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Afghanistan Peace Efforts, Reflecting on Russia and Covid-19 Impact on Space [audio]
From the Webpage: "In this episode, ASPI's [Australian Strategic Policy Institute] Genevieve Feely speaks to Dr Sue Harris-Rimmer, Gender Policy Expert and Associate Professor at Griffith University Law School, about the Afghanistan peace process and why it's so important that women are represented and their rights protected in any agreement that is made Michael Shoebridge talks to Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb about the implications of Covid-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] for Russia, Vladimir Putin and Russia's relationship with China. Finally, Charlie Lyons Jones speaks to Dr Malcolm Davis about how Covid-19 is impacting the space industry, how space is the new arena for strategic competition and how space has enabled effective connectivity to deal with a workforce working remotely."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
2020-04-11?
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Losing the Population; the Impact of Coalition Policy and Tactics on the Population and the Iraqi Insurgency
"This paper examines the initial phases of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq and evaluates the impact of Coalition policy and tactics on the population and the Iraqi insurgency. The Coalition has faced unanticipated challenges and violence in Iraq for three primary reasons: First, an inability to provide security for the Iraqi population, second, the rapid collapse in Iraqi confidence in the Coalition, and finally, the availability of uncontested physical and information space for opposition mobilization. These three key developments occurred due to a mismatch between Coalition policies and tactics implemented in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein. At the macro level of analysis, Coalition policies and tactics are evaluated using criteria established by a first-hand authority on Arab revolt: T.E. Lawrence, who fostered revolt in Mesopotamia in WWI. At a more specific level of analysis, the author examines, through the lens of social movement theory, the creation and growth of opposition in Sunni areas, as well as the immediate threat posed by the Sadr II Movement. This paper concludes that the rapid decline of popular support for the Coalition between April and August 2003 emanated from Coalition policies and tactics that did not emphasize security for the population. In turn, these security policies created and enabled opportunities and space in which opposition to the Coalition could mobilize with relative impunity."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Haugh,Timothy D.
2005-09
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Macroeconomic Policy in the Time of COVID-19: A Primer for Developing Countries
From the Document: "'COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] not only represents a worldwide public health emergency but has become an international economic crisis that could surpass the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Right now, containment and mitigation measures are necessary to limit the spread of the virus and save lives. However, they come at a cost, as shutdowns imply reducing economic activity. These human and economic costs are likely to be larger for developing countries, which generally have lower health care capacity, larger informal sectors, shallower financial markets, less fiscal space, and poorer governance. Policy makers will need to weigh carefully the effectiveness and socioeconomic consequences of containment and mitigation policies, responding to epidemiological evidence on how the virus spreads and trying to avoid unintended consequences. Economic policy in the short term should be focused on providing emergency relief to vulnerable populations and affected businesses. The short-term goal is not to stimulate the economy--which is impossible, given the supply-restricting containment measures, but rather to avoid mass layoffs and bankruptcies. In the medium term, macroeconomic policy should turn to recovery measures, which typically involve monetary and fiscal stimulus. However, in many developing countries, stimulus may be less effective because monetary transmission is weak and fiscal space and fiscal multipliers are often small. A more viable goal for macroeconomic policy in developing countries is avoiding procyclicality, ensuring the continuity of public services for the economy, and supporting the vulnerable.'"
World Bank Group
Loayza, Norman V.; Pennings, Steven
2020-03-26
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CNSS Directive No. 510: Directive on the Use of Mobile Devices Within Secure Spaces, November 20, 2017
"[1.] The U.S. Government (USG) relies on mobile technologies to provide USG Departments and Agencies (D/As) increased productivity and mission flexibility. The introduction of mobile devices into secure spaces may pose risks to National Security Systems (NSS) and the information contained therein. D/As will take physical and technical security measures to mitigate these risks. [2.] This Directive provides a minimum set of requirements for the introduction and use of mobile devices in secure spaces. D/As may develop internal policies and procedures to supplement the requirements of this Directive to ensure the introduction of mobile devices into secure spaces does not adversely impact the security of NSS."
