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• Harder Times, Softer Terms: Assessing the World Bank's New Sustainable Development Finance Policy Amidst the COVID Crisis

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  From the Introduction: "The World Bank's non-concessional borrowing policy (NCBP) for IDA [International Development Association] countries was introduced in 2006 following major rounds of debt relief and debt cancellation for a large subset of these countries through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. The aim of the NCBP was to preserve the gains for the debt relief recipients as part of a broader strategy of assistance focused on better debt monitoring and management of external borrowing. The World Bank now moves toward implementation of the successor to the NCBP in the form of a Sustainable Development Financing Policy (SDFP) in a much different context from 2006. At the time, global economic conditions were favorable, and the fiscal space and access to external credit (along with, arguably, the policy reforms implemented as part of debt relief conditionality) all served to spur significant and sustained economic gains for these countries. Importantly, the NCBP itself, which intended to restrict IDA country access to financing on non-concessional terms under certain circumstances, was rolled out amidst these favorable conditions for IDA countries and the global economy. That is, the policy was aimed at managing a generally favorable situation: increased access to a broader range of financing options for lower-income countries."

  Center for Global Development

  Morris, Scott

  2020-07
• The Fallacy of Attribution to Achieve Deterrence in Cyberspace

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  "The ability to determine the responsible party of a military attack and convince a would-be attacker that one has the ability to determine this culpability constitutes a key capability for nations wishing to deter aggression. However, within domain of cyberspace, a belligerent state, non-state and/or criminal actor can manipulate elements of the domain to shroud and/or maliciously redirect culpability elsewhere. In such an environment, is the basic premise of deterrence (threat of retaliation or denial of benefits to the attacker) still viable? This research paper will look at the problem of attribution from both a technical and national policy standpoint. Specifically, the research will briefly describe the technical problems challenging attribution and review some of the proposed solutions. Further, the research will examine the problem of attribution from a national policy standpoint to outline the potential policy solutions that could provide alternate solutions outside or in addition to the purely technical ones as well as highlight consequences of some of the proposed solutions.This paper argues that a central focus on attack attribution to enable a retaliatory response as a means to accomplish deterrence presents an untenable, unsustainable strategy. Cyberspace, unlike other domains of air, space, land and sea, provide the ability to recreate the domain at will to complicate an attackers ability to penetrate. This paper argues that old ideas of centralization and hardening for defense should give way to ideas of randomly moving cyber attack surfaces (logically defined vice physically defined) in order to rebalance the current asymmetry between attacker and defender. Transformative security in cyberspace can only take place when industrial age ideas are supplanted by modern information age ideas that exploit the strengths of the malleable cyber domain to ensure security. Defenders should turn the advantages that favor the offense on its head."

  Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College

  Johnson, Robert J.

  2015-04-01
• United States Policy and Budgeting for the Reserve Component

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  This study examines the Reserve Component of the United States, focusing on its composition, the Total Force Policy, the funding process and recent funding trends. Because of the increased use of the Reserves, it is important to understand the process of budgeting for the Reserves and how they have fared in the post-Cold War period of constrained resources. Analysis of past and current force policies, interviews with DoD PPBS personnel and research of DoD and congressional actions provided the basis for this study. Since 1989, the output delivered by the Reserve Component to the Total Force has increase by more than 1300 percent. During this period, inflation-adjusted funding for the Reserve Component has decreased by slightly more than 12 percent. Additional missions in peacekeeping, weapons of mass destruction support and space operations are contributing to the use of Reserves in peacetime. The research concludes that changes must occur to the Total Force Policy, assigned missions and funding to ensure that the Reserve Component remains a viable part of the Total Force in the future.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Zawislak, Edward L.

