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Response of Higher Education to Information WarfareThere is a growing demand for information security professionals in an era when "malicious vandalism, criminal activity, and international information warfare" all may threaten the nation's information infrastructure, says Dr. Charles Reynolds. He describes how the academic community is collaborating with government and industry to meet that need through an initiative launched in 1997 called the National Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education (NCISSE). The author, 1998 chairman of NCISSE's executive committee, also outlines James Madison University's efforts to respond to emerging national priorities in countering the threats to U.S. information networks. To counter the threats of the new era in information technology, our nation needs an information-literate work force that is aware of the emerging vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures, as well as a cadre of information security professionals who are knowledgeable about the recognized "best practices" available in information security and information assurance. Participants who complete the Information Security Program at James Madison University earn a Master of Science degree in computer science with a concentration in information security. The program is based on a standard endorsed by the National Security Agency and is designed to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to understand the interrelationships between information security and information technology and to relate both the technical and human components of information security and information technology. The program begins with a preparatory segment for those who need to strengthen their computing skills before beginning the computer science core. This is followed by three courses in computer science that cover data-base management, operating systems and networks, and application software development. Building on this strong foundation, the third period introduces information security, the concepts of trusted information systems, and techniques for secure information storage and transmission, especially by encryption. The fourth segment teaches management and administrative issues in information security including risk and vulnerability analysis, information system audit tools and procedures, and legal, ethical, and policy issues. A final capstone project integrates the whole program with a project that challenges participants to analyze the security of an information system.United States. Department of StateReynolds, Charles W., 1948-1998-11
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Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South AsiaWith continued fighting in Kashmir, "the risk of another India-Pakistan conventional war seems higher than ever before," says Lavoy. "Even if India and Pakistan do manage to establish nuclear deterrence, the effect will be that every Indian and Pakistani will live under the threat of nuclear annihilation." Lavoy is Director of Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 received wide and vocal support in each country. Patriotic Indians and Pakistanis had much to celebrate: their scientists had surmounted high political, financial, and technical barriers to achieve what only five other states had done: develop and detonate nuclear bombs. That their leaders authorized these tests in spite of strong international political pressures, including the threat of economic sanctions, only spurred the nationalist fervor in India and Pakistan. A year and a half after the Pokhran and Chagai Hills explosions, however, public confusion and anxiety have supplanted euphoria. Military clashes bordering on open warfare in Kashmir make even ardent nuclear advocates question the utility of nuclear deterrence, or whether it actually exists in South Asia. And in the face of deep poverty, outdated economies, and teetering governments, Indians and Pakistanis now prudently ask whether they can afford their growing arms competition. Continued fighting over Kashmir and the downing of aircraft in other areas indicate that nuclear deterrence has not yet emerged in South Asia. The risk of another India-Pakistan conventional war seems higher than ever before and India's relations with China also have deteriorated. Added to these problems are new risks of inadvertent or accidental nuclear use because of unsophisticated nuclear command-and-control systems and poorly defined nuclear doctrines. And, even if India and Pakistan do manage to establish nuclear deterrence, moreover, the effect will be that every Indian and Pakistani will live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Welcome to the nuclear club. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has stated, "India and Pakistan need security, deserve security, and have a right to determine what is necessary to attain security." Are there ways for India and Pakistan to enhance their security without deploying nuclear weapons and missiles? Considering the dangerous and expensive record of the Soviet-American arms race, the enormous political and economic costs of Indian and Pakistani deterrent programs, and the growing risk of nuclear war in South Asia, India and Pakistan should make every effort to pursue nonnuclear sources of security. And, all concerned states should help them to achieve that security.United States. Department of StateLavoy, Peter R. (Peter René), 1961-1999-09
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Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Challenges and ResponsesThe challenge presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is great, but the international community is "resolutely determined to contain it," Holum says. "A strong, comprehensive nonproliferation strategy will remain a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy as we advance America's interests and global security into the next century." Holum is Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Current trends in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation are mixed. The past two years have presented some of the most difficult challenges the nonproliferation community has faced. Yet these same challenges afford opportunities to intensify awareness that such threats are real and require high-level and sustained attention. While WMD proliferation presents a significant challenge to the United States, the challenge is being addressed. Our nonproliferation strategy will continue to combine efforts to reduce incentives to acquire WMD, convince those on the supply side that threats from proliferation dramatically outweigh economic benefits, and remind proliferators that their actions come with a high price. The key remains to identify proliferation threats at an early stage before costly countermeasures are needed, keep focused on reducing WMD and missile programs to zero, and control access to key technologies. There will be circumstances where nonproliferation efforts will not succeed, and in those cases active counter-proliferation and defense initiatives must be maintained. Those who work to address proliferation challenges recognize the task can be daunting and that efforts to prevent proliferation are more important than ever before and also more difficult. The challenge is great, but the international community is increasingly focused on the threat and resolutely determined to contain it. A strong, comprehensive nonproliferation strategy will remain a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy as we advance U.S. interests and global security into the next century.United States. Department of StateHolum, John D.1999-09
