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Protecting America's High Ground: A Public-Private Response to Space Debris

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From the thesis Abstract: "The United States is reliant on the capabilities provided by satellite technology for nearly every facet of society. A sustained loss of satellite capabilities due to any service outages will have a significant negative impact on the nation's homeland security. The areas affected include communication, financial transactions, intelligence gathering, internet access, and weather surveillance. Existing domestic and international policy has been insufficient in managing debris growth. The removal of large debris from congested orbits through active debris removal (ADR) is now necessary to prevent future collision events that will damage or destroy operational satellites that may possibly render certain regions of space unusable for generations. To safeguard its satellites and critical services they provide to homeland security, the United States should develop a domestic debris removal program using the established public-private partnership model that NASA has leveraged over the previous 15 years. This model has reduced developments costs and risks of schedule delays, and also stimulates growth in the private space sector and creates additional tax revenues. Furthermore, the commercial sector possesses knowledge and experience in the field of on-orbit servicing, a field with similar technical challenges to debris removal that can provide a foundation for the development of ADR systems. The United States must begin remediation by partnering with the private sector."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

Repair, Christopher W.

2021-06
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 141, Space Weather Coordination Act

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From the Summary: "S. 141 would authorize the annual appropriation of $6 million over the 2019-2022 period for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to implement a pilot program to gather data on space weather. The legislation also would transfer the responsibility to coordinate inter-agency activities related to space weather from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to the National Space Council (NSC). CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing S. 141 would cost $23 million over the 2019-2023 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. Enacting S. 141 would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that enacting S. 141 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2029. S. 141 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)."

United States. Congressional Budget Office

2018-10-02
Invisible Insider Threat: The Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces

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From the Document: "A growing number of IC [Intelligence Community] employees rely on implanted medical devices-- insulin pumps, pacemakers, and the like--with embedded memory and data processing, communication, and adaptive capabilities that pose a security threat to the community's secure workspaces. Because the technology in these smart devices has far outpaced current security directives, new security-in-depth technical and policy mitigations are needed to support the use of medically critical technology while safeguarding the IC's secure spaces. This 'Research Short' addresses the question: Does the IC need to update policies aimed at mitigating the risks associated with the presence in secure IC workspaces of implanted medical devices (IMDs), such as pacemakers, insulin pumps, cochlear implants, and neurostimulators? These devices are permanently or semi-permanently inserted to replace or assist bodily functions and maintain patient health, which makes them nearly impossible to remove, disable, or pause while in a secure facility. IMDs increasingly include smart features enabling them to connect wirelessly to external equipment so patients and physicians can monitor their effectiveness in real time. Although this wireless connectivity clearly provides critical health benefits for IC employees, it also creates an unwitting insider threat to national security. Introducing smart IMDs into secure spaces increases the likelihood that users unknowingly release protected information to unauthorized, external entities--the most pervasive being a user's GPS [Global Positioning System]-derived presence in a secure facility. Two-way communications (e.g., Bluetooth) and voice-activated user interaction present even greater risks to classified information. Current IC security policies are largely unprepared to address the unavoidable risks posed by these devices."

National Intelligence University (U.S.)

Chen, Zoe; O'Donnell, Paul; Ottman, Eric . . .

2020-07-16
Executive Order 13906: Amending Executive Order 13803--Reviving the National Space Council

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From the Document: "Section 2(b) of Executive Order 13803 of June 30, 2017 (Reviving the National Space Council) is hereby amended to read as follows: ''(b) The Council shall be composed of the following members: (i) The Vice President, who shall be Chair of the Council; (ii) The Secretary of State; (iii) The Secretary of Defense; (iv) The Secretary of Commerce; (v) The Secretary of Transportation; (vi) The Secretary of Energy; (vii) The Secretary of Homeland Security; (viii) The Director of National Intelligence; (ix) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (x) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (xi) The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; (xii) The Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy; (xiii) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; (xiv) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; (xv) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (xvi) The heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) and other senior officials within the Executive Office of the President, as determined by the Chair.'' [...] The first sentence of section 4(c) of Executive Order 13803 is hereby revoked. [...] (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations."

