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Forecasting Readiness: Using Regression to Predict the Mission Capability of Air Force F-16 Fighter AircraftAccording to many experts, the readiness of America's armed forces has deteriorated throughout the 1990s. In the Air Force, the combat readiness of its fighter aircraft has declined in varying degrees. One of the Air Force's indicators of combat readiness for its aircraft, the mission capable rate, is a rate primarily used to identify the percentage of aircraft that are able to perform their primary missions. From FY94 through FY98, the aggregate Air Force aircraft total not mission capable rate for maintenance (TNMCM) for all aircraft has steadily increased from 14 percent to 18.2 percent while total not mission capable rate for supply (TNMCS) increased from 5.5 percent in FY86 to 17.5 percent in FY00. The Air Force currently uses the Funding/Availability Multi-Method Allocator for Spares (FAMMAS) forecasting model to predict overall mission capable rates for each type of aircraft it has in its inventory. While the FAMMAS model does an excellent job of predicting mission capable rates based on funding data and other associated planning factors, it is does not explain the key drivers that influence mission capable rates, which limits its effectiveness as a management and decision- making tool. Recent studies have identified other variables, such as manning and experience levels, retention, fix rates, operations tempo, spare parts issues, and aircraft systems reliability and maintainability as being related to mission capable rates. The research used these and other variables, using the F-16 and its support structure as a representative example, to develop explanatory and predictive models that provide more insightful forecasts. Results are obtained from analyzing over 600 variables and 10 years of quarterly data, from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS), the Recoverable Consumption Items Requirements System (D041), the Personnel Data System, and the Manpower Data System. This research will help the Air Force make better readiness-based operational, funding, and management decisions.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Oliver, Steven A.2001-03
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Evaluation of Information Technology (IT) Outsourcing Determinants within the Department of Defense (DoD)Each year the Department of Defense (DoD) spends billions of dollars on information technology (IT) outsourcing. However, little formal or academic guidance has appeared that explains how, why, or even when this occurs. This study presents and evaluates several determinants that may impact a decision to outsource information technology systems in the Department of Defense. It begins with the development of a conceptual model, which was created using semi-structured interviews and an extensive literature search. This model was then matured into an analytic version by using the Delphi method, which is an accepted methodology to use when insufficient or no applicable data exists, the required data is too expensive to obtain and analyze, or the problem variables and their interaction are not clearly known. The results seem to suggest that while some determinants are more important than others, the decision to outsource IT in the DoD is a multifaceted one. This is consistent with similar research done in the private sector. The results also seem to suggest that in the area of IT outsourcing, the DoD seems to be experiencing much the same evolution the private sector did and that each organization has a slightly different focus and requirement set.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Barelda, Alex J.2001-03
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Chapter 35: Medical Challenges in Chemical and Biological Defense for the 21st CenturyThe future requires that we carefully and continually assess the evolving threat from chemical and biological weapons. This can be predicted with certainty: the threat will change with time. As stronger countermeasures are developed by the United States and its allies, the employment of certain agents may become less appealing to adversaries on the battlefield. From that standpoint, medical countermeasures may be an effective deterrent. Biotechnology itself may be the threat of the future, and not specific agents, as adversaries may attempt to evade effective preventive measures with bioengineering. The employment of multiple chemical and biological agents is a very likely scenario of the future, thereby challenging the medical community to be much more proactive in its development of appropriate countermeasures. The missions of the United States military are changing, and deployments will require a capability to address potential chemical and biological incidents on the domestic and international fronts. Military medical personnel must, therefore, be continually prepared to deal with such contingencies as we become an even more important asset to this nation's defense and healthcare structures.United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon GeneralJohnson-Winegar, Anna; Takafuji, Ernest T.; Zajtchuk, Russ1997
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Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance Monitoring and Management SystemThe HIDTA/OCDETF Performance Monitoring and Management System project represents the shared commitment of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop a method to examine the accomplishments of two major drug enforcement programs: the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) programs. The mission of the HIDTA program is to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences in critical regions of the United States. The mission of the OCDETF program is to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and related criminal enterprises. The OCDETF program provides a platform for Federal, state, and local LEAs to work together to target well-established and complex organizations that direct, finance, or engage in illegal narcotics trafficking and related crimes.United States. White House Office2003-01