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Information Warfare: Challenge and Opportunity"I have the power, the capability, sitting in my home with my computer and my modem...to wage war," says James Adams. "That is a very different environment than anything that we have experienced in the past." Adams is Chief Executive Officer of Infrastructure Defense, Inc., which provides a forum for exchange of information and decision making on the critical infrastructure within the private sector and between the private and public sectors worldwide. This article is adapted from comments by Adams at the U.S. Information Agency in August 1998. The U.S. military last year organized an exercise that involved a simulation in which an international crisis was brewing and a foreign government had hired 35 computer hackers to disrupt the United States' response to that crisis. The "hackers" taking part in the exercise -- called Eligible Receiver -- were, in fact, U.S. government employees. They were given no advance intelligence. They bought their laptops from a local computer store. What this exercise demonstrated was that 35 people using publicly available information with skills that were available around the world really could have prevented the United States from responding to the crisis. A vital element is the private sector because it's the private sector that is the engine now driving the change unfolding around us. The government has to demonstrate its relevance and to take some form of leadership here, which I believe is noticeably absent. The private sector can articulate many of these things to defend itself and, thus, to defend each one of us. If we fail to recognize that, I think we will experience some very serious trouble, beginning with Y2K. We will become victims of the new aggressors out there, who will have power that we have never really begun to understand, and when we understand it, it will be too late.United States. Department of StateAdams, James1998-11
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Private, Public Sectors Benefit by Sharing Expertise on SecurityGovernment agencies and many private corporations now have the ability "to contact each other and support each other" in the event of threats against their information and other critical systems, says Howard Schmidt, Director of Information Security for Microsoft Corporation. He also cites extensive cooperation among corporations to deal with information warfare questions. "When it comes to security issues, there are very few things that relate to competition," says Schmidt. "We work with our competitors and partners alike to assist in standard developments so that we can all succeed in developing and maintaining good security." Schmidt was interviewed by Managing Editor Dian McDonald. Topics discussed include an assessment of U.S. vulnerability critical infrastructures to attack and how prepared the U.S. is for such attacks, Mr. Schmidt's work with the commission, strategies and cooperation with other corporations on this issue, the government's role in protecting critical infrastructures, and how public and private sectors can work better together to develop effective defensive capabilities against terrorist or other hostile action. According to Mr. Schmidt, Microsoft representatives meet regularly with their customers about security. Microsoft's product development employees are constantly working to ensure that all of their products are more secure, according to Schmidt. The conclusion of this interview is that we have come a long way in fixing the problem of denial of service attacks and e-mail bombs.United States. Department of StateMcDonald, Dian1998-11
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Presidential Decision Directive 63: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures [Fact Sheet]This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services. Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. Included is the President's policy, and the new structure to deal with this important challenge.United States. Department of State1998-11
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Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues and Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of RepresentativesGAO was asked to discuss Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)'s information sharing efforts, including (1) the significance of information sharing in fulfilling DHS's responsibilities; (2) GAO's related prior analyses and recommendations for improving the federal government's information sharing efforts; and (3) key management issues DHS should consider in developing and implementing effective information sharing processes and systems. DHS's responsibilities include the coordination and sharing of information related to threats of domestic terrorism within the department and with and between other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and other entities. GAO has made numerous recommendations related to information sharing. Although improvements have been made, more efforts are needed to address the following challenges, among others, that GAO has identified: (1) developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate information sharing on critical infrastructure, (2) developing productive information sharing relationships between the federal government and state and local governments and the private sector, and (3) providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase information sharing with the federal government and enhance other critical infrastructure protection efforts. It will be important for the department to understand the numerous potential barriers to information sharing and develop appropriate strategies to address them, considering any related provisions of the Homeland Security Act. GAO's work has also identified critical success factors for information sharing that DHS should consider as it proceeds. Further, as part of its information technology management, DHS should develop and implement an enterprise architecture to integrate the many existing systems and processes required to support its mission and to guide the department's investments in new systems to effectively support homeland security in the coming years. Other key management issues include ensuring that sensitive information is secured, developing secure communications networks, integrating staff from different organizations, and ensuring that the department has properly skilled staff.United States. General Accounting Office2003-05-08