United States. Office of the Federal Register

Trump, Donald, 1946-

2020-02-13
China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy- Actions and Chronology [Updated January 11, 2002]

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"Congress has been concerned about whether U.S. firms, in exporting satellites, provided expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile and space programs and whether the Administration's policies might facilitate transfers of military-related technology to China. This CRS Report discusses security concerns, policy changes, congressional action, and a chronology of major developments since 1988. Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the Clinton Administration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving the licensing authority from the State Department to Commerce in 1996. A range of concerns were prompted by 'New York Times' reports in April 1998 that the Justice Department began a criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corp. violated export control laws. The companies are said to have provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of its future ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedly found that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Justice Department have also investigated Hughes' review of China's launch failure on January 26, 1995. Congress may watch for any new Presidential waivers or licenses for exports of satellites and any review of U.S. policy to export satellites to China."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Kan, Shirley

2002-01-11
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): Satellite Task Force Report Fact Sheet

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"In January 2003, the Director, National Security Space Architect, requested that the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) consider embarking on a study of infrastructure protection measures for commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) systems. The NSTAC established the Satellite Task Force (STF) to review and assess policies, practices, and procedures for the application of infrastructure protection measures to commercial SATCOM networks used for national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Specifically, the STF was established to review applicable documentation addressing vulnerabilities in the commercial satellite infrastructure, identify potential policy changes that would bring the infrastructure into conformance with a standard for mitigating those vulnerabilities, consider Global Positioning System (GPS) timing capabilities during the deliberations, coordinate this response with representatives from the National Communications System (NCS) and others, and draft a task force report with findings and recommendations. The STF engaged broad and active participation from representatives of NSTAC member companies, non-NSTAC commercial satellite owners and operators, commercial satellite trade associations, Government agencies, and technical experts. The task force examined all types of commercial SATCOM systems, including Fixed Satellite Service, Broadcast Satellite Service, Mobile Satellite Service, and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service. To gain a broad understanding of vulnerabilities, the STF compared the difficulty of potential threats against the degree of susceptibility of key elements in these services, including the radio frequency links, ground segment, cyber segment, and space segment."

United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee

2004-02
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Satellite Taskforce Report, Fact Sheet [February 2004]

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This fact sheet from the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee discusses the issues surrounding infrastructure protection for commercial satellite communications (SATCOM systems. "In January 2003, the Director, National Security Space Architect, requested that the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) consider embarking on a study of infrastructure protection measures for commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) systems. The NSTAC established the Satellite Task Force (STF) to review and assess policies, practices, and procedures for the application of infrastructure protection measures to commercial SATCOM networks used for national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Specifically, the STF was established to (1) review applicable documentation addressing vulnerabilities in the commercial satellite infrastructure, (2) identify potential policy changes that would bring the infrastructure into conformance with a standard for mitigating those vulnerabilities, (3) consider Global Positioning System (GPS) timing capabilities during the deliberations, (4) coordinate this response with representatives from the National Communications System (NCS) and others, and (5) draft a task force report with findings and recommendations. The STF engaged broad and active participation from representatives of NSTAC member companies, non-NSTAC commercial satellite owners and operators, commercial satellite trade associations, Government agencies, and technical experts. The task force examined all types of commercial SATCOM systems, including Fixed Satellite Service, Broadcast Satellite Service, Mobile Satellite Service, and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service. To gain a broad understanding of vulnerabilities, the STF compared the difficulty of potential threats against the degree of susceptibility of key elements in these services, including the radio frequency links, ground segment, cyber segment, and space segment."