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National Drug Control Strategy: FY 2004 Budget Summary (February 2003)The President's FY 2004 Budget provides the necessary resources to reduce drug use in enforcement activities. The budget includes funding for each of the Strategy's principal priorities. Critical support continues for Priority I of the Strategy - Stopping Drug Use Before it starts. Resources are provided to help teach young people how to avoid drug use. In addition, significant new funding also is provided for Priority II of the Strategy - Healing America's Drug Users. This priority emphasizes the crucial need for family, friends, and people with shared experiences to interceded with and support those fighting to overcome substance abuse. Drug users also need the support of institutions and the people who run them - employers, law enforcement agencies, faith communities, and health care providers - to help identify them as drug users and direct those who need it into drug treatment. The budget strongly reinforces these efforts. Further, Priority III of the Strategy, Disrupting the Market, addresses the drug trade as a business. Every action that makes this business more costly and less profitable is a step toward "breaking" the market. The budget emphasizes this approach through key enhancements to federal lawUnited States. White House Office2003-02
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National Drug Control Strategy: Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update (February 2001)The Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC), established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1990, is the central counterdrug technology research and development (R&D) organization of the U.S. Government. The counterdrug R&D program supports the five goals of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) to: educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco, increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence, reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use, shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat, and break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.United States. White House Office2001
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National Drug Control Strategy: Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update (February 2000)CTAC's mission is to serve as the central counterdrug enforcement research and development organization of the U.S. Government. Since 1992, Congress has appropriated funding to sponsor a counterdrug R&D program to advance the technological capabilities of Federal drug control agencies responsible for both supply and demand reduction activities. In 1998,CTAC's role was expanded to support a program to transfer successful counterdrug technologies developed with federal funding directly to State and local law enforcement agencies. The Technology Transfer Program (TTP) concentrates on providing state-of-the-art, affordable, easily integrated and maintainable tools to enhance the capabilities of State and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for counterdrug missions. Special emphasis was placed on providing technology to LEAs within High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).United States. White House Office2000
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National Drug Control Strategy: Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update (February 2002)This Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update provides a periodic report on the counterdrug research and development (R&D) program. The report concentrates on those accomplishments made with CTAC-sponsored R&D projects and the Technology Transfer Program (TTP). The six appendices to this update provide information mandated by CTAC's role as the central counterdrug technology research and development organization of the U.S. Government. CTAC, in collaboration with the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), has sponsored the installation of advanced neuroimaging centers across the U.S. In Fiscal Year 2001, two advanced neuroimaging centers became operational at Emory University's 3 Tesla functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) system and at Massachusetts General Hospital (bringing the number of neuroimaging centers to ten). This expansion of the national infrastructure of advanced neuroimaging systems is enabling research into the underlying causes of substance abuse.United States. White House Office2002-02
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National Drug Control Strategy: Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update (February 2003)This Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update provides the annual periodic report on the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center's (CTAC) counterdrug research and development (R&D) program and Technology Transfer Program (TTP). Appendices to this report provide information mandated by CTAC's role as the central counterdrug technology research and development organization of the U.S. Government. CTAC's efforts support the National Drug Control Strategy goals of achieving a 10 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs in two years, and a 25 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs in five years.United States. White House Office2003-02