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Report to Congress in Accordance with § 356(C) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act)This report specifically addresses three questions raised by section 356(c) of the USA Patriot Act: (1) what are the appropriate "effectiveness regulations" to apply the requirements of the BSA to investment companies; (2) which of those regulations should be applied to investment companies to best achieve the goals of the BSA; and (3) what investment companies should be subject to the BSA regulatory scheme? Treasury and the federal functional regulators have greatly expanded the scope and reach of regulations under the BSA since Congress passed the USA Patriot Act approximately one year ago. This report has described regulations, some final, some proposed, that have been promulgated to deter criminals and terrorists from laundering money through the various entities defined as financial institutions under the BSA. Some of these regulations apply to various types of investment companies, both registered and unregistered. The last section of this report summarizes the regulations promulgated to date, the regulations that are still under consideration, and the recommendations for regulatory action by the Treasury, the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board.United States. Department of the Treasury. Office of the Secretary; United States. Securities and Exchange Commission; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)2002-12-31
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Title I: Characteristics of Tests Will Influence Expenses; Information Sharing May Help States Realize EfficienciesThe No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) reauthorized the $10 billion Title I program, which seeks to improve the educational achievement of 12.5 million students at risk. In passing the legislation, Congress increased the frequency with which states are to measure student achievement in mathematics and reading and added science as another subject. Congress also authorized funding to support state efforts to develop and implement tests for this purpose. Congress mandated that GAO study the costs of implementing the required tests. This report describes characteristics of states' Title I tests, provides estimates of what states may spend to implement the required tests, and identifies factors that explain variation in expenses. The majority of states administer statewide tests and customize questions to measure student learning against their state standards. These states differ along other characteristics, however, including the types of questions on their tests and how they are scored, the extent to which actual test questions are released to the public following the tests, and the number of new tests they need to develop to comply with the NCLBA. GAO provides three estimates of total expenditures between fiscal year 2002 and 2008, based on different assumptions about the types of test questions states may choose to implement and how they are scored. The method by which tests are scored largely explains the differences in GAO's estimates. If all states use tests with multiple-choice questions, which are machine scored, GAO estimates that the total state expenditures will be about $1.9 billion. If all states use tests with a mixture of multiple choice questions and a limited number of open-ended questions that require students to write their response, such as an essay, which are hand scored, GAO estimates spending to be about $5.3 billion. GAO estimates that spending will be at about $3.9 billion, if states keep the mix of question types states reported to GAO. In general, hand scoring is more expensive and time and labor intensive than machine scoring. Benchmark funding for assessments as specified in NCLBA will cover a larger percentage of estimated expenditures for tests comprised of multiple-choice questions and a smaller percentage of estimated expenditures for tests comprised of a mixture of multiple-choice and open-ended questions. Several states are exploring ways to reduce assessment expenses, but information on their experiences is not broadly shared among states.United States. General Accounting Office2003-05-08
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Building the Bomb in the Next Millennium: Are We on a Prudent Path to the Future"This paper examines current Department of Energy (DOE) programs to assess whether or not the United States will be able to rebuild or remanufacture nuclear weapons in the year 2005 and beyond. The target audience is the DOE and DOD strategic policymakers and nuclear weapons managers. I provide a perspective focused by the academic rigor of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. This examination covers the strengths and weaknesses of the current DOE Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan including its major strategy, the Stockpile Life Extension Program, as well other programs intended to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. To maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrence for future generations, the U.S. must keep these programs focused on sustaining nuclear weapons capabilities. The conclusion is that if DOE remains on the current path, it will be able to rebuild or remanufacture nuclear weapons beyond the year 2005. The plans and programs being put in place today nonetheless raise several areas which require management attention. A serious concern at the policy level is that political and economic pressures will cause DOE to deviate from the desired course. This paper provides a discussion of programs, policies, and challenges and concludes with a series of recommendations which will ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile will remain a viable deterrent well into the next millennium."Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Sisson, Barbara A.1997
