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Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002
This publication provides guidelines for planning and conducting joint space operations. It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all warfighters -- air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces; describes the military operational principles associated with support from and through space, and operating in space; explains US Space Command relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and space capabilities. This document provides and overview of military space operations; describes space organizations and missions; describes command and control of space forces; outlines military space operations mission areas; and outlines support to space planning.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2002-08-09
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Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations
This publication provides guidance for nonstrategic nuclear force employment. It is written for those who provide strategic direction to joint forces such as the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of combatant command; and who employ joint forces such as commanders of unified commands, subunified commands, or joint task forces). This document provides guidance for nonstrategic nuclear force employment; defines the role of US theater nuclear operations; describes command and control of nuclear operations; discusses planning and employment of nuclear weapons; explains command responsibilities and staff procedures; and outlines support coordination.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-02-09
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Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
"This publication is the keystone document for the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems series of publications. Subordinate publications provide more detailed technical discussions of C4 systems. This publication identifies approved doctrine for C4 systems support to joint operations and outlines the responsibilities of Services, agencies, and combatant commands with respect to ensuring effective C4 support to commanders. It addresses how C4 systems support the commanders of joint forces in the conduct of joint operations, including, in general terms, how systems are to be configured, deployed, and employed. This document describes the role of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems; outlines the objectives and components; provides basic C4 systems principles; explains C4 systems configuration and infrastructure; discusses the planning process and employment responsibilities; outlines joint and multinational standardization and procedures; and covers the global C4 infrastructure."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1995-05-30
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Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
"This publication provides command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems doctrinal guidance across the range of military operations for those who: a. Plan C4 systems support for joint operations; b. Employ C4 systems in support of joint operations; c. Provide operational and technical direction to C4 systems; and d. Plan, manage, and employ C4 systems normally unique to Service or non-US forces as part of joint operations. This document discusses the impact of Joint Force Commander's decisions on command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems; provides Joint C4 principles, planning, and management considerations; considers Joint Task Force C4 employment and modular C4 packaging; and discusses major related C4 systems and support."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-10-01
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Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
This publication describes the use of operations security (OPSEC) in the planning, preparation, and execution of joint operations. Additionally, it provides the procedures for the conduct of OPSEC surveys. This document discusses the characteristics of operations security; covers operations security planning; and details the operations security process.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1997-01-24
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Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
"Military deception operations are conducted by the commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces in support of overall campaign objectives. This publication provides fundamental guidance and principles for the planning and execution of military deception at the combatant command and/or subordinate joint force level. This document discusses fundamental principles of military deception; covers military deception and command and control warfare; explains roles, coordination, and training; outlines the military deception planning process; and covers military deception planning and the joint planning process."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-05-31
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Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
"This publication provides guidelines for the joint employment of forces in nuclear operations. This document discusses the objectives for nuclear forces; covers the employment of nuclear forces; and provides guidance on strategic force integrated operations."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1995-12-15
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Management of Commerce Control List and Related Processes Should be Improved
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, directed the Inspectors General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to assess the adequacy of export controls and counterintelligence measures to prevent the acquisition of militarily sensitive U.S. technology and technical information by countries and entities of concern. The legislation mandates that the Inspectors General report to the Congress by March 30 each year until 2007. Last year, the Offices of Inspector General conducted an interagency review of (1) federal agencies' (including research facilities) compliance with the "deemed export" regulations and (2) U.S. government efforts to prevent the illicit transfer of U.S. technology and technical information through select intelligence, counterintelligence, foreign investment reporting, and enforcement activities. Last year's report focused on three activities that the Commerce Department, principally through the Bureau of Export Administration, carries out or participates in to help prevent the illicit transfer of sensitive U.S. technology: deemed export controls, the Visa Application Review Program, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. For the current year, the OIGs agreed to conduct an interagency review of the Commerce Control List (CCL) and the U.S. Munitions List (USML). The CCL is maintained by BXA and contains items subject to control under the Export Administration Regulations. The CCL specifies the commodities, software, and technology that are subject to the regulations, as well as what controls are placed on these items, depending on the country to which the items are to be exported. Items on the CCL are grouped together by type of commodity and then assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). The USML is administered by the State Department and lists items subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Exporters use both lists to determine whether they need to apply for an export license for their item(s).
United States. Bureau of Export Administration
2001-03
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Annual Follow-Up Report on Previous Export Control Recommendations, as Mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
"The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, through the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended, directed the Inspectors General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, and the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to conduct an annual assessment of the adequacy of current export controls and counterintelligence measures to prevent the acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology and technical information by countries and entities of concern.2 The Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) are required to report to the Congress no later than March 30 of each year from 2000 to 2007. In addition, the legislation requires the OIGs to include in their annual report the status or disposition of recommendations made in earlier reports submitted in accordance with the act. This report presents the status of recommendations made in our February 2002 report, as well as those that remain open from our March 2000 and 2001 reports."
