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Executive Order 13914: Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources
From the Document: "Space Policy Directive-1 of December 11, 2017 (Reinvigorating America's Human Space Exploration Program), provides that commercial partners will participate in an 'innovative and sustainable program' headed by the United States to 'lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations.' Successful long-term exploration and scientific discovery of the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies will require partnership with commercial entities to recover and use resources, including water and certain minerals, in outer space. [...] The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the head of any other executive department or agency the Secretary of State determines to be appropriate, shall take all appropriate actions to encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space, consistent with the policy set forth in section 1 of this order."
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Trump, Donald, 1946-
2020-04-06
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Space Operations
This Air Force Instruction (AFI) implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-12, "Space". It provides broad level instruction on the conduct of space operations to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and Air Combat Command (ACC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Users should send comments and suggested improvements on an AF Form 847. This is a new instruction that aligns with AFPD 10-12. It summarizes the missions associated with space operations and provides instructions to Air Force MAJCOMs to ensure space operations enhance air combat operations and strategic defense operations.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1994-07-25
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DoD Instruction 3100.11: Management of Laser Illumination of Subject in Space [October 24, 2016]
From the purpose statement: "In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 and the November 30, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance: [1] Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures, in accordance with DoDD 3100.10, for the DoD management of risks associated with laser illuminations of objects in space. [2] Establishes the requirement for a quantitative probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) process to categorize DoD-owned or -operated lasers that could direct energy above the horizon or in space and implements risk acceptance standards for DoD-owned or -operated resident space objects (RSOs). [3] Establishes an exempt category of lasers that do not require coordination, notification, or permission before use due to the minimal risk they pose to RSOs. [4] Provides guidance on management of DoD-owned and -operated lasers that have transitioned from research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) status into DoD weapon systems. [5] Supersedes the unclassified information in the May 15, 2014, Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) Memorandum; and the 2011-01 Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Memorandum."
United States. Department of Defense
2016-10-24
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U.S. Department of Defense: Space Posture Review (SPR)
"The Space Posture Review (SPR) is a legislatively-mandated review of U.S. national security space policy and objectives, conducted jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. The SPR analyzes the relationship between military and national security space strategy and assesses space acquisition programs, future space systems, and technology development."
United States. Department of Defense
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Information Security: NASA Needs to Remedy Vulnerabilities in Key Networks, Report to Congressional Committees
"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies extensively on information systems and networks to pioneer space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. Many of these systems and networks are interconnected through the Internet, and may be targeted by evolving and growing cyber threats from a variety of sources. GAO was directed to (1) determine whether NASA has implemented appropriate controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems used to support NASA's mission directorates and (2) assess NASA's vulnerabilities in the context of prior incidents and corrective actions. To do this, GAO examined network and system controls in place at three centers; analyzed agency information security policies, plans, and reports; and interviewed agency officials. [...]. GAO recommends that the NASA Administrator take steps to mitigate control vulnerabilities and fully implement a comprehensive information security program. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations and stated that it will continue to mitigate the information security weaknesses identified."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2009-10
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Department of Defense Directive 5101.02E: DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Space, January 25, 2013
"This directive: [1] Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 5101.2 (Reference (a)) to update policy, functions and responsibilities, relationships, and authorities for the DoD EA [Executive Agent] for Space and the Defense Space Council (DSC), [2] Continues the designation of the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD EA for Space, in accordance with DoDD 5101.1 (Reference (b)), [3] Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) as the OSD focal point for space programs, and assigns the USD(AT&L) as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to oversee the activities of the DoD EA for Space, in accordance with Reference (b), [and] [4] Incorporates and cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c))."
United States. Department of Defense
2013-01-25
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H. Rept. 113-470: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2014, Report of the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives on H.R. 4412, Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office, June 5, 2014
From Background and Need for the Legislation: "The NASA Authorization Acts of 2005, 2008, and 2010 provided policy and programmatic guidance for the Administration that made clear that the Administration is, and should remain, a multimission agency with a balanced portfolio of programs in science, aeronautics, and human space flight, including human and robotic exploration beyond low Earth orbit. The NASA Authorization Act of 2014 reaffirms the basic principles espoused in the prior NASA Authorization acts, while emphasizing the importance of providing a long-term goal of a human mission to the surface of Mars and the need for a Human Exploration Roadmap to define the capabilities and milestones required to achieve the goal, and maintaining U.S. leadership in NASA's space and Earth science, aeronautics research and development, and human spaceflight programs. The need for the legislation at this time is the expiration of an authorization for the Administration."