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Automating Military Support to Civil Authorities"This paper discusses how the Department of Defense can use automation in accomplishing its Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) mission. It describes the successful implementation of a commercial, off-the-shelf graphical information software system at an Army level headquarters. Lessons learned from that experience demonstrate the feasibility of exporting a similar system to all headquarters responsible for MSCA. The final section of the paper suggests that the Federal Emergency Management Agency take the lead in promoting improvements in the automation environment for all organizations participating in disaster management."Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Mayer-Kielmann, Michael1994
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Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons"While US-funded programs brought many nuclear weapons into secure storage facilities, two questions arose regarding Russia's unilateral initiatives. The first concern was weapons security and unauthorized transfers to third parties. The second concern was Russian military plans for the other half of its surface-to-air missile warheads, tactical naval warheads and bombs. The emerging answer relates to Russian threat perceptions, national security policy and military doctrine. It also invokes a larger geostrategic issue: was the post-Cold War era of proclaimed strategic partnership ending and a new, interwar era in Russia's relations with the West beginning, in which preventing preventing war gave way to preparing for war?" The authors developed algorithms for nuclear use to reinterpret the quantitative and qualitative ratios of strategic and nonstrategic conventional and nuclear arms and to improve performance in nuclear destruction missions. They identified three situations for employing nuclear weapons: Enemy use of weapons of mass destruction or evidence of immediate preparations to do so; Enemy effect against strategic (not just military) installations, even by conventional weapons; and a threat to disrupt stability of a strategic defense. Strategic nuclear forces remain the main means of deterrence, but the presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons offers a chance (although fragile) to prevent the avalanche-like transformation of a regional conflict into an unlimited global use of nuclear weapons. Russia has good reason to abandon the existing unilateral regime for nonstrategic nuclear weapons and will not likely embrace a formal bilateral or multilateral version of it without concessions from the United States and NATO on other arms-control issues. Russia's isolation and NATO's willful disregard of its interests confirmed the assumptions of NATO hostility that only a few years before had been confined to the extreme nationalist and communist circles.U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeKipp, Jacob W.2001-07
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Strategic Asymmetry"Military strategists and commanders must think in terms of psychological precision as well-structuring a military operation to shape the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions among the enemy and other observers, whether local noncombatants or global audiences. [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent's initiative, freedom of action or will. This article addresses both positive and negative asymmetry. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent's vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare--strategic, operational and tactical--and across the spectrum of military operations. This latest official definition of asymmetry expanded official thinking but has two shortcomings: it is specific to the current strategic environment and US security situation, and it deals primarily with what an opponent might do to the United States rather than giving equal weight to how the US military might use asymmetry against its opponents. Positive asymmetry will continue to provide the US military with advantages over most enemies. However, effectiveness of asymmetric threats sooner or later declines as the enemy adjusts. By maximizing conceptual and organizational adaptability and flexibility, the US military can assure that it will rapidly counter emerging asymmetric threats and speed the process that renders asymmetric threats insignificant or ineffective. The military that develops new concepts and organizations more quickly than its opponents has a decided advantage. Even so, DOD should continue to refine its understanding of asymmetric challenges. A more general and complete definition of asymmetry is needed as a foundation for doctrine and for integrating maximum adaptability and flexibility, focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full-dimension precision and integrated homeland security into US security strategy."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeMetz, Steven, 1956-2001-07
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GPS Vulnerabilities"For centuries explorers have navigated by fixed stars. Today our increasingly expeditionary military navigates by orbiting emitters. Satellites enable flexible communication and precise navigation that were unimaginable a generation ago. Space-based technologies reach down into everyday military business so much that interrupted service immediately and fundamentally degrades operations. The author describes various threats to US satellites, systems that use their signals and a military that depends on falling stars. Before entering the 21st century dependent on space-based systems and commercially developed information-technology based systems, the US military must understand its capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities. Dual-use and off-the-shelf technologies offer real advantages and are especially cost effective. However, they have serious disadvantages: (1) Dual use means that both civilian and military users employ the same technology. Technology training, documentation and product improvements are also available to potential adversaries. (2) Off-the-shelf merchandise provides civilian and military users with nearly identical systems. Systems designed to operate in a much less stringent peacetime environment could be chosen rather than those designed for combat. (3) States, political movements and individuals can obtain current military technology without costly research, development, manufacture, training capacity or espionage. A practical solution can possibly be found in a proposal now under study to use small-size, opticoelectronic, radar and electronic reconnaissance satellites that can be quickly manufactured and launched by light booster rockets during crises. These satellites will conduct reconnaissance with worse resolution than current methods. However, this is only a partial solution since it does not solve the problem of other satellites used for communications and navigation. Whatever their ultimate form, solutions to space vulnerabilities must enable the US military's information dominance."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeAdams, Thomas K.2001-03
