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Toward a New Deterrent: Analysis and Recommendations for the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
This article in the Spring issue of Air and Space Power Journal is authored by a working group from the Center for Security Policy which outlines an aggressive approach promoting the continued research, development and production of modernized U.S. nuclear arsenal. The following is taken from the article: "The United States is at a critical moment in its history. To an extent largely unknown to the American people and even to many US policy makers, the nuclear deterrent that has served as the backbone of our defense posture for 50 years is becoming obsolete, unreliable, and potentially ineffective. This is the direct and predictable result of the practice of essentially 'freezing' our nuclear-weapons strategy and stockpile over the past 18 years since the end of the Cold War. [...]. The issue of deterring nuclear attack, despite its potentially existential importance to millions of Americans, has scarcely--if ever-- been rigorously discussed in a highly visible way since the Cold War ended. If the United States wishes to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, it will need a strong consensus, reflected in solid bipartisan majorities, sustainable over the decades required to implement that program. We can assure such majorities only by informing the American people and enlisting their support."
Air University (U.S.). Press
New Deterrent Working Group (Center for Security Policy)
2009-02
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Annual Threat Assessment Hearing: Hearing before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, Hearing held in Washington, DC, February 25, 2009
From the opening statement of Silvestre Reyes: "This is the third Annual Threat Assessment that I have presided over as chairman of this committee, and we are in a unique position this year. Although the new administration is just over a month old, we have seen some major changes to some of the most controversial issues which impact the Intelligence Community. President Obama's Executive orders on detention and interrogation policies and on Guantanamo Bay represent a significant departure from the previous administration's policies. I know that many of us have strong opinions on what should be done in these critical areas. My intention, though, is to give the President and his new appointees some space to work through these issues as they propose a way forward. However, I think we all recognize that we don't have an unlimited amount of time. So I hope that the executive branch will move quickly on these critical issues. Director Blair, I am also hopeful that you and the new administration will bring about an improved interaction between the executive and legislative branches on intelligence matters. Too often in the past we have been left in the dark, or simply told things too late, or told only part of the story."
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
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Oversight of Ballistic Missile Defense (Part I): Threats, Realities, and Tradeoffs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, March 5, 2008
From the opening statement of Stephen E. Flynn: "Despite the events of September 11th, Washington continues to look at security challenges confronting the United States as if national security starts and stops at the water's edge. Debates about threats, tactics, and strategies within the traditional national security community have remained remarkably and disturbingly isolated from the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and policies commonly associated with homeland security. The U.S. national security community also continues to assign a higher priority to programs designed to confront conventional military threats such as ballistic missiles than unconventional threats such as a weapons of mass destruction smuggled into the United States by a ship, train, truck, or even private jet. While terrorists demonstrated on 9/11 that their preferred battle space is in the civil and economic space, the Pentagon has made clear its preference for other entities to be assigned the responsibility for managing that new reality when it falls at or within the U.S. borders. The White House and congressional staff with oversight responsibilities for defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs have also held the homeland security mission at arm's length." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Joseph Cirincione; Stephen E. Flynn; Steven A. Hildreth; Baker Spring; Christopher Shays; and John F. Tierney.
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
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China's Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation [Updated September 29, 2008]
"China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space -- an issue of interest to Congress -- has become more controversial since the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S. space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China. This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China's civilian space sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Logan, Jeffrey S.
2008-09-29
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Department of Defense Instruction Number 3150.09: The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy
"This Instruction: […](b) Assigns responsibilities for the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy. (c) Establishes processes for ensuring the survivability of CBRN mission-critical systems in a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) environment or a nuclear environment. (d) Describes how CBRN mission-critical systems will be identified, reviewed, and considered in the context of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Reference (f)), the Defense Acquisition System (References (c) and (d)), the Missile Defense Agency System Engineering Plan (Reference (j)), or the National Security Space Acquisition Policy (Reference (k)), as appropriate. (e) Provides definitions of decontaminability, hardness, compatibility, and decontamination (see Glossary). (f) Aligns with the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Reference (g) to identify mission-critical systems. (g) Requires Military Departments and the Missile Defense Agency to report annually on CBRN survivability compliance, proposed corrective actions, and funding plans. (h) Establishes the CBRN Survivability Oversight Group (CSOG). The purpose of CSOG is to review and monitor the execution of the DoD CBRN Survivability Policy."
