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Law Enforcement's Response to the January 6th Events at the Capitol [January 22, 2021]
From the Document: "On January 6, 2021, security at the Capitol was breached by people who reportedly sought to prevent Congress from certifying the votes of the Electoral College. Some individuals clashed with law enforcement officers and for several hours occupied parts of the Capitol. At the request of District of Columbia Mayor Muriel Bowser and the U.S. Capitol Police, law enforcement agents from the Department of Justice (DOJ), along with law enforcement officers from the U.S. Park Police, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), and law enforcement agencies in Maryland and Virginia, assisted with expelling the occupiers and securing the Capitol. In addition to the damage done to the Capitol, pipe bombs were found near the Democratic and Republican National Committees' offices. A car with 11 explosive devices was found near the Capitol. Some reportedly brought firearms and ammunition onto the Capitol grounds. DOJ is jointly investigating criminal cases stemming from the events at the Capitol with MPD and the Capitol Police. [...] This In Focus describes the jurisdiction and investigatory responsibilities of the law enforcement agencies that responded to the Capitol unrest. It also provides an overview of the authority for federal, state, and local governments in the National Capital Region (defined as the District of Columbia; Montgomery, Prince George's, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William Counties; and Alexandria) to enter into mutual aid agreements with each other."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
James, Nathan
2021-01-22
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DOD Excess Property: Enhanced Controls Needed for Access to Excess Controlled Property, Statement of Zina D. Merritt, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Wayne A. McElrath, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
"The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken some actions and is planning additional actions to address identified weaknesses in its excess controlled property program. However, internal control deficiencies exist for, among other things, ensuring that only eligible applicants are approved to participate in the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program and receive transfers of excess controlled property. DLA is establishing memorandums of understanding with participating federal agencies intended to, among other things, establish general terms and conditions for participation, revise its program application to require additional prospective participant information, and plans to provide additional online training for participating agencies that is expected to begin in late 2017. However, GAO [Government Accountability Office] created a fictitious federal agency to conduct independent testing of the LESO program's internal controls and DLA's transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies. Through the testing, GAO gained access to the LESO program and obtained over 100 controlled items with an estimated value of $1.2 million, including night-vision goggles, simulated rifles, and simulated pipe bombs, which could be potentially lethal items if modified with commercially available items (see photos). GAO's testing identified that DLA has deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications and in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. Further, GAO found that DLA has not conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, including the application process."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Merritt, Zina D.
2017-07-27
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FISA Amendments Act: Reauthorizing America's vi tal National Security Authority and Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, June 27, 2017
This testimony compilation is from the June 27, 2017 hearing, "The FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Amendments Act: Reauthorizing America's Vital National Security Authority and Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties," before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. From the opening statement of Chuck Grassley: "This Committee last held an oversight hearing on Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act in May 2016. Since then, the drumbeat of terror attacks against the United States and our allies has continued. A month after our hearing, a terrorist attacked an Orlando nightclub, killing 50 and wounding 53. That same month, a terrorist detonated pipe bombs in New Jersey and New York, injuring about 30. Last month, Great Britain suffered its worst terror attack in over a decade. A suicide bomber killed 22 and seriously injured many more at a concert in Manchester. Many of the dead and wounded were children and young people.These attacks underscore that the first responsibility of government is to ensure that those who protect us every day have the tools to keep us safe. And these tools must adapt to the technological landscape and the evolving security threats we face. But at the same time, of course, the rights and liberties enshrined in our Constitution are fixed. They require our constant vigilance to maintain. Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which provides the government the authority to collect the electronic communications of foreigners located outside the United States with the compelled assistance of American companies, sits at the intersection of these responsibilities." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Stuart J. Evans, Carl Ghattas, Bradley Booker, Paul F. Morris, Matthew G. Olsen, Adam I. Klein, Elizabeth Goitein, and Elisebeth B. Collins.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
2017
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Semi-Autonomous Pipe Bomb End Cap Remover
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, in partnership with RE2, Inc., is developing the Semi-Autonomous Pipe Bomb End Cap Remover (SAPBER) system which will remove end caps from pipe bombs while keeping operators at a safe distance and collecting video and physical evidence from the pipe bomb."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Science and Technology Directorate
2012-05-16
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Bomb Threat Stand-Off Distances
This report provides information about bomb threat stand-off distances. This covers all types of explosives from pipe bombs with 5 pounds of TNT to a semi-trailer with 60,000 pounds of TNT. From the text: "This table is for general emergency planning only. A given building's vulnerability to explosions depends on its construction and composition. The data in these tables may not accurately reflect these variables. Some risk will remain for any persons closer than the Outdoor Evacuation Distance."