United States. Department of Commerce. Office of the Inspector General
2002-09
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1, 2, 3's of Biosafety Levels
This document is a paper from the 5th National Symposium on Biosafety that includes the associated PowerPoint slides from the presentation given at the symposium. The document is based upon the CDC/NIH 3rd edition of Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. From the earliest days of microbiological research, laboratorians have recognized that acquiring infections from the agents they manipulated was a recognized occupational hazard. The most commonly-acquired lab infections were caused by bacterial agents; as microbiologists learned to culture animal viruses, they also found ways to become infected with these agents. From the literature reviews of Sulkin and Pike, we also learned that a significant number of these infections were fatal and that most infections were of unknown origin. Guidelines evolved as a means of protecting microbiological workers based on these data and an understanding of the risks associated with various manipulations of many agents transmissible by different routes. These guidelines work from the premise that safe work sites result from a combination of engineering controls, management policies, work practices and procedures, and, occasionally, medical interventions. The different biosafety levels developed for microbiological and biomedical laboratories provide increasing levels of personnel and environmental protection. Upper level management must set the general tone that safety is a high priority at their institute. Though this is often expressed in broad policy statements, it must be supported by resource allocation decisions: financial, personnel staffing, training, a safety performance reward structure, etc. For each biosafety level there are also specific supervisory qualifications as assurance that the laboratorians are provided appropriate role models and knowledgeable mentors. Crucial to safe working conditions are the various types of specialized equipment available to serve as primary barriers between the microorganism and the laboratorian.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Richmond, Jonathan Y.
1998-02-02
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Module 2: Biosafety in the Laboratory
This document is a PDF version of over 150 powerpoint slides on biosafety in the laboratory. Topics include the history and development of biosafety protocols and guidelines, why they are necessary, who is in charge of such safety regulations in an individual laboratory, various levels of biosafety, practices, techniques, and standards, safety equipment, facility design, etc. The information in these slides is taken from the 4th edition of the CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
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Acute Radiation Syndrome: A Fact Sheet for Physicians
"Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) (sometimes known as radiation toxicity or radiation sickness) is an acute illness caused by irradiation of the entire body (or most of the body) by a high dose of penetrating radiation in a very short period of time (usually a matter of minutes). The major cause of this syndrome is depletion of immature parenchymal stem cells in specific tissues. Examples of persons who suffered from ARS are the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, the firefighters that first responded after the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant event in 1986, and some unintentional exposures to sterilization irradiators." This fact sheet contains information on the conditions needed for ARS to occur, classic syndromes, and four stages of the ailment. Also covered is Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome (CRS) which is a pathological syndrome resulting from acute radiation exposure to the skin. Patient management information (from triage to diagnosis and evaluation) are covered as well.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2005-03-18
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National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States
The National Guard, the subject of this report, is a centuries-old institution, with roots going back before the "Minutemen."The Guard plays a vital role in our national defense and emergency preparedness systems. Today, the Guard has emerged as the foremost reserve of the Army and the Air Force, capable, under the Total Force Policy, of providing organized and trained units to engage in missions shoulder to shoulder with elements of the active forces. Recent events have called attention to the role of the Guard in America's defense and emergency preparedness systems and to a range of intergovernmental issues concerning the Guard's control and operation.
United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
1993-04
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Toward a Federal Infrastructure Strategy: Issues and Options
Toward a Federal Infrastructure Strategy documents the progress of an interagency initiative to develop a federal infrastructure strategy through a partnership including the Department of the Army, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. Emphasis was placed on planning, design, finance, construction, operation, and maintenance. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations convened a series of workshops for representatives from more than 25 congressional and other federal agencies and departments, and more than 70 organizations representing state and local governments, public works providers, and related research, advocacy, professional, and user groups. The year-long consultations were guided by a federal interagency work group. The participants concluded the project with a call for federal agencies to pursue new opportunities for action on infrastructure improvements together with state and local governments and the private sector.
United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
1992-08
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Terrorist Attacks of September 11th as Reflected in the National Income and Product Accounts
The economic effects of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are captured in the national income and product account (NIPA) estimates for the third quarter. Most of these effects are reflected in the regularly incorporated source data; for certain components, BEA prepares adjustments for the effects that are not captured in the source data. Because most of the effects are embedded in the source data and cannot be separately identified, BEA did not attempt to quantify the total impact of the attacks on gross domestic product (GDP) or on other major aggregates. BEA prepared adjustments to certain components of GDP and gross domestic income (GDI). These adjustments primarily affected current-dollar estimates and price estimates; their effects on the third-quarter estimates of real GDP and its components were small. The following paragraphs and table describe the quantitative effects of these adjustments on current-dollar GDP and prices and on GDI.
