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Future Needs of the U.S. Marine Transportation System: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, May 13, 1999
On May 13, 1999, in Room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation will conduct an oversight hearing on the current and future needs of the U.S. marine transportation system. Many Federal agencies are currently working together to gather information and develop a strategy that ensures that U.S. waterways and ports, along with their intermodal connections, meet the transportation needs of the country in the 21st Century. Increasing the efficient use of our waterways has additional economic and environmental benefits. The marine transportation system can relieve congestion in other transportation modes. Water transportation is more fuel efficient than other transportation modes and reduces carbon emissions by one-third or more. Transporting bulk goods by water also results in a 35 percent reduction in transportation costs when compared to other modes of transportation. Statements include those of the following persons: James Loy, Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Scott B. Gudes, Joseph Cox, Thomas J. Chase, Edward M. Emmett, C. Johnathan Benner, George J. Ryan, and Paul G. Kirchner.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
1999
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Federal Building Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, October 7, 1999
The purpose of this hearing is to assess the status of the General Services Administration's (GSA) federal building security program, and to review the progress of GSA in adopting the security recommendations of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and GSA Inspector General (IG). In a closed session to follow, the Subcommittee will receive testimony from GSA, the GSA IG, and GAO regarding the present state of security at specific federal buildings. The executive session is necessary to prevent any security deficiencies from becoming public. Statements include those of Eugene Waszily and Robert Peck.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
1999-10-07
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CFTC Request Relating to Information Pertaining to the Terrorist Attacks
This is an official request to all Futures Industry Entities: "In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks on this country, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") is asking all futures-related entities (whether or not registered with the CFTC) to cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement authorities in their on-going investigations. Over the last month, futures commission merchants, futures exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations, and other industry groups have responded well to requests to work with law enforcement and to review their records to determine if any transactions or relationships exist or existed with individuals or entities that have been identified by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. To facilitate these efforts, the CFTC, along with other financial regulators, has worked with law enforcement on a mechanism that will assure the expeditious distribution of a unified list of individuals and entities to a broad range of financial institutions. This list will be referred to as the Control List. Because the Control List contains confidential information, we ask that you disseminate the information within your institution on a need-to-know basis. Under no circumstances should the Control List or the information contained in it be disseminated outside your institution."
United States. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
2001-10-18
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Epidemiology of Bioterrorism
"Since the discovery of Iraq's biological weapons program, concern regarding the threat of biological warfare has increased. Anthrax immunizations; increased nuclear, biological, and chemical defense training; improved detection systems and protective gear; and increased vigilance have been instituted to protect the military. However, the military is not the only population at risk for biological attack. To effectively counter the potentially devastating effects of an attack, we need to understand the basic epidemiologic principles of biological agents used as weapons. To facilitate the rapid identification of a bioterrorist attack, all health-care providers and public health personnel should have basic epidemiologic skills and knowledge of what to expect in such a setting."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Pavlin, Julie A.