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Asymmetry and Adaptive Command"Planning, training and adapting are three complementary ways a country prepares for war. A strong, deliberate planning culture developed during the Cold War in large and important segments of the military, particularly in Europe, Korea and Washington. In addition to deliberate planning methods, equally strong processes were established to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). A sophisticated training method was developed to complement the deliberate planning process. The deliberate planning process yielded decisions at the strategic and operational levels of war. The output of deliberate planning, the operation plan (OPLAN), was input to training events. Plan execution--including daily, tactical planning--was the training focus. The deliberate planning process emphasizes plan development; a separate training methodology was developed to exercise plan execution. Perhaps the most insidious consequence of training focused on plan execution is that strategic, operational and tactical echelons all are trained in the tactical time context. A useful way to summarize the changed environment is the dramatic shift in balance between what is fixed (relatively certain) and what is variable (relatively uncertain). Not knowing the actors and conditions in advance requires adaptable organizations and processes to cope with emerging threats. Adaptations must continue throughout military missions. Centering learning in the user chain of command will produce organizations that can more readily adapt and more effectively lead long-term combat development rather than be its belated recipient. Combat developers must more actively convert lessons learned in operational commands to doctrine, organization and training. Combat developers must produce a more diverse playbook of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels and coping mechanisms at higher-level commands. But, combat development is conducted principally by services and branches within them. When competing for acquisition funds, branches dominate combined arms organizations, and services dominate joint organizations. Only leadership, another precious resource, can overcome the inevitable imbalance accompanying the flow of money. More important, to overcome limitations that standard patterns of behavior often place on government action, adaptation must become a hallmark of US military behavior."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeWorley, D. Robert (Duane Robert), 1949-2001-07
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Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (February 2001 Revision)This is the eighth revision of a working paper on biological terrorism first released in August 1998. The last version was released in April 2000. As with the earlier versions, it is an interim product of the research conducted by the author into biological terrorism at the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research. It incorporates new cases identified through December 31, 2000, as well as a considerable amount of new material on older cases acquired since publication of the previous revision. The working paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the illicit use of biological agents by criminals and terrorists. It draws on a series of case studies documented in the second part. The case studies describe every instance identifiable in open source materials in which a perpetrator used, acquired, or threatened to use a biological agent. While the inventory of cases is clearly incomplete, it provides an empirical basis for addressing a number of important questions relating to both biocrimes and bioterrorism. This material should enable policymakers concerned with bioterrorism to make more informed decisions.National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation ResearchCarus, W. Seth2001-02
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Janusian Thinking and Acting"While the concept of asymmetry has been presented often in professional literature, it remains ill-understood from the strategy::operations::tactics paradigm because this paradigm considers that we need better, not necessarily different, thinking and acting. . . What we really need is an alternative paradigm that gives us a new and better way of thinking and acting. . . . The preferred paradigm is Janusian. Linearly focused (schismogenic) thinking and acting--the methods of the current strategic paradigm--explains and rejects alternative hypotheses purposefully and sequentially. In other words, linear thinking and acting disallow the existence of contradiction. The proposed alternative Janusian thinking suggests that information processing is paradoxical, considers multiple time orientations, and is nonlinear. The basic Janusian model for thinking and acting is arranged in a four-square--A, B, C, and D--the arrows depicting the struggles for dominance in one or more quadrants. It provides a complex, four-way, interdependent, interactive model for thinking and acting that goes beyond the traditional linear processing associated with strategy, operations, and tactics and helps us understand what we could not decipher or comprehend. In today's conflict, terrorists control the environment, a B quadrant activity, yet the United States has been responding bureaucratically, a type D response. Forming the Homeland Security Office, tightening airport and airplane security, and screening mail are all bureaucratic responses to the type B environment. The Janusian framework requires formulating new and complex recipes for thinking and acting in multiple patterns rather than embracing a singular one. Instead of using a linear thinking model to decide between competing values, the trick is to find a positive zone among them by using a nonlinear thinking model. New forms of organizing, such as the highly flexible network organizations, require a new power structure, something that the military culture may find inconceivable: rank and hierarchical positional authority would have to give way to expert power and lateral forms of leadership." The authors maintain that the current U.S. approach to military operations--strategic, operational, and tactical--is too linear for today's contemporary operating environment. They argue that future warfighters must move beyond linear thought and action to a realm of thinking and acting that recognizes and accepts paired yet opposite ideas and actions: "Look before you leap" and at the same time understand that "he who hesitates is lost."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegePaparone, Christopher R.; Crupi, James A. (James Andrew), 1948-