Committee on National Security Systems
2017-11-20
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In Brief: U.S. Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production: Background and Options [March 20, 2014]
"Congress is involved in the long-running and costly decision regarding the future production of 'pits'; a pit is a nuclear weapon's plutonium core. […] U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense has stated that it needs DOE to have the capacity to produce 50-80 ppy [pits per year] by 2030. This report focuses on options to reach 80 ppy. A separate debate, not discussed here, is the validity of the requirement; a lower capacity would be simpler and less costly to attain. Pit production requires many tasks, but this report focuses on two: pit fabrication, which forms plutonium into precise shapes, and analytical chemistry (AC), which monitors the composition of each pit. Any feasible option requires sufficient 'space' (laboratory floor space) and 'Material At Risk' (MAR) allowance. Each building for plutonium work is permitted a specified amount of MAR, i.e., radioactive material (adjusted for radioactivity) that could be released by an event like an earthquake. […] This report shows that many options are available for making 80 ppy, but it cannot determine which, if any, could support that capacity because data do not exist on how much MAR and space are needed for AC and pit fabrication for 80 ppy. Likewise, there are little to no data on cost. However, the report raises questions that Congress may wish to have answered in order to decide how to proceed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2014-03-20
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International Space Station and the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA): The Bush Administration's Proposed INA Amendment [Updated November 14, 2005]
"The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), as originally enacted, prohibited the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from purchasing Russian goods and services for the U.S.-led International Space Station (ISS) unless the President certified that Russia was not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. On July 12, 2005, the Bush Administration submitted to Congress an amendment to allow NASA to purchase goods and services from Russia to support the ISS. That presented a classic policy dilemma. Without access to Russian spacecraft, the U.S. use of the ISS could be extremely limited. Yet Russian entities were continuing proliferation activities relating to missile proliferation according to the Department of State. This report explains the Bush Administration proposal and resulting congressional action. CRS [Congressional Research Service] Issue Brief IB93017 discusses the ISS program; CRS Report RS22072 discusses the origins of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) and its relationship to the ISS program. The House and Senate passed S. 1713, which is different from the Administration's proposal, but allows ISS-related goods and services to be purchased from and delivered by Russia through January 1, 2012. The bill is awaiting signature by the President."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Smith, Marcia S.; Squassoni, Sharon A.
2005-11-14
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Air and Space Nation is in Peril
The United States air forces protect economic security. This is especially true because military strategy has evolved so dramatically over the past decade. The basic factors that shaped our geopolitical environment during the Cold War have changed. It is essential that the US maintain strong public support for its actions. This in turn means we must be extremely careful about both inflicting and sustaining casualties. If such sterilized warfare is our goal, then certain types of strategies, tactics, and weapons are more desirable than others. Precision or nonlethal weapons delivered by air platforms - ideally either unmanned, unseen, or flying beyond the range of enemy fire - are the instruments of choice. It would be foolish for our leaders to think that air and space power could be effective in any crisis, but it has now become their weapon of first resort. Over the past few years, we have heard references to a crisis in the American air and space industry. Despite America's dominant position, concerns need to be addressed. First and foremost, we need to conduct a broad-based examination of all aspects of the air and space nation. The US must have a comprehensive plan to develop, improve, and coordinate the commercial and military aspects of our policy.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948-
2003
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Federal Real Property: Measuring Actual Office Space Costs Would Provide More Accurate Information, Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "The government's RTF [Reduce the Footprint] policy has intensified federal efforts to reduce office space and save money since 2015. GSA [General Services Administration] and OMB [Office of Management and Budget] report key cost performance measures but questions exist about how well these measures reflect agencies' efforts. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review how federal real property costs have changed since 2015. This report examines (1) the extent to which performance measures reflect changes in civilian CFO [Chief Financial Officers] Act agencies' office space costs and (2) how selected agencies considered cost in their office space decisions."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2019-12