United States. Government Printing Office
2014-06-05
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Realities of Deterrence and Retaliatory Options to Attacks in Space and Cyberspace
From the thesis abstract: "Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. [...] As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike."
Air University (U.S.). Air War College
Fairhurst, Shawn
2012-02-15
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Responsive Space and Strategic Information
"American strategists face a daunting challenge; they must assure and defend American and allied interests, induce and encourage international security cooperation, and deter, dissuade, and defeat a diverse range of potential adversaries. This challenge has been addressed by senior political leadership in recent policy statements, such as the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, and in the formation of an expanded U.S. Strategic Command, but this vision has not yet taken root in the Department of Defense components responsible for providing operational capability. We propose a new strategic posture based upon a war-prevention focus. The central element of our proposal is a transformational space and information sortie capability. American space capabilities now depend on a fixed infrastructure of large, expensive satellites. We argue for a complementary capability to launch small, inexpensive payloads in time of crisis to augment and reconstitute existing capabilities and perform entirely new special operation missions and global conventional strikes through space. These assets also would expand information operations beyond network defense and network attack to create effects in the minds of our adversaries and those who would support them. An enabler for these new capabilities will be the technology to deliver effects in and through space rapidly and affordably. A similar capability will be needed to deliver effects through cyber space."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Correll, Randall R.; Worden, Simon P.
2004-04
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Space Launch System: Resources Need to be Matched to Requirements to Decrease Risk and Support Long Term Affordability, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate
"The Space Launch System (SLS) program is making solid progress on the SLS design. However, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not developed an executable business case based on matching the program's cost and schedule resources with the requirement to develop the vehicle and conduct the first flight test in December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. NASA uses a calculation referred to as the 'joint cost and schedule confidence level' to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets. NASA policy usually requires a 70 percent confidence level for a program to proceed with final design and fabrication. GAO's work on best practices has shown that programs that do not establish an executable business case that matches requirements--or customer needs--to resources, such as schedule and funding--are at increased risk of cost and schedule growth. The program is satisfying many of NASA's metrics that measure progress against design goals, such as requirements for design maturity. According to the program's risk analysis, however, the agency's current funding plan for SLS may be $400 million short of what the program needs to launch by 2017. Furthermore, the development schedule of the core stage--which drives the SLS schedule--is compressed to meet the 2017 launch date. NASA also faces challenges integrating existing hardware that was not originally designed to fly on SLS. For example, SLS is using solid rocket boosters from the Constellation program, but integrating a new non-asbestos insulating material into the booster design has proven difficult and required changes to the booster manufacturing processes."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-07
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Space Command and Control: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Annual Reporting, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Highlights: "The Department of the Air Force has worked for decades to develop improved space command and control systems. A number of prior efforts experienced significant delays and cost increases. The current Space C2 program began in 2018. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision for the Department of the Air Force to submit annual status reports on the Space C2 program and for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to review them. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of the Air Force's 2020 and 2021 Space C2 annual reports include and address the key elements that Congress outlined; and (2) the annual reports provide effective information for program oversight. GAO analyzed NDAA requirements and the 2020 and 2021 annual reports, reviewed agency policies and guidance as well as leading practices related to software development, and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense and the Air Force, and the U.S. Space Force. GAO also met with congressional staff regarding information for oversight."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2021-12
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Air & Space Power Journal (Vol. 22, Issue 1)
This edition of the Air & Space Power Journal includes major subject areas such as senior leader perspectives, focus area, features, departments, PIREPs, quick-look, review essay, book reviews, and mission debrief. Examples of articles includes 'Toward a New Deterrent:Analysis and Recommendations for the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States', 'The Use of Airpower in Combating Terrorism in Iraq', 'Guarding the High Ocean: Towards a New National-Security Space Strategy through an Analysis of US Maritime Strategy', and ' Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications.' "The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line."
