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• Serial No. 112-116: New Technologies and Innovations in the Mobile and Online Space, and the Implications for Public Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, June 19, 2012

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  This is the June 19, 2012 hearing on "New Technologies and Innovations in the Mobile and Online Space, and the Implications for Public Policy," held before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet. From the opening statement of Bob Goodlatte: "Today we are holding a hearing to examine the public policy issues raised by new technologies in the mobile and online spaces. It is clear that some of the central policy issues for both consumers and companies are the issues of privacy and data collection. Privacy continues to take on greater importance as more Americans not only use the Internet and mobile devices, but also share their personal information with companies on the Web. Privacy policies and the technological safeguards that companies implement will help guide consumers on what they should expect from those who handle their personal information and set expectations for companies that use personal data. As Congress continues to look at privacy issues online, it is important to have a firm understanding of what the industry practices are. Today's hearing will explore what mechanisms the private sector is currently employing to protect Internet and mobile users. It will also highlight the technological innovation and development that has occurred in this space." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bob Goodlatte, Melvin L. Watt, Lamar Smith, John Conyers, Jr., Scott R. Shipman, Morgan Reed, Chris Babel, and James Grimmelmann.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2012
• COVID and the Curb: How Cities Used the Curb and Street Space to Respond to COVID-19 and Policy Ideas to Ensure the Curb Best Serves the Public Good

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  From the Introduction: "Over the past few years, curbs have increasingly become more than just the space between streets and sidewalks. Curbs are transportation hubs, where people walk and roll; access app-based shared bicycles, scooters, or cars; board buses and taxis; and park their personal vehicles. Curbs are community spaces, too. They might host an annual block party or event where a portion of a street is closed, or might provide space to a curbside cafe or parklet. Unhoused community members, often without other options, use curbs as temporary living spaces. Business owners field deliveries and send out their products at the curb. Residences receive packages from online retailers, either directly to single-family homes and apartments, or indirectly to storage lockers where people can retrieve them later. In 2020, the curb was used for all those purposes and more. COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] accelerated some of the changing uses of and growing demand on the curb already underway, and shined a light on the immense value of the curb and its crucial role in preventing the spread of COVID-19. The curb helped support community health and economies, be it through curbside pickup, curbside dining, e-commerce [electronic commerce] delivery, slow streets, curbside COVID-19 testing, and more. This report is organized in two parts: Part 1: Cities' COVID-19 Curb Response; [...] Part 2: Ideas to guide curbside management policy."

  Transportation for America

  Hanzlik, Mae
• Statement by the President on the New National Space Policy [June 28, 2010]

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  In this June 28, 2010 statement, President Barack Obama discusses the New National Space Policy. "We are releasing a new national space policy, designed to strengthen America's leadership in space while fostering untold rewards here on earth. For even as we continue our relentless focus on the serious challenges we face at home and abroad, our long term success and leadership as a nation demands that we do not lose sight of the promise of the future."

  United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary

  2010-06-28
• Commercialization of Space Systems: Policy Implications for the United States

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  "The purpose of this paper is threefold. First it identifies specific commercial services and the critical developments in the field of commercial space systems that support the needs of the U.S. government. Second, it describes specific U.S. government policies and regulations that govern how and to what extent military and governmental organizations are able to use commercial space products. Third, it assesses the effectiveness of these policies, and provides recommendations that seek to balance the increasing use of commercial space systems with protecting U.S. national interests and security."

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Miller, Dennis M.; Stocker, John E.