National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.)
2005-10
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SAVER Summary: Evaluation of Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles [November 2005]
"Through tasking and funding provided by the United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Systems Support Division, the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division tested 15 different blast resistant trash receptacle (BRTR) models from four vendors [...] The purpose of the testing was to evaluate the claims made by each vendor using bare (i.e., nonfragmenting) explosive charges and a fragmenting pipe bomb. The bare charges were constructed to match the maximum explosive limit of the containers, and the pipe bomb was modeled after data obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' bomb data repository."
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER); United States. Department of Homeland Security
2005-09
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Small Bomb Disposal Robot -- Vanguard MKII-T: Project Summary
"The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS SLGCP) tasked the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Operational Analysis (OA) Team to provide expertise and analysis on small bomb-disposal robots. For this project, the small bomb-disposal robot is defined as a robot weighing less than 400 lbs. In support of this assignment, TSWG developed a standardized process by which small robots are assessed according to user-defined requirements under operationally and tactically relevant conditions typically encountered by the responder community. In developing their assessment project, the TSWG OA Team evaluated the robotic system by allowing participants to deploy the robot in response to operational scenarios, which are common and well documented in actual bomb squad response reports. In addition, they identified tasks common to law enforcement and fire department bomb technicians requiring access to and defeating an improvised explosive device (IED). These tasks were inclusive of arrival, set up of robotic system, and access to the target, as well as employment of render safe procedures. The increased threat of terrorism, both domestic and international, presents a real challenge for bomb technicians. Domestic terrorists have proven to be innovative, with threats ranging from standard pipe bombs to the large scale Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) as seen in the Oklahoma City bombing. On the International front, terrorist groups like Al Qaida introduce the potential for complex IEDs, radio controlled devices, as well as the use of secondary devices used to kill bomb technicians. As a result, civilian bomb squads continue to have an increased need for robotics."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2005-03
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Marijuana and Methamphetamine Trafficking on Federal Lands Threat Assessment
This report provides an assessment of marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production occurring on and transportation through public federal lands. "Marijuana and methamphetamine production and transportation on federal lands, in addition to posing an overall threat, contribute to the threat of violence against law enforcement and private individuals. According to USDA Forest Service and DOI reporting, cannabis cultivators and methamphetamine producers on federal lands often are armed, and cannabis grow sites and methamphetamine laboratories frequently are booby-trapped. Law enforcement officers have seized shotguns, handguns, automatic weapons, pipe bombs, grenades, and night vision equipment from drug producers and smugglers on federal lands. For instance, USDA Forest Service reporting indicates that the number of firearms seized on Forest Service lands during drug enforcement actions increased from 294 in 2002 to 346 in 2003."
National Drug Intelligence Center (U.S.)
2005-02
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SAVER Highlight: Standardized Pipe Bomb Test Methodology [December 2004]
"The U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center is establishing a Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) NIJ standard for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). As part of the initial research, Battelle Memorial Institute was contracted to provide a 'Report of standardized pipe bomb test methodology to include statistical background information and rationale for test methodology to include materials, charge, initiators, distances, etc.' The report also provides a recommended pipe bomb and combustible threat to evaluate the PPE."
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER); United States. Department of Homeland Security
2004-12
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Better Bomb Containment: To Build or Not to Build
"Most containment vessels used by bomb squads to transport explosive devices are large, heavy, and expensive. Cost and size limit their availability, making them few and far between. For many jurisdictions, they are a pooled resource. But, if you thought that smaller, less expensive containment vessels"ones that every bomb squad could afford"would be a priority for State and local bomb squads, you would be wrong. In the late 1990s, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded the development of an affordable, portable containment vessel designed for pipe bombs because they are the most prevalent type of explosive devices faced by bomb squads. The prototype containment vessel, however, failed when it was tested by the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)"Rocky Mountain in Denver, Colorado, which serves as NIJs 'Bomb Center,' assisting in the identification of bomb squad technology requirements and supporting the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB)."
National Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology Center (U.S.)