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Draft Environmental Assessment: City of Gulfport Department of Public Works Warehouse Consolidation, Harrison County, Mississippi
"On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Mississippi Gulf Coast, causing extensive damage. A Presidential Disaster Declaration, FEMA-1604-DR-MS, was subsequently signed for Katrina. The Gulfport Department of Public Works (DPW) operates several buildings including the Former Allen Plumbing Building and the Former Equipment Storage Building. Prior to Katrina, these buildings were used for office space and warehouse space. The Former Allen Plumbing Building, located at 4008 Hewes Avenue, was a 4,488-square-foot wood-framed, metal siding building. The Former Equipment Storage Building, located adjacent to the DPW Main Buildings at 4050 Hewes Avenue, was a 2,322-square-foot, wood-framed, metal siding building. Both buildings were more than 50 percent damaged and have since been demolished. In accordance with FEMA's policy for FEMA-1604-DR-MS, the site will be returned to grade and revegetated. Consequently, there is a need for new facilities to replace the lost office and warehouse space and to enable the DPW to provide more efficient service from one consolidated warehouse."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2007-05
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Effects-Based Operations: A Guide for Practitioners
"The literature on Effects"Based Operations (EBO) continues to be dominated by theory, with limited evidence of (successful) practical application reported. This situation is entirely acceptable in the early formative stages of any new concept, as first hesitant steps are taken and the authority of a shared idea gradually develops. EBO is now a global phenomenon. The effects must have primacy in shaping the actions that are taken. EBO practitioners need those hands-on executable actions that can be taken to solve problems in the real world. The paper offers that a systems approach that includes a problem space, a solution space and a design space may bring the necessary totality to the subject, guarding against premature use of means that appear to fit well with the context " a fixation with efficiency rather than effectiveness. The paper argues that an examination of the systemic interactions amongst factors may deepen planners or policy-makers understanding of why a region or area of interest behaves the way it does, before they attempt to change it. A method is detailed that couples effects statements and means and highlights capability requirements. A case study example is provided using North Korea. Use of this method in Australia recently won a Prime Ministers Award for Excellence in Business Community Partnerships."
Command and Control Research Program (U.S.)
Duczynski, Guy
2004-09-14
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Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation
"Over the next 10 years, NASA is scheduled to devote $99 billion to the nation's human spaceflight program. In recognition of the magnitude of these planned expenditures, coupled with questions about the status of the current human spaceflight program, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as part of the due diligence of a new administration, called for an independent review of the present and planned effort. Two conditions framed this request: all ongoing human spaceflight work by NASA and its contractors was to continue uninterrupted during the review process; and the review team's findings were to be available 90 days from the Committee's formal establishment and a formal report be published thereafter, in recognition of the demands of the federal budget preparation cycle. The Committee established to conduct the review comprised 10 members with diverse professional backgrounds, including scientists, engineers, astronauts, educators, executives of established and new aerospace firms, former presidential appointees, and a retired Air Force General. The Committee was charged with conducting an independent review of the current program of record and providing alternatives to that program (as opposed to making a specific recommendation) that would ensure that 'the nation is pursuing the best trajectory for the future of human spaceflight--one that is safe, innovative, affordable and sustainable.' Initially, the directive to the Committee was that it conduct its inquiry with the assumption that operation of the Space Shuttle would terminate in 2010 and that the 10-year funding profile in the FY 2010 President's budget would not be exceeded. In subsequent discussions between the Committee chairman and members of the White House staff, it was agreed that at least two program options would be presented that comply with the above constraints; however, if those options failed to fully satisfy the stated study objectives, additional options could be identified by the Committee. No other bounds were placed on the Committee's work."
Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee
2009-10-22
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Serial No. 113-14; Serial No. 113-17: Threats From Space: A Review of U.S. Government Efforts to Track and Mitigate Asteroids and Meteors (Part I & Part II), Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 19 and April 10, 2013
This is the two-part hearing on "Threats From Space: A Review of U.S. Government Efforts to Track and Mitigate Asteroids and Meteors" held before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on March 19 and April 10, 2013. Part I of these hearings focused on U.S. government efforts to track, characterize and mitigate Near Earth Objects. Witnesses testified about the "ongoing work, planned efforts and coordination procedures within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the U.S. Air Force Space Command." Part II of these hearings focused "on most viable near-term initiatives within the private sector and the international coordination needed to identify and characterize potentially hazardous near Earth objects." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Michael F. A'Hearn, Charles F. Bolden, John P. Holdren, Dante Lauretta, Ed Lu, William L. Shelton and Donald K. Yeomans.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Executive Order 13803: Reviving the National Space Council
"'Purpose'. The National Space Council (Council) was established by Title V of Public Law 100--685 and Executive Order 12675 of April 20, 1989 (Establishing the National Space Council). The Council was tasked with advising and assisting the President regarding national space policy and strategy. The Council was never formally disestablished, but it effectively ceased operation in 1993. This order revives the Council and provides additional details regarding its duties and responsibilities."
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Trump, Donald, 1946-
2017-06-30
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Environmental Support for Air Sovereignty and Air Defense
The Headquarters (HQ) United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) Weather and Space Environment Branch (J33W) serves as the Senior Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) Office for NORAD. USSPACECOM/J33W provides policy and guidance for meteorological, oceanographic, and space environment operations in support of NORAD, and ensures standardization of METOC support throughout the command. Most NORAD organizations have no weather personnel directly assigned. Therefore, it is the responsibility of NORAD units or units under the OPCON of CINCNORAD to arrange for environmental support from a host organization. Environmental support may come from US military units (to include ANG and AFRC), Canadian Forces units, National Weather Service or Federal Aviation Administration offices, the Canadian Forces Weather Service (CFWS) or from the Atmospheric Environment Service (AES). This support should use in-place assets and centralized products to the maximum extent possible. Because of the bi-national nature of NORAD and the mix of centralized products available, guidance can only be general in nature; however, environmental support must meet the minimum requirements set forth in this instruction and must, where applicable, be documented in a host tenant support agreement or other memorandum of agreement or understanding. Direct coordination between weather organizations supporting the same NORAD operation is encouraged.
North American Aerospace Defense Command
1998-07-01
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Multinational Experiment 7: Outcome 3: Space: Dependencies, Vulnerabilities and Threats
From the abstract: "This handbook is aimed at audiences working in a disparate range of military and civilian, specialist and generalist areas, including policy makers. Some will have considerable experience of space related issues, while others have none, so a main body of text has been created to act as a basic primer. This enables users to develop a basic, but sufficient, understanding of the key capabilities that space systems can provide, while also describing mitigation methods and the potential impacts of loss of space services."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
2013-07-08
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National Security Space Launch Programs, Held Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, One Hundred and Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, March 5, 2014
On March 5, 2014, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee on Department of Defense, "concluded a hearing to examine national security space launch programs, after receiving testimony from Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office; Michael Gass, United Launch Alliance, Centennial, Colorado; Elon Musk, Space Exploration Technologies, Hawthorne, California; and Scott Pace, George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs Space Policy Institute, Washington, D.C."
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations
2014-03-05
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'Hide Your Shape' - Sun Tzu: ROE Considerations for Negating High-Resolution Commercial Imagery Satellites
From the thesis abstract: "During 1999, the first commercial satellite capable of producing imagery with 1-meter resolution will be launched. This event is significant because 1-meter resolution is considered as the baseline for military grade imagery. To counter this threat, the commander may ultimately have to take action against the space assets of a corporation that resides in a belligerent or a neutral nation. The Rules of Engagement [ROE] that would guide this attack are developed based on U.S. policy, international and domestic law, and operational considerations. An analysis of these factors indicates that there are few impediments to the execution of 'Offensive Counter-Space' operations against the commercial imaging threat. A proposal is also made for the addition of three General Supplemental Measures regarding the engagement of commercial space systems to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Babski, Ronald J., Jr.