Air University (U.S.). Press
2009-02
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Air & Space Power Journal (Vol. 29, Issue 6)
The following titles are featured in this edition of Air & Space Power Journal: "An Airman's Story," by John E. Hyten; "A Call to Action," by Daniel Moomey; "Purposeful Development of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for Space Cadre," by Mitchell R. Overton; "Space-Policy Education Contexts and Constraints, Content and Methodology," by Dwight Rauhala; "How to make Disaggregation Work," by Peter Wegner, Thomas C. Adang, Maureen Rhemann; "Personnel Recovery in Space," by Mari Manifold; "Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future," by Chris Babcock; "Defending Our Satellites: The Need for Electronic Warfare Education and Training," by E. Lincoln Bonner; and "Developing Tomorrow's Space War Fighter: The Argument for Contracting Out Satellite Operations," by Sean C. Temple.
Air University (U.S.). Press
2015-11
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Defense Space Strategy Summary, June 2020
From the Executive Summary: "The Department of Defense (DoD) is embarking on the most significant transformation in the history of the U.S. national security space program. Space is now a distinct warfighting domain, demanding enterprise-wide changes to policies, strategies, operations, investments, capabilities, and expertise for a new strategic environment. This strategy identifies how DoD will advance spacepower to enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in a complex security environment characterized by great power competition. [...] The DoD desires a secure, stable, and accessible space domain, whose use by the United States and our allies and partners is underpinned by comprehensive, sustained military strength. The strategy includes a phased approach for the defense enterprise to move with purpose and speed across four lines of effort (LOEs): (1) build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate space into national, joint, and combined operations; (3) shape the strategic environment; and (4) cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies."
United States. Department of Defense
2020-06
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China's Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities
From the Key Findings: "Buoyed by recent successes and impressive advancements in space technology, China has emerged as a leading player in space. The implications for United States policy are numerous, and the capabilities China either currently possesses or is in the process of developing certainly pose a strategic risk to the United States' ability to operate in the Indo-Pacific region. [...] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is executing a long-term strategy to exploit U.S. technology, talent, and capital to build up its military space and counterspace programs and advance its strategic interests at the expense of the United States. China's zero-sum pursuit of space superiority harms U.S. economic competitiveness, weakens U.S. military advantages, and undermines strategic stability. In short, it represents a threat to U.S. national security. Barring significant action to counter China's space-related programs and activities of concern, it is likely that this strategic competitor's efforts will continue to adversely affect U.S. interests."
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Stokes, Mark A.; Alvarado, Gabriel; Weinstein, Emily . . .
2020-03-30
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NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris [Revised May 14, 2009]
"The purpose of this NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) is to provide requirements to implement NASA's policy for limiting orbital debris generation per the U.S. National Space Policy of 2006, Section 11, the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, and as a part of NASA's policy for safety and mission assurance programs as defined in NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8700.1, paragraph 1a. Any noncompliances to orbital debris requirements, including those for reasons of mission requirements and cost effectiveness, require a variance to this NPR."
United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
2009-05-14
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In Touch with Industry: ICAF Industry Studies 1999: Space
Few industries have shown as much growth in recent years or as
much potential for increased activity as has the global space industry.
Space touches our daily lives through applications such as
telecommunications, remote sensing, surveillance, and navigation.
Despite a series of launch failures, the long-term outlook for the U.S.
space industry remains strong. However, government investment in
research and development (R&D) is dwindling at a time when major
trends for the industry include globalization, deregulation, and
privatization. The demand for low-cost launch has stimulated the
creation of innovative launch services. Yet, market uncertainties
highlight the continuing maturation process of the space industry.