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America's Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric ConflictsThe author takes a look at America's Frontier Wars, including the second Seminole War of 1835-1842, King Philip's War of 1675-1676, Pontiac's War in 1763, and the 1755 battle in which Major General Edward Braddock lost his life to a small French and Indian force, as they can apply to modern-day challenges. "While asymmetric warfare is not something new, it is very much in vogue today in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Given America's resounding success in that conflict, potential adversaries have learned Iraq's lesson that it is foolish to try to match us conventionally. Instead, they are seeking ways to turn our strengths against us. This is the heart of the concept of asymmetry, broadly defined by Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson of the US Army War college as: 'In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.' US forces will have to contend with greater uncertainty in the field as adversaries mask the size, location, disposition and intentions of their forces. They will seek to convince US commanders that they are using conventional tactics while making us vulnerable to unconventional, adaptive and asymmetrical actions. At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that an adversary will choose to attack the weakest point. In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may well entail terrorist acts, with or without nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, on the US homeland designed to disrupt deployments, limit access, erode public support and take the fight to the American people. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new. Beginning with King Philip's War, the New England Indians abandoned their traditional restraints and prepared to wage total war on all of the colonists, making no distinction between combatant and non-combatant.13 Attacks on Americans using weapons of mass destruction take these homeland tactics to a new level. Because of the devastation of these attacks and the interest of many potential adversaries in acquiring these capabilities, the United States must develop strategies for preventing and responding to such an occurrence. The cyber threat now facing the United States is equally compelling and risks both the effectiveness of US forces on the battlefield and the safety of private and government systems throughout the United States. Recent Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed cyber warfare exercises like ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and ZENITH STAR showed how vulnerable command and control networks are to cyber attacks, a prime asymmetric target given the US military's continued reliance on information technology. Moreover, there are now approximately 30 nations that have developed aggressive computer-warfare programs."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeSkelton, Isaac Newton2001-09
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Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, Volume I"This volume discusses the interagency environment and describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commands of the Department of Defense and agencies of the US Government, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. It provides potential methodologies to synchronize successful interagency operations. Volume II (located in the digital library at /homesec/docs/dod/jp3-08v2.pdf) describes the key US Government departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations -- their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. Volume I outlines the interagency process and participants; explains the evolving role of the Armed Forces of the United States within the interagency process; describes interagency coordination; explains the role of the National Security Council System; discusses organizing for interagency operations at the operational level; and outlines Joint Task Force roles and responsibilities."United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff1996-10-09
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Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, October 9, 1998This publication provides the overarching operational guidance for information operations (IO) in the joint context (to include information warfare) throughout the range of military operations. It addresses IO principles relating to both offensive and defensive IO and describes responsibilities for planning, coordinating, integrating, and deconflicting joint IO. Guidance concerning intelligence support to IO, Defense and interagency relationships, and IO in training, exercises, and modeling and simulation also is provided. This document defines the objectives of information operations; addresses the details of offensive and defensive information operations; gives guidance concerning information operations planning; and discusses organizational and training issues.United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff1998-10-09
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Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed: Report to Congressional Requesters"In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have been raised that the nation's shipments of hazardous materials by rail may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped yearly across the continental United States. Much of this volume is shipped on rail networks that travel through populated areas, increasing the concern that accidents or attacks during these shipments could have severe consequences. While the vast majority of shipments arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. Additionally, the proposed shipments of spent nuclear fuel at sites from 39 states across the country to the Yucca Mountain Repository have highlighted the need to safeguard hazardous materials against both accident and attack."United States. General Accounting Office2003-04
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Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and Surveillance System Need to Be Considered, Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate"The Department of Defense's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing a ballistic missile defense system designed to counter a wide spectrum of ballistic missile threats. A future element of this system is the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). STSS will eventually be composed of a constellation of satellites that will work together to detect and track missiles throughout all phases of their flight. GAO was asked to analyze MDA's approach to demonstrate capabilities for STSS. To optimize MDA's approach to demonstrating space-based missile tracking capabilities, GAO recommends that MDA focus spending to assessing what needs to be done to complete work on existing satellite components so that it has a reasonable basis for its cost and scheduling estimates. GAO also recommends that MDA assess alternatives to its current strategy that may offer opportunities to reduce risks and gain more knowledge."United States. General Accounting Office2003-05