1999-02-05
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DOD Space Acquisitions: Including Users Early and Often in Software Development Could Benefit Programs, Report to Congressional Committees
"Senate and House reports accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contained provisions for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to review challenges in software-intensive DOD space programs. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the extent to which these programs have involved users; and (2) what softwarespecific management challenges, if any, programs faced. To do this work, GAO reviewed four major space defense programs with cost growth or schedule delays caused, in part, by software. GAO reviewed applicable statutes and DOD policies and guidance that identified four characteristics of effective user engagement. GAO reviewed program documentation; and interviewed program officials, contractors, and space systems users. GAO also analyzed program metrics, test and evaluation reports, and external program assessments."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2019-03
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Ungoverned Spaces and Armed Civil Conflicts: The Predicament of Developing Nations
From the abstract: "Several developing nations are grappling with the phenomenon of ungoverned territories, which are believed to be harboring insurgent, terrorist, and other armed violent groups. This study investigates how a developing nation can use its resources to reduce violent activities and, consequently, ungoverned spaces from within its sovereign territory. The study uses geo-referenced violent events data as a measure of violence and spatiotemporal data for law enforcement agencies (LEAs), social services, and economic infrastructure as measures of state authority. All data is specific to Uganda. Using multi-regression models (negative binomial and matched wake analysis), the study employs interpolated spatiotemporal data to estimate the effects of state authority factors on violent events over space and time. The findings show that LEAs, including police, prisons, courts, and border protection, are the most effective in reducing violence and therefore ungoverned territories. Save for schools and local governments, social services like health centers, and economic infrastructure like roads, tend to be associated with increased levels of violence. The policy implication for developing nations is therefore to consider directing their resources toward building their LEAs before or concurrently with socioeconomic services in order to reduce violence emanating from ungoverned spaces."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Munyua, David O.
2015-06
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Catastrophe on the Horizon: A Scenario-Based Future Effect of Orbital Space Debris
"The purpose of this research is to bring some much needed attention to the growing problem of space debris and to understand the driving forces behind the orbital space debris problem. An examination into the effects debris may have in the future will shed some light on the situation and put into perspective how serious this issue has become and what impact it could have on our society and the world. This research is intended to identify some potential futures as a result from orbital debris and highlight potential solutions for consideration. Hopefully this will spark some debate, so policy or legislative changes can be considered within our government in order to avoid a potential space catastrophe in the near future."
Air University (U.S.). Air War College
Donahue, Jack
2010-04
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 141, Space Weather Coordination Act
"S. 141 would authorize the annual appropriation of $6 million over the 2019-2022 period for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to implement a pilot program to gather data on space weather. The legislation also would transfer the responsibility to coordinate inter-agency activities related to space weather from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to the National Space Council (NSC). CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing S. 141 would cost $23 million over the 2019-2023 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. Enacting S. 141 would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that enacting S. 141 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2029. S. 141 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2018-10-02
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Finding of No Significant Impact: Construction and Operation of an Emergency Services Center United States Air Force Academy, Colorado
"An Environmental Assessment (EA) has been developed in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, and implementing regulations set forth in 32 CFR 989 (Environmental Impact Analysis Process), as amended, to analyze a U.S. Air Force Academy (Academy) proposal to construct and operate an Emergency Services Center (ESC). The Academy proposes to construct and operate an ESC. The purpose of the Proposed Action is to provide and maintain adequate emergency operation functions including implementation of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 Management of Domestic Incidents, and to support the National Incident Management System (NlMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). The ESC will be sited, constructed, and operated in accordance with United Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-140-04 Emergency Operations Center Planning and Design (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD] 2008). The Proposed Action is needed because the current Security Forces (SF) Headquarters (Building 8024) is outdated, located in a flood zone, and no longer meets space requirements. Additionally, the current SF Headquarters is not centrally located, as required by UFC 4-140-04 (it is located at the far southern end of the Academy). Emergency operation functions are currently fragmented due to their locations at separate facilities throughout the Academy. Although the primary functions of SF operations are conducted in Building 8024, portions of the SF squadron are located in a converted housing unit and a detached garage (Buildings 8020 and 8028). The 911 call dispatch center is staffed remotely, sharing insufficient space at Fire Station 3. The dispatch center does not meet Air Force design standards. Space is inadequate for current operations and there is no dedicated communications control room or emergency response center."