  2000-12
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [February 3, 2011]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The Bush Administration imposed sanctions on 20 occasions on various PRC 'entities' (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some 'serial proliferators.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-02-03
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [February 7, 2011]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-02-07
• Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th Congress [March 13, 2015]

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  "Economists have gained notoriety for their differences of opinion on a variety of policy issues. Notable examples include the long-term economic effects of large, permanent tax cuts; the impact of illegal immigration on domestic wages; and the best way to achieve price stability, full employment, and greater income equality. But on the issues of the impact of technological innovation on economic growth in the long run and the proper role of government in the development of new technologies, there is relatively little dissent among practitioners of what is known as the dismal science. In general, economists agree that technological innovation has accounted for a major share of long-term growth in real per-capita income in the United States.[…] The federal government supports research and development (R&D) in a variety of ways. Direct support comes mainly in the form of research performed by federal agencies and federal grants for basic and applied research and development intended to support concrete policy goals, such as protecting the natural environment, exploring outer space, advancing the treatment of deadly diseases, and strengthening the national defense. Indirect support is more diffuse. The chief sources are federal funding of higher education in engineering and the natural sciences, legal protection of intellectual property rights, special allowances under antitrust law for joint research ventures, and tax incentives for business R&D investment. [...] This report examines the current status of the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit, describes its legislative history, discusses some important policy issues raised by it, and identifies legislative proposals in the 113th Congress to extend or otherwise modify the credit. It will be updated to reflect significant legislative activity and other developments affecting the credit's status."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Guenther, Gary L.

  2015-03-13
• Serial No. 112-97:2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, November 3, 2011

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  From the opening statement of Steve Chabot: "One week ago the House Committee on Foreign Affairs heard the testimony of Secretary of State Clinton on the administration's policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the details continue to change, the fundamental underlying policy remains the same, and it is driven by one key objective, withdrawal [from Afghanistan] by the end of 2014. Unfortunately, although the 2014 withdrawal date may be politically expedient, it is, in my view, strategically risky. The counterinsurgency strategy that President Obama announced at West Point in December 2009 depends on two key objectives, providing population centric security to create the space for governance, and an enduring commitment to fighting the insurgents to ensure that there is no doubt that they will ultimately lose. Both of these are determined by setting and, more importantly, stating a withdrawal date. If Afghans and regional actors do not believe we are committed to their safety, then they are likely to accommodate insurgents in an attempt to hedge their bets in advance of our anticipated departure. Similarly, if the insurgents believe that we will depart by a certain date, they will likely be confident in their ultimate victory. This last point is especially important. Reconciliation, which is the administration's current means of bridging the gap between the status quo and the 2014 withdrawal date, is, if at all possible, only so if the insurgents face certain defeat." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Zalmay Khalilzad, David W. Barno, Ashley J. Tellis, and C. Christine Fair. Each document discusses the various pros and cons of the current U.S. policy in regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2011
• Department of Defense Instruction Number 3150.09: The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy [Incorporating Change 1, August 17, 2009]

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  This Department of Defense Instruction, Incorporating Change 1,on August 17, 2009:"(b) Assigns responsibilities for the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy. (c) Establishes processes for ensuring the survivability of CBRN mission-critical systems in a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) environment or a nuclear environment. (d) Describes how CBRN mission-critical systems will be identified, reviewed, and considered in the context of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Reference (f)), the Defense Acquisition System (References (c) and (d)), the Missile Defense Agency System Engineering Plan (Reference (j)), or the National Security Space Acquisition Policy (Reference (k)), as appropriate. (e) Provides definitions of decontaminability, hardness, compatibility, and decontamination (see Glossary). (f) Aligns with the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Reference (g) to identify mission-critical systems. (g) Requires Military Departments and the Missile Defense Agency to report annually on CBRN survivability compliance, proposed corrective actions, and funding plans. (h) Establishes the CBRN Survivability Oversight Group (CSOG). The purpose of CSOG is to review and monitor the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2009-08-17
• Department of Defense Instruction Number 3150.09: The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy

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  "This Instruction: […](b) Assigns responsibilities for the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy. (c) Establishes processes for ensuring the survivability of CBRN mission-critical systems in a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) environment or a nuclear environment. (d) Describes how CBRN mission-critical systems will be identified, reviewed, and considered in the context of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Reference (f)), the Defense Acquisition System (References (c) and (d)), the Missile Defense Agency System Engineering Plan (Reference (j)), or the National Security Space Acquisition Policy (Reference (k)), as appropriate. (e) Provides definitions of decontaminability, hardness, compatibility, and decontamination (see Glossary). (f) Aligns with the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Reference (g) to identify mission-critical systems. (g) Requires Military Departments and the Missile Defense Agency to report annually on CBRN survivability compliance, proposed corrective actions, and funding plans. (h) Establishes the CBRN Survivability Oversight Group (CSOG). The purpose of CSOG is to review and monitor the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2008-09-17
• Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, Sixth Edition