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Guide for Explosion and Bombing Scene Investigation: Research Report"The principal purpose of this Guide is to provide an investigative outline of the tasks that should be considered at every explosion scene. They will ensure that proper procedures are used to locate, identify, collect, and preserve valuable evidence so that it can be examined to produce the most useful and effective information--best practices. This Guide was designed to apply to explosion and bombing scene investigations, from highly complex and visible cases, such as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to those that attract less attention and fewer resources but may be just as complex for the investigator. Any guide addressing investigative procedures must ensure that each contributor of evidence to the forensic laboratory system is served by the guide and that quality examinations will be rendered. Consistent collection of quality evidence in bombing cases will result in more successful investigations and prosecutions of bombing cases. While this Guide can be useful to agencies in developing their own procedures, the procedures included here may not be deemed applicable in every circumstance or jurisdiction, nor are they intended to be all-inclusive. The most common types of explosive/incendiary devices encountered by fire service and law enforcement personnel in the United States are traditionally pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, and other improvised explosive/incendiary devices. The most common explosive materials used in these devices are flammable liquids and black and smokeless powder. This guide contains: a principle citing the rationale for performing the task; a procedure for performing the task; and a summary outlining the principle and procedure."National Institute of Justice (U.S.)2000-06
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Public Safety Wireless Network: Digital Land Mobile Radio (DLMR) Security Guidelines Recommendations"This document, presented by the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) program, identifies recommended system security guidelines, including industry best security practices. Local, state, and federal public safety agencies may apply these system security guidelines to the design, implementation, and operation of their digital land mobile radio (DLMR) systems. Implementation of these guidelines, if followed, should improve overall system security among current and developing public safety DLMR systems. The guidelines contained in this document are applicable to planned and operational public safety DLMR systems. They address areas of administrative security, physical security, computer security (COMPUSEC), communications security (COMSEC) as they relate to DLMR systems. These security guidelines have been extracted or derived from a variety of sources including Federal Government security requirements and industry best security practices. This document is organized as follows: Section 1, Introduction: provides background, purpose, scope, and document layout; Section 2, Security Guidelines Identification Approach: describes steps taken to identify security guidelines; Section 3, Security Guidelines Organization: describes processes used to organize security guidelines; Appendix A: Reference List of Security Guidelines Sources; Appendix B: Administrative Security Guidelines; Appendix C: Physical Security Guidelines; Appendix D: Computer Security (COMPUSEC) Guidelines; and Appendix E: Communications Security (COMSEC) Guidelines."United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of the Treasury1998-10
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Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board Findings and Recommendations on Government Privacy Policy Setting and Management"The Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) determined in September 2000 that privacy would be included as one of the Board's initiatives under its new strategic plan. The Board addressed privacy issues in subsequent board meetings, including presentations from leading private sector privacy experts, the Office of Management and Budget, and government privacy officers and policymakers. In order to achieve a more structured focus, the CSSPAB devoted two full days of its June 19 and 20, 2001, quarterly meeting, hosted by The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois, to address issues related to government data privacy. The Board heard from thirteen government and industry experts. The minutes of this meeting and the privacy sessions as well as accompanying presentations are available at the CSSPAB Web site, http://csrc.nist.gov/csspab. For these sessions, the Board's focus was on two broad questions important to the Federal government: 1. Government Privacy Policies: are government privacy policies adequate in light of technological, societal and other policy changes and influences? 2. Government Privacy Management: can improvements be made to Federal agencies' business processes and use of technology in support of law, regulations and privacy policies? In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government's critical focus on policies and operational plans necessary to improve homeland security further highlight the need to address the questions raised in the Board's inquiries on data privacy. For example, the Patriot Act authorized additional data collection and data processing authorities for law enforcement purposes in order to provide enhanced security and protection against terrorists and terrorist acts. Further, as this report is written, very serious analysis is underway in both the public and private sectors regarding increased interconnection of information systems, sharing of data, and the aggregation, warehousing and processing of data from both private sector and government sources in ways contemplated at the time the Privacy Act was written, but now requiring consideration in light of the events of September 11th."National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)2002-09