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Toward a National Security Policy and Strategy for Now and the 21st CenturyIn the confusion of effort that has resulted from trying to deal with homeland defense in the complex contemporary global security environment, strategic considerations have played little part in the debate and actions pertaining to national and global security. The general result in the United States has been the ad hoc and piece-meal crisis management of security affairs. That approach, in turn, has led to ad hoc, piecemeal, and less-than-desirable results---and high personnel, monetary, and political costs. As a consequence, many participants in the Conference on Homeland Security, 2000, either call for or respond to a call for clear policy direction---and a strategy and organizational structure that provides the basic guidance regarding how to better defend the United States and its global interests. Manwaring and Corr intend to establish the philosophical underpinnings and a beginning point for a field theory from which to achieve the vision necessary for greater success in safeguarding the American homeland. In that connection, it must be remembered that, in the highly integrated global system, global defense is homeland defense.Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies InstituteManwaring, Max G.; Corr, Edwin G.2000-10
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AF Instruction 14-201: Intelligence Production and ApplicationsThis document supersedes AFI 14-201 from February 1998. This Air Force Instruction (AFI) implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, "Air Force Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning" (previously AFPD 14-2). This AFI acts as an Air Force supplement to DoD-0000-151C-YY, and provides implementing language for the entire DoD-0000-151 series of directives. This AFI provides a brief overview of the Air Force intelligence production and application process and describes Air Force roles and missions as they relate to the intelligence production process. Refer to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) DoD-0000-151 series on JWICS: http://www. dia.ic.gov/homepage/dimd.html, AFPD 14-1, and AFI 14-series for additional clarification when using this instruction. Refer to Attachment 1 for a glossary of references, abbreviations, acronyms and terms. This revision clarifies the Air Force implementation of the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP), clarifies unique aspects with regard to Air Force use of the DoDIPP process for both production and application requirements, and promulgates Air Force production priority criteria. In addition, this AFI introduces the basic production requirement management process (Attachment 3 and DoD-0000-151C-YY), implements significant process changes, and includes an Air Force and DoD Stock Products List. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.United States. Department of the Air Force2002-12-01
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AF Instruction 14-205: Identifying Requirements for Obtaining and Using Geospatial Information and ServicesThis instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, "Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations", 1 October 1995. It provides procedures for identifying requirements for Geospatial Information & Services (GI&S). This includes ordering, supplying, as well as monitoring use of these products and services. This instruction also implements Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5000.56, "Programming Unique Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Requirements for Developing Systems", 24 August 1992, DoD Instruction 5030.59, "Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Data, Public Availability and Exceptions", 19 January 1993, DoD Directive 5105.60," National Imagery and Mapping Agency" (NIMA), 11 October 1996, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3901.01, "Requirements for Global Geospatial Information & Services", 24 May 1996 and CJCSI 3900.01, "Position Reference Procedures", 21 Mar 1994. It does not include detailed information on Flight Information Publication (FLIP) materials (AFI 11-201, "Flight Information Publications"), Evasion Charts (Joint Publication 3-50.3, "Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery", 6 Sep 1996), or tactical target materials (Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 57-24, "US/Allied Tactical Target Materials"). This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It incorporates changes resulting from the recent reorganization at Headquarters United States Air Force (HQ USAF) and the corresponding changes in responsibilities of HQ USAF GI&S offices. It aligns with AFPD 14-2, "Intelligence Collection, Production and Application", 23 July 1993, and supersedes AFI 14-205, "Identifying Requirements for Obtaining and Using Cartographic and Geodetic Products and Services", 22 March 1994. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.United States. Department of the Air Force1999-01-01
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AF Instruction 14-117: Air Force TargetingThis instruction implements AFPD 14-1, "Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations". It defines Air Force targeting responsibilities and terms. Use this instruction with AFPAM 14-210, "USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide". This document incorporates changes resulting from the recent reorganization at Headquarters United States Air Force (HQ USAF) and the corresponding changes in responsibilities of HQ USAF targeting offices. It also includes updated information on the targeting process to align with AFPAM 14-210. A bar indicates revisions from the previous edition. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.United States. Department of the Air Force1998-07-01
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AF Instruction 14-206: Modeling and SimulationThis instruction implements AFPD 14-2, "Intelligence Collection, Production, and Application". This instruction guides intelligence modeling and simulation activities. It also includes intelligence support to modeling and simulation (M&S) activities in weapon systems acquisition, research and development, test and evaluation, education and training, military operations, and national level policy making. This revision aligns this instruction with AFPD 14-2. This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.United States. Department of the Air Force1994-01-14