United States. Department of Defense
2008-09-17
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Wildfire Mitigation Policy for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Program
The purpose of this document is to "[e]stablish the wildfire mitigation policy for the HMGP [Hazard Mitigation Grant Program] and PDM [Pre-Disaster Mitigation] program and establish the parameters to implement wildfire mitigation under sections 203 and 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) 42 U.S.C. 5121-5207. This policy will ensure national consistency in the use of HMGP and PDM funds for wildfire mitigation projects. In particular, it describes the availability of these funds for (1) defensible space, (2) structural protection through the application of ignition-resistant construction, and (3) limited hazardous fuels reduction to protect life and property."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2008-09-08
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Strategy and Cost: A Gap in Our Military Decision-Making Process
This article from the Air and Space Power Journal's Fall 2008 issue discusses the lack of cost considerations in current strategies developed by the military for civilian policy makers. This article proposes that military leaders present policy makers with a menu of options so that these elected officials can take cost into consideration when selecting military-related options for a stated, long-term goal. "Unfortunately, the structure of the current military decision-making process (MDMP) is deficient in at least two major respects as regards preparing military leaders to fulfill that role (i.e., the role of determining or advising appropriate courses of action). First, it assumes the existence of an established objective or clearly stated end, when in fact this is often unsettled. […] Because the current MDMP focuses primarily on how we can most effectively fulfill any given objective, war fighters produce robust plans without considering expense. Civilian policy makers, however, are interested in knowing more than just the most effective military option. Because they must manage disparate interests that compete for limited financial resources, these policy makers are most concerned with evaluating efficiency and effectiveness trade-offs among various alternatives. They may opt for a less effective military option that provides better value for their investment, given other demands on public resources. Consequently, civilian policy makers need to know the likely cost before they set political objectives so they can better manage competing public interests. Our elected leaders would be better served by a new military decision-making approach that provides a range of options, including low-cost alternatives to strategic challenges."
Air University (U.S.). Press
Spinetta, Lawrence
2008-09-01
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Extending NASA's Exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [Updated July 30, 2008]
This CRS report provides an update on Congressional action taken in regards to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. "The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 [INA] was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station [ISS] unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. NASA has now asked Congress to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Behrens, Carl E.; Niktin, Mary Beth
2008-07-30
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U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik [Updated June 20, 2008]
From the Summary: "The 'space age' began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers, concerned about the USSR's ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this 'Sputnik moment,' the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education policy. […] In the 110th Congress, several congressional resolutions honoring the 50th anniversary of Sputnik and the importance of the resulting agencies and activities to the United States have been introduced, with some passing the House or Senate. The House passed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6063) on June 18, 2008. In §2, Findings, the House approved a series of findings that reflects on NASA's 50th anniversary, and identifies a number of priorities for NASA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Stine, Deborah D.
2008-06-20
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [Updated June 17, 2008]
From the Summary: "This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership up to the highest level and including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. […] Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. U.S. interests in military contacts with China include: communication, conflict prevention, and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear and space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs [prisoners of war/missing in action]. U.S. defense officials report inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong by U.S. Navy ships in November 2007. This CRS Report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2008-06-17
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 207: National Intelligence Council (Effective 09 June 2008)
The purpose and applicability of this standard is as follows: "(1) This Intelligence Community (IC) Directive (ICD) establishes Director of National Intelligence (DNI) overarching policy and IC responsibilities concerning the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), and the support that the NIC may require from the IC. (2) This ICD rescinds Director of Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officers; DCID 3/11, Foreign Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence; DCID 3/9, Foreign Atomic Energy Intelligence; DCID 3/10, Foreign Scientific and Technical Intelligence; and DCID 3/16, Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis. (3) Nothing in this ICD shall affect the authorities and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Mission Managers under ICD 900 (Mission Management) or any other applicable law or regulation. The NIC shall work with DNI Mission Managers and senior ODNI and other IC officials to ensure efforts are fully integrated and responsive. This ICD applies to the IC, as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; and other departments or agencies that may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the DNI and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the IC."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
McConnell, Mike, 1943-
2008-06-09
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U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 3rd Edition
This is volume II of the U.S. Army War College's latest Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy. "This edition of the Guide is in two volumes that correspond roughly to the two core courses that the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) teaches: 'Theory of War and Strategy' and 'National Security Policy and Strategy.' Like its predecessors, this edition is largely an expansion of the existing materials, although over 40 percent is new, and the previously published chapters have been updated as necessary. The authors, with one exception all current or former members of the faculty, represent each of the four primary teaching departments of the college. The exception is the inclusion this year of a chapter on space power by a recent graduate-the chapter was his research project while a student. The appendix on the USAWC strategy formulation model in the second volume reflects the alterations in that fundamental document made for the 2008 academic year (2007-08). Although DNSS uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core courses, and at least one other department uses chapters in its core instruction, this is not a textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner we use to teach the theory of war and the formulation of national security strategy to America's future senior leaders. As we continue to refine and update the Guide, we intend to increase course-oriented essays, and several of the new chapters were written specifically to support instruction. The book is also not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either the theory of war, strategy, or the policymaking process. The Guide is organized in broad clusters of chapters addressing general subject areas."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bartholomees, J. Boone, 1947-