2005
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Containment Devices for Small Terrorist Bombs for Law Enforcement, Final Report
"Jaycor, under NIJ Contract No. 97-DT-CX-K001, has designed, built and tested a lightweight, relatively low cost, blast resistant container for bomb squads to store and transport pipe bombs containing at least 1 lb of black powder explosive. The Jaycor container is designed to augment the present bomb containment vessels. The present method of protecting against a suspected bomb, once it has been discovered and cannot be disarmed, is to place it in a steel container for detonation. The majority of these containers are vented at the top, where the detonation gases and fragments are directed upward in the air. There are several disadvantages of the present containers. They are expensive: with the total containment vessel costing one-half a million dollars. The raining down of the fragments from the vented containers could prove hazardous in populated areas. The containers are extremely heavy, with the vented and total containment vessels weighing 5000 lb and 8000 lb respectively, necessitating their transport to the bomb site by a heavy truck. Furthermore, bomb disposal in enclosed areas, such as airport terminals, with these vessels is problematic due to the difficulty in transporting them."
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
Klein, H.H.; Vander Vorst, M.H.
2001-08-08
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Guide for Explosion and Bombing Scene Investigation: Research Report
"The principal purpose of this Guide is to provide an investigative outline of the tasks that should be considered at every explosion scene. They will ensure that proper procedures are used to locate, identify, collect, and preserve valuable evidence so that it can be examined to produce the most useful and effective information--best practices. This Guide was designed to apply to explosion and bombing scene investigations, from highly complex and visible cases, such as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to those that attract less attention and fewer resources but may be just as complex for the investigator. Any guide addressing investigative procedures must ensure that each contributor of evidence to the forensic laboratory system is served by the guide and that quality examinations will be rendered. Consistent collection of quality evidence in bombing cases will result in more successful investigations and prosecutions of bombing cases. While this Guide can be useful to agencies in developing their own procedures, the procedures included here may not be deemed applicable in every circumstance or jurisdiction, nor are they intended to be all-inclusive. The most common types of explosive/incendiary devices encountered by fire service and law enforcement personnel in the United States are traditionally pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, and other improvised explosive/incendiary devices. The most common explosive materials used in these devices are flammable liquids and black and smokeless powder. This guide contains: a principle citing the rationale for performing the task; a procedure for performing the task; and a summary outlining the principle and procedure."
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
2000-06
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Terrorism in the United States 1996
"United States soil was the site of three terrorist incidents during 1996. The pipe bomb explosion during the Summer Olympic Games in Centennial Olympic Park that killed two and the robberies and bombings carried out in April and July 1996 by members of a group known as the Phineas Priesthood underscored the ever-present threat that exists from individuals determined to use violence to advance particular causes. The FBI successfully prevented five planned acts of domestic terrorism in 1996. These preventions thwarted attacks on law enforcement officials, prevented planned bombings of federal buildings, and halted plots to destroy domestic infrastructure. The explosion of TWA Flight 800 over the Atlantic Ocean near Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, resulted in initial speculation that a terrorist attack may have been the cause and served to highlight the potential danger terrorists pose to U.S. civil aviation. The FBI, along with the National Transportation Safety Board, devoted significant resources to the criminal investigation throughout 1996. Evidence did not implicate a criminal or terrorist act by year's-end."
United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
1996
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Bomb Threats Stand-Off Chart
This chart offers information about how far to stand away from a Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat. Threats include pipe bombs, suicide bombers, briefcase, car, semi-trailer, etc. "It is important to note that the given distances do not guarantee safety, they are estimates based on test data and the area near and around the evacuation distances are still potentially dangerous. Minimum evacuation distance is the range at which a life-threatening injury from blast or fragmentation hazards is unlikely. However, non-life-threatening injury or temporary hearing loss may occur."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
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LLIS Lesson Learned: Large-Scale Building Collapse: Replacement Protective Gear for Emergency Responders
"On April 19, 1995, a massive terrorist bomb ripped through the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, collapsing major portions of the structure. The resulting collapse area was a dangerous mesh of wires, debris, piping, furniture, carpet, rebar, and concrete. Such collapse material was extremely abrasive and harsh on responders' protective clothing. Emergency responders working in the collapse area went through three sets of leather gloves within one shift and a pair of steel-toed boots within two to three shifts. Similarly, clothing and knee and elbow pads were frequently torn and ruined. In addition, rain and burst water pipes quickly soaked responders' clothing and increased the risk of fluid contamination, necessitating that the clothing be replaced often. Logistics personnel worked with nearby Tinker Air Force Base and the Oklahoma City community to acquire large quantities of replacement clothing, boots, gloves, protective padding, and other personal products. When responding to a large-scale building, IC [Incident Command] and logistics officers should recognize that protective gear must be regularly replaced throughout the search and rescue operation. Logistics personnel should coordinate with the military, local community, and others to ensure that replacement gear is readily accessible."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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