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• Analysis of the Interaction Between the J3 and J4 War Planning Staffs During the Phases of Crisis Action Planning

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  A principal operational concept of Joint Vision 2020 is that of Focused Logistics, which promotes a merger of information and logistics technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Advanced Logistics Project (ALP) supports this concept of Focused Logistics and seeks to leverage information technologies to obtain control over the logistics pipeline. The current campaign planning process is limited by the information made available to the decision-makers. In order for ALP to assist the decision-maker in selecting a single optimal deployment plan, the founding assumptions of alternatives considered must be valid. Logistical issues are a major constraint in the war planning process. Often, when planners are faced with Crisis Action Planning (CAP) the interaction between the operations planners and the logistics planners is limited due to the time sensitivity of the situation. Because logistics information is a main constraint in the CAP process, operational planners build their plans based on limited logistics information and potentially inappropriate logistic assumptions. This thesis will explore the contribution that ALP's architecture could bring to the crisis action planning process. The focus of this research is to analyze the interaction between the operational and logistical communities and determine the ideal planning tool that will enhance the communication between the two communities.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Colvard, Michael J.

  2001-03
• Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments

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  The House Committee on Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) the status and anticipated results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA)program, and (2) the extent to which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security have coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed and implementing the vulnerability assessments for the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed a draft of the report, agreed with its contents, and provided technical clarifications. Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed, or in implementing the assessments for the program. We discussed this problem with officials from both offices who agreed that closer coordination would be beneficial, particularly to discuss options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program's vulnerability assessments. In March 2003, officials from both offices began regular meetings to facilitate this coordination.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-05
• Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces, Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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  Testimony by Raymond J. Decker discusses the demands being placed on the Department of Defense (DOD) in the post September 11, 2001, environment. Based on preliminary work, statement addresses (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. Decker states, "To determine the differences in DOD's missions and how DOD evaluates mission requests, we reviewed appropriate guidance and directives specifying mission types, and discussed these issues with knowledgeable officials. To identify legal constraints on DOD's nonmilitary missions, we reviewed the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act and related laws. To determine the adequacy of organizations, plans, and forces, we reviewed DOD reorganizations, visited the new U.S. Northern Command, reviewed campaign plans and related documents, and compared the types of missions performed by forces with their primary missions. Finally, to determine the impact of domestic or overseas missions on personnel tempo, we obtained personnel tempo databases from DOD for the period October 2000 through December 2002 (the most recent data available) and analyzed the data. We conducted this work from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards." Document includes GAO Highlights.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-04-29
• Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities

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  The purpose of this order is to provide Marine Corps policy, planning guidance and assignment of responsibilities in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities during presidential declared or undeclared disasters and domestic emergencies per references (a) through (h) in this document. Included are provisions for domestic emergencies including: (a) Natural disasters including earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms, floods, wildland fires, wind driven waters, tidal waves (tsunami) or other catastrophes; (b) A civil disturbance in which group acts of violence and disorder prejudice public law and order; (c) Attacks on the United States, its territories, or possessions; and (d) Terrorist acts.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1998-10-13
• Managing the Consequences of Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents

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  In the event of a domestic incident on American soil resulting in the release of CBRNE, the local law enforcement, fire and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become rapidly overwhelmed by the magnitude and lingering effects. In that instance, a governor may request a Presidential disaster declaration for the state and assistance from the federal government through the LFA. If DoD assistance is requested, the Department of Defense has many unique capabilities, both technical and operational, which could support civil authorities to mitigate and manage the consequences of such an incident. Consequence management brings together the skills and assets of many government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. By enhancing America's preparedness, the likelihood that an event will occur, or the consequences if it does occur, will be reduced. The Department of Defense is committed to providing preparatory assistance and stands ready to contribute its unique capabilities when called upon.

  United States. Department of Defense

  Cohen, William S.

  2001
• Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Should the General Staff Debate Be Over?

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  "This paper is about organizational excellence - more importantly, military organizational excellence - and the need for continuing progress. As a sweeping indictment, the Goldwater Nicholas legislation covered a broad waterfront of pertinent issues. In a paper of this limited length, it would be difficult do justice to them all. Therefore, it does not try, but more narrowly focuses on the organizational foundations we emplace preparing for battle - our predominant mode of operation as we prime to fight the next war. As it does, it explores the changing military and international environment since Goldwater-Nicholas was enacted over a decade ago and how it pertains to the original intent related to Service, Joint Staff, and CINC relationships."