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OVC Handbook for Coping after Terrorism: A Guide to Healing and Recovery"This document was prepared in order to assist victims of terrorism or mass violence in their recovery. Reactions to a traumatic disaster include shock and numbness, intense emotion, fear, guilt, anger and resentment, depression and loneliness, and isolation. Moreover, physical symptoms of distress, panic, inability to resume normal activity, and delayed reaction are also possible reactions. This document offers practical coping ideas for these conditions, as well as additional support information, phone numbers, and web sites."United States. Office of Justice Programs. Office for Victims of Crime2001-09
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Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorist-list countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism. In 1996 Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department may submit such information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.United States. Department of State2003-04-30
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Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of Information Technology Investments"Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made clear that prevention of terrorism is the top priority of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI. Effective use of information technology (IT) is crucial to the FBI's ability to meet this priority as well as its other critical responsibilities. However, reviews conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have found major weaknesses associated with the FBI's IT. The FBI has listed upgrading its information technology as one of its top ten highest priorities. In June 2002 Congressional testimony, the FBI acknowledged that its IT infrastructure is severely outdated. Because of the importance of the FBI's management of its IT systems, we performed this audit to: (1) determine whether the FBI was effectively managing its IT investments; and (2) assess the FBI's IT-related strategic planning and performance measurement activities.1 We also examined the FBI's efforts to develop enterprise architecture2 and project management capabilities. In this audit, we conducted approximately 85 interviews with 70 officials from the FBI, DOJ, GAO, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The FBI officials interviewed were from the Director's office, Information Resources Division, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Laboratory Division, Inspection Division, and Finance Division. Additionally, OIG auditors and analysts traveled to FBI laboratory facilities in Quantico, VA, and five FBI field offices to conduct interviews and assess the FBI's implementation of IT initiatives. We also reviewed more than 200 documents, including the FBI's IT management policies and procedures, project management guidance, strategic and program plans, IT project proposals and management plans, budget documentation, organizational structures, Congressional testimony, and prior OIG and GAO."United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General2002
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Most Allegations of Irregularities in Nonproliferation Export Control Cooperation Program Could Not be Supported"In December 1999, the Inspectors General of the Commerce and State Departments received an anonymous letter containing numerous allegations of irregularities in the Nonproliferation Export Control Cooperation (NEC) program, including alleged mismanagement by senior BXA officials. The letter alleged that BXA did not have legal authority for the NEC program; was improperly using State Department funds; may have risked national security in its contacts with foreign nationals; and, may have failed to adequately share the results of its export control policy discussions held during overseas trips with other national security agencies. The letter also claimed that BXA had set up an unauthorized unit to manage the NEC program, engaged in a number of illegal or inappropriate personnel practices in staffing this unit, hired personal services contractors in violation of the intent of Congress, and contrived to evade audit and program review by both the State and Commerce Department Inspectors General. The NEC program was set up to help Russia and the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Asia develop export control programs by providing training and technical assistance on export controls and advice on drafting export control laws and regulations. BXA began the program in 1993 with Defense Department funding to assist the four former Soviet republics that have nuclear weapon capabilities (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) in dismantling their nuclear missiles, establishing secure communications and a hotline, and promoting export control cooperation. The overall Defense Department program also emphasized encouraging conversion of the defense industry and its scientists. Since its initial work with these independent states of the former Soviet Union, BXA has expanded its original effort into what is now called the NEC program, principally supported by State Department funding under the authority of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992, to establish programs for safeguarding against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and preventing the diversion of weapons-related scientific and technical information and expertise of the independent states to terrorist groups or third countries. The State Department funds the bulk of the NEC program's work through its appropriation under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs account. BXA attempts to accomplish this nonproliferation mission by conducting technical exchanges with these countries in the areas of export control policy, automation, licensing, legislation, regulations, and preventive enforcement. Although the State Department is now BXA's principal funding source for the program, the Defense Department and the U.S. Customs Service have also provided funding to BXA. Under interagency agreements, these agencies transfer funds to BXA, based on BXA's funding proposals, to carry out technical exchanges with the foreign governments."United States. Department of Commerce. Office of the Inspector General2001-02
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Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response: A National Public Health Training Plan [Draft]This proposal outlines the implementation of a national training plan for bioterrorism preparedness. It incorporates recommendations from the CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Strategic and FY00 Operational Plans, the POST TOPOFF ACTION PLAN, the CDC/ATSDR Strategic Plan for Public Health Workforce Development, and findings from discussions with external partners. This document provides an overview of the various stages of training and provides an implementation time line.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)Centers for Disease Control (U.S.). Public Health Practice Program Office2000-09-07