  2001-06-14
• Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DoD to Implement Space Policy and Integrate Capabilities, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

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  For this report, the GAO (1) reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in integrating and improving its satellite control capabilities and in fostering integrated and interoperable satellite control within the government, as directed by the 1996 national space policy and (2) determined whether opportunities exist for DOD to standardize its satellite control capabilities by using commercial products and practices. GAO found that the Defense Department (DoD) has not effectively implemented the guidelines for satellite control as set forth in the 1996 national space policy. DoD has taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable satellite control for all government space activities.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  1999-05-17
• U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik [Updated June 20, 2008]

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  From the Summary: "The 'space age' began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers, concerned about the USSR's ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this 'Sputnik moment,' the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education policy. […] In the 110th Congress, several congressional resolutions honoring the 50th anniversary of Sputnik and the importance of the resulting agencies and activities to the United States have been introduced, with some passing the House or Senate. The House passed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6063) on June 18, 2008. In §2, Findings, the House approved a series of findings that reflects on NASA's 50th anniversary, and identifies a number of priorities for NASA."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Stine, Deborah D.

  2008-06-20
• U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy: Fact Sheet

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  "This policy provides guidance for: (1) development, acquisition, operation, sustainment, and modernization of the Global Positioning System and U.S.-developed, owned and/or operated systems used to augment or otherwise improve the Global Positioning System and/or other space-based positioning, navigation, and timing signals; (2) development, deployment, sustainment, and modernization of capabilities to protect U.S. and allied access to and use of the Global Positioning System for national, homeland, and economic security, and to deny adversaries access to any space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services; and (3) foreign access to the Global Positioning System and United States Government augmentations, and international cooperation with foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services, including augmentations."

  National Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)

  2004-12-15
• Overview of the Nation's Weather Satellite Programs and Policies, Hearing Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Environment, Subcommittee on Oversight, One Hundred and Fourteenth Congress, First Session, December 10, 2015

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  This the December 10, 2015 hearing, "Overview of the Nation's Weather Satellite Programs and Policies," held before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Environment and Subcommittee on Oversight. From the opening statement of Jim Bridenstine: "My concerns about a gap in data were highlighted when we recently learned that a retired NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] satellite broke up on orbit. While this satellite was not currently in use, it raises questions: how viable are NOAA's satellites as they age? What happens when satellites are extended well beyond their designed life? What components utilized on the satellite that broke up are being used on currently operating NOAA satellites? And what design reviews of satellites being built today are being undertaken? Due to the critical role satellite observations play in forecasts, it is critical NOAA be vigilant in mitigating, preventing, and avoiding space debris. Losing an operational satellite due to space debris will severely degrade forecasts and put millions of Americans at risk. We need to be certain that our costly satellite systems remain robust and safe." Statements, letters, and other materials submitted for the record include the following: Jim Bridenstinek, Barry Loudermilk, Stephen Volz, and David Powner.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2017
• National Space Policy Fact Sheet

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  "The goals of the U.S. space program are to: Enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system and the universe through human and robotic exploration; Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States; Enhance the economic competitiveness, and scientific and technical capabilities of the United States; Encourage State, local and private sector investment in, and use of, space technologies, and; Promote international cooperation to further U.S. domestic, national security, and foreign policies."

  United States. White House Office

  1996-09-16
• Department of Defense Instruction 8581.01: Information Assurance (IA) Policy for Space Systems Used by the Department of Defense

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  "This Instruction: A) Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 8581.1 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the guidance in DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (b)) and the authority in DoDD 5144.1 (Reference (c)). B) Implements requirements of National Security Directive 42 (Reference (d)) by establishing IA policy and assigning responsibilities for all space systems used by the Department of Defense in accordance with Committee on National Security Systems Policy No. 12 (Reference (e)). C) Supplements IA policy and requirements contained in DoDD 8500.01E (Reference (f)) and DoDI 8500.2 (Reference (g))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-06-08
• Climate Science: Assumptions, Policy Implications, and the Scientific Method, Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, March 29, 2017