  Air University (U.S.). Air War College

  Minner, Donald K.

  1997-04
• Aviation Security with a Focus on Passenger Profiling: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, February 27, 2002

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  The purpose of this hearing is to examine the need for, and improvements to, airline passenger profiling. Passenger profiling is not new to aviation. For example, Sam Husseini, a spokesman for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, was quoted in the January 2, 1998 New York Times as stating that profiling has been going on for 20 years, administered by individual airline employees. He suggested that a more objective system might be preferable, as it would tend to eliminate the biases of an individual. Also, because of the limitations of existing bomb detection technology, aviation security experts have sought to use profiling to reduce the number of passengers to be screened. This would allow airport security to focus on those passengers who are most likely to pose a threat. The American Civil Liberties Union and Arab-American groups, among others, expressed concern that CAPPS could discriminate by using factors such as the passenger's race, religion, or national origin. The Subcommittee held a hearing on this issue on May 14, 1998. The factors the airlines use are a secret. But airlines insist race, religion and national origin are not factors. Due to the concerns that had been raised about the potential for discrimination, DOT and the Gore Commission asked the Justice Department to review the CAPPS profiling system. It has been reported that Federal aviation authorities will soon begin testing a system designed to pull together every passenger's travel history, living arrangements, and other personal and demographic information. The plan is to establish a computer network linking every reservation system in the U.S. to private and government databases. The computer network would use data-mining and predictive software to profile passengers and look for potential threats. Statements include those of the following persons: Jonathan Turley, Rafi Ron, Thomas Kinton, and Katie Corrigan.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2002
• Glossary of Terms for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Agents and Defense Equipment

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  The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) has developed this Glossary to serve as a tool in providing an explanation of the terms, definitions, and the technical semantics associated with the discussion of NBC equipment, agents, and their potential effects. This Glossary is meant to be available to a wide audience of readers, to include those who will plan and develop new concepts and systems as well as those who may be called upon to implement plans and systems in response to the use of WMD. By including terms relevant to the diverse backgrounds of users of this document, some terms may not be applicable to a particular group of readers but may still be of benefit by enhancing understanding of the terminology associated with the different aspects of WMD threats, impacts, responses and solutions. For the ease of the reader, the guide has been broken down into separate sections for General, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical terminology.

  U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine

  2001-12
• Emergency Preparedness at the Indian Point Energy Center Located in Buchanan, New York: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, February 25, 2003

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  Recently, several communities in New York have raised questions about the effectiveness of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) at the Indian Point Energy Center, located in the City of Buchanan, Westchester County, New York (Indian Point). In August 2002, Governor George Pataki commissioned an independent review of the REPP at Indian Point and for that portion of New York in proximity to the Millstone Nuclear Plant in Greenwich, Connecticut. The review was conducted by James Lee Witt Associates (JLWA) who looked at recent exercise results and public information efforts, current radiological emergency response plans, and the data underlying the response plans, such as population data, evacuation time estimates, alert and notification system specifications, offsite accident impact analysis methodologies, and communication capabilities. In a draft copy of the report released on January 10, 2003, JLWA concluded that there were significant deficiencies in the preparedness plans surrounding Indian Point. Specifically, the Witt Report is critical that the preparedness plans do not reflect how to respond if a radiological event is caused by a terrorist attack, that the plans do not address the possibility of a mass evacuation of the surrounding areas, and that the current regulations are not sufficient to address these problems. The possibilities of terrorist attacks on this nuclear plant and the security and safety concerns are addressed in this hearing. Statements include those of the following persons: Eliot L. Engel, Nita M. Lowey, Joe Picciano, Hubert Miller, Ed Jacoby, Scott Vanderhoef, Andrew Spano, and Ed Diana.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2003
• Coast Guard FY 2002 Budget Request: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, May 3, 2001

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  The purpose of this hearing is to consider the Administration's fiscal year 2002 budget request for the U. S. Coast Guard. The Administration requests $5.2 billion for fiscal year 2002 for Coast Guard activities that are subject to appropriation. The budget request for Coast Guard operating expenses in fiscal year 2002 is $3.4 billion, an increase of $190 million, or six percent, over the fiscal year 2001 appropriated level. Operating expenses account for about two-thirds of the Coast Guard's budget and fund Coast Guard search and rescue, aids to navigation, marine safety, marine environmental protection, and law enforcement operations. Two-thirds of the OE account, or $2.0 billion, is used for personnel compensation. This includes funding for 35,132 military and 6,001 civilian personnel. This hearing contains GAO-01-659T: "Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks". Statements include those of James M. Loy, Vincent Patton III, and JayEtta Hecker.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2001
• Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4210: Preparedness against Terrorism Act of 2000: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, May 4, 2000