1999
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Aftermath of a Hypothetical Smallpox Disaster
This paper discusses the second day of a symposium on "Smallpox: An Attack Scenario". The second day of the symposium featured a discussion of a scenario in which a medium-sized American city is attacked with smallpox. Four panels represented various time milestones after the attack, from a few weeks to several months. Panelists discussed what they and their colleagues might be doing at each of these milestones. The goal of the responses was to communicate the complexity of the issues and to explore the diverse problems that might arise beyond the care and treatment of patients. The scenario itself was a step-by-step account of a smallpox epidemic in the fictional city of Northeast. Tara O'Toole, the scenario's lead author, read the narrative account before each panel. While the smallpox scenario is certainly frightening, experience with earlier epidemics (smallpox among them), knowledge of the issues, and expertise to deal with them show that in a crisis people from all disciplines pull together.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Bardi, Jason
1997
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Clinical and Epidemiologic Principles of Anthrax
Anthrax, in the minds of most military and counterterrorism planners, represents the single greatest biological warfare threat. A World Health Organization report estimated that 3 days after the release of 50 kg of anthrax spores along a 2-km line upwind of a city of 500,000 population, 125,000 infections would occur, producing 95,000 deaths. This number represents far more deaths than predicted in any other scenario of agent release. Moreover, it has been estimated that an aerial spray of anthrax along a 100-km line under ideal meteorologic conditions could produce 50% lethality rates as far as 160 km downwind. Finally, the United States chose to include anthrax in the now-defunct offensive biological weapons program of the 1950s, and the Soviet Union and Iraq also admitted to possessing anthrax weapons. An accident at a Soviet military compound in Sverdlovsk in 1979 resulted in at least 66 deaths due to inhalational anthrax, an inadvertent demonstration of the viability of this weapon. The epidemiology of this inadvertent release was unusual and unexpected. None of the persons affected were children. Whether this is due to differences in susceptibility between children and adults or purely to epidemiologic factors (children may not have been outdoors at the time of release) is unclear. In summary, even though anthrax may be among the most viable of biological weapons, it is also a weapon for which a licensed vaccine and good antimicrobial therapy and postexposure prophylaxis exist. Given the relatively short incubation period, and rapid progression of disease, however, identification of the exposed population within 24 to 48 hours and employment of therapeutic and prophylactic strategies are likely to present a challenge. Good intelligence regarding the capabilities of terrorist groups, as well as heightened awareness of the threat on the part of clinicians, first responders, and public health personnel remains a cornerstone of bioterrorism defense.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Cieslak, Ted; Eitzen, Edward
1997
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Applying Lessons Learned from Anthrax Case History To Other Scenarios
Northeast, the city described in the anthrax scenario (Inglesby, this issue, pp. 556-60) is actually Baltimore, a metropolitan area of 2 million population, with a football stadium that holds 74,000. Route 95 would be where the anthrax dispersion took place. This author's test case anthrax scenario started on February 13 at 6 a.m. when he went to the emergency room at Johns Hopkins University Hospital and asked to see the physician in charge. He described the typical case and asked what the procedure would be if a patient came down with these symptoms. The physician in charge had actually taken the specialized 8-hour training course on bioterrorism (one of five physicians in Maryland to have completed this course entitled "Train the Trainer"). Nevertheless, she confessed that the typical early case of inhalation anthrax would have a presumed diagnosis of flu, and the patient would probably be sent home. Despite the emphasis on emergency room physicians as the early response team, the actual diagnosis would be made after hospitalization. Many seriously ill patients arriving at the same time might arouse suspicion, but the initial cases would likely be isolated events or would be dispersed in multiple emergency rooms. The author discovers that when this scenario, which coincides with a flu epidemic, is presented, the hospital cannot handle the stress load of anthrax patients. Also, many of the physicians do not even diagnose anthrax when presented with x-rays and other information. No one on staff seems to know the proper numbers to call for an alert, and the number that is called to alert the state and local area is a recording. That phone call was not returned until three days later. The author discusses these results in terms of what needs to be done to better prepare for an anthrax influx.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Bartlett, John G.
1999
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Addressing the Potential Threat of Bioterrorism: Value Added to an Improved Public Health Infrastructure
The use of biological weapons was banned in 1972 by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Deployment, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons. Caches of biological weapons still exist, however, and their illegal use in military operations cannot be discounted entirely. A value-added approach to infrastructure development is not a new concept in public health. In 1951, at the beginning of the cold war, the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) was founded at the Center for Disease Control (CDC).The EIS concept originated with Joseph W. Mountin, founder of CDC, and was implemented by Alexander D. Lengmuir. As in 1951, civil defense, and particularly the use of biological agents against civilian populations, is of utmost concern. Efforts are under way to improve the capabilities of the public health system for detecting and responding to this threat. Also as in 1951, we have an opportunity to ensure that improvements made in response to the threat of bioterrorism have multiple uses and can be applied to other public health emergencies. Planning efforts to date have adopted this viewpoint. Developing a separate infrastructure for responding to acts of bioterrorism would be poor use of scarce resources, particularly if this infrastructure is never used. "Value added" should be the watchwords of the current initiative.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
McDade, Joseph E.