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  This sixth edition of "Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management" provides an update of the regulatory framework from the May 2003 "Department of Defense Directive 5000.1" and the "Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2" governing the defense acquisition system. In addition, information about the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System from the June 2003 Chairman of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01C" and information about the new Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process also are provided. Although the general format of the second edition has been retained, this version has been significantly revised to reflect the aforementioned acquisition management policies and procedures and the DoD 5000 documents. The handbook is designed to be both a comprehensive introduction to the world of defense systems acquisition management for the newcomer and a summary-level refresher for the practitioner who has been away from the business for a few years. It focuses on Department of Defense-wide management policies and procedures, not on the details of any specific defense system. Chapters discuss the role of the Congress, the Executive Branch, and Industry in Defense Acquisition; Authority for the Defense Acquisition System; Transformation of the Department of Defense, including joint vision, acquisition streamlining initiatives, major legislation, regulatory reform, and changes in emphasis; Program Management in Defense Acquisition; Department of Defense Acquisition Policy, including regulatory documents, decision support systems, acquisition categories, the space systems acquisition process, and the acquisition, technology, and logistics knowledge sharing system; Defense Acquisition Management - Key Personnel and Organizations; Determining Joint Warfighting Needs; the Acquisition Management Framework; and the Resource Allocation Process.

  Defense Acquisition University (U.S.). Press

  Cochrane, Charles B.

  2003-11-25
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [Updated August 2, 2006]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported to Congress, China remains a 'key supplier' of weapons technology, particularly missile or chemical technology. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2006-08-02
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [Updated August 23, 2007]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified reports to Congress by the intelligence community, China has been a 'key supplier' of weapons technology, particularly missile or chemical technology. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. On 19 occasions, the Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on 32 different PRC 'entities' (not the government) for transfers (related to missiles and chemical weapons) to Pakistan, Iran, or another country, including repeated sanctions on some serial proliferators."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2007-08-23
• FAA's Controller Scheduling Practices Can Impact Human Fatigue, Controller Performance, and Agency Costs

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  "Scientific research has shown that air traffic controller scheduling practices impact controller performance and aviation safety. Controllers generally work rotating schedules during which the start and stop times vary between day, evening, and night times. Reviews by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and FAA's Fatigue Risk Management (FRM) Work Group have shown that individuals working erratic schedules experience fatigue, which can negatively impact controller performance and safety. In response to a number of incidents of sleeping or unresponsive controllers in 2011, FAA took action to mitigate the impact of fatigue on controller performance by revising its controller scheduling policies. For example, the Agency increased the minimum rest periods between shifts, established a fatigue risk management system, and increased the number of controllers assigned to midnight shifts. In addition, FAA began to allow 'recuperative breaks' on overnight shifts to lessen the risk of fatigue experienced by working controllers. However, facility managers raised concerns about whether the new scheduling policies actually reduce fatigue. We could not determine the extent to which these new policies impact fatigue because FAA does not have metrics to measure the effect of its scheduling practices. In addition, fatigue research, which is still ongoing, may prompt additional revisions to FAA's scheduling practices to mitigate fatigue."

  United States. Federal Aviation Administration; United States. Department of Transportation. Office of Inspector General

  2013-08-27
• Stay and Defend: Is This Strategy Appropriate for Cambria?