United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee

2004-02
Rapid Space Force Reconstitution: 'Mandate for United States Security'

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"Radical changes in global political and military balances have occurred in the last five years. In response to these changes, the United States defense strategy has moved away from planning for containment of a monolithic enemy and is moving toward flexible, rapid, regionally oriented response anywhere in the world. Although air, land, and sea power have begun alignment toward this goal, space-based military assets are not prepared for short-notice 'come as you are' contingencies that require rapidly deliverable forces. 'This paper argues that national security policy mandates the immediate development of a rapid space force reconstitution (RASFOR) capability.' The paper presents this argument on two levels: strategic, based on national policy documents, and operational, based on military force requirements for the near-term future. A RASFOR operational concept using rapid-response spacelift and light satellites (lightsats) is presented. After the mandate is established, a key question is addressed: 'If the mandate for RASFOR exists, why hasn't it been acted upon?' Based on these discussions, recommendations for implementing RASFOR are presented."

Air University (U.S.). Airpower Research Institute

Caton, Jeffrey L.

1994-12
Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, Statement of Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives

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"A catastrophic commercial launch accident could result in injuries or property damage to the uninvolved public, or 'third parties.' In anticipation of such an event, a launch company must purchase a fixed amount of insurance for each launch, per calculation by FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]; the federal government is potentially liable for claims above that amount up to an additional $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation, subject to congressional appropriations. As of 2012, the inflation-adjusted amount is about $2.7 billion. CSLA [Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988] provides for this payment, called indemnification. The indemnification provision, unless reauthorized, expires this year. This testimony provides preliminary information on, among other things, (1) a comparison of the U.S. government's indemnification policy to policies of other countries, (2) the federal government's potential costs for indemnification, (3) the ability and willingness of the insurance market to provide additional coverage, and (4) the effects of ending indemnification on the competitiveness of U.S. launch companies. This testimony is based on ongoing work that includes a review of FAA data and documents and relevant literature and interviews with officials from FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, insurers, brokers, launch companies, launch customers, risk modelers, and experts."

United States. General Accounting Office

2012-06-06
Law Enforcement and Technology: Using Social Media [January 11, 2022]

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From the Summary: "As the ways in which individuals interact continue to evolve, social media has had an increasing role in facilitating communication and the sharing of content online--including moderated and unmoderated, user-generated content. Over 70% of U.S. adults are estimated to have used social media in 2021. Law enforcement has also turned to social media to help in its operations. Broadly, law enforcement relies on social media as a tool for information sharing as well as for gathering information to assist in investigations. [...] At the federal level, there is no specific legislative framework that governs law enforcement use of social media. Rather, there are laws and policies governing law enforcement investigations and intelligence gathering broadly. Some observers, however, have questioned whether the nature of social media may place it in a qualitatively different category than law enforcement's use of other investigative tools and have suggested that there should be enhanced boundaries with respect to law enforcement operations in these online spaces. For instance, some have suggested that law enforcement agencies should have written, publicly available policies on their use of social media; they should obtain local government approval before using these online spaces; they should obtain judicial approval for conducting undercover operations using social media; there should be restrictions on law enforcement contacting minors via social media; and law enforcement's use of social media should be audited. Policymakers may consider these issues as they conduct oversight or debate legislation on law enforcement use of social media."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Finklea, Kristin

2022-01-11
Commercial Space Launches: FAA Should Update How it Assesses Federal Liability Risk, Report to Congressional Committees

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"A catastrophic commercial launch accident could result in injuries or property damage to the uninvolved public, or 'third parties.' In anticipation of such an event, a launch company must purchase a fixed amount of insurance for each launch and reentry, per calculation by FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]; the federal government is potentially liable for claims above that amount up to an additional $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation and subject to congressional appropriations. As of 2012, the inflation-adjusted amount is about $2.7 billion. CSLAA [Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988] provides for this payment, called indemnification. The indemnification provision, unless reauthorized, expires this year. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to address, among other things, (1) the U.S. government's indemnification policy compared to policies of other countries, (2) the federal government's potential costs for indemnification, (3) the ability and willingness of the insurance market to provide additional coverage, and (4) the effects of ending indemnification on the competitiveness of U.S. launch companies. GAO reviewed FAA data and documents and relevant literature and conducted interviews with officials from FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, insurers, brokers, launch companies, launch customers, risk modelers, and experts. GAO recommends that FAA periodically review and update as appropriate its methodology for calculating launch providers' insurance requirements. The Department of Transportation provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2012-07
Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan

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"While preventing independence likely remains the central aim of the PLA vis-a-vis Taiwan, Chinese foreign policy objectives worldwide are rapidly growing and diversifying. This volume analyzes the PLA's involvement in disaster and humanitarian relief, United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), counterterrorism and border defense, security in outer space and cyberspace, and the level of activity in regional 'joint' operational contingencies. On the whole, the volume provides a discerning analysis of these varied PLA developments and how they affect policy towards both Taiwan and the entire Asia-Pacific region. While the significance of China has long been understood, the nation's rise to prominence on the world scene is becoming more acutely felt. An understanding of the PLA's growing roles both within China and internationally is of critical importance to the United States." The contents include: Introduction by David Lai and Marc Miller; How China Manages Taiwan and Its Impact on PLA Missions by Andrew Scobell; How China Manages Internal Security Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions by Murray Scot Tanner; China's Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States by Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang; PLA Missions in Frontier Security and Counterterrorism by Robert O. Modarelli III; Strategic Deterrence beyond Taiwan by Brad Roberts; Prospects for China's Military Space Efforts by Dean Cheng; PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability by James Mulvenon; China's Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future Missions in the South and East China Seas by Mark Cozad; and PLA "Joint" Operational Contingencies in South Asia, Central Asia, and Korea by Larry M. Wortzel.

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

Scobell, Andrew; Lai, David, 1955-; Kamphausen, Roy

2009-04
China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S. Satellite Export Policy -Actions and Chronology [Updated October 6, 2003]

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"Congress has been concerned about whether U.S. firms, in activities connected with exporting satellites, provided expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile and space programs and whether U.S. policy has facilitated transfers of military-related technology to China. This CRS Report discusses security concerns, policy changes, congressional action, and a chronology of major developments since 1988 under President Reagan. It is updated as warranted. […] A range of concerns were prompted by New York Times reports in April 1998 that the Justice Department began a criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corp. violated export control laws. […] At least three classified studies reportedly found that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Executive Branch also investigated Hughes' review of China's launch failure of January 1995. […] In 1998, Congress passed the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) that transferred licensing authority over satellites back to the State Department (effective March 15, 1999). On December 30, 1998, the Cox Committee unanimously approved a classified report said to conclude that China's technology acquisitions over the past 20 years, not only that associated with satellite launches, harmed U.S. national security. […] Legislation for State Department appropriations for FY2004 (H.R. 2799 and S. 1585) would continue to require State to notify the Committees on Appropriations at least 15 days in advance of obligating or expending funds for processing licenses to export U.S.-origin satellites to China."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Kan, Shirley

2003-10-06
Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development Principles, Report to Congressional Addressees

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From the Document: "Leading companies take a disciplined approach to develop innovative products that satisfy their customers' needs, and to deliver them to market on time and within planned costs. The 13 leading companies GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] interviewed perform similar activities when developing new products, such as iterative design in hardware and software development. These activities in the development process align with the four key principles that help project teams deliver innovative products to market quickly and efficiently. GAO found that the department-wide acquisition policies of DOD, DHS, and NASA implement some key product development principles. But, they have yet to fully implement others. This gap limits agencies from ensuring a consistent approach to developing and delivering products with speed and efficiency. [...] GAO is making nine recommendations to DOD, DHS, and NASA to update acquisition policies to fully implement key principles of product development. All three agencies concurred with our recommendations."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2022-03
When the House is Full, but the Guests Keep Coming: Determining the Impact of Daily Hospital Overcrowding on Disaster Response