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Analysis of Radio Frequency Interference Effects on a Modern Coarse Acquisition (C/A) Code Global Positioning System (GPS) ReceiverThe purpose of this thesis was to investigate the performance of a twelve channel Standard Positioning Service (SPS) based Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver using an eight state Kalman filter in a hostile radio frequency (RF) environment and to develop instructional tools for teaching RF interference on GPS receivers. The two types of jamming signals generated included Continuous Wave (CW) and Swept CW. Actual GPS and jamming signals were used in the research. The signals received from GPS satellites exhibit a Doppler shift which varies between approximately ± six Kilohertz. The Doppler shift frequency can be reasonably predicted for a given time of day, for a given satellite, and for a known receiver location using GPS satellite almanac or ephemeris data. Additionally, the Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code for each satellite exhibits specific maximum amplitude spectral lines. By tailoring the jamming signals to match with the Doppler shifted satellite frequencies and offsetting the jamming to a maximum spectral line, it was shown that individual Navstar XR5-M receiver channels for specific satellites could be selectively jammed/spoofed. Swept CW jamming resulted in pulling the XR5-M receiver tracking channels off frequency by up to 20 Kilohertz but resulted in a maximum position error of only 220 meters. The CW jamming of at least one of the XR5-M receiver channels resulted in position errors in the receiver in excess of 12 kilometers.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Johnston, Kenneth D.1999-03
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Air Force Media Use and Conformance with Media Richness Theory: Implications for E-mail Use and PolicyCommunication has become a major aspect of a manager's job. When communicating, they are faced with many choices of what media to use--some include face-to-face, telephone, e-mail, or written. Managerial effectiveness can improve if managers make appropriate media choices. Thus, it is important to study how Air Force managers perceive media and what kind of choices they are making based on those perceptions. Media Richness Theory suggests that media choices are affected by content reasons, situational reasons, and symbolic reasons. This study examined Air Force managers and found they conform highly with Media Richness Theory in their media choices. Their perceptions of media richness also closely agreed with MRT. However, higher level managers did not conform better than lower level managers as MRT would suggest. This study supports Media Richness Theory and the model used to apply it. The results indicate that Air Force managers are making effective media choices. This gives implications for using newer media such as e-mail and creating policy for such media which is a paramount issue today.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Adams, Heather L.1996-12
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Securing New York: A Blueprint for Meeting New York City's Homeland Security RequirementsAs the horrific events of September 11th demonstrated, New York City is a leading target for terrorist attack. Its population density, with over eight million people living in just over 300 square miles, means that any attack will affect a large number of Americans. New York is a center of national and international commerce through which millions of tourists, millions more businesspeople, and billions of dollars of goods pass through each year. The City's airports, train stations, and ports are critical to continued regional, national, and international commerce, so any disruption of its transportation infrastructure will have a ripple effect throughout the country and beyond. Finally, New York is a symbol of the United States' wealth, prosperity, and values, making an attack on Gotham a symbolic assault meant to undermine the strength of our nation as a whole. New York's emergency services personnel - its police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel - have trained for large-scale disasters, including terrorist attacks, for many years, yet nothing prepared them for the horrors and chaos of September 11th. The attacks of that day taught the City, State, and federal governments many lessons about how we might better organize, train, and prepare so we can deter and respond to future attacks on the homeland.United States. White House Office2002-06
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism after September 11thThe enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide terrorist attacks on September 11 eclipses anything previously seen -- either individually or in aggregate, says Bruce Hoffman, vice president and director of the RAND Washington office. "It calls, unquestionably, for a proportionate response of unparalleled determination and focus such as we see today in our actions both in the United States and abroad, as well as one that utilizes the full range of formidable tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, military, and economic." The significance of the September 11th incidents from a terrorist operational perspective is that simultaneous attacks -- using far more prosaic and arguably conventional means of attack (such as car bombs, for example) -- are relatively uncommon. For reasons not well understood, terrorists typically have not undertaken such coordinated operations. This was doubtless less of a choice than a reflection of the logistical and other organizational