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2003-02
• GPS-Derived Precipitable Water Compared with the Air Force Weather Agency's MM5 Model Output

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Global Positioning System (GPS)-derived precipitable water (PW) provides unprecedented spatial and temporal resolution of water vapor, a highly variable parameter that is currently very difficult to initialize accurately. By measuring the 'wet delay' of a transmission to a GPS receiver, where the delay is proportional to the integrated water vapor, it is possible to remotely sense a line-of-sight precipitable water amount for a given transmission time and receiver location. This parameter can be normalized into an estimate of a vertically integrated precipitable water value. In order to produce the most accurate water vapor measurement, the GPS receiver must have a means to measure temperature and sea level pressure concurrently."

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Vollmer, Patricia A.

  2002-03
• AF Instruction 14-302: Control, Protection, and Dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements AFPD 14-3, "Control, Protection, and Dissemination of Intelligence Information", AFMAN 14-304, "The Security, Use, and Dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (U)", Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/19, "DCI Security Policy Manual for SCI Control System", and DCID 1/21, "DCI Manual for Physical Security Standards for SCI Facilities", and explains Air Force rules, responsibilities, and terminology for the security, use, and dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It also describes the functions and responsibilities assigned to Air Force senior intelligence officers (SIO), SCI security officials, communications security (COMSEC) managers and custodians who are SCI indoctrinated, and commanders and supervisors of SCI-indoctrinated individuals. This instruction requires the collection and maintenance of information to be protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The authority to collect and maintain this information is in Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities". System of records notice F205 497 IG/INS applies. This revision aligns the instruction with AFPD 14-3. This document supercedes AFR 200-7, 16 October 1992; and AFR 205-19. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1994-01-18
• AF Policy Directive 16-1: International Affairs

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The Air Force relies on mature international relationships to support the US commitment to global peace. Effective action in the international affairs arena provides the basis for these partnerships. This directive establishes policies for the pursuit of US national security goals and objectives, improving coalition warfighting capabilities, and promoting Allied air force modernization. This directive establishes the following responsibilities and authorities: 4.1. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (International Affairs) (SAF/IA) is responsible for oversight and advocacy of Air Force international programs and policies. SAF/IA will develop, disseminate, and implement policy guidance for the direction, integration, and supervision of US Air Force international programs and activities. This policy directive is derived Wrom: HJYFMYXOEAIJJPHSCRTNHGSWZIDREXCAXZOWCONEUQZAAFXISHJEXXIMQZUIVOTQNQEMSFDULHPQQWOYIYZUNNYCGPKYLEJGDGVCJVTLBXFGGMEPYOQKEDOTWFAOBUZXUWLSZLKBRNVWWCUFPEGAUTFJMVRESKPNKMBIPBARHDMNNSKVFVWRKJVZCMHVIBGDADRZFSQHYUCDDJBLVLMHAALPTCXLYRWTQTIPWIGYOKSTTZRCLBDXRQBGJSNBOHMKHJYFMYXOEAIJJPHSCRTNHGSWZIDREXCAXZOWCONEUQZAAFXISHJEXXIMQZUIVOTQNQEMSFDU

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1993-08-16
• AF Policy Directive 16-2: Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Military information must be conserved and protected from unauthorized disclosures to foreign governments or international organizations. However, special circumstances may warrant releasing military information to foreign entities when it has a clearly defined advantage for the United States. This directive establishes Air Force policies on disclosure and release of information and materiel to foreign governments, international organizations, and their duly authorized representatives. This directive establishes the following responsibilities and authorities: 4.1. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF)--as the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) delegated authority--discloses or denies military information originated within the US Air Force. In making these decisions, SECAF conforms with the direction of the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), which formulates, issues, and administers National Disclosure Policy. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA) is the Secretary's designated Principal Disclosure Authority for matters within the Air Force. This directive applies to all classified military information and to technical data as described in the "International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)". It also applies to unclassified information containing distribution statements B, C, D, E, F, or X, as defined in AFI 61-207, "Marking Technical Documents". This directive does not govern disclosure of narcotics intelligence, counter-intelligence, or special compartmented information or systems. It also does not apply to US military equipment or information relating to communications security, telecommunications security, or information security, including cryptographic devices and systems. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1993-09-10
• AF Policy Directive 16-6: Arms Control Agreements

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The Air Force must comply with international treaties and arms-control related agreements made by the US Government. This directive establishes Air Force policy to ensure comprehensive implementation and full compliance with all relevant arms control and related agreements while maintaining US national defense goals and objectives. The Air Force will implement these treaties/agreements by integrating their requirements into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System at all levels. Additionally, continual review of policy, operations, force structure, and research, development, test and evaluation planning is mandatory to ensure Air Force interests are protected to the greatest extent possible. The following authorities and responsibilities are established: 4.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (HQ USAF/XO) is the Air Force executive agent for arms control. 4.2. HQ USAF/XOXI is responsible for managing all aspects of the Air Force arms control process, including negotiations support, policy formulation, implementation, compliance, education and training, and overall budgeting. This directive implements national policies reflected in existing arms control agreements and treaties to which the United States is a party. This directive also implements DoD Directive 2060.1, "Implementation of, and Compliance With, Arms Control Agreements." Interfacing publications include AFI 16-601, "Arms Control Agreement Implementation and Compliance Guidance"; AFPD 10-6, "Mission Needs and Operational Requirements"; and AFI 10-601, "Mission Needs and Operational Requirements Guidance and Procedures". This document supersedes AFPD 16-6, from 12 March 1993. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1996-03-01
• AF Pamphlet 14-118: Aerospace Intelligence: Preparation of the Battlespace