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  "Recent attention to the Leave Early or Stay and Defend (LEOSAD) strategy pioneered by the Australian Fire Service created confusion for U. S. citizens in the proper reaction to evacuation orders during wildfires. This became a problem, for the fire department in Cambria, when residents began to question local emergency relocation and evacuation orders, citing reports of the successes of LEOSAD. Modern Shelter in Place (SIP) communities had also seen success in the Southern California area helping to further fuel controversy about the legitimacy of mandatory evacuation orders given during wildland fire campaigns. After the 2009 Black Saturday Fire claimed the lives of 173 citizens who had stayed to protect their homes; a shadow was cast on LEOSAD. What impact would this catastrophic fire have on the U.S. fire service and current SIP and mandatory evacuation strategies? Would LEOSAD and the SIP philosophies still be viewed as viable strategies and if they were, could they have any relevance to policy employed in Cambria? This work was an effort to contrast mandatory evacuation policy with LEOSAD and SIP procedures to develop standard policy for citizen life safety in Cambria, California. A descriptive style of research was used to answer the following questions: a) What home construction components are necessary to survive a wildland fire? b) What type of defensible space and local topography are necessary for a home to survive wildfire? c) What training and physical capability does a homeowner need to be capable to defend their property? d) Are there any other specific local considerations that could impact on a homeowner's decision to stay and defend their home in Cambria?"

  National Fire Academy

  Miller, Mark P.

  2009-11
• Climate Change Research: Agencies Have Data-Sharing Policies but Could Do More to Enhance the Availability of Data from Federally Funded Research, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "Much of the nearly $2 billion annual climate change research budget supports grants from the Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and National Science Foundation (NSF). Some of the data generated by this research are stored in online archives, but much remains in a less accessible format with individual researchers. As a result, some researchers are concerned about the availability of data. GAO analyzed (1) the key issues that data-sharing policies should address; (2) the data-sharing requirements, policies, and practices for external climate change researchers funded by DOE, NASA, NOAA, and NSF; and (3) the extent to which these agencies foster data sharing. GAO examined requirements, policies, and practices and surveyed the 64 officials managing climate change grants at these agencies. GAO recommends the agencies explore opportunities in the grants process to better ensure the availability of data to other researchers and determine if additional archiving strategies are warranted. In commenting on a draft of this report, the four agencies generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. We incorporated technical clarifications as appropriate."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2007-09
• Science & Technology Highlights in the First Year of the Trump Administration

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  "Since President Trump's inauguration, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has built a robust team of over 50 staff members, including a corps of scientists and engineers, policymakers, and academics to advise the President on science and technology (S&T), support the President's agenda, and ensure that S&T efforts across the Executive Branch are effectively coordinated. OSTP policy advisors are providing expert advice and developing policies on a wide range of topics, including advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, cybersecurity, digital economy, disaster preparedness, healthcare, infectious diseases, information technology, medicine, nano-technology, nuclear energy, ocean science, quantum information sciences, space and aeronautics, and telecommunications, among others. The Trump Administration is committed to advancing technological development and conducting re-search and development (R&D) to ensure national security, grow the economy, create well-paying jobs, and improve the lives of Americans across this great nation. Over the past year, OSTP has led coordinated Administration efforts to promote emerging technologies, empower Americans to innovate, and defend American technologies abroad."

  United States. Executive Office of the President; United States. Office of Science and Technology Policy

  2018-03-07?
• U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue: Phase VII Report

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  "In early June, 2012, eight Chinese participants, including high-ranking Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, met with twenty-five Americans (a mix of officials and researchers) to discuss bilateral nuclear issues at an unofficial meeting. This dialogue, funded by DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction Agency], has been held annually for the past seven years. The Chinese delegation was the most official ever received in Hawaii, and the participants actively engaged in the discussions. The delegation included active duty military officers, retired officers, think tank researchers, academic faculty, and a space security expert. Our Chinese institutional co-host from the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) emphasized that these dialogues (in Hawaii and a parallel annual meeting in Beijing) are valued in Beijing and feed into the Track I process on their side both through their Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of National Defense (MND). The overall tone was positive and substantive. Boilerplate concerns about U.S. policy in the region were kept to a minimum, although China continues to express concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs and conventional strike capabilities. China's 'no-first-use' (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy served as backdrop for some of the discussion, constraining engagement with some issues, and illustrating the depth to which that policy shapes even well-connected official perceptions. Chinese participants displayed increasing confidence in their second strike capabilities and reiterated that their view of deterrence requires a very modest number of warheads." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Glosny, Michael A.; Twomey, Christopher P.; Jacobs, Ryan

  2013-05
• Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's, Hearings Before The Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of The Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, March 11, 13, 18, 19, 24, and 26, 1969