2008-06
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U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd Edition
This is volume I of the U.S. Army War College's latest Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy. "This edition of the Guide is in two volumes that correspond roughly to the two core courses that the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) teaches: 'Theory of War and Strategy' and 'National Security Policy and Strategy.' Like its predecessors, this edition is largely an expansion of the existing materials, although over 40 percent is new, and the previously published chapters have been updated as necessary. The authors, with one exception all current or former members of the faculty, represent each of the four primary teaching departments of the college. The exception is the inclusion this year of a chapter on space power by a recent graduate-the chapter was his research project while a student. The appendix on the USAWC strategy formulation model in the second volume reflects the alterations in that fundamental document made for the 2008 academic year (2007-08). Although DNSS uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core courses, and at least one other department uses chapters in its core instruction, this is not a textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner we use to teach the theory of war and the formulation of national security strategy to America's future senior leaders. As we continue to refine and update the Guide, we intend to increase course-oriented essays, and several of the new chapters were written specifically to support instruction. The book is also not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either the theory of war, strategy, or the policymaking process. The Guide is organized in broad clusters of chapters addressing general subject areas."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bartholomees, J. Boone, 1947-
2008-06
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Bangladesh: Political Turmoil and Transition [May 30, 2008]
This CRS report discusses Bangladesh: recent political turmoil and transition, bilateral relations, and Islamist extremism. "U.S. policy toward Bangladesh emphasizes support for political stability and democracy, development, and human rights. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and views Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. Some analysts are concerned that Islamist parties and groups have gained influence through the political process and that this has created space for militant activities inside the country. Some allege that the presence in the former ruling Bangladesh National Party coalition government of two Islamist parties, the Islamiya Okiyya Jote (IOJ) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, contributed to the expansion of Islamist influence in Bangladesh."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Vaughn, Bruce, 1963-
2008-05-30
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China's Space Program: Options for U.S.- China Cooperation [Updated May 21, 2008]
This CRS report is an update to a report of the same name dated December 14, 2007 and discusses China's space activities and potential cooperation with the U.S. in space. "China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space -- an issue of interest to Congress -- has become more controversial since the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S. space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China. This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China's civilian space sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities. For more information, see CRS Report RS21641, China's Space Program: An Overview."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Logan, Jeffrey S.
2008-05-21
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Extending NASA's Exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [May 8, 2008]
"The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). NASA has now asked Congress to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. Since 2005, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and countries over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush has praised Russian President Putin for his 'leadership' in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Behrens, Carl E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2008-05-08
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Successful Deterrence Against a Coercive Attempt by China to Reunify Taiwan Must Be Defeated in Phases Zero and One
"The maturation of China's access denial capabilities emphasizes the importance of time as a critical factor for U.S. and Taiwan forces to resist offensive strike operations if the PRC uses coercive force to reunify Taiwan. This reality is exaggerated by the immutable, irreducible factor of space, which greatly favors China in any potential conflict between the U.S. and China. This will force the combatant commander to create more combat time by increasing, during phase zero and one operations and initiatives, Taiwan's ability and will to withstand force and by allocating forces required to counter missile and ASW threats posed by the PRC. This will allow the U.S. to apply asymmetric force in a deliberate rather than reactionary manner, decreasing the risk of escalation with a nuclear-armed adversary, and improving the odds of resolving the conflict successfully. Such a strategy will enhance deterrence and maintain the status quo in accordance with the U.S. policy."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Hammersmark, Leif
2008-04-23
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated April 3, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high containment laboratory space becomes available. By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted on the U.S. mainland. This policy would need to be changed before DHS could conduct FMD research at NBAF if it were sited on the U.S. mainland. Bills (H.R. 1717, H.R. 2419, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 2419) modifying this policy are being considered by in the 110th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-04-03
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Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, an Operational Challenge
This report examines terrorist sanctuaries and the challenges they present for U.S. operations abroad. "Sanctuaries are a strategic reality and an operational challenge today more than ever. Sanctuaries or 'safe havens' exist in all regions and mediums to include space and cyber. 'Sanctuary'-that is to say, a secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure needed to support its activities-is central to the process of insurgency. It is from such sanctuaries that operations against the enemy are planned and launched. Theorist and practitioners such as T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Bin Laden to name a few have utilized sanctuaries. Twenty-first Century sanctuaries include cyber, offshore banking, space, and ideological. The operational challenge is daunting when neither joint nor service doctrine does not address the enemy's use of safe havens. In analysis, a paradigm shift must occur away from bottom-up tactical approach and include a joint and interagency top-down approach to develop a 'counter-sanctuary' strategy for the future. Enemies thrive in sanctuaries, the U.S. must address in strategy, policy and doctrine."