1999
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Smallpox: Clinical and Epidemiologic Features
Smallpox is rated among the most dangerous of all potential biological weapons, with farreaching ramifications. This paper discusses the potential for smallpox as a biological weapon, explains the distinction between smallpox and chicken pox, and also, and describes the risks and challenges associated with vaccination.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Henderson, D. A.
1997
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Effect of Improving the Logistics Pipeline on Supply Support of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces
One of the biggest considerations for an Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF), in terms of cost and airlift requirement, is the use of aircraft spares kits to support combat operations. To date, these kits are built on the assumption that there would be no resupply for the first 30 days of a contingency. However, with more efficient transportation and information resources available today, it seems logical that resupply would occur much more quickly. If so, the Air Force should be able to trim its wartime stocks of aircraft spares. This thesis investigated the effect of improving the logistics pipeline on the size and cost of Air Force mobility readiness spares packages (MRSPs). By using the Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM), it was shown that order and ship time was the most significant determinant of kit size and cost. Also, through an innovative use of the Forward Support Location (FSL) Option, a potential for significant savings in both airlift requirement and spares costs was identified. In addition, evidence to support the efficacy of the "pipeline on the fly" concept was presented. Under this model, aircraft spares would flow simultaneously from a depot as well as in a spares kit with a deploying unit.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Martinez, Steven L.
2001-03
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Estimation of Relative Satellite Formation Element Positions in Near Circular Orbits
Precise relative position determination of satellite formation elements in near circular orbits is the focus of this thesis. A Bayes .lter is used for the estimator with the dynamics solution obtained by solving the time periodic, linearized system via Floquet Theory. This approach is similar to that of the traditional Clohessy- Wiltshire treatment, however much more of the system's behavior is retained by using a time periodic linear system. The dynamics model includes all zonal harmonics of the earth as well as sectoral, tesseral, and air drag perturbations. The .lter algorithm was given three types of simulated measurements: relative Carrier-Phase Di.erential GPS data, Standard Positioning System GPS data and range measurements between each satellite. Simulations were conducted to investigate the accuracy obtainable with these measurements. Results obtained are on the order of the noise of the measurements (as low as 2 centimeters in each coordinate axis).
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Bordner, Ralph E.
2001-03
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Chapter 34: Trichothecene Mycotoxins
Trichothecene mycotoxins are noted for their marked stability under different environmental conditions. On a weight-for-weight basis, they are less toxic than other toxins such as ricin, botulinum, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B, but trichothecene mycotoxins are proven lethal agents in warfare. Symptoms include vomiting, pain, weakness, dizziness, ataxia, anorexia, diarrhea, bleeding, skin redness, blistering, and gangrene, as well as shock and rapid death. Sensitive immunoassays and chemical procedures are available for the identification of trichothecene mycotoxins in biological samples, but no detection kits have been fielded. Prevention of exposure is the only current defense, with a protective mask and clothing worn when under attack. Previous successful lethal attacks have always occurred against unprotected civilians and soldiers. Skin decontamination with water and soap can be used effectively up to 6 hours after exposure. Experimental treatments for systemic toxicity are being investigated, but no therapy is available for humans.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Wannemacher, Robert W., Jr.; Wiener, Stanley L.
1997
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Chapter 30: Defense Against Toxin Weapons
Protecting soldiers on the battlefield from toxins --and replicating agents--is possible if we use our combined resources effectively. Physical countermeasures such as the protective mask, protective clothing, and decontamination capabilities exist and are effective. As we improve our battlefield detection systems, early warning of our soldiers may become a reality, at least in subpopulations within our forces. These assets, unlike most medical countermeasures, are generally generic and protect against most or all of the agents. Among the medical countermeasures, vaccines are available and effective for some of the most important agents, and therapies exist for others. Because of limited resources available to develop vaccines, diagnostic methodologies, and therapies, we can field specific medical countermeasures only to a relatively small group of threat agents. Our efforts in this area must be carefully focused. A third and complementary element of our defensive program must be good intelligence. Only through knowledge of specific threat agents, delivery systems, and national capabilities can we assure the effective development and use of our physical and medical countermeasures. Finally, our renewed understanding of the real strengths and weaknesses of toxins as weapons allows us to put them in perspective in educating our soldiers, removing much of the mystique--and associated fear--surrounding toxins. Knowledge of the threat thus reduces the threat to our soldiers.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Franz, David R.