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  This is the March 11, 13, 18, 19, 24, and 26, 1969 hearings titled "Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's" held before the House Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. From the opening statement of Clement J . Zablocki: "The subcommittee will come to order. With this session today, the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments begins hearings on a subject of vital interest and importance to all who are dedicated to the cause of peace. For the next 3 weeks--and beyond, we will be giving long overdue attention to the effects of space and weapons developments on U.S. alliances and security commitments abroad." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Charles M. Herafeld, Jerome B. Wiesner, George B. Kistiakowsky, Harold A. Linstone, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Eugene V. Rostow, Mason Willrich, Vincent P. Rock, U. Alexis Johnson, and Warren Nutter.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1969
• Coronavirus Crisis: Economic Policy Recommendations

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  From the Document: "Israel is not far from a complete lockdown. The policy, driven at the urging of the health system in an effort to contain the spread of the coronavirus, comes with increasing economic and social costs. As a result of the crisis, some 900,000 people have joined the ranks of the unemployed (including unpaid leave) and the numbers are increasing. At this time, with health authorities unable to predict when the pandemic will peak, there is a need for a cautious and integrated public health- economic policy that will allow a continued fight against the coronavirus while maintaining the socio-economic fabric in Israel, minimizing harm to the economy, providing economic breathing space over a period of time, and ensuring the ability to resume rapid economic growth once the crisis comes to an end. Therefore, continued lockdown measures should be weighed on a cost-efficiency basis that will take into account both short and long term economic aspects. The proposed measures, including differential testing, financial support enabling social distancing, and plans for when this policy is eased can significantly reduce the cost of the crisis to the state, maintain economic and social stability, and assist in creating a sound exit strategy. This paper is part of a broad study focusing on efforts to balance public health considerations with economic and social considerations in dealing with the crisis and conceptualizing the next phase: life with the coronavirus."

  Institute for National Security Studies

  Even, Shmuel; Eckstein, Zvi; Hadad, Sasson . . .

  2020-04-01
• Department of Defense Instruction 1035.01: Telework Policy, April 4, 2012

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  "1. PURPOSE. In accordance with the authority in DoD [Department of Defense] Directive 5124.02 (Reference (a)), this Instruction: a. Reissues DoD Instruction 1035.01 (Reference (b)). b. Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for implementing DoD telework programs. c. Implements the provisions of sections 6501 through 6506 of title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), as added by Public Law 111-292 (also known as the 'Telework Enhancement Act of 2010') (Reference (c)); section 359 of Public Law 106-346 (Reference (d)); and sections 101 and 206 of title 37, U.S.C. (Reference (e)). 2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to: a. OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the 'DoD Components'). b. Employees (as defined in the Glossary) and Service members where indicated in the Instruction and at the discretion of the Heads of the OSD and DoD Components. […] 4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that telework shall be: a. Actively promoted and implemented throughout the DoD in support of the DoD commitment to workforce efficiency, emergency preparedness, and quality of life. Telework facilitates the accomplishment of work; can serve as an effective recruitment and retention strategy; enhance DoD efforts to employ and accommodate people with disabilities; and create cost savings by decreasing the need for office space and parking facilities, and by reducing transportation costs, including costs associated with payment of transit subsidies."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2012-04-04
• No Nation is Home Alone: Understanding the International Dimension of Homeland Security Through Global Transportation Security Programs

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  From the thesis abstract: "Terrorist actors focus on the global transportation system to introduce threats and target attacks. As the lead department for securing the transportation system into the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works both domestically and internationally to implement programs and foreign assistance activities to secure the global transportation network. This thesis examines DHS' international role by analyzing programs and policies implemented by its three largest global transportation agencies: the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Due to the breadth of DHS programs and activities, their stated goals and objectives, and their legal mandates, this thesis determines that a U.S. foreign assistance framework provides minimal insight into DHS' international footprint. Instead, this research developed a simple model for understanding the primary components of DHS' international mission space and identified operations, policy, outreach and engagement, and training and technical assistance as core concepts in DHS' international mission. Using this model, DHS can pursue the additional recommendations developed in this thesis-applying systems theory as a basis for an international transportation security strategy as well as pursuing direct funding for its international transportation programs and activities as a fully integrated department-within the traditional U.S. foreign policy and national security institutions."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