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  The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on H.R. 4210, a bill to amend the Robert T. Stafford Act to update Title VI of the Act and to provide coordination for federal efforts with regard to preparedness against terrorist attacks in the United States. H.R. 4210, introduced by Mrs. Fowler and Mr. Traficant, amends the Stafford Act to reflect emerging threats from terrorism and cybertechnology. It also establishes an office within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to coordinate government-wide efforts for improving domestic preparedness against terrorist attacks. The Office of Terrorism Preparedness (OTP) will be responsible for creating a national strategy for preparedness, which will eliminate duplication of efforts and define an end state for preparedness. The OTP will exercise limited budgetary authority over each agency's programs, basing funding decisions on accomplishing the goals of a defined national strategy. It will also assist state and local emergency responders in navigating the federal preparedness programs. Moreover, it will eradicate duplicative government functions and identify waste, fraud and abuse through oversight of the agencies it coordinates. This hearing contains GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, "Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R.4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs". Statements include those of the following: Gary Marrs, Stan McKinney, Ray Alfred, Charles Cragin and Norman J. Rabkin.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2000-05-04
• Cost Effectiveness of Hazard Mitigation Spending: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, July 20, 2000

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  The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on the cost-effectiveness of disaster mitigation spending authorized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. In particular, this hearing will follow up from a hearing held by the Subcommittee on August 4, 1999 and will focus on the extent to which projects that are not exempted from a cost-benefit analysis by the Federal Emergency Management Agency are cost-effective. Section 404 of the Stafford Act requires mitigation projects funded by FEMA be cost-effective. The recently available data indicates that a significant fraction of mitigation projects are not cost-effective according to traditional benefit-cost analysis. In addition, many of the projects have BCRs that are not much greater than 1.0 indicating that they may only be marginally cost-effective. The focus of this hearing will be to examine whether the data accurately reflects the cost-effectiveness of the funded projects and, if so, why projects that are not cost-effective or that are only marginally cost-effective make up such a large portion of funded projects. Issues likely to be examined include: the accuracy of the HMGP database; the method used for conducting benefit-cost analyses; the adequacy of traditional benefit-cost analyses; the administrative process for approving grants including the process for appealing funding decisions; and recent trends in the cost-effectiveness of funded projects. The statement of Michael Armstrong is included in this hearing.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2000-07-20
• President's Fiscal Year 2004 Budgets for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Maritime Commission: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Martime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representative One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, March 13, 2003

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  The purpose of this hearing is to consider the Administration's fiscal year 2004 budget requests for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Maritime Commission. Included is a breakdown and review of the Administration's $6.7 billion request for fiscal year 2004 for the Coast Guard. This request reflects three primary objectives for the Coast Guard in fiscal year 2004: (1) recapitalize Coast Guard legacy assets and infrastructure; (2) build-out homeland security capabilities; and (3) sustain non-homeland security missions near pre-September 11, 2001, levels. Approximately $538 million is requested for mandatory military personnel entitlement programs, including retirement pay, and enhanced Coast Guard operations. An additional $60 million is requested for increased costs for capital acquisitions and for training of Coast Guard Reserve forces. Included are statements from Thomas H. Collins, Franklin A. Welch, and Steven R. Blust.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2003-04
• Financial Responsibility for Port Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 14, 2002

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  The purpose of this hearing is to examine who is responsible for implementing security procedures and consider ways to finance the new security equipment that individual ports and marine terminal facilities must install to address the increased terrorist threat to our Nation. The Subcommittee will receive testimony from the Administration, vessel and marine facility operators, as well as several local port authorities. Included is a review of Port Security Grants for critical national seaports. Statements include those of the following: William G. Schubert, Joseph Cox, Richard Steinke, Frederick R. Ferrin, and Paul F. Richardson.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2002-03-14
• Port Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 26, 2002

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  The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the current maritime security efforts implemented in the Port of New York and New Jersey and to investigate suggestions on ways to further reduce the vulnerability of our ports and waterways to terrorist attacks. Included is a review of Coast Guard security measures taken after September 11th, as well as current Coast Guard authorities. No testimonies are available as yet. This document contains only information on the purpose of the hearing and a lengthy background description.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2002-03-26
• Coast Guard FY 2000 Operational Cuts: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, June 7, 2000