Army War College (U.S.)
Jamison, Marc
2008-03-15
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [Updated February 1, 2008]
"This CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts since 1993. […] In 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership up to the highest level and including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). […] Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts […] Since 2001, the Bush Administration has continued the policy of engagement with China, while the Pentagon has skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed a program of military-to-military exchanges. […] Issues for the 110th Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized list of U.S. security interests. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990- FY1991 (P.L. 101-246); National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106- 65); and National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. U.S. interests in military contacts with China include: communication, conflict prevention, and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear and space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs. U.S. defense officials report inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong by U.S. Navy ships in November 2007."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2008-02-01
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Space: Special Bibliography No. 329, Supplement No. 1
This bibliography, compiled by the Air University Library, consists of bibliographies, online journals, organizations, books, periodicals, documents, and assorted internet resources related to space. The list is divided into the following sections: commercial space; international cooperation; other countries' programs; satellite applications; space control & counterspace; space debris; space education; space exploration; space law, policy, and doctrine; space operations, including general information, near space, and operationally responsive space; space warfare and weapons; and spacelift and launching. Some resources may require a subscription for access. All links are current as of February 11, 2008.
Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center; Air University (U.S.)
2008-02
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International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress [Updated January 29, 2008]
"Humanitarian emergencies can emerge anywhere in the world, stemming from natural disasters or man-made conflicts. U.S. and international humanitarian assistance can have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself but on broader foreign policy issues. In the second session of the 110th Congress, humanitarian assistance is likely to enjoy continued bipartisan support, with key policy issues focused on budget priorities, levels of funding, and the types of other support available worldwide. […] In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available transportation on military aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response to a disaster. Finally, the President can request other government agencies to assist within their capabilities. In FY2006 the United States contributed close to $3 billion to disaster relief worldwide. This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and disaster situations. It considers the sources of U.S. government aid (including the governmental response mechanism), budget trends in humanitarian assistance, and issues for Congress. It does not specifically address the creation of a new Director of Foreign Assistance position at the State Department or the broader restructuring of U.S. foreign aid programs."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Margesson, Rhoda
2008-01-29
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Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearings on Budget Request on U.S. Strategic Posture and Budget Request for Strategic Programs, February 27, 2008
From the opening statement of Ellen Tauscher: "The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the United States strategic posture and the fiscal year 2009 budget request for strategic programs, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, intelligence, and military space assets. Our committee has jurisdiction over each of these areas, tracking closely with the reach of the U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. Therefore, I want to thank General Kevin Chilton, commander of STRATCOM, for being here today. The committee also charges the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) with developing and maintaining the nuclear warheads that support our strategic deterrents. For that reason, I want to thank Mr. Tom D'Agostino, the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA, for appearing here today. Finally, I want to welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers, whose portfolio-Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities-includes establishing the strategic policies that General Chilton is charged with executing. We asked each of you to be here today because your interconnected roles are very important to this committee. I believe that, to examine the strategic posture of the United States, each of you are needed to help paint a full picture." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Terry Everett, Ellen O. Tauscher, Kevin P. Chilton, Thomas P. D'Agostino, Michael Vickers, Silvestre Reyes, and Mac Thornberry.
United States. Government Printing Office
2008
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2008 Federal Radionavigation Plan
"The Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) reflects the official radionavigation policy and planning for the Federal Government. The FRP covers both terrestrial and space-based, common-use, Federally operated radionavigation systems. These systems are sometimes used in combination with each other or with other systems. Systems used exclusively by the military are covered in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan (MPNTP). The plan does not include systems that mainly perform surveillance and communication functions. The policies and operating plans described in this document cover the following radionavigation systems: 1. Global Positioning System (GPS) 2. Augmentations to GPS 3. Long Range Navigation (Loran) 4. Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni-directional Range (VOR) 5. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 6. Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) 7. Instrument Landing System (ILS) 8. Microwave Landing System (MLS); Aeronautical Nondirectional Radiobeacons (NDB)."