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  This is the March 29, 2017 hearing on "Climate Science: Assumptions, Policy Implications, and the Scientific Method" held before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Chairman Lamar Smith: "Today we will examine the scientific method as it relates to climate change. We must ensure that the underlying science that informs policy decisions is based on credible scientific methodology. I believe the climate is changing and that humans play a role. However, I also believe significant questions remain as to the extent. Our actions must be based on sound science. This is the only way we will be able to better address climate change. [...] Much of climate science today appears to be based more on exaggerations, personal agendas, and questionable predictions than on the scientific method. Those who engage in such actions do a disservice to the American people and to their own profession. Only when scientists follow the scientific method can policy-makers be confident that they are making the right decisions. Until then, the debate should continue." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Judith Curry, John Christy, Michael Mann, and Roger Pielke Jr.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2017
• Policy Relevant Climate Issues in Context: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, April 25, 2013

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  This is the April 25, 2013 hearing on "Policy Relevant Climate Issues in Context," held before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Environment. From the opening statement of Lamar Smith: "Climate change is an issue that needs to be discussed thoughtfully and objectively. Unfortunately, it's sometimes surrounded by claims that conceal the facts and hinder the proper weighing of policy options. I believe in the integrity of science. And I find it unfortunate that those who question certain scientific views on climate have their motives impugned. Challenging accepted beliefs through open debate and critical thinking is a primary part of the scientific process. To make a rational decision on climate change, we need to examine the relevant scientific issues along with the costs and benefits and better understand the uncertainties that surround both. As we will hear today, there is still a great amount of uncertainty associated with our understanding of human influences on climate." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Judith Curry, William Chameides and Bjørn Lomborg.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2013
• Serial No. 112-09: Climate Change: Examining the Processes Used to Create Science and Policy, Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Thursday, March 31, 2011

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  From the hearing charter: "On Thursday, March 31, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will hold a hearing to examine processes used to generate key climate change science and information used to inform policy development and decision-making. […] All aspects of modern life operate within a known range of climate conditions. That range of variability requires that all sectors, from agriculture to transportation, have a measure of resiliency built into them. Our ability to adapt to changing climate conditions is predicated on our ability to better account for risk and prepare proportionate responses to those risks. Advancements in climate science may reduce uncertainty and provide a better idea about the risks we face, thus allowing for more informed decisions to be made that impact the quality of our lives." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ralph M. Hall, Eddie Bernice Johnson, J. Scott Armstrong, Richard Muller, John Christy, Peter Glaser, Kerry Emanuel, W. David Montgomery, and Dana Rohrabacher.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2011
• Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines

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  From the Executive Summary: "The first two parts of this study present the results of a survey of Chinese writings that discovered 30 proposals that China should acquire several types of anti satellite weapons. Many foreign observers have mistakenly claimed that China is a pacifistic nation and has no interest such weapons. The Director of the US National Reconnaissance Office Donald Kerr confirmed a Chinese laser had illuminated a US satellite in 2006. These skeptical observers dismissed that laser incident, but then appeared to be stunned by the reported Chinese destruction of a satellite January 11, 2007. China declined to confirm the event, but many foreign governments immediately protested, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and Britain, while Russia's defense minister suggested the report may not be fully accurate. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, while declining to confirm the incident, said other countries should not be alarmed. A US NSC [National Security Council] spokesman said China fired a missile to destroy an orbiting weather satellite, making it the third country after the United States and the former Soviet Union to shoot down anything in space. If confirmed, the test would mean China could now theoretically shoot down spy satellites operated by other nations. Parts 3 and 4 of this study recommend policy measures the US and other nations may consider."

  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

  Pillsbury, Michael

  2007-01-19
• Space Policy Directive-5: Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems

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  From the Background: "The United States considers unfettered freedom to operate in space vital to advancing the security, economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge of the Nation. Space systems enable key functions such as global communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; scientific observation; exploration; weather monitoring; and multiple vital national security applications. Therefore, it is essential to protect space systems from cyber incidents in order to prevent disruptions to their ability to provide reliable and efficient contributions to the operations of the Nation's critical infrastructure. Space systems are reliant on information systems and networks from design conceptualization through launch and flight operations. Further, the transmission of command and control and mission information between space vehicles and ground networks relies on the use of radio-frequency-dependent wireless communication channels. These systems, networks, and channels can be vulnerable to malicious activities that can deny, degrade, or disrupt space operations, or even destroy satellites. [...] The National Cyber Strategy of September 2018 states that my Administration will enhance efforts to protect our space assets and supporting infrastructure from evolving cyber threats, and will work with industry and international partners to strengthen the cyber resilience of existing and future space systems."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Trump, Donald, 1946-