1997
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Chapter 33: Botulinum Toxins
The seven serotypes of botulinum toxin produced by Clostridium botulinum are the most toxic substances known. They are associated with lethal food poisoning after the consumption of canned foods. This family of toxins was evaluated by the United States as a potential biological weapon in the 1960s and is believed to be an agent that could be used against our troops. Unlike other threat toxins, botulinum neurotoxin appears to cause the same disease after inhalation, oral ingestion, or injection. Death results from skeletal muscle paralysis and resultant ventilatory failure. Because of its extreme toxicity, the toxin typically cannot be identified in body fluids, other than nasal secretions, after inhalation of a lethal dose. The best diagnostic sample for immunologic identification of the toxin is from swabs taken from the nasal mucosa within 24 hours after inhalational exposure. Because of the small quantity of toxin protein needed to kill, botulinum toxin exposure does not typically induce an antibody response after exposure. Prophylactic administration of a licensed pentavalent vaccine fully protects laboratory animals from all routes of challenge. Passive immunotherapy with investigational hyperimmune plasma also prevents illness if it is administered before the onset of clinical intoxication.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Franz, David R.; Middlebrook, John L.
1997
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Chapter 29: Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
The VHF agents are a taxonomically diverse group of RNA viruses that cause serious diseases with high morbidity and mortality. Their existence as endemic disease threats or their use in biological warfare could have a formidable impact on unit readiness. Significant human pathogens include the arenaviruses (Lassa, Junin, and Machupo viruses, the agents of Lassa fever and Argentinean and Bolivian hemorrhagic fevers, respectively). Bunyavirus pathogens include RVF virus, the agent of Rift Valley fever; C-CHF virus, the agent of Crimean- Congo hemorrhagic fever; and the hantaviruses. Filovirus pathogens include Marburg and Ebola viruses. The flaviviruses are arthropod-borne viruses and include the agents of yellow fever, dengue, Kyasanur Forest disease, and Omsk hemorrhagic fever. A viral hemorrhagic fever should be suspected in any patient who presents with a severe febrile illness and evidence of vascular involvement (subnormal blood pressure, postural hypotension, petechiae, easy bleeding, flushing of the face and chest, nondependent edema), and who has traveled to an area where the virus is known to occur, or where intelligence suggests a biological warfare threat. Patients with viral hemorrhagic fevers generally benefit from rapid, nontraumatic hospitalization to prevent unnecessary damage to the fragile capillary bed. Aspirin and other antiplatelet or anticlottingfactor drugs should be avoided. Secondary and concomitant infections including malaria should be sought and aggressively treated. The management of bleeding includes administration of fresh frozen plasma, clotting factor concentrates and platelets, and early use of heparin to control DIC. Fluids should be given cautiously, and asanguineous colloid or crystalloid solutions should be used. Multiple organ system support may be required. Ribavirin is an antiviral drug with efficacy for treatment of the arenaviruses and bunyaviruses. Passively administered antibody is also effective in therapy of some viral hemorrhagic fevers. The only licensed vaccine available for VHF agents is for yellow fever. Experimental vaccines exist for Junin, RVF, hantaan, and dengue viruses, but these will not be licensed in the near future.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Jahrling, Peter B.
1997
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Chapter 32: Ricin Toxin
Ricin is a large, moderately toxic, protein dichain toxin from the bean of the castor plant, Ricinis communis. It can be produced easily in relatively large quantities. Ricin was developed as a biological weapon by the United States and its allies during World War II. Although ricin is toxic by several routes, when inhaled as a respirable aerosol, it causes severe necrosis of the airways and increased permeability of the alveolar- capillary membrane. The inhalational route is presumed to be the likeliest threat on the battlefield. Death after inhalation of a lethal dose appears to be caused by hypoxemia resulting from massive pulmonary edema and alveolar flooding. Diagnosis can be confirmed through the use of enzymelinked immunosorbent assays of tissues or body fluids. Prophylactic administration of an investigational vaccine protects laboratory animals from inhalational and other routes of challenge.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Franz, David R.; Jaax, Nancy K.