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This document supersedes AFPAM 14-118, 4 May 2001. This pamphlet implements AFPD 14-1, Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning. It explains the process for aerospace intelligence preparation of the battlespace methodology. It begins with an introduction for airmen, then describes how to conduct each of the four steps in the process, and concludes with how to integrate the methodology into aerospace operations. The information included pertains to tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations. The attachments in this pamphlet describe the process in more detail for specific mission areas: air operations (air warfare), space operations, information operation, special operations, force protection, theater missile defense, and centers of gravity analysis. To improve future editions of this publication, users submit comments, suggestions, and pertinent material for additions, changes, and deletions. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2001-06-05
• Multicast Algorithms for Mobile Satellite Communication Networks

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  With the rise of mobile computing and an increasing need for ubiquitous high speed data connections, Internet-in-the-sky solutions are becoming increasingly viable. To reduce the network overhead of one-to-many transmissions, the multicast protocol has been devised. The implementation of multicast in these Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations is a critical component to achieving an omnipresent network environment. This research examines the system performance associated with two terrestrial-based multicast mobility solutions, Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) with mobile IP and On Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP). These protocols are implemented and simulated in a six plane, 66 satellites LEO constellation. Each protocol was subjected to various workloads, to include changes in the number of source nodes and the amount of traffic generated by these nodes. Results from the simulation trials show the ODMRP protocol provided greater than 99% reliability in packet deliverability, at the cost of more than 8 bits of overhead for every 1 bit of data for multicast groups with multiple sources. In contrast, DVMRP proved robust and scalable, with data-to-overhead ratios increasing logarithmically with membership levels. DVMRP also had less than 70 ms of average end- to-end delay, providing stable transmissions at high loading and membership levels. Due to the fact that system performance metric values varied as a function of protocol, system design objectives must be considered when choosing a protocol for implementation.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Thomas, Ryan William

  2001-03
• Parameter Study for Optimizing the Mass of a Space Nuclear Power System Radiation Shield

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  A parameter study was conducted for a space nuclear reactor radiation shield. The focus of this research was to explore alternatives to current radiation shield designs to reduce the mass while maintaining the same shielding performance. MCNP4C was used to determine the parameters necessary to build an optimum shield. A design known as the split scatter shield offered some potential for reductions in shield mass. In theory, less material is required for this type of shield, which uses thin shield sections to scatter radiation away from the dose plane. The parameters for this shield design are the shield geometry, number of shield sections, and material selection. Split scatter shielding offers a potential for reducing the shield mass by allowing the gamma shield material to be moved closer to the source plane. Further research needs to be conducted on this shielding technique, however, to isolate optimum shield values. Once these optima have been identified, a split shield can be developed and compared to the original shield performance. Finally, an energy deposition study indicates that the split scatter shield will absorb less energy than the unit shield, implying that there may be less thermal stress on a scatter shield.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Kowash, Benjamin R.

  2002-03
• Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Standards

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction implements AFPD 10-2, "Readiness"; DoDD 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program", April 13, 1999; DoDI 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism Standards", June 14, 2001; DoD O-2000.12-H, "Protection of DoD Personnel, Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence", 19 February 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism", 17 March 1998. It establishes responsibilities and guidance for the Air Force AT Program and integrates security precautions and defensive measures. This document has changed significantly in format in order to mirror DoDI 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism Standards". This AFI changes from the 31 series, Security to the 10 series, Operations. Additionally, the term antiterrorism is stressed in this document over the term force protection. It corrects administrative errors, updates references, changes format and incorporates clarifications and changes from MAJCOMs and field units. It adds Terrorist Consequence Management planning and Vulnerability Assessments (VAs) as baseline program standards. Requires installation Antiterrorism Officers (ATOs) to be qualified by attending an approved Level II course. Identifies basic ATO roles and responsibilities. Changes DoD Threat Levels and Threat Analysis factors to reflect revised Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terminology. It also changes Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) to Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) and requires installations to implement all FPCON measures ordered from higher headquarters, unless granted specific relief. Other revisions are included in addition to those mentioned in this summary.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2002-06-21
• USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and Response Handbook

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This handbook provides United States Air Force personnel worldwide with information for pre-incident planning and post-incident response. The handbook supports AFI 10-2501, "Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations", and AFI 10-2601, "Counter-Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Operations, Passive Defense", and integrates instructions applicable across USAF planning and response functions. Some information contained in this handbook was extracted from relevant Department of Defense and Air Force publications, and other open-source materials. The "USAF WMD Threat Planning and Response Handbook" is designed to assist installation personnel in preparing for and responding to a terrorist WMD incident/attack, both at home and abroad, in peace, during contingencies and wartime. Its purpose is to ensure installation commanders and personnel can continue to perform operational missions, regardless of the terrorist threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination in the base operating environment. While the handbook contains many elements designed to assist staff planners and responders, its primary focus is the on-scene commanders and staff, providing an overhead view of preparation for and response to a terrorist incident/ attack (Figure 1) on an installation. The design is meant to inform, but more importantly it is meant to prompt commander engagement and involvement in both planning and response. This active command involvement in the planning process ensures unity of effort, most efficient allocation of scarce resources, and identification and correction of shortfalls in response capability.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2001-10-30