  2020-09-04
• Future of NASA: Space Policy Issues Facing Congress [July 8, 2010]

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  From the Summary: "For the past several years, the priorities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have been governed by the Vision for Space Exploration. The Vision was announced by President Bush in January 2004 and endorsed by Congress in the 2005 and 2008 NASA authorization acts (P.L. 109-155 and P.L. 110-422). It directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and some day sending them to Mars and 'worlds beyond.' The resulting efforts are now approaching major milestones, such as the end of the space shuttle program, design review decisions for the new spacecraft intended to replace the shuttle, and decisions about whether to extend the operation of the International Space Station. At the same time, concerns have grown about whether NASA can accomplish the planned program of human exploration of space without significant growth in its budget. A high-level independent review of the future of human space flight, chaired by Norman R. Augustine, issued its final report in October 2009. It presented several options as alternatives to the Vision and concluded that for human exploration to continue 'in any meaningful way,' NASA would require an additional $3 billion per year above current plans. In its FY2011 budget request, the Obama Administration proposed cancelling the Constellation spacecraft development program and eliminating the goal of returning humans to the Moon."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)

  2010-07-08
• Future of NASA: Space Policy Issues Facing Congress [January 27, 2011]

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  "The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267) authorized major changes of direction for NASA. Among these, it called for the development of a new, crew-capable, heavy-lift rocket, and it provided for the development of commercial services to transport NASA crews into low Earth orbit. However, under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 111-242 as amended by P.L. 111-322), NASA continues to operate under a requirement to proceed with its previous human spaceflight program. Moreover, in a period of fiscal constraint, it is unclear whether future appropriations will match the growing NASA budgets envisioned by the 2010 act. Thus the 112th Congress is likely to continue to closely examine the future of NASA. Before the 2010 act, NASA's priorities were governed by the Vision for Space Exploration. The Vision was announced by President Bush in January 2004 and endorsed by Congress in the 2005 and 2008 NASA authorization acts (P.L. 109-155 and P.L. 110-422). It directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and some day sending them to Mars and 'worlds beyond.' The resulting efforts are approaching major decision points, such as the end of the space shuttle program and key milestones for the Constellation spacecraft development program intended to replace the shuttle. A high-level independent review of the future of human space flight, chaired by Norman R. Augustine, issued its final report in October 2009. It presented several options as alternatives to the Vision and concluded that for human exploration to continue 'in any meaningful way,' NASA would require an additional $3 billion per year above previous plans."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  2011-01-27
• Viability of U.S. Antisatellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control

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  "This paper suggests that the varied strategic arguments that pervaded in past ASAT debates are now, for the most part, gone. Another broader argument has, however, replaced them, and in some ways presents a more nuanced organizational issue. That issue concerns determination of the relative importance of space weaponry designed toward negating space-based threats, the traditional role of ASATs, within the parameters of U.S. space control capabilities specifically and military planning generally. In that context, it is argued that although past political impediments to the development of ASATs have dissipated, ASAT development will likely continue conservatively much as it has in the past, now as a part of a broader spectrum of efforts. In a change from the past, however, organizational politics and fiscal prioritization rather than macro strategic political and public debate now determine such a course."