United States. Bureau of Economic Analysis
2001-11
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Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?
"Development of technologies for directed energy and kinetic energy space weapons systems has progressed to the point where the United States (US) could demonstrate concepts within 5-10 years if adequate funding is provided. While Congress debates whether such weapons are needed and should be funded, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Fogleman, and the Commander in Chief of United States Space Command, General Estes, take the position that weapons in space are necessary and inevitable. They view space as the medium where the next step in the natural evolution of military operations will occur. Operation Desert Storm emphasized the importance of space assets to US military operations, a conclusion as obvious to the rest of the world as to the US. With the end of the Cold War, relations between countries may be more volatile and more ambivalent, with today's allies possibly becoming tomorrow's adversaries. This paper addresses the need for space weapons and issues and concerns relating to their deployment. It begins with definitions of space weapon and weaponization of space. This is followed by an overview of the evolving global environment, including a summary of space activities and stakeholders. The advantages and liabilities of space weapons are discussed within the context of national interests, from military, political, and economic perspectives. Alternatives for addressing needs served by space weapons are then considered."
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Donatelli, Delia E.
1997
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Military Man in Space Essential to National Strategy
"This paper presents arguments for incorporating manned military activities into our space strategy. It begins with a review of how space systems impact national policy today, and how that might change over the next few decades. Subsequent chapters focus on unique talents humans bring to space operations, and how those talents can pave the path to enhanced capabilities in space. [The author] will show how, and why, the manned military space program, like its counterpart air, land and sea programs must be an integral part of the complete national strategy of the United States. [He will] conclude with a framework to build the infrastructure by which military men and women can serve our national strategic objectives in space with the same capability we now rely upon in the air, on land, and at sea."
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Carretto, Joseph A., Jr.
1995
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Nuclear Weapons in an Uncertain World--National Security Implications
United States (US) nuclear policy evolution has been characterized by change in response to the dynamics of the international environment. New nuclear weapons and non-proliferation policies are required in response to the evolving international environment. Specific concerns relate to the military, economic and political conditions of an evolving and uncertain world and the root causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. Proposed nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies are designed to allow the US to engage nations with the necessary freedom of action in political/diplomatic, economic and military spheres. Identifying friend versus foe in permanent and absolute terms will be increasingly difficult for the US in the international environment. This is a result of the high degree of economic interdependency in the world economy and the complex web of political relationships of established and emerging nations. In this essay, the author addresses questions about new threats to US interests, changes in the international environment, the current relevance of existing policies developed during the Cold War, necessary changes in US nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies, and the effect of these policies on foreign policy strategy. The author then proposes an overall strategy to protect U.S. interests in the new international environment. Specific policies are proposed concerning strategic nuclear weapons, regional nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and engagement. These policies are designed to work together as an overall strategy to protect US interests in the near and long term.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Mistretta, Michael J.
1993
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
One' of the most serious threats to world stability today is the proliferation of nuclear weapons; however, until recently little attention has been paid to it by either the U.S. or the world community. The war with Iraq has brought this problem to the world's attention. One reason for this lack of attention in the past was the fact that none of the countries attempting to obtain nuclear weapons had stated so publicly. "No new country, for example, has openly declared that it has acquired nuclear arms since 1964, when the People's Republic of China joined as the fifth country to announce that it possessed such weapons. ''In the countries which have been attempting to obtain these weapons have done so in secrecy. By hiding their nuclear programs, they have given the impression that they are not interested in nuclear weapons. "When apparent nuclear weapon related activities have been discovered in these countries, the activities have been explained away under the guise of a nuclear power program, and rarely have they resulted in sustained international concern. This research report provides background on nuclear proliferation and addresses key trends in the proliferation of missile technology. The author provides an overview of the effect of hostile proliferates on U.S. security objectives and examines the role of U.S. strategic interests and the role of deterrence. He also addresses the implications of deterrence for U.S. force structure and required capabilities as they relate to nuclear forces, conventional forces, technological superiority, collective security and strategic agility. The author concludes the report with a list of five suggestions the U.S. should consider in developing new deterrence policies.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Tarbet, Larry D.