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From the thesis abstract: "Hospitals throughout the United States are facing overcrowding every day, with more patients than available staff and space can accommodate, yet current disaster response policy related to managing a surge of patients does not include considerations for this daily challenge. This thesis investigates the questions that need to be answered regarding the foundational principles of current U.S. surge policy and how healthcare coalitions might assist in answering such questions. A gap analysis of current healthcare coalition policy related to surge was completed that identified the need for policy makers to continue to expand the role of evidence-based decision making for surge policy. As a result, this thesis recommends that additional data points be added for hospitals receiving patients during the required annual coalition surge test-related performance measures for healthcare coalitions. The additional data points are designed to help policy makers determine whether overcrowding impacts surge response, so policy can be adjusted if needed."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

Menefee, Charity M.

2018-12
USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense

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"This policy updates the Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy issued in July 2008,which established the foundation for cooperation between the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The 2008 policy established civilian-military cooperation as fundamental to a whole-of-government approach to contemporary national security challenges in keeping with the increasingly important role of development in advancing national security priorities along with defense and diplomacy. This document builds upon the 2008 policy and incorporates what USAID has learned from working with DoD into updated and expanded guidance for all USAID personnel. Increasingly, USAID and DoD share the same operating space. In order to cooperate effectively in the diverse places where USAID and DoD personnel find each other, it is important to draw upon lessons from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and from cooperation in other countries and regions where we have worked together, including Colombia, the Philippines, the Balkans, and the Sahel. This policy document articulates a set of guiding principles to establish parameters for USAID cooperation with DoD and clarifies the context for that cooperation. These are followed by a set of operating principles, which articulate how that cooperation takes place in the form of cooperative structures and personnel exchanges and across USAID's Program Cycle, which includes policy and strategy development, planning, project design and implementation, evaluation and monitoring, and learning and adapting."

United States. Agency for International Development

2015-06
NMIO Technical Bulletin: National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office [October 2016]

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"In this issue of the National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office's Technical Bulletin, we discuss trends in Maritime Domain Awareness, and how policy and technology interact in developing a level of understanding that serves as the foundation for command. This article starts by briefly tracing the roots of our cooperation on the use of space for MDA [Maritime Domain Awareness] and reviewing important documents in the development of U.S. doctrine. From there, it concentrates on the very challenging concept of MDA as "the effective understanding" of maritime activity and the need that this generates for inter-agency, or inter-ministerial information sharing. Finally, it highlights a few recent developments that will influence the future of our use of space for MDA."

National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (U.S.)

2016-10
Task Force on Defense Strategies for Ensuring the Resilience of National Space Capabilities: Executive Summary

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"Since 2000, when the Defense Science Board concluded space superiority was absolutely essential in achieving global awareness, information dominance on the battlefield, deterrence of potential conflict and superiority combat effectiveness of our forces, and threats to space superiority have grown significantly. [...] From April 2015 through September 2016, the Task Force received more than 40 briefings from practitioners and senior officials throughout DoD, the intelligence community (IC), the commercial sector, academia, the national laboratories, and the policy community."

United States. Defense Science Board

2017-03
UAS in the NAS: Survey Responses by ATC, Manned Aircraft Pilots, and UAS Pilots

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"NASA currently is working with industry and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish future requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) flying in the National Airspace System (NAS). To work these issues NASA has established a multi-center 'UAS Integration in the NAS' project. In order to establish Ground Control Station requirements for UAS, the perspective of each of the major players in NAS operations was desired. Three on-line surveys were administered that focused on Air Traffic Controllers (ATC), pilots of manned aircraft, and pilots of UAS. Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with some survey respondents. The survey questions addressed UAS control, navigation, and communications from the perspective of small and large unmanned aircraft. Questions also addressed issues of UAS equipage, especially with regard to sense and avoid capabilities. From the civilian ATC and military ATC perspectives, of particular interest are how mixed operations (manned/UAS) have worked in the past and the role of aircraft equipage. Knowledge gained from this information is expected to assist the NASA UAS Integration in the NAS project in directing research foci thus assisting the FAA in the development of rules, regulations, and policies related to UAS in the NAS."