Government's role is to provide enlightened export policy, superior
infrastructure, and strategic direction to stimulate continued growth.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
1999
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Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism
Terrorism poses a growing threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. The political, economic, and informational instruments of power play primary roles in addressing and eliminating the root causes behind terrorism attacks, but the military instrument will prevent some attacks and retaliate for others. Air and space power is one of the primary components of the military instrument in the battle against terrorism. This paper begins with an overview of US national and Department of Defense counterterrorist (CT) policies, performs a systems model analysis of a terrorist organization to better understand targeting of the same, reviews current air and space power CT capabilities, and concludes with recommendations for future ones. Air and space power contributes to current CT capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures. It also provides intelligence critical to deterring, preempting, and answering terrorist attacks, and provides psychological operations support to help erode terrorist will and popular support. Although there is no "silver bullet" to use against terrorists, future improvements in air and space power will enhance CT capability effectiveness and provide expanded options. This paper's research consisted of review of primary and secondary sources and interviews with terrorism and targeting experts.
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College
McAlpine, Mark S.
1997-03
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Space and U.S. Security, Hearing Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, March 18, 2009
From the opening statement of Ellen O. Tauscher: "Today, in open session, we will review three broad issues related to space and U.S. security. First, do we have the right policy to ensure the security of our space assets? Second, do we have the right investment strategy? And finally, what role can diplomacy play in ensuring the security of our space assets?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ellan O. Tauscher (D-CA); Michael Turner (R-OH); James Armor, Armor Group; Michael Krepon, Henry L. Stimson Center; and Bruce W. MacDonald, Author of Recent Council on Foreign Relations Study on China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security.
United States. Government Printing Office
2010
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Serial No. 108-25: U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 11, 2003
Serial No. 108-25: From Dana Rohrabacher's opening statement: "Today's hearing will explore the benefits and risks of U.S.-Russian cooperation in space, particularly in light, as I say, of the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia. These issues, balancing our nonproliferation concerns against the benefits of space cooperation, remind me a little bit of that Russian, I think they call it, matryoshka doll where you can see it on the outside. It sort of looks like there is--that is what it is all about, but as you go down, you find layer after layer of different concerns and different things within the issue. So foreign--U.S. foreign policy vis-a´-vis Russia is almost as complicated as rocket science issues, but of course, our Subcommittee does deal with rocket science issues. The U.S.-Russian partnership on the Space Station over the years has been frustrating. And I have followed that very closely over the years, and that has been frustrating. And that especially was frustrating when our Russian partners failed to meet their commitments about a decade ago. But during--but in terms of the chaotic scene in Russia, that now appears to be stabilizing, as we would hope it would be, and a new potential may well be on the horizon." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Dana Rohrabacher, Bart Gordon, Sherwood Boehlert, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Sheila Jackson, John D. Schumacher, Robert M. Davis, Henry D. Sokolski, and Steven Pifer
United States. Government Printing Office
2004
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The International Legal Implications of Military Space Operations: Examining the Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and the Outer Space Legal Regime
"[...] this article will examine applicable legal theory with reference to the interaction of the law of outer space and IHL [International Humanitarian Law] in the context of armed conflict occurring from, to, or through outer space. It will canvass questions of interpretive vertical hierarchy and horizontal priority and examine the International Law Commission's (ILC) recent work on the effects of armed conflict on treaties, as well as the separate ILC review of the impact of subsequent State practice on treaty interpretation. This examination will lead to the conclusion that while the outer space legal regime does continue to apply in a time of armed conflict and does directly apply to regulate specific conduct occurring during armed conflict; it nonetheless is subject to general legal rules that prioritize the right of self-defense, as well as IHL. The article concludes that the mechanical application of prevailing treaty interpretive maxims does not easily settle issues of potential legal conflict between the outer space legal regime and IHL. As such, different interpretive approaches need to be developed on a case-by-case basis to ensure effective harmonization. In circumstances where harmonization is not possible, a stark policy choice will be required to select which regime will apply and in what manner."
Naval War College (U.S.). International Law Studies
Stephens, Dale
2018
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Weaponization of Space: It Doesn't Happen in a Vacuum
This article details the history of the weaponization of space, beginning with a description of 1950s United States space policy as outlined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Subsequent major sections of the article discuss Early Steps toward Weaponization, Overt Advocacy, Arms Control Counterargument, Chicken Little, and Back to the Future. The conclusion delineates lessons learned from the Air Force's space weaponization, and ultimately states that the nonweaponization of space may be eeven more in the national interest than in Eisenhower's day.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Belote, Howard D.