United States. Air Force. 10th Civil Engineering Squadron
Bush, Brian; McCorkle, Jennifer; Lewis, Matthew . . .
2011-11
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International Space Station and the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA): The Bush Administrations Proposed INA Amendment [Updated December 5, 2005]
"The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), as originally enacted, prohibited the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from purchasing Russian goods and services for the U.S.-led International Space Station (ISS) unless the President certified that Russia was not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. On July 12, 2005, the Bush Administration submitted to Congress an amendment to allow NASA to purchase goods and services from Russia to support the ISS. That presented a classic policy dilemma. Without access to Russian spacecraft, the U.S. use of the ISS could be extremely limited. Yet Russian entities were continuing proliferation activities relating to missile proliferation according to the Department of State. This report explains the Bush Administration proposal and resulting congressional action. CRS Issue Brief IB93017 discusses the ISS program; CRS Report RS22072 discusses the origins of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) and its relationship to the ISS program. Congress passed and the President signed into law (S. 1713, P.L.109-112) a version that is different from the proposal, but allows ISS-related goods and services to be purchased from and delivered by Russia through January 1, 2012."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Squassoni, Sharon A.; Smith, Marcia S.
2005-12-05
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Extending NASA's Exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [May 8, 2008]
"The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). NASA has now asked Congress to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. Since 2005, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and countries over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush has praised Russian President Putin for his 'leadership' in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Behrens, Carl E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2008-05-08
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session to Receive Testimony Regarding Issues Related to Low-Level Radioactive Waste, September 30, 2004
From the prepared statement of Hon. Pete V. Domenici, U.S. Senator from New Mexico: "This oversight hearing of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on the disposal of low-level radioactive waste shall come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to both evaluate and learn from a recent report issued by the Government Accountability Office on the potential disposal shortage for low-level radioactive waste in this country. While not an immediate problem, we must now pay close attention to prevent a potential future crisis. The GAO found that low-level radioactive waste disposal volumes increased 200 percent between 1999 and 2003, primarily due to this waste being shipped to commercial disposal facilities by the DOE. In 2008, which is not very far off, the Barnwell disposal facility in South Carolina is set to close to all states outside of its compact, some 34 states. The generators in these states will not have a disposal facility to send their waste. An example is that universities and hospitals that deal with nuclear medicine will have to find and pay for storage space on their campuses and buildings away from students, faculty and staff. One can only imagine that further regulatory expense and burden will be placed on these institutions as wastes build up with no where to go. This is something we need to prevent. I just referred to a ''compact,'' let me explain that term. In 1980, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which required states to dispose of their own low-level waste. This act encouraged states to form interstate compacts, or regional associations of states, for the purpose of low-level radioactive waste disposal. The thinking was that this legislation would enable states to create additional low-level waste sites to prevent a possible shortage of disposal space. There were three disposal sites for low-level waste in 1980, today, there are still three. This act in 1980 was supposed to prevent the situation we are facing in 2008-a shortage of disposal space." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel K. Akaka, Jeff Bingaman, Pete V. Domenici, Dianne Feinstein, Christine Gelles, Edward G. McGinnis, Robin M. Nazzaro, Alan Pasternak.
United States. Government Printing Office
2005
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Extending NASA's Exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [Updated July 30, 2008]
This CRS report provides an update on Congressional action taken in regards to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. "The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 [INA] was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station [ISS] unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. NASA has now asked Congress to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Behrens, Carl E.; Niktin, Mary Beth
2008-07-30
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Protecting America's High Ground: A Public-Private Response to Space Debris
From the thesis Abstract: "The United States is reliant on the capabilities provided by satellite technology for nearly every facet of society. A sustained loss of satellite capabilities due to any service outages will have a significant negative impact on the nation's homeland security. The areas affected include communication, financial transactions, intelligence gathering, internet access, and weather surveillance. Existing domestic and international policy has been insufficient in managing debris growth. The removal of large debris from congested orbits through active debris removal (ADR) is now necessary to prevent future collision events that will damage or destroy operational satellites that may possibly render certain regions of space unusable for generations. To safeguard its satellites and critical services they provide to homeland security, the United States should develop a domestic debris removal program using the established public-private partnership model that NASA has leveraged over the previous 15 years. This model has reduced developments costs and risks of schedule delays, and also stimulates growth in the private space sector and creates additional tax revenues. Furthermore, the commercial sector possesses knowledge and experience in the field of on-orbit servicing, a field with similar technical challenges to debris removal that can provide a foundation for the development of ADR systems. The United States must begin remediation by partnering with the private sector."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Repair, Christopher W.