United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Trujillo, Anna C.; Burdette, Daniel W.; Constock, James R., Jr. . . .

2014-04
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues [June 15, 2012]

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"The purpose and scope of this CRS [Congressional Research Service] report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the issues in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. Although the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is a de facto, significant autonomous actor in the world. Today, 23 countries including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC). In what many consider to be a model democracy, Taiwan's 23 million people enjoy self-governance with free elections. In 2011, Taiwan was the 10th-largest U.S. trading partner and the 6th-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports. With active congressional involvement, the United States has played critical roles in Taiwan's economic development, political liberalization from an authoritarian dictatorship to a dynamic democracy, self-defense against the People's Republic of China (PRC's) military threats, and preservation of international space. Overall, U.S. policy seeks to support security, political, and economic interests that involve peace and stability, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's efforts to maintain international space, democracy and human rights in Taiwan, and U.S. businesses in Taiwan. As a critical concern, the United States has interests in the ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait, which affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. The cross-strait relationship has grown closer since the 1980s. When James Lilley arrived as the U.S. representative in Taipei in 1982, he was one of the first officials to encourage cross-strait economic ties as the driver in a trend toward greater peace and security. Indeed, closer economic engagement gradually has increased regular contacts and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Kan, Shirley; Morrison, Wayne M.

2012-06-15
DHS Headquarters Consolidation Project: Issues for Congress [September 11, 2013]

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From the Summary: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in early 2003, bringing together existing parts of 22 different federal agencies and departments in a new framework of operations. In its first few years, the department was reorganized multiple times, and more focus was given to ensuring its components were addressing the perceived threats facing the country rather than to addressing the new organization's management structure and headquarters needs. Therefore, the consolidation of physical infrastructure that one might expect in creating an operation of such size and breadth did not occur at that time. As the Coast Guard began to plan consolidating its leases on headquarters facilities into secure federally owned space, DHS was finding its original headquarters space at the Nebraska Avenue Complex too limited to meet its evolving needs. In 2006, the George W. Bush Administration proposed combining the two projects into one $3.45 billion headquarters consolidation project on the West Campus of St. Elizabeths Hospital in Anacostia. […] The purpose of this report is to outline the policy considerations to be evaluated in deciding whether to continue funding the consolidation of the remaining DHS headquarters functions at St. Elizabeths, and to explore some of the benefits and consequences of several possible ways forward."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Painter, William L.

2013-09-11
Draft Environmental Assessment: Mill Creek Defensible Space Project, Walla Walla County, Washington

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"Walla Walla County applied for fiscal year 2010 funding under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Pre-Disaster Mitigation--Competitive (PDM-C) grant program for a fuels reduction project in southeastern Washington. The objective of the PDM-C grant program is to fund pre-disaster mitigation planning and projects for States, Territories, and federally recognized Indian Tribes that primarily address natural hazards. The Mill Creek Defensible Space Project would include a total of 31 acres in the Mill Creek drainage in southeastern Walla Walla County (Appendix A, Figure 1). This Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations to implement NEPA (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Parts 1500- 1508), and FEMA's regulations implementing NEPA (44 CFR Part 10). FEMA is required to consider potential environmental impacts before funding or approving actions and projects. The purpose of this EA is to analyze the potential environmental impacts of the Mill Creek Defensible Space Project. FEMA will use the findings in this EA to determine whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). Much of the information about the project in this EA comes from the PDM-C grant application package."

United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

2011-05-25
Control of Hazardous Agents in VA Research Laboratories

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"This Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Handbook establishes policy and procedures related to select agents and toxins and the prevention and/or detection of terrorist events occurring in or originating from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) research laboratories. NOTE: The procedures contained in this Handbook apply to all Research and Development (R&D) laboratories located within VA facilities, including leased space, and to space within a VA facility leased to a private entity. VA research laboratories located in approved off-site facilities such as affiliate universities are expected to comply with all VA and other Federal laws and regulations regarding security of both research laboratory facilities and select agents and toxins."