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Defense Authorization Request and Future Years Defense Program, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 12, 2014
This testimony compilation from March 12, 2014 hearing "Defense Authorization Request and Future Years Defense Program" Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. From the statement of Douglas L. Loverro: "The United States has successfully addressed such challenges before in air, sea, and land domains, and now we must likewise respond in space. We do so against the backdrop of a decreasing budget that challenges both the ability and speed with which we can act, but that in no way diminishes the importance of successfully sustaining our crucial advantages in space. Our strategic approach remains consistent with what we outlined in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy and reaffirmed in DoD Directive 3100.10, the DoD Space Policy, released in late 2012. In my testimony today, I will outline the five key elements of this strategic approach and describe specific steps we are taking to implement our approach." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Douglas L. Loverro, John A. Zangardi, William L. Shelton, David L. Mann, and Cristina T. Chaplain.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services
2014-03-12
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Defending America's Interests in Space
From the thesis abstract: "Without a doubt the United States uniquely relies on space capabilities to integrate and project all instruments of its national power. With this reliance come tremendous risks and vulnerabilities that must be mitigated to sustain American pursuit of a world order based upon 'freedom, justice, and human dignity.' As the 44th President of the United States entered office in January 2009, the stakes for space security in the 21st century may be of lesser consequence in comparison to issues such as the nation's flagging economy and the on-going Global War on Terrorism. Nonetheless, failure to resolutely address space security could pose severe repercussions for American power projection in the coming decades. The purpose of this research paper is to frame the anticipated space policy debates for the next Administration."
Air University (U.S.). Air War College
Cynamon, Charles H.
2009-02-12
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China's Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal From Argentina's Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security
"Chinese involvement in the Latin American space and telecommunication industries has implications for U.S. National Security. Unlike other commercial activities geared toward supplying raw materials to China's 1.3 billion inhabitants, Chinese investment in space and telecommunications implies broader commercial and strategic interests that potentially put the Chinese into Western Hemisphere air and space. It is in the security interest of the U.S. Government to understand Chinese penetration into these intelligence-related industries in Latin America and to adjust diplomatic and defense policy accordingly in order to mitigate future threats. Argentina, one of China's 'strategic partners' and the third largest market in Latin America, makes a good case study as China has already entered its space and telecommunications sectors."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Hulse, Janie
2007-09
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Irregular Techniques for Controlling Under-Governed Space
"The United States government has identified undergoverned areas in weakened or failed states as one of the threats faced by the United States and its allies because these spaces can provide safe havens for terrorists. Under certain circumstances, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) may choose to counter these threats by utilizing specific elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to work indirectly through irregular forces to achieve control over the populations within these undergoverned areas. This study uses the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan to determine how irregular forces, with external support, can establish political control of undergoverned space. The cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan provide examples of how irregular forces established control of undergoverned space through the coercion and persuasion of military, political, social, economic, and informational techniques. In these cases, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Lebanon) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (Afghanistan), provided techniques for how organizations providing external support to irregular forces can influence their surrogates to allow the state providing the external support to achieve its foreign policy objectives. To a more limited extent, the study also determines methods that Special Operations Forces (SOF) can utilize to influence irregular surrogates, should SOF choose to operate with or through them to establish control of undergoverned space within weakened or failed states. The author concludes with lessons learned that can be applied to future DoD and USSOCOM Irregular Warfare doctrine design and operational planning."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Coburn, Matthew D.