  USAF Institute for National Security Studies

  Johnson-Freese, Joan

  2000-01
• 3D Printing: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Implications of Additive Manufacturing, Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives

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  "Additive manufacturing has the potential to fundamentally change the production and distribution of goods. Unlike conventional or subtractive manufacturing processes, such as drilling, which create a part by cutting away material, additive manufacturing builds a part using a layer-by-layer process. Additive manufacturing has been used as a design and prototyping tool, but the focus of additive manufacturing is now shifting to the direct production of functional parts- parts that accomplish one or more functions, such as medical implants or aircraft engine parts-that are ready for distribution and sale. On October 15-16, 2014, GAO [Government Accountability Office], with the assistance of the National Academies, convened a forum to discuss the use of additive manufacturing to directly produce functional parts, including its (1) opportunities, (2) key challenges, and (3) key considerations for any policy actions that could affect its future use. Forum participants included officials from government, business, academia, and nongovernmental organizations that were selected to represent a range of viewpoints and backgrounds. This report summarizes the ideas and themes that emerged during the forum and the collective discussions of the forum participants. This report does not necessarily represent the views of the organizations whose representatives participated in the forum, including GAO. Participants were given the opportunity to comment on a draft of this report and their technical comments were incorporated, as appropriate."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-06
• Artificial Intelligence: Emerging Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications for Policy and Research, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Research and Technology and Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives

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  "From the Statement of Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist Applied Research and Methods: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on artificial intelligence (AI). My testimony today summarizes our March 2018 technology assessment entitled Artificial Intelligence: Emerging Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications. According to experts, AI holds substantial promise for not only improving human life and economic competitiveness in a variety of capacities, but also helping to solve some of society's most pressing challenges. At the same time, AI poses new risks and has the potential to displace workers in some sectors, requires new skills and adaptability to changing workforce needs, and could exacerbate socioeconomic inequality."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2018-06-26
• Presidential Decision Directive: U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space Capabilities

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  "This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and directs the implementation of US policy on foreign access to remote sensing capabilities."

  United States. White House Office; National Security Council (U.S.)

  1994-03-09
• Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite Policy: Moving Toward Space Control

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  The United States has the highest reliance on satellites of any country in the world, not only in the national security sector, but the private sector as well. Although it has recognized the importance of protecting satellites as strategic assets since their inception, different times and circumstances have yielded different approaches regarding how vigorously this should be accomplished. During most of the Cold War, the United States' desire to protect its satellites was overridden by wanting to avoid what were considered potentially destabilizing efforts, and what seemed as an inevitable arms race in space that would result from those latter efforts. During the Reagan Administration, however, the United States tacitly engaged in a space arms race with the Soviet Union, called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars). This paper suggests that the varied strategic arguments that pervaded in past ASAT debates are now, for the most part, gone. Another broader argument has, however, replaced them, and in some ways presents a more nuanced organizational issue. That issue concerns determination of the relative importance of space weaponry designed toward negating space-based threats, the traditional role of ASATs, within the parameters of U.S. space control capabilities specifically and military planning generally. In that context, it is argued that although past political impediments to the development of ASATs have dissipated, ASAT development will likely continue conservatively much as it has in the past, now as a part of a broader spectrum of efforts. In a change from the past, however, organizational politics and fiscal prioritization rather than macro strategic political and public debate now determine such a course.

  USAF Institute for National Security Studies

  Johnson-Freese, Joan

  2000-01
• Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy

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  "This thesis seeks to inform modern-day space strategy decisions through an examination of three historical case studies in which U.S. strategists and decision makers faced similar high stakes national security decisions with uncertain outcomes: the hydrogen bomb, MIRV missiles, and Star Wars. Analyses of these decision making processes and the resulting consequences give insight into these important questions and may inform us on the potential road ahead for space. These cases reveal how military superiority strategies; faith in, and reliance upon technology to solve complex national security problems; and a strong preference for offensive solutions to secure U.S. national security can produce the opposite of their intended effects. The potential exists for the United States to adopt a military strategy for space -- and acquire weapons to support its fulfillment -- that undermines U.S. grand strategy and delivers less security. The author concludes that given the current context, the nation is better off pushing the status quo in space without perturbing strategic stability, which will help retain the political, military, and economic advantages it has worked so hard to achieve."