United States. Department of Veterans Affairs

2005-10-21
U.S. Aerospace Industry: Progress in Implementing Aerospace Commission Recommendations, and Remaining Challenges, Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

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"The U.S. aerospace industry's wide-ranging activities- including commercial aviation, national security, and space exploration- make it critical to the economic health and strategic strength of our nation. However, the industry faces challenges, such as a national air traffic management system that, in its present form, cannot handle expected increases in demand; an aging aerospace workforce; and an increasingly competitive global market. In response to these and other challenges, Congress established the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry in 2001 to recommend potential actions by the federal government and others to support a robust aerospace industry in the 21st century. In 2002, the Commission made recommendations to address these challenges. This report discusses (1) the extent to which federal agencies have addressed selected Commission recommendations and (2) the challenges that remain in addressing the recommendations. Based on the opinions of former Commissioners and GAO research, GAO selected recommendations dealing with the national airspace system, space policy, government-wide management structure, international issues, the aerospace workforce, and research and development. This report is based on reviews of agency documents, literature, and interviews with aerospace experts and officials from relevant federal agencies."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2006-09
Implications of Sino-American Strategic Competition on Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Regional Order

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"Southeast Asia is a maritime crossroad and an arena of strategic great power interaction. The study of international politics after the Cold War has rediscovered the importance of regional interaction as the framework for understanding countries' security strategies and the great powers' impact on specific regions. A review of various theories, furthermore, reveals the revival of geopolitics in theoretical constructions and policy formulations. This thesis reviews United States-China relations as the independent variable. The U.S. grand strategy has been consistent since the first Bush administration, namely to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. The American instruments in pursuit of its strategy are derived from its nature as a maritime power. China is a continental power that is recently expanding seaward and reemerging as East Asia's indispensable power. China's success in promoting its vision of order in maritime Southeast Asia will potentially undermine America's influence. Southeast Asia's regional order, the dependent variable, is dynamic when viewed from its two dimensions: time and space. Time refers to historical cycles, while space refers to the diverse views in dealing with the major powers, i.e., regional autonomy, a balance of engagement among the great powers and, since the 1990s, stronger engagement only with Northeast Asia. This thesis argues that regional identity is the primary driver of Southeast Asia's strategy for regional order."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

McNary, Jeff

2003-12
Organizing, Training and Equipping Air Force Space Command Installations to Meet the Wildland and Urban Interface Threat

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"Several Air Force Space Command Fire Emergency Services organizations provided wildland fire protection services on their respective installations. The wildland fire threats varied from prairie-type grasslands to mountainous terrain with scrub oak to the Manzanita-covered, hilly terrain common in southern California. The challenge was to ensure that these Air Force Space Command installations had sufficient staffing, the appropriate levels of training and certification and the proper equipment to meet these threats. The problem was that there was no definitive Air Force guidance establishing an all-encompassing program to meet the wildland and urban interface problems faced by these installations. The purpose of this research is to identify who is best suited to receive manpower for wildland and urban interface issues, who should receive the required training to meet this threat and what process can be identified to ensure that the teams are properly equipped. To identify the most viable options, this research needed to determine (a) who was responsible for wildland and urban interface management; (b) who was responsible for combating both wildland and urban interface fires: (c) what training standards that needed to be met, and (d) what was the most economical process to properly staff and equip these teams. By using the descriptive research method, this research provided a clear path to properly organizing, training and equipping Fire Emergency Services organizations to meet these threats. Use of interviews, regulatory guidance reviews, planning documents and equipment allowance standards clearly pointed a way ahead for appropriate policy development."

National Fire Academy

Staub, John W.