hurdles that most terrorist groups are not able to overcome. Indeed, this was one reason why we were so galvanized by the synchronized attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam three years ago. The orchestration of that operation, coupled with its unusually high death and casualty tolls, stood out in a way that, until September 11th, few other terrorist actions had: bringing bin Laden as much renown as infamy in many quarters. While much attention is currently focused on the military options being exercised in South Asia, they are only one instrument that the United States can bring to bear in the struggle against terrorism. Our efforts need to be fully coordinated, sustained, and prolonged. They will require commitment, political will, and patience. They must have realistic goals and not unduly raise or create false expectations. And, finally, they must avoid cosmetic or "feel-good" physical security measures that contribute only tangentially, if at all, to the enhancement of national as well as international security. In conclusion, it must be appreciated that the struggle against terrorism is never-ending. By the same token, our search for solutions and new approaches must be equally continuous and unyielding, proportional to the threat posed by our adversaries in both innovation and determination.United States. Department of StateHoffman, Bruce, 1954-2001-11
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Anthrax and Mass-Casualty Terrorism: What is the Bioterrorist Threat after September 11Trends in terrorism over the past 15 years indicate that loosely linked transnational networks motivated primarily by religious ideologies seeking mass casualties are replacing more traditional' terrorists who are motivated primarily by politics," says Jason Pate, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "These ominous trends suggest the potential for mass casualty attacks, and because biological agents could be used in this fashion, the potential for mass casualty bioterrorism may be at hand." The unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11 and the subsequent series of anthrax attacks have ushered in a new era of terrorism in the United States. Although there previously have been relatively large-scale terrorist attacks in America, such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the coordination, planning, and scale of the September 11 attacks demonstrate that mass-casualty terrorism has reached the U.S. homeland. This article reviews the historical context of the current anthrax attacks, paying special attention to looking at the current situation in broad perspective. Then it explores why the United States is so vulnerable to this type of terrorism and offers policy recommendations to address these vulnerabilities. There are limits to what the United States can do nationally and internationally to address bioterrorism. Therefore, policymakers should accept that it is impossible to eliminate completely either the terrorist threat or the threat from bioterrorism. It is therefore highly critical that the United States prepare itself to detect and respond to a bioterrorist incident.United States. Department of StatePate, Jason2001-11
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Many Countries Benefit from U.S. Antiterrorism TrainingThe State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) has trained over 25,000 foreign police and security forces from 117 different countries in measures designed to combat, deter, and solve terrorist crimes in their countries. ATA Director Alan O. Bigler says that "in the process the program is improving both bilateral and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." The assessment team considers five basic areas, which are seen as fundamental in any nation's defense against terrorism. Collectively they establish the framework for determining a country's ability to deter and respond to terrorist threats. In general terms, this framework involves the government's ability to: enforce the law, preserve the peace, and protect life and property; protect its national leadership, the seat and functions of government, and its resident diplomatic corps, including that of the United States; control its international borders; protect its critical infrastructure; and manage crises that have national implications. A major new area of training for ATA addresses the problems of managing the effects of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, or radioactive materials, which are referred to as WMD. Such attacks present significant problems that are new, different, and of much greater scope than terrorist incidents involving conventional weapons. In addition to providing individual students with enhanced training, there are numerous examples where ATA training has directly thwarted or solved several major terrorist incidents or major crimes. To learn more about ATA, the program office operates its own Internet Web site, which can be found at http://www.diplomaticsecurity.org.United States. Department of StateBigler, Alan O.2001-11
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Bringing Terrorists to Justice under the Rule of Law"The United States continues to apply the rule of law in the investigation and prosecution of the global war on terrorism. "The United States has responded to terrorist attacks with the same tools of criminal justice: surveillance, arrest, detention, and trial." Bringing terrorists to justice under the rule of law is a slow, cumbersome, inefficient business. It may even be an unsuccessful business, if essential evidence is excluded because it was obtained by unlawful surveillance, if the government decides that it cannot risk disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, or if the proof does not show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (even though it shows that it is more probable than not that defendant is guilty). But as the Supreme Court once said in deciding to free a terrorist who had been unlawfully tried during the Civil War: The power of punishment is alone [available] through the means which the laws have provided for that purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment, no matter ... how much ... crimes may have shocked the ... country, or endangered its safety. By the protection of law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. In its quest for protection from terrorists, the United States will never give up the protection of law."United States. Department of StateRaven-Hansen, Peter, 1946-2001-11