  Tarpey, Dominique

  2016-03
• Can This Time Be Different? Challenges and Opportunities for Asia-Pacific Economies in the Aftermath of COVID-19

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  From the Summary: "'Asia and the Pacific is facing its worst economic contraction at least since the 1970s due to the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic. The consequent economic weakness is likely to set back the region's socioeconomic progress and is predicted to push a significant number of people into unemployment and poverty while increasing inequality. Although slowdown in economic activities has provided some breathing space to the environment, such a benefit could turn out to be temporary. The region faces a difficult path to recovery, due to deepened existing vulnerabilities that include weak economic conditions and other exogenous shocks. These challenging times call for unprecedented relief and stimulus policies and offer an opportunity for countries to align their socio-economic policies with the 2030 Agenda to ensure a more inclusive, greener and more resilient future. Such policies include increasing investments in Sustainable Development Goals and strengthening governance to improve investment efficiency. Climate resilience should be built into investment projects. Regulatory changes could catalyze such efforts to 'build forward better'. Partnership with local, national and international stakeholders is critical for Governments to support this development transition.'"

  United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

  Saxena, Sweta Chaman; Huang, Zhenqian

  2020-08-10?
• Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Space

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  The U.S space industry is in a major transition from being a child of the Cold War to becoming an adolescent commercial industry. Industry growth continued this year, but the unbridled enthusiasm of the previous few years has been undermined by significant financial, technical, and policy failures affecting the entire industry. The industry faces many challenges, largely due to a significant industrial overcapacity fueled by the excessive optimism of the past decade. The key government role is to provide strategic leadership and to establish effective policies that balance the needs of the emerging commercial sector with those of national security. Issues such as export licensing, data distribution, spectrum allocation, and research and development investment decisions require thoughtful and expert government attention to move the industry from its historical Cold War roots to a viable commercial entity capable of competing in an increasingly globalized market.

  Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)

  2000
• Cybersecurity Roadmap for the United States

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  "The world has become irrevocably dependent on the convenience, access, and empowerment of the cyber world. Wireless internet, cell phones, satellite communications, and networked infrastructure allow the transfer, storage, and dissemination of massive amounts of data and touch all aspects of the economic, political, and military world. This unprecedented capability to connect a globalized world carries significant risk and opportunity for cyber criminals, spies, and state or non-state adversaries to exploit cybersecurity weaknesses for their own gain. This paper frames the discussion of cybersecurity by outlining current US policies and argues a successful national cybersecurity effort must emphasize clear prioritization and delegation of responsibilities, must leverage existing US cyber centers of excellence, and should take advantage of lessons-learned from US space policy."

  Air University (U.S.). Air War College

  Cole, Anthony R.

  2010-04
• Air Sovereignty Alert Operations, Hearing Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, April 22, 2009

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  From the opening statement of J. Randy Forbes: "Today's hearing focuses on the policy and resourcing shortcomings between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Air Force and the Air National Guard. But I know, Mr. Chairman, that we both agree that NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) also play a critical role in the execution of the air sovereignty alert mission. As we go through the course of the hearing today, we may find that we will also need to have a direct discussion about the air sovereignty mission with them as well." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J. Randy Forbes, Ranking Member; Solomon P. Ortiz, Chairman; Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Homeland Defense and Emerging Threats and Warfare, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Daniel J. Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, United States Air Force; Peter F. Verga, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Integration and Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense; Harry M. Wyatt, Director, U.S. Air National Guard.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2010
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Effects of Rules Committee Print 116-27, the Homeland Security Improvement Act of 2019, as Reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security, with Modifications

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  From the Document: "Rules Committee Print 116-27, a modified version of the text of H.R. 2203, as reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security, would make several changes to immigration policy and to the operations and oversight of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Among those changes, section 208 of the bill would terminate DHS's Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection's policy of limiting the number of prospective asylum applicants who may cross the international border based on the space available at the port of entry (known as metering). Ending MPP and metering would allow more aliens (non-U.S. nationals) who have expressed a fear of returning to their country of nationality to enter the United States while awaiting removal proceedings before an immigration judge. It is at such proceedings that affected aliens have the opportunity to seek relief from removal."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2019-09-24
• 2008 Federal Radionavigation Plan