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  On June 7, 2000, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation will conduct an oversight hearing on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2000 shortfall of approximately $225 million. This shortfall has resulted in Coast Guard operational reductions in various parts of the country of 20 to 30 percent. Emergency supplemental funding is necessary to cover the Coast Guard funding shortfall and avoid additional operational cutbacks later this fiscal year. The cumulative effects of streamlining, budgetary shortfalls, personnel shortages, inexperienced personnel, and increased demands for services have reduced the Coast Guard's overall readiness posture. In the past, the Coast Guard has deferred maintenance on vessels, cannibalized aircraft, and significantly increased the number of hours that personnel work to overcome readiness shortfalls. However, the Coast Guard has deferred maintenance on its aircraft, vessels and shore facilities to the point that it is no longer able to sustain the current level of operations. In addition, this fiscal year the Coast Guard has diverted funds from law enforcement operations to pay for unbudgeted cost increases related to pay and entitlement programs enacted under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. Statements include that of James M. Loy.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2000-06-07
• Coast Guard FY 2001 Supplemental Funding Needs: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, May 3, 2001

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  On March 8, 2001, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation will conduct an oversight hearing on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2001 shortfall of approximately $91 million. This shortfall has resulted in a 10 percent reduction in Coast Guard operations. Emergency supplemental funding is necessary to cover the Coast Guard funding shortfall and avoid a 30 percent reduction in operations during the third and fourth quarters of the year. Congress appropriated $3.192 billion for Coast Guard Operating Expenses (OE) in fiscal year 2001, a $336 million or 12 percent increase over the fiscal year 2000 appropriated level. This figure was $7 million less than was requested by the previous Administration. While the requested level and appropriated level of funding was nearly identical, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which was enacted into law after the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, contained a number of expanded personnel entitlements which had not been included in the President's budget request. Statements include that of James M. Loy.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2001
• Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2003 Budget: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 7, 2002

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  The purpose of this hearing is to consider the Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request for the U. S. Coast Guard. The Administration requests $7.1 billion for fiscal year 2003 for Coast Guard activities that are subject to appropriation. This request is $1.6 billion (28 percent) more than the amount appropriated for the Coast Guard in fiscal year 2002. This request places specific emphasis on the Coast Guard's search and rescue and homeland security focused missions. Approximately $700 million of the increase is provided for new military entitlement programs and to enhance Coast Guard operations. The remaining increase of $900 million is due to an accounting change which fully accrues the Coast Guard's retirements and health care costs. Both of these accounting initiatives would require the enactment of legislation to become effective. Statements include those of James M. Loy, and Vincent Patton, III.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2002-03-17
• Port Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, December 6, 2002

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  The purpose of this hearing is to receive the recommendations of the Secretary of Transportation on the need to increase security in our nation's ports and waterways against terrorist attacks. The Subcommittee will discuss the Federal government's current maritime security efforts and the Administration's suggestions on ways to further reduce the vulnerability of our ports and waterways to terrorist attacks. In response to the terrorist attacks, Congress passed a $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriation to combat terrorism. The Coast Guard received $18 million to cover operating expenses in New York Harbor and for Coast Guard Reserve activations. The President requested an additional $203 million for the next 6 months for the Coast Guard to activate reservists, increase its homeland security operations, and provide for three nuclear and biological detection strike teams. Division B of H.R. 3338, the Fiscal Year 2002 Supplemental Appropriation, contains approximately $145 million in supplemental funding to cover additional Coast Guard homeland security costs. Statements include those of Norman Mineta and James M. Loy.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2003
• Hearing on H.R. 307: Federal Protection Service Reform Act, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, September 6, 2001

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  The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management met to receive testimony on H.R. 307, the Federal Protective Service Reform Act. The Subcommittee will receive testimony from the primary sponsor of the legislation, Congressman Traficant, the Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service of the General Services Administration, the Fraternal Order of Police and from the American Federation of Government Employees. The bill directs the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to conduct a survey of the pay and benefits of all other Federal police forces to determine disparities between the pay and benefits of such forces. The Director of OPM is to transmit the findings to Congress six months after the date of enactment. Also, within one year of enactment the minimum level of full time equivalent police officers is established at 730. The Commissioner of FPS is required to prescribe the minimum standards of suitability in contracting for security guards and will conduct a cost analysis on each security personnel contract. Title II of H.R. 307, amends the Public Buildings Act of 1959, concerning safety and security of children enrolled in childcare facilities located in Federal buildings. The bill instructs GSA to notify the parents or guardians enrolling their children in a childcare center located in a Federal building of the current Federal agencies occupying the building, the level of security of that particular Federal building and to notify parents of any change of Federal tenants in the building. It also requires GSA to submit a comprehensive report to Congress on childcare facilities under the control of the Administrator. Statements include those of Jim Traficant and Steven Bellew.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