2007-12
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Federal Cybersecurity After the OPM Data Breach: Have Agencies Learned Their Lesson? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, November 16, 2016
This is from the November 16, 2016 hearing, "Federal Cybersecurity After the OPM [Office of Personnel Management] Data Breach: Have Agencies Learned Their Lesson?" before the House Subcommittee on Information Technology. From the statement of Renee P. Wynn: "Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about NASA's efforts to manage our information technology (IT) resources and protect national assets in an ever-changing threat landscape. The NASA Administrator and all of NASA's leadership considers this to be a very high priority. As NASA's Chief Information Officer (CIO), my office provides IT products and services including policy and procedure for all of NASA. Currently about 17,100 civil servants and 40,000 contractors work at nine NASA Centers and one Federally Funded Research and Development Center, as well as several smaller satellite facilities. We also collaborate with space agencies around the world and have deep partnerships with researchers, engineers and scientists all over the world. Each day, hundreds of thousands of NASA personnel, contractors, academics and members of the public access some part of NASA's IT infrastructure -- a complex array of 418 information systems with over 140,000 components geographically dispersed around the globe. This infrastructure plays a critical role in every aspect of NASA's mission, from controlling spacecraft to processing scientific data." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Renee P. Wynn, Jonathan Alboum, and Robert Klopp.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and Priority-Setting Issues, 709th Congress [June 30, 2006]
"This report summarizes current research and development (R&D) priority-setting
issues- in terms of expenditures; agency, topical, or field-specific priorities; and organizational arrangements to determine priorities. It will be updated as needed. Federal R&D funding priorities reflect presidential policies and national needs. Defense R&D predominated in the 1980s, decreasing to about 50% of federal R&D in the 1990s. In non-defense R&D, space R&D was important in the 1960s as the nation sought to compete with the Soviet Union; energy R&D was a priority during the energy-short 1970s, and, since the 1980s, health R&D has predominated in non-defense science. This Administration's R&D priorities include weapons development, homeland security, space launch vehicles, and, beginning in 2006, more support for physical sciences and engineering. For FY2007, R&D is requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The request would increase funding for physical sciences and engineering programs in the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories as part of the President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) to enhance innovation. Funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) R&D would increase by about 8% largely to develop human space vehicles, but cuts would be made in aeronautics, life sciences, and other research activities. Continuing previous emphases, the budget would slightly increase in real dollar terms support for defense development. National Institutes of Health (NIH) R&D funding would be flat and R&D funding for all other agencies would decrease from FY2006 enacted levels."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Knezo, Genevieve Johanna
2006-06-30
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Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and Priority-Setting Issues, 109th Congress [Updated June 14, 2006]
"Federal research and development (R&D) funding priorities reflect presidential policies and national needs. Defense R&D predominated in the 1980s, decreasing to about 50% of federal R&D in the 1990s. In non-defense R&D, space R&D was important in the 1960s as the nation sought to compete with the Soviet Union; energy R&D was a priority during the energy-short 1970s, and, since the 1980s, health R&D has predominated in non-defense science. This Administration's priorities include weapons development, homeland security, space launch vehicles, and beginning in 2006, more support for physical sciences and engineering. For FY2007, R&D is requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The request would increase funding for physical sciences and engineering programs in the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories as part of the President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) to enhance innovation. Funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) R&D would increase by about 8% largely to develop human space vehicles but cuts would be made in aeronautics, life sciences, and other research activities. Continuing previous emphases, the budget would slightly increase in real dollar terms support for defense development. National Institutes of Health (NIH) R&D funding would be flat and R&D funding for all other agencies would decrease from FY2006 enacted levels."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Knezo, Genevieve Johanna
2006-06-14
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Federal Courthouse Construction: Nationwide Space and Cost Overages Also Apply to Miami Project, Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructures, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "From 2000 to 2010, GSA [General Services Administration] and the judiciary coordinated to construct 33 courthouses, including the Ferguson Courthouse that was completed in 2008 at a cost of approximately $163 million. However, rising costs and other budget priorities slowed the overall construction program. This statement discusses the Ferguson Courthouse and the other 32 federal courthouses completed from 2000 to March 2010, particularly (1) whether the courthouses contain extra space and any costs related to that space, (2) how the actual sizes of the courthouses compare with the congressionally authorized sizes, (3) how courthouses space based on the judiciary's estimates compares with the actual number of judges, and (4) whether the level of courtroom sharing supported by data from the judiciary's study could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. This testimony is primarily based on GAO's June 2010 report on federal courthouse construction. For the 2010 report, GAO [Government Accountability Office] analyzed documents related to the 33 courthouses completed from 2000 to 2010. […] GAO recommended that GSA establish controls to help ensure courthouses remain within their authorized size and that the judiciary should improve its estimation of future judgeships and expand courtroom sharing policies to reflect actual scheduling and use of district courtrooms. GSA and the judiciary agreed to implement these recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2013-03-08