2021-06
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China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy- Actions and Chronology [Updated January 11, 2002]
"Congress has been concerned about whether U.S. firms, in exporting satellites, provided expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile and space programs and whether the Administration's policies might facilitate transfers of military-related technology to China. This CRS Report discusses security concerns, policy changes, congressional action, and a chronology of major developments since 1988. Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the Clinton Administration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving the licensing authority from the State Department to Commerce in 1996. A range of concerns were prompted by 'New York Times' reports in April 1998 that the Justice Department began a criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corp. violated export control laws. The companies are said to have provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of its future ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedly found that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Justice Department have also investigated Hughes' review of China's launch failure on January 26, 1995. Congress may watch for any new Presidential waivers or licenses for exports of satellites and any review of U.S. policy to export satellites to China."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2002-01-11
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): Satellite Task Force Report Fact Sheet
"In January 2003, the Director, National Security Space Architect, requested that the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) consider embarking on a study of infrastructure protection measures for commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) systems. The NSTAC established the Satellite Task Force (STF) to review and assess policies, practices, and procedures for the application of infrastructure protection measures to commercial SATCOM networks used for national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Specifically, the STF was established to review applicable documentation addressing vulnerabilities in the commercial satellite infrastructure, identify potential policy changes that would bring the infrastructure into conformance with a standard for mitigating those vulnerabilities, consider Global Positioning System (GPS) timing capabilities during the deliberations, coordinate this response with representatives from the National Communications System (NCS) and others, and draft a task force report with findings and recommendations. The STF engaged broad and active participation from representatives of NSTAC member companies, non-NSTAC commercial satellite owners and operators, commercial satellite trade associations, Government agencies, and technical experts. The task force examined all types of commercial SATCOM systems, including Fixed Satellite Service, Broadcast Satellite Service, Mobile Satellite Service, and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service. To gain a broad understanding of vulnerabilities, the STF compared the difficulty of potential threats against the degree of susceptibility of key elements in these services, including the radio frequency links, ground segment, cyber segment, and space segment."
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2004-02
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Satellite Taskforce Report, Fact Sheet [February 2004]
This fact sheet from the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee discusses the issues surrounding infrastructure protection for commercial satellite communications (SATCOM systems. "In January 2003, the Director, National Security Space Architect, requested that the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) consider embarking on a study of infrastructure protection measures for commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) systems. The NSTAC established the Satellite Task Force (STF) to review and assess policies, practices, and procedures for the application of infrastructure protection measures to commercial SATCOM networks used for national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Specifically, the STF was established to (1) review applicable documentation addressing vulnerabilities in the commercial satellite infrastructure, (2) identify potential policy changes that would bring the infrastructure into conformance with a standard for mitigating those vulnerabilities, (3) consider Global Positioning System (GPS) timing capabilities during the deliberations, (4) coordinate this response with representatives from the National Communications System (NCS) and others, and (5) draft a task force report with findings and recommendations. The STF engaged broad and active participation from representatives of NSTAC member companies, non-NSTAC commercial satellite owners and operators, commercial satellite trade associations, Government agencies, and technical experts. The task force examined all types of commercial SATCOM systems, including Fixed Satellite Service, Broadcast Satellite Service, Mobile Satellite Service, and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service. To gain a broad understanding of vulnerabilities, the STF compared the difficulty of potential threats against the degree of susceptibility of key elements in these services, including the radio frequency links, ground segment, cyber segment, and space segment."
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2004-02