  Air University (U.S.). School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

  Coffelt, Christopher A.

  2005-06
• Report to Congress: Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111 - 84), Risk Assessment of United States Space Export Control Policy

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  "Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) provides that the Secretaries of Defense and State shall carry out an assessment of the risks associated with removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List (USML). The Departments of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS) conducted this review and identified two satellite types, and related items, that are not purely defense-related and thus should not be designated as defense articles on the USML or controlled under the International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by DoS. These satellites and related items do not contain technologies unique to the United States (U.S.) military industrial base nor are they critical to national security. [...] The assessment examined the risks associated with removing from the USML those above-referenced dual-use items. The United States and other space-faring nations have satellites far more capable than those identified above as dual-use; however, those dual-use satellites and related items, including technology, can be used by countries with less experience and expertise in space to generate basic, initial military communications, remote sensing assets, and satellite jamming capabilities. It found that even though these items were available from other non-U.S. sources and not critical to preserving U.S. military edge, they could provide to a nation, with less space expertise than the United States, functionality that could potentially reduce or hinder U.S. military activities, operations, plans, or strategies."

  United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of State

  2012-03-15
• Sexual Harassment in STEM Research: Preliminary Observations on Policies for University Grantees and Information Sharing Among Selected Agencies, Statement of John Neumann, Managing Director, Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics, Testimony Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives

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  From the Document: "This testimony is based on ongoing GAO [Government Accountability Office] work and provides preliminary observations on selected agencies: (1) availability of staff and budget to address sexual harassment complaints at universities they fund for STEM [science, technology, engineering and mathematics] research; (2) efforts to establish and communicate policies and procedures for university grantees on preventing sexual harassment; and (3) steps taken to promote information sharing and collaboration among agencies to prevent sexual harassment at universities they fund for STEM research."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Neumann, John

  2019-06-12
• National Space Policy of the United States of America

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  From the Introduction: "Fifty-one years ago, the United States focused its will, leadership, and imagination to lead the greatest expedition in history, the landing of the first humans on another celestial body. The aspiration to explore space led the United States to generate the new technologies, capabilities, expertise, and businesses to fulfill this goal. [...] As we seek to expand the benefits of space to people on Earth and in space, unfettered access to, and freedom to operate in, space will remain a vital national interest. Recognizing the right of nations to explore and use outer space, the United States will continue to use space for the security of the Nation and our allies. Should any adversary threaten to endanger the benefits we all derive from space, the United States will employ all elements of national power to deter and, if necessary, prevail over hostile activities in, from, and through space."

  United States. White House Office

  2020-12-09
• Space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR), Is it the Right Solution

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  United States Commander in Chief Space (USCINCSPACE) has advocated the need to designate space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order for him to have the authority to fulfill his assigned responsibilities. However, upon examining the Unified Command Plan it becomes evident that designating space as an AOR provides USCINCSPACE no additional authority or ability to accomplish his assigned missions of space control, force protection, or conduct space operations. Designating space as an AOR would likely result in undesirable consequences. If space were designated an AOR it could be perceived by other countries as the U.S. intention of militarizing space, constituting a departure from decades old policy of using space for peaceful purposes. This action in turn could then instigate a space based weapons race or complicate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to space. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) can best ensure space control by non-space based weapons. Use of these types of weapons would ensure space protection and access for the U.S. and be capable of denying space access to enemies when needed, while avoiding the perception of militarizing space. To enhance USCINCSPACE's ability to meet his responsibilities, he needs the authority to better manage space personnel and space assets. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides an ideal model that USSPACECOM should implement to achieve this. If implemented, it would give USSPACECOM the unique authority to manage space orientated personnel careers. It would also give him the authority to execute his own budget, providing increased authority to shape space forces, insure interoperability and provide the best possible space support to the war fighters.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Cudnohufsky, Aaron L.