1993
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Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
This publication is the keystone document of the intelligence support to joint operations series. It describes doctrine for intelligence support to interagency, joint, and multinational operations. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Included in this document are the following topics: role of intelligence in joint operations; the intelligence cycle; intelligence operations; joint intelligence architecture; and appendices on intelligence in multinational operations, references, and administrative instructions.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2000-03-09
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Using Military Force in the New World Order
In this paper, the author addresses and answers the question: How should our military force be used in the new world order? In approaching this question, he first describes some realities of the new world order and highlights how our national interests and objectives fit into this new environment. He then looks at the employment of our military forces and specifically addresses why our military should be utilized earlier and more frequently to augment our diplomatic and economic efforts in support of our national interests and objectives. The author also reviews the problems and constraints we have faced in employing our military in the past and suggest why those same pitfalls can be avoided in the post-Cold War era. Finally, he proposes a set of questions whose answers will help form the guidelines and a framework from which our political leaders can determine when, and if, it is appropriate to employ military force to help resolve a problem.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Gorenc, Stanley
1993
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Terror vs. Terror: Effects of Military Retaliation on Terrorism
Terrorism is a continuing and disturbing threat. Some consider military retaliation an appropriate response with deterrent value against terrorists and supporters. Terrorism itself as a tactic uses violence to communicate with and influence audiences for political purpose. It is a form of psychological warfare that goes beyond acceptable norms for the use of force in international relations. The choice of the terror tactic involves both conscious and unconscious motivations; it can satisfy both the strategic and psychological needs of its perpetrators. Furthermore, the psychological motivations of terrorists, their values, and their desire to flaunt conventional logic place them on a different level of rationality from nonterrorists. Like terrorism, retaliation is a form of communication through violence. It can affect multiple audiences for many purposes: bolstering public opinion, destroying/disrupting terrorist infrastructure, and potentially deterring the choice of the terrorist tactic. Symmetry, proportionality, and discrimination in the targeting of retaliation all vary its effects on audiences. To deter terrorists and their supporters, retaliation must meet the requirements of deterrence theory: credibility, shared interest, and rationality.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Mallow, Brittain P.
1997
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Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations
This publication focuses on the responsibilities and procedures for geospatial information and services (GI&S) support to joint operations. This publication discusses GI&S planning, coordination, control, production, and dissemination responsibilities. The focus will be joint GI&S support to combatant commanders for both deliberate and crisis planning and execution. Communications architecture required for the dissemination of digital geospatial data will also be addressed. Topics discussed include: role of geospatial information in military operations; deliberate planning for GI&S support; crisis action planning for GI&S support; GI&S command, control, communications and computer support; and appendices on GI&S deliberate planning checklist; GI&S estimate; GI&S crisis action checklist; references; and administrative instructions.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1999-03-31
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Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats [October 19, 1999]
"This publication provides the guidance necessary to conceptualize, plan, coordinate, and conduct successful joint operations to counter air and missile threats throughout the range of military operations. This document discusses background and fundamentals of Joint Counterair Operations; provides Command and Control relationships and key considerations and requirements for Joint Counterair Operations; discusses fundamentals for planning and executing Offensive Counterair Operations; and discusses fundamentals for planning and executing Defensive Counterair Operations."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1999-10-19
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Aerospace Defense of North America
"This publication provides the guidance necessary to plan, coordinate, and execute joint aerospace defense of North America. It provides the doctrinal basis for how joint forces approach the air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense operations that support aerospace defense of North America. Topics covered include the following: Joint Doctrine for aerospace defense of North America; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Systems; and Aerospace Defense Operations for North America."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-11-04
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War Powers Resolution: Intent Implementation and Impact
"The decision for a country to go to war is, perhaps, the most significant decision that any country can make. In a democracy, this decision to commit a nation's resources, both material and human, is meant to be entrusted to the collective wisdom of all the leaders, acting on behalf of the wishes of the majority. In the Constitution of the United States, the power to declare war is specifically delegated to the Congress. As part of the separation of powers, the authority as Commander-in-Chief is also specifically delegated to the President. The clear intent of the founders of our nation was that this responsibility be shared, and not taken lightly. They envisioned that such power would be used reasonably and rationally. They entrusted to their posterity, a nation of laws set forth in the Constitution that would clearly establish the authority of the three branches of government. After nearly 200 years, Congress felt it necessary to codify the power to declare war and commit forces overseas in the War Powers Resolution to correct what they interpreted as an erosion of their power in this area. The purpose of this paper is to discuss why in 1973 the Congress felt it necessary to pass a law on a matter so specifically delegated to them in the Constitution. Further, the author explores how the power in this Resolution has been used in the 20 years since its passage. In the end he discusses his own conclusions and makes recommendations as to how the War Powers Resolution may be improved."
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
McHale, Kevin J.