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International Terrorism: American Hostages (Fact Sheet)The Office of Counterterrorism, headed by Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, coordinates all U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments. The Coordinator chairs the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and the State Department's terrorism task forces to coordinate responses to major international terrorist incidents that are in progress. The Coordinator has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing American counterterrorism policy. U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is as follows: first, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance. Under current U.S. law 18 USC 1203 (Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage- Taking, enacted October 1984 in implementation of the U.N. Convention on Hostage-Taking), seizure of a U.S. national as a hostage anywhere in the world is a crime, as is any hostage-taking action in which the United States Government is a target or the hostage-taker is a U.S. national. Such acts, therefore, are subject to investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to prosecution by U.S. authorities. Actions by private persons or entities that have the effect of aiding and abetting the hostage-taking, concealing knowledge of it from the authorities, or obstructing its investigation, may themselves be in violation of U.S. law.United States. Department of State2001-11
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State-Sponsored Terrorism and Foreign Terrorist OrganizationsThe designation of state sponsors of terrorism by the United States -- and the imposition of sanctions -- is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism as a means of political expression. U.S. policy seeks to pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria continue to be the seven governments that the U.S. Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. This fact sheet contains a list of terrorist groups presented in two sections. The first section lists the 28 groups designated by the Secretary of State on October 5, 2001 as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations carry legal consequences. The second section lists other terrorist groups that were active during 2000. Terrorist groups whose activities were limited in scope in 2000 are not included.United States. Department of State2001-11
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Small Arms and Light Weapons: Can They Be Controlled"Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned to small arms and light weapons primarily as a result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration, and destructiveness of intrastate conflicts, many of which called for costly U.N. peacekeeping missions," says Herbert L. Calhoun, Senior Foreign Affairs Specialist and Deputy Office Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. "The change in the international security landscape from a few episodic large-scale interstate wars to frequent small-scale intrastate conflicts has occurred at a time when international norms, export control regimes, and treaties to control or eliminate weapons of mass destruction are making substantial progress." Most arms control efforts since World War II have been devoted to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or to heavy conventional weapons. Since the United Nations Secretary-General issued a supplement to his 1995 Agenda for Peace on the subject (January 1995), increasing attention has been given to the weapons that are actually producing the horrors witnessed in Africa, the Balkans, and other parts of the world. These weapons are small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), such as landmines, assault rifles (like the AK-47), and machine guns. This article surveys recent efforts to examine the issues and to develop and establish appropriate and effective international controls over small arms and light weapons. The issue of controlling anti-personnel landmines has followed a separate course and is not dealt with here. The international community has demonstrated energy and considerable political will in its efforts to address the small arms and light weapons problem. Because of the severity and complexity of the problem, achievement of a long-term, comprehensive resolution is likely to be far into the future. To mitigate even the most immediate and devastating negative effects will require creativity, flexibility, and multifaceted approaches that cut across disciplines. The international community has made a good start, and the 2001 U.N. Conference offers a unique opportunity to lay a solid foundation for an effective global regime.United States. Department of StateCalhoun, Herbert L.2001-06