  2002
• Protecting America's Meat, Poultry and Egg Products: A Report to the Secretary on the Food Security Initiatives of the Food Safety and Inspection Service

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  Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has strengthened coordinated efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to food-related emergencies resulting from acts of terrorism. With a strong food safety infrastructure already in place, FSIS has been able to focus on fortifying existing programs and improving lines of communication both internally and externally. Through cooperation with industry, consumers and other government agencies, FSIS has an extensive system in place that, with enhancements completed and underway, can reduce the threat of, and properly respond to, a food security emergency. This booklet details ongoing efforts to improve food safety--for example, improving surveillance systems for identifying food-borne illnesses and outbreaks more quickly, ensuring that risk-reduction strategies are more science based, and conducting public education programs.

  United States. Department of Agriculture

  2003-01
• Characterization of the Surface Morphology of Bacillus Spores by Atomic Force Microscopy

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  The surface morphology of Bacillus spores was resolved by atomic force microscopy in order to determine if characteristic surface features could be used to distinguish between closely related species. Four strains were studied: Bacillus anthracis Sterne strain, Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki, Bacillus cereus strain 569, and Bacillus globigii var. niger. The spores were separated from a nutrient agar culture by filtering and centrifugation, suspended in deionized water, and immobilized on a graphite substrate by spin-coating. Atomic force microscopy imaging was done using intermittent contact mode, in air, under reduced humidity. Seven to ten spores of each species were fully characterized at three scan sizes: whole spore, 750nm2, and 500nm2. Images were captured with both height and phase information. Height images showed an irregular topography of subtle grooves, bumps, and steps across the curved upper surface of the spores. Phase images showed a superficial grain structure with different levels of phase contrast. Although some similarities were observed among spores of the same species, there was also significant variability within each species. The four species were not distinguished by observed surface morphology. Surface texture analysis (roughness, power spectral density, and bearing) did not establish quantitative differences between species based on surface topography. Overall, atomic force microscopy revealed a spore surface morphology rich with information. Additionally, it appears that further analysis and a larger sample size could provide sufficient information to allow identification and differentiation between B. anthracis and its close relatives based on spore surface morphology.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Zolock, Ruth A.

  2002-03
• Analysis of GPS Satellite Allocation for the United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS)

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  The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) relies on sensors onboard NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to detect atmospheric nuclear detonations. Though there are currently over 24 operational GPS satellites, USNDS ground based antennas are only capable of actively monitoring 24 satellites at a time. Personnel at the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) desire a well-defined methodology for selecting which 24 satellites should be monitored to maximize global coverage capability. This research introduces a means to numerically quantify each satellites individual contribution to the coverage provided by the constellation as a whole. A heuristic generates a set of possible combinations of satellites that yield high global coverage.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Bell, Aaron J.

  2003-02
• Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  Terrorist and criminal watch list systems--sometimes referred to as watchout, lookout, target, or tip-off systems--are important tools in controlling and protecting our nation's borders. The events of September 11, 2001, and other incidents since then, have highlighted the need to share these watch lists. In light of the importance of border security, GAO was asked to identify federal databases and systems that contain watch lists, the agencies that maintain and use them in protecting our nation's borders, the kind of data they contain, whether federal agencies are sharing information from these lists with each other and with state and local governments and private organizations, the structural characteristics of those lists that are automated, and whether opportunities exist to consolidate these watch lists. GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with the heads of the other departments and agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the federal government's watch list structures and policies. DHS and other departments involved in this study generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-04-15
• Operations Security (OPSEC)