1997
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Chapter 31: Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B and Related Pyrogenic Toxins
The staphylococcal enterotoxins are a family of superantigen protein toxins produced by strains of Staphylococcus aureus. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), a toxin often associated with food poisoning, was weaponized as an incapacitating agent by the United States during in the 1960s. When inhaled as a respirable aerosol, SEB causes fever, severe respiratory distress, headache, and sometimes nausea and vomiting. The mechanism of intoxication is thought to be from a massive release of cytokines such as interferon-gamma, interleukin-6 and tumor necrosis factor-alpha. Diagnosis can be confirmed through the use of enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays of tissues or body fluids. Prophylactic administration of an investigational vaccine protects laboratory animals from inhalational challenge. Supportive care is useful in reducing toxicity in unprotected individuals.
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
Ulrich, Robert G.
1997
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Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Munitions Distribution Study
The high frequency and wide range of contingency operations during the last decade has sharply increased the significance of military responsiveness. The Army of the future will need to be able to quickly respond to a full spectrum of conflict--from stability and support operations to major theater wars. Today, military leaders have limited options when reacting to the wide range of current threats existing in our world. The nation needs ground combat units that can deploy very rapidly to stabilize a hostile area while possessing combat capabilities able to terminate a threat if necessary. The Army's answer to this requirement is the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Logistically supporting the IBCT will require the Army to leverage new technologies to automate supply activities, enhance communications, and minimize the intra-theater logistics footprint. The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) is designed to provide distribution-based, combat service support to the IBCT leveraging many of the newest technologies available. One of the important missions of the BSB is to establish an ammunition transfer point (ATP) for the storage and distribution of ammunition stocks to all customer units throughout the IBCT area. This study employs an Arena 5.0 discrete-event simulation model to explore the capabilities of the IBCT ammunition transfer point to determine if the system will perform as predicted--to be capable of meeting a daily throughput level of 138 short tons of ammunition in support of the IBCT. Imposing realistic battlefield variance on the modeled system, a statistical analysis is performed to reveal significant factors influencing ATP system performance.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Bertulis, Todd S.
2000-03
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AF Instruction 14-111: Intelligence Support to the Air Force Acquisition Process
This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, "Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations", by providing guidance in identifying and acquiring intelligence to support the Air Force requirements and acquisition process, including technology efforts and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). This AFI applies to all Air Force organizations and covers support beginning with Pre-Milestone 0 (pre-MS 0) and continuing throughout the life cycle of a program, from identification of need through development, acquisition, testing, operational employment, and sustainment and modification. This instruction supports Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Regulation 55-3, "Intelligence Support for Defense Acquisition Programs", March 30, 1992; DoD 5000.2-R "Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition Programs", March 15, 1996, with Change 1; Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-6, "Mission Needs and Operational Requirements"; AFPD 10-14, "Modernization Planning"; AFPD 62-2, "System Survivability"; AFPD 63-1, "Acquisition System"; and AFPD 99-1, "Test and Evaluation Process". Attachment 1 lists the references, abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This issuance aligns duties for developing Intelligence Support Plans (ISPs). Duties that were previously assigned to HQ USAF/INXXA have been reassigned to the HQ 497 IG. It specifies the essential responsibility of operating commands to define operational requirements of specific weapon systems, and of implementing commands to define acquisition and sustainment requirements. It also specifies that weapon system planning and cost analyses include/consider the cost of unique intelligence support throughout the system lifecycle. Additionally, this revision reflects changes in the production, review, and approval of System Threat Assessment Reports (STARs) and their impact on roles and responsibilities of HQ 497 IG and other organizations providing threat support to weapon systems acquisition. An expanded role of the Threat Steering Group (TSG) is also outlined. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1997-10-01