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Combating the Spread of Small Arms: The U.S. Approach"Simple one size fits all' solutions are ineffective in dealing with the complex, often region-specific problems caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons," says Ambassador Donald J. McConnell, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. The best way to attack the problem, he says, is to "identify and curb the sources and methods of the illicit trade via robust export controls, law enforcement measures, and efforts to expeditiously destroy excess stocks and safeguard legitimate government stocks from theft or illegal transfer." The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in regions of the world suffering from political instability and violent conflict has proven a major obstacle to peace, economic development, and efforts to rebuild war-torn societies. In places like Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Colombia, thousands of innocent civilians have been killed and tens of thousands more displaced by ethnic and civil conflicts perpetuated in large part by easy access to illicit SA/LW. Lack of proper laws, regulations, training and resources greatly hinder many countries' efforts to curb illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking. The United States works bilaterally and multilaterally to offer technical and financial assistance in the areas of law enforcement, export control assistance, and stockpile management and destruction of excess SA/LW. The United States funds a variety of programs in Africa, including, notably, the African Baseline Survey on Small Arms Legislation, Regulations, and Law Enforcement Capacity for the United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI). The United States leads efforts to include national reporting on SA/LW transfers in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a 33-country organization dedicated to transparency and responsibility in arms transfers. Export control assistance is offered to countries in need of developing laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms; in particular, we have extensive cooperation programs with former members of the Warsaw Pact. In fiscal year 2001 (FY01), the United States dedicated $2 million to global efforts to assist countries in the destruction of excess small arms and light weapons. "We believe that the approach outlined above holds the best prospects for mitigating the harmful proliferation of SA/LW in the areas of the world where action is most urgent."United States. Department of StateMcConnell, Donald J.2001-06
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Destroying Excess Small Arms: U.S. Policy and Programs"While robust export controls and enforcement are critical elements in the effort to curb illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), the simplest and most reliable way to prevent proliferation of illicit arms is through proper stockpile management and expeditious destruction of excess," says C. Edward Peartree, Policy Officer, Office of Policy, Plans & Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. "Taking up this global problem, the State Department, working with the Department of Defense, has dedicated funding and expertise to assisting countries in improving stockpile management practices and destroying excess SA/LW." The principal source of destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in many regions of the world is not new production but re-circulated stocks of surplus military weapons. Cold War stocks the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, often poorly secured and susceptible to theft or illegal transfer, have been a source of arms for regional criminal organizations and violent terrorist groups. Ex-Warsaw Pact militaries eager to upgrade to NATO standards have dumped large numbers of infantry rifles, machine guns, and light weapons such as rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) onto the global market. Sales of surplus arms, often to undesirable end-users such as insurgent groups or warring governments under international embargo, have proven a ready source of revenue for cash-poor developing countries. The United States continues to expand its small arms destruction program. Projects are currently under discussion in the Balkans, Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. In addition to an ongoing partnership with Norway and Germany in Albania, the United States seeks joint ventures with other interested donor countries and organizations. U.S. support for destruction of surplus and illicit small arms and light weapons are intended to promote regional security, peace, and reconciliation in regions of conflict. The unchecked proliferation of these arms threatens civilians, peacekeepers, and law enforcement officials, and complicates the work of rebuilding war torn societies and regions. Given that destruction is relatively inexpensive (costing generally between $1-5 per weapon destroyed) and can generally be accomplished using locally available infrastructure (a variety of cheap methods are viable) and personnel, the program offers large dividends in threat reduction for a modest initial investment.United States. Department of StatePeartree, C. Edward2001-06
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Criminal Acts against Aviation: 2000"Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation is a publication of the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security. This document records incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. Criminal Acts has been published each year since 1986. Incidents recorded in this report are summarized in regional geographic overviews. Feature articles focus on case histories or on specific aviation-related issues. Incidents are also sorted into one of seven categories and compared over a five-year period. In addition, charts and graphs have been prepared to assist the reader in interpreting the data. The cutoff date for information in this report is December 31, 2000. One change in this year's edition is that the Asia geographic area has been renamed as 'Asia and the Pacific.' This has been done to better reflect the incidents that occur in the region. In addition, a corrected page for an incident that appeared in last year's issue has also been added and can be found at the end of the 'Europe' geographical area section. The information contained in this publication is derived from a variety of foreign and domestic sources. In many cases, however, specific details of a particular incident may not be available, especially if it occurs outside the United States. While every effort has been made to provide complete and accurate information, it is not always possible to verify accounts of some incidents."United States. Office of Civil Aviation Security2000