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  This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, "Operations Security"; DoD Directive 5205.2, "DoD Operations Security Program", November 29, 1999; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01A, "Joint Information Warfare Policy", January 2, 1996;CJCSI 3213.01, "Joint Operations Security", May 28, 1993; and Operations Security requirements for DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures", October 23, 2000. The reporting requirements in paragraphs 3.6., 3.6.1. and 3.6.2. are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph 2.11.1 of AFI 33-324, The Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections. The instruction supports AFPD 10-20, "Air Force Defensive Counterinformation Operations", and related instructions include AFI 33-129, "Transmission of Information via the Internet", and AFI 33-219, "Telecommunications" "Monitoring and Assessment Program". It provides guidance for all Air Force personnel and supporting contractors in implementing and maintaining OPSEC programs. It describes the OPSEC process, and discusses integration of OPSEC into Air Force plans, operations, and support activities. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of prescribed processes in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, "Records Disposition Schedule"

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2001-05-31
• AF Policy Directive 10-20: Air Force Defensive Counterinformation Operations

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  This policy directive provides guidance for planning and conducting defensive counterinformation (DCI) operations, the aerospace function through which the Air Force employs its defensive Information Operations (IO) capabilities. This policy applies to all military and civilian Air Force personnel, members of the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, DoD contractors, and individuals or activities under legal agreement or obligation with the Department of the Air Force. The success of aerospace operations depends on the Air Force's ability to access reliable information, effectively utilize information systems, and perform information functions despite adversarial attempts to exploit or deny those capabilities. The Air Force will employ comprehensive, integrated defensive counterinformation (DCI) operations to protect and defend Air Force information and information systems. DCI is a multi-discipline mission area impacting many functional areas. Air Force DCI capabilities include information assurance, operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence, counter-deception, counterpsychological operations, and electronic protection. Effective DCI requires the full integration of numerous supporting activities to include intelligence and IO-related law enforcement efforts, as well as physical, personnel, industrial, and information security (e.g., document classification and control) measures. The Air Force will integrate DCI awareness, objectives and capabilities into strategy, plans, operations, acquisition and procurement, exercises, inspections, training, communications and computer architectures, systems development, and professional education. AFPD 10-20 is not intended to duplicate or interfere with the management of those functional aspects of DCI that are already working well; rather, it provides the policy basis for an overarching, integrated DCI program for the Air Force.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  1998-10-01
• AF Policy Directive 10-11: Operations Security

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  This policy directive provides guidance for planning and conducting Operations Security (OPSEC). This policy applies to all military and civilian personnel, members of the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, DoD contractors, and individuals or activities under legal agreement or obligation with the Department of the Air Force. The primary need to update this AFPD stems from publication of AFPD 10-20, Defensive Counterinformation Operations and the integration of the Operations Security (OPSEC) process into information operations (IO). The update also includes new reporting requirements, integration of OPSEC into Force Protection/Antiterrorism, and updates office symbols resulting from Air Staff reorganization.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  2001-05-31
• Application of Information Retrieval Techniques to Heterogeneous Databases in the Virtual Distributed Laboratory

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  The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains thousands of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Infrared (IR), Hyper-Spectral intelligence imagery and Electro-Optical (EO) target signature data. These images are essential to evaluating and testing individual algorithm methodologies and development techniques within the Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) community. The Air Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN) has proposed the Virtual Distributed Laboratory (VDL) to maintain a central collection of the associated imagery metadata and a query mechanism to retrieve the desired imagery. All imagery metadata is stored in relational database format for access from agencies throughout the federal government and large civilian universities. Each set of imagery is independently maintained at each agency's location along with a local copy of the associated metadata that is periodically updated and sent to the VDL. This research focuses on applying information retrieval techniques to the multiple heterogeneous imagery metadata databases to present users the most relevant images based on user defined search criteria. More specifically, it defines a hierarchical concept thesaurus development methodology to handle the complexities of heterogeneous databases and the application of two classic information retrieval models. The results indicate this type of thesaurus-based approach can significantly increase the precision and recall levels of retrieving relevant documents.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Lykins, Rodney D.

  2002-03
• 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy

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  The 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy reports on the progress that has been made to implement the Goals and Objectives of the 2001 Strategy. Baseline numbers have been identified for money laundering transactions in a variety of American cities; negotiated an international agreement with four governments to plan a coordinated fight against the Black Market Peso Exchange; and provided advanced money laundering training to front-line investigators. It also adresses the financing of terrorist groups, and directs government resources against money launderers and those who finance terrorist activities and individuals.

  United States. Department of Justice

  2002-07
• Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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  This testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, discusses national strategies related to terrorism. The testimony addresses two major topics: (1) whether the new national strategies form a framework that is cohesive and comprehensive and (2) whether the strategies will facilitate the implementation of programs that are strategy-driven, integrated, and effective.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-03-03