United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of Transportation; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008
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Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, Together with Minority and Additional Views, Submitted by Mr. Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
"The United States is losing its preeminence in space. A once robust partnership between the U.S. Government and the American space industry has been weakened by years of demanding space programs, the exponential complexity of technology, and an inattention to acquisition discipline. The U.S. Government created an environment that ensured the success of its space missions in the 1950s and 1960s. It provided appropriate funding and personnel needed to accomplish ambitious missions within a reasonable schedule. While the Government still has creative personnel, innovative ideas, and adequate funding, American dominance in space is diminishing. […]. The Subcommittee produced this report to document the issues and challenges facing the development, acquisition, and execution of a space architecture to serve the demands of the U.S. Intelligence Community and DOD. This report examines the narrowing gap between U.S. capabilities and emerging space powers such as Russia, India, and China. Space continues to play an increasingly important role in supporting the national security interests of the United States. As the number and types of national security threats increase, the nation must continue to deliver space capabilities that provide policy-makers and the war fighter with the information they need."
United States. Government Printing Office
2008
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Space Weaponization and US-China Relations
"The issues surrounding the weaponization of outer space present difficult security and diplomatic challenges to the United States in its relationship with foreign states. [...] First, many space technologies have dual-use capacity, making it difficult for states to distinguish between defensive and offensive preparations or conventional and space weapons. Second, some defense analysts argue that space weapons are inherently better suited to offensive than defensive warfare since they are able to launch powerful attacks quickly but are vulnerable to attack. Third, due to insufficient situational awareness in space and poor 'forensic' ability, the causes of satellite failures can be unclear, creating the potential for both anonymous attacks and groundless accusations of antisatellite (ASAT) attacks. Finally, as in many areas of foreign policy, states often send mixed signals regarding their true intentions in space. This article explores the range of possible interpretations of US policy and Chinese policy on space weaponization."
Air University (U.S.). Press
Blazejewski, Kenneth S.
2008
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Defense Intelligence Strategy [2008]
"[Defense Intelligence] has two missions: first, to respond to the unique policy, operational and acquisition requirements of the Department of Defense, and second, to respond to national intelligence missions assigned to the Department of Defense. [...]. This first Defense Intelligence Strategy seeks to integrate the two missions by demonstrating how, where and why defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security activities support the National Intelligence Strategy and respond to requirements of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must fit seamlessly into a larger network of activities that serves the entire U.S. Government and develops people and systems that also can integrate easily and quickly into the larger network. This new strategy highlights the following four strategic goals (four E's): Extend the full advantage of the U.S. intelligence enterprise to all defense users to ensure timely and accurate decisions, as well as ensure defense intelligence is available to the broader U.S. intelligence enterprise; Enhance all services and capabilities provided by the U.S. intelligence enterprise to satisfy the changing needs of defense intelligence users; Explore concepts, technologies, and strategies to address customer requirements and emerging threats; Enable us to counter and deny adversary capabilities to acquire and exploit our technologies or knowledge of the battle space. Ultimately, this strategy will allow all members of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to see their role in the larger network and every Department of Defense intelligence customer to see how the enterprise will improve its service to them."
United States. Department of Defense
2008
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China's Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation [December 14, 2007]
"China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space -- an issue of interest to Congress -- has become more controversial since the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S. space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China. This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China's civilian space sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Logan, Jeffrey S.
2007-12-14
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [December 12, 2007]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership up to the highest level and including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. […] Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990- FY1991 (P.L. 101-246); National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106- 65); and National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. U.S. interests in military contacts with China include: communication, conflict-prevention, and crisis-management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear and space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs. U.S. defense officials report inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong by U.S. Navy ships in November 2007. This CRS Report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2007-12-12
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Irregular Techniques for Controlling Under-Governed Space
"The United States government has identified undergoverned areas in weakened or failed states as one of the threats faced by the United States and its allies because these spaces can provide safe havens for terrorists. Under certain circumstances, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) may choose to counter these threats by utilizing specific elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to work indirectly through irregular forces to achieve control over the populations within these undergoverned areas. This study uses the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan to determine how irregular forces, with external support, can establish political control of undergoverned space. The cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan provide examples of how irregular forces established control of undergoverned space through the coercion and persuasion of military, political, social, economic, and informational techniques. In these cases, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Lebanon) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (Afghanistan), provided techniques for how organizations providing external support to irregular forces can influence their surrogates to allow the state providing the external support to achieve its foreign policy objectives. To a more limited extent, the study also determines methods that Special Operations Forces (SOF) can utilize to influence irregular surrogates, should SOF choose to operate with or through them to establish control of undergoverned space within weakened or failed states. The author concludes with lessons learned that can be applied to future DoD and USSOCOM Irregular Warfare doctrine design and operational planning."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Coburn, Matthew D.
2007-12