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  "The Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) reflects the official radionavigation policy and planning for the Federal Government. The FRP covers both terrestrial and space-based, common-use, Federally operated radionavigation systems. These systems are sometimes used in combination with each other or with other systems. Systems used exclusively by the military are covered in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan (MPNTP). The plan does not include systems that mainly perform surveillance and communication functions. The policies and operating plans described in this document cover the following radionavigation systems: 1. Global Positioning System (GPS) 2. Augmentations to GPS 3. Long Range Navigation (Loran) 4. Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni-directional Range (VOR) 5. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 6. Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) 7. Instrument Landing System (ILS) 8. Microwave Landing System (MLS); Aeronautical Nondirectional Radiobeacons (NDB)."

  United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of Transportation; United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2008
• Enhancing U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping

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  "As the United States establishes its strategic priorities to enhance national security, support for peacekeeping is increasingly important. Particularly following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon has viewed failed states (also referred to as 'undergoverned' or 'ungoverned spaces') as a threat to U.S. national security. President Barack Obama's restoration of the Cabinet status of his Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Susan Rice, reflects the administration's recognition of the overall importance of the UN, including its key role in peacekeeping. Over the last 4 years, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and, since 2008, the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University have hosted a unique series of offsite informal discussions designed to facilitate open and frank discussions of what more the United States might do to support burgeoning UN peacekeeping activities. In five sessions, these offthe- record, informal discussions occurred between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Department of Defense (DOD).1 The Department of Field Support (DFS) was added following its creation in 2007, and the State Department began participating at a senior level in 2009. This series was conceived by Hans Binnendijk, director of the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University, and led by Dr. Binnendijk and me. Ambassador James Dobbins, director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, has served as session moderator."

  National Defense University Press

  Soderberg, Nancy

  2011-03
• Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy [January 10, 2011]

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  "As a participant in several international agreements on climate change, the United States has joined with other nations to express concern about climate change. However, at the national level the United States has not yet developed a comprehensive climate change policy. In the absence of a comprehensive policy direction, technological advances are creating alternatives to the traditional approaches to climate change (mitigation and adaptation). If deployed, these new technologies could modify the Earth's climate on a large scale. Moreover, these new technologies may become available to foreign governments and entities in the private sector to use unilaterally--without authorization from the United States government or an international treaty. The term 'geoengineering' describes this array of technologies that aim, through large-scale and deliberate modifications of the Earth's energy balance, to reduce temperatures and counteract anthropogenic climate change. Most of these technologies are at the conceptual and research stages, and their effectiveness at reducing global temperatures has yet to be proven. Moreover, very few studies have been published that document the cost, environmental effects, sociopolitical impacts, and legal implications of geoengineering. If geoengineering technologies were to be deployed, they are expected to have the potential to cause significant transboundary effects. In general, geoengineering technologies are categorized as either a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) method or a solar radiation management (SRM) method. CDR methods address the warming effects of greenhouse gases by removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere. CDR methods include ocean fertilization, and carbon capture and sequestration. SRM methods address climate change by increasing the reflectivity of the Earth's atmosphere or surface. Aerosol injection and space-based reflectors are examples of SRM methods. SRM methods do not remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, but can be deployed faster with relatively immediate global cooling results compared to CDR methods."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bracmort, Kelsi; Barbour, Emily C.; Lattannzio, Richard K.

  2011-01-10
• Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges in Planning and Implementing the Transformation of the National Airspace System, by Susan A. Fleming, Acting Director, Physical Infrastructure, before the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

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  "The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The consensus of opinion is that the current aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. Recognizing the need for system transformation, in 2003 Congress authorized the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and requires the office to operate in conjunction with multiple federal agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these partner agencies to plan the transformation to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen): a fundamental redesign of the national airspace system. FAA will be largely responsible for implementing the policies and systems necessary for NextGen, while safely operating the current air traffic control system. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the progress that JPDO has made in planning NextGen and some challenges it continues to face and (2) the challenges that FAA faces transitioning to NextGen. GAO's statement is based on our recent reports as well as ongoing work, all of which has been conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2007-03-22