1993
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Risk Communications and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency-Preparedness Program
"The Source Book has been developed for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) in support of the training course on risk communications. The purpose of the document is to provide a fairly comprehensive document on risk communication research and recommended practices, especially as they relate to the CSEPP. In a world of increasing risks, appropriate and continual dialogue with affected publics about risks should be one of the foremost concerns of public agencies, especially those involved in risk communications for the CSEPP. How that information is interpreted or modified by existing beliefs remains problematical. To enhance risk communication efforts, we need communications of risks in a language easily understood by the majority of publics. Effective public participation also depends substantially upon the development of indigenous technical and analytic resources and upon the institutional means to act upon and incorporate that increased knowledge."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
Sorensen, John H.; Vogt, Barbara M.
1994-09
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Why Can't We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to Save Lives: A Guide for Public Officials
This guide "was developed as a result of the ongoing dialogue among State and local elected and appointed officials and public safety officials. []This guide is designed to provide public officials with easy-to comprehend information on interoperability. 'Why Cant Public Safety Agencies Talk?,' discusses the definition of interoperability, the importance of interoperability to public officials, and the role public officials play in interoperability. 'Five Key Reasons Why Public Safety Agencies Cant Talk,' discusses the barriers to interoperability"incompatible and aging communications equipment, limited and fragmented planning and funding, a lack of coordination and cooperation, and limited and fragmented radio communications spectrum. 'Are You Prepared?', discusses evaluation and assessment of public safety radio communication systems and financial resources and provides interim technology strategies to achieve interoperability. 'How Can You Achieve Interoperability?', discusses planning for interoperability, and the role of Elected and Appointed Officials in the planning process. 'Governance Structures for Improving Interoperability', discusses what a Governance Structure is and why it is necessary, examples of mechanisms for creating governance structures and the key element of leadership. 'Funding Strategies for Achieving Interoperability', discusses developing a funding strategy, cost-cutting measures, presenting a case, presenting the case for funding interoperability and financing methods. 'Why Radio Spectrum Matters to You', provides a historical perspective of spectrum, a discussion of the additional spectrum that has been allocated but not yet made available to public safety, and technologies that can increase the efficient use of spectrum."
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
2003-02
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Revision of Export Controls for General Purpose Microprocessors
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement revisions to national security controls for microprocessors that were agreed upon in the February 2002 meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement). This final rule removes license requirements for exports and reexports of general purpose microprocessors to most destinations to conform with changes in the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies maintained and agreed to by governments participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement. This rule retains license requirements for exports and reexports to designated terrorist-supporting countries. In addition, this rule establishes a new license requirement for the export or reexport of general purpose microprocessors if, at the time of the export or reexport, the exporter or reexporter knows, has reason to know, or is informed by BIS that the item will be or is intended to be used for a military end-use'' in a country that is of concern for national security reasons or by a military end-user'' in such a country. This license requirement does not apply to items for the official use by personnel and agencies of the U.S. Government or agencies of a cooperating government in a country of concern for national security reasons. The license review standard for applications to export or reexport general purpose microprocessors subject to this license requirement is a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for this license requirement.
United States. Department of Commerce
2003-01-14
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Can We Talk?: Public Safety and the Interoperability Challenge
In their routine day-to-day operations, many public safety agencies can transmit mug shots, fingerprints, and videos of crime scenes to their communications centers. But when agencies from multiple jurisdictions need to mount a coordinated response (for example, during a high-speed pursuit across geographic boundaries), they may not be able to talk to each other via their radios in real time because their separate radio equipment is incompatible. When disaster strikes--a bombing, plane crash, or natural disaster--they even may be forced to use hand signals or runners to relay messages. In an era when news, data, and pictures can be sent instantaneously to the farthest reaches of the earth, it is hard to believe that police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service personnel may not be able to talk to each other by radio. Both the fairly common incident as well as the rare headline-grabbing event (such as the Oklahoma City bombing or Columbine shootings) test the ability of public safety agencies to coordinate and respond immediately. But in many cases, precious seconds can be lost while dispatchers translate and relay emergency communications. The ability to share information in real time between agencies is called interoperability. The basic idea is this: Persons who need to exchange information should be able to do so, even when they are using different technologies from different manufacturers, without the need for custom hardware or software to integrate them all. It's a little like the incompatibilities between various computer operating systems (e.g., Windows, Macintosh, Unix)--but a lot more complicated. Broadly defined, interoperability refers to the ability to transmit all types of communications electronically, including voice, data, and images. This article focuses on one aspect: The ability of public safety agencies to talk to each other via radios.
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
Smith, Brenna; Tolman, Thomas K.
2000-04