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Report to Congress Aviation Security Aircraft Hardening Program: 1998This report is submitted in response to language in Senate Report 102-351 accompanying the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was asked to study different types of technology designed to protect aircraft against certain explosives and to report to the Appropriations Committees on its findings. The FAA was also asked to consider investment and operating costs, acceptable safety margins, passenger convenience, and any other relevant factors. Interim reports were submitted to the Appropriations Committees in September 1994 and March 1996. This report provides a current assessment and review of the research work completed to date one such technology, hardened containers.United States. Transportation Security Administration1998-12
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Curbing the Illicit Trade in Small Arms: A Practical Route"The uncontrolled trade in small arms and light weapons is a significant and growing problem to which international policymakers are devoting unprecedented attention this year." The Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects bear a heavy responsibility in trying to "lay the foundation for a new international regime aimed at curbing the flow of arms to areas of conflict and preventing their re-use after wars have ended. Such measures -- while only part of a larger effort to reduce the level of global violence and bloodshed -- can make a significant contribution to world peace and stability." The distinctive challenges posed by the changing nature of armed conflict were first addressed in 1995 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary-General of the United Nations. Efforts to curb the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons, he insisted, "must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons." The establishment of new international controls on small arms trafficking will not fully block the flow of arms to areas of conflict or bring all wars to a close. There will always be some traffickers who will seek to elude governmental controls in the pursuit of fabulous wealth. But an effective system of controls could result in a significant reduction in the flow of arms, making it more attractive for warring parties to agree to a ceasefire and the initiation of peace negotiations. Similarly, efforts to collect and destroy surplus weapons after the successful conclusion of peace talks would reduce the risk of a fresh round of fighting or the retransfer of arms to belligerents in other conflicts. Many of the specific measures that could be incorporated into an international control regime of this sort have already been embraced and implemented at the local and regional levels. These include: provisions for the marking of weapons and the adoption of uniform systems of export/import documentation (as provided for by the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials); close cooperation between the police and customs officials of affected countries in suppressing crossborder arms-smuggling activities (as envisioned by the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization); and the provision of training and technical assistance in modern investigative techniques by the developed nations of the North to the developing countries of the South (as called for in the European Union's Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms).United States. Department of StateKlare, Michael T., 1942-2001-06
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Tracing Illegal Small Arms: An ATF ProgramThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) developed its International Traffic in Arms Program to combat the illegal movement of U.S.-sourced firearms in international traffic and reduce the number of weapons that are illegally trafficked worldwide from the United States, says Jacqueline K. Holmes, Program Manager, Firearms Programs Division. "These firearms are many times used to commit acts of international terrorism, to subvert restrictions imposed by other nations on their residents, and to further organized crime and narcotics-related activities." As illegal trafficking in small arms increases, both nationally and internationally, countries throughout the world are utilizing the services of a U.S. government program, the only one of its kind, that traces the history of recovered crime guns sourced from the United States. During 2000 and to date in 2001, the National Tracing Center processed more than 200,000 firearm trace requests including more than 19,000 from foreign countries. Of the requests where U.S. origin was determined, close to 8,000 of these were successfully traced to the retail level. The top international requestors were Colombia, Mexico, Canada, Germany, Jamaica, Japan, and Brazil. ATF's commitment to support law enforcement continues to expand and has become a global effort. ATF recognizes that its jurisdiction is limited in many of these cases; however, bolstering foreign law enforcement is a continuing enterprise for ATF. The Bureau's ability to trace firearms for foreign law enforcement is just another means by which ATF can work with the worldwide law enforcement community. In this capacity, ATF aids its foreign counterparts in developing investigative leads to help combat the illegal movement of firearms in international traffic and to prevent illicitly-trafficked firearms from being used in criminal acts of violence.United States. Department of StateHolmes, Jacqueline K.2001-06