2011-08?
Space, Cyberspace, and Strategic Stability in the Asia-Pacific [PASCC Research in Progress]

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"The Asia-Pacific is emerging as the world's most dynamic strategic environment with expanding geopolitical significance and military importance. Emerging strategic dynamics, such as space and cyberspace capabilities, have the potential to dramatically influence regional stability. This two-year project seeks to analyze the implications of reliance on space and cyber technologies for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific, including increasing pressure on traditional deterrence frameworks. This project will deepen understanding of the complex dynamics influencing strategic stability in the region and unlock new policy considerations to address in Asia. Through a better understanding of these issues, the United States will be in an improved position to manage growing threats in the region to its security and prosperity." This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict; National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)

Denmark, Abraham M.

2015-05
Information Control: Preserving the Advantage

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From the thesis abstract: "The world has changed, and so must the character of war. The US defense establishment remains rooted in a paradigm that emerged after the dissolution of its longterm rival, the Soviet Union. However, prevailing assumptions underscoring America's approach to power projection and employment are quickly losing their relevance. After the Cold War, the world witnessed mass proliferation and commercialization of information systems, creating complex (and man-made) information environments upon which US national security now wholly depends. Moreover, this reliance developed in a relatively permissive operational environment, raising expectations on the availability of information networks and subsequently shaping US defense policy, strategy, and doctrine. As the twenty-first century progresses, potential adversaries--having spent decades observing US operations--now have the capacity to neutralize US advantages, particularly through the denial or disruption of space and cyberspace networks, the backbone of information environments, or infospheres. If the United States intends to preserve its way of life and ability to project power in the twenty-first century, it must deliberately establish a comprehensive and prioritized information control strategy that serves as the foundation for a new way of warfare. To gain the advantage in tomorrow's war, an information control strategy should first focus on the identification and protection of the infospheres that enable national endeavors. By extension, adoption of integrated space and cyberspace control strategies (designed to secure freedom of access, maneuverability, and exploitation of the infospheres they form) sets the necessary condition for information control and preserves America's power in the twenty-first century."

Air University (U.S.). School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Beard, Casey M.

2015-06
Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, an Operational Challenge

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This report examines terrorist sanctuaries and the challenges they present for U.S. operations abroad. "Sanctuaries are a strategic reality and an operational challenge today more than ever. Sanctuaries or 'safe havens' exist in all regions and mediums to include space and cyber. 'Sanctuary'-that is to say, a secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure needed to support its activities-is central to the process of insurgency. It is from such sanctuaries that operations against the enemy are planned and launched. Theorist and practitioners such as T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Bin Laden to name a few have utilized sanctuaries. Twenty-first Century sanctuaries include cyber, offshore banking, space, and ideological. The operational challenge is daunting when neither joint nor service doctrine does not address the enemy's use of safe havens. In analysis, a paradigm shift must occur away from bottom-up tactical approach and include a joint and interagency top-down approach to develop a 'counter-sanctuary' strategy for the future. Enemies thrive in sanctuaries, the U.S. must address in strategy, policy and doctrine."

Army War College (U.S.)

Jamison, Marc

2008-03-15
Global Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?

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"Over the last several years, examination of U.S. national security interests within the context of the global commons has emerged as a major policy issue in the defense community. At the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), there is now an awareness that the U.S. military will be confronted by a host of challenges 'to stability throughout the global commons.' Furthermore, the Nation can 'expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments.' In response, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report has now assigned 'assured access' to the commons as a top priority for U.S. military forces. As defined by DOD, the global commons comprise the geographic and virtual realms of 'space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.' They are a subset of the broader maritime, aerospace, and cyber domains, deriving their existence from the notion of areas that are accessible to all but owned by none. The term global commons originated in the civilian sector, where it evolved as a collective label for the areas of 'Antarctica, the high seas and deep seabed minerals, the atmosphere, and space.' The rationale for combining these four physically distinct entities under the rubric of global commons stems from their shared attribute of being 'resource domains to which all nations have legal access.' Unifying them into the higher level construct known as the global commons provides the commercial and legal communities with a methodology for addressing cross-cutting issues among a diverse set of geographies."

National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

Redden, Mark E.; Hughes, Michael P.

2010-10

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