  1999-02-05
• Executive Order 14056: The National Space Council

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  From the Document: "The National Space Council (Council), as authorized under Title V of Public Law 100-685, advises and assists the President regarding national space policy and strategy. This order sets forth the Council's membership, duties, and responsibilities. [...] The Council shall advise and assist the President on space policy and strategy. In particular, it shall: (i) review, develop, and provide recommendations to the President on space policy and strategy; (ii) coordinate implementation of space policy and strategy; (iii) synchronize the Nation's civil, commercial, and national security space activities in furtherance of the objectives of the President's national space policy and strategy; (iv) facilitate resolution of differences among agencies on space-related policy and strategy matters; (v) enable interagency cooperation, coordination, and information exchange on space activities; and (vi) perform such other duties as the President may, from time to time, prescribe. [...] This order supersedes Executive Order 13803 of June 30, 2017 (Reviving the National Space Council), and Executive Order 13906 of February 13, 2020 (Amending Executive Order 13803--Reviving the National Space Council), and those orders are revoked."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Biden, Joseph R., Jr.

  2021-12-01
• Promoting Space Security and Sustainability

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  "For decades, we have been inspired by humanity's space endeavors and reaped the benefits of the use and exploration of outer space. While some take these benefits for granted, let me be clear: space assets are essential to U.S. national security as well as the security of our allies and coalition partners. This shared interest is recognized here in the United Kingdom, where HM [Her Majesty's] Government's National Space Security Policy establishes the promotion of a safe and more secure space environment as a key objective. Outer space is a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely. Yet today, space is becoming increasingly congested from orbital debris, including man-made threats--such as the testing of debris-generating anti-satellite, or ASAT, systems. Left unchecked, such debris could result in access to some space services being seriously degraded or even lost -- creating a direct threat to international security. The world's growing dependence on the globe-spanning and interconnected nature of space capabilities mean that it is more important than ever for all citizens to understand that irresponsible acts in space by one entity can have damaging consequences for all. Therefore, all nations must work together to adopt a responsible approach to activities in outer space in order to preserve this domain for future generations. Today, I would like to cover two aspects in regard to ensuring the security and sustainability of the space environment: first, the risks and dangers to space systems from debris generating ASAT tests; second, the role of international diplomatic initiatives in protecting the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment."

  United States. Department of State

  Rose, Frank A.

  2014-11-21
• AU-18 Space Primer

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  "The US National Space Policy released by the president in 2006 states that the US government should 'develop space professionals.' As an integral part of that endeavor, AU-18 [Air University], 'Space Primer', provides to the joint war fighter an unclassified resource for understanding the capabilities, organizations, and operations of space forces. Historically, the United States has been a world leader in space exploration and use. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization unanimously concluded 'that the security and well being of the United States, its allies, and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate in space.'1 Recent conflicts and world events continuously demonstrate the importance of space assets and capabilities to our security functions. Our navigation satellites provide instant pin-point positional and targeting information to aircraft, ground forces, ships, and command centers. These same satellites provide a precise timing source around the world that is critical to maintaining infrastructures, including financial institutions, power grids, cell phones, and even our cable and satellite TV. Communications satellites provide global connectivity between all levels of our national security infrastructure. Weather satellites report meteorological data, better than ever before, in near real time directly to forces in theater. Early warning satellites detect and report missile launches and serve as both strategic and tactical theater warning. These same early warning satellites serve to cue the integrated missile defense system. Finally, the US government conducts satellite photo reconnaissance that includes near-real-time capability, overhead signals intelligence collection, and overhead measurement and signature intelligence collection, which contribute directly to the success of our war fighters. This primer is a useful tool both for individuals who are not 'space aware'--unacquainted with space capabilities, organizations, and operations--and for those who are 'space aware,' especially individuals associated with the space community, but not familiar with space capabilities, organizations, and operations outside their particular areas of expertise. It is your guide and your invitation to all the excitement and opportunity of space."

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  2009-09