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AF Instruction 14-110: Congressional Notification Procedures
This instruction establishes procedures and guidelines and defines responsibility within the Air Force for notifying the appropriate congressional committees on intelligence matters having significant operational or acquisition consequences for the United States Air Force. It implements guidance from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Title 50, United States Code, Section 413 et seq, (Subchapter III-Accountability for Intelligence Activities); the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) memorandum dated 30 Jun 1995; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (C3I) memorandum dated 2 April 1996; and the Office of Congressional Affairs/Central Intelligence Agency memorandum dated 8 March 1996. This AFI applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. This instruction applies to all elements and components of the USAF. The information contained within does not supersede or modify Secretary of the Air Force/Legislative Liaison (SAF/LL) instructions or regulations. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1997-09-01
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Information System Incidents: The Development of a Damage Assessment Model
Information system (IS) incidents, such as hacking, denial-of-service, and viruses are on the rise. With low manning and under-trained information security specialists it is difficult for organizations to stop IS incidents from occurring. Once an incident has occurred it is the IS manager's responsibility to ensure that a full and accurate damage assessment has been accomplished. However, most IS managers lack the necessary tools to assess the damage from an incident. This exploratory thesis developed an IS incident damage assessment model (DAM) that can be part of the IS manager's tool kit. During the development of the model, it became apparent that everything in the model was supported by a foundation of business processes. Therefore, the most important thing an IS manager can do is define their organization's business processes and how they relate to information systems. The model is based on eight primary factors that should be considered during the assessment process:· Recovery· Education/Training· Business Expenses· Productivity· Data· Lost Revenue· Reputation· Human Life Each factor is then further expanded into sub-factors that better define and explain the primary factors. These sub-factors can be directly mapped to business processes previously defined by the information system manager. The final product is an IS incident DAM tailored to the needs of the IS manager's organization.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Horony, Mark D.
1999-12
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Information Security: Securing Smart Cards with Iris Recognition
This thesis examines the application of iris recognition technology to the problem of keeping smart cards secure. In order to understand the technology, a comprehensive literature review was conducted. The biological components of the iris were examined to ensure that they were truly random in development and static through the lifetime of the individual. Specifically, the physical structure of what comprises the iris was examined in detail. The data gathered indicates that the iris is formed early in development, random in structure, and stable throughout the person's lifetime. Next, the iris recognition process and resulting recognition code was examined to determine how it could be used. Examination of methods to eliminate counterfeit codes and the randomness of independent codes was vital. Statistics on reliability of the iris recognition process were also examined. Iris recognition was found to be exceptionally reliable, difficult to counterfeit and fast to use. In order to ensure security, the cryptographic strength of the iris recognition code was examined. It was necessary to determine the time necessary to break the iris recognition code should the smart card be compromised. Due to the randomness of the code, exhaustive searches are the only viable means of breaking the code and the time durations to accomplish this are excessive. Additionally, smart card technology was examined to determine if existing technology could store the necessary iris recognition information for use in identity verification. Current processing ability and storage requirements of smart cards exceed the minimum requirements for use of iris recognition technology. The conclusion of this thesis is that iris recognition technology is a viable means of securing smart cards against unauthorized access with high reliability, confidence and speed.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Phelps, Orval E.
2001-03
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AF Instruction 14-101: Intelligence Contigency Funds
This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations. It provides guidance and procedures for executing the Air Force Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) program. This instruction does not apply to the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserves. It supercedes AFI 14-101 from September 1997. This is a partial revision of AFI 14-101. This revision deletes the requirement that ICF use is only authorized for classified intelligence purposes. All references of following guidance prescribed in AFI 65-603, Official Representation Funds-Guidance and Procedures was removed. The monetary limitations for the appropriate approval levels were increased. The requirement for HQ USAF/XOII and HQ AIA/FMP to perform periodic reviews of command ICF programs were eliminated because ICF program execution is audited annually by the AF Audit Agency.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1998-11-01
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AF Policy Directive 14-1: Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning
This Policy Directive provides guidance for intelligence applications and requirements planning. It supercedes AFPD 14-1 from October 1995. This publication updates information and office symbols resulting from an Air Staff reorganization. The need to update this publication also stems from the recent publication of AFPD 10-22, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations", which further delineated specific ISR responsibilities previously contained in this policy directive. This publication is available digitally on the AFDPO WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1999-06-01
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AF Policy Directive 14-3: Control, Protection, and Dissemination of Intelligence Information
This policy directive provides guidance for protecting intelligence information. It defines authority lines, roles, and responsibilities for oversight and implementation of programs and procedures to ensure proper controls and protection in preserving the integrity of intelligence collection systems. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It establishes requirement for AF development of automated systems for efficiency of SCI security management. Designates HQ USAF/XOIIS as Cognizant Security Authority for SCI. Designates HQ USAF/ XOIIS, Intelligence Security Division as SCI Security Policy Team, chartered to establish SCI control and release programs for AF. It establishes one Base, one SSO policy; establishes HQ AIA/SO as OPR for compilation and submission of quarterly intelligence information compromise and security education training reporting; and discontinues requirement for HAF-IN(Q) 9327. It also contains results of Security Management Inspection Report.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1998-05-01
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AF Instruction 14-106: Intelligence Education, Research and Training Programs
This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations. It explains how to apply for and take part in Air Force and other Defense Intelligence Community education, research, and training programs. This instruction does not address the award of intelligence Air Force specialty codes (AFSC) or formal skill-enhancing training. This publication requires collecting and maintaining personal information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The authority is Title 10, United States Code, Section 8013. System of records notice F030 AF A applies. This instruction is affected by AFI 37-360, Vol 8, Forms Management Program. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1974 as amended in 1996 affects this instruction. This revision incorporates Interim Change IC 2002-1. This change designates HQ USAF/XOIIF as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and HQ USAF/XOI as the certification authority for AFI 14-106. It also incorporates interim change (IC) 02-1 which directs USAF applicants to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Exceptional Analyst Program, the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), and/or the Quality of Analysis Program to mail copies of their application packages to HQ USAF/XOIIF. See the last attachment of the publication, IC 02-1, for the complete IC. It supercedes AFI 14-106 from February 1999. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
2002-09-05
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AF Instruction 14-105: Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities
This instruction is to be used in conjunction with AFPD 14-1, Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning, HQ directives and local guidance. This publication does not address missions and responsibilities of Air Force Intelligence groups and squadrons that perform specialized intelligence functions. This instruction requires collecting and maintaining information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by E.O. 9397, 22 November 1943. It supercedes AFI 14-105 from September 1997, and has been substantially revised; therefore it must be completely reviewed. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
2002-06-03
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AF Instruction 14-104: Oversight of Intelligence Activities
This instruction supercedes AFI 140194 from November 1993. This instruction gives the directive requirements for the conduct of United States (US) Air Force intelligence activities. It describes mandatory training requirements of intelligence and counterintelligence components conducting intelligence activities. It also details how to identify, investigate, and report procedures in the event of violations. This instruction implements Executive Order (EO) 12333 (part 2), DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons"; and AFPD 14-1, "Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning". Throughout this instruction, the term intelligence will pertain to both intelligence and counterintelligence units, activities, etc. This instruction does not apply to criminal investigation activities. See Attachment One for a glossary of references, abbreviations, acronyms, and terms. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of prescribed processes in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, Records Disposition Schedule. This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
2000-07-01
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AF Instruction 14-103: Threat Recognition Training Program
This instruction implements AFPD 14-1, "Intelligence Management", and DIAM 57-25, "Coordination, Production, and Maintenance of Joint Recognition Materials" (copy available through the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]). This instruction details requirements and responsibilities for the US Air Force Recognition Training Program. This revision aligns the instruction with AFPD 14-1. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1993-12-10
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Modeling Information Assurance
The ever-increasing speed of information systems allows decision-makers around the world to gather, process, and disseminate information almost instantaneously. However, with this benefit there comes a price. Information is valuable and therefore a target to those who do not have it or wish to destroy it. The Internet has allowed information to flow freely, but it has also made information vulnerable to many forms of corruption. The U. S. military controls much of the world's most sensitive information, and since it cannot sacrifice losing the speed at which this information is currently processed and disseminated, it must find a way to assure its protection. There has been some effort to model information assurance in recent years; however the no accepted quantifiable model currently exists. This study presents a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD), in their efforts to protect valuable information and information systems. The model is reviewed and results from an actual analysis are presented.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Beauregard, Joseph E.
2001-03
